Findings Of Fact On January 31, 1984, the subject vessel, a 1969 sixty-five foot Hargrave Halmatic motor yacht, was purchased by Nelson Gross as President and principal of the corporation, Binghamton Too, Inc., for $457,500 in Houston Texas. It was financed through a Connecticut bank. The closing was held in Mr. Gross' New Jersey office. No sales or use tax has been paid on the yacht in Florida or in any other state. Mr. Gross' initial intent was to operate his new purchase as a commercial charter boat in conjunction with the "Binghamton," a ferryboat permanently moored and operating in Edgewater, New Jersey, as a floating restaurant. To get the new motor yacht there, Mr. Gross directed that it be brought to New Jersey around the Florida coast under its own power. The motor yacht reached Florida on February 17, 1984, but en route from Texas an unexpected vibration had arisen which required emergency repairs. These repairs were commissioned at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, where the motor yacht remained, except for sea trials in connection with the vibration problem, until the first week in April, 1984. A cracked strut was diagnosed as the cause of the vibration problem. Repair costs of this emergency problem totalled $5,975. The balance of charges incurred at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, was $21,729, including dockage. Many more of the repairs catalogued by Respondent's Exhibit 5, the Bradford Marine records for this period, were clearly voluntary, discretionary, and cosmetic in nature. The majority were of a non-emergency nature. The vessel, by then relettered "Binghamton Too," left Florida waters approximately April 20, 1984. "Binghamton Too" next spent approximately three weeks at Thunderbolt Marine Industries in Georgia at an approximate cost of $12,000. There, a strap was fabricated to hold the strut and the yacht proceeded on to New Jersey. The "Binghamton Too" began its charter business as part of the "Binghamton" operation in Edgewater, New Jersey on May 5, 1984. Seventy-five to eighty charters were accomplished between May, 1984 and October, 1984 under New Jersey state and local chartering, transit liquor, and environmental licenses and under U.S. Corps of Engineers permits. "Binghamton Too" returned to Florida waters sometime on or before October 25, 1984, when it was sighted at the Indian River Causeway Bridge. On October 26, 1984, it was sighted at Flagler Bridge in West Palm Beach. Thereafter, it went on to the Lantana Boat Works Marina, Lantana, Florida, for repairs. Lantana is the location of the yacht's original builder, whose equipment and expertise were preferable to that of other boatyards for certain strut repairs due to the peculiar nature of this type of yacht. After those repairs, the yacht was anchored in Palm Beach from January 1985 to April 1985. Although Mr. Gross testified that the strut repairs of necessity had to be done in the Lantana boatyard, his view is not necessarily conclusive of this issue because he admitted "Binghamton Too" was the first yacht he had ever purchased, because he was vague about equating desirability and necessity without any supporting direct expert testimony, and because of the facts found infra. The Lantana repair records from October 29 to December 31, 1984 show $42,521.82 in repairs, of which only $2,500 pertain to fabrication of a strut. Again, the majority of repairs was to refurbish and paint the vessel. Mr. Gross spent approximately October 1984 to April 1985, October 1985 to April 1986, and October 1986 to April 1987 in his father's home in West Palm Beach, Florida. By his own testimony, he confirmed that he established the "technical" office for his "Binghamton Too" business there. He applied, in early December 1984, for a Florida sales tax registration to operate a charter business, representing Palm Beach as his place of business. The account was established January 1, 1985 with the account number of 60-22-080051-61. The captain and mate of the "Binghamton Too" also wintered in Florida each of these years. On December 6, 1984, Mr. Gross wrote the State of New Jersey's Division of Taxation that the yacht's "principal location and headquarters are in West Palm Beach, Florida where it maintains an office and full-time employees," thus successfully arguing that the "Binghamton Too" should be exempt from New Jersey's registration requirements for any vessel residing in that state in excess of 180 days. This correspondence was in connection with a tax problem of the mother ship "Binghamton," still moored in New Jersey. Mr. Gross further represented that Florida was "Binghamton Too's" primary location with trips to the Bahamas." For most of the period from late December, 1984 to early April, 1985, the yacht was in Palm Harbor Marina, West Palm Beach, Florida, the first time not in repairs, and clearly could have returned to New Jersey under its own power had Mr. Gross chosen to do so. From January 24 to March 26, 1985, the boat was in operation, as sighted at the Pompano Beach and Fort Lauderdale bridges. From April 1985 until October of 1985, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. Nonetheless, on June 10, 1985, Mr. Gross purchased a boat slip at Ocean Reef Club in Key Largo, Florida. This slip was later sold. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact 6-12, which clearly establish a pattern of wintering the yacht in Florida waters, it is inferred that, despite Mr. Gross' testimony that it was "necessary" to have "Binghamton Too's" strut repaired in late 1984 by the original Florida manufacturer of the yacht, its presence in Florida from October 1984 until April, 1985 was primarily and substantially due to the preference of Mr. Gross, Petitioner's President, and not due to necessity or emergency. In October of 1985, the yacht returned to Florida where it remained until April of 1986. During this time, the boat underwent further repairs, including the complete repainting of the hull, the need for which Mr. Gross attributed to the old paint being cracked and shaken off by the vibration of the yacht. From April 1986 until October of 1986, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. The yacht returned to Florida in October, 1986, and again remained in Florida until early April, 1987, when it left for New Jersey. In late October 1987, the yacht returned to Florida where it was traded in as part of the consideration for a larger yacht in November of 1987. The closing date was December 30, 1987. The cash equivalent received by Petitioner as credit on the trade-in was $100,000. In all, Petitioner asserts that over $200,000 was spent by the corporation on the "Binghamton Too" before it was traded. Shortly after buying the "Binghamton Too", Petitioner had begun trying to sell it for the highest price obtainable. These sales efforts included large ads in national yachting publications and listings with active yacht brokers. The highest outright offer received by Petitioner was $75,000. However, this was Mr. Gross' first sales effort of this kind, and his opinion testimony that the "Binghamton Too" was not bought from the Petitioner outright and at a good price because of latent defects and cost of repair is neither credible nor persuasive since his opinion does not possess the reliability of an expert in assessing whether it was the condition of the yacht, its unusual "Halmatic" type, or some other factor which made the "Binghamton Too" undesirable to potential purchasers. The Florida Department of Revenue issued a Notice of Delinquent Tax January 30, 1987, of five-percent use tax upon the purchase price plus 25 percent penalty. Interest was figured at 12 percent per annum. Petitioner timely protested. The agency conceded that the purchase price on the original notice was mistakenly listed at $475,000, that the assessment appropriately should have been on $457,500 (see Finding of Fact No. 1) and that the State presently claims only the tax amount of 5% of Petitioner's initial $457,500 purchase price at $22,875, the 25 percent penalty at $5,719, and interest on the tax from February 18, 1984, to June 18, 1989 at $14,650. (Interest accrues at $7.52 daily.) The total assessment through June 18, 1989 is $43,234.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order affirming the assessment of $22,875, with 25% penalty and interest at $7.52 per day from February 18, 1984 until paid. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon consideration of Section 120.59(2) Florida Statutes the following rulings are made upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2,3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22: Accepted except to the degree not proven. 4: Rejected as stated because not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. 6, 12: Rejected in part as not proven, in part as subordinate and unnecessary, and in part as to the conclusion-if law as "latent." 7, 8, 9: Accepted except as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 16: Accepted that Mr. Gross testified to this amount, however, the evidence does not support the amount precisely nor that it all went to "repairs." 20: Accepted as modified to better express the record as a whole. Respondent's PFOF: 1: Accepted, but as a Conclusion of Law. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23: Accepted. 5: Accepted in substance; what is not adopted is either mere recitation/characterization of testimony, is cumulative, or is subordinate to the facts as found. 6: Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 7: Sentence 1 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as mere legal argument or subordinate to the facts as found. 8, 11: Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole. Mr. Gross testified to a May 5, 1984 date for No. 8. 18: Except for mere legal argument, accepted. 24: Accepted upon the terms set forth in the Recommended Order. 25: Except as subordinate and unnecessary, accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene D. Brown, Esquire 3836 Killearn Court Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is, and during the years in question was, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, properly qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and the parent company of a consolidated group of corporations that kept its books and records and filed its federal and state income tax returns on the basis of a fiscal year ending August 31. During the tax years in question, the consolidated group consisted of 36 corporations, of which 15 (including Petitioner) had Florida transactions or were otherwise separately subject to taxation under the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code (the "Florida members"). The other 21 corporations had no such transactions or were not subject to taxation under the Florida Code (the "non- Florida members"). For both years 1972 and 1973, petitioner filed federal and Florida income tax returns on behalf of the entire group. On the Florida return's, it duly elected under the second sentence of Subsection 220.131(1), F.S., to include both the Florida and non-Florida members. As required by Subsections 220.131(1)(a), (b) and (c), each member of the group consented to such filing, the group filed a consolidated federal return for each year, and the component members of the Florida return group were identical to the members of the federal return group. Petitioner protested the proposed corporate income tax assessment for 1972 and 1973, but, by letter, dated July 7, 1976, T. H. Swindal, Chief, Corporation Income Tax Bureau, Florida Department of Revenue, adhered to the original determination that for a parent corporation to include all of its subsidiary corporations for the purposes of consolidating its taxable income, it must be incorporated in Florida. The letter further explained: ". . . The Florida Legislature obviously considered these classifications justified and constitutionally permissible. Any regulation, therefore, which is so drafted as to permit an interpretation which in substance changes or strikes the statutory classification is a nullity. It appears that the Department's regulation may have been inadvertently so drafted as to invite an unintended and contrary-to-the- statute interpretation. When the Department became aware of the situation it proceeded, in accordance with the prescribed statutory requirements of Chapter 120, to amend the regulation by striking those words being misinterpreted." The regulation referred to in Swindal's letter was Rule 12C-1.131(1), F.A.C., the first sentence of which had read as follows: "12C-1.131 Adjusted Federal Income; Affiliated Groups. The term "Florida parent company" as used in the second sentence of Code subsection 220.131(1) shall mean any corporation qualified to do business in Florida or otherwise subject to tax under the Code, irrespective of its place of incorporation " The aforesaid rule was in effect during 1972 and 1973, and was amended on August 4, 1975, to delete the above-mentioned sentence.
Recommendation That Petitioner not be held liable for the proposed assessment of corporate income tax deficiency for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April , 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alan L. Reinstein, Esquire Dancona, Pflaum, Wyatt and Riskind 30 North LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60602
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner owes sales and use tax or specifically use tax, on certain purchases of tangible personal property in accordance with the relevant provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Property Care, Inc. (Petitioner, taxpayer), was a Florida "Subchapter-S Corporation" having its home office in Dade City, Florida, at times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3288869 and its Florida sales tax number was 06-1041158. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of cutting and removing trees, driveway construction, lawn maintenance, and landscaping. The Department of Revenue (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering the tax laws of the state in accordance with Section 212 and 213, Florida Statutes. After issuing proper notification to the Petitioner on January 2, 2003, the Department conducted a sales and use tax audit of the Petitioner's business records. The audit covered the period of December 1, 1999 through December 16, 2001. The Petitioner corporation ceased doing business on December 16, 2001. The Department examined purchase invoices, general ledgers, and federal income tax returns of the Petitioner in the course of its audit. The Department elected to examine the records in detail rather than doing a statutorily permissible sample audit, since the assessment period was relatively short. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property (construction driveways, landscaping, etc.) through the purchase and use of items of tangible personal property, as raw materials, it bought for use in its business. This included the purchase of limerock, plants, sod, mulch and the like for use in maintaining or landscaping real property. Because the Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property, and not merely re-selling limerock, mulch, etc., it was generally only liable to pay sales tax on its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in its business, but not to charge and collect sales tax on its landscaping and real property improvement business activities or services for its ultimate customers. See Chapter 212, Fla. Stat. During the audit period, it was determined by the Department that sales tax had not been paid by the Petitioner on some of its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in the conduct of its business, such items as sod, limerock, asphalt, hay, and other products. The Department also found that the Petitioner had not paid sales tax on certain auto repairs that included both parts and labor charges. Accordingly, the Department noticed an assessment to the Petitioner for use tax on the purchases of items of tangible personal property, for which sales invoices produced in the audit, and by the Petitioner, did not indicate that sales tax had been paid when the items had been purchased from the suppliers. The Department calculated the additional tax due by multiplying the taxable amounts taken from the purchase invoices by the applicable tax rate. The Department also gave the Petitioner credit for sales taxes already paid. Specifically, on a purchase invoice for auto repairs, the Department gave the Petitioner credit for sales tax paid on the parts used in the repairs. The Petitioner's witnesses testified that the four purchase invoices identified as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2 in evidence, represented freight charges and were not tangible personal property purchase amounts for the limerock involved. Those purchase invoices, however, indicate on their face that they were for limerock. They indicate the total tonnage and the price per ton and do not indicate any portion of the charges representing freight or delivery charges. The price indicated per ton appears reasonable as a price for limerock and not just for freight charges. Moreover, the Petitioner's own witnesses concede that the purchase invoices in composite Exhibit 2 do not indicate any itemization or amount for freight charges. It is determined that these invoices are actually invoices for the purchase of limerock and not merely freight charges. The Petitioner contends that it assumed that the purchase invoices, identified as Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4, and 7-9, in evidence, included sales tax in the unit price represented on those invoices, even though any sales tax increment of those invoices is not separately stated and itemized. The Petitioner's witness in this regard conceded, however, that he had no way of knowing whether the vendors from whom he purchased the goods actually charged sales tax on the subject invoices, since it was not itemized. He was only assuming that the tax was included in the unit price he paid, as a part of the total number. The Petitioner contends that it is not liable for the sales tax because sales tax was included in the unit price of the tangible personal property that the Petitioner purchased. The Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that it is not liable for sales tax because the vendors were responsible for charging and collecting the sales tax and that they should be held liable for the tax. In consideration of the evidence which shows that the Petitioner bought the limerock, sod, and other items for use in its business of providing landscaping, maintenance, and other improvements to real property, the Petitioner did not provide documentary or other evidence to corroborate its testimonial assumption or belief that the invoices were either not subject to tax or that the invoiced amounts included payment of the tax. Most of the invoices (the only documentary evidence of billing and the amount and category of payment), do not depict an itemization or category for tax on the face of the invoices. The evidence adduced by the Petitioner does show, as to Invoice Number 29, that tax indeed was paid on that purchase in the amount of $679.25. Additionally, with regard to APAC Invoice Number PORT 16175, $73.39 in tax was paid. Any assessment and collection of tax, penalty and interest by the Department upon conclusion of this proceeding should reflect credit to the Petitioner for these amounts. On June 3, 2003, a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department to the Petitioner, setting forth deficient sales and use tax in the sum of $1,812.86, with interest through June 3, 2003, in the sum of $354.34, accruing at the rate of $.25 per day as well as a penalty in the sum of $906.44. The Notice of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 2, 2003, for purposes of filing a request for formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings or for contesting the assessment in the circuit court. On September 30, 2003, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking a formal proceeding and hearing to contest the final assessment in this case.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue assessing the tax as depicted in the notice of assessment, in evidence herein, including credit for the tax shown to have been collected on the two invoices referenced in the above Findings of Fact, and assessing interest and penalties in the amounts legally prescribed or as agreed to by the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Charles B. Morrow Jeanne Morrow Post Office Box 659 Astor, Florida 32102 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Petitioner's challenge to the Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, that was filed by the Respondent March 13, 1978. A copy of the Notice of Proposed Assessment together with the attendant work papers may be found as the Respondent's composite Exhibit #3, admitted into evidence. (By stipulation of the parties, in view of certain evidence presented by the Petitioner in the course of the hearing a First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest under Chapter 212. Florida Statutes, has been filed and it is this First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest which is in dispute between the parties. A copy of the First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest, dated October 17, 1978 may be found as Hearing Officer's composite Exhibit #1, admitted Info evidence. That composite exhibit contains the First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment, together with the applicable work sheets and Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through 3, admitted into evidence in the course of the hearing. These Petitioner's exhibits are those referred to as constituting the basis of the stipulation previously mentioned.) The Petitioner is registered with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue as a wholesale business, for purposes of Florida taxes. A copy of the certificate which shows this regis- tration may be found as Respondent's Exhibit #1 admitted into evidence. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue is an agency of the State of Florida that audits business record, to include the Petitioner's records. Specifically, in this instance, an audit was conducted in accordance with Chapter 21, Florida Statutes, to ascertain whether or not the Petitioner was responsible for the payment of sales and use tax under the authority of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The tax examiner assigned to conduct the audit was carrying out that function as a follow-up to an audit performed on a business known as Quail Ridge located in Delray Beach, Florida. The audit of Quail Ridge led the Respondent to believe that the Petitioner had made certain retail sales to Quail Ridge without collecting sales tax. If this were true, then the Petitioner would become responsible for the payment of those sales taxes under the provision of Section 212.07(2), Florida Statutes. There ensued an audit of the Petitioner's books and records, which were constituted of certain bank statements and a ledger book together with invoices and signed resale certificates that were made available. In the course of this audit process, the Petitioner was allowed a period of two months within which time to collect certain invoices and signed resale certificates. The significance of the invoices and resale certificates was, assuming the sales had been made for purposes of resale; thereby constituting a wholesale transaction, no sales tax would be due because the collection of that sales tax would become the responsibility of the purchaser who had obtained the item from the Petitioner in a wholesale transaction. That purchaser would become the "dealer", within the meaning of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and therefore would be responsible for the collection of the sales tax upon a further sale to a third party in a retail transaction. After the Petitioner had been given time to establish those wholesale transactions in his flower business and given credit for certain months in which no business income was gained, the calculations were made by the tax examiner of the Respondent and the March 13, 1978, Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, was issued. This Notice of Proposed Assessment taxed the Petitioner for all business transactions arising from the sale of flowers which could not be established as exempt sales in the capacity of a wholesaler. (This requirement for the establishment of an exemption by the proof of the petitioner is found in Chapter 212, Florida Statute and in accordance with Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code.) After the Notice of Proposed Assessment of March 13, 1978, had been served on the Petitioner, an informal conference was held between the tax examiner and the petitioner. This conference was held on April 26, 1978, and at that time the Petitioner offered to introduce further invoices and resale certificates. Brandjes claimed that these invoices and resale certificates established further exemptions. The invoices and resale certificates were not accepted at that time because the tax examiner felt that the case was to be submitted for formal hearing and he was not of the opinion that he could make further adjustments to the proposed assessment at that juncture. The same invoices and resale certificates which were of fered at the April 26, 1978 conference were produced in the course of the hearing before the undersigned. After such production, the Exhibits, 1 through 3, were submitted to the Respondent's tax examiner for review to establish possible further reduction of the proposed assessment, through the process of showing other exempt sales, or wholesale transaction. That review led to the First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of October 17, 1978, which reduces the amount of tax, penalties and interest claimed by the Respondent. The amount claimed, effective October 17, 1978, was $3,129.77. This included tax, penalties and interest computed to that date. The audit period is November 1, 1974 through October, 1978. The Petitioner in this cause has pled ignorance to the requirements of law in the question of collecting sales and use taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the necessity to establish exempt sales which were made as wholesale transactions. He makes his contention premised upon the belief that his registration as an inactive business relieved him of the necessity to collect the taxes and to establish an exemption from tax. Notwithstanding this belief on the part of the Petitioner, it is clear that Chapter 212, Florida Statutes through its provisions places an obligation on the Petitioner to collect sales and use taxes for a retail transaction and the failure to meet that obligation places the responsibility for that payment of sales and use taxes on business transactions entered into by the Petitioner, with the Petitioner. This carries with it the potentiality of the assessment of penalties and interest for the failure to collect and remit those taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The only possibility to escape the payment of the sales and use taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes exists with the ability of the Petitioner to establish that the sales were sales at wholesale and not taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. To the extent that the Petitioner has established the exemptions in keeping with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes and Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code, the Petitioner has been given credit for those exemptions. The balance of the sales transactions in the audit period November 1, 1974 through October 1978, as reflected in the First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest, under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, becomes the responsibility of the Petitioner for his failure to collect the taxes for the sales. Therefore, the Petitioner is responsible for the payment of tax, penalties and interest through October 17, 1978 in an aggregate amount of $3,129.77.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, Jack Brandjes, d/b/a Jack's Flowers be required to pay the tax, penalties, add interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes in the amount of $3,129.77 as set forth in the October 17, 1978 First Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1978. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Brandjes c/o Jack's Flowers Ixora Market 4700 Canal 14 Road Lake Worth, Florida 33463 Cecil Davis, Esquire State of Florida Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Attorney, Division of Administration Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Petitioners' liability for sales tax, penalty and interest as set forth in revised notice of proposed assessment dated February 1, 1978.
Findings Of Fact On September 15, 1975, Miles L. Johnson, a Beverage Agent with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation, conducted a surveillance of premises occupied by Petitioners located at 4440 Southwest 64th Court, Dade County, Florida. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., he observed one Andy Tucker arrive and enter the residence and later exit the same carrying something which he placed in the trunk of a car. He then reentered the house. Agent Johnson looked in the trunk and observed that it contained numerous cartons of cigarettes. Tucker again exited from the residence carrying a case of cigarettes which he also placed in the trunk. He then drove to another house, followed by Johnson, who observed him take the cigarettes into a garage. Johnson then prepared an affidavit and obtained a warrant from the Dade County Circuit Court to search the Marson residence for un-taxed cigarettes. Johnson gave the warrant to another agent, John Fay, to serve the same upon the Marsons. Johnson later arrived at the residence and observed that Marson had a copy of the warrant in his possession and that Fay had his copy and was executing the return thereon. Johnson was informed by officers at the residence that 420 cartons of cigarettes, marijuana and contraband liquor had been found in the house. The agents also had found certain records in the form of invoices from a cigarette distributor in North Carolina indicating purchases of a large amount of cigarettes, together with handwritten notes showing the sale of cigarettes to a large number of individuals, Johnson observed that the cigarettes had North Carolina excise tax stamps, but no Florida tax stamps thereon. The Marsons were thereafter arrested and the cigarettes and other materials were seized and retained by the Beverage Agents. No return was made on the search warrant, however, due to the fact that the Department's copy of the warrant was inadvertently left in the Marson residence and was never recovered (testimony of Johnson). Agent Victor E. Sosa of the Department of Business Regulation was assigned to prepare an excise tax warrant on the cigarettes seized from the Marson residence. For this purpose, he used the case report prepared by Agent Miles Johnson. Thereafter, the report was forwarded to the Department of Revenue. It contained information to the effect that 24, 171 cartons of un- taxed cigarettes allegedly sold by the Petitioners were subject to State sales tax. Respondent's auditor thereafter issued a formal demand to the Marsons to produce records concerning cigarette transactions, but they did not produce any such records pursuant to the request. The auditor proceeded to prepare an estimated proposed assessment on the basis of the information provided by the Department of Business Regulation. Notice of proposed assessment of tax, penalties and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $6,094.08 was issued to Petitioners on December 27, 1977 (Testimony of Sosa, Pooley, Tompkins, Respondent's Exhibits 1, 2).
Recommendation That the proposed assessment against Petitioners be withdrawn. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of June, 1979. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: William D. Townsend, Esq. Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Richard A. Burt, Esq. 527 Ingraham Building Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed at the hearing that there were no issues of fact which remained to be determined. The parties stipulated that the relevant facts are as set out in paragraph 5 of the Petition for Administrative Hearing. The following findings are quoted directly from paragraph 5 of the Petition. Petitioner is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Petitioner initially employed the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal Income Tax purposes. In a desire to more clearly reflect income, Petitioner applied for and received permission from the Internal Revenue Service allowing Petitioner to change its method of tax accounting from the cash to the accrual method, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 70-27. This change was to commence with the calendar year 1971. Consistent with this accounting method change, all net accrued income as of January 1, 1971, was recorded in its entirety in Petitioner's financial statements as of December 31, 1970. The total net adjustment required to convert to the accrual method was $758,911.00. Pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Internal Revenue Service, an annual adjustment of $75,891.00 was required. The annual adjustment spread the effect of the accounting change over a 10-year period, despite the fact that all the income was realized prior to January 1, 1971. On January 1, 1972, the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner timely filed its 1970 and 1971 Florida Intangible Personal Property Tax Returns. Upon subsequent review of Petitioner's records, it became apparent that the intangible tax had been overpaid and a refund claim was submitted. The refund was issued to Petitioner by the State of Florida during the calendar year 1973 and reported in Petitioner's 1973 Federal Corporate Income Tax Return. On December 16, 1975, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner was deficient in its payment of Florida Corporate Income Tax in the amount of $25,386.84. The total deficiency consisted of $3,267.00 for the year ended December 31, 1972; $19,202.00 for the year ended December 31, 1973; and $2,916.84 for the year ended December 31, 1974. Included in the alleged total deficiency of $25,386.84 is a tax in the amount of $14,696.70 for the year 1973. This tax is attributable to Petitioner's apportionment of a part of its 1973 income to sources outside of the State of Florida. Petitioner is no longer protesting this deficiency. On February 9, 1976, Petitioner filed its protest against Respondent's determination that a deficiency in tax existed. By letter dated March 9, 1976, Respondent denied Petitioner's protest filed on February 9, 1976.
The Issue Broadly stated, the issue in this proceeding the validity of the proposed deficiency in petitioner's corporate income in the amount of $25,712.80 for the 1972 fiscal year. More specifically, the issue is whether Florida may lawfully tax for the gain it realized on the sale of securities in the of $941,418.00. Included within this issue is the question of whether the apportionment formula set forth in Florida Statutes is applicable to petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, the stipulations the parties and the record in this proceeding, the following relevant During the calendar year 1972, petitioner was a foreign " Corporation subject to the Florida Corporate Income Tax, imposed Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Petitioner also operated a business in St. Louis, Missouri. January 1, 1972, petitioner held a 95 percent interest in Bal Harbour Joint Venture, which owned and operated the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant in Bal Harbour, Florida. On December 15, 1972, petitioner was the sole owner of the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant. November 16, 1972, the petitioner acquired by merger 100 percent interest in the Clearwater Beach Hilton, a motel and restaurant business located in Clearwater, Florida, and continued to own this interest on December 31, 1972. The Clearwater and Ivanhoe hotel and restaurant businesses in Florida and the petitioner's business in Missouri have separate, individual general managers. There is no central purchasing by the hotels and no centralized operating records are maintained by petitioner. There are no central reservation services available between the hotels and the hotels advertise separately and unilaterally in local publications in the cities in which they are located. No standardized product lines exist. On November 2, 1972, petitioner sold certain securities which resulted in a realized gain to petitioner for federal income tax purposes of $941,418.00. Said securities were purchased, located and sold in the State of Missouri, and had no relationship to petitioner's Florida transactions. Petitioner timely filed its 1972 Florida corporate income tax return on which it subtracted from its federal taxable income the gain realized from the sale of the securities. Its "Florida net income" and its "total tax due" were thus reported as "none." On or about May 8, 1974, respondent advised petitioner of a proposed deficiency in petitioner's 1972 tax in the amount of $29,392.00. In accordance with the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 214.11, petitioner timely filed with respondent its protest of the proposed deficiency assessment. After a hearing, respondent issued to petitioner its Notice of Decision in which the proposed, deficiency was reduced to $25,712.80, and the reasons therefor were set forth. Petitioner requested reconsideration by respondent. On March 11, 1975, the parties stipulated that further proceedings in this cause would be, processed under the Florida Administrative Procedures Act. The petition for hearing was forwarded by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned was duly assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: the proposed deficiency assessment in the amount of $25,712.80 be vacated and set aside; and The respondent permit petitioner to file an amended 1972 return utilizing, within the discretion of the respondent, the employment of either separate accounting, a monthly averaging formula or another method which would effectuate an equitable apportionment of petitioner's income to the State of Florida. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Pleasants Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings and Evans Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 Louis de la Parte, Jr. 725 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Patricia S. Turner Assistant General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a stipulation, the following facts are found. Petitioner is a West Virginia corporation, organized under the laws of that state on January 4, 1958. Prior to June 1, 1962, it operated an automobile dealership in Huntington, West Virginia. On June 1, 9162, Petitioner exchanged assets of its automobile dealership for fifty (50 percent) percent of the capital stock of Dutch Miller Chevrolet, Inc., a West Virginia corporation organized to succeed the automobile dealership formerly operated by the Petitioner. Prior thereto, in 1961, the Petitioner had acquired one hundred percent (100 percent) of the capital stock in Palm Beach Motors (the name of which was changed on August 10, 1961 to Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.). Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Petitioner which operated on property owned by the Petitioner. The years involved herein are the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, during which years the Petitioner's principal income (except for the gain involved herein) consisted of rents received from Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. Petitioner and its subsidiary filed consolidated returns for the years involved. During the fiscal year ending December 31, 1972, Petitioner sold its stock in Dutch Miller Chevrolet, Inc. to an unrelated third party for a gain determined by the Respondent to be in the amount of $349,217.00, which, although the sale took place out of the State of Florida, the Respondent has determined to be taxable under the Florida Income Tax Code* (Chapter 220, Florida Statutes). In the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, Petitioner included in Florida taxable income, the amounts of $76.00 and $6,245.00, respectively, from the sale of property on April 23, 1971, such gain being reported for federal income tax purposes on the installment method under Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Roger H. Dean, individually or by attribution during the years involved herein, was the owner of one hundred (100 percent) percent of the stock of Roger Dean Enterprises, Inc. and seventy-five (75 percent) percent of the stock of Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. The remaining twenty-five (25 percent) percent of Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. was owned by Robert S. Cuillo, an unrelated person. The Respondent disallowed the $5,000.00 exemption to the Petitioner in computing its Florida corporate income tax for each of the years in question on the theory that the two corporations were members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. By letter dated April 13, 1976, the Respondent advised Petitioner of its proposed deficiencies for the fiscal years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, in the respective amounts of $19,086.25 and $1,086.79. Within sixty (60) days thereafter (on or about May 10, 1976), Petitioner filed its written protest in response thereto. By letter dated May 27, 1976, the Respondent rejected the Petitioner's position as to the stock sale gain and exemption issues. Thereafter on September 17, 1976, a subsequent oral argument was presented at a conference held between the parties' representatives in Tallahassee, and by letter dated September 23, 1976, Respondent again rejected Petitioner's position on all pending issues raised herein. The issues posed herein are as follows: Whether under the Florida Corporate income tax code, amounts derived as gain from a sale of intangible personal property situated out of the State of *Herein sometimes referred to as the Code. Florida are properly included in the tax base of a corporation subject to the Florida code. Whether amounts derived as installments during tax years ending after January 1, 1972, from a sale made prior to that date are properly included in the tax base for Florida corporate income tax purposes. Whether two corporations one of whose stock is owned 100 percent by the same person who owns 75 percent of the stock in the other, with the remaining 25 percent of the stock in the second corporation being owned by an unrelated person, constitute members of a control group of corporations as defined by Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Many states, in determining corporate income tax liability, utilize a procedure generally referred to a "allocation" to determine which elements of income may be assigned and held to a particular jurisdiction, where a corporation does business in several jurisdictions. By this procedure, non- business income such as dividends, investment income, or capital gains from the sale of intangibles are assigned to the state of commercial domicile. This approach was specifically considered and rejected when Florida adopted its corporate income tax code. Thus, in its report of transmittal of the corporate income tax code to the legislature, at page 215, it was noted: "The staff draft does not attempt to allocate any items of income to the commercial domicile of a corporate taxpayer. It endeavors to apportion 100 percent of corporate net income, from whatever source derived, and to attribute to Florida its apportionable share of all the net income." Additional evidence of the legislature's intent in this area can be seen by noting that when the corporate income tax code was adopted, Florida repealed certain provisions of the Multi-state Tax Compact (an agreement for uniformity entered into among some twenty-five states). Thus, Article IV, Section (6)(c), a contained in Section 213.15, Florida Statutes, 1969, which previously read: "Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state", was repealed by Chapter 71-980, Laws of Florida, concurrently with the adoption of the Corporate Income Tax Code. This approach has survived judicial scrutiny by several courts. See for example, Johns-Mansville Products Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration, 343 A.2d 221 (N.H. 1975) and Butler v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). Respecting its constitutional argument that amounts derived as installments during tax years subsequent to January 1, 1972, from a sale made prior to the enactment of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code, the Petitioner concedes that the Code contemplates the result reached by the proposed assessment. However, it argues that in view of the constitutional prohibition which existed prior to enactment of the Code, no tax should now be levied based on pre-Code transactions. The Florida Supreme Court in the recent case of the Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, So.2d (Fla. 1977), Case No. 47,440 slip opinion p. 7 n. 4, cited with apparent approval the decision in Tiedmann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974). The court in Tiedmann, reasoned that the legislature adopted a "yard-stick" or measuring device approach by utilizing federal taxable income as a base, and reasoned that there was no retroactivity in taxing installments which were included currently in the federal tax base for the corresponding state year even though the sale may have been made in a prior year. The Respondent denied the Petitioner a $5,000.00 exemption based on its determination that the two corporations herein involved were members of a controlled group of corporations as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code. Chapter 220.14(4), Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part that: "notwithstanding any other provisions of this code, not more than one exemption under this section shall be allowed to the Florida members of a controlled group of corporations, as defined in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1972, filing separate returns under this code." Petitioner's reliance on the case of Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), for the proposition that the 25 percent ownership of an unrelated third party in one of the corporations precluded that corporation and the Petitioner from being considered a "controlled group of corporations" within the meaning of Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code, is misplaced in view of the recent reversal on appeal by the Fourth Circuit. Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia v. C.I.R., 548 F.2d 501 (4th C.A. 1977). Based thereon, it appears that the Respondent correctly determined that the Petitioner and Florida Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., were members of the same controlled group of corporations as provided in Section 1563 of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore properly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to a separate exemption. Based on the legislature's specific rejection of the allocation concept and assuming arguendo, that Florida recognized allocation income for the sales of intangibles, it appears that based on the facts herein, Petitioner is commercially domiciled in Florida. Examination of the tax return submitted to the undersigned revealed that the Petitioner has no property or payroll outside the state of Florida. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the proposed deficiencies as established by the Respondent, Department of Revenue, be upheld in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David S. Meisel, Esquire 400 Royal Palm Way Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Thomas M. Mettler, Esquire 340 Royal Poinciana Plaza Palm Beach, Florida 33480
Findings Of Fact In the original corporate income tax report submitted by Florida Power Corporation for the 1973 tax year the tax was computed using the federal income tax base. This included various depreciation methods and schedules in which accelerated depreciation had been claimed for federal tax purposes by Petitioner in years prior to 1972 and the initiation of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law. By using accelerated depreciation schedules authorized by the federal tax laws, higher depreciation is allowed in the early years of an asset's useful life, leaving a lesser amount of depreciation to be charged off for tax purposes in the latter years of an asset's life. Essentially, Petitioner here contends that depreciable assets acquired prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law were depreciated on accelerated schedules for federal tax purposes, but upon the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law had value in excess of that shown on the federal tax schedule. By requiring taxpayers to use the same depreciation schedules for Florida taxes that are required for federal taxes Petitioner contends it is being penalized for the accelerated depreciation taken before the Florida income tax became constitutional. As an example of Petitioner's position it may be assumed that a depreciable asset was acquired for $100,000 with a useful life of 10 years, three years before the Florida Income Tax Law was passed. Also assume that during this three-year period from acquisition a double declining balance depreciation was taken for computing federal income taxes. Depreciation taken for the first year would be $20,000, for the second year $16,000 and for the third year $12,800, leaving a basis for further depreciation of $41,200 for this asset with seven years useful life remaining. For federal tax purposes Petitioner takes depreciation each year based upon initial cost less accumulated depreciation. Because this value decreased rapidly for the first three years in the assumed example and the excess depreciation thereby generated was not usable in reducing Florida taxes, Petitioner contends it is discriminated against in being required to, in effect, use the book value for federal tax purposes in computing its Florida income tax. Petitioner presented additional examples of reported income for federal income tax purposes which it claims should be exempt from Florida Income Tax. The specific deductions from which the $619,697 refund was computed were not broken down to show how much resulted from the accelerated depreciation schedules which commences prior to January 1, 1972, and how much was derived from these additional examples, some of which were given simply as an example of deferring income for tax purposes. Prior to January 1, 1972, Petitioner purchased some of its bonds prior to maturity and at a discount. As an example if Petitioner purchases $1,000,000 face value of these bonds for $800,000, it has realized a $200,000 gain which it must report as income for federal income tax purposes. These same federal tax rules allow Petitioner to elect to pay the income tax in the year received or spread it equally over the succeeding ten year period. Petitioner elected to spread the income over the succeeding ten year period and each year add $20,000 to its reported income for federal income tax purposes. Since the income was realized before January 1, 1972, Petitioner contends this is not subject to federal tax purposes. With respect to overhead during construction of depreciable assets the taxpayer is allowed to charge these costs off as an expense in the year incurred or capitalize these expenses. If the taxpayer elects to capitalize these expenses they are added to the cost of the constructed asset and recovered as depreciation as the asset is used. Petitioner elected to charge these expenses in the year incurred rather than capitalize them. Had they been capitalized originally, Petitioner would, in 1973, have been entitled to recover these costs in its depreciation of the asset. In its amended return it seeks to treat these costs as if they had been capitalized rather than expenses prior to January 1, 1972. Although apparently not involved in the amended return, Petitioner also presented an example where changes in accounting procedures can result in a gain to the taxpayer which is treated as income to the taxpayer, which he may elect to spread over future years in equal increments until the total gain has been reported.