The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race or color in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003); and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Respondent, whose correct name is AIG Marketing, Inc. is a subsidiary of American International Group, Inc. ("AIG"). Respondent supplies marketing services for AIG. Respondent is an employer as defined by Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner is an African-American female. She began working for Respondent as an "insurance consultant" on April 22, 2003. Petitioner resigned her employment by letter dated February 17, 2004. Petitioner's last day at work for Respondent was March 2, 2004. Petitioner worked at Respondent's facility in Seminole County, Florida. An insurance consultant's primary job responsibility is to answer incoming telephone calls from prospective customers seeking information concerning automobile insurance. Respondent has an anti-discrimination and anti- retaliation policy. Respondent has a published policy specifically prohibiting discrimination and retaliation. The policy states that discrimination, including that based upon race and color "is strictly prohibited." The policy states that any employee found to have engaged in any form of discriminatory harassment will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including termination. The policy states that Respondent will not tolerate any retaliation against any employee for making a complaint, bringing inappropriate conduct to the Respondent's attention, or for participating in an investigation of an alleged act of harassment. Respondent's management employees support and enforce its policies against discrimination and retaliation. After she was hired in April 2003, Petitioner received training for a period of approximately 10 weeks. Thereafter, on approximately July 1, 2003, she was placed on a "team" with other insurance consultants. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Melody Garcia-Muniz. While on Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team, Petitioner also received instruction, also called "coaching," from Nirmala Sookram. Ms. Garcia-Muniz is an Asian female. Ms. Sookram is an Indian female. Approximately one month after she was placed on Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team, on or about August 2, 2003, Petitioner had a confrontation with Ms. Sookram. Thereafter, by correspondence dated August 2, 2003, Petitioner wrote Respondent's Human Resources Office and Ms. Garcia-Muniz complaining of "the work condition, I have been experiencing with team leader Nirmala Sookram." As a result of Petitioner's August 2, 2003, letter, Respondent replaced Ms. Sookram as the team coach with another coach. Respondent also immediately investigated the allegations contained in Petitioner’s August 2, 2003, correspondence. This investigation was conducted by Ms. Garcia-Muniz and another management employee Dawn Bronwnlie. No evidence of discrimination was revealed. In approximately September or October 2003, Petitioner was transferred from Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team to a team supervised by Beverly Swanson. Ms. Swanson is a Caucasian female. This transfer was done pursuant to a reorganization of Respondent's shifts. Respondent had two business practices which are relevant to this matter and which are acknowledged by Petitioner. First, Respondent requires that its insurance consultants respond to in-bound calls from customers as soon as possible. Respondent has a policy prohibiting insurance consultants from making out-bound calls if there are in-bound calls waiting. Out-bound calls would typically be follow-up calls between an insurance consultant and a prospective customer. Second, Respondent has a policy prohibiting one insurance consultant from accessing an insurance quote being worked on by another insurance consultant. This policy is intended to prevent one insurance consultant from "stealing" a customer from another insurance consultant. Petitioner consistently violated Respondent's policy against making out-bound calls when in-bound calls were waiting. She was counseled with respect to this policy on August 5, 2003. Petitioner continued to violate this policy and received a verbal warning on September 19, 2003. The verbal warning confirmed Petitioner had been counseled in August with respect to this policy. The verbal warning confirms that for a 14-day period Petitioner made 649 out-bound calls while only receiving 444 in-bound calls. The verbal warning stated that at no time should Petitioner's out-bound calls exceed her in-bound calls. With respect to Respondent's policy prohibiting one insurance consultant from accessing a quote for a customer of another insurance consultant, Petitioner was advised on November 7, 2003, about the proper procedures to handle such situations. Though Petitioner claimed that she did not know accessing a quote for another insurance consultant's customer was inappropriate until November 7, 2003, she admits that on that date she was so advised and from that date forward knew that it was a violation of Respondent's policies. Nonetheless, on December 10, 2003, Petitioner's then supervisor Ms. Swanson was advised that Petitioner had accessed a quote for another insurance consultant's customer in violation of Respondent's policies. This occurred on December 9, 2003. Two days later on December 12, 2003, another insurance consultant, Steve Mintz advised Ms. Swanson that Petitioner had also accessed one of his insurance quotes. Ms. Swanson investigated and determined that Petitioner had, in fact, violated Respondent's policies by accessing the quote of another insurance consultant's customers. As part of that investigation, Ms. Swanson interviewed Petitioner and reviewed reports. Petitioner's statements were inconsistent with the reports, and Ms. Swanson ultimately determined that Petitioner had been untruthful with her during the investigation. As a result of Petitioner's violation of the policy, on December 16, 2003, Ms. Swanson issued Petitioner a written warning for inappropriate sales conduct. The written warning noted that Ms. Swanson had thoroughly investigated "several" complaints about Petitioner's sales conduct and confirmed that Petitioner had processed sales incorrectly despite several discussions with other supervisors as well as Ms. Swanson. The written warning also confirmed that Petitioner had been untruthful with Ms. Swanson during Ms. Swanson's investigation into this matter. As a result, Ms. Swanson placed Petitioner on a written warning which advised her that should her practices continue, her employment would be terminated. In accordance with Respondent's policies, Petitioner was ineligible to post for a position, switch shifts, or work overtime. Immediately after the December 16, 2003, meeting during which Ms. Swanson issued the written warning, Petitioner contacted Respondent's Human Resources department. As a result, Louisa Hewitt, Respondent's Human Resources professional, undertook an independent investigation to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of Ms. Swanson's findings which formed the basis for the written warning. Ms. Hewitt is a Hispanic female. Ms. Hewitt's independent investigation determined that Petitioner had, in fact, improperly processed sales and inappropriately accessed quotes. Accordingly, Ms. Hewitt met with Petitioner on December 31, 2003. In attendance was another of Respondent's managers Patricia Brosious. During this meeting, Ms. Hewitt advised Petitioner that the written warning was appropriate. Despite the fact that the December 16, 2003, written warning prohibited Petitioner from switching shifts, Respondent allowed Petitioner to switch shifts in order to allow her to care for an ill relative. This request was received on or about December 21, 2003, and granted on December 22, 2003. Dawn Bronwnlie (one of the Respondent's assistant managers who investigated Petitioner's August 2003 complaint) requested the accommodation on Petitioner's behalf by e-mail dated December 21, 2003, sent to, among others, Petitioner's immediate supervisor Ms. Swanson. Petitioner and Respondent management employee Patricia Brosious were copied on the e-mail. Approximately one month later, Petitioner again requested a shift change. By e-mail dated January 26, 2004, Respondent's management employee Patricia Brosious informed Petitioner of all of the shifts that were open at that time to which a transfer was possible. Ms. Brosious copied Ms. Hewitt and Timothy Fenu on this e-mail. Mr. Fenu is the manager of Respondent's facility in Lake Mary, Florida, and the highest- ranking employee of Respondent at that facility. On January 27, 2004, Petitioner responded to Ms. Brosious' e-mail, which had advised Petitioner of the shifts that were available. In response, Mr. Fenu sent an e-mail to Petitioner advising her that the shifts offered to her were based on business need and current unit sizes. Mr. Fenu advised Petitioner that her response was inappropriate and requested her to advise Respondent if she desired to change shifts. After initially scheduling a meeting with Mr. Fenu, Petitioner canceled the meeting by e-mail dated February 10, 2004. Petitioner resigned her employment February 17, 2004. Petitioner presented no direct evidence of discrimination or statistical evidence of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia McGee Post Office Box 550423 Orlando, Florida 32855 Daniel C. Johnson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Box 1171 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency, should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, in these two cases.
Findings Of Fact As to Both Cases Petitioner, Larry D. Thomas, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 036360. Respondent, Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. This matter was filed pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The actions in AHCA Case Nos. 1994-12341 and 1999-57795 were initiated by the Agency, an agent for the Department of Health, a state agency, and neither the Agency nor the Department of Health was a nominal party to the underlying actions. The attorney's fees sought by Petitioner are reasonable in the amount up to $15,000 for each case, and the statutory cap of $15,000 applies to each case separately. Petitioner prevailed in the underlying action, and there are no special circumstances that exist that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust in these cases. Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, because he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, whose professional practice is in this state, and whose professional practice had, at the time the action was initiated by the state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or did not have a net worth of more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. As to Case No. 02-4843F In 1994, pursuant to Section 455.225, Florida Statutes (currently renumbered as Section 456.073, Florida Statutes), Petitioner was notified of the investigation by the Agency and invited to submit a response to the allegations. Petitioner, through his attorney, submitted a detailed response to the allegations, which included an expert opinion by William Yahr, M.D., and medical literature that discussed the risks of the procedure at issue in the case. The expert opinion of Dr. Yahr stated that Petitioner did not fall below the standard of care in this case and that the patient died of a predictable complication of the procedure at issue in the case. The Administrative Complaint in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 01-4406PL (AHCA Case No. 1994-12341), was filed on May 10, 1999, against Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Petitioner had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; by failing to treat Patient D.J.P.'s preoperative coagulopathy; and by failing to use an alternate vein that would have allowed visualization of the shunt placement, thereby reducing the risk of causing hemorrhage given the patient's preoperative history. As required by statute, the probable cause panel that considered this matter was composed of two physicians, who were or are Board of Medicine members, and a consumer member of the Board of Medicine. Present at the May 5, 1999, meeting of the South Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine (Panel) were Panel members Margaret Skinner, M.D., Chairperson of the Panel; John Glasgoe, M.D.; and Becky Tierney. Also present at the meeting were Allen R. Grossman, Acting Board Counsel; Randy Collette, Senior Attorney for the Agency; Jim Cooksey of Agency Investigations; Larry McPherson, Senior Attorney for the Agency; and Susan Drake, M.D., Medical Consultant for the Agency. Prior to the May 5, 1999, meeting, the members of the Panel received and reviewed the Agency's entire investigative file, including Petitioner's response and Dr. Yahr's opinion, and the expert opinions of Henry Black, M.D., and John Kilkenny, III, M.D. The expert opinions available to the Panel were those completed in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Dr. Black opined that Petitioner met the standard of care in the case, but admitted that he did not perform the procedure at issue in the case; Dr. Kilkenny, who did perform the procedure at issue in the case, opined that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case; and Dr. Yahr opined in 1994 that there was no evidence that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case, but did not state whether he performed the procedure at issue in the case. In addition, the Panel had access to the written response to the investigation prepared by counsel on behalf of Petitioner, which was submitted on October 13, 1994. Prior to consideration of the case, Mr. Grossman advised the Panel that any questions concerning interpretation of the law or rules, or what the Panel's duties were, should be directed to him. Mr. Grossman also advised the Panel that any questions they had regarding the materials that they received, the recommendations that had been made, or the investigation that had been conducted should be directed to Mr. Collette, as the attorney for the Agency. Mr. Collette then gave a summary of the complaint to the Panel members and recommended that an Administrative Complaint be filed in the case. The Panel discussed the complaint very briefly, asked no questions, and voted for a finding of probable cause for alleged violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. The record in the underlying case does not demonstrate why there was an inordinate delay between the completion of the Agency's investigation in October 1994 and the Agency's retention of Dr. Black in 1997; why Dr. Kilkenny was retained in 1999 after Dr. Black had given his opinion on August 4, 1997, that there was no deviation from the standard of care by Petitioner; nor why Dr. Yahr's opinion was not given any consideration. While Dr. Black may not have had the appropriate qualifications to render an expert opinion in the case, both Dr. Kilkenny and Dr. Yahr did have sufficient qualifications to render an expert opinion in this matter. Further, there was no assertion by the prosecuting authority that any of the fact witnesses needed to prove this case were even available after five years of delay. Nor did the counsel for the Panel bring any special attention to the Panel members in regard to the possible proof problems with this case caused by the inordinate delay in bringing the case before the Panel. Finally, no explanation has been given for the delay in forwarding the Administrative Complaint, issued on May 10, 1999, to the Division of Administrative Hearings until October 15, 2001. As to Case No. 02-4844F The Administrative Complaint in the underlying case, DOAH Case No. 01-4407PL (AHCA Case No. 1999-57795) was filed on June 13, 2001, against Petitioner. The complaint alleged that Petitioner had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; by failing to adequately monitor Patient H.H. post-operatively given Patient H.H.'s high risk for distal emboli and/or due to evidence of tissue ischemia; by failing to clamp the arteries distally prior to manipulation of the aneurysm; and/or by failing to take adequate steps to prevent emboli, such as ensuring periodic monitoring of the patient's condition post-operatively for evidence of ischemia or other problems. Pursuant to Section 455.225, Florida Statutes (now at 456.073, Florida Statutes), Petitioner was notified of the investigation by Respondent by letter dated November 12, 1999, and invited to submit a response to the allegations. Petitioner, through his attorney, submitted a detailed response to the allegations, denying that he violated the standard of care. The Investigative Report was issued on February 11, 2000. The probable cause panel that considered this matter met on June 8, 2001, and was composed of two physicians, who were or are Board of Medicine members, and a consumer member of the Board of Medicine, as required by statute. However, the consumer member of the Panel was unavailable to attend the Panel meeting that day. Present at the June 8, 2001, meeting of the Panel were Panel members Fued Ashkar, M.D., Chairperson of the Panel, and Gustavo Leon, M.D. Also present at the meeting were Lee Ann Gustafson, Acting Board Counsel, and Randy Collette, Senior Attorney for the Agency. Prior to the probable cause meeting, the members of the Panel received and reviewed what was purported to be the Agency's complete investigative file, including Petitioner's response, and the expert opinion of James Dennis, M.D. The expert opinion available to the Panel was that of James Dennis, M.D., a board-certified vascular surgeon, who performed the procedure at issue in the case. Dr. Dennis opined that Petitioner failed to meet the standard of care in the case. Prior to consideration of the case, Ms. Gustafson advised the Panel that any questions concerning interpretation of the law or rules, or what the Panel's duties were, should be directed to her. Ms. Gustafson also advised the Panel that any questions they had regarding the materials that they received, the recommendations that have been made, or the investigation that has been conducted should be direct to Mr. Collette, as the attorney for the Agency. Mr. Collette then gave a summary of the complaint to the Panel members and recommended that an Administrative Complaint be filed in the case. The Panel voted for a finding of probable cause for alleged violations of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. Following the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Petitioner timely filed a request for a formal hearing. After probable cause was found in the underlying case, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and shortly before the date of the scheduled formal hearing, the attorneys for Petitioner and Respondent discovered that Respondent's expert, Dr. Dennis had been retained by Petitioner's former attorneys, after probable cause had been found, to give an opinion on behalf of Petitioner in the underlying case. This resulted in the disqualification of Dr. Dennis' opinion. The formal hearing was continued, and Respondent retained another expert, Kenneth Begelman, M.D. He opined that Petitioner fell below the standard of care in the case, and his testimony was used at the formal hearing. No reference to the opinion of Dr. Dennis was made or used at the formal hearing. Dr. Begelman's opinion was also not available to the Panel at the time that probable cause was found against Petitioner, nor did Respondent seek to return jurisdiction to the Panel for their reconsideration. Any objection to this procedure was waived by the parties. At the formal hearing, a CT Scan of the patient in question and missing nurses' notes relating to Petitioner's postoperative monitoring were introduced into evidence. Upon review of this new evidence and under cross- examination, Respondent's expert, Dr. Begelman, could not conclusively determine whether Petitioner's surgical and post- surgical treatment of Patient H.H. fell below the standard of care. However, it is clear from the record in the underlying case that the evidence regarding Petitioner's performance of the procedure at issue in the case, as well as his postoperative care of the patient, was in dispute. The expert opinion of Dr. Dennis and Petitioner's response highlight this fact. The events involving Dr. Dennis, which occurred after the finding of probable cause by the Panel, and Respondent's subsequent use of Dr. Begelman at the formal hearing are not relevant to the determination of whether Respondent was substantially justified in finding probable cause against Petitioner in the underlying case. And, while the underlying case was ultimately resolved in Petitioner's favor, there were disputes of fact in this case and the Agency and Respondent clearly were substantially justified to go forward with the underlying action. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, as to DOAH Case No. 02-4844F.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a community association manager by examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fred Storch (Storch), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Community Association Managers (Department) on April 14, 1998, for licensure as a community association manager by examination. The application contained the following question: Have you now or have you ever been licensed or certified in any profession such as real estate, insurance, securities, etc., in Florida or in any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation? If the applicant answered "yes" to the question, the application required the applicant to list the name of the profession, the license number, the date the license was first obtained, and the current status of the license. Storch answered "yes" to the question and indicated that he currently had a real estate salesperson's license in Florida and a real estate broker's license in New York. At the final hearing, Storch testified that he had a current mortgage broker's license and a real estate salesperson's license from New York and that he was currently licensed in Florida as a real estate salesperson and had been licensed in Florida as a mortgage broker. The application contained the following question: Has any license, certification, registration, or permit to practice any regulated profession been revoked, annulled or suspended in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation or is any proceeding now pending? This includes any disciplinary action taken against you such as a reprimand, probation, etc. Storch answered "no" to the question. The following question was also on the application: Have you ever relinquished or withdrawn from any license, certification, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation or is any proceeding now pending? Storch answered "yes" to the question and provided the following explanation. I relinquished my license as a Mortgage Broker because I was unable to submit to an audit on a timely basis due to my son's poor health. My son is afflicted with epilepsy, which cannot be controlled with medication. He is having surgery on April 21, 1998 at George Washington University Hospital, Washington, D.C., to eliminate the cause of his seizures. I have enclosed the documentation from the Comptroller's Office and my son's doctor. In 1994, Storch and the Florida Department of Banking and Finance (DBF) entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order which was incorporated in a Final Order, dated January 13, 1995. Storch and DBF agreed that Storch's mortgage broker's license was suspended until a location and occupational license was obtained. Storch agreed to pay an administrative fine of $500 and agreed to cease and desist all violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. On February 12, 1997, DBF entered a Default Final Order and Notice of Rights, finding that Storch had acted as a mortgage broker without a current active license and that Storch had failed to provide his books and records for inspection as requested by DBF. Storch was ordered to cease and desist from violating Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and all registrations and licenses previously issued to Storch, which included his mortgage broker's license, were revoked. By letter dated February 13, 1997, Storch advised DBF that he would be willing to turn in his license if DBF would not pursue any action against him then or in the future. On September 18, 1997, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed an Administrative Complaint against Storch alleging that Storch had violated Section 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, because his residential mortgage broker's license had been revoked. On December 17, 1997, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, entered a Final Order, disciplining Storch's real estate salesperson's license. The Final Order stated that Storch was guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint and required Storch to pay an administrative fine of $100.00 and investigative costs of $313.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Fred Storch's application for licensure as a community association manager. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward Broyles, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Thomas G. Thomas, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Storch 7782 Edinburough Lane Delray Beach, Florida 33446
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, The Exchange Club Center for the Prevention of Child Abuse of the Treasure Coast, Inc. ("Respondent" or "Exchange Club"), is liable to Petitioner, Tiffany L. Rusinko ("Petitioner" or "Ms. Rusinko"), for employment discrimination and retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was a child abuse prevention agency that provided services to families in Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties. Among other things, Respondent sought to prevent child abuse and neglect through education and parenting skills classes to parents of at-risk children. All of Respondent’s programs were funded by outside sources including grants and fundraising. Respondent ceased operations in September 2020. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 1, 2013, as a "Parent Educator" with Respondent’s Safe Families Program on a full-time basis. Petitioner understood that during her employment with Respondent, she was required to adhere to the Human Resources Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual ("Policies & Procedures"), as well as the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers ("Code of Ethics"). Upon hiring, Petitioner received copies of the Policies & Procedures and the Code of Ethics. Petitioner was required to sign and acknowledge receipt and review of both. On February 27, 2017, Petitioner was promoted to the position of "Program Supervisor" for the Safe Families Program. Her salary in that position was $40,000. This was also a full-time position and, as part of her responsibilities as a Program Supervisor, Petitioner supervised four parent educators. In June 2017, Petitioner agreed to take on the role of a Supervisor in Respondent’s PAT Program in addition to her role as a Program Supervisor for Respondent’s Safe Families Program. Petitioner remained a full-time employee of Respondent and her salary was increased to $44,000. Between July 27, 2017, and August 11, 2017, Petitioner was late or did not report to work as required due to various personal matters. On or about September 27, 2017, Respondent hired a "Program Manager" to manage Parent Educators in the Safe Families Program. The new Program Manager was paid a higher salary than Petitioner, which Petitioner believed was due to Respondent discriminating against her because of her race and gender. Thereafter, Petitioner sent a text message to Respondent’s Executive Director expressing her displeasure with her responsibilities and her rate of pay. Petitioner demanded a salary increase commensurate with what Petitioner believed she should be paid. Petitioner communicated with Andrea Medellin about her responsibilities and salary, which contravened Respondent’s Policies & Procedures. Andrea Medellin was the Executive Director of an agency that funded one of Respondent’s programs. On February 12, 2018, Petitioner submitted a grievance to Respondent claiming that she was the subject of discrimination based on race and gender. Specifically, she claimed that her salary and job responsibilities varied from those of a co-worker who was a Black male, but who had a similar title and experience. On February 13, 2018, Respondent issued a Corrective Action Notice to Petitioner, which resulted in Petitioner being placed on probation for ninety days. Based on her prior demand, Respondent gave Petitioner a cost-of- living increase that commenced in her February 16, 2018, paycheck and continued until her termination. In February and March 2018, Petitioner had several e-mail exchanges with her supervisor, Respondent’s Human Resources Director, and Respondent’s Executive Director, wherein she raised concerns about her salary and job responsibilities. On March 13, 2018, Petitioner submitted another grievance to Respondent reiterating her prior allegations of discrimination and claiming that she was the subject of a campaign of harassment and retaliation. Respondent subsequently became aware that Petitioner was making disparaging remarks about Respondent on social media, in violation of Respondent’s Policies & Procedures. Petitioner also allowed Respondent’s clients to be present in her home in violation of the Code of Ethics. Although several witnesses testified that Petitioner was a dedicated employee, Respondent ultimately determined that her termination was appropriate based on her violations of the Policies & Procedures and Code of Ethics. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on March 26, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Gary Shendell, Esquire Shendell & Pollock, P.L. 2700 North Military Trail, Suite 150 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Tiffany Rusinko 615 Southeast Eighth Avenue Okeechobee, Florida 34974 Seth A. Kolton, Esquire Shendell & Pollock, P.L. 2700 North Military Trail, Suite 150 Boca Raton, Florida 33431
Findings Of Fact Jacqueline A. Irby was employed as an Allstate Insurance Agent from April 25, 1983 until her dismissal July 17, 1987. Respondent has a company policy prohibiting employees from bringing firearms into company offices or carrying them while on company business. Violation of this policy can result in termination. (Exhibit 6). Petitioner was aware of this policy when employed in 1983 (Exhibit 1). She was unsure the policy applied to her office which she rented in the building not otherwise used by Respondent. On April 14, 1987, Petitioner wrote a memo to her supervising sales manager, Randy Rouse, stating that she had witnessed Judith Gill walk into her office with a handgun and point it directly at Petitioner's client. Both Gill and Petitioner were Allstate Agents sharing office spaces if not actually partners. During the subsequent investigation of this incident, Petitioner acknowledged to Rouse that she kept a .357 Magnum in her office for her protection when she worked late at night. Both Gill and Petitioner were fired by Respondent as Allstate Agents on or about July 17, 1987. Petitioner presented Exhibits 2 through 5 representing disciplinary action taken by Respondent against male Allstate Agents. Although the maximum penalty authorized by Respondent's Policy Statements Manual (Exhibit 6) for their offenses was dismissal, each of these Agents received a lesser punishment. None of the offenses noted in Exhibits 2 through 5 involved a firearm violation. No evidence was presented regarding the Agent hired to replace Petitioner, if any, or the sex of such replacement.
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1986, petitioner, Scott William Katz, who is now 31 years of age, filed an application for examination as an independent insurance adjuster with respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). If approved, Katz would be authorized to take an examination for an independent adjuster license. After additional information was requested by the Department, Katz withdrew his application by letter dated January 3, 1987. On April 2, 1987 Katz filed a second application with the Department. After obtaining additional information from Katz, the Department, by letter dated October 7, 1987, advised Katz that his application had been denied on the ground he lacked the necessary fitness, trustworthiness and business reputation required by the law. The denial prompted this proceeding. Katz is a former member of The Florida Bar having been admitted as a member in 1980. He also was a member of the Oklahoma Bar. In August, 1985 The Florida Bar filed a three count complaint against Katz alleging that he had violated certain disciplinary rules. The complaint stemmed from charges that Katz (a) represented a wife in a dissolution of marriage proceeding and subsequent proceedings to modify the final judgment and to collect various arrearages, and then, without advising the wife, commenced proceedings against the wife on behalf of the former husband to reduce the support payments, (b) coerced an agreement from a former client to pay damages on a claim which had no legal basis, and (c) misrepresented material facts in a sworn pleading to a federal judge to obtain the relief sought. After a hearing on November 8, 1985, the referee entered his report on January 21, 1986 finding Katz guilty of all charges and recommending he be disbarred. This recommendation was approved by the Supreme Court on June 26, 1986 in The Florida Bar v. Katz, 491 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 1986), and Katz was disbarred effective July 25, 1986. This decision triggered a disbarment order by the Oklahoma Bar in 1987 and Katz' loss of his right to practice law in that state. In a separate proceeding instituted under former Integration Rule 11.14 (now found in Rules Regulating the Florida Bar), the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County found Katz guilty of filing a falsified affidavit and proposed order for attorney fees in a criminal case then pending before the Palm Beach County Court. In an order dated July 22, 1986, the circuit court ordered that Katz be disbarred and that such disbarment be consecutive to that ordered by the Supreme Court in its decision rendered on June 26, 1986. On May 12, 1987 Katz pled nolo contendere to five counts of practicing law while disbarred, a misdemeanor offense, and was placed on twelve months' probation. At hearing, petitioner stated he was now a student at Florida Atlantic University taking coursework for a masters degree in business administration. Katz indicated that, through his former practice of law, he has become familiar with the responsibilities of an independent adjuster and desires to become self- employed in that field. Katz contended the charges leveled against him by The Florida Bar and circuit court were untrue and were the result of the malicious actions of other parties. There was no corroborative or independent evidence that Katz has been rehabilitated, has a good business reputation, or is otherwise considered trustworthy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Scott William Katz to take the examination as an independent adjuster be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1987.
The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race in violation of Pinellas County Code Chapter 70 (the Code).
Findings Of Fact The Department investigated the complaint of Petitioner and issued a determination on August 7, 2007, that reasonable cause exists to believe that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Petitioner is an African- American female. At the hearing, Petitioner presented a prima facie case of discrimination that is undisputed in the evidentiary record. Respondent is an "employer." Respondent employed Petitioner from December 19, 2006, through February 16, 2007. Respondent employs approximately five employees. Respondent was the only African-American employee. Respondent paid Petitioner at the rate of $7.00 an hour. Petitioner performed the duties required by the terms of her employment in a competent and reliable manner. Petitioner received no complaints from her employer concerning the performance of her job duties. The first adverse employment action occurred on January 29, 2007, when Respondent reduced the hours for Petitioner's shift from 40 hours a week to 24 hours. The second adverse employment action occurred on February 5, 2007, when Respondent reduced the hours for Petitioner's shift to 16 hours. Respondent did not reduce the hours of any Caucasian employee. The final adverse employment action occurred on February 16, 2007, when Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment without cause and with no explanation. Respondent replaced Petitioner with a Caucasian employee who works a 40-hour schedule. No evidence of record shows that Respondent took any adverse employment action against a Caucasian employee. During the Department's investigation of this matter, the Department provided Respondent with repeated opportunities to respond to the allegations, to participate as a party subject to investigation, and to participate in mediation. Respondent has not responded to the allegations of racial discrimination. Petitioner submitted no proof of damages other than lost wages. The Code does not prescribe the methodology for calculating lost wages and interest. The Department interprets the Code to mean that Petitioner is entitled to lost wages through the date of the final order to be issued in this proceeding plus interest at the statutory rate prescribed by the chief financial officer of the state in accordance with Subsection 55.03(1), Florida Statutes (2007). The total amount of lost wages through the date of this Recommended Order is $16,856.00. The trier of fact calculated lost wages in the following manner. If Petitioner had suffered no adverse employment action, Petitioner would have worked 40 hours a week at $7.00 an hour for 62 weeks from January 29, 2007, through the date of this Order on April 11, 2008, for a total of $17,360.00. That amount is offset by the wages Petitioner earned after the first and second adverse employment actions in a total amount of $504.00. The difference between $17,360.00 and $504.00 is $16,856.00. The total amount of lost wages through the date of the Recommended Order, in the amount of $16,856.00, must be increased by the amount of lost wages from the date of the Recommended Order through the date of the final order to be issued in this proceeding. That amount will be determined according to the date of the final order if the final order does not modify the Recommended Order after receiving the parties' exceptions to the Recommended Order. No reduction to lost wages is made for wages earned by Petitioner from another employer after the date of the final adverse employment action on February 16, 2007. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent submitted any evidence that Petitioner earned wages from another employer or received unemployment benefits. The record deprives the trier of fact of a factual basis for an offset to lost wages owed by Respondent. The website of the chief financial officer prescribes rates of interest for current and past years to be utilized in determining interest due on judgments and decrees. The applicable interest rate for 2007 and 2008 is 11 percent. The interest rate will apply to the unpaid portion of the amount determined to be due, if any, in the final order until Respondent pays the amount due, if any. Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs. Petitioner is pro se and submitted no evidence of having incurred attorney's fees or other costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding Respondent guilty of the allegations of racial discrimination against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner the lost wages and interest described in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Queenie E. Booth Post Office Box 35201 St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Theresa Jones St. Petersburg Department of Community Affairs Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-2842 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Robert J. Molitar Oar Enterprises, Inc. 4807 22nd Avenue South St. Petersburg, Florida 33711
