The Issue Whether the Respondent, Kenneth M. Watson, abandoned his career service position with the Department pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by being absent from work without authorization on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Watson was employed by the Department from June l2, 1985, until November 6, 1987. When Mr. Watson was first employed by the Department he was given a copy of the Florida Department of Transportation Employee Handbook. Mr. Watson was, therefore, informed of the following, which appears on page 43 of the Handbook (DOT exhibit 5-B): JOB ABANDONMENT After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. The leave policy of the Department requires that employees "[g]et your supervisor's approval before taking leave." Page 21 of the Handbook (see DOT exhibit 5-A). In November, 1987, Mr. Watson was employed by the Department as a Highway Maintenance Technician II. He was a Career Service employee. In November, 1987, Mr. Watson worked under the direct supervision of Tommy Gay. Mr. Gay was a welder and had no authority over Mr. Watson other than to supervise work they performed together. Mr. Gay had no authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson's next immediate supervisor was Elzie Mercer, a Highway Maintenance Supervisor IV. Mr. Mercer had authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson's next immediate supervisor was Joseph Heath, the District Bridge Inspection Engineer. Mr. Heath also had the authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. On November 3, 1987, Mr. Watson was absent from work. This absence had been approved by the Department. Mr. Watson was supposed to return to work on November 4, 1987. He was supposed to be at work on November 5 and 6, 1987, also. Mr. Watson did not report to work with the Department on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Neither Mr. Mercer or Mr. Heath approved Mr. Watson's absence for November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Mr. Watson did not directly contact Messrs. Gay, Mercer and Heath, or anyone else at the Department about his absence on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Mr. Watson did not request approval for his absence on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. A woman who identified herself as Mrs. Green called the Department on November 4, 1987, and spoke with the receptionist, Carol Ellis. Mrs. Green informed Ms. Ellis that "if Mr. Watson does not show up at his job in a couple of days he is probably in jail." Ms. Ellis informed Messrs. Gay and Mercer about this conversation. Mrs. Green called again on November 6, 1987, and spoke with Barbara Taylor, a secretary with the Department. Ms. Taylor informed Mr. Heath of this phone call. Mr. Heath had Mr. Gay call the Duval County Jail. Mr. Gay verified that Mr. Watson was in jail. Mr. Watson first spoke with Mr. Heath on November 10, 1987. Mr. Watson informed Mr. Heath that he was in jail. Mr. Watson requested approval of annual and sick leave for the period of his absence. Mr. Watson was told that he could not use sick leave for the absence. Mr. Heath also informed Mr. Watson that he was denying the request for annual leave and that Mr. Watson would be treated as having abandoned his position with the Department because of his unauthorized absence. Mr. Watson spoke with Mr. Heath by telephone again on November 13, 1987. Mr. Heath again denied Mr. Watson's request for leave. On November 17, 1987, Mr. Watson appeared at work for the first time since before his authorized absence on November 3, 1987. He was informed that he could not work and he left. Messrs. Mercer and Heath were not contacted by Mr. Watson and requested to approve his absence from work on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987, until November 10, 1987, or later. At no time did Mr. Watson obtain approval of his absence. Mr. Watson was informed by letter dated November 24, 1987, that he had abandoned his position with the Department. The Department received a letter on November 25, 1987, requesting a formal administrative hearing. Mr. Watson had sufficient annual leave to cover his absence from the Department on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987. He did not have sufficient annual leave to cover his absence through November 17, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Department of Administration concluding that Kenneth M. Watson abandoned his career service position with the Department. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 88-0798 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-3. 2-3 4. 4-5 5. 6 7. 7 11. 8 13. 9 11-15. 10 16. Hereby accepted. See 17. 13 13. 9. But see 16. Mr. Watson attempted to return to work on November 17, 1989. Hereby accepted. 16 18. 17-18 2. 19-20 Although generally true, the Department failed to present evidence sufficient to support these policies. See Florida Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 463 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1 and 3-6. 2 7. 3 9. 4 11. 5 12. Except for the last three sentences, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last three sentences are accepted in findings of fact 14-16. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or irrelevant in this de novo proceeding. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or argument. See 20. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Irrelevant in this de novo proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Larry D. Scott Senior Attorney Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Council 79 is a labor organization whose business is to represent employees in matters involving public employers concerning contractural negotiations and the administration of bargaining agreements. Council 79 employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1987 and 1988. Council 79 has elected officers. Blondie P. Jordan, a black female, is the elected president and chief executive officer of Council 79. Jordan has the authority to employ persons to assist her in carrying out the duties of Council 79. Until the fall of 1988, Cox, a white male, was one of those employed by Council 79, under Jordan. Cox was employed as the Regional Director of Region III (also referred to as Tampa Region) of Council 79, and reported to Jordan. Council 79, under Jordan, also employed several other white males in positions of authority. Those included: Charles Brannon, employed in March, 1988, as the Assistant to the President, who in the absence of Jordan ran the day to day operations of Council 79 Headquarters; Ted Buri, Regional Director in Tallahassee; John Crosby, Business Manager; Mark Neimeisser, lobbyist; and Ben Patterson, Chief Attorney. Council 79 has an Executive Board over which Jordan presides, but through which the Council is governed and operated. During 1987 and 1988, Nancy Serrano, Jimmy Newell, Wesley Leon and Craig Lehning were members of the Executive Board from Region III. Serrano, Leon and Lehning belonged to a group referred to as the "Solidarity Group" that opposed Jordan. During 1987 and 1988, Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning at Executive Board meetings complained to Jordan about the operation of Cox's office in Tampa, particularly about the office staff and Cox not being responsive to the membership of the local unions. However, during this same period of time there were presidents of local unions who complained to Jordan about how these same Executive Board Members were not being responsive to the local union, specifically in regard to how these Executive Board members were attempting to close the Regional Director's Office in Tampa, and advised Jordan that Cox and his staff were working well with the local unions. Also, one member of Cox's staff complained to Jordan about having to drive Cox to meetings and run the office while Cox absence attending to personal business. There was no written documentation that Jordan ever discussed these complaints with Cox or any of his staff, and even though Cox admitted to having heard these complaints, although not from Jordan, he dismissed them as being political because there were coming from the Solidarity Group that opposed Jordan. Notwithstanding Jordan's testimony to the contrary, there is insufficient evidence to show that Jordan discussed any of these complaints with Cox or that Jordan counseled or advised about correcting the problems before November 3, 1988. Apparently, Jordan left the day to day operation of Region II, including the Regional Office, to the discretion of Cox, and expected Cox to correct problems in the Region without being counseled or advised by Jordan unless Cox determined that Jordan's intervention was necessary or appropriate. Likewise, there was no documentation that Cox had ever been reprimanded or counseled about his performance. In fact, the only written documentation concerning Cox's performance (other than an incomplete report by Linoria Anthony which was not received as evidence) of any problems with Cox's performance was the report written by David McGhee to Jordan on November 1, 1988, after McGhee replaced Cox, having been appointed Acting Regional Director of Region III on September 14, 1988 by Jordan. On September 12, 1988, Cox was scheduled to attend a meeting with employees from the City of Fort Myers which McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero were also to attend. Cox was to meet privately with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero before meeting with the employees from Ft. Myers. Before the meeting, Cox was observed around the pool area by Neimesser. Cox did not attend the private meeting with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero but did attend the meeting with the Ft. Myers employees. On September 13, 1988, Neimesser reported to Jordan that Cox had failed to attend the private meeting. On September 14, 1988, as instructed by Jordan, Brannon informed Cox that he was relieved of his duties as Regional Director. Cox was not given an opportunity to explain his failure to attend the private meeting in Ft. Myers, Florida before relieving him of his duties as Regional Director. Although Cox was relieved of his duties as Regional Director, he continued in the employment of Council 79 assisting McGhee in negotiating contracts and other matters. By letter dated September 14, 1988, Jordan appointed David McGhee Acting Regional Director of Region III. McGhee, a black male, employed by the International which Council 79 was affiliated. McGhee was the Assistant Area Director for International and its staff person with responsibility for Region III. McGhee assumed the responsibilities of Acting Regional Director for Region III on September 14, 1988.. McGhee is not now nor has he ever been on the payroll of Council 79. McGhee is continues to be the Acting Regional Director for Region III, and in addition to reporting to Jordan, reports to Gilbert Escudero, a Hispanic male, Area Director for the International and to Gerald McEntee, a white male, president of the International. On September 19, 1988, Cox voluntarily entered Horizon Hospital for treatment. Upon entering Horizon, Cox described his condition as being depressed and unable to function. Cox also described a previous history of excessive alcohol intake to the point of intoxication every weekend since his early twenties. However, there was insufficient evidence to show that Cox was suffering from alcoholism. Cox did not advise Jordan or McGhee or anyone else in authority with Council 79 that he was entering Horizon for treatment, or more specifically that he was being treated for alcoholism. Although Jordan and other employees of Council 79 may have known that Cox consumed alcohol, even to the point of intoxication on occasions, there is insufficient evidence to show that either Jordan or any other employee of Council 79 were aware that Cox had a problem with alcohol, or more specifically that Cox was suffering for alcoholism. As requested by Jordan, McGhee, by letter dated November 1, 1988, reported the problems he had encountered in the Regional Office since assuming the duties of Acting Regional Director. The report basically advised Jordan of the the problems that had been reported earlier by Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning. Additionally, McGhee reported on Cox's failure to negotiate contracts with the city of North Port and Local 167, Hillsborough County before they expired on September 30, 1988. As requested by Jordan, Linoria Anthony prepared a report concerning Cox's failure to negotiate contracts for several local unions in Region III with their employers. However, this report, initially offered as evidence, was withdrawn because Council 79 was unable to furnish a complete copy. On November 3, 1988, Charles Brannon was instructed by Jordan to secure Cox's resignation or to terminate his employment with Council 79. Cox resigned after being given the choices by Brannon. Upon resigning, Cox was to be given certain concessions, including one month's severance pay. Council 79 failed to honor this agreement with Cox, and he obtain a judgment in the County Court of Hillsborough County which was eventually satisfied. While Jordan's decision to effectively terminate Cox's employment (discharge) without first counseling or advising Cox on the problems in Region III as reported to her, and giving him an opportunity to correct those problems may not have been the correct or morally right decision, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Jordan did not terminate Cox's employment because of his race (white) or alleged handicap (alcoholism).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner, Robert Cox, was not discharged due to his race or alleged handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be Dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statute, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner did not file any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); 4(4); 5(4); 6(5); 7(6&7), 9(6); 10(9); 11(10); 12(11); 13(12); 14(13); 16(16&17); 17- 18(18); 19-20(14) and 21(19). Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, except for thesecond phrase, that complaints did not stop, which is adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Proposed finding of fact 15 is neither material nor relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 125 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Robert Cox, Pro se 8514-#3, Daffodil Drive Hudson, FL 34667 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Patterson and Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Respondent?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a Career Service employee with the Respondent. The Petitioner received a copy of an Employee Handbook upon his employment with the Respondent. The Handbook informed the Petitioner of the rules governing absences from work, including the rule providing that an employee will be treated as having abandoned his position if absent for 3 days without authorized leave. The Petitioner was employed as an Investigator in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent in Inverness, Florida. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Shirley Barker. In June, 1986, the Petitioner suffered a seizure. The Petitioner subsequently underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor in June, 1986. The Petitioner returned to work following his surgery on approximately September 15, 1986. Ms. Barker determined that the Petitioner's performance was not up to standard and discussed the need for additional leave with the Petitioner. The Petitioner's physician agreed that it would be beneficial for the Petitioner to have additional time to recover from his surgery and recommended an additional six months leave of absence. The Petitioner signed a Report of Personnel Action indicating that he was going to take leave without pay. The Petitioner's leave was effective October 13, 1986, "for a period of 6 months with return pending medical reevaluation." This leave of absence ended on April 13, 1987. During the Petitioner's 6 months leave of absence he was given a monthly medical evaluation by his physician. In December, 1986, the Petitioner met with Ms. Barker and told her that he planned on returning to his position with the Respondent when his physician approved his return. The Petitioner did not, however, tell Ms. Barker when he would return or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. In March, 1987, the Petitioner met with Barbara Jordan, a supervisor in the Child Support Enforcement Office of the Respondent. This was the Petitioner's only meeting during 1987 with any employee of the Respondent. During this meeting the Petitioner did not indicate when he would return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. By letter dated April 16, 1987, Herbert R. Hildreth, Sr., Human Services Program Manager, and Ms. Barker's supervisor, informed the Petitioner that his 6 months leave of absence had expired. The Petitioner was also informed that he should advise the Respondent by April 26, 1987, of his intentions concerning his employment with the Respondent. Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, was received by the Respondent on April 21, 1987. The Petitioner did not respond to Mr. Hildreth's letter of April 16, 1987, prior to April 26, 1987. By letter dated April 30, 1987, Judith Mesot, Deputy District Administrator of the Respondent, informed the Petitioner that the Respondent considered the Petitioner to have abandoned his Career Service position with the Respondent because the Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave since April 10, 1987. By letter dated May 27, 1987, the Petitioner informed the Respondent that his physician had informed him during a May 20, 1987, appointment that he could return to work on a part-time basis. At no time between October 13, 1986, and April 13, 1987, did the Petitioner inform the Respondent when he intended to return to work or request an extension of his 6 months leave of absence. The first time that the Petitioner informed the Respondent that he was ready to return to work was in his May 27, 1987, letter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner, John Blackford, has abandoned his position with the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2617 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 and 4 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence, see finding of fact number 3. 5 and 6 4. 7 5. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 and 10 6. 11 7. 12 Although the Petitioner testified that he met with Ms. Barker within one day after his monthly examina- tions, the weight of the evidence failed to support this testimony. See 8. Even if the Petitioner had met with Ms. Barker as often as the Petitioner indicated, the Petitioner still did not return to work or obtain approval of his absence after April 13, 1987. 13 and 14 To the extent that these proposed facts were proved by the evidence and are relevant, see finding of fact number 9. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not relevant, however. 15 10 and 12. 16 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1. 2 6. 3 10 and 11. 4 Hereby accepted. 5 11. 6 12. 7 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Don Royston, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District III Building H 1000 Northeast 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 John Blackford 3199 East Quail Court Inverness, Florida 32652 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a career-service employee of Respondent. She served as a health service representative assigned to the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Her specific task was to investigate and follow up on contacts for sexually transmitted diseases. Petitioner's Employee Handbook, which Respondent received when she was hired, states: You may request annual leave for any purpose desired, but you must obtain Your supervisor's approval before taking annual leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask for verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work, complete the leave request form for your supervisor's signature. The Handbook also Provides that certain employees are entitled to one eight-hour personal holiday "at a time which is mutually agreeable to the individual and the immediate supervisor." The local policy of the Seminole County Public Health Unit required each employee to request leave by filling out the back of a timesheet. In this manner, the employee would show the type of leave requested, the date and time of the leave, the employee's initials. The form provided spaces for the signature of the supervisor and the date described in detail in the Paragraph 5 below. The back of the timesheet states: "All Leave and Overtime must be requested and approved in advance." The Handbook requires advance approval of annual leave. Although the blanket statement on the back of the timesheet requires advance approval of all leave and overtime, the Seminole County Public Health Unit routinely did not require advance approval for all types of leave. For instance, sick leave, overtime, and annual leave for less than a few hours were normally approved after the fact. On at least two occasions, including one involving Respondent, annual leave for an entire day was also approved after it had beef taken. However, the Seminole County Public Health Unit normally requires advance approval of annual leave for a Period of one day or more. The instructions on the timesheet direct that the date next to the supervisor's signature indicate the date of the request for leave. Consistent with the varying policies governing leave, the date beside the supervisor's signature on the timesheet was used to show the date of approval of a request for annual leave and the date of the request for sick leave and certain other types of leave. By negative implication, the Handbook also requires written approval of annual leave for nonemergencies because it expressly permits "verbal approval" for annual leave for emergencies. There are no requirements in the Handbook or the timesheets for written approval of requests for other forms of leave, and the Seminole County Public Health Unit did not maintain enforceable policies to that effect. Two persons were authorized to approve requests of Respondent for annual leave. The first person was Charlotte Blades, who was the coordinator of the sexually transmitted disease program of the Seminole County Public Health Unit. Ms. Blades was Respondent's immediate supervisor The other person authorized to approve requests for annual leave was Bernice Duncan, who was the senior community health nurse of the Seminole County Public Health Unit and Ms. Blades' supervisor. In practice, the written approval of Ms. Blades could be revoked by Ms. Duncan. On one occasion, Respondent requested eight hours' annual leave to attend her son's high school graduation on June 9, 1989. Ms. Blades signed the timesheet on May 23, 1989. Between that date and the date of the leave, Ms. Duncan told Respondent that, although Ms. Blades had signed the timesheet, the leave was not approved. Ultimately, Respondent received approval for leave through 2:30 p.m., rather than 5:00 p.m., on the day of the graduation. In late July or early August, 1989, Respondent submitted a timesheet requesting 32 hours' annual leave from August 28-31, 1989. About one week later, before Ms. Blades or Ms. Duncan had acted on the request, Respondent changed the request to September 1, which was the Friday before Labor Day weekend, and September 13-14, 1989. In addition, she requested leave with pay for September 15, 1989, as her personal holiday. According to the timesheets, Ms. Blades approved the September 1 leave request on August 25, 1989, which was a Saturday. She assured Respondent that she would discuss with Ms. Duncan the remaining requests for leave. Respondent followed up with Ms. Blades several times, explaining that she wanted the leave to attend her son's graduation ceremonies from military basic training in South Carolina. Despite her assurances, Ms. Blades had not mentioned Respondent's request to Ms. Duncan before Ms. Blades became sick and missed work from September 6-9. On the second day of Ms. Blades' absence, Respondent took her request to Ms. Duncan, who said that she had not been aware of Respondent's request. Ms. Duncan told Respondent that Ms. Blades was on sick leave and did not respond further. The following day, Respondent spoke again with Ms. Duncan, who this time assured her that if Ms. Blades were not at work on Monday, September 11, Ms. Duncan would sign the timesheet approving the leave requested for September 13-15. Ms. Blades returned to work on Monday, September 11. When Respondent asked her in the morning to sign the timesheet, Ms. Blades refused to do so and told her that it had not yet been approved. Consistent with her prior conversations with Respondent, though, Ms. Blades did not say that the request had been disapproved. Respondent then left the office for much of the day. When she returned, Ms. Blades and Ms. Duncan were both out. The next day, Tuesday, September 12, Ms. Blades spoke with Respondent, but still declined to say whether the request was approved or rejected. She continued to say merely that the request had not yet been approved. Tuesday afternoon, Respondent told a coworker to tell Ms. Blades that Respondent was going to South Carolina and would be back the following Monday morning. While still in town, Respondent telephoned both supervisors shortly after 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday, but they had not arrived at work yet. Respondent asked the receptionist to remind Ms. Blades that Respondent had gone to South Carolina and would return the following Monday morning. Both messages were delivered to Ms. Blades, who relayed them to Ms. Duncan. Respondent then departed for South Carolina, where she remained through at least September 15. At the time of her departure, Respondent knew that her request for annual leave had not been approved and that she was taking unauthorized annual leave. When she arrived back in the office on September 18, Respondent received a copy of a letter dated September 15 that had been mailed to her the prior Friday. The letter states that Respondent had been separated from State service for abandonment of position, effective at the close of business on September 15, 1989. The second paragraph of the letter contains material misstatements of fact. It states that Respondent had been advised that, due to the present work situation, her leave could not be approved. The letter also states that she did not contact her supervisor that she would be absent. No one ever advised Respondent that her leave could not be approved or in fact was rejected until after her return from South Carolina. Also, Respondent informed both supervisors, directly and through third parties, that she would be absent, where she was going, why, and when she would return. However, she did not contact them during the three-day absence. Concerning the request for leave for a personal holiday, neither Ms. Blades nor Ms. Duncan ever informed Respondent that the date was inconvenient. Under the circumstances, Respondent could reasonably infer that the date was agreeable with Ms. Blades. At no time did Respondent intend to abandon her career-service position. The facts do not support a reasonable inference that Respondent abandoned her job during the three days in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has not abandoned her position in Career Service employment with the State of Florida. ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda L. Parkinson Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 701 Orlando, FL 32801 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Alva J. Barfield 1010 Locust Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Judith A. French (French), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department), as a switchboard operator in Riveria Beach, Florida. On three consecutive workdays, to wit: July 7- 9, 1986, French was absent from her employment without authorized leave. By certified letter dated July 10, 1986, the Department advised French that her absence from work since July 7, 1986, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), Florida Administrative Code, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised French of her right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. French timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review. On August 13, 1986, the Department of Administration accepted French's petition and requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing. At hearing, French asserted that her absence was occasioned by a sudden and severe illness she contracted over the fourth of July weekend, which illness she averred rendered her totally incapacitated and unable to contact her employer the week of July 7, 1986. French offered no proof, however, of the cause or nature of her illness but merely testified that she was incapacitated, subject to profuse vomiting, and admitted to a hospital on July 14, 1906, where she was treated for a lack of potassium. While unable to do so personally, French contended that efforts were made on her behalf to advise the Department of her illness. According to Lester Smith (Smith), French's live-in-boyfriend and co-worker at the Department's Riviera Beach office, he made on attempt to call French's supervisor at noon, July 7, 1986, but no one answered the Department's telephone. Smith asserted that his efforts to contact the Department on July 1986, were frustrated by an epileptic seizure he suffered that morning, and the fact that he had to use a pay phone since their phone was out-of-order. Smith did not contend that he was incapacitated by his seizure of July 7, 1986, and offered no further excuse for his failure to notify the Department that he and French would be absent that day. On July 8, 1986, according to French and Smith, their friend Mr. Dudick offered to call the Department concerning their absence, and subsequently advised them that he had been unable to reach their supervisor but had left word with the Department that French and Smith were ill and their telephone out-of- order. Mr. Dudick did not testify at hearing, and there is no record of any such call having been received by the Department. On July 9, 1986, no effort was made to notify the Department that French would be absent from work. The proof established that French's absence from her employment on July 7-9, 1986, was not authorized, and that the Department was not notified that she would be absent due to illness. Consequently, on no less than three consecutive business days her employer was left without the benefit of her services or the notice needed to secure a replacement to perform her duties. While French may have been ill, she offered no proof that would excuse her failure to promptly notify her employer of her incapacity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Judith A. French, abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986 APPENDIX The Department's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraphs 2-7. COPIES FURNISHED: Judith A. French 2815 Broadway, Apartment #1 West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 K. Stuart Goldberg, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against, by being separated from her employment with Respondent, because she sustained a back injury which Respondent perceived as a potential problem and whether she was the subject of disparate treatment as relates to the treatment Respondent afforded its other employees.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Petitioner, Joyce A. Dykes, was employed by Respondent, Quincy Telephone Company, for a period of approximately thirteen (13) years where she served as a service representative/cashier and an operator. Petitioner was laid off on May 27, 1983 based upon a company-wide employment reduction mandated by economic factors. Prior to her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was formerly employed as a bookkeeper with Higdon Furniture Company for approximately 17 years. Petitioner's first date of employment with Respondent was September 28, 1970. Approximately 7 years later, i.e., on November 21, 1977, Petitioner, during the course of her duties as an operator, left her work area and, upon return, sat down in a chair which she described as "wobbly." Petitioner fell backwards from the chair and "landed on her buttocks." Ann Kirkland, a fellow employee, was summoned to the scene of the incident and took Petitioner to the hospital for an examination. Petitioner stayed in the hospital approximately 3 days and returned to work. Since she returned to work, Petitioner has not requested any special treatment such as a convenient parking space, less strenuous duties or other more favorable treatment based on her "back problem." Petitioner expressed that she was leery of complaining to Respondent, and/or its agents, based on her back problem and therefore refused to make noises about that problem. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner experienced a traumatic incident involving the drowning of her son at the pool of a local motel. Petitioner's fellow employees, including Bladis Crow, an employee of Respondent during December, 1980 to October, 1981, and who was in overall charge of Petitioner, attempted to console her during her period of mourning by suggesting that she return to work where she would be in the company of fellow employees who could console her during this low period in her life. During the period of 1980-81 when Petitioner was under the supervision of supervisor Crow, she was "cross-trained" such that she could fill in for other employees during periods of other employee absences including vacations and other leaves. Petitioner, like other employees who were "cross-trained" did not like the idea of learning new tasks and being assigned to perform other duties temporarily. Supervisor Crow perceived Petitioner to be a valuable employee and considered that she got along well with other employees. One other employee, Eunice Hancock, a cashier and service representative, recalled Petitioner bringing in a heating pad and, on occasion, voicing complaints about a backache. During her period of employment with Respondent, Petitioner was perceived as a divisive employee in the minds of Respondent's managerial employees. (Testimony of supervisor Geary 1/; Lila D. Corbin, president and general manager; and Ann Kirkland, a former supervisor and business representative). Petitioner was viewed as an employee with a morale problem and often appeared unhappy and was a source of constant bickering between other employees. Petitioner was reprimanded by Bill Geary, who served as Respondent's supervisor for approximately one year from mid-1982 to the time of her layoff on May 26, 1983. Supervisor Geary interviewed Petitioner respecting a written reprimand he issued her on January 21, 1983. All of the items listed on that reprimand were discussed with Petitioner. Among the items discussed were Petitioner's fellow employees' complaints about her activities including moodiness, low morale and other problems dealing with the quantity and quality of Petitioner's work. Throughout the discussions with supervisor Geary, Petitioner repeatedly attempted to digress from the purpose of her interview and attempted to compare her work with that of other employees. From the time that Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Respondent has undergone three changes of ownership and is presently owned by Teledata Systems (TDS). With the change in ownership by TDS, a number of changes were instituted, some of which stem from the deregulation of the telephone industry. Upon becoming the owner, TDS immediately commissioned an overall forecast study of the operations in Quincy. Following that study, TDS determined that cutbacks in operating costs were necessary to insure profitability. The decision was therefore made to reduce employees and, in some instances, to reclassify positions or redefine the duties of its employees. In keeping with that goal, TDS, through its management, issued a directive to implement a work force reduction during May of 1983. Ms. Corbin, then the president and general manager, first learned of TDS' plans to institute the work force reduction during March of 1983. The plan was divulged to other supervisory and management employees during the week of approximately May 22, 1983. Pursuant to the company-wide reduction plan, TDS determined that of its complement of 83 employees when it took over during January of 1983, the work force needed to be reduced by approximately 11 employees. When the policy directive was issued to managers and supervisors, they were told to rid themselves of employees who did not meet certain criteria deemed critical by management such as the skills of each employee; the difficulty in replacing certain skilled employees and in training replacements; customer relationship; productivity level; ability to learn new skills; ability for overtime work, if and when needed; attendance; salary level; ability to work as a member of a new organizational structure and to be a team player; and the overall attitude toward company, customer and fellow employees. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Those employees considered as fitting within the category of employees needing to be laid off were employees who came in late and left early; were repeatedly absent; performed sloppy work; wasted time and material; engaged in personal telephoning; stretched breaks and lunch hours; spent too much time in the washrooms and talked to other employees about personal activities; rudeness that causes customer irritation and costly work errors. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) During the time when the work force reduction was implemented, Petitioner was on vacation. Prior to that time, she had been afforded training as a keypunch operator. Of the 3 employees who were given keypunch training with Petitioner, Petitioner was tested as having the least leadership skills of the three. When the work force reduction was implemented, 11 employees were laid off. Presently that number has increased from 11 to 19. The only area where there has been one (1) employee hired is an employee trained to operate the Respondent's "complex" PBX and PABX systems. It is true that there were employees with less seniority than Petitioner who were retained, however seniority (length of service) was considered to be only a factor if it is also indicative of the experience gained and versatility (of the employee). Respondent considered that there were other factors more paramount which would influence the retention decision. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, paragraph 2) Respecting Respondent's claim that the Respondent perceived her back injury as a handicap or a potential problem, the evidence fails to sustain her claim in that regard. What the facts show is that while Petitioner did sustain an on-the-job injury during 1977, evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the injury was perceived the Respondent as a problem it needed to rid itself of or that it was a physical handicap which could or would be the source of a problem for Respondent. Noteworthy is the fact that Petitioner never requested any preferential treatment in her job assignments based on this claimed handicap other than one isolated incident wherein she spoke to her then- supervisor Geary at the time that she was asked if she desired training as a keypunch operator. For all of these reasons and the wide range of layoffs implemented by this Respondent during May of 1983, Petitioner's claim does not appear meritorious but was rather necessitated by changes in the telephone industry which continues today to have an economic impact on the Respondent. Respondent developed nondiscriminatory criteria which were given to all management types to use in determining what employees should be retained. The criteria was not designed to weed out or eliminate troublesome employees but, rather, to determine those employees to be retained and the criteria which guided that retention decision. That decision appeared to have been based solely on economic and business decisions of the Respondent company as a whole. 2/ Petitioner failed to establish that she was the subject of unlawful disparate treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice (discrimination under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes) against Petitioner on the basis of his race (Black/African-American), handicap, or retaliation, and if so, what is the remedy? Although cases arising under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) may be instructive for interpreting and applying the handicap provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, Petitioner's claim under ADA and any allegations of libel and slander are not within the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lawrence James, Jr., is a Black/African- American. Respondent, The Alachua County Department of Criminal Justice Service, is an "employer" within the definition in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent operates the Alachua County Jail. Respondent maintains a paramilitary command, advancement, and ranking system for its employees. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a Correctional Officer and rose to the rank of Sergeant. On March 2, 1994, an inmate escaped from the Alachua County Jail during the evening shift. As a result of the inmate's escape, several correctional officers were disciplined. Petitioner was disciplined by a reduction in rank April 26, 1994. (P-37) There were allegations that harsher discipline had been meted out to the Black/African-American officers, and the matter was arbitrated, pursuant to the union collective bargaining contract. As a result of the arbitration, in the summer of 1994, it was recommended that Petitioner be returned to his position at the Jail with restoration of rank, but without any back pay. However, at the time of that recommendation, Petitioner already had been terminated for "a non-related infraction of county policy." (P-37) The "non-related infraction of county policy" reason for Petitioner's 1994 termination was not established on this record, but neither was any discriminatory reason proven.2 After Petitioner's 1994 termination, further proceedings ensued, and Petitioner was ultimately restored to his rank and position at the Jail. As part of this restoration, it was agreed the Respondent employer would conduct training and re-orientation sessions for Petitioner, since he had not actively been performing his duties at the Jail for approximately two years. The present case only addresses the discrimination Petitioner allegedly suffered due to race, handicap, or retaliation concerning his leave requests in 1996, and his 1997 termination for unauthorized absence. After his second successful arbitration(s) and/or grievance procedure, Petitioner was eligible to return to work on February 19, 1996. He did not return on that date. Respondent ordered Petitioner back to work on March 13, 1996, at which time Petitioner requested, and was granted, leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). It is not clear if Petitioner ever made Respondent aware that he suffered from high blood pressure, but from the evidence as a whole, it is found that Petitioner notified Respondent in March 1996, that he was suffering from a prior on- the-job injury to his back, diabetes, and depression. Diabetes, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Clinical depression, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner contended at hearing that his clinical depression in 1996 was due to his 1994 demotion and termination and the procedures to get his job back and also due to the hostile work environment he anticipated he would face if he returned to work daily in 1996 with people whom he perceived as having lied about him and who had tried to terminate him. It should be noted that Petitioner did not clearly include "hostile work environment" in either his 1998, Charge of Discrimination or his 2000, Petition for Relief. The Florida Commission on Human Relations only considered and referred the instant case upon allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, and retaliation. From Petitioner's description of his back ailment, it is found that condition also constituted a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. From Petitioner's description of how his back injury affected his daily life and job performance, it is very doubtful that Petitioner was able to physically fulfill the requirements of being a jailor at any time in 1996 until he was terminated in 1997. No evidence was presented with regard to the workers' compensation consequences of this situation. By an April 1, 1996, letter, Respondent's Interim Director of Criminal Justice Service, Richard Tarbox, informed Petitioner that he had exhausted his sick leave credits as of the pay period ending March 31, 1996; that based on Respondent's records, Petitioner would exhaust the balance of his accrued sick leave at the rate of forty hours per week during the pay period ending May 12, 1996; that he was expected to know his available accrued leave credits and to contact his immediate supervisor at least one week prior to the expiration of the current leave period to request leave without pay if he anticipated not returning to work; and that he had been placed on FMLA leave for an indefinite period, not to exceed twelve weeks, which would expire on June 6, 1996. (R-30) The April 1, 1996, letter specifically informed Petitioner that failure to come to work or contact Respondent could be considered abandonment of his position. (R-30) The foregoing instructions concerning "abandonment of position" parallel Alachua County's Personnel Regulations and Disciplinary Policy, hereafter sometimes referred to collectively as "personnel regulations." (P-1). Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; c. Group III Offenses No. 8, at pages 5-6, of the personnel regulations had existed prior to Petitioner's 1994 termination, and was in effect at all times material. It provided, Absence of three consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ. The personnel regulations also provided in Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; a. Group I Offenses No. 8, at pages 3-4, that the following offense would subject an employee to progressive discipline: Absence without authorization or failure to notify appropriate supervisory personnel on the first day of absence. (Emphasis supplied). This regulation also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994, and was in effect at all times material. Progressive discipline for the first such offense was written instruction, counseling and/or one-day suspension. For the second occurrence, one to five days' suspension was specified. For the third occurrence, up to five days' suspension or discharge was specified. These provisions also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994 and were in effect at all times material. Petitioner was also familiar with the long-standing progressive discipline system of Respondent's personnel regulations. Basically, this system required that discipline first be proposed in writing by a superior. The proposed discipline would go into effect and become actual discipline if the employee did not appear at a hearing to dispute the charges or the proposed discipline. If the employee prevailed at the hearing, the proposed discipline would be rescinded or altered. If the employee did not prevail, the proposed discipline would be reduced to writing in another document, and the employee then had the option of filing a grievance pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement or of appealing through the personnel system to a citizens' board. While Petitioner had been absent in 1994-1996, a new requirement had been added to the personnel regulations, under Chapter A-299, which required that employees who planned to be absent, must notify their immediate supervisor no later than 30 minutes from the time they are scheduled to report for work. (Emphasis supplied) The "immediate supervisor" or "appropriate supervisory personnel" in Petitioner's situation would have been the lieutenant on his shift. However, Petitioner and Lt. Little, who became his supervisor, concurred that the custom at the Jail always had been to require that employees contact the shift sergeant on the shift preceding an emergency absence, or if that were not possible, to contact the employee's own shift sergeant or anyone else on that shift. Jail custom also provided that the employee who was going to be absent could rely on any person on his shift to deliver his oral message to the employee's supervising lieutenant and that approval or disapproval paperwork would be handled by that lieutenant after notification. On June 6, 1996, Petitioner still had not returned to work. Instead, he requested leave without pay until June 15, 1996. Respondent granted Petitioner's request. This constituted an accommodation of Petitioner's handicap(s) in that he had no remaining earned leave or entitlement to FMLA leave, yet his employer held his position open for his return. On or about June 10, 1996, Anthony F. Greene, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at Vista Pavilion, a free-standing psychiatric facility, released Petitioner to return to work. He wrote to Respondent's Risk Manager that Petitioner continued to have problems with depression, which might prove "volatile" in a work environment with superiors Petitioner believed had harassed him by terminating and blaming him for the 1994 escape. At approximately the same time, Richard Greer, M.D., medical specialty unexplained, also released Petitioner to return to work, upon the conditions that Petitioner continue to see Dr. Greene on a weekly basis and continue to take his prescriptive medications. By a July 17, 1996, letter (P-4), Interim Director Richard Tarbox notified Petitioner to report for work at the Jail on the evening shift of July 22, 1996. The letter required Petitioner to continue his sessions with Dr. Greene; to continue to take his prescriptive medications; and to take the re- training and re-orientation specified as a result of the resolution of his 1994 termination and return to work. (See Finding of Fact 7.) The July 17, 1996, letter also included the sentence, We are in the process of contacting Dr. Greene to establish a procedure to verify that you continue your sessions with him. Petitioner interpreted this sentence as the employer's promise "[T]o get all my leave slips, find out when I was going to the doctor, my mental condition, and also my medical condition." (TR-Vol.II, pages 175-176) Petitioner's interpretation of this sentence was unreasonable in light of its express language, the context of the remainder of the July 17, 1996, letter, the instructions of the April 1, 1996, letter (See Findings of Fact 16-17), and what Petitioner already knew of the County's personnel regulations and/or the Jail custom requiring him to call in and/or apply for leave to be subsequently approved or disapproved by his supervisor. Nothing in the July 17, 1996, letter altered the requirements of the personnel regulations or the April 1, 1996, letter. Petitioner bore the responsibility to ask for medical leave sufficiently in advance of his absences. On July 22, 1996, Petitioner reported for work at the Jail as instructed and was assigned to an evening shift supervised by Lt. Stover. According to Sgt. Babula, Petitioner also worked under Shift Sgt. Withey at some point in July 1996. However, by July 1996, Petitioner was an insulin- dependent diabetic. He needed to self-administer a shot of insulin each morning and night. To ensure ideal spacing of these two shots, Petitioner almost immediately requested to work the day shift. Respondent accommodated this request concerning Petitioner's handicaps and assigned him to the day shift under Lt. Little and Sgt. Babula, as shift sergeant. Petitioner claimed his handicaps were not accommodated by Respondent, but in addition to approving leave for him from February 19, 1996, to July 22, 1996, not replacing him during that period, and the change of shift made in July 1996, at Petitioner's request, Sgt. Babula testified to approving special shoes for Petitioner due to his diabetes. By September 1996, Petitioner again had used up all of his accrued leave. Accordingly, he had to ask for leave without pay to visit his various doctors, including Dr. Greene. On September 9, 1996, during a therapy session, Petitioner told Dr. Greene that he had been threatened on the job and that he was pursuing resolution of the incident through appropriate channels. The same day, Dr. Greene wrote to Lt. Little, telling him of the threat. The nature of this alleged threat or who made it was not stated in Dr. Greene's letter or at hearing. The letter cleared Petitioner to return to work September 12, 1996. This out-of-court statement to his psychotherapist at that time does not establish the truth of the statement or that Petitioner's superiors made the alleged threat. Also, the threat, if one existed, could not have related to Petitioner's written leave requests, because Petitioner's earliest dispute about leave did not occur until September 13, 1996. (See Finding of Fact 41). The September 9, 1996, date was not related by testimony to any oral or written request for leave or any disciplinary matter in evidence. Petitioner testified to having been threatened on the job sometime prior to September 9, 1996, but he never testified what the threat was, why the threat was made, or by whom the threat was made. Petitioner's witness, Alfred Dickerson, also is African-American. He testified generally that it was "pure hell" at the Jail for anyone who, like himself and Petitioner, had been disciplined due to the 1994 escape and who had prevailed in the resultant grievance activities, but he could not remember any specific incidents involving Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Dickerson was out of the Jail, on workers' compensation leave, from May 1996 to October 1997, the whole of the material time frame for this case.3 On September 16, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay to Lt. Little, his supervisor, for the previous dates of September 13 and 15, stating thereon that he had been ill those days and that the request was being made because his request to work his days off to make up for the 16 hours of leave he had used on September 13 and 15 had been denied. The request does not specifically mention "flex time." (P-6) "Flex time," as described by both Petitioner and Lt. Little, would have permitted Petitioner to work his days off, instead of taking time off without pay to make up time used to go to his doctors on days he was scheduled to work. However, if an employee asked to use flex time in this way, another employee had to trade days with him, and the exchange would be worked out by the supervising lieutenant. On October 1, 1996, Petitioner was given a "Letter of Warning" by Lt. Little. The Warning reflected that Petitioner's advising a sergeant other than his immediate supervisor, Lt. Little, on September 24, 1996, that he was not coming to work until some personal matters were taken care of, was insufficient notice and was being treated as "absence without authorization" in violation of the personnel regulations. It also stated, It has been standard practice and understood that you must notify your immediate supervisor . . . please be advised that any further violations of this nature may result in docked pay and progressive disciplinary action . . . Attached to this document was a Notice of Disciplinary Action, also prepared October 1, 1996, stating, Disciplinary action taken as a result of the Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action dated blank not filled in. (Except for WARNING) WARNING (Reasons for warning): Violation of Alachua County Personnnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, a., Group I, Offense No. 8 'Absence without authorization'. (P-8) The same document notified Petitioner that he had a right to appeal the Warning pursuant to either the personnel regulations or the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement, as appropriate. Petitioner did not acknowledge receipt of this latter document until October 7, 1996. (P-8/R-19) Also on October 1, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay for September 23- 26 and for September 29-30, to Captain King. The reason for Petitioner's absence September 23-26 was not stated on the formal request, but Petitioner did again state thereon that his request to "flex" his days off had been denied, presumably by Lt. Little. The time for September 29-30 was requested for "personal business and emergency family leave without pay" due to his mother's seeing a doctor about her detached retinas. (P-7) Respondent is not obligated under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, to accommodate Petitioner's family's handicaps.4 On October 21, 1996, a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action" was issued by Lt. Little, apparently covering the same date, September 24, 1996, as his October 1, Warning, and adding other dates. The reasons for the proposed discipline given in this October 21, 1996, Notice differ slightly from the content of the October 1, Warning. The October 21, 1996, Notice related that on September 23, Petitioner had spoken to Captain King and Lt. Little, and because his request for leave had been made in advance, Petitioner had been granted the day off; that on September 24, Petitioner had failed to report to work and failed to request an extension of leave, and he was therefore considered to be "absent without authorization" for September 24, 1996. The October 21, Notice further stated that on September 25, Petitioner had called Captain King, requesting leave without pay for September 25 and 26, and because Petitioner had requested leave in advance, Captain King had granted the request covering those two days, but that on his October 1, leave request (see Finding of Fact 44) Petitioner had included two more days, September 29 and 30, which had not been previously authorized. Finally, the October 21, Notice indicated that on September 30, Petitioner had called Lt. Stover to say that he would be reporting to work as soon as he was through testifying to the Grand Jury that afternoon, and that his failure to request leave in advance was being treated as "absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." As of this October 21, 1996, Notice, the proposed disciplinary action became suspending Petitioner without pay. Petitioner was offered an opportunity to contest the proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on November 19, 1996. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of this document on October 24, 1996. (R-21) On October 22, 1996, Petitioner wrote to the Interim Director of the Jail, Richard Tarbox. In his letter, Petitioner complained that he had not yet received the agreed re- orientation and re-training. He also discussed his medical problems, including problems with recent changes in his medications and his five-year-old back injury. He requested flex time and related that his life had been threatened by employees on the job (see Findings of Fact 37-40), and that Lt. Little had been informed of the threats and flex time request, but the letter again did not indicate by whom Petitioner was threatened or why. (P-10) Despite Petitioner's after-the-fact written requests for flex time, Lt. Little had no recollection of Respondent ever asking him for flex time. There is no evidence that Lt. Little, Mr. Tarbox, or any other representative of Respondent contacted Petitioner concerning the alleged threat against him or specifically addressed the issues of re-orientation/re-training or flex time. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Greene also wrote Mr. Tarbox. He described Petitioner as cooperative and not evidencing any inappropriate behavior. He reported that Petitioner had voiced no homicidal or vengeance ideation to him. He felt that Petitioner's supervisors' requirement that Petitioner use leave to attend the mandatory therapy sessions with him constituted a paradox and a stressor for Petitioner. He felt that other stressors were the employer's failure to offer re-orientation/ re-training to Petitioner and the employer's failure to contact him, Dr. Greene, to verify treatment purposes and schedules. Dr. Greene requested that Mr. Tarbox clarify Petitioner's treatment and work status to both him and to Petitioner in a timely manner because not doing so was exacerbating Petitioner's physical condition, headaches, and diabetes. He further stated that he could release Petitioner for work without further psychological treatment and that further psychological treatment was not necessary to ensure Petitioner's fitness for work or to prevent his being a risk to others, but that Petitioner would continue in therapy for other purposes. (P-11) Neither Mr. Tarbox nor any other representative of Respondent specifically replied to Dr. Greene's October 25, 1996, letter. However, all leave disputes pending on that date were addressed in a November 22, 1996, letter to Petitioner from Captain King. (See Findings of Fact 57-59.) On October 31, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for eight hours leave without pay for leave he had taken on October 30, 1996, for "emergency dr. app't for work related injury, and lab work for diebetic [sic] condition." (P-14) At some point, a leave form for eight hours leave without pay on November 9, 1996, was prepared. It indicates that Petitoner was "unavailable to sign." This form was disapproved by Lt. Little and by Mr. Tarbox on November 12, 1996. Apparently Petitioner only signed the request on November 26, 1996. (P-21) On November 14, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 15, 1996, for "work related condition, Dr. Greene." (P-15) On November 19, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 22, 1996. The request was approved by a supervisor on November 19, 1996. (P-17) On November 22, 1996, Captain King issued a "Letter of Warning" to Petitioner. It stated that on November 19, 1996, a disciplinary hearing had been held (see Finding of Fact 47) regarding the October 21, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action, addressing Petitioner's absences on September 29-30, 1996, and that because Petitioner had proven that he had attempted to contact his supervisor in advance of his absence, the September 29 violation was being withdrawn. With regard to the September 30 violation charged, it was found that Petitioner had contacted Lt. Stover and informed him that Petitioner would return to work after testifying before The Grand Jury, and since Petitioner had not returned to work on that day after testifying, he was being found guilty as charged for violation of Alachua County Personnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3. a. Group I, Offense No. 8, "Absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." The November 22, 1996, letter went on to warn Petitioner that future violations would be more carefully scrutinized for strict adherence to the policy of notification and that failures on Petitioner's part might result in progressive disciplinary action being taken. (P-20) Because prior discipline had been overturned or rescinded, the November 22, 1996, Letter of Warning was technically Petitioner's first violation/discipline. Also on November 22, 1996, Petitioner submitted to Lt. Little a leave request form, dated the same day, labelled "FOR INFO.," with supporting documentation, including Dr. Hunt's certificate showing Petitioner had been treated on November 4, and November 22, 1996, had office management of HTN/NIDDM hematuria, a pending IVP and urology consult, and would need to be seen again by Dr. Hunt in 4-6 weeks. The language of one attachment showed Petitioner "is under Dr. Hunt's continual care," but nothing specified any period of time Petitioner intended to take off from work for the pending consultation or any other purpose. (P-19) Petitioner testified that his November 22, 1996, leave request was not intended to request any leave at all when he submitted it, but that it should have alerted his supervisors that Petitioner had a growth between his legs that was potentially malignant and that he needed an operation sometime in the future. A reasonable person would not have concluded this from the four corners of the November 22, 1996, written request with attachments dated for past medical appointments. Petitioner also testified that by submitting the November 22, 1996, leave request "in blank" and explaining orally to Lt. Little what he intended to do was his effort to comply with the requirement that he ask for leave in advance of taking it. This testimony shows that Petitioner at this point understood the employer's prior instructions to request leave in advance. Apparently, Petitioner envisioned only having to phone in to get any member of his shift to fill in the blanks on his November 22, 1996, request form, but he admitted he had never before used a blank leave request in this way. Petitioner further testified that he had told Mr. Tarbox and other supervisors at a meeting (probably one of his disciplinary hearings) before Christmas 1996, that he "did not know how long he could work." While this representation of Petitioner is credible and it may be reasonably inferred that Mr. Tarbox understood Petitioner was debilitated to some degree by the growth and might need an operation sometime in the near future, it does not logically follow that all those hearing Petitioner at that time understood that his oral statement related to the November 22 blank leave request which had attached to it only information about past doctors' appointments and potential, undated, future consultations. Petitioner's vague statement at the meeting/hearing did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail for requesting leave. The blank November 22, 1996, leave request marked "FOR INFO" also did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail. There is no requirement that Respondent grant Petitioner an open-ended request for leave or one that specifies no time period at all. Petitioner's November 22, 1996, blank leave request was never approved. On November 26, 1996, Petitioner also acknowledged receipt of a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action," by which Lt. Little and Mr. Tarbox recommended that Petitioner be suspended without pay.5 Petitioner was again offered an opportunity to contest this proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on December 3, 1996. (P-18) The record is silent as to whether a disciplinary hearing was actually held on December 3, 1996. Petitioner submitted a leave form on December 6, 1996, for 2.5 hours "vacation" leave without pay on December 3, 1996, for a "Conference with doctor to try an [sic] stop continued disciplinary action because of illness doctor approved." (P-23) On December 3, 1996, Petitioner had telephoned Lt. Little to ask if his message had been received. He then reported to work at 10:00 a.m. Respondent's business records (P-22) show the following: Petitioner worked December 4-5, some of December 6, and all of December 7, 1996. He was not required to be at work on December 8-9. He called in sick on December 10-11. On December 12, he reported for work and attended five hours of drug policy training. Then he left for medical reasons and later called in to say he was too sick to return to work. On Friday, December 13, Petitioner called in sick, saying he was going to the doctor for a cut foot. He later called in again and was told that he needed to do his timesheet and it was agreed he would do it and have it in the following Monday. Petitioner was absent on Saturday, December 14. He was not required to be at work on December 15-16, 1996. On Monday, December 17, Petitioner did not phone or appear for work. On December 18, Petitioner phoned in, saying he had to wear bedroom slippers and had domestic problems. On December 19, Petitioner called in late and left a voice message on the Jail phone. On Friday, December 20, Petitioner called in on time but said he would not be in until Tuesday of the following week. He gave no reason. He was not required to be at work on December 22-23. On December 24, 1996, Petitioner did not come to work or call in. On Christmas Day, Petitioner called in before shift and stated he would not be in that day or the following day, December 26, 1996, until 10:00 a.m. On December 26, December 27, and December 28, Petitioner did not report for work or call in. Petitioner was not required to work December 29 or 30, 1996. On December 31, Petitioner called and said that he would not be in that day but would call back to talk to the shift lieutenant. He did not do so. Also, Petitioner did not report for work or call in for January 1 through 4, 1997. Most of this business record was substantiated by the direct testimony of Sgt. Babula and Lt. Little who observed the events and wrote most of the business record. The matters that were not confirmed in their direct testimony were supported by the type of hearsay that explains or supplements direct evidence and is admissible in this type of proceeding. Petitioner acknowledged that the business record was essentially correct as to days he was absent in December 1996, and January 1997. Petitioner's testimony only varies the foregoing business record to the effect that on December 10, 1996, not December 13, 1996, Petitioner called and spoke with Sgt. Withey, stating that he would not "be back [to work] until [he had] seen and heard from [his] doctors," and related to Withey that he had some problem with his foot. Petitioner assumed that his superiors would get this message and would understand that he meant he was exercising the blank November 22, 1996, leave request. (See Findings of Fact 60-66). His superiors did not infer from this message what Petitioner had hoped they would. A reasonable person would not infer all that from the information Petitioner says he provided Sgt. Withey. It is uncontested that Petitioner did have an injury to his foot at this time and that such injuries can be particularly hazardous to persons who, like Petitioner, suffer from diabetes. From December 4, 1996, onward, Petitioner did not speak directly with his lieutenant, although he had been repeatedly instructed to do so in order to request advance leave. Petitioner did not return to work after December 7, 1996. Despite the personnel rules, custom at the Jail, and prior direct orders by warning and disciplinary action letters, Petitioner submitted no leave slips directly to his superiors after December 6, 1996. Instead, he submitted them to his union shop steward and to a County Commissioner, although he had no reason to believe the Commissioner had any authority over Jail personnel matters. Respondent never authorized leave for Petitioner after December 13, 1996. Petitioner's extended absence without authorization was in violation of Respondent employer's long-standing "three day abandonment rule." There had been no word from Petitioner since December 31, 1996, so between January 17 and January 24, 1997, a "Notice of Disciplinary Action" was issued against Petitioner for [V]iolation of Alachua County Personnel Rules and Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, c., Group III, Offense No. 8 'Absence of three (3) consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ.' The proposed discipline was termination, and again, Petitioner was offered the opportunity to contest the proposed final agency action at a hearing to be convened on February 18, 1997. (P-25) Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner saw a Master of Social Work, because Dr. Greene was on educational leave. Petitioner was so upset that the social worker advised him to focus on his medical problems. Apparently, Petitioner leapt to the conclusion that meant his doctors would handle all his leave-related problems. Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner had successful surgery on the growth between his legs. On January 27, 1997, Dr. Greene saw Petitioner in therapy and notified Mr. Tarbox in writing that, Mr. Lawrence James was seen for an appointment today in my office. He is apparently unable to continue working in what is perceived to be a hostile work environment at the jail. Compounded by his medical problems and what seems to be a lack of responsivity and accommodation by the administration, Mr. James' level of emotional distress has considerably increased since our last communication. It is strongly recommended that he take a leave of absence from the workplace until his condition is improved. He is scheduled to return next week for continued intervention. Thank you for your time and attention. (Emphasis supplied) (P-26) Dr. Greene testified that it was Petitioner's combined mental and physical circumstances which caused him to recommend the leave of absence. The January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action was mailed to the last address Petitioner had given Respondent. On January 30, 1997, Petitioner's mother signed the certified mail receipt for the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action. Sometime thereafter, she delivered the Notice to Petitioner, who no longer lived with her. He refused to deal with it. Dr. Brient removed a suture from Petitioner's leg on February 4, 1997. This seems to have related to Petitioner's post-surgery release after removal of the growth between his legs. Petitioner did not then return to work. Because Respondent's principals had not recognized Petitioner's mother's name on the certified mail receipt, they caused the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to be served on Petitioner by a Deputy Sheriff. Petitioner received this personal service on February 5, 1997, and told the Deputy that he would not deal with the Notice of Disciplinary Action, but his doctors would. Having been released as a result of his operation, there was no physical reason Petitioner could not have appeared for the February 18, 1997, hearing to present any opposition to his proposed termination based on "the three day abandonment rule." He did not appear. On February 21, 1997, Petitioner was mailed a "Notice of Dismissal," effective that date and signed by Harry Sands, a new Interim Director, for abandoning his position, in violation of the personnel regulations. The Notice of Dismissal gave Petitioner the option of appealing his termination through the employee appeal system or the collective bargaining grievance procedure. Petitioner did not take either appeal route. However, Petitioner did suggest to another Jail officer that those who had done this to him might need to get a pine box, i.e. coffin. The threat was not deemed worthy of prosecution by the State Attorney's Office. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that he never received the promised re-orientation or re-training associated with re-instatement to his job. No witness gave any clear indication of what the re- orientation and re-training, as contemplated by the re- instatement agreement (see Finding of Fact 7) or as contemplated by Mr. Tarbox's July 17, 1996, letter (see Finding of Fact 29), was supposed to include. Lt. Stover did not remember any specific training he gave Petitioner, nor did Lt. Little, but Lt. Little testified that he was present when, before Petitioner first arrived on Lt. Stover's shift in July 1996, the Captain had ordered them both to "bring [Petitioner] up to speed." Petitioner suggested that failure to re-orient and retrain him evidenced Respondent's discrimination against him. His post-hearing proposal also asserts that due to Respondent's failure to train him in "new" personnel regulations, combined with Respondent's requirement that he adhere to those regulations which Jail custom did not normally follow, constituted disparate treatment and/or discrimination against him on the basis of his race or due to retaliation, and/or failure to accommodate his handicap. This perception is unpersuasive in light of the employer's repeated correspondence urging him to take the training, whatever that training might have been. Despite Mr. Tarbox's failure to reply to Petitioner's October 22, 1996, inquiry about training (See Finding of Fact 48), Petitioner's perception of discrimination was not established as fact. From the evidence as a whole, it is more probable that any failure to train Petitioner was the result of his request to change shifts, and thus, lieutenant-supervisors in July or his frequent absences. The record does not make clear whether the re-orientation/re-training requirement was unique to Respondent, who returned in 1996, or applied to all four of the returning African-American officers restored in 1994, but Petitioner did not demonstrate that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than he did. He did not establish that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than the other restored African-American officers, handicapped or otherwise. He also did not establish that any other restored African-American officer, handicapped or otherwise, received more re- orientation/re-training than he did. Moreover, contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Sergeant Babula testified credibly that he had at least instructed Petitioner with regard to the new payroll forms when Petitioner changed shifts in July 1996. Payroll forms include calculating hours worked and monies owed. Testimony and business records also show Petitioner had five hours of drug policy training. (See Finding of fact 72). Also, Respondent did not discipline Petitioner for his failure to request leave of specific personnel as required by the only new personnel regulation, until after Petitioner had been instructed in writing to do so. These written instructions may not have constituted complete "re-orientation" or "re- training," but they were direct orders sufficient to instruct Petitioner what was expected of him. (See Findings of Fact 16, 29, 43, 46-47, 57-59). Lastly, based on Petitioner's testimony that even if he had known he was required by a new regulation to request leave from his lieutenant-supervisor he would not have followed that regulation but instead would have considered himself bound by his union contract and by the custom of asking for leave of anyone on his shift at the Jail, it appears that any failure of Respondent to specifically "train" Petitioner concerning new personnel regulations had no effect on his subsequent failure to comply with the employer's expectations concerning its leave policy. Petitioner had admitted in evidence a certified copy of a "Second Superceding Indictment" issued by a federal Grand Jury on February 27, 2001. It was not established that this was the same Grand Jury before which Petitioner testified in 1996. (See Finding of Fact 47). The indictment (which is only a charging document, not a conviction) named Nate Caldwell, Respondent's former Director; Samuel Krider, Respondent's former Assistant Director; Garry M. Brown, a former Captain with Respondent; and Charles Scott Simmons, a former Lieutenant with Respondent, for conspiracy to obstruct justice by violating 18 USC Section 1503, by hindering the court and jury in a federal civil rights action brought by Mr. Dickerson against the Alachua County Board of County Commissioners. Mr. Dickerson's federal case arose out of Mr. Dickerson's demotion in rank with Petitioner in connection with the 1994 escape. It was not established that any of the indicted officials held office during the time material to Petitioner's instant case, 1996- 1997, or that any of them had anything to do with Petitioner's 1996 leave disputes or 1997 termination. Indeed, it was established that Sands or Tarbox was Interim Director at all times material. The indictment mentions Petitioner and Captain King, a superior of Petitioner at all times material, but neither Petitioner nor Captain King were indicted. Despite the lack of clarity of Petitioner's and Mr. Dickerson's testimony, the undersigned infers from their testimony and the indictment that Petitioner testified concerning the same matters before the Grand Jury in 1996 and that prior to 1996 Petitioner had been a witness in Mr. Dickerson's federal discrimination case against the County Commissioners. However, Petitioner testified that his retaliation allegation herein is not based on his 1996 testimony before the Grand Jury. Rather, Petitioner asserted at hearing that he believed he had been retaliated against by his superiors in 1996-1997 for speaking at 1993 meetings of the County Commission concerning structural and staffing problems at the Jail, and otherwise he did not know why he had been retaliated against. (TR-Vol. I pp. 229-233).
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Petitioner has not proven discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment as an educational support employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a food service worker at Lehigh Acres Middle School in Lee County, Florida (the school), from October 22, 1998, until August 2, 2004, when Petitioner suspended Respondent with pay and benefits. A food service worker is an educational support employee defined in Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner proposes to terminate Respondent's employment on the basis of facts alleged in the Petition for Termination dated August 11, 2004 (the petition). In relevant part, the petition alleges that during the 2003-2004 school year Respondent was guilty of excessive absences that affected Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015 of the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Support Personnel Association of Lee County (SPALC agreement). During the 2003-2004 school year, Respondent's work day began at 8:30 a.m. and ended at 3:00 p.m. Each day included two paid 15-minute breaks and one unpaid 30-minute lunch break. Respondent's immediate supervisor adopted a policy identified in the record as a "ready-to-work" policy. The policy required food service workers, including Respondent, to put on their hair nets and aprons and wash their hands before beginning work. After a worker was ready to work, the worker then entered in a daily log sheet the time that the worker began work each day. The policy also required each worker to record in the daily log the time the worker left work and any period that the worker left and returned to work in the same day. The supervisor incorporated the "ready-to-work" policy in a revised employee handbook. The revised handbook was distributed to food service workers on September 26, 2003. On December 10, 2003, Respondent signed a form acknowledging that she had read the revised handbook. On 47 days from August 14, 2003, through May 20, 2004, Respondent was late to work, left work early, left for part of the same day, or was absent the entire day. Respondent was late to work on 20 days, left work early on 13 days, was absent 13 days, and left for part of one day for two hours and ten minutes. Petitioner deems all 47 instances to be "absences" within the meaning of Section 9.015 of the SPALC agreement. Assuming arguendo that all 47 instances are absences, the preponderance of evidence does not show that the absences were unauthorized. The supervisor testified at the hearing. The supervisor did not have authority to approve or disapprove absences. Rather, the head of the department or the school principal authorized requests for absences. Neither the head of the department nor the principal testified at the hearing. The supervisor did not know whether Respondent's absences were unauthorized. The supervisor merely reported the 47 absences to the "front office" and later determined they were unauthorized and excessive. Petitioner did not submit personnel records that may have documented which absences, if any, were unauthorized. Counsel for Petitioner argued during the hearing that even authorized absences can adversely affect Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015. However, counsel did not cite any legal authority in his PRO to support the argument. Assuming arguendo that all 47 absences were unauthorized, Subsection 9.016(a) of the SPALC agreement imposed an affirmative duty on Petitioner to inform Respondent, immediately upon her arrival to work following each absence, that Petitioner considered the absence to be unauthorized. The purpose of the requirement is to afford an employee such as Respondent with notice and an opportunity to show extenuating circumstances. If an employee demonstrates extenuating circumstances, the agreement requires Petitioner to change the absence to an authorized absence. It is undisputed that Respondent had several physical conditions, including skin cancer and a miscarriage, that affected her attendance during the 2003-2004 school year. The preponderance of evidence shows that Respondent was absent from work due to medical conditions. During the hearing, Petitioner stipulated that it was withdrawing several dates as a basis for its proposed termination of employment. The withdrawn dates include all 13 days on which Respondent was absent for an entire day; the day that Respondent left and returned to work for part of the day; and ten days that Respondent left work early on August 25 and September 10, 2003, and between October 20, 2003, and March 26, 2004. The stipulation reduced the contested absences on which Petitioner based the proposed termination to 20 days when Respondent was late to work and three days when Respondent left work early. As previously found, Petitioner failed to submit testimony or documentation that the contested absences were unauthorized or that Petitioner informed Respondent upon her arrival to work that Petitioner had determined the immediately preceding absence to be unauthorized. Assuming arguendo that the contested absences were unauthorized and that Petitioner provided timely notice to Respondent, the contested absences present other evidential concerns for the trier of fact. On 12 of the 20 days that Respondent was late to work, Respondent was no more than five minutes late. Being late five minutes or less did not affect Respondent's ability to carry out the essential functions of her position within the meaning of Section 9.015. Another food service worker testified for Petitioner that being late five minutes or less did not affect any employee's ability to do his or her job. For the remaining eight late arrivals, Respondent was 15 minutes late on two days, 30 minutes late on two days, and was late the remaining four days between seven and 12 minutes. The preponderance of evidence did not show that Respondent failed to telephone her supervisor when Respondent was going to be late 15 or more minutes. During most of the remaining four days, Respondent was at the school getting ready for work or otherwise within view of her supervisor. The co-worker called as a witness by Petitioner, testified that Respondent's tardiness in excess of five minutes did not adversely affect the witness' job responsibilities, but did adversely affect the supervisor or other workers. However, the witness erroneously thought that Respondent's work day in the 2003-2004 school year began at 8:00 a.m. It is undisputed that Respondent's shift began at 8:30 a.m. The witness never really knew Respondent's actual start time. When Respondent was late to work, Respondent made up the time by working into her lunch or break periods. This was a custom that similarly situated workers practiced regularly. The assistant principal for the school did not testify. However, documents in the record indicate that the assistant principal met with Respondent on October 20, 2003. At that time, Respondent had been late to work approximately 15 times, absent approximately two times, and had left work early approximately two times. The documents indicate the assistant principal "talked with [Respondent] . . . about being on time to work." The supervisor who testified at the hearing was not present at the meeting. Following the meeting with the assistant principal, Respondent's attendance improved. The supervisor did not formally discuss Respondent's attendance with her again until the supervisor completed a performance evaluation for Respondent in March 2004. The performance evaluation, in pertinent part, authorized the supervisor to score prescribed categories of Respondent's job performance as "Effective level of performance observed," "Inconsistently practiced," or "Unacceptable level of performance observed." The supervisor did not score any of Respondent's targeted areas as "Unacceptable level of performance observed." She scored five areas as "Inconsistently practiced," including categories labeled "Is punctual in attendance," "Follows written and oral work schedule," and "Exhibits dependability." On April 22, 2004, the school principal signed a form recommending Respondent for reemployment for the 2004-2005 school year. On April 29, 2004, Respondent counter-signed the form recommending reemployment. On the date of the proposed reemployment, Respondent had been absent from work 43 days, including 19 of the 20 contested late arrivals and one of the three contested days when Respondent left work early. On May 20, 2004, Respondent left work three hours early. On May 21, 2004, the supervisor issued a written reprimand to Respondent for being late to work, leaving work early, or being absent from work approximately 47 times between August 14, 2003, and May 20, 2004. The written reprimand did not provide a clear point of entry for Respondent to contest the factual basis for the reprimand in an administrative hearing. The reprimand merely informed Respondent that Respondent was entitled to prepare a response to the reprimand. Respondent and her union representative did not challenge the factual basis of the written reprimand in a grievance procedure authorized in Article 5 of the SPALC agreement. However, Section 5.102 prohibits the grievance procedure from being construed to deny any rights that are otherwise guaranteed to Respondent by law. On May 24, 2004, the first work day following Respondent's receipt of the written reprimand, Respondent began work five minutes late at 8:35 a.m. Neither the supervisor nor any other representative for Petitioner spoke with Respondent to inform her that Petitioner had determined the late arrival to be an unauthorized absence. On May 27, 2004, the supervisor recommended that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment. This proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the petition, reinstating the employment of Respondent, and awarding Respondent full back pay and benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Coleman, Esquire Coleman & Coleman 2300 McGregor Boulevard Post Office Box 2089 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2089 J. Paul Carland, II, Esquire Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3916 Dr. James W. Browder, III, Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901-3916 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable John Winn, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Respondent, Joseph F. Connolly, II, was licensed as a teacher in the State of Florida under Certificate Number 393556, in the areas of public service and E.M.R. medical technology. On May 25, 1982, Respondent was employed as a teacher by Mid-Florida Technical Institute (MFTI), a part of the Orange County, Florida, School District. For a period of time prior to late 1981 or early 1982, Respondent had been teaching at an off-campus facility of this school, but at about that time he was brought onto the main campus and assigned to clerical duties not related to teaching. He was, however, on the rolls as a teacher and paid as such, and maintained his teacher credentials and license. On January 22, 1982, Respondent submitted a request for military leave in order to engage in Army Reserve training to extend from January 29 through February 15, 1982. Attached to this request was a set of military orders signed by a Captain Decker. Due to illness, this leave was not taken by Respondent. On May 25, 1982, Respondent again submitted a request for leave for military duty for the period June 7-16, 1982. This request was given to Respondent's supervisor, Chester F. Dalton, who asked that Respondent wait while he checked with the school director concerning the need for military orders to accompany the request. This second request was not, at the time, supported by military orders. The director, Mr. Stephens, indicated that orders were required, which information Mr. Dalton passed on to Respondent. Within two or three days, Respondent brought in a set of orders bearing the signature of Captain Deck and personally handed them to Mr. Dalton. Mr. Dalton gave them to his secretary, Mrs. Zimmer, to process. Mrs. Zimmer, who has been married to a military member for many years and is familiar with the basics of military orders, was not comfortable with these. They appeared to her to have been altered, and, when she held these and the orders which accompanied the January leave request up to the light, she observed that they were identical except for the dates and the last two letters in the signing official's name. Mrs. Zimmer brought her suspicions to the attention of Mr. Dalton, who, in turn, took them to Mr. Stephens, who, in turn, took them to Dr. James L. Scaggs, Associate Superintendent for Employee Relations of the Orange County Schools. Dr. Scaggs suggested the school officials verify the orders and, in the interim, notify Respondent that his pay would be held up pending verification. When the inquiry, outlined above, revealed the orders were invalid, Dr. Scaggs forwarded a report of the circumstances to Petitioner. Inquiry of Captain Raymond K. Carter, executive Officer of Respondent's Reserve unit, revealed the orders were invalid. There was no Captain Deck assigned to the unit, nor was there any training period scheduled for the period June 7-16, 1982. After a brief inquiry, the Reserve organization determined to take no action against Respondent, but to leave action to his employers. In the interim, on June 7, 1982, Mr. Dalton received another leave request for the period June 7-16, 1982, dated June 3, 1982, this time not for military training, but for Red Cross training to retain certification in his field of teaching. Attached to this request was an unsigned note requesting that the May 25 leave request be retrieved and returned in the attached envelope and this latter one substituted. Because, however, it is school board policy not to pay teachers to take certification training during school session time, this June 3 request was disapproved. By this time, also, the May 25 request had been approved by Mr. Stephens and had been forwarded to the superintendent's office for approval. Consequently, the May 25 leave request, which had false orders attached to it, was approved, and the June 3 request was denied. When the June 3 request was received on June 7, Respondent had presumably departed on leave which, under either request, was to begin on June 7, and no effort was made to contact him. There is no evidence to indicate other than that when Respondent submitted the orders to go with the May 25 leave request he knew they were false and that, therefore, his application was false, and it is so found. School officials consider the filing of false documents as definitely reducing Respondent's future effectiveness as a teacher, since it would render all future documents he might submit, of whatever nature, suspect. A teacher whose reports and communications cannot be accepted as true within the school system cannot function effectively within the system. Respondent urged in argument that his utilization as a file clerk at the time the leave request was submitted, and not as a teacher, takes him outside the issue of his effectiveness as a teacher. Without determining that legal issue here, it is nonetheless determined that while he was not, on March 25, 1982, being utilized by MFTI as a teacher, he was under contract as a teacher, had been employed as a teacher, was being paid as a teacher, and was licensed as a teacher. Under these conditions, therefore, he was a teacher and may be considered as such for the purposes of this hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license to teach in the State of Florida be suspended fob two years. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 15th day of October, 1983. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esq. Post Office Box 1694 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph F. Connolly, II 4218 Arajo Court Orlando, Florida 32812 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Donald L. Griesheimer Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
