The Issue Whether the University of Florida acted arbitrarily and capriciously or abused its discretion by selecting C & S X-Ray Systems for the award of Lots I, II and II in Bid J89F-74, Radiology Equipment.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On February 17, 1989, the Respondent, University of Florida mailed an Invitation To Bid (ITB), Bid No. J89F-74 for certain radiology equipment for the Department of Veterinary Radiology. The ITB was divided into five lots in order to give more vendors an opportunity to bid. Only Lots I, II and III of Bid No. J89F-74 are in contention in this proceeding. The Respondent received bids on Lots I, II and III from C & S X-Ray Systems (C & S), Medical Imaging specialties (MIS) and Siemens Medical Systems, Inc. (Siemens). The bid of MIS on Lot I was the lower bid but the bid was determined to be nonresponsive by the Respondent because the bid did not meet the specifications for the generator in Lot I. The bid of Siemens on Lot I was lower than the bid of C & S on Lot I, but Siemens' bid was determined to be nonresponsive by the Respondent. Siemens also bid a 100 kw generator in Lot I. The bid of C & S on Lot I was determined to be the lower responsive bid. The bids of C & S on Lots II and III were the lower bids and responsive. Dr. Norman Ackerman recommended, and the Respondent awarded the bids on Lots I, II and III to C & S. Dr. Norman Ackerman, Chief of Radiology, Veterinary Medical Teaching Hospital, University of Florida, was the person responsible for drafting the specifications for the radiology equipment to be purchased by bid through the ITB. In preparation for writing the specifications for the radiology equipment, Dr. Ackerman: (a) was advised by Fred Swearingen, purchasing agent for the J. Hillis Miller Health Center, that the specifications had to be as broad and generic as possible to prevent "lock-out" specifications and enhance competition; (b) attended the Radiology Society of North America (RSNA) convention in Chicago, Illinois, where he looked at different radiology equipment and spoke with company representatives, including Douglas Coon, President, Florida X-Ray Corporation of which C & S is a division; (c) discussed radiology equipment with colleagues at other universities; (d) reviewed brochures, drawings and engineering information from C & S, MIS, Siemens, Technomed, Quantel, Picker and Transworld; and (e) had discussions, other than at the RSNA convention, with representatives from C & S, Transworld, Picker and Siemens concerning radiology equipment. Based on all the information received and reviewed by Dr. Ackerman, and his independent judgment, Dr. Ackerman wrote the specifications for the radiology equipment to be purchased through the ITB. These specifications reflect the requirements of the Respondent. While the specifications written by Dr. Ackerman are very similar to the specifications for several pieces of radiology equipment for which C & S was vendor, they are not "lock-out" specifications because other radiology equipment handled by other bidders could meet those specifications. Also, the very nature of veterinary radiology requires certain radiology equipment to be customized because animals, such as horses, unlike humans, do not always move as directed, and the equipment has to be designed to move around the animal. Under General Conditions of the ITB, the bidder is advised to follow the instructions to insure acceptance of the bid. Section 4(c) and 7, General Conditions, of the ITB provides in pertinent part as follows: MISTAKES: Bidders are expected to examine the specifications ... and all instructions pertaining to supplies and services. Failure to do so will be at bidder's risk.... (Emphasis supplied). * * * INTERPRETATIONS: Any questions concerning conditions and specifications shall be directed to this office... No interpretation shall be considered binding unless provided in writing by the University of Florida in response to reguests in full compliance with this provision. Under SPECIAL CONDITIONS of the ITB, the headings of AWARD and BID SPECIFICATIONS provide as follows:
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witness, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, University of Florida enter a Final Order denying the protest of Petitioner, Medical Imaging Specialties to the award of Lots I, II and III of Bid J89F-74, Radiology Equipment, to C & S X-Ray Systems. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Bryan, President University of Florida 226 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Judy Waldman, Esquire General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Lawrence J. Hamilton, II, Esquire GALLAGHER, MIKALS & CANNON, P. A. 200 Independent Square Post Office Box 4788 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Joseph T. Barron, Jr., Esquire Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for her response to Question 36 or for her response to Question 41 of the X-ray interpretation portion of the Chiropractic Licensure Examination administered in November 2000.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 456, Florida Statutes, Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida that develops, administers, scores, and reports scores for licensure examinations, such as the examination at issue in this proceeding. The Board of Chiropractic Medicine is created as a part of Respondent by Section 460.404(1), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 456.013(4), Florida Statutes, this Recommended Order is to be forwarded to the Board of Chiropractic Medicine, which will enter a Final Order. Section 460.406(1), Florida Statutes, provides that anyone seeking licensure as a chiropractic physician must pass a licensure examination. The Florida Chiropractic Medicine Licensure Examination consists of two portions: (a) a practical examination and (b) a Florida Laws and Rules examination. The practical examination is further subdivided into three areas: (a) interpretation of chiropractic and pathology films (the X-ray portion), (b) physical diagnosis, and (c) technique. A candidate cannot be licensed as a chiropractic physician until he or she has passed all portions of the licensure examination, including the X-ray portion. The X-ray portion consists of 60 multiple-choice questions, with each question having four possible answers. A chiropractic or pathology film is displayed for each question. The candidates are instructed to select from four possible answers the best answer to the written question pertaining to the accompanying film. The candidates are given 90 seconds to answer each question. The X-ray portion of the examination tests minimal competency and does not provide the candidates a certification or specialty in the field of radiology. Petitioner received a failing score on the X-ray portion of the examination. A candidate must correctly answer 45 of the 60 scores to pass. Petitioner received credit for correctly answering 44 questions. If Petitioner is awarded credit for correctly answering Question 36 or Question 41, she will be entitled to a passing score on the X-ray portion of the examination as well as the over-all examination. The written portion of Question 36 described certain symptoms being experienced by a 60-year-old female. The X-ray depicted a patient whose trachea was deviated to the left of its usual position. Candidates were asked to select the answer that best responded to the question "what is your impression of the radiograph." The parties agree that two of the four answers were incorrect. The other two answers will be referred to as Answer A and Answer B. Answer A, the answer Respondent considered the correct answer, was that the radiograph showed the trachea was deviated to the left of its usual position. Answer B, the answer selected by Petitioner, is a possible reason the trachea was deviated to the left. Petitioner agrees that the radiograph showed that the trachea was deviated to the left, but argues that because the question asks for the candidate's impression, she should attempt to answer why the body part was deviated. 2/ The written portion of the question and the radiograph do not provide sufficient information for a candidate to determine that Answer B was the reason the trachea was deviated to the left. Additional testing would be required before a practitioner could reach a correct diagnosis for the cause of the deviation. Answer A was the best answer to Question 36. Petitioner should not be awarded credit for her answer to Question 36 because her answer was not the best answer to the question. The written portion of Question 41 advised that the candidate's examination of a patient did not find a reason for the patient's mild back pain. The candidate was required to select the best answer to the question "[w]hat does the X-ray disclose." The greater weight of the credible evidence established that the only correct answer was the answer selected by Respondent as being the correct answer. Petitioner concedes that the X-ray disclosed what Respondent asserted was the correct answer, but chose another answer because Respondent's answer would not account for the patient's pain. Petitioner chose the answer that the X-ray disclosed a bilateral fracture. There was a dispute among the experts as to whether the X-ray contained jagged lines, which would indicate a fracture. Respondent's expert testified that there were no significant jagged areas. Dr. Stern testified that there may be some jagged areas, but that further testing would be necessary to reveal a fracture. Dr. Richard Santo testified that there were jagged areas that disclosed a severe fracture. The conflicting evidence is resolved by finding that the X-ray did not clearly disclose an area that had been fractured and did not disclose a bilateral fracture. Petitioner should not be awarded credit for her answer to Question 41 because her answer was not the best answer to the question. Respondent's psychometrician evaluated the responses to Question 36 and Question 41, and found that both questions performed at an acceptable level. For Question 36, 77% of the candidates who took the examination with Petitioner chose Respondent's correct answer, while 17% of the candidates choose Petitioner's answer. For Question 41, 74% of the candidates chose Respondent's answer, and 24% chose Petitioner's answer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Medicine enter a final order denying Petitioner additional credit for her responses to Questions 36 and 41 of the X-ray portion of the Chiropractic Licensure Examination administered in November 2000. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2001.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Gerald Greenwald, M.D., based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as contained in the two Administrative Complaints filed against the Respondent on June 3, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses, and on the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, the following facts are found. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0015097. Respondent's last known address is Dadeland Medical Building, 7400 North Kendall Drive, Miami, Florida 33156. In the yellow pages effective as of May 10, 1984, in Miami, Florida, Respondent placed an advertisement wherein Respondent advertised the "Dadeland Dermatology Center," which is located at 7400 Kendall Drive, in Miami, Florida. Despite the fact that Respondent practices medicine at the Dadeland Dermatology Center, the advertisement placed by Respondent in the Miami, Florida, yellow pages and in effect on May 10, 1984, does not anywhere list Respondent's name. In December of 1978, Respondent applied pursuant to the fictitious name statute with the Secretary of State of the State of Florida to do business under the name of "Dadeland Dermatology Center." In the yellow pages for the City of Miami, Florida, effective as of May 10, 1984, Respondent also placed an advertisement under the heading "Physicians & Surgeons - M.D. - Dermatology (Skin)" under the name Gerald Greenwald, M.D., P.A. In the advertisement, Respondent advertised that Respondent provided Silicone and Collagen implants. The Silicone and Collagen implant therapy was advertised among a list of several other conditions/treatments which Respondent dealt with in his practice. The specific phrase "Silicone & Collagen implants" was italicized and set forth in larger type and in capital letters. The above-described advertisements for "Gerald Greenwald, M.D., P.A." and for "Dadeland Dermatology Center" were contained on the same page of the City of Miami, Florida, yellow pages, in effect on May 10, 1984. Pursuant to Respondent's instructions, any member of the public who called his office, pursuant to either advertisement, was immediately informed that they were calling the office of Gerald Greenwald, M.D. Despite the fact that Respondent advertises that he provides Silicone and Collagen implants in his practice, Respondent has never purchased Collagen, has never used Collagen in his practice, and has never participated in the training program sponsored by the manufacturer and distributor of Collagen. Further, despite his statements to patients that he can obtain Collagen, Respondent has never had any intention of using Collagen because he is convinced that it is an inferior product when compared to medical grade Silicone. Collagen is a purified form of cow skin that is used to stimulate the formation of scar tissue, which then raises the surface underneath which it is injected. It is used for removing and softening wrinkles and lines. Collagen is a foreign substance and as such can cause allergic reactions, as well as exacerbation of certain diseases. Because it can cause allergic reactions, Collagen may be used only after appropriate allergy reaction skin testing has been performed. Silicone is a chemical that is commonly present in the form of sand. Medical grade Silicone has been used in injectable form to correct lines, wrinkles, and depressions in the body. The primary problems which occur with administration of Silicone are the problems of lumps and bumps caused by improper administration of the substance, which should only be injected in very small or "pin head" amounts. Before providing Collagen therapy, allergy testing is necessary, as previously described above. A small amount of Collagen is injected under the skin and examined closely for a period of three days and then re-examined after one month. If no reaction occurs, Collagen may be injected in the patient for purposes of removal of facial wrinkles and lines. It is, of course, necessary to have Collagen available in order to provide the allergy testing because the substance is used in the allergy tests. Zyderm Corporation is the only corporation that manufactures Collagen for distribution in the United States. Respondent has never ordered Collagen from Zyderm Corporation and has never participated in the training program for Collagen provided by Zyderm Corporation. Furthermore, Respondent has never had in his office the Collagen necessary to perform allergy testing on those patients seeking Collagen treatments. If a Miami, Florida, physician were to place an order for Collagen with Zyderm Corporation, it would take between four to seven days to obtain the substance. Collagen therapy is not a permanent treatment. Repeated injections will be required as the Collagen is absorbed by the body. Silicone, on the other hand, is more permanent. Because Collagen is not a permanent treatment, for the most part permanent problems will not result from improper administration of the substance. If Silicone is improperly administered, lumps and bumps and sagging may occur. Respondent is of the opinion that Collagen is much inferior to Silicone and that intelligent people, when informed about the merits of Silicone and the deficiencies of Collagen, will invariably choose Silicone. It is false, deceptive, and misleading for a physician to advertise that he provides both Collagen and Silicone implants when he does not have Collagen readily available but would have to order the substance, resulting in a delay of between four to seven days, and the physician does have Silicone readily available. It is also false, deceptive, and misleading for a physician to advertise that he provides both Collagen and Silicone implants when he has never had any intention of using Collagen because he has never taken any training in the use of Collagen and thinks it is an inferior product. During the summer of 1984, DPR investigator Diane Robie, pursuant to Respondent's advertisement, telephoned the Respondent to discuss the possibility of having Collagen treatment for the lines around her eyes. Investigator Robie was informed on the telephone, prior to her visit to Respondent's office, that Respondent preferred the use of Silicone to Collagen because it was more effective and less expensive. When investigator Robie visited Respondent's office, the Respondent discussed the relative advantages and disadvantages of both Silicone and Collagen. While the Respondent did not exert any undue pressure on investigator Robie to make a decision about whether or not she would decide to be treated, Respondent made it clear that he thought that if she chose to be treated, the treatment should be Silicone. During investigator Robie's visit, the Respondent also told her that if she still wished to have Collagen treatments, Respondent could obtain Collagen for her. Investigator Robie left the Respondent's office and did not arrange for any further appointments. Investigator Robie did not pursue what the Respondent's course of conduct would have been if she had persisted in her request for Collagen treatment. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the owner of an insurance policy taken out on Paula Greenwald, Respondent's ex-wife, which would pay $1.09 million in proceeds in the event of Paula Greenwald's death. Respondent also had a $3.5 million insurance policy on himself for the care of his children in the event of Respondent's death. In 1983, Respondent went through divorce proceedings terminating his marriage to Paula Greenwald. At the time of the divorce, there were six children ranging from seven to seventeen years of age. The divorce proceedings brought out a great deal of acrimony on both sides. After the divorce, Mrs. Greenwald was to have custody of the children and Respondent perceived that Mrs. Greenwald was, on a number of occasions, denying Respondent's visitation rights. Due to those disputes and disputes about other matters, the relationship between Respondent and Mrs. Greenwald became severely deteriorated after the divorce, continually worsening until about September of 1984. In approximately September of 1984, Mrs. Greenwald sent Respondent a card which contained an anonymous death threat. There was no evidence presented to establish that this death threat was acted upon. At a time prior to September 15, 1984, the Metro-Dade County Organized Crime Bureau received information from an Eastern Airlines employee named Mr. Armstrong, indicating that Respondent was trying to put out a contract for the death of Mrs. Greenwald. Mr. Armstrong obtained the information which he provided to the Metro-Dade County Organized Crime Bureau from another Eastern Airlines employee, Thomas Young. No one from the Metro-Dade County Organized Crime Bureau ever discussed the information directly with Mr. Young until after the arrest of the Respondent. Acting on the information received from Mr. Armstrong, Detective Paul Ohanesian went to the Respondent's office undercover posing as a patient, Paul DeSantis, on or about September 15, 1984. Ohanesian had sun spots on his back and used this as the reason for visiting Respondent's office. On the same day as Ohanesian's first visit, the Respondent became engaged to be married. When the Respondent's first wife heard about the engagement, she threatened to hurt Respondent like he had never been hurt before, and also threatened to break up his relationship with his fiancée. During the course of the office visit which occurred on or about September 15, 1984, Respondent examined Ohanesian's (DeSantis') back, diagnosed his condition, prescribed medication for the condition, and suggested that Ohanesian (DeSantis) return in one week. At the outset of the office visit which occurred on or about September 15, 1984, Ohanesian told Dr. Greenwald that "(a) couple of guys down at the Union down at Eastern Airlines sent me (Ohanesian) here." During the course of the first office visit, Ohanesian said, "they said that ah, you had some expensive marital problems." This initiated a conversation between Respondent and Ohanesian about Respondent's marital problems. After some discussions, Ohanesian made the statement "(s)ounds to me like it's time to get rid of her." Respondent responded as follows: Greenwald - You can't deal with it Ohanesian - Yeah Greenwald - It's a. . . She 's nuts Ohanesian - Yeah Greenwald - She's nuts Greenwald - And I like, ya know, if I had the ability Ohanesian - Ya Greenwald - To commit the perfect crime I'd kill her. She deserves to be dead Ohanesian - Well Greenwald - She's a one of the few truly evil. . . Ohanesian - Ya Greenwald - People I know. But what the hell Ohanesian - Hey, sometimes there's people That will do it for you though Greenwald - Yeah but the first one they're gonna come in on look to is me. Respondent then proceeded to tell Ohanesian that if someone would kill Respondent's ex-wife and then come to Respondent a month or two later, Respondent would give the person $50,000. Respondent told Ohanesian that he (Respondent) could not make a contract because the police and the FBI would look to Respondent. Respondent informed Ohanesian that he had told Mrs. Greenwald that if Respondent thought he could get away with it, Respondent would have his wife killed. Then Respondent again told Ohanesian that if someone killed his wife and came to him afterwards, it would be worth a lot of money to Respondent. Nothing further of significance occurred during the first office visit dated September 15, 1984, which is described above. No contract was entered into. However, Ohanesian, still known to Respondent as Paul DeSantis, was directed to return to Respondent's office and an appointment was scheduled for September 22, 1984. On or about September 22, 1984, Ohanesian returned to Respondent's office still using the name Paul DeSantis. Respondent examined Ohanesian and again prescribed medication. During the course of the office visit which occurred on or about September 22, 1984, Respondent initiated a conversation about his marital problems and informed Ohanesian that he (Respondent) had received a death threat from Mrs. Greenwald. In response, Ohanesian asked Respondent if he was still serious about having Mrs. Greenwald killed. The conversation continued as follows: Greenwald - Ya know, I can't tell you that I'm serious . . . Ohanesian - Ya - Greenwald - . . . because that would be conspiracy. I don't know if you're a cop or private, ya know, I don't know that stuff. Ohanesian - Ya, ya Greenwald - Ah, but it would certainly ah, behoove the world and be of great financial benefit to me if she were gone. Then Respondent proceeded to tell Ohanesian that his wife and her friend liked to jog at Coral Reef Park at six in the morning. Respondent described the location of the park. Respondent gave Ohanesian a description of Mrs. Greenwald's vehicle. Respondent provided Ohanesian with his wife's address and a description of Respondent's wife and her friend. During the course of the above-described conversation, the method of payment came up as follows: Ohanesian - Yeah. Well, that's all right Okay, ahm. If I give a, you a post office box, ya know, if something should happen. Greenwald - Uh hum Ohanesian - Just send it in the post office box, if you can just jot it down for yourself. Okay, it's gonna go to J and M Greenwald - Uh hum Ohanesian - Box 523816. That's in Miami, 33152. Okay, well ah, I'll guess you know anyways. So, you won't need much proof. Greenwald - Whataya mean? Ohanesian - Ahm, if she dies you won't need much proof. Greenwald - No, no, I certainly won't. Ahm, Respondent, in the course of the same conversation also stated: Greenwald - So I'm not in a conspiracy. Ahm, I'm telling you like I've probably told fifty people . . . Ohanesian - Uh hum Greenwald - . . . that the world would be better better off without her. And I would be grateful. Ohanesian - Right Greenwald - And it's as simple as that. Nothing occurred during the second office visit to establish a clear-cut contract. At the conclusion of the office visit, Respondent told Ohanesian that in ten days his (Ohanesian's) spots would be gone and the treatment would be finished. Respondent did not direct Ohanesian to return to his office for another visit after September 22, 1984. On or about September 26, 1984, Ohanesian returned to Respondent's office still using the undercover name Paul DeSantis. Ohanesian told Respondent that people were always getting run over by stolen cars. Then Ohanesian asked for expense money to run over Mrs. Greenwald. The conversation was as follows: Ohanesian - Like kids that steal cars then run over joggers all the time. I can't put out any of my own money, you know? So, we need some expense money. Is there going to be any way we can do, work something out here? Greenwald - How much expense money do you need? Ohanesian - Uh! Greenwald - And how do I know you're not a cop? Ohanesian - I'm not, Doc. You know this isn't the movies, you know? What am I going to do? I mean, well? Greenwald - All right, How much expense money? Ohanesian - I'm talking about eight hundred dollars. Greenwald - Eight hundred bucks. You got a look at her? Ohanesian - I got a good look at her, she looked at me. Greenwald - All right, how do you make sure that, uh, that uh, she's run over? Ohanesian - Well, she's going to get run over real good, I mean, you know? She's going to be jogging. She didn't jog Monday and uh, I'm just going to run her over. Run the shit off of her, and that's going to be the end of it. * * * Ohanesian - When can you get me some money? Greenwald - Uhm! Greenwald - You got no recorders or microphones? Ohanesian - No, shit no, shit the only thing is the gun Greenwald - Take it, there. At that time, Respondent gave Ohanesian $800 cash out of Respondent's wallet. After discussing expenses, Respondent and Ohanesian talked about payment of the fifty thousand dollars as follows: Ohanesian - Uhm, when I'm gone, okay, I know you're scared, just send it in this envelope, okay? Greenwald - How much money do I send in? Ohanesian - After it's over? Greenwald - Yeah Ohanesian - Fifty thousand we talked about, less whatever you're going to pay me now Greenwald - All right now. Fifty thousand Ohanesian - Uh huh Greenwald - It's fine. It's a lot of money, but it's fine. I want you to know that it is from insurance that I have Ohanesian - Okay Greenwald - I don't have fifty grand that I could give you now Ohanesian - No, I don't want, we made an agreement when I first came in here. You send it after it's over with. Did you say a month? Greenwald - Whenever I get... Ohanesian - Okay Greenwald - ... the insurance check. Ohanesian and Respondent then talked about Mrs. Greenwald's schedule for the week in question. On his patient records for DeSantis, dated September 26, 1984, Respondent wrote "Improving. Finish above. . ." At the time Respondent paid the $800 cash to Ohanesian (DeSantis) it was Respondent's intent to hire Ohanesian to kill Respondent's ex-wife, Paula Greenwald, and Respondent believed that he had hired someone to accomplish that purpose. This action of hiring someone with the motive of and for the purpose of causing the death of another person demonstrates that Respondent is a person who is extremely cruel, callous, and unfeeling. Those characteristics can affect clinical judgments and therefore relate to the ability to practice medicine. Further, the act of soliciting a patient to commit murder is poor medical judgment. On or about September 27, 1984, Respondent was arrested for solicitation to commit first degree murder. John Collins, a sergeant with the Metro-Dade Organized Crime Bureau, was one of the arresting officers. Sergeant Collins, upon arresting Respondent, advised Respondent only that he was under arrest for solicitation to commit murder. No further information was provided. Respondent was not advised of his Miranda rights because no questioning was to be pursued at that time. Respondent then asked Sergeant Collins if "she" was dead. On or about October 16, 1984, under case number 84- 22607, an information was filed against Respondent in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, alleging that Respondent between September 14 and 28, 1984, did unlawfully and feloniously solicit Paul Ohanesian to commit murder in the first degree, and in the course of such solicitation did command, encourage, hire or request Paul Ohanesian to kill Paula Greenwald, and to effect her death with premeditated design. On or about January 23, 1985, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to charges of solicitation to commit murder in the Circuit Court for Dade County. On or about January 23, 1985, the court accepted Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to charges of solicitation to commit murder. On or about January 23, 1985, a sentencing hearing was held in Case Number 84-22607, before the Circuit Court in Dade County, Florida. As a result of the sentencing hearing, Respondent was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. As a special condition of probation, Respondent was to perform 5,000 hours of community service over a ten-year period, by performing 500 hours of community service per year for specified organizations. Additionally, as a special condition of probation, Respondent was to obtain a psychiatric evaluation from one of three specified physicians.
Conclusions Based on the foregoing findings of fact and on the applicable legal principles, the following conclusions of law are made. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this proceeding. See Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 455.225(4), Florida Statutes. The Board of Medical Examiners is empowered to revoke or suspend the license of, or otherwise discipline, any physician who violates any of the following provisions of Section 458.331(1), Florida statutes: Being convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine. Any plea of nolo contendere shall be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter; False, deceptive or misleading advertising; Advertising, practicing or attempting to practice under a name other than one's own; Failing to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician; and Making deceptive, untrue or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine when such trick or scheme fails to conform to the generally prevailing standards of treatment in the medical community. Petitioner has the burden of proof in this license discipline case and must prove clearly and convincingly that the alleged violations of the above-cited statutory provisions occurred. Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Robinson v. Florida Board of Dentistry, 447 So.2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); and Sneij v. Department of Professional Regulation, 454 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Conclusions regarding charges in DPR Case No. 0048232 Count One of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by "[a]dvertising, practicing, or attempting to practice under a name other than his own." There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by advertising under the name Dadeland Dermatology Center, a name other than his own. Respondent in mitigation offered evidence that the Dade County Medical Association did not find unethical behavior in Respondent's advertising. This evidence does not negate, but only mitigates the violation of Section 458.331(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Count Two of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that the Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by advertising in a false, deceptive, or misleading manner that Respondent provided Collagen and Silicone treatments, when in fact the Respondent has never used Collagen in his practice, has never been trained in the use of Collagen, has never ordered Collagen, has never had any Collagen at his office, believes Collagen is an inferior product, and has no present intention of using Collagen. It is clearly false, deceptive, and misleading for the Respondent to advertise the availability of both Collagen and Silicone treatments when in fact the Collagen treatments are not available at Respondent's office and he has no intention of making them available. Count Three of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(u), Florida Statutes, by Performing any procedure or prescribing any therapy which, by the prevailing standards of medical practice in the community, would constitute experimentation on a human subject, without first obtaining full, informed, and written consent. Counsel for the Department voluntarily dismissed the charges in this count at the commencement of the hearing. Accordingly, Count Three of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 should be dismissed. Count Four of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Counsel for the Department voluntarily dismissed the charges in this count at the commencement of the hearing. Accordingly, Count Four of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 should be dismissed. Count Five of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes, by Making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine when such scheme or trick fails to conform to the generally prevailing standards of treatment in the medical community. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes, by making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations that Respondent provided Collagen implants in his practice. Essentially, Respondent is advertising that he provides both Collagen and Silicone treatments, when this is not true, and in fact is deceptive in nature. Conclusions regarding charges in DPR Case No. 0052038 Count One of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0052038 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.311(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by Being convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine. Any plea of nolo contendere shall be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter. The manner in which the last sentence of the above-quoted statutory provision is to be construed and applied was addressed as follows in Ayala v. Department of Professional Regulation, 478 50.2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985): We find that Section 458.331(1)(c) is clearly constitutional by construing the word "shall" in the last sentence of that subsection as permissive rather than mandatory in meaning. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So.2d 641, 643. As so construed, the Board of Medical Examiners may presumptively consider the nolo contendere plea as evidence of a conviction for purposes of chapter 458; however, in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion in The Florida Bar v. Lancaster, 448 So.2d 1019, the Board must allow appellant the opportunity to rebut this presumption and assert his innocence of the underlying criminal charges by explaining the reasons and circumstances surrounding his plea of nolo contendere, and thereby attempt to convince the Board that he is not guilty of a crime in violation of the provisions of section 458.331(1)(c). The Board must consider this evidence in deciding appellant's guilt or innocence for purposes of the disciplinary charges. Such explanation may, of course, always be considered in mitigation of punishment if appellant should be adjudicated guilty by the Board. At the hearing in this case, the Respondent was allowed an opportunity to rebut the presumption which arises from his nolo contendere plea. Respondent availed himself of the opportunity and attempted to explain the reasons and circumstances surrounding his plea of nolo contendere and attempted to convince the Hearing Officer that he is not guilty of a crime in violation of the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes. As is obvious from the findings of fact earlier in this Recommended Order, the Respondent's efforts in this regard were unsuccessful. After careful consideration of the Respondent's explanations, I have found them to be lacking in persuasiveness when considered in light of the other evidence of the Respondent's guilt of the criminal charge of solicitation of the first degree murder of his ex-wife. Section 777.04(2), Florida Statutes, reads as follows in pertinent part: Whoever solicits another to commit an offense prohibited by law and in the course of such solicitation commands, encourages, hires, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such offense or an attempt to commit such offense commits the offense of criminal solicitation . . . Upon consideration of the totality of the evidence in this case, there is an abundance of competent substantial evidence that the Respondent encouraged and hired Paul Ohanesian to murder Respondent's ex-wife and that Respondent did so with the motive of and for the purpose of causing the death of his ex-wife. Respondent's explanations with regard to his having had some other motive or purpose are simply unconvincing. Count Two of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0052038 charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(h), Florida Statutes, by "[f]ailing to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician." In this regard, the Respondent is alleged to have failed to comply with or to have violated the provisions of Section 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides for disciplinary action where "[t]he licensee has been convicted of a felony which relates to the practice of his profession." For the following reasons this charge must be dismissed. First, while Section 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes disciplinary action upon conviction of certain felonies, Section 455.227(1)(a) does not impose any statutory or legal obligation upon a licensed physician (or upon any other licensee). Section 455.227(1)(a) may provide a separate basis for discipline against a licensed physician (or other licensee), but because it does not impose any duty or obligation on licensed physicians, there can be no failure to perform anything required by Section 455.227(1)(a) which could constitute the basis of a violation of Section 458.331(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Second, even if the Respondent had been charged directly with a violation of Section 455.227(1)(a) [which he was not], such a charge would fail on the facts in this case because Section 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes, is limited by its terms to licensees who have been "convicted," and does not contain the broadening language of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which encompasses situations in which adjudication has been withheld or in which a plea of nolo contendere has been made. Therefore, no violation of Section 458.331(1)(h), Florida Statutes, can be found, and Count Two of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0052038 must be dismissed. Conclusions regarding the appropriate penalty With regard to the violation of Section 458.331(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by advertising under a name other than his own, even though the Dade County Medical Association found nothing wrong with the Respondent 'a advertising, the fact remains that the language of the statutory prohibition is simple and clear and the Respondent should have been aware of it. Respondent did mitigate the harm caused by the improper advertising by advising all who called that they had called Respondent's office. Accordingly, for the violation of Section 458.331(1)(e), Florida Statutes, I recommend issuance of a reprimand and an administrative fine in the amount of $250. With regard to the violation of Section 458.331(1)(d) and (1), Florida Statutes, by false, deceptive, or misleading advertising and by deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent misrepresentations, I recommend an administrative fine of $1,000. With regard to the violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by being found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the ability to practice medicine, due to the particularly heinous nature of the Respondent's crime, I recommend that Respondent's license to practice medicine be revoked.
Recommendation Consistent with all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Medical Examiners issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Finding the Respondent guilty of the violations charged in Counts, One, Two, and Five of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232; Finding the Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0052038; Reprimanding the Respondent for the violation of advertising under a name other than his own; Imposing a total of $1,250 in administrative fines against the Respondent; Revoking the Respondent's license to practice medicine; and Dismissing Counts Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0048232 and dismissing Count Two of the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case No. 0052038. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th of April, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esq. Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence E. Besser, Esq. SAMEK AND BESSER 1925 Brickell Suite #D-207 Miami, Florida 33129 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the findings of fact proposed by each of the parties. Rulings on findings proposed by the Petitioner The paragraphs referred to below are to the numbered paragraphs of the proposed findings of fact which appear at pages 3 through 13 of the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. The substance of all of the findings proposed in the following paragraphs has been accepted. Some editorial modifications have been made in the interests of clarity and accuracy, as well as when integrating similar proposals by the Respondent: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32. Paragraph 11: The findings in this paragraph are accepted with the exception of the language in parentheses, which is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 18: Accepted in substance with unnecessary details deleted. Paragraph 29: The last sentence of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. The remainder of this paragraph is accepted. Rulings on findings proposed by the Respondent The paragraphs referred to below are to the numbered paragraphs of the proposed findings of fact which appeared at the following pages of the Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16 and 17, 19 and 20. Inasmuch as the paragraphs of Respondent's proposed findings are numbered in three series of numbers in which many numbers are repeated, I have also included page reference below in the interest of clarity (Findings proposed at pages 1 through 6) Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance, with deletion of some irrelevant details. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance, with deletion of some irrelevant details. Paragraph 3: Rejected because not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6: T he substance of these paragraphs has been accepted with the deletion of certain editorial material. Paragraph 7: Rejected as constituting either a cumulative rehash of previous findings or as argument about the significance of the findings. Paragraphs 8 and 9: The substance of these paragraphs has been accepted with the deletion of certain editorial material. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting an irrelevant opinion or a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, and 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence. (See other findings regarding the guilt of the Respondent. In making my findings of fact regarding Respondent's intent, motive, and purpose, I have specifically rejected as unpersuasive and unworthy of belief Respondent's testimony that he knew that Ohanesian was not a "hit man," that he believed that Ohanesian was a private detective sent by Respondent's ex-wife, that he had no intention of causing his wife's death, and that his sole reason for paying $800 to Ohanesian was to "send a message" to his ex-wife so she would believe he was serious about having her killed even though he was not.) Paragraphs 17 and 18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence. (See other findings regarding the guilt of the Respondent.) Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Rejected in part as irrelevant and in part as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence. Paragraph 22: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence. (See other findings regarding the guilt of the Respondent.) Paragraph 23: Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony and argument about the testimony and does not constitute a proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 24: Rejected in part because it constitutes a summary of the testimony and opinion rather than a proposed finding of fact. Rejected primarily because it is inconsistent with the greater weight of the persuasive evidence, including some of Dr. Jacobson's testimony on cross-examination. Paragraph 25: Rejected in part because it is irrelevant. Rejected primarily because the opinions of the Board of Directors of the Dade County Medical Association are not warranted on the basis of the persuasive evidence in this record. Paragraph 26: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence. (Findings proposed at pages 16 and 17) Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 4, 6, and 7: Although essentially correct statements, these paragraphs are rejected as findings because they are irrelevant to the issues in this case. (Findings proposed at pages 19 and 20) Paragraph 1: The substance of the first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the persuasive evidence or as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence of this paragraph is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance with some additional clarification regarding the emphasis placed on the benefits of silicone. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. (See other findings on this subject.)
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether the Petitioner should be given a passing grade on the podriatry examination he is challenging; and (2), in light of his failure to appear at the final hearing, whether the Department should assess attorney fees, costs and court costs under Section 455.229(3), Fla. Stat. (1993).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner took the podiatry licensure examination administered by the Department on August 20, 1993, and received a failing grade. The Petitioner had due notice of the final hearing scheduled in this matter on June 14, 1994, by virtue of the Notice of Hearing issued on March 7, 1994. It also is clear that the Petitioner had actual notice of the scheduled final hearing. Counsel for the Department was in telephone communication with the Petitioner in the weeks before the scheduled final hearing and discussed the scheduled final hearing with the Petitioner. The Petitioner requested an opportunity to review the examination (for the second time) at 11:00 a.m. on the day of the final hearing (which was scheduled to begin at 1:00 p.m.) Counsel for the Department acceded to the Petitioner's request and, together with the Department's psychometrician, appeared at the final hearing site at 11:00 a.m. The Petitioner did not appear either at 11:00 a.m. or at 1:00 p.m. and had not appeared by the time the final hearing was concluded at approximately 1:33 p.m. The Petitioner gave no notice that he would not appear and has given no explanation why he did not appear. The Petitioner also has not responded to the Department's Motion for Recommended Order that Petitioner Pay Respondent's Reasonable Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Court Costs which was served on June 21, and filed on June 23, 1994. The Department expended $651.04 for fees and costs related to its attorney's preparation for, travel to and from, and participation in the final hearing. The Department expended $826.14 for fees and costs related to its psychometrician's preparation for, travel to and from, and participation in the final hearing. The Department expended $239.20 for fees and costs related to its podiatry expert's preparation for, travel to and from, and participation in the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order denying the Petitioner's examination challenge and assessing against the Petitioner attorney fees, costs, and court costs in the amount of $1,716.38. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald J. Gambale 9713 Morehead Lane Port Richey, Florida 34668 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Board of Podiatric Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for certification by examination as a basic X-ray machine operator should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact In February 2009, the Petitioner submitted an application to the Respondent for certification by examination as a basic X-ray machine operator. The application was submitted by “Ultimate Medical Academy” (UMA), where the Petitioner obtained his basic X-ray training, but the Petitioner provided the information contained therein and was responsible for the accuracy of the application. On the Petitioner’s application, he stated that he was employed in “basic x-ray” at Palm Harbor MRI, and indicated that “100%” of his time at Palm Harbor MRI was related to duties other than radiography, nuclear medicine, or radiation therapy. On February 19, 2009, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that the application was incomplete because it lacked a criminal history record from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. On April 14, 2009, the Respondent received the Petitioner’s criminal history record, which revealed convictions between the years 1993 and 2002, and related periods of incarceration, for retail theft, felony grand theft, felony uttering of forged checks, other forgeries, and failure to appear. The Petitioner was also convicted of federal crimes, including possession of counterfeited checks in 2000 and felony uttering a forged check in 2002. The Petitioner spent three years in federal prison and, in December of 2003, was transferred to a halfway house after his release. His most recent sentence included a probationary period that expired at the end of May of 2007. As part of the application process, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that his civil rights had been restored on January 31, 2008. The Petitioner provided documentation to the Respondent that spelled his first name as “Erin.” For purposes of this Recommended Order, the restoration of civil rights has been deemed applicable to the Petitioner. The Respondent reviewed the Petitioner’s application, including the criminal history and the restoration of civil rights, and denied the application because of the Petitioner’s criminal history. The specific basis for the denial was the Respondent’s concern with the access an X-ray operator has to the personal belongings and medications of a patient while X-ray images are obtained, as well as to the personal and medical information contained within patient records. After receiving the Respondent’s decision, the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to challenge the denial. After issuing the initial Notice of Intent to Deny, the Respondent became aware of potential issues related to the Petitioner’s employment during and after his training at UMA. As part of his educational training, UMA placed the Petitioner into an externship at Palm Harbor MRI for a six-week period of clinical practice. The externship ended on April 4, 2008, when he graduated from the UMA. The quality of the Petitioner’s job performance at Palm Harbor MRI is not at issue in this proceeding. There is no evidence that he was not competent to perform the tasks assigned to him during the externship. On April 9, 2008, the Petitioner began working as a full-time employee at Palm Harbor MRI. He performed some customer contact duties, greeting patients and gathering information. His duties also included placing and positioning patients on the X-ray table, imputing the machine settings (“technique”) and operating the X-ray machine, including the administration of radiation to obtain the desired images. Positioning patients for X-rays, machine technique, and operating the radiation equipment constitutes the practice of radiologic technology. The Petitioner was supervised by a licensed technician at all times during his positioning of patients and operation of the machine. The Petitioner performed these duties without being properly licensed. After the Respondent learned of the Petitioner’s job responsibilities at Palm Harbor MRI, the Respondent issued an Amended Notice of Intent to Deny that identified the alleged unlicensed activity as an additional basis for denial of the application. The Respondent also initiated a review of the Palm Harbor MRI facility’s operating procedures that was continuing at the time of the hearing. The application information originally disclosed by the Petitioner was inaccurate because it failed to reveal that he was involved in performing radiography at Palm Harbor MRI. In May 2009, the office manager at Palm Harbor MRI requested that the Petitioner provide a copy of his certificate, apparently unaware that the Petitioner had no license at that time. When he was unable to provide the certificate, his employment was terminated on May 18, 2009. The Petitioner has asserted that he was exempt from licensure because he was a student attending St. Petersburg College (SPC) with the intention of being admitted to the SPC radiologic technology program, and ultimately to become licensed as a radiography technologist. Students attending a medical school or “enrolled in and attending” a radiologic technology educational program are statutorily exempt from licensure during their educational period; however, there is no evidence that UMA students are entitled to the exemption. Although SPC has a radiologic technology educational program, the Petitioner has neither been admitted to the program nor attended any classes within the program’s curriculum. Additionally, Palm Harbor MRI is not an approved clinical training site for students enrolled in and attending the SPC radiography program. The Petitioner had not applied to the SPC radiography program prior to termination of his employment from Palm Harbor MRI, and the applications subsequently submitted by the Petitioner for application to the SPC radiography program were denied. There was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner was a medical student or was enrolled in and attending a radiologic technology educational program at any time relevant to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's application for certification by examination as a basic X-ray machine operator. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Erlich, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 C. Erica White, Esquire Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 510 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
