The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
The Issue Did the Department of Transportation (Department) improperly deny a refund to Petitioner of a penalty assessed pursuant to Chapter 316, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes. On June 7, 1999, the Department's Inspector Clemente Igracio stopped Petitioner's truck for an inspection. After inspecting Petitioner's truck, Inspector Igracio issued a Safety Report Citation numbered 0862152 wherein Petitioner was cited for the alleged violations of Sections 316.515(1) and (3) and 316.550, Florida Statutes. The total fine imposed was $1,600.00 which included a fine of $1,250.00 for the alleged violation of Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes. However, since the maximum fine imposed for a Section 316.515(3), Florida Statutes, violation is $1,000.00, the total fine imposed was $1,350.00, which Petitioner paid. Subsequently, due to mitigating circumstances, the Department refunded Petitioner the $100.00 that it had paid for the alleged violation of Section 316.550, Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not protest the Section 316.515(1), Florida Statutes violation nor does it protest the Section 316.550, Florida Statutes violation. Petitioner stipulated that the combined length of the truck and trailer was 65 feet, 9 inches. Petitioner also stipulated that the length of the trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches. Inspector Igracio categorized the truck as a "straight- truck" because it had two axles and load-carrying capacity on the power unit. The vehicle in question is a two-axle vehicle with the cargo unit and motive power unit located on the same frame so as to form a single, rigid unit. The subject vehicle and trailer combination was 65 feet, 9 inches in overall length. The subject trailer was 42 feet, 10 inches in length. Petitioner did not have a permit to be over the legal length.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the refund sought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Byra West Coast Towing 124 South Berkley Road Auburndale, Florida 32823 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
The Issue The only issue remaining in this case is the extent to which the Petitioner, the Department of Transportation (DOT), should penalize the Respondent, Keystone Excavators, Inc. (Keystone), for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an expired vehicle registration and for exceeding the maximum legal weight of 35,000 pounds allowed under Section 316.545, Fla. Stat. (1987).
Findings Of Fact On July 8, 1987, one of Keystone's commercial motor vehicles was operating on Interstate I-4 near Plant City, Hillsborough County, Florida, with a registration that expired on May 31, 1987. According to the DOT scales, the weight of the vehicle, loaded, was 82,520 pounds. The DOT's Form 509-13, Revised 1/86, titled the "Load Report and Field Receipt," specifies that, in subtracting the legal weight from the the scaled weight to determine the amount of overweight, a ten percent tolerance should be added to the legal weight. This is how the DOT interprets and applies the requirement of Section 316.545(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987), that for enforcement purposes, all scaled weights of the gross or axle weight of vehicles and combinations of vehicles shall be deemed to be not closer than 10 percent to the true gross weight. When Keystone last registered the vehicle in question, it obtained a six-month registration instead of an annual registration. As a result, the registration expired May 31, 1987. For some reason, the sticker stating the month of expiration of the registration was not put on the vehicle's registration tag. Through inadvertent oversight, Keystone failed to renew the registration on the vehicle. When the DOT discovered the violation, it fined Keystone $2,376, calculated as 5 cents for each pound the vehicle weighed over 35,000 pounds. Keystone paid the fine under protest, taking the position that the fine was excessive under the circumstances. On the same day, after the DOT citation, Keystone paid a late fee and renewed the vehicle's registration for the period from May 31, 1987, forward. Keystone's evidence proved that Keystone did not intentionally violate the vehicle registration laws in this instance. Keystone does not intentionally violate the applicable laws and attempt to avoid or escape detection of violations. Nor does Keystone conduct business in a reckless or careless manner with respect to compliance with the applicable laws and treat penalties for detected violations as a cost of doing business. Notswithstanding this violation, Keystone generally has a good record for operating safe and properly licensed and permitted vehicles. The violation in this case resulted from an isolated case of inadvertent oversight. Keystone requested that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board (the Review Board) drop or reduce the fine. The Review Board considered Keystone's request on August 13, 1987, and denied it by letter dated August 18, 1987. Keystone then requested a rehearing. The Review Board met on December 8, 1987, and denied rehearing by letter dated December 14, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order reducing the fine against Keystone to $750. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer. Until his retirement in January 2008, Respondent served in excess of 20 years as a sworn police officer in the Tampa Police Department (TPD). At the time of his retirement, he was a corporal. At all times material to the instant case, including January 4, 2007, in addition to working full-time as a TPD police officer, Respondent owned an automotive parts and service business (Adkins Enterprises) and the seven-acre property at 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue in Tampa (including the improvements thereon) where the business was located. Until April 2005, when its Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (HSMV)-issued motor vehicle dealer's license expired, Adkins Enterprises also sold used vehicles at this location. The business had approximately 25 employees. Respondent left the day-to-day operations of the business to his managerial employees. He would stop by when he was off-duty to check on how things were going and to help out, particularly with the paperwork. At a meeting held in 2004 (2004 Meeting), TPD Captain Robert Lovering introduced Respondent to three brothers-- Roynauth "Sham" Sahdeo (Sham), Seewchand "Blacks" Sahdeo (Blacks), and Deonauth "Prim" Sahdeo (Prim)--all of whom worked at a business on 15th Street in Tampa (S & S Auto) which did automotive repairs and paint and body work, as well as provided towing services.2 Respondent understood Sham to be the "main brother," under whom the other two brothers worked. Sham, in fact, at that time, did own the business (which, unlike Adkins Enterprises, was not a Florida-licensed motor vehicle dealer). Blacks and Prim did not then have any ownership interest in S & S Auto. It was verbally agreed, at the 2004 Meeting, that Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto would go into the auto parts and scrap metal business together, with the auto parts and scrap metal to be sold by the joint venture coming from vehicles purchased at motor vehicle auctions using Adkins Enterprises' dealer license.3 (Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, provided then, as it still does, that only licensed dealers could purchase vehicles at these auctions.) Respondent also agreed to rent out space to S & S Auto at Adkins Enterprises' 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue location (Adkins' Location). Sometime in or around 2005, Sham sold his interest in S & S Auto to his two brothers, Blacks and Prim. As far as Respondent understood, however, Sham continued to act on behalf of S & S Auto.4 Also in or around 2005, S & S Auto applied for and obtained a motor vehicle dealer license from HSMV. Because Adkins Enterprises no longer had its dealer license (it having expired in April 2005), S & S Auto's dealer license was used to purchase (at auction), not only the vehicles it sold as a licensed motor vehicle dealer, but also the vehicles from which the parts and scrap metal for the joint venture between Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were obtained. After they were purchased at auction, the vehicles were transported to Adkins' Location on a tow truck operated by Blacks. Space was set aside at Adkins' Location for S & S Auto to conduct motor vehicle sales operations. Insofar as Respondent knew, Dale Marler was in charge of these operations. Sham helped Mr. Marler out, but most of Sham's time at Adkins' Location (where he had a regular presence) was devoted to the auto parts/scrap metal joint venture in which Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were participants. (It was at Adkins' Location where the vehicles purchased for the joint venture were stripped and crushed, and the salvaged auto parts were sold.) When he had the time, as a favor, Respondent would take tag and title paperwork to the HSMV local office for Mr. Marler and/or Sham. As of January 4, 2007, Sham and Mr. Marler were still working out of Adkins' Location and engaging in the business activities described above. On that day, Respondent agreed, at Sham's request, to go to the local HSMV office and purchase temporary tags for S & S Auto's motor vehicle sales operations at Adkins' Location. In addition to the money to make the purchase, Sham provided Respondent with S & S Auto's HSMV- assigned Personal Identification Number (PIN), which Respondent had to give to the HSMV clerk in order to initiate the transaction. Respondent went to the local HSMV office, as Sham had requested, later that same day (January 4, 2007). He told the clerk that he was there to purchase 25 temporary tags for S & S Auto, and he gave her S & S Auto's PIN. The clerk inputted the information Respondent had provided her into the HSMV computer system and produced a completed HSMV Form 83090, which represented S & S Auto's application for 25 temporary tags (S & S Auto's Application). The clerk printed out copies of S & S Auto's Application, and Respondent signed the "agency copy" on the "Authorized Representative for Dealership" signature line. At the clerk's request, he showed her his driver's license, and she wrote down his driver's license number next to his signature on the application. Respondent left the office with 25 temporary tags (numbered Q415821 through Q415845), for which he paid $53.00. Respondent did not knowingly provide any false or misleading information in obtaining these tags. He honestly believed that he was acting as the "Authorized Representative" of S & S Auto in this transaction, as he represented by placing his signature on the "agency copy" of S & S Auto's Application. When he returned to Adkins' Location, Respondent put the 25 temporary tags that had been purchased at the local HSMV office in a file for Mr. Marler and Sham to use. He had nothing further to do with the tags.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2011.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner, the Department, was the state agency responsible for the licensing and monitoring of the operation of interstate motor carriers in this state. The Respondent, PAT, was an interstate motor carrier of automobiles operating over the roads of this state. On October 10, 1991, Officer Ralph Vargas, an officer with the Department's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance stopped the Respondent's automobile carrier being operated by an employee of the Respondent in Boynton Beach, Florida, going north on US Highway #1. The stop was a random routine Level III safety inspection. Review of the documents carried by the driver reflected that the driver's driver license and the vehicle registration were in order. However, a review of the outside of the cab revealed that there was no required fuel decal being displayed. The driver showed Officer Vargas the cab card issued by the State of Florida for the fuel decal reflecting a decal had been issued for this vehicle. However, the decal was not displayed on the outside of the vehicle even though Mr. Vargas could see an area where an decal had been affixed. He can not recall whether he felt the area to see if it was sticky and he was unable to determine whether the former decal had been issued by the State of Florida or not. He did not see a CVSA, (Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance) decal either. As a result of this infraction, Mr. Vargas assessed a penalty in the amount of $50.00 and issued a temporary permit at a cost of $45.00, both of which were paid by the driver at the scene. It is this penalty and permit which the Respondent contests. The pertinent statute in issue here required a vehicle of this kind to have both a cab card and a fuel decal which must be affixed to the vehicle. Mr. Vargas also issued the driver a warning for having an unauthorized passenger, (his son) on board and for not having his log book current. Mr. Hurley contends that just one week prior to this stop, the vehicle and driver were in California where a CVSA inspection was accomplished. While this was being done, Mr. Hurley personally inspected the vehicle to insure that all required decals were affixed. Again, before the truck left New Jersey on the instant trip, he again checked to insure the required decals were there. They were. Because he is aware of the extended time required to get a replacement decal for a vehicle, Mr. Hurley routinely purchases several extra $4.00 cab card and fuel decal sets for his trucks so that if, as here, one is lost or removed, he can, upon notice, get a replacement to the driver overnight. Here, he claims the decal must have been peeled off by someone while the vehicle was on this trip. It is his experience that Florida's decals are easily pulled off and, unlike the decals in some other states, there is no built in voiding process which would void the decal in the event it is stolen. Here, Mr. Hurley claims, the driver did not know the decal was gone. Had he known, he could have called the home office on the truck phone and have it delivered. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered herein denying Professional Auto Transport, Inc.'s request for a refund of the $50.00 civil penalty and $45.00 permit fee. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Richard L. Hurley President Professional Auto Transport, Inc. Box 492 Lakewood, N.J. 08701 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and if so, what administrative penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida, having been issued license number VI-29558. Petitioner issued the license based upon an application signed by Brenda L. Johnson, as President. Respondent's address of record is 3707 N. Main Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32206. On or about August 30, 2001, two of Petitioner's compliance examiners conducted an initial records inspection of Respondent's dealership. The purpose of the initial inspection was to determine whether the dealership was complying with statutory and rule requirements. Because the initial inspection was of an educational nature, it gave the compliance examiners an opportunity to provide Respondent with guidance in areas that needed improvement. During the August 30, 2001, inspection, the compliance examiners found violations of Sections 319.23(6), 320.131(7), 320.27(6), 320.27(7), 320.27(9)(b)16, and 320.27(9)(b)17, Florida Statutes. The compliance examiners also found violations of Rule 15C-1.004(3), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the August 30, 2001, inspection, included but was not limited to the following violations: (a) titles on vehicles not properly filled out; (b) buyer's guides not posted; (c) no titles to prove ownership on vehicles; (d) no proof of purchase for one vehicle; (d) titles not transferred within 30 days of sale; and (e) temporary tag log not properly filled out. The compliance examiners discussed the above-referenced violations with Respondent's general manager, Steve Landers, advising him that Petitioner would conduct a follow-up inspection within 60 days. The inspectors also advised Respondent's president, Barbara Johnson, about the violations via telephone. On or about October 10, 2001, Petitioner's compliance examiners conducted the 60-day follow-up inspection of Respondent's records. During this inspection, Respondent did not provide the examiners with a title or other proof of ownership for a 1991 Lincoln, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 1LNCM82W0MY78. The Lincoln was parked in an area where other vehicles were displayed for sale. There is no credible evidence that the Lincoln was Mr. Lander's personal vehicle. The October 10, 2001, inspection also revealed that Respondent had issued a total of 50 temporary tags. However, there were no records to verify the sale of the vehicles listed in the temporary tag log. During the October 10, 2001, inspection, the compliance examiners requested Mr. Landers to take copies of all of Respondent's records to Petitioner's office in Jacksonville, Florida, for a continuation of the follow-up inspection. The examiners also made a request for Mrs. Johnson to accompany Mr. Landers to the Jacksonville office. On or about October 25, 2001, Petitioner's compliance examiners conducted the continuation of the 60-day follow-up inspection of Respondent's record at the Jacksonville office. During the inspection, the examiners reviewed a total of 30 motor vehicle records, finding the following violations: (a) no proof of purchase for 30 vehicles; (b) no documentation indicating that Respondent had applied for titles for 20 vehicles; (c) no copy of registration for tag and title issuance documentation on 26 vehicles; and (d) no documentation indicating the date sold and odometer disclosure for 27 vehicles. On or about August 21, 2002, Petitioner's compliance examiners conducted another follow-up records inspection on Respondent's premises. At that time, Respondent did not have a title or other proof of ownership for a blue Pontiac Grand Am, VIN 1G2NE5432NM052548, or a red Dodge Shadow, VIN 1B3XP24D6PN566374, both of which were displayed for sale. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent ever had the required proof of ownership for these vehicles. On August 21, 2002, Respondent's records indicated that it had sold three vehicles: (a) a 1985 Ford, VIN 1CLEG25K047; (b) a 1994 Chevrolet, VIN 2C1MR2464R6749435; and (c) a 1989 Buick, VIN 1G4NJ14D1kM026233. Respondent's records relating to the purchase and sale of these vehicles were incomplete. For instance, there was no proof of purchase/sale for two of the vehicles. Additionally, Respondent did not have records of the odometer disclosure at the time of purchase or sale for any of the three vehicles. Finally, Respondent had issued more than two temporary tags for one vehicle. While the examiners were conducting the August 21, 2002, inspection, Respondent had six vehicles displayed for sale. None of the vehicles had buyer's guides posted in their windows. The examiners reviewed Respondent's temporary tag records on August 21, 2002. They found that several such records lacked required signatures and VINs. On or about October 11, 2002, Petitioner's compliance examiners conducted a third follow-up records inspection on Respondent's premises. At that time, Respondent did not have title or any other proof of ownership for the following: (a) a 1989 Plymouth, VIN 1P3BA56J8KF504260; (b) a 1992 Toyota, VIN JT2EL46B8N0@@8549; and a 1988 Toyota, VIN 1NYAE82G4JZZ536776. Additionally, the 1989 Plymouth and the 1992 Toyota did not have a buyer's guide properly posted. The review of Respondent's sales records on October 11, 2002, revealed that Respondent had sold a 1993 Ford, VIN 1FAPP14JPW130409. However, Respondent did not have proof of purchase or an odometer disclosure statement for this vehicle. On October 11, 2002, Respondent's temporary tag records indicated that it had issued three temporary tags to L. Smith for the 1993 Ford. Respondent issued these tags on June 26, July 26, and August 24, 2002. The October 11, 2002, inspection revealed that Respondent sold the 1993 Ford on June 26, 2002, and applied for the title on September 5, 2002. Thus, Respondent failed to file the application for certificate of title by July 26, 2002, or within 30 days of June 26, 2002. At the conclusion of every inspection referenced above, Petitioner's compliance examiners reviewed the deficiencies they found with Mr. Landers. They discussed the statutes and rules that Respondent had violated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner issue a final order revoking Respondent's motor vehicle dealer's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kenneth Steven Landers Officer/Director 433 Safer Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0600
The Issue Petitioner seeks to have the title to a specific motor vehicle cancelled and reissued to himself. The title at issue is currently in the name of John W. Klingerman. The central issue before the Hearing Officer is whether the title at issue was "improperly issued" by the Department so as to require cancellation of the certificate of title pursuant to Section 319.25(1), Florida Statutes. It was clear from the nature of the relief sought by the Petitioner that the disposition of this case might adversely affect the substantial interests of John W. Klingerman, the person to whom the disputed certificate of title is presently issued. Accordingly, an order was issued requiring that Mr. Klingerman be notified of the pendency of this case and of his right to file a petition to intervene in this case. Mr. Klingerman was so notified more than two months prior to the final hearing in this case. Mr. Klingerman did not seek to participate in this case. The only witness at the hearing was the Petitioner. Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 were received in evidence by stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 10 were received in evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit 9 was received with the caveat that it might later be disregarded by the Hearing Officer if, upon further consideration of the issues, the Hearing Officer determined it was not relevant. The Hearing Officer reserved ruling on the admission into evidence of Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 12. Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 13 were rejected, but Petitioner was permitted to proffer them for inclusion in the record as rejected exhibits. Petitioner's Exhibit 11 was withdrawn by Petitioner. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was received in evidence. Rulings on Petitioner's Exhibits 8, 9 and 12 Upon consideration of all of the legal issues in this case, as set forth in the Conclusions of Law hereinafter, it is clear that Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 12 are irrelevant to the disposition of the issues in this case. Accordingly, the objections to those two exhibits are sustained and both exhibits will be treated as rejected exhibits proffered for inclusion in the record. Upon further consideration, it is also clear that Petitioner's Exhibit 9 is irrelevant to the disposition of the issues in this case. Accordingly, even though Exhibit 9 has been received in evidence, no findings of fact have been based on that exhibit.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony presented at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: During November of 1986, Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service embarked upon the process of enforcing a mechanic's lien on Petitioner's 1963 Ford Stationwagon, vehicle identification number 3T24F155323 (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner's vehicle.") The owner of Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service arranged for the paperwork regarding the mechanic's lien to be handled by an agent, Title Clearing Service. Title Clearing Service is operated by John Boesch and Carol Boesch. On November 21, 1986, John Boesch mailed a document titled Notice of Claim of Lien And Proposed Sale of Vehicle to Petitioner at two different addresses. The documents were sent via certified mail. Both of the documents were returned to John Boesch because they were not delivered to the Petitioner. The documents mailed on November 21, 1986, contain all of the information itemized at Section 713.585(1)(a) through (i), Florida Statutes. On December 17, 1986, a notice of sale was published in the Fort Myers News-Press, a newspaper circulated in Lee County, Florida. The notice published in the newspaper read, in its entirety, as follows: LEGAL NOTICE OF SALE Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service, 5371 McGreagor Blvd., Fort Myers, Florida 33907 will hold a private sale on the following vehicle to satisfy lien pursuant to Chapter 713:585 of Florida Statue (sic) on January 5, 1987, at 8 a.m. 1963 Ford SW VIN #3T24F155323 Amount of Lien $2,027.95 (813) 549-0631 Dec. 17 No. 5247 Thereafter, on January 5, 1987, a private sale was conducted at which time John W. Klingerman purchased Petitioner's vehicle from Chuck's Whiskey Creek Service for $200.00. On January 13, 1987, John W. Klingerman applied to the Respondent for issuance of a certificate of title in his name, based on his purchase at the January 5, 1987, sale. On January 30, 1987, the Respondent issued a certificate of title to Petitioner's vehicle described above to John W. Klingerman of 1824 Coronado Road, Ft. Myers, Florida 323901-7008. Title Number 43916166 issued by the Respondent now shows John W. Klingerman as the owner of the 1963 Ford stationwagon bearing vehicle identification number 3T24F155323. The issuance of the certificate of title to John W. Klingerman was in reliance upon the application for certificate of title filed by John W. Klingerman and various supporting documents. The supporting documents included a copy of the certificate of compliance and the report of sale certified by the clerk of the court. Other supporting documents certified by the clerk of the court included copies of the Affidavit of Publication, the Notice Of Claim Of Lien And Proposed Sale of Vehicle, the vehicle repair order, and envelopes reflecting efforts to mail notices to the Petitioner. The Petitioner's vehicle was previously titled in the state of South Carolina.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issue a final order in this case cancelling certificate of title number 43916166 issued to John W. Klingerman and that the Department thereafter notify John W. Klingerman of the cancellation of the certificate as provided in Section 319.25(1), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2613 The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The paragraph numbers below correspond to the paragraph numbers of the parties' proposed findings. Rulings on Petitioners Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1 and 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance with exception of vehicle identification number, which is incomplete. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Paragraph 6: First sentence rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7: First sentence rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Second sentence is accepted in substance, i.e., that publication of the notice was less than 20 days prior to scheduled sale and the newspaper publication contained insufficient information. Paragraph 8: First two sentences are rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Last sentence is rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 9: First two sentences are rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Last two sentences are rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 10: Entire paragraph rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 11: Entire paragraph rejected as primarily constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact. To the limited extent this paragraph contains factual matter, it is rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted with exception of proposed purchase date. Greater weight of the evidence shows purchase date as January 5, 1987. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance, but with most details omitted as irrelevant or subordinate. Paragraph 4: Rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraphs 6 and 7: Rejected as constituting irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 8: First sentence rejected as not fully consistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence rejected as argument or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard R. Mellon Executive Director Department of Highway and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Department of Highway and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Mr. Ocie C. Allen, Jr. Post Office Box 10616 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504
