The Issue Whether Respondent was Petitioner’s employer at the time of Petitioner’s alleged unlawful termination, or is otherwise liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination under any theory of successor liability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a Legal Assistant by Igler & Dougherty Law Offices, P.A. (Igler & Dougherty), in Tallahassee, Florida, for approximately three-and-a-half years. Petitioner was terminated by Igler & Dougherty by letter dated February 6, 2012, allegedly for failure to make “adequate progression to date.” Petitioner alleges that she was unlawfully terminated after treatment for migraine headaches during an extended hospital stay. Respondent, Adams and Reese, LLP, is a limited liability law partnership headquartered in Louisiana, with offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Alabama, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Charles P. Adams, Jr., is Respondent’s Managing Partner. In mid-summer 2012, Respondent approached George Igler, Partner in Igler & Dougherty, about the possibility of joining Adams and Reese to establish the firm’s Tallahassee office. Mr. Adams was primarily responsible for all discussions with Mr. Igler and other members of Igler & Dougherty who eventually joined Respondent. On October 1, 2012, Respondent announced the official opening of its Tallahassee office. The new office was located at 2457 Care Drive, the building that formerly housed Igler & Dougherty. At no time before October 1, 2012, did Respondent maintain an office or employ individuals in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty joined Respondent as partners. Other former Igler & Dougherty lawyers joined Respondent as partners and associates. Respondent also hired some of the support staff from Igler & Dougherty. Respondent did not hire Petitioner. Respondent did not merge with Igler & Dougherty, did not acquire the assets of Igler & Dougherty, and did not assume the liabilities of Igler & Dougherty. Igler & Dougherty retained its accounts receivable and work in progress, and Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty continued to wrap up the business of Igler & Dougherty after joining Adams and Reese. Respondent is managed by its Managing Partner and an Executive Committee comprised of six partners. None of the attorneys or employees of Igler & Dougherty hired by Respondent are Executive Committee members. Respondent has two classes of partners, capital partners and income partners. Only capital partners have an ownership interest in the firm. Only one of the seven attorneys hired by Respondent from Igler & Dougherty, Mr. Igler, is a capital partner. On October 12, 2012, the date Respondent opened its Tallahassee office, Respondent had 114 additional capital partners, none of whom had worked for Igler & Dougherty. At no time did Respondent employ Petitioner. Respondent did not participate in Petitioner’s termination nor did it have any role in the decision to terminate her. At the time Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, the Florida Secretary of State website showed that Igler & Dougherty, P.A., was an active Florida registered corporation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Kelli Lawhead in FCHR No. 2013-00581. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lauren F. Strickland, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, P.A. 310 East Bradford Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Leslie A. Lanusse, Esquire Adams and Reese, LLP 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Lauren L. Tafaro, Esquire Adams and Reese, LLP 701 Poydras Street 4500 One Shell Square New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission of Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent initially employed the Petitioner in the maintenance department in January 1996. There is no evidence that the Petitioner’s employment in the maintenance department was unsatisfactory. In May 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the production department. The Petitioner’s supervisor in the production department described his performance as somewhat unsatisfactory but made no written report of any problems. On September 17, 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the laboratory and began work as a lab technician. The transfer in the lab technician position was at the Petitioner’s request. On October 21, 1996, Richard Barnes, an employee of the Respondent, assumed supervisory responsibility for the laboratory operation. On November 8, 1996, Mr. Barnes met with the Petitioner to discuss the job. At the time of the November 8 discussion, the Petitioner had been working in the lab for almost eight weeks. The Respondent’s lab employees are responsible for assuring that the materials produced by the plant comply with the "release specifications" set by the buyers of the materials. During the discussion, the Petitioner was asked about specific tasks assigned to lab employees. His response was incorrect and indicated a lack of familiarity with lab procedures. The Petitioner was informed that his job performance was unsatisfactory. Over the next week, Mr. Barnes continued to monitor the situation, and subsequently decided to terminate the Petitioner’s employment for unsatisfactory performance. On November 18, 1996, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner’s employment on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance. At the time of the termination, the Petitioner was 56 years old. During the time of the Petitioner’s transfer into, and termination from, the lab, the Respondent was in the process of expanding the number of lab employees from six to ten employees. Shortly before terminating the Petitioner’s employment, the Respondent transferred another employee, of similar age as the Petitioner, into the lab. Shortly after the Petitioner’s termination, Respondent transferred another employee, younger than the Respondent, to the lab. The transfer of the younger employee was being processed prior to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. There is no evidence that a transfer of the younger employee was related to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. The evidence fails to establish that termination of the Petitioner’s employment was based on his age. There is no evidence that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age. There is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered any economic injury based on the termination. He became employed shortly after the termination at a salary higher than the Respondent was paying him. Subsequent employment has included additional increases in compensation. The Petitioner asserts that had he remained employed by the Respondent, his compensation would have included promotions and increased compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have received further promotions from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Terry B. Hillman. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Terry B. Hillman 2048 Laurel Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Robert E. Tardif, Jr., Esquire Duncan & Tardif, P.A. 1601 Jackson Street, Suite 101 Post Office Box 249 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0249 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent violated various provisions of Section 489.129(1) by failing to pay for all roofing materials used on the North Orient Road job; by filing a false payment statement and by having his permitting privilege revoked by the City of Tampa Unified Construction Trades Board.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the Department of Professional Regulation charged, in conjunction with the Construction Industry Licensing Board, with the responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 489, 455 and 120, Florida Statutes, and the Rules promulgated pursuant to the statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto, a certified roofing contractor and a registered roofing contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CC CO39803 and RC 049317. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the licensed qualifying agent for Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., for which Sharon K. Jenkins was an officer. Ed Nabakowski is, and has been at all times material hereto, the owner of the real property and improvements thereon located at 2501 North Orient Road, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. R. L. Dykes is, and has been at all times material hereto, a certified general contractor duly licensed by the State of Florida. In the months proceeding July 1988, Nabakowski entered into a contract with Dykes wherein Dykes agreed to construct a commercial building upon Nabakowski's property on North Orient Road. Pursuant to that contract, Dykes entered into a subcontract on July 6, 1988, with Respondent Jenkins, doing business as Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., wherein Jenkins agreed to construct the roof of the building. Pursuant to the subcontract, Dykes agreed to pay Jenkins the sum of $8,487.00 which payment included costs of all materials, supplies and labor. Pursuant to the subcontract, Jenkins had the sole responsibility for ordering, arranging delivery to the site and paying for such materials and supplies as would be necessary for the construction of the roof. Jenkins construction activities commenced on July 6, 1988 and were concluded within the time contemplated by the subcontract. Greenbriar Building Materials, Inc., was, in July 1988, a supplier of building materials in Tampa, Florida. In connection with his construction of the roof, Jenkins ordered certain materials and supplies from Greenbriar which were delivered to the construction site. The materials and supplies had not been altered in their form or substance in any discernable manner between the Greenbriar warehouse and the construction site. Greenbriar maintained invoice records of the specific materials and supplies delivered to the job site. Greenbriar's records had three invoices for the North Orient Road site. The total sum of the three invoices was in the amount of $5,747.22. The invoiced price of the materials and supplies was usual and reasonable. The materials and supplies listed on the Greenbriar invoices were of such nature and quantity as would normally be used in the construction of the particular roof structure of this project. The materials and supplies listed in the invoices were used for and exhausted in the construction of the roof. By check dated August 8, 1998, Dykes paid Jenkins the sum of $6,790.00 as a draw against the total amount of the subcontract. On August 15, 1988, and as a prerequisite to receiving the draw payment a document titled "Partial Waiver of Lien" was signed by Sharon K. Jenkins as Secretary for Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc. Under the terms of that document, Respondent warranted that " ... invoices for all materials, supplies and services provided by others ... arising out of work or items furnished to the described property, prior to the date hereto, have been paid." Greenbriar recorded a Claim of Lien in the Official Records of Hillsborough County, Florida, on September 19, 1988, securing the debt for roofing materials delivered to the job site. The lien was in the exact amount of the sum of the three Greenbriar invoices, to wit: $5,747.22. In the text of the Claim of Lien which was executed under oath by Greenbriar, Notice to Owner was certified as having been served on July 26, 1988. There was not and has not been any dispute as to the validity of the lien and all interested parties have acted in accord with the lien's validity. By certified letter dated September 28, 1988, Greenbriar made formal demand of the owner, Nabakowski, for payment of the amount of the Claim of Lien under threat of foreclosure. Nabakowski communicated with Dykes and in accord with professional responsibility, Dykes paid the full amount of the debt due to Greenbriar. Dykes payment to Greenbriar resulted in the satisfaction of the lien against the owners property on December 12, 1988. Dykes was financially harmed by paying the amount necessary to secure the satisfaction of the lien against the owner's property. It caused him to twice pay for the same building materials, since he had already paid Jenkins the amount necessary to pay Greenbriar at the time of his drab on August 8, 1988. Jenkins Economy Roofing had not paid the debt due to Greenbriar for materials supplied to this job at the time of signing the Partial Waiver of Lien. Jenkins Economy Roofing, Inc., did not pay the debt due to Greenbriar for materials supplied to his job site at any time thereafter. Pursuant to a formal complaint filed by Dykes on September 21, 1988, the City of Tampa, Code Compliance Section, conducted an investigation of Jenkins's transactions relative to the construction project on North Orient Road. As a result of the investigation, Jenkins was charged with violations of the City of Tampa Code, Chapter 25, Sections 25-101(6),(7),(19) and (22). A disciplinary action against Respondent was scheduled for hearing before the Unified Construction Trades Board. Respondent was notified of the disciplinary action hearing by certified mail. Respondent failed to respond to or appear at the City of Tampa disciplinary action. Pursuant to evidence produced at the hearing on January 3, 1989, the Unified Construction Trade Board unanimously determined that Respondent was guilty of violating City of Tampa Codes and disciplined Respondent by permanently revoking his permitting privileges. Respondent was notified of this local disciplinary action in writing and was verbally advised of his rights to appeal and the appellate review procedure by Darrow in a subsequent telephone conversation. Respondent did not appeal the local discipline. In Department of Professional Regulation v. Thomas L. Jenkins, DPR Case No. 89-903, which is an unrelated disciplinary action case, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered a Final Order on November 28, 1990, finding Respondent guilty of violating local building codes, being disciplined by any municipality and misconduct in the practice of contracting, i.e., violations of Section 489.129(1)(d),(e) and (m). The Final Order imposed a fine of $2,500.00 against Respondent and ordered that his license CC CO39803 be suspended until the fine is paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding the Respondent guilty of violations of Counts I through V of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Board REVOKE the Respondent's license as a certified roofing contractor, number CC C039803, and as a registered roofing contractor, number RC 0049317, in accordance with disciplinary guidelines set forth in Rule 21E-17.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 25th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-47. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig M. Dickinson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Thomas L. Jenkins HC 73, Box 3035 Vanceburg, KY 41179 Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact For many years Mark Dunning Industries, Inc. (MDI), held the contract for trash removal and processing for Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida (NAS Pensacola). In the summer of 1995, the contract for these services, for a period beginning January 1996, were the subject of a bid solicitation. The apparent winner of the bid was Ohio Disposal Systems, Inc (ODSI). This bid was contested by MDI. Ultimately, ODSI prevailed in the bid contest and was selected to perform the contract. Performance was to begin on January 1, 1996, however, ODSI was not informed that it was to be the contractor until early December 1995. Petitioner was born on July 12, 1922. He is a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico, and of Hispanic origin. Petitioner first came to be employed by MDI in the summer of 1994. Petitioner worked on the "hill," which is an elevated portion of the trash dump on board NAS Pensacola. It was his job to weld broken equipment. He also operated two kinds of equipment: a Bobcat, which is a small front-end loader, and a backhoe with a dozer blade mounted on the front. Petitioner was paid about $16.00 per hour as a welder. Victor Cantrel, Petitioner's friend, commenced employment with MDI in July 1995. He worked on the "hill" and also drove the Bobcat and the back-hoe. He would utilize this equipment to push trash into a compactor. In trash-handling parlance, he was known as a "hill man." He was not a welder. He worked closely with Petitioner. Mr. Cantrel was born on June 25, 1972, and is Anglo- American. He was paid about $9.00 per hour. The supervisor of Petitioner and Mr. Cantrel, during the latter months of 1995 while they were working for MDI, was Thomas Lucky. The principal of ODSI was Vince Crawford. On or about December 28, 1995, at the end of the workday, Mr. Lucky informed the employees, including Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, and a number of trash truck drivers, that there was to be a meeting in the company office near the "hill." Present at the meeting in the office, which commenced around 6:30 p.m., was Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, Mr. Lucky, several truck drivers, Mr. Crawford, and his wife Cathy. Mr. Crawford informed the assembled employees that he was bringing in all new equipment; that because there would be new equipment, the new employees of ODSI would be able to work 40 hours per week; and that due to the requirement to get his company in shape in time to meet the January 1, 1996, deadline, many of the employees of MDI would be offered jobs with ODSI. After revealing these preliminary matters, Mr. Crawford asked a man named Lee what he did at MDI; this man said that he was a truck driver. Mr. Crawford told him that he was hired with the new company. Then he asked Mr. Cantrel what he did; he said he drove the Bobcat. Mr. Crawford said, "Recycle, huh. You are hired." Mr. Cantrel subsequently filed an employment application. However, he knew that after the announcement at the meeting, he was going to work for ODSI. When Mr. Crawford inquired of two more people, they both responded, "truck driver," and Mr. Crawford informed them that they were hired. When he asked Petitioner, Petitioner said, "Welder." Mr. Crawford then said, "We don't need no welders here." This was the first and last encounter Petitioner had with Mr. Crawford. The next day Petitioner arrived at work at the usual time and was informed that he no longer was employed at that facility. On January 2, 1996, Petitioner presented an employment application to the office at ODSI seeking employment as a "Welder and/or Heavy Equip. Opr." He never received a response. No evidence was adduced that at that time there were job openings for a "welder and/or heavy equipment operator." Additionally, according to Petitioner, no one from ODSI informed Petitioner that he was not qualified. No evidence was adduced at the hearing which indicated that Mr. Crawford noticed that Petitioner was 73 years of age, or that he was a Puerto Rican, or that he was of Hispanic origin. The unrebutted evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was not hired, at the time jobs were available, because Mr. Crawford was bringing in new equipment. New equipment does not require frequent welding and, therefore, Mr. Crawford did not need a welder.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 H. William Wasden, Esquire Pierce, Ledyard, Latta, Wasden & Bowron, P.C. Post Office Box 16046 Mobile, Alabama 36616 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age, as stated in the Charge of Discrimination, in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Preliminary Statement Petitioner, Alton Saunders, filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("Commission") on May 10, 2000. The Commission did not make a determination regarding Petitioner's charge of discrimination within 180 days as required by Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes. On December 27, 2000, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief and thereby requested an administrative hearing. On March 2, 2001, the Commission referred the matter to Division Of Administrative Hearings to conduct an administrative hearing. On March 22, 2001, a final hearing was set for May 9-11, 2001, in Orlando, Florida. The final hearing was reset for June 6-8, 2001. On March 27, 2001, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that Petitioner "failed to timely request an administrative hearing with the Florida Commission on Human Relations as required by Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes." On May 17, 2001, an Order Reserving Ruling on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was entered, reserving ruling until the matter was reconsidered after the close of evidence at the final hearing. At the onset of the final hearing, Petitioner requested a continuance, which was denied. In support of his request for continuance, Petitioner presented a letter from Robert Wheelock, an Orlando attorney, which was made a part of the record as Petitioner's Exhibit A, but not received into evidence. Petitioner presented James "Jan" Saunders, Hugh Paton, Brett Saunders, Doris Dixon, Debra Sweeney, and himself as witnesses. Petitioner offered two exhibits, 1 and 2, which were received into evidence. Respondent presented Debra Sweeney and two additional witnesses, Richmond Taylor and Karl D. Fillauer, by deposition. Respondent offered 13 exhibits; 1-8 and 14-17 were received into evidence. Respondent's exhibit 11 was not admitted into evidence. The Transcript of proceedings was filed on July 23, 2001. Respondent filed a Proposed Recommended Order on August 20, 2001. Petitioner did not file a proposed recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on August 16, 1922, is 79 years old, and is a member of a protected class. Respondent, Hanger Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc. ("Hanger"), employed Petitioner at the time of the alleged discrimination. Hanger is engaged in the manufacture, service, and sale of prosthetics and orthotic devices around the country, including in Central Florida. Petitioner and his family have also been engaged in the prosthetics and orthotics industry throughout Central Florida for many years, operating under a variety of different business names. From approximately 1985 through 1997, Petitioner was employed as a general office employee by Amputee and Brace Center, a prosthetics and orthotics company owned by Petitioner's sons, Jerome and Jan Saunders. In 1997, Amputee and Brace Center was acquired by NovaCare, a competitor in the prosthetics and orthotics industry. As part of the sale, members of the Saunders family, including Petitioner, became employees of NovaCare. Shortly after the acquisition of Amputee and Brace Center by NovaCare, several members of the Saunders family left NovaCare's employ to work for competing prosthetics and orthotics companies. For example, Scott Saunders, Petitioner's grandson, left NovaCare's employ and opened a competing company, ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc. across the street from NovaCare's facility on Gore Street in Orlando. In July 1999, NovaCare was acquired by Hanger, previously another competitor of NovaCare. Following the merger of NovaCare and Hanger, Petitioner became an employee of Hanger and remained at the facility located on Gore Street in Orlando. As a result of the merger, numerous personnel changes occurred at the Gore Street facility. For example, Debra Sweeney, a longtime Hanger employee, was transferred to the Gore Street facility as the Clinical Operations Director. In December 1999, the title of Clinical Operations Director was changed to Area Practice Manager. Ms. Sweeney was the individual ultimately responsible for the Gore Street facility where Petitioner was then employed. On March 8, 2000, a misdirected envelope and its contents arrived with the rest of the mail at the Gore Street facility. The envelope was addressed to Dr. Steven Goll, a significant source of patient referrals for Hanger. The return address on the envelope was the return address of ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc., the company owned by Petitioner's grandson, Scott Saunders, and Hanger's biggest competitor in Central Florida. The envelope was routinely opened by a member of Hanger's office staff and then delivered, along with its contents, to Debra Sweeney. The envelope addressed to Dr. Steven Goll contained a solicitation letter bearing Petitioner's signature seeking business referrals on behalf of a new company, Anatomically Correct Cosmetic Restorations ("Anatomically Correct"). The envelope also contained Petitioner's business card and a trifold marketing piece which explained the types of products and services offered by Anatomically Correct. According to the trifold, Anatomically Correct offered prosthetic and orthotics services and devices which were identical to significant services and devices being offered by Hanger. Upon receiving the marketing materials, Debbie Sweeney immediately recognized the return address on the envelope and trifold marketing piece as the return address for Hanger's competitor, ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc. ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc., Hanger's competitor, had given Petitioner permission to use the business address of ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc., as well as ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc.'s envelopes in distributing the Anatomically Correct marketing materials. Petitioner's granddaughter-in-law, the wife of the president of ABC Prosthetics and Orthotics, Inc. designed the marketing materials for Anatomically Correct. Upon examining the contents of the envelope, Ms. Sweeney suspected that Petitioner was engaged in improper competition with their employer, Hanger. On March 9, 2000, a meeting was held among Ms. Sweeney, Petitioner, and Rose DeLucia, the branch manager of the Gore Street facility, during which time Ms. Sweeney presented Petitioner with an opportunity to explain the contents of the envelope that had arrived at Hanger's Gore Street facility the previous day. During the March 9, 2000, meeting, Petitioner admitted that he had developed the marketing materials, signed them, and distributed them. Additionally, Petitioner admitted that he had mailed the solicitation materials out to physicians practicing throughout the Orlando area who referred patients to Hanger for the purpose of seeking patient referrals from them for his new business. Petitioner had not solicited business from Hanger's referring physicians during the time that he was actively working for Hanger, i.e., 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. Petitioner acknowledged that he had not advised Hanger that he intended to start Anatomically Correct and engage in business. Petitioner's conduct was a violation of Hanger policy as well as the policy of Petitioner's former employer, NovaCare, which merged with Hanger. As a result of the discussion and Petitioner's acknowledgment of production and distribution of the solicitation materials, Ms. Sweeney advised Petitioner that his employment was terminated for conduct in conflict with his obligations to Hanger, specifically competing with Hanger while employed by Hanger. Petitioner's employment was terminated for his improper competition with his employer, Hanger, and was unrelated to Petitioner's age. In his March 10, 2000, application for unemployment compensation benefits with the State of Florida Department of Labor, Petitioner indicated that he had been informed that he was being terminated because his "outside work is in conflict with their type of work." In a July 1999, conversation involving overstaffing at the Gore Street facility, Wallace Faraday, a Hanger executive, suggested, "Isn't it time for Al [Respondent] to resign, maybe one of his sons will hire him," or words to that effect. On April 27, 2000, Petitioner signed and dated a Charge of Discrimination. The Charge of Discrimination was filed with the Commission on May 10, 2000. Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, requires that the Commission determine whether there was reasonable cause for the Charge of Discrimination within 180 days of the date Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination. The last day the Commission could have issued its determination of reasonable cause was November 6, 2000. The Commission failed to issue an order determining reasonable cause. When the Commission failed to determine reasonable cause, Petitioner had 35 days from November 6, 2000, or no later than December 11, 2000, to request an administrative hearing in accordance with Sections 760.11(4), (6), (7), and (8), Florida Statutes. Petitioner executed an Election of Rights form indicating his desire to withdraw his Charge of Discrimination and file a Petition for Relief to proceed with an administrative hearing on December 27, 2000. Petitioner did not file his request for administrative hearing within 35 days of November 6, 2000. Petitioner's claim is barred. Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes, expressly provides, in pertinent part: "An administrative hearing pursuant to paragraph 4(b) must be requested no later than 35 days after the date of determination by the commission."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order granting Hanger's Motion to Dismiss finding that Petitioner's Election of Rights and request for an administrative hearing was not timely filed, finding that Hanger did not discriminate against Petitioner, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa H. Cassilly, Esquire Ashley B. Davis, Esquire Alston & Bird, LLP One Atlantic Center 1201 West Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3424 Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Alton M. Saunders Jerome Saunders 418 Seville Avenue Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, an African-American female, was employed as a nurse at Bayside Manor ("Bayside"), a long-term nursing facility owned and operated by Respondent. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent in or around 2004, which continued until she resigned from her position on December 5, 2013. Petitioner's Complaint, which she filed shortly thereafter, raises two discrete claims. First, Petitioner asserts that, because of her race, Respondent treated her disparately by issuing her a written reprimand without cause. Petitioner further contends that she was constructively discharged from her position due to the existence of an intolerable, racially-charged working environment. Beginning with the first issue, it is undisputed that, on December 5, 2013, a member of Bayside's administration cited Petitioner for "failure to follow policies," and that the genesis of the reprimand was Petitioner's act of maintaining possession of a drug-cart key while taking a lunch break. The parties are in sharp disagreement, though, as to whether Respondent's policies required staff members to surrender drug- cart keys while eating lunch on site. On this point, the credible evidence demonstrates that, on the date of the purported infraction, Petitioner was required to turn in her drug-cart key during lunchtime only if she left the worksite. As it is evident that Petitioner remained at Bayside during her lunch break on the date in question, the undersigned is persuaded that the December 5, 2014, reprimand should not have been issued. This does not end the inquiry, however, as Petitioner must also demonstrate, in order to prove her claim of disparate treatment, that the reprimand constituted an adverse employment action and that it was issued on account of her race. Here, Petitioner's claim fails on the first prong (making it unnecessary to address the second), for the record is devoid of evidence that the December 5 reprimand led to a materially adverse consequence such as lowered pay, demotion, suspension, loss of benefits, or the like.1/ As for the claim of constructive discharge, the evidence adduced at final hearing focused almost exclusively on the conduct of Heidi Duncan, who served as Bayside's director of nursing during Petitioner's term of employment. In particular, Petitioner testified: that Ms. Duncan frequently spoke to her in a demeaning fashion; that, on one occasion, Ms. Duncan harshly——and erroneously——scolded her for leaving work unfinished at the end of a shift; that Ms. Duncan reassigned her to a different floor of the facility (by all appearances, a change that did not affect the terms of Petitioner's employment); that, on one particular day, Ms. Duncan brusquely instructed her to do as she was told, at which point Petitioner broke into tears; that Ms. Duncan forbade her (Petitioner's) husband from visiting Bayside because of his "black man's swagger"; that, on the lone occasion when she attempted to complain about Ms. Duncan to a member of Bayside's management, her concerns were brushed aside; and that Ms. Duncan attempted to stir up marital discord between Regine Smith——Petitioner's direct supervisor, who, in turn, reported to Ms. Duncan——and Ms. Smith's husband by telephoning Mr. Smith and informing him that Ms. Smith was nowhere to be found at the worksite.2/ According to Petitioner, the straw that broke the camel's back was Respondent's erroneous issuance of the December 5 reprimand. Assuming for argument's sake that Petitioner's recounting of the foregoing incidents was credible and, moreover, that each event was the product of racial animus, the evidence fails to satisfy the high threshold applicable to constructive discharge actions——namely, that the working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced into involuntary resignation. To be sure, the comment regarding Petitioner's husband was despicable and outrageous, and the undersigned has no doubt that Ms. Duncan's abrasive management style added unnecessary anxiety to an already stressful line of work. Nevertheless, as discussed below, it has not been shown that a reasonable person in Petitioner's shoes would have felt forced to quit, particularly since the credible evidence discloses only one attempt by Petitioner (on an unspecified date) to address her concerns with a member of Bayside's management. Accordingly, Petitioner's constructive discharge claim fails.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August of 2013, the Petitioner and Respondent discussed the Petitioner’s potential employment as a “Pharmacy Sales Representative” for the Respondent. The Respondent eventually offered such employment to the Petitioner, the terms of which were set forth in a letter (hereinafter “agreement”) from the Respondent (identified therein as “SCP, LLC” or “company”) to the Petitioner. The agreement stated as follows: Your job title will be Pharmacy Sales Representative and your duties include all aspects of sales and marketing to physicians and patients SCP, LLC can provide for. You will be responsible for producing leads and establishing new pharmacy sales as well as maintaining all existing accounts. You will report to members of SCP, LLC. You may be assigned other duties as needed and your duties may also change on reasonable notice, based on the needs of the company and your skills, as determined by the company. The agreement provided that the Petitioner would be paid an annual base salary of $45,000, and a commission “based on the total sales of compounded products sold to all accounts you are managing.” The salary was to be paid bi-weekly. The commission was to be paid quarterly. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would receive an additional $250 per month for the purposes of obtaining private health insurance, and that the additional payment would cease if a company health insurance plan became available to employees. The agreement stated that the Petitioner would also have access to an expense account, including a company credit card, and receive either a car or a paid car allowance from the Respondent. The agreement specifically provided as follows: YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IS AT-WILL. IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER YOU OR THE COMPANY CAN TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE. According to the agreement, the Petitioner’s employment was to commence on September 3, 2013. Although the Petitioner was dissatisfied with the salary structure offered by the Respondent and believed that the offer was below her market value, the Petitioner signed the agreement on August 1, 2013, and accepted the employment terms set forth therein. The Petitioner’s dissatisfaction with her income was a continuing issue during her employment. The Petitioner repeatedly requested that her base salary be increased, but the Respondent was unprofitable and was unwilling to agree to the Petitioner’s request. Although the Petitioner initially developed some marketing materials for the Respondent, the Respondent was not satisfied with the Petitioner’s overall job performance. Additionally, there appears to have been disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent as to the responsibilities of her employment, including continuing friction between the Petitioner and her supervisor. On several occasions, the supervisor requested that the Petitioner come into the office during working hours to meet with him. The Petitioner apparently believed that her time was better utilized meeting with prospective clients; however, some of the prospective clients sought products that, for a variety of reasons, the Respondent could not supply. In any event, rather than come into the office as requested by her supervisor, the Petitioner chose to communicate with him by “after hours” email or by telephone. The supervisor was dissatisfied by the Petitioner’s failure to comply with his request. At some point in December of 2013, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory and that a change needed to occur. The Petitioner was advised of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction in a meeting on December 5, 2013, between the Petitioner and a representative of the Respondent. After being advised that some type of change was going to occur, the Petitioner raised a number of complaints about her supervisor. The Petitioner complained that the supervisor used profanity, that he had hung up on her during a telephone call, and that, on one occasion, he had patted her on the head in an apparently demeaning manner. The Respondent had a written “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. The policy prohibited any form of retaliation against an employee who complained that he or she was a target of harassment. The Respondent also had a written “open door” policy that provided a specific procedure for resolving employment-related disputes. The Petitioner was specifically advised of such policies during an orientation process that occurred at the commencement of her employment with the Respondent. Additionally, the Petitioner received written copies of all relevant policies from the Respondent’s human resource director. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 5, 2013, that her employment was in jeopardy, the Petitioner advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she objected to the supervisor’s alleged behavior. After the meeting on December 5, the Petitioner wrote an email to company officials dated December 17, 2013, wherein she asserted that she had “closed” a number of accounts on behalf of the Respondent, and suggested that her contribution to the company was being undervalued. She also requested reevaluation of her compensation because she believed the commission structure was inadequate. The Respondent apparently disagreed with the Petitioner because few actual sales resulted from the Petitioner’s “closed” accounts. Accordingly, during a meeting with Respondent’s representatives on December 20, 2013, the Petitioner was advised that her employment was officially being terminated. Central to the Respondent’s decision was the lack of revenue generated by the Petitioner’s sales and the unprofitability of the company. The Petitioner’s failure to comply with the requests of her supervisor also provided a basis for her termination from employment. During the meeting on December 20, the Petitioner restated the complaints she had first addressed during the meeting on December 5, and raised a number of additional complaints, including allegations of harassment or sexual harassment by her supervisor or another employee. There is no evidence that, prior to learning on December 20, 2013, that her employment was being terminated, the Petitioner had advised any representative or employee of the Respondent that she had been harassed in any manner by her supervisor or by any other employee of the Respondent. The alleged perpetrators of the harassment dispute the Petitioner’s assertions. The evidence fails to establish that any of the alleged acts of harassment or sexual harassment actually occurred. In a memorandum to the Petitioner dated December 20, 2013, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that her termination package would include salary payments for three weeks (one week of “final” pay and two weeks of severance pay), additional payment for 27 hours of accrued paid time off and unused comp time, and a total commission payment of $31.97. By letter to the Respondent dated December 27, 2013, the Petitioner restated the alleged harassment referenced herein and requested that she receive an additional two weeks of severance pay. The Respondent ultimately paid the Petitioner a total of four weeks of severance pay. The evidence fails to establish that the termination of the Petitioner’s employment by the Respondent was related to any complaint of harassment or sexual harassment, or was retaliatory in any manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Antonios Poulos, Esquire Poulos Law Firm 1502 West Busch Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order holding the Respondent guilty as charged, impose a fine in the amount of $2000 and suspend the Respondent's license for one year. DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1988.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race or color in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003); and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Respondent, whose correct name is AIG Marketing, Inc. is a subsidiary of American International Group, Inc. ("AIG"). Respondent supplies marketing services for AIG. Respondent is an employer as defined by Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner is an African-American female. She began working for Respondent as an "insurance consultant" on April 22, 2003. Petitioner resigned her employment by letter dated February 17, 2004. Petitioner's last day at work for Respondent was March 2, 2004. Petitioner worked at Respondent's facility in Seminole County, Florida. An insurance consultant's primary job responsibility is to answer incoming telephone calls from prospective customers seeking information concerning automobile insurance. Respondent has an anti-discrimination and anti- retaliation policy. Respondent has a published policy specifically prohibiting discrimination and retaliation. The policy states that discrimination, including that based upon race and color "is strictly prohibited." The policy states that any employee found to have engaged in any form of discriminatory harassment will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including termination. The policy states that Respondent will not tolerate any retaliation against any employee for making a complaint, bringing inappropriate conduct to the Respondent's attention, or for participating in an investigation of an alleged act of harassment. Respondent's management employees support and enforce its policies against discrimination and retaliation. After she was hired in April 2003, Petitioner received training for a period of approximately 10 weeks. Thereafter, on approximately July 1, 2003, she was placed on a "team" with other insurance consultants. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Melody Garcia-Muniz. While on Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team, Petitioner also received instruction, also called "coaching," from Nirmala Sookram. Ms. Garcia-Muniz is an Asian female. Ms. Sookram is an Indian female. Approximately one month after she was placed on Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team, on or about August 2, 2003, Petitioner had a confrontation with Ms. Sookram. Thereafter, by correspondence dated August 2, 2003, Petitioner wrote Respondent's Human Resources Office and Ms. Garcia-Muniz complaining of "the work condition, I have been experiencing with team leader Nirmala Sookram." As a result of Petitioner's August 2, 2003, letter, Respondent replaced Ms. Sookram as the team coach with another coach. Respondent also immediately investigated the allegations contained in Petitioner’s August 2, 2003, correspondence. This investigation was conducted by Ms. Garcia-Muniz and another management employee Dawn Bronwnlie. No evidence of discrimination was revealed. In approximately September or October 2003, Petitioner was transferred from Ms. Garcia-Muniz' team to a team supervised by Beverly Swanson. Ms. Swanson is a Caucasian female. This transfer was done pursuant to a reorganization of Respondent's shifts. Respondent had two business practices which are relevant to this matter and which are acknowledged by Petitioner. First, Respondent requires that its insurance consultants respond to in-bound calls from customers as soon as possible. Respondent has a policy prohibiting insurance consultants from making out-bound calls if there are in-bound calls waiting. Out-bound calls would typically be follow-up calls between an insurance consultant and a prospective customer. Second, Respondent has a policy prohibiting one insurance consultant from accessing an insurance quote being worked on by another insurance consultant. This policy is intended to prevent one insurance consultant from "stealing" a customer from another insurance consultant. Petitioner consistently violated Respondent's policy against making out-bound calls when in-bound calls were waiting. She was counseled with respect to this policy on August 5, 2003. Petitioner continued to violate this policy and received a verbal warning on September 19, 2003. The verbal warning confirmed Petitioner had been counseled in August with respect to this policy. The verbal warning confirms that for a 14-day period Petitioner made 649 out-bound calls while only receiving 444 in-bound calls. The verbal warning stated that at no time should Petitioner's out-bound calls exceed her in-bound calls. With respect to Respondent's policy prohibiting one insurance consultant from accessing a quote for a customer of another insurance consultant, Petitioner was advised on November 7, 2003, about the proper procedures to handle such situations. Though Petitioner claimed that she did not know accessing a quote for another insurance consultant's customer was inappropriate until November 7, 2003, she admits that on that date she was so advised and from that date forward knew that it was a violation of Respondent's policies. Nonetheless, on December 10, 2003, Petitioner's then supervisor Ms. Swanson was advised that Petitioner had accessed a quote for another insurance consultant's customer in violation of Respondent's policies. This occurred on December 9, 2003. Two days later on December 12, 2003, another insurance consultant, Steve Mintz advised Ms. Swanson that Petitioner had also accessed one of his insurance quotes. Ms. Swanson investigated and determined that Petitioner had, in fact, violated Respondent's policies by accessing the quote of another insurance consultant's customers. As part of that investigation, Ms. Swanson interviewed Petitioner and reviewed reports. Petitioner's statements were inconsistent with the reports, and Ms. Swanson ultimately determined that Petitioner had been untruthful with her during the investigation. As a result of Petitioner's violation of the policy, on December 16, 2003, Ms. Swanson issued Petitioner a written warning for inappropriate sales conduct. The written warning noted that Ms. Swanson had thoroughly investigated "several" complaints about Petitioner's sales conduct and confirmed that Petitioner had processed sales incorrectly despite several discussions with other supervisors as well as Ms. Swanson. The written warning also confirmed that Petitioner had been untruthful with Ms. Swanson during Ms. Swanson's investigation into this matter. As a result, Ms. Swanson placed Petitioner on a written warning which advised her that should her practices continue, her employment would be terminated. In accordance with Respondent's policies, Petitioner was ineligible to post for a position, switch shifts, or work overtime. Immediately after the December 16, 2003, meeting during which Ms. Swanson issued the written warning, Petitioner contacted Respondent's Human Resources department. As a result, Louisa Hewitt, Respondent's Human Resources professional, undertook an independent investigation to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of Ms. Swanson's findings which formed the basis for the written warning. Ms. Hewitt is a Hispanic female. Ms. Hewitt's independent investigation determined that Petitioner had, in fact, improperly processed sales and inappropriately accessed quotes. Accordingly, Ms. Hewitt met with Petitioner on December 31, 2003. In attendance was another of Respondent's managers Patricia Brosious. During this meeting, Ms. Hewitt advised Petitioner that the written warning was appropriate. Despite the fact that the December 16, 2003, written warning prohibited Petitioner from switching shifts, Respondent allowed Petitioner to switch shifts in order to allow her to care for an ill relative. This request was received on or about December 21, 2003, and granted on December 22, 2003. Dawn Bronwnlie (one of the Respondent's assistant managers who investigated Petitioner's August 2003 complaint) requested the accommodation on Petitioner's behalf by e-mail dated December 21, 2003, sent to, among others, Petitioner's immediate supervisor Ms. Swanson. Petitioner and Respondent management employee Patricia Brosious were copied on the e-mail. Approximately one month later, Petitioner again requested a shift change. By e-mail dated January 26, 2004, Respondent's management employee Patricia Brosious informed Petitioner of all of the shifts that were open at that time to which a transfer was possible. Ms. Brosious copied Ms. Hewitt and Timothy Fenu on this e-mail. Mr. Fenu is the manager of Respondent's facility in Lake Mary, Florida, and the highest- ranking employee of Respondent at that facility. On January 27, 2004, Petitioner responded to Ms. Brosious' e-mail, which had advised Petitioner of the shifts that were available. In response, Mr. Fenu sent an e-mail to Petitioner advising her that the shifts offered to her were based on business need and current unit sizes. Mr. Fenu advised Petitioner that her response was inappropriate and requested her to advise Respondent if she desired to change shifts. After initially scheduling a meeting with Mr. Fenu, Petitioner canceled the meeting by e-mail dated February 10, 2004. Petitioner resigned her employment February 17, 2004. Petitioner presented no direct evidence of discrimination or statistical evidence of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia McGee Post Office Box 550423 Orlando, Florida 32855 Daniel C. Johnson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Box 1171 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
