The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (CILB) as a certified contractor and has held license CGC 13316. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Coastal Structures, LCC (Coastal Structures) has possessed a certificate of authority as a contractor qualified to do business in the State of Florida and has held license QB39088. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been the primary qualifying agent for Coastal Structures. At times relevant to this proceeding, Ruth Schumacher was the owner of a residence located in Martin County at 2880 Southwest Brighton Way, Palm City, Florida (the subject property). Ms. Schumacher passed away on June 17, 2008. Prior to her mother’s death, Ms. Macey assisted Ms. Schumacher with her affairs. After her death, all of Ms. Schumacher’s estate, including the subject property, was placed in a trust with Ms. Macey as the trustee. In late October 2005, a screened porch on the subject property was damaged by Hurricane Wilma. In November 2005, Ms. Macey, on behalf of her mother, contacted Coastal Structures about making repairs to the damaged porch. In November 2005, David and Donna Williams, on behalf of Coastal Structures, visited the subject property, made temporary repairs to the damaged porch, and discussed with Ms. Macey and Ms. Schumacher the replacement of the porch. On November 28, 2005, Coastal Structures entered into a written contract with Ms. Schumacher to remove the damaged porch and to replace it with a new screened porch over the existing concrete slab. The written contract failed to contain a written statement explaining to Ms. Schumacher her rights under the Florida Homeowners’ Construction Recovery Fund as required by Section 489.1425(1), Florida Statutes. When Ms. Schumacher contracted with Coastal Structures on November 25, 2005, her insurance company had accepted her claim, but had not completed the damage assessment. The scope of the work was to be based on the allowances provided in the insurance adjuster’s statement of loss once the damage assessment was completed. The insurance company’s damage assessment for the damaged porch was completed December 3, 2005. The total replacement cost was valued at $21,190.10, with a deductible of $2,960.00, for a net claim value of $18,230.10. On March 8, 2006, Respondent submitted to the Martin County Building Department an application for a permit for a screen enclosure over an existing slab. The Martin County Building Department approved the permit application and issued permit number BSCE-2006030334 (the subject permit) to Respondent on March 8, 2006. The subject permit required one inspection, which was to be a final inspection after the completion of the work. Respondent failed to request the required inspection and the subject permit expired. After the execution of the contract with Coastal Structures and the completion of the damage assessment by the insurance company, Ms. Schumacher and Coastal Structures agreed to change the scope of the work from a screened enclosure to a glass enclosure with windows. Ms. Schumacher and Coastal Structures did not execute a written change order or any other written amendment to the written contract. Coastal Structures completed its work on the porch in May 2006. Pursuant to its verbal agreement with Ms. Schumacher, Coastal Structures replaced the damaged screen porch with a glass enclosure with windows. On May 17, 2006, Ms. Schumacher paid Coastal Structures the sum of $25,363.00 in full payment for the work it had done. After payment had been made, Ms. Macey observed several problems with the project including leaks from the ceiling panels and tile work that was not flush with the bottom of the exterior doorway, which allowed water to seep into the structure. In response to complaints from Ms. Macey, Mr. Williams returned to the subject property in May 2006 and applied caulking to the ceiling and along the floor of the structure. That work did not resolve the problems with the project. Ms. Macey made further complaints to Mr. Williams, but he did not respond to those complaints. Ms. Macey and Ms. Schumacher asked Palm City Screening, LLC (Palm City Screening) to determine the problems with the project and to provide an estimate to repair those problems. On February 13, 2007, Palm City Screening provided Ms. Schumacher with an estimate of $19,785.00 to replace the existing porch. In May 2007, Respondent visited the subject property in response to complaints from Ms. Macey. Ms. Macey pointed out to Respondent problems with the porch and Respondent inspected the structure. Respondent told Ms. Macey that he would send someone named George to the subject property to make repairs. Respondent left the subject property and Ms. Macey heard nothing further from him. No one returned to the property on behalf of Respondent. At no time did Ms. Schumacher or Ms. Macey terminate the contract with Coastal Structures or prevent Coastal Structures from correcting the problems with the porch. On July 2, 2008, Palm City Screening provided a second estimate to Ms. Macey in the amount of $23,230.00 to replace the structure. Palm City Screening’s representative told Ms. Macey that the structure could not be repaired as built, but would have to be replaced. The scope of work and estimated costs excluded electrical work for the structure. On July 11, 2008, Jimmy Rowell Electric Service provided Ms. Macey with a written estimate in the amount of $1,520.00 for the electrical work that would be required if the structure were to be replaced. No one on behalf of Palm City Screening or Jimmy Rowell Electric Service testified at the formal hearing. The total investigative costs of this case to Petitioner, excluding costs associated with attorney’s time, was $176.39. On October 8, 1995, Petitioner filed an Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent in DBPR Case 91- 00022. The Amended Administrative set forth certain factual allegations pertaining to Respondent’s dealings with a person named Donald H. Shaffer. Based on those allegations, Petitioner charged Respondent with abandonment of a project (Count I); committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to a customer by allowing liens to be placed against the project (Count II); failure to supervise (Count III); mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to a customer by abandoning the project (Count IV); and by having committed fraud, deceit, gross negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in the practice of contracting (Count V). DBPR Case 91-00022 was resolved by stipulation. As part of the stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine and make restitution to the customer. The stipulation contained the following provision: Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations of fact contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. The CILB entered a Final Order Approving Settlement Stipulation on August 2, 1966, which “. . . approved and adopted in toto . . .” the settlement stipulation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order impose against Respondent administrative fines as follows: $500.00 for Count I; $5,000.00 for Count II; $5,000.00 for Count III; and $5,000.00 for Count IV, for the aggregate amount of $15,500.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s licensure be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Sarasota Housing Authority (the Housing Authority), discriminated against Petitioner, Estella Smith (Ms. Smith), based on her disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Florida FHA), and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Smith, a 52-year-old female, testified she participated in the Section 8 program for over ten years and never had any problems until she moved to Sarasota. Ms. Smith moved into the Sarasota rental unit in October 2009. The Housing Authority is a public housing authority that administers the Section 8 program, within Sarasota County, Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1437f. Under the Section 8 program, the Housing Authority uses funds, supplied by HUD, to pay a percentage of the monthly rent on a leased "unit" directly to the landlord. The Section 8 program tenant pays the balance of the monthly rent to the landlord. Ms. Smith executed a residential lease for a HUD- approved unit on September 5, 2009, to begin a one-year rental. Ms. Smith agreed to abide by all the terms and conditions of the residential lease, including the timely payment of rent and the number of occupants (one adult and one child) in the rental unit without the written consent of the landlord. On or about October 1, 2009, Ms. Smith moved from Tampa, Florida, to Sarasota, Florida, and resided at the rental unit, 3047 East Tamiami Circle, Apartment A, Sarasota, Florida. On September 8, 2009, Ms. Smith executed the Housing Authority's personal declaration/tenant information form. Under part three of this form labeled: "Family Members (including Head of Household) currently residing in unit," there were blank lines to be completed by Ms. Smith. The following information was requested: name; date of birth; social security number; disabled; Hispanic; race; and relationship. Ms. Smith (or someone at her direction) completed the form including information about herself and her sole dependant. Under the disabled heading on the line for Ms. Smith, the word "Pending" is written. Additionally, in part five of this form labeled: "Expenses," was a question, "Are you or your spouse age 62 or older and/or disabled?" Ms. Smith (or someone on her behalf) checked the box before "no" after this specific question. Ms. Smith testified she suffered a stroke sometime in 2009 and was physically affected by it. However, she was unable to reference the specific time frame except for prior to her "porting" back to Sarasota. Ms. Smith claimed to use both a walker and a wheelchair at various times since suffering the effects of the stroke. Further, she later testified that, when she was in her rental unit, the doorways were narrow but she could maneuver in it. During her initial interview with the Housing Authority in September 2009, Ms. Smith stated she was using a walker that day and never told anyone at the Housing Authority that she was disabled. Ms. Smith admitted she withheld the rent from the landlord. However, she claimed her refusal to pay the rent was based on the lack of heat in the rental unit and the suspension of her laundry room privileges. Ms. Smith further testified Bertha L. Pete (Ms. Pete) provided Ms. Smith with assistance in her daily living activities and started living in Ms. Smith's rental unit after Christmas or in late December 2009. A copy of Ms. Pete's Florida driver's license, which reflects Ms. Smith's rental unit address as Ms. Pete's residence as of January 27, 2010, was admitted into evidence. On February 10, 2010, Ms. Smith executed a request for a live-in aide with the Housing Authority. Ms. Smith named Ms. Pete to be her proposed live-in aide. The date stamp for the Housing Authority reflects that the request was received by the Housing Authority on February 17, 2010. Any proposed live- in aide has to meet the requirements imposed by the Housing Authority and HUD. Ms. Pete did not meet the requirements. Additionally, on February 17, 2010, Ms. Smith executed a verification of live-in aide form to be completed by her physician and returned to the Housing Authority. That completed form was never returned to the Housing Authority. Both parties produced an executed medical doctor's prescription with Ms. Smith's name as the patient. The hand-written notation on the prescription is "patient needs in home aid." This verbiage is not sufficient nor equivalent to the requirements listed on the verification form for a "live-in aide." The Housing Authority did not know that Ms. Smith needed a live-in aide when she completed her application in September 2009. Although Ms. Smith utilized a walker at the time of her initial interview with the Housing Authority, the Housing Authority did not know she was disabled at that time. It is not the Housing Authority's practice to inquire of someone's physical status, as that could be perceived as a discriminatory question. Sharla Frantz (Ms. Frantz), director of human resources for the Housing Authority, is the hearing officer for the Section 8 program. Ms. Frantz testified as to the process utilized in the Housing Authority's Section 8 program. Ms. Frantz testified that Ms. Smith made a request for assistance on January 27, 2010, regarding the lack of heat in her rental unit. The Housing Authority caused an inspection to be made that same day, and a deficiency was noted. The repair was completed, and the rental unit passed a follow-up inspection on February 28, 2010. However, at the time of her complaint, Ms. Smith did not discuss any other conditions or circumstances regarding the rental unit, nor was any request for a live-in aide made. On or about February 11, 2010, the Housing Authority was made aware of a possible unauthorized person living at Ms. Smith's rental unit, as well as her failure to timely pay rent. Several days later, the Housing Authority issued a letter to Ms. Smith detailing the reasons for her termination from the Section 8 program: an unauthorized person living in the rental unit and her failure to pay rent. Ms. Smith requested a hearing from the Housing Authority, which was held on March 2, 2010. As a result of the hearing, the Housing Authority issued a letter detailing the basis for Ms. Smith's termination from the Section 8 program: an unauthorized person living in the rental unit and her failure to pay rent. Ms. Smith was afforded time to prove that the rental amount was paid in full and that Ms. Pete did not live with her. Ms. Frantz testified that at the Housing Authority hearing, Ms. Smith wrote a check for the past due rental amount. However, Ms. Frantz never received proof that the payment was actually made to the landlord. Ms. Smith testified the landlord wanted the payment in cash; however, Ms. Smith did not feel comfortable paying the rent in cash, as it did not provide her with a receipt. The rent was never paid. After waiting several days, the Housing Authority issued another letter to Ms. Smith stating that Ms. Smith was terminated from the Section 8 program for two program violations. It further described that a lease agreement, brought in to the Housing Authority, did not substantiate her claim that an unauthorized person (Ms. Pete) was not living in Ms. Smith's rental unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Estella Smith in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a place of public accommodation, violated Section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to accommodate Petitioner, an individual with a disability.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Shawn Sutton, is physically disabled and entitled to the protection of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent is the owner of Golden Corral Restaurant, which is a structure for public accommodation. On July 8, 2007, Petitioner, accompanied by his parents, grandmother and siblings, visited Respondent restaurant for the purpose of eating therein. The total number in the group that accompanied Petitioner was approximately 15. Prior to July 8, 2007, Petitioner's family was a frequent customer of Respondent restaurant and had eaten there on approximately 50 occasions. There had never been a request for special accommodations for Shawn Sutton on any previous occasion. Respondent has a sign on the front door of the restaurant that reads as follows: "Please remain with your party until seated. For guests with special needs, please see the manager. Golden Corral." Respondent is a buffet restaurant. Patrons pay for meals upon entry and prior to being seated. Respondent has a seating policy that requires all persons on the same receipt of payment to remain seated together until a waitress takes their beverage order, verifies that all persons in the party are included on the receipt, and delivers a plate to each person. The members of a party are then free to sit wherever they choose. On July 23, 2007, after a visit to the same restaurant on that day, Petitioner's mother emailed Golden Corral three times complaining about rudeness and lack of professionalism on the part of restaurant employees. In one email, she makes her only reference to the matter at issue in this case, indicating that when told that her son was disabled, a restaurant employee, "Tangie," "changed the entire tone and tried to accomidate [sic] us the best she could." While Petitioner's disability is such that he needs assistance carrying his plate (and food) from the buffet line to his seat, he is able to feed himself without assistance. On July 8, 2007, the entire family sat together and Petitioner was able to eat after his mother and grandmother assisted him in obtaining his food. The evidence revealed that Petitioner's mother's complaint was substantially directed to the "rudeness" she perceived from Respondent's employees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maureen M. Deskins, Esquire Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller Katz and Craig, LLP 777 South Harbor Island Boulevard Suite 500 Tampa, Florida 33602 Jerry Girley, Esquire The Girley Law Firm, P.A. 125 East Marks Street Orlando, Florida 32803
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner may be presumed, pursuant to Rules 22A- 7.0l0(2)(a) and 22A-8.002(5)(a)3 F.A.C. to have abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner started working for Florida State Hospital, a residential facility owned and operated by HRS, on August 8, 1986. On June 22, 1987, Petitioner was assigned to Unit 14, at Florida State Hospital, a unit which treated geriatric mentally ill patients. In that assignment, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Senior Registered Nurse Supervisor Shirley Greggly. It is an established policy at the HRS facility in question for employees who will be absent to notify their supervisors as soon as possible when they know they will be absent. During her employment, Petitioner had received printed copies of this general policy and of the State rules governing the presumption of abandonment of position in cases where an employee is on unexcused leave for three consecutive workdays. During her employment, Petitioner had been a less-than-exemplary employee with regard to absenteeism, tardiness and timely notification and had been counselled prior to April 1989 that she should make contact with the Hospital within seven minutes of the time she was due on shift if an absence was necessary. Only after review of such contact initiated by an employee can a superior determine to approve or disapprove the requested leave. If no contact were initiated by the employee, it was Ms. Greggly's standard procedure to attempt to initiate contact herself with the missing employee. Failure of an employee to notify Ms. Greggly or delayed notification of Ms. Greggly by an employee creates great hardship for the patients who may receive delayed care as a result, and also it creates considerable administrative turmoil for Ms. Greggly in rounding up a substitute employee. Petitioner had been disciplined with a ten-day suspension in September 1988 for failure to notify. She had received a prior written reprimand for absence without authorized leave in June 1988 and an oral reprimand for excessive absenteeism in December 1987. Petitioner had been frequently counselled in regard to these shortcomings. During the first few months of 1989, Petitioner was absent from work due to a work-related injury and, if not already filed, a workers' compensation claim pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. was at least imminent. Petitioner's primary treating physician was Daniel Bontrager, D.C. By April 1989, Dr. Bontrager had determined that Petitioner could return to light duty work. On April 7, 1989 and again on April 13, 1989, Dr. Bontrager orally informed Petitioner that she could return to light duty work as of April 17, 1989. On April 13, 1989, Ms. Hobbs stated that she would not return to work. Dr. Bontrager communicated his advice to the Hospital. The best diagnostic evidence obtainable by Dr. Bontrager indicated that there was no valid medical reason why Petitioner could not return to work. Ms. Greggly expected Petitioner back at work on April 17, 1989. From that date until April 28, 1989, when Petitioner was deemed to have abandoned her position, Petitioner initiated no contact with her employer or Ms. Greggly, and therefore no leave was authorized for her. On the dates between April 17, 1989 and April 28, 1989, inclusive, Petitioner neither appeared at work nor informed the hospital that she was going to be absent. This period constitutes in excess of three consecutive workdays of absence without approved leave.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order ratifying its previous presumption that Petitioner has abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: None filed. Respondent' PFOF: 1-3, 8, 10, 12-14 Accepted. 4-5 Immaterial. 6-7, 9 Accepted as modified; unnecessary argument and detail is rejected as such. 11 Modified to reflect the record; rejected where it is not true to the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ms. Clara Hobbs Route l, Box 186B Sneads, Florida 32460 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Suite 200-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4082 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the son of Floyd Goins, an enrollee of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, is an eligible dependent under the provisions of such plan, and therefore eligible for insurance benefits.
Findings Of Fact Background Floyd Goins (the "Insured") has been employed by the State of Florida, Dade County State Attorney's Office, for approximately 11 years, and was, at all times material hereto, a participant in the State of Florida Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Plan (the "Plan"), with family coverage. On January 17, 1988, the Insured's son, Ronald Goins (Ronald), date of birth March 7, 1965, was involved in an automobile accident in which he sustained serious injury. As a consequence, Ronald was admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital, where he apparently underwent extensive treatment. As a result of the accident, Ronald suffered severe physical handicap, in that he cannot walk or talk, and is not capable of self sustaining employment. Currently, Ronald resides with his parents, and is wholly dependent upon them for support. As a consequence of the medical expenses incurred on behalf of Ronald, a request for reimbursement was made to respondent, Department of Administration, Division of State Employees' Insurance (Department), under the Plan. Upon review, the Department, relying upon the provisions of Rule 22K- 1.103, Florida Administrative Code, concluded that Ronald, since he was over the age of 19 at the time of the accident and was not enrolled in and attending a school, college or university as a full-time student at the time of the accident, was ineligible for coverage as a dependent under the Plan. Accordingly, the Department denied the request for reimbursement. Thereafter, the Insured assigned to petitioner, The Public Health Trust of Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Memorial Hospital, his interest in any benefits payable for services rendered by such facility as a consequence of Ronald's admission, and further authorized Jackson Memorial to take whatever legal action might be necessary to collect such benefits. As a consequence, petitioner filed a request for formal hearing to contest the Department's conclusion that Ronald was ineligible for coverage under the Plan. 1/ The issue of coverage. Under the provisions of the Plan, an employee's "eligible children" are included within the definition of "eligible dependents" who are eligible to participate in the Plan, provided family coverage has been selected. Rules 22K- 1.103(5) and 22K-1.201(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Eligible children" are defined by Rule 22K-1.103(4), Florida Administrative Code, as follows: "Eligible children" shall mean the employee's . . . own children . . . Such children are eligible for coverage as follows: From their date of birth to the end of the month in which their nineteenth (19th) birthday occurs; From their nineteenth (19th) birthday to the end of the month in which their twenty-third (23rd) birthday occurs, if they are enrolled in and regularly attending on a full-time basis any school, college or university which provides training or educational activities, and which is certified or licensed by a state or foreign country. Such children who are mentally or physically handicapped shall be eligible to continue coverage after attainment of the above age limits and while the employee's or retiree's family coverage is in effect provided such children are incapable of self- sustaining employment by reason of such mental or physical handicap and chiefly dependent upon the employee, retiree or supervising spouse for support and maintenance. (Emphasis added) And, Rule 22K-1.103(9), Florida Administrative Code, defines "full-time basis", as follows: (9) "Full-time basis" shall mean the number of hours required by the school, college or university to qualify an eligible child as a full-time student. In no case shall an eligible child be considered attending on a full-time basis unless such child is currently enrolled and attending, or has, during the previous twelve (12) month period, attended as a full-time student, two (2) semesters, three (3) quarters or eight (8) months at such school, college or university. (Emphasis added) Here, petitioner contends that Ronald was an eligible dependent of the Insured, and therefore covered by the Plan because he was "enrolled in and regularly attending on a full-time basis" Bauder College, an institution licensed by the State of Florida, at the time of his accident or, alternatively, because such accident rendered him "physically handicapped." The proof fails, however, to support the conclusion that Ronald was an eligible dependent of the Insured, at the time of the accident, on either basis. Ronald's educational pursuits. Regarding Ronald's educational pursuits, the proof demonstrates that his public education was interrupted in or about 1984 when he was incarcerated in the State prison system, and that he remained so incarcerated until the later part of 1987. While incarcerated, Ronald apparently pursued some educational program, although no specifics were offered at hearing from which any conclusion could be drawn regarding its "full-time" nature, since the Department of Education awarded to him a high school diploma on December 12, 1984. Ronald apparently also pursued, while incarcerated, a course of study in electronic repair through Sumter Vocational School, during the period of November 1, 1985 to September 20, 1986. [Petitioner's Exhibit 1]. Again, no specifics were offered at hearing from which any conclusion could be drawn regarding the "full- time" nature of this program, but Ronald was awarded a certificate upon its completion. In sum, the proof fails to support the conclusion that Ronald, while incarcerated, was enrolled in and regularly attending any school on a "full-time basis", as that term is defined by Rule 22K-1.103(9), Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, there is no proof of record that Ronald pursued any educational program after September 20, 1986, a date in excess of 12 months prior to his automobile accident, excepting his enrollment at Bauder College. Regarding Ronald's enrollment at Bauder College, the proof demonstrates that on November 3, 1987, Ronald executed an enrollment agreement with Bauder College whereby he elected to pursue an educational program in electronic engineering technology. According to the enrollment agreement, the program was to start January 19, 1988, and the school calendar [Respondent's Exhibit 1] confirms that January 19, 1988, was "ORIENTATION/REGISTRATION - FIRST DAY" of the 1988 Winter Quarter. Ronald was, however, hospitalized on January 17, 1988 as a consequence of his automobile accident, and never started his course of training. 2/ Therefore, Ronald, although enrolled, was not yet "regularly attending" school when injured and, therefore, was not at the time of his accident an eligible dependent of the Insured. 3/ Ronald's handicapped status. Here, petitioner also contends that, as a consequence of his handicap, Ronald was an eligible dependent under the Plan. Such contention is rejected as contrary to the provisions of Rule 22K-1.103(4), Florida Administrative Code. Handicap, under the facts of this case, is not a factor which renders a person eligible for coverage. Rather, handicap is a factor which permits the child of the insured "to continue coverage" after attainment of the age limits for coverage. Rule 22K-1.103(4)c), Florida Administrative Code. Ronald, not having been a covered dependent at the time he suffered his handicap, had no coverage to continue. Estoppel Notwithstanding the rules which govern eligibility to participate in the Plan, petitioner contends that the Department should be estopped to apply such rules in the instant case. 4/ The predicate for petitioner's argument lies in a brochure [Petitioner's Exhibit 7] that was provided the Insured, and which defines eligible dependents as follows: Your own children . . . ; if they are under the age of 19, if they are full-time students under the age of 23, or if they are determined by the administrator to be mentally or physically handicapped, incapable of self- sustaining employment, chiefly dependent upon your support, and otherwise insurable. Petitioner's claim of estoppel is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, the brochure does not purport to replicate the Plan, but to summarize it, and advises all recipients that it "is not a contract since it does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions and limitations" of the Plan. Under such circumstances, it would not be reasonable to rely solely on the brochure for any definition of coverage. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the proof is not persuasive that the Insured relied upon the referenced provision of the brochure or that he made any change in position as a consequence of such provision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds that Ronald Goins is not covered by the Plan, and which dismisses the petition with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December 1991.
Findings Of Fact THE PETITIONER: The first three sentences of paragraph 1 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument or comment. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are accepted. The first three sentences of paragraph 4 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant, hearsay, argument or not supported by the record. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 6 is rejected as irrelevant. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted. With the exception of the last two sentences, paragraph 7 is accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 7 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Dr. Rivera did acknowledge Ritodrine to be a tocolytic drug, the use of which should be monitored. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraph 9 is accepted. Paragraph 10 and, with the exception of the last two sentences, paragraph 11 are accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 11 are rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Paragraphs 6 through 11 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 12 and 13 are accepted but are not controlling as the weight of the evidence in this case would suggest that the device is only investigational as it relates to diagnosis of pre-term labor, not as used in this case. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraphs 16 through 19 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 20 through 29 are accepted. Paragraph 30 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 31 through 34 are rejected as irrelevant, contrary to the facts and weight of the evidence of this case, or inconclusive based upon all facts and circumstances of this case. Paragraphs 35 through 37 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Martin J. Sperry SPERRY & SHAPIRO, P.A. Suite 300 805 East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes Secretary Augustus Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Carl Ogden Division Director Division of State Employee's Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Road Building B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4811
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for insurance benefits for the AHUM as utilized under the facts of this case. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1990.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed a housing discriminatory practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact On or about January 20, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Pursuant to the Commission's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed that resulted in a Notice of Determination of No Cause. Essentially, the Commission found that based upon the allegations raised by the Petitioner there was no cause from which it could be found the Respondents had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondents for the alleged violation. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. The Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Notice of Hearing that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. The postal service did not return the notices as undelivered. It is presumed the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. No party appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Leaford Green Danett Green 3758 Southwest Findlay Street Port St. Lucie, Florida 34953 Paula Adams Post Office Box 1665 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
