The Issue Whether applicable law authorizes the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing on the merits of issuing a permit, where the referring agency issued the permit almost three months before the objectors' petition for hearing was filed?
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DER enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the amended petition for formal proceeding under Section 120.7, Florida Statutes, filed by Freeport and STI. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of September, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Earl Esquire One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3636 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Joe W. Fixel, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John T. Allen, Jr., Esquire 4508 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 Edward P. de la Parte, Jr., Esquire 403 N. Morgan Street, Suite 102 Tampa, Florida 33602 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION FREEPORT SULPHUR COMPANY, Division of FREEPORT MINERALS COMPANY, and SULPHUR TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-527 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, and AGRICO CHEMICAL COMPANY, Respondent. /
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent has violated Rule 21F-20.002, Florida Administrative Code, and Sections 477.0265(1)(c) and 477.029(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1985). At the hearing the Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses and offered one exhibit into evidence. Thereafter, the Respondent testified in her own behalf. At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the parties advised the Hearing Officer that they did not intend to obtain a transcript of the proceedings. A deadline of 10 days from the date of the hearing was established for the submission of the parties' proposed recommended orders. The hearing concluded with the presentation of oral argument by counsel for both parties addressed primarily to the issue of the appropriate penalty. As of the date of this recommended order, neither party had filed a proposed recommended order.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed to practice cosmetology and to operate a cosmetology salon in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CL 0163833 and CE 0041166. At all times material hereto, the Respondent has been the owner of a cosmetology salon named All Around Hair Stylist, located at 5567 Moncrief Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32209. An inspection of the premises of All Around Hair Stylist was conducted on August 29, 1987, by one of the Petitioner's inspectors. At that time the salon was in substantial disarray. Among the conditions in existence in the salon at that time were the following: The container for soiled linens contained trash other than linens. Bags of overflowing trash were in the service area and in the back of the premises. Hair was all over the back room floor that one had to pass through to get to the shampoo bowl and restroom. Food scraps were left in the back room. The salon had an objectionable odor. The floors were filthy and littered with hair, trash, dust, and dirt. The shampoo bowls were not clean. The door leading to the restroom had no handle and a rug jammed against the door made it very difficult to open. The restroom had a very unpleasant odor. There was a hole in the wooden floor. The pipes to the sink did not work properly and water from the sink would pour onto the floor. The restroom did not have a waste receptacle, paper towels, or soap. There was no ventilation in the restroom. The service area was quite cluttered. The brushes and combs were full of hair. A reinspection was done on December 3, 1987. At that time there were still some shortcomings in the condition of the premises, but substantial improvements had been made. Shortly before the hearing, another reinspection was done. At the time of the second reinspection, the premises were "spotless." Approximately a week or ten days before the August 29, 1987, inspection, the Respondent's premises were vandalized. The vandals broke into the building and once inside they broke the sink, the pipes to the sink, the water heater, and various other things in the salon. The vandals also made quite a mess inside the premises by doing such things as taking supplies out of drawers and dumping garbage on the floor. At the time of the August 29, 1987, inspection the Respondent had not yet been able to repair all of the damage caused by the vandals or clean up all of the mess caused by the vandals. The Respondent did not receive a settlement check from her insurance company until sometime after August 29, 1987, and due to her economic circumstances she was not able to begin to repair the damage caused by the vandals until she received the insurance settlement. Since August 29, 1987, the Respondent has repaired all of the damage to the premises and has made other substantial improvements to the premises. The Respondent's premises are in a low rent neighborhood. Many of her customers are in low income brackets. Accordingly, the Respondent charges lower than usual prices for her services and does not earn a large income from the business.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Cosmetology enter a final order in this case finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 477.029(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty consisting of a reprimand and an administrative fine in the total amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00) DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Chief Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 R. Lee Utley, Jr., Esquire 331 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Myrtle Aase, Executive Director Board of Cosmetology Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452
The Issue Whether Petitioner, M.B. Doral, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes (2019); and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact On December 21, 2018, Petitioner MB Doral filed a Petition Challenging Validity of Existing Rule 61A-4.020 and Determination Regarding Unadopted Rule, in DOAH Case Number 18-6768RX. On January 25, 2019, the undersigned entered an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Proceedings, which stayed MB Doral’s unadopted rule challenge pending the proposed rulemaking that would promulgate ABT Form 6017. On October 16, 2019, amendments to rule 61A-4.020 became effective, which promulgated ABT Form 6017. On November 6, 2019, the undersigned entered an Order Dismissing Unadopted Rule Challenge and Retaining Jurisdiction, which dismissed MB Doral’s remaining unadopted rule challenge and retained jurisdiction to consider a request for attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to section 120.595(4)(b). On December 3, 2019, MB Doral filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Motion), seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the unadopted rule challenge pursuant to section 120.595(4)(b). The Motion alleges that MB Doral advised the Department, in writing on at least seven occasions prior to filing the rule challenge petition, and beginning on May 19, 2015, that the Department’s failure to adopt ABT Form 6017 constituted an unadopted rule. The Motion also alleges that the Department did not file a notice of rulemaking until January 28, 2019. The Motion further alleges that the Department has never alleged that the federal government required ABT Form 6017 to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition to receipt of federal funds. On December 10, 2019, the Department filed its Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for an Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. On February 11, 2020, the Department filed a Notice of Filing Joint Stipulation for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, which included the Joint Stipulation for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The Joint Stipulation states that the Department agrees to the entry of a final order assessing the sum of $7,500.00 for attorneys’ fees and costs in the unadopted rule challenge, which the undersigned bifurcated from the existing rule challenge in DOAH Case No. 18-6768RX, which is currently pending before the First District Court of Appeal in Case Number 1D19-0820. The Joint Stipulation further states that the parties agree that this Final Order should direct the Department to seek immediate approval for payment within 30 days of this Final Order, and that the undersigned retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Final Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Second Amended Petition to Intervene in Licensing and Administrative Proceeding and for Formal Administrative Hearing filed in each of these cases by LEAF and Suzi Ruhl. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Ludder, Esquire Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. 1115 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cynthia K. Christen, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez and Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Virginia B. Wetherall, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the First Amended Petition by Capeletti Brothers, Inc., to determine the validity of Rules 17-4.02 and 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Cede, and is presented pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The First Amended Petition also makes allegations concerning the validity of an alleged rule purportedly found in the Notice of Intent to Deny the permit dated October 16, 1978; however, this statement is considered and ruled upon in the companion case, D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1440R. The reason for this procedural disposition is due to the fact that the original Petition only contains allegations concerning the Letter of Intent to Deny of March 26, 1979, and any attempt on the part of the Petitioner to amend the Petition to include additional rules or purported rules that were not the subject of the original Petition was not deemed appropriate and, consequently, the attack on the validity of Rules 17-4.02 and 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Cede, was allowed to go forward only through an independent case consideration which is the case D.O.A.H. 79-1602RX. This approach was adopted to accommodate the notice requirements of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In summary, the document entitled "First Amended Petition" has been divided into two cases, D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1440R dealing with the Letter of Intent to Deny of March 26, 1979, and D.O.A.H. Case No. 79-1602RX dealing with the challenge to Rules 17-4.02 and 17- 4.28, Florida Administrative Code. (The evidential facts and certain related legal conclusions involved in considering the case sub judice, have been the subject of an Order of the undersigned in D.O.A.H. Case 79-891 involving the same parties to this cause, and the evidential fact determinations and legal conclusions in that Order dated December 7, 1979, are hereby incorporated into this Order by reference and through the act of attaching a copy of the prior Order are made a part of the present Order.)
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.008, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and because it exceeds Respondent’s rulemaking authority; and Whether an interpretation of Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, constitutes an unpromulgated “rule.”
Findings Of Fact The first 12 findings of fact are facts contained in the Stipulation: Prior to June 2005, Petitioner, Juan Cuellar, Luis Garcia, and Gerardo Quintero, received what appeared to be a valid Miami-Dade Building Business Certificate of Competency. Upon receipt, Petitioners applied to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”), to obtain a registered contractor’s license using the Certificates of Competency. Based on the Certificates of Competency, the Department issued each Petitioner a registered contractor’s license bearing license numbers RG291103667 (Mr. Cuellar), RF11067267 (Mr. Garcia), and RF11067268 (Mr. Quintero). Petitioners each applied for a certificate of authority for their respective businesses, Cuellar Construction and Drywall (Mr. Cuellar), A.P.A. Plumbing Corp. (Mr. Garcia), and Q Plumbing Services Corp. (Mr. Quintero). Based on the fact the Certificates of Competency and the registered contractor’s licenses had been granted, the Department issued a certificate of authority to Cuellar Construction and Drywall, QB 41342; APA Plumbing Corp., QB 42763; and Q Plumbing Services Corp., QB 42825. At the time the Department issued Petitioners their registered contractor’s licenses and subsequent certificates of authority, it did so based solely on the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificates of Competency presented by Petitioners and the only information submitted to it. The parties stipulate that Petitioners were not entitled to their registered contractor’s licenses and certificates of authority because the Miami-Dade Building Business Certificates of Competency were not valid certificates. At the time of their applications to the Department, Petitioners were not qualified by any local jurisdiction or any other method necessary to receive a registered contractor’s license from the Department. The Department filed Administrative Complaints against Petitioners for the suspension or revocation of their licenses based on violations of Sections 489.129(1)(a), 489.129(1)(d), 489.129(1)(m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Administrative Complaints”). (All references to Sections of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, as they relate to the Administrative Complaint are to the 2005 version. All other references to Florida Statutes are to the 2007 version). Each Petitioner challenged the Administrative Complaint filed against him in DOAH Case No. 07-2823PL (Mr. Cuellar), DOAH Case No. 07-2824PL (Mr. Garcia), and DOAH Case No. 07-2825PL (Mr. Quintero). On December 13, 2007, the undersigned, as the Administrative Law Judge to whom the cases had been assigned, issued a Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 07-2823PL (Mr. Cuellar), DOAH Case No. 07-2824PL (Mr. Garcia), and DOAH Case No. 07-2825PL (Mr. Quintero), determining that Petitioners violated Sections 489.129(1)(a), 489.129(1)(m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred collectively as the “Recommended Orders”). The “Recommendation” in each of the Recommended Orders was, except for the name of the Respondent, the same as the following: Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Luis Garcia violated the provisions of Sections 489.129(1)(a) and (m), and 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, III, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint; requiring that Respondent pay the costs incurred by the Department in investigating and prosecuting this matter; giving Respondent 30 days to voluntarily relinquish his license; and revoking Respondent’s license if he fails to voluntarily relinquish it within 30 days of the final order. Based upon the foregoing, and the fact that no final decision has been entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), Petitioners are facing the possible revocation or voluntary relinquishment of their licenses (an adverse impact whether they are “entitled” to the licenses or not), continued defense against the Administrative Complaints, and the payment of the cost incurred by the Department in prosecuting the Administrative Complaints. Should the Board revoke Petitioners’ licenses, they will also be precluded from re-applying for licensure for a period of five years pursuant to Section 489.129(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioners face the same consequence even if they voluntarily relinquish their license pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-12.017(3)(a). The adverse consequences of the possible final action on the Administrative Complaints which they face stem in part from a finding that they have violated Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides the following: The board may take any of the following actions against any certificateholder or registrant: place on probation or reprimand the licensee, revoke, suspend, or deny the issuance or renewal of the certificate, registration, or certificate of authority, require financial restitution to a consumer for financial harm directly related to a violation of a provision of this part, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation, require continuing education, or assess costs associated with investigation and prosecution, if the contractor, financially responsible officer, or business organization for which the contractor is a primary qualifying agent, a financially responsible officer, or a secondary qualifying agent responsible under 489.1195 is found guilty of any of the following acts: Obtaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by fraud or misrepresentation. . . . . Petitioners were found in the Recommended Orders to have violated Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, based upon an interpretation of that statutory provision adopted by the Board in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4-15.008, an existing rule which Petitioners have challenged in this proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the “Challenged Existing Rule”), which provides: Material false statements or information submitted by an applicant for certification or registration, or submitted for renewal of certification or registration, or submitted for any reissuance of certification or registration, shall constitute a violation of Section 489.129(1)(a), F.S., and shall result in suspension or revocation of the certificate or registration. Essentially the same conclusions of law were reached in the Recommended Orders concerning the application of the Challenged Existing Rule (in paragraphs numbered “23” through “25” or “25” through 27” of the Recommended Orders): While Respondent has not been specifically charged with a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4- 15.008, the Department cited the Rule, which contains the following interpretation of what constitutes "[o]btaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by . . . misrepresentation" in violation of Section 489.129(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in support of Count I of the Administrative Complaint: . . . . It is the Department’s position, that despite the fact that Respondent did not commit “fraud” in obtaining his license and a certificate of authority for [the business] and, in fact, did not knowingly submit false information to the Department in obtaining his license and the certificate of competency, “[m]aterial false statements or information” were nonetheless submitted by Respondent in support thereof. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4- 15.008, in defining what constitutes the act of "[o]btaining a certificate, registration, or certificate of authority by . . . misrepresentation” eliminates the need for the Department to prove any knowledge on the part of Respondent that he has made a material misrepresentation or any intent on the part of Respondent to rely upon a material misrepresentation. All that is required is proof that a material representation was made and that the representation was false. Petitioners have challenged the validity of the Challenged Existing Rule as being an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes. Petitioners were also found in the Recommended Orders to have violated Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, based upon an interpretation of that statutory provision advanced by the Department during the prosecution of the Administrative Complaints. Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, provides that the following act constitutes grounds for which disciplinary action may be taken: (h) Attempting to obtain, obtaining, or renewing a license to practice a profession by bribery, by fraudulent misrepresentation, or through an error of the department or the board. (Emphasis added). The Department’s argument concerning the appropriate interpretation and application of Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, advanced in the prosecution of the Administrative Complaints, was advanced in paragraphs 24 through 26 of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order: Obtaining a certificate or registration in error as a result of a misrepresentation made during the application process is conduct proscribed by Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued a registration by error of the Department. To be issued a registration by the Department, an applicant must submit along with an application for registration, a copy of the applicant’s validly issued competency card from a local government licensing board . . . . Respondent submitted a fake competency card that appeared to be validly issued by the Miami Compliance Office. . . . If the Department had known Respondent’s Competency Card was fake and Respondents’ answer to the attest statement was false, the Department would not have issued Respondent a registration. Thus, since the Department did not have truthful and accurate information, the registration issued to Respondent was in error. The Department’s interpretation was described and accepted in the Recommended Orders (in paragraphs numbered “29” through “31” or “31” through 33”, in the Recommended Orders), as follows: In support of this alleged violation, the Department has argued that Respondent obtained his license “through an error of the department . . . .” That “error” was the Department’s reliance upon an improperly issued Miami-Dade building business Certificate of Competency. The evidence proved clearly and convincingly that the Department issued the Respondent’s license in “error.” While it is true that Respondent did not intentionally cause or even know of the error, the Department reasonably takes the position that Respondent obtained his license nonetheless as a result of this error and that is all that Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The Department has proved clearly and convincingly that Respondent violated Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes [requires]. Although not specifically quoted in their Petition in this case, Petitioners have quoted what they believe is the unpromulgated rule of the Board which they are challenging in this case in paragraph 60 of Petitioner’s Proposed Final Order (hereinafter referred to as the “Challenged Language”): . . . . Essentially, the Board applies the following unadopted rule when applying Section 455.227(1)(h): Disciplinary action may be taken pursuant to Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes, where an individual attempts to obtain a license through an error of the department even if the individual did not have knowledge of the error. As of the date of the final hearing of this matter, the Board had taken no action on the Recommended Orders.
Findings Of Fact In their Prehearing Stipulation, filed on August 14, 1990, the parties stipulate to the following: Container Corporation of America (CCA) owns and operates a pulp and paper mill in Fernandina Beach, Nassau County, Florida. The mill is authorized by various Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) permits to discharge industrial wastewater and emit air pollutants and is subject to DER's power to enforce such permits, as well as Chapter 403, F.S. and DER Rules. DER issued an Administrative Notice of Violation charging CCA with various wastewater violations, an filed a judicial action alleging violation of air pollution standards at the mill. The Notice of Violation was issued on April 24, 1990, OGC Case NO. 90-0346; and the judicial action was filed in the Circuit Court of Nassau County in June of 1989, Civ Case NO. 89- 562-CA. CCA has not yet requested a hearing on the merits of the Notice of Violation; it requested an informal conference on the charges, which tolls the time for requesting a hearing. A verbal settlement has been reached, but is not yet reduced to writing. Neither DER nor CCA has requested a hearing on the merits in the judicial action. The allegations in the complaint are, however, at issue and, absent settlement, will be tried by the court. On June 27, 1990, DER gave notice of its intent to deny an operating (renewal) permit for the No. 5 Recovery Boiler and Smelt Dissolving Tank because of the pending judicial action. Subsequent to the filing of this rule challenge petition, DER notified CCA that the Notice of Intent to Deny renewal of CCA's operating permits for the NO. 5 Recovery Boiler and the Smelt Dissolving Tank dated June 27, 1990 was issued erroneously and that the permits would be issued. [Issuance is based on expiration of the 90-day deadline for denial rather than the agency's interpretation of the rule under scrutiny.] On June 28, 1990, DER notified. CCA that it may not be able to issue.. the requested construction permits [for a new batch digester and brown stock washer] due to the pending Department enforcement action ... CCA was notified that its applications for construction of the proposed new batch digester and brown stock washer were incomplete. If the judicial action is not resolved at the time action must be taken on the application for construction permits for the new batch digester and brown stock washer, the permits will be denied in reliance on Rule 17-4.070(5)(first three sentences). By a separate letter on June 28 1990, DER also notified CCA that until the Notice of Violation was resolved the application for the construction permit for the new paper machine would be held in abeyance. CCA has been notified that its application for a construction permit for its new proposed paper machine is incomplete. Subsequent to the filing of this rule challenge petition, DER has notified CCA it will not hold CCA's application for a construction permit for its proposed new paper machine in abeyance upon the submission of the requested material, or its request to process the application without the material, but will process the permit at that time and issue either an intent to issue or deny. If, however, the Notice of Violation is not resolved by the time action must be taken on the application the permit will be denied in reliance on Rule 17-4.070(5). Until or unless the judicial action against CCA filed by DER in June 1989 is resolved, Rule 17-4.070(5)(first three sentences) requires DER to deny any permit applications filed by CCA relating to the Multiple Effect Evaporators (2), Nos. 5 and 7 Power Boilers, including electiostatic precipitators, Recovery Boilers (2) and Pulp Digester Systems (2) located at its Fernandina Beach mill. Each of the foregoing sources operate by virtue of permits issued by DER. The permits periodically expire and must be renewed. DER interprets the first sentence of Rule 17- 4.070(5) to mean that no permits for the sources listed in paragraph 10 above can be renewed unless and until the pending civil action against CCA is resolved, and the issue of reasonable assurance is not reached. [As to Intervenor Florida Pulp & Paper Association) The Florida Pulp & Paper Association is a trade association representing the vital interests of its members -- the pulp and paper companies operating mills in Florida or discharging to state waters. Rule 17-4.070(5), F.A.C., the rule which is the subject of this proceeding, regulates and affects the substantial interests of the members of the Association. Each of the mills operate [sic] under various environmental permits issued by DER. Permits must be obtained when existing permits expire or when sources are replaced or expanded. The rule at issue forbids the issuance of such permit to any source or for any activity against which the Department has filed a Notice of Violation or judicial enforcement action, which remain(s) pending. The Association's scope of interest and activity includes participating in the development of rules proposed by DER membership. Here, a senior DER official has indicated that the rule at issue will henceforth be uniformly and strictly applied, industry-wide. Accordingly, a determination of invalidity of this rule is an appropriate remedy for the Association to seek on behalf of its members
