Findings Of Fact By letter dated August 10, 1979, Indian River County (hereafter "County") submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation (hereafter "Department" or "DER") applications for construction permits for the Gifford Area sewer treatment plant and collection improvements thereto, a domestic wastewater treatment and disposal system located in the County. (DER Exhibits Nos. 1 & 2). After receiving the permit applications submitted by the County, the Department's Orlando District Office requested additional information to determine whether reasonable assurances were provided that the facility would not discharge, emit or cause pollution in violation of Department standards. (Testimony of William Bostwick; testimony of Chancellor; DER Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8). The County, through its consulting engineers Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., responded to the Department's requests for additional information. (DER Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8). The Department presented testimony of two professional engineers in its employ, Mr. William M. Bostwick and Mr. Gerald Chancellor, both of whom were accepted as expert witnesses in the field of sewage treatment technology and the processing and evaluation of permit applications for sewage treatment plants. Both witnesses testified that in their expert and professional opinion, based on their review of all plans, test results and other information submitted by the County, the applicant provided the Department with reasonable assurances that the proposed construction and operation of the sewage treatment facility and its collection system would not discharge, emit or cause pollution in violation of Department standards. (Testimony of Bostwick; testimony of Chancellor). The standards applicable to the subject construction permit applications involve (a) treatment level and (b) ambient standards of the receiving waters. The proposed system provides a minimum of ninety (90) percent treatment to incoming wastewaters. Because of the added features of surge tanks, gas chlorination, and dual blowers and motors, the ninety (90) percent minimum treatment was expected to be exceeded. (Testimony of Bostwick; testimony of Chancellor). The secondarily treated effluent from the proposed sewage treatment plant will be dispersed by spray irrigation. Because the effluent is expected to percolate to area groundwaters, the ambient groundwater standards of Section 17-3.101, Florida Administrative Code are applicable. The discharge from the facility will not cause any violation of the groundwater quality standards of the Florida Administrative Code. (Testimony of Bostwick; testimony of Chancellor; testimony of Aront). Although the design of the plant does not contemplate surfacewater discharge, if it did, it would meet the waste load allocation of Indian River County which permits discharge to surfacewaters. When the treated waste leaves the sprinkler head, it will meet secondary water treatment standards. (Testimony of Bostwick; testimony of Chancellor). In the course of evaluating a permit application for a wastewater treatment plant, the Department considers only Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and its implementing rules and regulations and does not consider local issues relating to zoning, the propriety of expenditure of public funds or the like. (Testimony of Bostwick). There is presently no state standard regulating permissible levels of viruses in effluent discharged to either surface of groundwaters. Large numbers of viruses exist in the effluent discharged from spray irrigation treatment plants which operate at a ninety (90) percent treatment level. The viruses contained in the discharge remain viable as they percolate through the soil. The greatest concern exists when humans are in physical contact with such discharge. However, the present sewage treatment facility in its existing condition is a greater threat to public health than the proposed spray irrigation system. (Testimony of Dr. Welling, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2 & 3). Research concerning viral standards for effluent discharge is in an experimental stage. The Department is examining this question for possible future rule drafting. Neither the federal government nor any state, with the exception of Maryland, has adopted viral standards. (Testimony of Welling) The design of Use Gifford plant contemplates a series of perimeter monitoring wells through which groundwater samples can be attained and tested for compliance with groundwater standards end the presence of viruses. (Testimony of Aront) The plant will spray irrigate effluent at the rate of one (1) inch per week. Although surface run off is not expected, any that occurs due to heavy rains, etc., will be discharged into a perimeter ditch surrounding the plant. The plant design is formulated to retain effluent on site. (Testimony of Chancellor). There are four (4) different types of soil on the site with a water permeability of moderately rapid to very rapid. These soils have a percolation rate which makes the site suited for the intended purpose provided surface drainage is obtained. On a conservative basis the site could accept up to fourteen (14) inches of water per day or ninety-eight (98) inches per week. (Testimony of Connell; testimony of Eng; DER Exhibit No. 6). The parties stipulated prior to the hearing to the following: The project complies with local zoning laws; and The applicable provisions of law are Sections 403.086, 403.087, 403.088, Florida Statutes, and Rules 17-3.091, 17-4.03, 17-4.07 and 17-4.26, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department issue a construction permit to the County on condition that sample effluent from the monitoring wells on the subject facility be regularly analyzed for compliance with Department rules and the existence of infectious viruses. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1980, at Tallahassee, Florida 32301. SHARYN SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 COPIES FURNISHED: Sherman N. Smith, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 1030 Vero Beach, Florida 32960 George G. Collins, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 3686 Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a professional engineer in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Board of Professional Engineers was the state agency responsible for the licensing of professional engineers in this state. Respondent, James B. Whittum, was licensed as a professional engineer by the Board under License No. PE 0027689, dated March 9, 1979. He is a consulting engineer dealing primarily in aluminum structures - mostly pool enclosures. Starting in 1990, Respondent did a number of designs, some thirty to fifty a year, for Paglino Aluminum, an aluminum contractor located in Tampa, which might also have had offices in Miami. The company is now out of business. Sometime in 1992 Respondent approved plans for Paglino for a residence for Mr. and Mrs. Marrero. These drawings were for an aluminum enclosure. He did not personally make the drawing which had been done by Mrs. Paglino. He did not know where the Marrero residence was but claims that at no time did he do or approve any drawings which he believed would be utilized for construction in Miami. In order to save clients money, Respondent had established a practice with Paglino and with a number of other clients by which he would train them in how to design and draw the pool cages. Respondent would provide the clients with a design booklet and instruction on how to use it. The client would bring drawings to the Respondent who would check them over to make sure that everything was done according to the design basis. A copy of the design guide was furnished to Paglino. Once Respondent received the drawings from the client, he would go through the whole design procedure himself to be sure that the drawings conformed to the code. In order to place his signature and seal on drawings, he had to have an identification of the site (either the name of the owner or the address of the site), the dimensions of the slab on which the structure is to be built, and the orientation of the structure with reference to the existing building to which it was to be attached. With regard to the specific plans in issue, Mr. Whittum did not know the structure was to be built in Dade County. The plans he saw bore the Marreros' name but not their address. He never spoke to the Marreros except for one call from Mrs. Marrerro, after the structure was built, complaining about it. Before signing the plans, Respondent checked in the Tampa phone book for listings for Marrero and found twenty-five or thirty listings for that name. He assumed the Marreros for which these plans were drafted were one of those families listed. It is not Respondent's practice to know the street address for every design he signs and seals. He inquired of several other engineers designing aluminum structures to see if they did the same as he proposed before signing and sealing these plans. He found that they have either the name of the owner or the street address, but not necessarily both. Included in those with whom Respondent spoke concerning this issue were engineers in Sarasota and Cape Coral. This testimony by Mr. Whittum as to the practice of other engineers is hearsay, however. Most counties in Florida, except Pinellas County, do not allow the use of standard plans as submittals for the purpose of permitting. However, an engineering firm has drawn a set of master drawings for the design of aluminum structures. These drawings were done for the Pinellas Chapter of the Aluminum Association of Florida, and each aluminum contractor in that county files them with the Pinellas Building Department. Thereafter, when plans are submitted, the Department official examines the plans with reference to the standard and decides whether or not to issue the permit. If the plans submitted by the contractor conform to the master design no engineer's signature or seal is required. This procedure has no bearing on any other county in Florida, however, and Respondent does not contend he believed at the time that the plans he signed would be used for construction in Pinellas County. It was not Respondent's practice to require a street address for the plans he signed and sealed for Paglino Aluminum. It was his understanding, however, that the instant structure was to be built in Hillsborough County because all the other jobs he had done for that company were, without exception, built in Hillsborough County. At no time did Paglino ever seek Respondent's permission to transfer these drawings to Dade County. By the same token, nobody asked him if the design he drew would be appropriate for Dade County. Had they done so, he would have told them the drawings were not suitable to meet the South Florida Building Code where the structural design standards are, in many ways, more stringent than in the Standard Building Code. As a result of this incident, Respondent has changed the procedure he follows. He now requires the drawings include a statement of who purchased the plans and who the proposed permitting authority is. This is not required by rule but is a precaution he takes. In his opinion, the drawings in issue were site specific. They showed the dimensions of the slab the structure was to be built on which determines the design for the size of the beams and their spacing. They also showed the orientation to the house where the structure would be connected. This was, he contends, all he needed to know to do the calculations for construction under the Standard Building Code. These calculations generally do not vary from county to county, with the exception of Dade and Broward County, where the South Florida Building Code is used. The plans Respondent signed and sealed did not indicate where the structure was to be built at the time he signed and sealed them. The plans called for a structure that could be put up anywhere in the state, except for Dade and Broward Counties. The fact remains, however, that at the time he signed and sealed these plans, Respondent did not know where the structure was to be built. His supposition that it would be built in Hillsborough County, while perhaps reasonable for a lay person, was not reasonable for a licensed professional engineer. According to James O. Power, a consulting structural engineer and expert in the practice of engineering, a structural engineer, in signing and sealing plans, accepts responsibility for the integrity of the design, certifies that the plans are good for their intended purpose, and asserts that the structure will be safe. A sealed plan may be necessary, depending on the building code and enforcement agency. The code leaves it up to the building official to require what he feels is necessary. Depending on the agency, permits may be issued on the basis of non-sealed plans. The seal carries with it the added imprimatur of the engineer's expertise. Properly sealed plans should: (1) identify the project; (2) identify the drafter; (3) identify the Code used; and (4) indicate limitations on responsibility the engineer has taken. Aluminum screen enclosures are generally similar and simple. Standard drawings can be developed for them. However, the standard plan, by itself, will not support a permit. To support the issuance of a permit, the plan must be site specific. This is a universal concept. For that purpose, additional drawings must be accomplished which consider and treat the specifics of that project. Frequently, plans are issued with a statement by the engineer limiting the degree of his or her responsibility, such as "only treating one issue" or "plans are standard and not site specific." No such limiting language was placed on the drawing in issue except, "This design is specific to this job. It is not valid if filed as a standard." In July, 1994, Mr. Power was contacted by the Department to evaluate the allegations against the Respondent in this case. In doing so, he reviewed the investigative report, portions of the transcript of the meeting of the Probable Cause Panel, the drawings in issue, and affidavits by Respondent and by the Dade County building official, but did not speak with any of them. Respondent's plans in issue bear the notation that the design is "job specific" and not valid if filed as a standard. This means that the plan should identify the job for which the plans were drawn and bear details pertinent to it. Here, the Respondent's plans refer to the "Marrero" job, and who the contractor was. In Power's opinion, this is not complete and it is not enough for the engineer to say he had the specifics in his mind. The plans must be complete and stand by themselves. Mr. Power admits he has not designed any pool enclosures. He also did not inquire whether Respondent had an office in Dade County or what the permit requirements of counties in the state are. However, in his opinion, it is universal that standard plans do not support the issuance of a permit. Respondent's design includes connection details, slab details and wind load requirements. However, the name of the owner, alone, is not site specific information. While the exact street location is not required, an identification of the area in which the project is to be built, at the very least by county, is. Respondent's expert, Mr. Sterling, is less critical of Mr. Whittum's performance. In his opinion, it is not common within the profession for signed and sealed drawings to have an address or a name or contractor's name on them. Having reviewed Respondent's drawings, Mr. Sterling does not see anything else he would need to know to properly design the structure. He does not agree with Mr. Power with respect to having the address on each and every drawing. To him, what is important in looking at the drawing from a structural point of view are the design criteria that were applied to that particular structure. To his knowledge there is no professional requirement, statute or regulation that would oblige one to provide additional information. He admits, however, that there may be different practices or rules being applied in Dade and Broward Counties with respect to structure of this type. By Final Order dated April 3, 1992, the Board disciplined Respondent's license for negligence in the practice of engineering by signing and sealing plans for an aluminum screened pool enclosure which the Hillsborough County Building Department found failed to meet acceptable engineering standards. The penalty imposed included an administrative fine of $500, a reprimand, and probation for one year under conditions designed to insure technical and professional enhancement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of negligence in the practice of engineering; imposing a fine of $1,000.00 and revoking his license, but that so much of the penalty as provides for revocation be suspended for a period of two years. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. Accepted and incorporated herein. 2 - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. - 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. Accepted, but primarily a restatement of testimony. 17. - 22. Accepted, but these are primarily restatements of witness testimony. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 4. Not Findings of Fact but statements of procedure followed. Unknown. - 9. Not Findings of Fact but comments of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 13. Accepted. 14. - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as surmise of witness, not knowledge. - 25. Accepted. - 28. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the issue. & 31. Not Findings of Fact but restatements of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. - 37. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the evidence. & 40. Not Findings of Fact but restatements of testimony. - 44. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of testimony. More a comment by one witness on the testimony of another witness. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Mary Ellen Clark, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles S. Stephens, Esquire 1177 Park Avenue, Suite 5 Orange Park, Florida 32073 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's certificate as a plumbing contractor in Pinellas County should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Petitioner, Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board (Board) was the agency responsible for the certification of plumbing contractors and the regulation of the plumbing trade in Pinellas County. Respondent was certified by the Board as a plumbing contractor, but his certification had been suspended by the Board on August 8, 1999, for failure to provide proof of required liability insurance. Ernie Martin Plumbing (EMP) has been in business in Pinellas County, Florida, since the 1940's. The business was started by Respondent's father, with whom Respondent worked until he took over the business. Respondent operated the business until, due to the demands of health, he relied on two employees, Charlie Pierce and Greg Rowe, to do all the work commencing in the mid-1980's. He actually sold them the business in the late 1980's. Since neither Pierce nor Rowe was a licensed plumber, in October 1984 Respondent changed the status of his certificate to qualify the company on those jobs where certification was required. Because he was not satisfied with the way the business was being run, however, on August 8, 1999, Respondent went to the offices of the Board for the purposes of having his certificate and name removed as the qualifying certification for EMP. At that time he was advised by a clerk at the Board office that his certificate had been suspended for a failure to maintain the required liability insurance for the company. Because of this, Respondent erroneously believed his license was no longer active and could not be used by the company, so he took no further action. On November 8, 1999, Doris Ruttledge called EMP to fix a leak under her kitchen sink in her home at 3800 Fifth Avenue South. A representative of the company came to her home and purportedly fixed the leak. Ms. Ruttledge paid the fee required. She soon found out that the leak had not been properly fixed and still existed. She called EMP several times to come fix it, speaking each time with Greg Rowe, but the repair was not done. She finally had another plumber complete the required repairs. Somewhat earlier, on July 31, 1999, Arthur Arendt experienced problems with the sewer line exiting his home located at 501 36th Avenue North. The line was blocked and sewage was backing up. Arendt called EMP and asked what it would cost to repair the problem. When he was quoted a price of $100.00, he agreed to have the work done, and a representative of EMP came to the house to do it. After digging down about five feet from the house, the plumber determined that the line was clogged and broke through the pipe to remove the blockage. Once the blockage was removed, the plumber asked Mr. Arendt for an empty two-liter soda bottle from which he cut a curved section which he placed over the opening in the pipe as a patch. The plumber then covered the patch with dirt and declared it fixed. The following day, Mr. Arendt noticed that the pipe was leaking at the patch. He called Greg Rowe, the representative of EMP, who said he would fix it but did not do so. Finally, on September 30, 1999, after no-one from EMP had come out to repair the leak, Mr. Arendt repaired it himself. Several weeks later, in November 1999, Mr. Martin came to the Arendt home, examined the repair and Arendt's modification to it, and determined that further work needed to be done. Mr. Martin contacted Greg Rowe and told him he wanted the line repaired correctly and he wanted it done immediately. The required corrections were made. According to Kenneth Klotz, the chief plumbing inspector for St. Petersburg, the use of a piece of plastic bottle is not an acceptable means of repairing a broken sewer line. A seal must be watertight to prevent leakage of sewage from the line into the surrounding ground. Within those parameters, small repairs may be made by patch, but larger repairs require the replacement of the broken pipe section. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board enter a final order in this case revoking Respondent's certification (License C-985(RF0040714))as a plumbing contractor in Pinellas County without prejudice to apply for re-certification after one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Owens, Executive Director Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board 11701 Belcher Road, Suite 102 Largo, Florida 33773-5116 Ernest J. Martin 5050 34th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33714
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement, pursuant to Section 489.115, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact On or about April 4, 2003, Petitioner applied for a certified plumbing contractor's license by endorsement. Applicants who seek a licensure by endorsement must have passed an examination that is substantially equivalent to the examination given in Florida or hold a license in another state or territory of the United States where the criteria for issuance of the license is substantially equivalent to Florida's criteria. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed or certified as a plumber in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. For the purpose of his application for licensure by endorsement, Petitioner submitted information to the Board regarding the examination he took in Georgia. Petitioner was not precluded from submitting information regarding the examinations he took in Alabama and Tennessee. However, Petitioner submitted the information regarding the examination he took in Georgia because it was the one he had taken most recently. Georgia gives three different plumbing examinations and issues three different plumbing licenses. One examination is for a journeyman's license. Another examination is for a Class I restricted plumbing license. Still, another examination is given for a Class II unrestricted plumbing license. In order to obtain his plumbing license in Georgia, Petitioner successfully completed the Class I Restricted Georgia Examination (Georgia Examination). Florida issues only one certified plumbing contractor's license and that license is the equivalent of Georgia's Class II unrestricted plumbing license. To meet the examination requirement for licensure as a plumber in Florida, an applicant must successfully complete the Certification Examination for Plumbing Contractors (Florida Examination or Certification Examination for Plumbing Contractors). Stephen Allen, a psychometrician employed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, evaluated the Georgia Examination to determine if it were substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. In determining whether the Georgia Examination and the Florida Examination were substantially equivalent, Mr. Allen considered and compared the material covered; the emphasis placed on various topics; the actual content of the examinations; the general characteristics of the examination; the number of questions; the amount of time allowed to complete the examination; the weight given to various areas or categories of the examinations; and the method of measuring knowledge in the various content areas. Based on a comprehensive review and analysis of the Georgia Examination and the Florida Examination, Mr. Allen properly determined that the Georgia Examination was not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. The area in which the examinations are significantly different is the isometric area or category. First, the relative weight on the isometric area of the examinations varies greatly. On the Florida Examination, the weight given to the isometric area is 31 percent. On the Georgia Examination, the weight given to the isometric area is, at most, only 6 percent. Second, the knowledge of isometrics is measured differently on the examinations. The Florida Examination requires that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of isometrics by having the candidate draw five different isometric drawings, which show the room's plumbing based on the fixtures to be installed. The five drawings are graded on legibility, orientation, flow, angles, piping, labeling, and vents. The Georgia Examination is a multiple choice examination and measures knowledge of isometrics by the candidate's selecting the correct answer from four possible answers. The Georgia Examination successfully completed by Petitioner to obtain his master plumber's restricted license is not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. Petitioner is ineligible for licensure by endorsement because the examination he took in Georgia is not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William Lantrip 927 Lakewood Drive Dunedin, Florida 34698-7218 Timothy Vaccaro, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation is the administrative agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty to protect the water resources of the State and to administer and enforce the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, embodied in Chapters 373, Florida Statutes, as well as the rules promulgated thereunder. The St. Johns River Water Management District is a unit of government established by Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, also charged with the duty to administer and enforce that chapter and related rules. The Department of Environmental Regulation, pursuant to Section 373.103, Florida Statutes, and Section 317.104(8), Florida Administrative Code, has delegated to the District the power and authority to administer and enforce Part III of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to that part which implement it. Those rules are embodied in Chapter 40C-3, Florida Administrative Code. Stanley U. Monds is a licensed water well contractor licensed by St. Johns River Water Management District. He has been issued license number 2257. Mr. Monds is also registered by the District as a "water well driller." That registration bears the number 2257. The Respondent on various dates in 1984-1986 contracted to construct and constructed water wells from which water was to be drawn for drinking or other domestic purposes, within the geographical boundaries of the District, for the following named individuals: WELL OWNER COUNTY YEAR CONSTRUCTED Ray Howell Clay 1986 Clayton McCumbers Clay 1986 Joe Eddy Nassau 1986 Joe Eddy Nassau 1986 Kevin Brooks Clay 1984 Nancy Harris Duval 1985 Marcus Rhoden Baker 1985 Cecil Hagen Baker 1985 Ken Tenson Baker 1985 Jim Griffis Baker 1985 Tom Scott Baker 1985 Tom Ott Baker 1985 J. Ray Gatlin Baker 1984 J. Ray Gatlin Baker 1984 The Respondent never filed "well completion reports" with the District for these wells, as required by District rules. The Respondent also contracted to construct and constructed wells for domestic water use, including drinking, located within the geographical boundaries of the District for the following named individuals and thereafter filed well completion reports, however, the reports were actually filed more than 30 days after the wells were completed and thus in violation of District rules: WELL OWNER COUNTY DATE COMPLETED COMPLETION REPORT FILED James Hall Clay 3/10/86 5/06/86 Dennis Bennett Duval 6/16/83 5/04/85 Bennett's Hardware Duval 6/17/83 5/23/85 Don Tenbush Clay 1/08/86 10/1/86 In March 1986, the Respondent installed a water well for a Mr. Joe Eddy in Nassau County, Florida. This well was abandoned by the Respondent and a second well was drilled nearby in June 1986. The Respondent failed to properly abandon the first well by filling it from top to bottom with grout. The Respondent was warned of this condition and reminded to correct it by certified letter sent him by District personnel concerning his improper abandonment of the first well. He acknowledged receiving that letter in a conversation with witness J. C. Varnes, a District field representative. The Respondent, however, refused or failed to later properly abandon the first well by filling it with grout from bottom to top. In June 1986, the Respondent contracted to construct and did construct a second water well for the same Mr. Eddy on his property in Nassau County. That well penetrated multiple aquifers, but the Respondent refused or failed to complete the well so as to prevent cross-contamination of different aquifers or water-bearing strata by water of significantly different quality. This should have been prevented by proper casing of the well which Respondent failed to do. Further, the Respondent used PVC (polyvinylchlride) plastic casing instead of metallic casing in constructing the well and seated the casing by driving it into the ground which resulted in the plastic casing being cracked. The Respondent also failed to grout and seal the annular space between the well casing and the naturally occurring geological formations through which the well bore passed. Another certified letter was sent him by District personnel advising him of these violations of District rules which he acknowledged. He refused or failed to correct the well construction violations, however. Failing to case a well to the bottom of a well or having cracks in the casing allows water and/or other materials from one geological strata to enter the casing, migrate upward or downward and enter aquifers or water-bearing strata at other levels, thus posing a potential of cross-contamination of different aquifers or water-bearing strata due to improper "short casing" or due to cracked casing. In 1984, the Respondent constructed a water well for Kevin Brooks on his property in Clay County, Florida. The well was constructed into an "unconsolidated aquifer," but the Respondent failed to attach a well screen to the bottom of the casing as a filtering device, in violation of well construction standards promulgated by the District. In June 1983, the Respondent contracted to construct and did construct a well for Bennett's Hardware on its property in Duval County. He failed to grout and seal the annular space between the well casing and the naturally occurring geological formations from the bottom to the top of the well in violation of District well construction standards. In 1984, the Respondent constructed two four-inch water wells for J. Ray Gatlin on his property in Baker County, Florida. The Respondent failed to grout and seal the upper three feet of annular space in each of these two wells. He was sent a certified letter on July 14, 1986, advising him of the deficiencies in the well construction. He acknowledged receiving that letter in a conversation with witness J. C. Varnes, but failed to grout the well properly anyway. Also in 1984, he constructed an eight-inch water well for J. Ray Gatlin on property in Baker County, Florida. He failed to grout and seal the annular space between this well's casing and the surrounding geological formations from the bottom to the top of the casing. He also failed to install a water tight seal at the top of the well casing. After being sent a certified letter advising of these violations by District personnel, he acknowledged to Mr. Varnes once again that he had received that letter. He still failed to properly grout or seal the well after being so warned. On September 16, 1986, he was sent a second certified letter which he acknowledged receiving which instructed him to properly abandon the well. He refused to follow that instruction. In January 1986, the Respondent constructed a water well for Don Tenbush on his property in Clay County. He failed to grout and seal the annular space between the well casing and the geological formation surrounding the casing in this well from top to bottom. This well penetrated multiple aquifers or water-bearing zones and yet the Respondent failed to complete the well so as to prevent potential cross-contamination of different zones or aquifers by water of significantly different quality. He did not case the well all the way down to the producing aquifer at the bottom of the well. Here, again, he acknowledged receiving a certified letter advising him of these violations and requiring correction and yet failed to correct the violations. The Respondent began construction of a second well for Mr. Tenbush on the same parcel of property in January 1986 after abandoning the first well described above. He failed to properly abandon the first well by filling it from bottom to top with grout. He was notified of that deficiency or failure, but refused to correct that condition. In constructing the second well for Mr. Tenbush, he refused to or failed to extend the well casing from the land surface all the way down to the producing aquifer and to seat it. After being sent a certified letter advising him of this violation, receipt of which he acknowledged to Mr. Varnes, he again refused or failed to correct the violation. Both wells drilled by Respondent for Mr. Tenbush subsequently had to be abandoned by another water well contractor.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the allegations of the administrative complaints are correct, and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is charged with responsibility for regulation of the practice of engineering within the State of Florida. At all times material to these cases, the Respondent has been licensed by the State of Florida as a professional engineer holding license PE40904. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Joseph Berryman, P.E., a professional engineer licensed by the State of Florida. Mr. Berryman was accepted as an expert in structural engineering design, including aluminum structure design. Mr. Berryman's testimony regarding deficiencies in the Respondent's design of the projects referenced herein was clear and persuasive. In response, the Respondent testified that the referenced projects met applicable professional standards, including load and stress standards. The Respondent's primary engineering experience has apparently been in the realm of civil, not structural, engineering. According to Mr. Berryman, the Respondent's calculations included material errors, reflected structural elements other than those identified in the design documents, and revealed misunderstanding and misapplication of engineering precepts. The Respondent's testimony has been rejected. Mr. Berryman's testimony has been credited. DOAH Case No. 12-1635PL (Del Vecchio) On October 7, 2011, the Respondent signed, sealed, and dated a one-page structural engineering design document for construction of an aluminum screen swimming pool enclosure located at "3611 Throle" in Rockledge, Florida (the "Del Vecchio" project). The document failed to include elements and information required by the Florida Building Code (FBC) and by the Petitioner's rules. The document failed to identify the height of the mansard rise, failed to detail a proper end connection between diagonal roof bracing and the frame of the structure, failed to identify the size of the "K-bracing" elements included in the design, failed to indicate the size of the corner columns or to show a corner column section, and referenced a design element that had been superseded elsewhere in the document. Additionally, the frame spacing dimensions set forth on the document failed to conform to the width of the proposed structure. Because the material to be used in construction of the proposed structure was aluminum, the applicable design standard is set forth in Chapter 20 of the FBC and the Aluminum Design Manual (ADM). The standard requires that every element in the structure must be so proportioned as to resist the applied loading without exceeding the allowable stress for the construction material and without exceeding the allowable stress for each specific element of the structure's construction. Mr. Berryman reviewed the project proposed in the document for compliance with the standard set forth in the ADM and determined that the proposed structure (specifically the proposed roof beams, columns, and purlins) would not be sufficient to comply with applicable stress and load requirements. Mr. Berryman's analysis of the design proposed by the Respondent has been fully credited. The Respondent's preparation of the design document for the Del Vecchio project demonstrated a lack of due care in the practice of engineering and a lack of due regard for professional engineering standards. DOAH Case No. 12-1636PL (Nunez) On September 20, 2011, the Respondent signed, sealed, and dated a three-page structural engineering design document for construction of an aluminum screen swimming pool enclosure located at 4128 Southwest 102nd Lane Road, in Ocala, Florida (the "Nunez" project). The document failed to include elements and information required by the FBC and by the Petitioner's rules. The document failed to identify the height of the mansard rise and failed to detail a proper end connection between diagonal roof bracing and the frame of the structure. Because the material to be used in construction of the proposed structure was aluminum, the applicable design standard is set forth in Chapter 20 of the FBC and the ADM. The standard requires that every element in the structure must be so proportioned as to resist the applied loading without exceeding the allowable stress for the construction material and without exceeding the allowable stress for each specific element of the structure's construction. Mr. Berryman reviewed the project proposed in the document for compliance with the ADM and determined that the proposed structure (specifically the proposed roof beams, columns, purlins, cable bracing, anchor bolts, and gusset plates used in a roof beam splice) would not be sufficient to comply with applicable stress and load requirements. Mr. Berryman's analysis of the design proposed in the Respondent's document has been fully credited. The Respondent's preparation of the design document for the Nunez project demonstrated a lack of due care in the practice of engineering and a lack of due regard for professional engineering standards. DOAH Case No. 12-1637PL (Dunaway) On September 8, 2011, the Respondent signed, sealed, and dated a three-page structural engineering design document for construction of an aluminum screen swimming pool enclosure located at 8538 Southwest 135th Street, in Ocala, Florida (the "Dunaway" project). The document failed to include elements and information required by the FBC and by the Petitioner's rules. The document failed to identify the height of the gable rise, failed to detail a proper end connection between diagonal roof bracing and the frame of the structure, failed to indicate the size of the corner columns or to show a corner column section, and failed to identity the metal alloy of a clip used at a detailed shoulder connection. Because the material to be used in construction of the proposed structure was aluminum, the applicable design standard is set forth in Chapter 20 of the FBC and the ADM. The standard requires that every element in the structure must be so proportioned as to resist the applied loading without exceeding the allowable stress for the construction material and without exceeding the allowable stress for each specific element of the structure's construction. Mr. Berryman reviewed the project proposed by the Respondent's design document using the information set forth in the ADM and determined that the proposed structure (specifically the proposed roof beams, columns, and shoulder connection fasteners) would not be sufficient to comply with applicable stress and load requirements. Mr. Berryman's analysis of the design proposed in the Respondent's document has been fully credited. The Respondent's preparation of the design document for the Dunaway project demonstrated a lack of due care in the practice of engineering and a lack of due regard for professional engineering standards.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order reprimanding the Respondent, placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years under terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Petitioner, and imposing a fine of $6,000 against the Respondent. Additionally, the final order should prohibit the Respondent from the practice of structural engineering until the Respondent submits to the Petitioner proof of his successful completion of an appropriate examination to be designated by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: John Jefferson Rimes, III, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corp. 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite B-112 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Scott Guy Campbell Apartment 805 250 58th Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Zana Raybon, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite B-112 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5268 Michael Flury, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Several years prior to1978, petitioner General Development Corporation (GDC) applied to the DER for a dredge and fill permit to remove a plug of land between the Ocean Breeze Waterway and the North Fork of the St. Lucie River. During the course of negotiations for this permit, it was discovered that the North Port St. Lucie Sewage Treatment Plant, owned and operated by General Development Utilities, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the petitioner, was operating without a permit from the DER and discharging effluent into a ditch which flowed into the Ocean Breeze Waterway. In March of 1978, a temporary operating permit was issued for the sewage treatment plant. In July of 1978, petitioner received from the DER Permit No. 253.123- 1031 to dredge an area approximately 800 feet in length, 90 feet in width and 6 feet in depth in order to connect the Ocean Breeze/Sagamore Waterways to the dead end oxbow of the North Fork of the St. Lucie River. The permit application was given special consideration pursuant to Rule 17-4.28(7), Florida Administrative Code. The purpose for obtaining the permit was to create direct navigable access to the North Fork of the St. Lucie River from thee Ocean Breeze Waterway. The Ocean Breeze Waterway was and is currently connected to the North Fork of the St. Lucie River by a narrow, shallow, meandering creek and lake system. However, there is not a large enough opening to allow the type of navigable access desired by the petitioner for the benefit of 118 lots plotted along the Ocean Breeze and Sagamore Waterways. Among the seven particular or special conditions attached to the dredge and fill permit issued to petitioner was that the earthen plug not be removed until such time as a permanent operational permit was issued for the sewage treatment plant owned and operated by General Development Utilities, Inc. More specifically, petitioner agreed to the following special conditions to the issuance of the dredge and fill permit: "(7) The applicant is aware that the GDC Utilities' sewage plant is providing an unknown quantity of discharge into Ocean Breeze Waterway and that this discharge may be a source of pollution to the receiving body of water unless affirmative steps are taken by the Utilities. The sewage treatment plant is currently operating under a Temporary Operating Permit (TP56-4601). In no case shall the plug at Cove Waterway be removed before an Operation Permit for the STP has been issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation." At time of issuance of the dredge and fill permit, DER personnel considered the quoted special condition number 7 to an integral part of the permit in terms of water quality assurances. General Development Utilities, Inc. has not been able to obtain a permanent operational permit from the DER for its sewage treatment plant which discharges into a ditch that flows into the Ocean Breeze Waterway. Therefore, particular condition number 7 has not been satisfied and petitioner has been unable to proceed with the dredging or removing of the plug under the permit. As a result of the delays in removal of the plug, petitioner has had to repurchase some 41 of the 118 plotted lots. The sewage treatment plant was and is still operating under a temporary permit. General Development Utilities, Inc. has requested a permanent operational permit for the sewage treatment plant and DER has issued a letter of intent to deny such a permit. As a result, General Development Utilities has petitioned DER for site specific alternative criteria pursuant to Rule 17-3.031, Florida Administrative Code. This matter is the subject of a separate proceeding currently being held in abeyance pending a determination of alternative criteria. General Development Utilities, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, DOAH Case No. 81-177. In September of 1980, petitioner sent a letter to DER requesting that special condition number seven be removed from its dredge and fill Permit No. 253.123-1031. It was intended that this request be considered as a minor modification to the dredge and fill permit. In response, DER's Chief of the Bureau of Permitting, Suzanne P. Walker, informed petitioner by letter dated October 15, 1980, that it was the staff's initial reaction, after a review of the original dredge and fill permit file, that the requirement that the sewage treatment plant obtain a permanent operational permit prior to dredging remain as a condition of the dredge and fill permit. Petitioner was informed that if it wished to pursue the matter further, the project must be reevaluated as a major modification to the dredge and fill permit. A major modification to a permit requires a new permit application and fee and is treated and processed as an initial application for a permit, with the applicant being required to provide reasonable assurances that the water quality standards will not be violated. Upon request for a minor modification, DER simply reviews the file and determines whether the request is obviously environmentally insignificant. After receipt of the letter from Mrs. Walker, petitioner supplied DER with additional water quality data. Based upon this additional data, discussions with DER staff who had been involved with the initial dredge and fill permit and the sewage treatment plant permit, and two days of sampling data collected by DER, DER determined that particular condition number seven was an integral part of the affirmative reasonable water quality assurance provided and should remain a condition of the permit. This determination was communicated to petitioner by letter dated January 7, 1981. The sewage treatment plant discharges treated effluent into a drainage ditch known as C-108. Effluent from the plant first goes into holding or retention ponds. Under its current flow, it takes about forty days for the effluent to be discharged from the plant to C-108 and the Ocean Breeze Waterway. C-108 flows into the Ocean Breeze Waterway, an artificial waterway which is presently connected to the North Fork of the St. Lucie River by a narrow, shallow meandering creek and lake system. The sewage treatment plant currently operates at 300,000 gallons per day but has an authorized capacity to operate at two million gallons per day. It currently contributes approximately two percent of the total daily flow to C-108. The Ocean Breeze Waterway and C-108, independent of the sewage treatment plant, drain approximately 4,000 square acres and produce about 35 percent of the water that will flow into the North Fork. The North Fork is tidal, with four one foot tides per day. The tidal action comprises almost 63 percent of the moving water. At a two million gallons per day discharge, the wastewater plant would be contributing about 12 percent of the water that would be going into the North Fork from the Ocean Breeze Waterway system. In comparison with two adjacent drainage systems, the Ocean Breeze system contributes only about three percent of the fresh water which flows into the North Fork. The dissolved oxygen levels of C-108 are chacteristically below the state standard of five milligrams per liter, primarily due to the seepage of ground water into the canal. Due to man-made alterations and to natural phenomena, the North Fork's dissolved oxygen levels also characteristically fall below state standards. The dissolved oxygen level of the Ocean Breeze Waterway is characteristically above state standards. Higher levels of dissolved oxygen coming from the sewage treatment plant improves the dissolved oxygen levels of the existing system. High levels of nitrogen, phosphate and chlorophyll have been found near the point of discharge. The quality of water in the North Fork is better than in the Ocean Breeze Waterway. It was the opinion of petitioner's experts that no change in dissolved oxygen levels would occur in the Ocean Breeze Waterway or the North Fork if the plug of land between these water bodies were removed. Petitioner's witnesses also opined that the Ocean Breeze/C-108 system was not a source of nutrient enrichment to the North Fork, and that the present creek system provided no water quality benefits in the form of nutrient uptake for the North Fork. It was estimated that, if the plug of land were removed pursuant to the permit, a pollutant placed at the upper end of the Ocean Breeze Waterway would be diluted by 98 percent in 26 hours in lieu of the present 39 hours due to increased flushing. These opinions were based upon analyses by petitioner's witnesses of various samplings and data regarding dissolved oxygen, nutrients and phytoplankton. The respondent's witnesses felt that the poor water quality in the Ocean Breeze Waterway was attributable in large part to the sewage treatment plant discharge and, if the plug of land were removed, the water quality problems would be moved to the North Fork and the St. Lucie River. It was felt that the present creek and lake system -- the narrow circuitous connection presently existing between the canal and the river -- reduces the nutrients which otherwise would flow into the river. These conclusions were based upon DER's own survey, a review of the dredge and fill permit file and a review of the additional data supplied by the petitioner General Development Corporation. No data regarding the water quality of the effluent from the sewage treatment plant was submitted by the petitioner at the time of DER's review of the original application for the dredge and fill permit.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the request of General Development Corporation to modify Permit Number 253.123-1031 by removing particular condition number seven be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Valerie Fravel Corporate Counsel General Development Corp. 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami Florida 33131 Alfred J. Malefatto Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Victoria Tschinkel Secretary, Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department should give the Petitioner a passing grade on the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Jane A. Caldera, took the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination and received a failing grade. Her grade was 67.20; passing was 70. In terms of raw scores, 48 was passing, and the Petitioner scored 45 points. During the morning session of the exam, candidates were allowed to answer any four of twelve "essay" questions. During the afternoon session, candidates were allowed to answer any four of twelve multiple-choice questions. One of the "essay" questions the Petitioner chose to answer during the morning session, number 125, had three parts. The Petitioner did not answer the second part and answered the third part correctly. On the first part, she properly set up the multiple equations necessary to answer the question but made a calculation error in the last step, and her answer was 810 linear feet instead of the correct answer of 630 linear feet. Question 125 was graded in accordance with a scoring plan that set out the following "'Problem Weighting": t' Part (a) 4 points, Part (b) 4 points, Part (c) 2 points." It also provided, in part, that a score of six points out of ten, signifying "minimum competence, required: "Correct solution to either part (a) or part (b) and part (c) or a solution with a combination of two deficiencies consisting of some series of logic errors, computation errors, or insufficient accuracy as defined above." The next highest possible score, according to the scoring plan, was score of four out of ten for "more than a rudimentary knowledge but insufficient to demonstrate competence." On question 125, the Petitioner was awarded two out of a possible four points on part (a) (in which the Petitioner's solution contained a calculating error), none of four possible points on part (b) (which the Petitioner did not answer), and both of the two possible points on part (c) (which the Petitioner answered correctly), for a total of four out of the ten possible points on question 125. The Petitioner's score on question 125 was consistent with the scoring plan, which also was applied to all of the other candidates. Both question 125 and the scoring plan were provided by the National Council of Examiners of Engineers and Surveyors. A primary purpose of the scoring plan is to ensure consistently rational scoring. To eliminate the chance of bias, questions are graded "blindly," using the scoring plan. Statistically, question 125 has achieved reliable test results. The candidates scoring higher on the examination overall also scored better on question 125. The Petitioner contended that there is a better scoring plan for question 125 under which she would have scored six out of a possible ten points. While the Petitioner's proposed scoring plan is logical, and may even be a better scoring plan, the Petitioner did not prove that the scoring plan utilized by the Department was arbitrary or devoid of logic. One of the multiple choice questions the Petitioner chose to answer during the afternoon session, number 423, had ten parts, each worth one point. The Petitioner received no credit for her answers to parts (2) and ( 3 ), Parts (2) and (3) of question 423 are prefaced by a descriptor of the characteristics of a freeway section. One of the characteristics is a "V/C" of 0.60; another is a peak hour factor (PHF) of 0.90. Part (2) of question 423 asked for the "maximum number of vehicles going west during a one-hour period under these conditions." To answer the question, the Petitioner solved for "maximum service flow," assuming ideal conditions. The Petitioner did not apply the PHF of 0.90; as a result, her answer did not take PHF into consideration. It is found that part (2) of question 423 is at least ambiguous. It asked for "maximum number of vehicles . . . during a one-hour period," not the actual number of vehicles. This could lead one to believe that it asked for "maximum service flow, extended over one entire hour, without considering the PHF. On the other hand, the question specified vehicles "going west . . . under these conditions," implying the actual volume and the application of the PHF. Only 31% of the candidates answering question 423 answered part (2) correctly. (43.6% gave the same answer as the Petitioner.) In and of themselves, those statistics do not prove that the question was invalid or unreliable. But they support the finding that the question was at least ambiguous. Part (3) of question 423 asked the candidates to assume a capacity in passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl) and to solve for the "average travel speed . . . under these conditions." The Petitioner solved for the average speed at the volume of traffic that would result from the given number of pcphpl, under "ideal conditions," without applying the "V/C" ratio of 0.60. It is found that part (3) of question 423 also is at least ambiguous. After having given the candidates the characteristics of the road in the preface to question 423, including a "V/C" of 0.60, part (3) asked the candidates to assume a pcphpl. It is not clear whether the given pcphpl was intended to override, or be the result of the application of the V/C' factor of 0.60, or whether the "V/C" factor was supposed to be applied to the pcphpl. On part (3) of question 423, 52.6% of the candidates answering the question chose the answer for which credit was given; 28.3% chose the Petitioner s answer. Those statistics do not prove that the question was invalid or unreliable. But neither was there any evidence that they would be inconsistent with a finding that the question was at least ambiguous.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers, enter a final order granting the Petitioner's examination challenge in part, to the extent that parts (2) and (3) of question 423 of the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination are found to be ambiguous, but nonetheless finding that the Petitioner did not successfully complete the examination. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J.LAWRENCE J JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected, as not proven, that the Petitioner's proposed scoring plan is only 'appropriate, reasonable, and fair deduction for a math error," or that the deduction of two points was "a 50% deduction, or a "totally unfair and unreasonable percentage" or that it is "inappropriate . . . to tie the solutions or partial solution together." Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that the two-point deduction for a math error is a 50% deduction and is clearly inconsistent with" the reference material. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that the Petitioner received a 50% deduction on question 125, or that the NCEE scoring plan was inconsistent and should be considered arbitrary by problem chosen." Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that NCEE's "two point (20%) increment grading scale is an unfair, unlogical, and unreasonable means to evaluate" or that it is "too rigid to fairly evaluate detailed engineering solutions." Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven. 9.-10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that question 423(2) asked for "maximum volume or "service volume," or that the PHF was added "arbitrarily, and for no reason." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that 43.6% is a majority. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and found that question 423(3) is ambiguous. Rejected as not proven that LOS "Et" conditions should be assumed or that "A" is the best answer, or that 423(3) is "devoid of reason, capricious, and a 'trick' question." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and found that question 423(3) is ambiguous. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. However, PHF is used to determine actual maximum numbers of vehicles, not maximum service flow or maximum possible numbers of vehicles. Rejected. (It asked for average speed.) Rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Rejected as not established by the evidence that they are statistically valid, only that they are not statistically invalid. COPIES FURNISHED: Jane A. Caldera 5414 Deerbrooke Circle Tampa, Florida 33624 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0764
