The Issue Whether Petitioner must be discharged from his position as a sanitation equipment operator II because he can no longer perform the essential functions of that job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that ECUA and its employees “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. For instance, Section B-11 provides that “[r]easonable accommodation is available to all disabled employees, where his or her disability affects the performance of job functions.” Section B-13 A (10) of the Manual requires ECUA employees to maintain all capabilities that are necessary for them to perform their assigned duties. Mr. Smith is 52 years old and initially worked for ECUA as a sanitation equipment operator from March 1997 through October 2002. He returned to his previous position at ECUA in January 2018. ECUA’s description of the sanitation equipment operator II position describes the “essential job functions” as follows: Operates a heavy duty, highly technical, and specially designed, one-person automated residential or commercial refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container loading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route. Required to manually load yard trash, brush, or bulk waste when assigned to yard-trash duty. Operates a heavy duty residential rear-loading, semi-automated refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container leading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route, while acting as crew leader for the two/three person assigned crew. Other “essential job functions” include activities such as manually picking up waste containers for disabled customers, climbing in and out of trucks, climbing stairs and ladders, and walking refuse containers to and from residences. As for the position’s physical requirements, the job description states that: While performing the essential functions of this job the employee is regularly required to sit, stand, or walk, use hands to finger, handle, or feel, reach with hands and arms, stoop, kneel, jump, step, or crouch, and lift and/or move up to 100 pounds and occasionally required to lift over 100 pounds. On June 25, 2019, Mr. Smith’s right knee collided with the rear door or bumper of a refuse truck while he was dumping refuse into a landfill. He sought medical attention that day, and the resulting “work status report” from the Sacred Heart Medical Group indicated he could return to work on June 26, 2019, but was prohibited from bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting for the next eight days. ECUA learned of Mr. Smith’s injury on June 25, 2019, and he was promptly placed on leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The standardized form memorializing that action advised Mr. Smith that “[y]ou will be required to present a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment.” Mr. Smith’s injured knee did not improve to a point at which he could return to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II, and he exhausted his 12 weeks of FMLA leave in September of 2019.1 At that point, ECUA’s Human Resources department placed him in two light-duty positions. The first was a temporary position counting inventory. That temporary position comes open for a week at the end of every ECUA fiscal year. After Mr. Smith completed that work, he was assigned to removing paper and plastic from ECUA’s composting operation. Mr. Smith’s tenure with the compost operation was brief because he was unable to walk or stand for long periods of time.2 1 Mr. Smith enjoyed working for ECUA and was interested in other employment opportunities there following his accident. Because he has 20 years of customer service experience and associates degrees in culinary management and hotel and restaurant management, Mr. Smith inquired about becoming a customer service representative. However, ECUA only had one such opening between March and November of 2019 and typically receives hundreds of applications when such a position comes open. Also, ECUA’s Human Resources department does not have the authority to reassign employees from one department to another. An employee interested in a position outside his or her department must apply for the position, and the department seeking to fill that opening makes the final decision as to who is hired. 2 The witnesses disagreed about how long Mr. Smith worked at the compost operation. Chiquita Payne, a senior human resources generalist at ECUA, and Tim Dean, ECUA’s lead compost technician, testified that Mr. Smith spent no more than a few days with the compost operation. Mr. Smith testified that he was there for 2.5 weeks. Mr. Smith never returned to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II. The medical restrictions prohibiting Mr. Smith from activities such as bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting were not lifted. A note from Dr. Juliet De Campos, Mr. Smith’s attending physician at the Andrews Institute of Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, gave the following assessment of Mr. Smith: This 52-year-old male, truck driver had an impact injury to the anterior [of] the right knee in the patellofemoral area with a fall to the ground which may have twisted his knee. He had a laceration which healed uneventfully but had recurrent swelling and giving way of his knee. X-ray showed no fracture or loose body. MRI suggested abnormal MRI and medial meniscus. What was not read was a prepatellar bursitis and contusion. The contusion has resolved but the patient still has recurrent swelling, catching, and giving way. He has had physical therapy and a knee sleeve. Exam today shows findings consistent with medial meniscus tear but no ACL injury, atrophy. Prepatellar bursitis has resolved. He continues to have recurrent swelling and instability. He has been in physical therapy which has helped but [has not restored] normal function. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, this injury was caused by the job injury and treatment is necessary on that basis. The note continued by recommending that Mr. Smith have right knee surgery, and he ultimately did so on January 22, 2020. Following the surgery, Mr. Smith’s attending physician anticipated that Mr. Smith would have a “permanent impairment rating” and recommended that he do no stooping, squatting, or kneeling. The attending physician also recommended that Mr. Smith not lift anything over 10 pounds. Thus, the attending physician noted that “[o]ffice work would be appropriate” and counseled against Mr. Smith engaging in “commercial driving.” Section D-16 of the Manual contains a section on workers’ compensation providing that: Employees will return to work anytime they are medically able, with or without reasonable accommodations, within six (6) months of the date of injury. If after six (6) months from the date of injury the employee remains unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, the employee’s department director, in consultation with the Human Resources Director, shall consider the employee’s prognosis and anticipated return-to- work date, the department’s present and projected workload and needs, and all other relevant factors in determining whether additional leave is appropriate under the circumstances. Should the employee remain unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, after passage of six (6) months from the date of the injury and any extension thereof, if any, he or she shall retire, resign, or be terminated. Keith Kyles Sr., ECUA’s sanitations collections manager, issued a letter to Mr. Smith on December 3, 2019, stating the following: The most recent medical note in your file shows you were last seen by your treating physician, Dr. DeCampos, on November 19, 2019. Regarding your ability to return to work to perform the essential functions of your job, Dr. DeCampos stated, “No change – will need to schedule surgery.” Based on the above, it is clear you are unable to perform the essential functions of your position as a Sanitation Equipment Operator II. Moreover, a return to work date is unknown and there is no estimated date for your return to work at this time. Your continued absence, without a probable date of your return to work, creates a substantial hardship on the operational needs of the Sanitation Department and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its responsibilities to its ratepayers. ECUA is also unaware of any reasonable accommodations which would enable you to perform the essential functions of your job. Moreover, ECUA cannot indefinitely hold your position open, as the duties which it entails simply must be performed. We have done everything reasonably possible to accommodate your work restrictions. However, we can no longer allow your continuing inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, to create a substantial hardship and impair ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. The letter closed by notifying Mr. Smith that Mr. Kyles had scheduled a predetermination hearing for December 10, 2019, so that Mr. Smith could have an opportunity to discuss whether he could perform the essential functions of a sanitation equipment operator II, with or without a reasonable accommodation. After the predetermination hearing, Mr. Kyles issued another letter to Mr. Smith on December 12, 2019, notifying him that his employment with ECUA had come to an end: During your hearing, you provided information that your knee surgery is scheduled for December 26, 2019. After surgery, you stated that you would be required to be on crutches for 10 days, followed by an additional eight weeks off work for recovery post-surgery. Based on the information provided, I have determined your continued inability to perform the essential functions of your position, with or without reasonable accommodation, creates a substantial hardship and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. Your inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without reasonable accommodations, constitutes a violation of Section B-13 A (10) . . . of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual Therefore, it is with regret I notify you that your employment with ECUA is hereby terminated effective close of business December 12, 2019. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Smith cannot tolerate the physical demands associated with his former position as a sanitation equipment operator II, nor is there any reasonable accommodation that could be made that would allow him to perform the duties of a sanitation equipment operator II. Thus, Mr. Smith is not in compliance with Section B- 13 A (10) of the Manual. Mr. Smith did not meaningfully contest ECUA’s argument that he could no longer perform the physical tasks associated with a sanitation equipment operator II. Instead, Mr. Smith’s case focused on arguing that there are other, less demanding positions, within ECUA’s Sanitation Department and that assigning him to one of those positions would be a reasonable accommodation. However, Mr. Smith failed to prove that he was capable of handling the physical demands associated with those positions. For instance, Mr. Smith raised the possibility of being assigned to ECUA’s “miss truck.” ECUA’s standard refuse trucks occasionally miss refuse pick-ups due to inadvertence on the drivers’ part or residents’ failure to place their garbage on the curb in a timely manner. The miss truck is not as large as a typical refuse truck and is more automated. Therefore, miss truck duty is not as physically demanding as driving a typical refuse truck. Nevertheless, Mr. Kyles’s testimony demonstrated that miss truck duty is still a physically demanding position in that the miss truck driver must be capable of transporting large refuse cans to and from residences over all types of surfaces and distances. Because ECUA’s standard refuse trucks typically miss 40-50 refuse pickups a day, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the physical demands associated with miss truck duty are not appropriate for someone with Mr. Smith’s physical limitations. Mr. Smith also raised the possibility of transporting ECUA’s fuel trailer. ECUA obtains fuel for its refuse trucks by transporting a fuel trailer to the Alabama-Florida line, acquiring the fuel, and transporting it back to ECUA. While this work is probably not as physically demanding as operating a refuse truck, Mr. Kyles testified that a fuel trailer operator would still have to satisfy the physical requirements associated with the sanitation equipment operator II position. Mr. Smith did not present any evidence to rebut Mr. Kyles’s testimony, and it is therefore accepted. Finally, Mr. Smith mentioned “monitoring piles” during his direct testimony. However, he presented no details about such duty. As a result, there is no competent, substantial evidence indicating that pile monitoring would be within his physical limitations, or that it would be a reasonable accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the executive director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that James V. Smith, Sr., is no longer qualified to perform the functions of a sanitation equipment operator II and take such action as deemed appropriate under the pertinent provisions of the Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly E. Scruggs Emerald Coast Utilities Authority Post Office Box 17089 Pensacola, Florida 32522-7089 James V. Smith, Sr. 901 Booker Street Cantonment, Florida 32533 Jessica L. Scholl, Esquire Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A. Post Office Box 13290 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Steve E. Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed) Cynthia Sutherland, Director Human Resources and Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's request for variance should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns a parcel of land in Palm Beach, County on which is housed Petitioner's paving and landscapping business and which is zoned for industrial use. Petitioner intends to install a manufactured building for use as an office. To provide sewage treatment for the bathroom of the office, Petitioner had a septic tank designed and applied for a septic tank permit which was denied as was its variance request. As a result of a complaint, Petitioner was inspected in August, 1988, by the Palm Beach County Department of Environmental Resources Management and by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. Both inspections yielded citiations for soil contamination by oil and other hazardous waste. Petitioner represented that most of the infractions had been rectified by the date of the hearing in this matter and pledged full cooperation with the County and State rules. To oversee the operation of the business and assure that no further problems arose, Petitioner decided to establish its office on site. The closest sewage treatment plant is at full capacity and does not intend to provide service to the parcel in the near future. The adjoining properties are serviced by septic tanks. As such, the proof did not demonstrate that alternative methods of waste disposal were available to the site However, as part of its business operation, Petitioner does minor repair of its equipment on site and may include oil changes and other such services. Although Petitioner does not intend to pollute the groundwater and intends to use the proposed septic tank for office use only, the proof demonstrated that waste disposal into a septic tank from the maintenance and repair of its equipment could result in the disposition of prohibited hazardous waste into the groundwater. Further, the proof failed to demonstrate that the septic tank would be protected from use by those who handled the hazardous waste. Although the hardship, if any, caused by the denial of the variance was not caused by Petitioner and the proof failed to demonstrate reasonable alternatives of waste disposal, the potential for an adverse affect of the operation to the groundwater is great. Additionally, the proof failed to establish the ameliorating conditions of soil, water table or setback conditions or whether the property was platted prior to 1972. Accordingly, the denial of the variance was proper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the variance. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of July 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Hattie Parker 160 Toneypenna Drive Jupiter, Florida 33468 Peggy G. Miller, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department should give the Petitioner a passing grade on the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Jane A. Caldera, took the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination and received a failing grade. Her grade was 67.20; passing was 70. In terms of raw scores, 48 was passing, and the Petitioner scored 45 points. During the morning session of the exam, candidates were allowed to answer any four of twelve "essay" questions. During the afternoon session, candidates were allowed to answer any four of twelve multiple-choice questions. One of the "essay" questions the Petitioner chose to answer during the morning session, number 125, had three parts. The Petitioner did not answer the second part and answered the third part correctly. On the first part, she properly set up the multiple equations necessary to answer the question but made a calculation error in the last step, and her answer was 810 linear feet instead of the correct answer of 630 linear feet. Question 125 was graded in accordance with a scoring plan that set out the following "'Problem Weighting": t' Part (a) 4 points, Part (b) 4 points, Part (c) 2 points." It also provided, in part, that a score of six points out of ten, signifying "minimum competence, required: "Correct solution to either part (a) or part (b) and part (c) or a solution with a combination of two deficiencies consisting of some series of logic errors, computation errors, or insufficient accuracy as defined above." The next highest possible score, according to the scoring plan, was score of four out of ten for "more than a rudimentary knowledge but insufficient to demonstrate competence." On question 125, the Petitioner was awarded two out of a possible four points on part (a) (in which the Petitioner's solution contained a calculating error), none of four possible points on part (b) (which the Petitioner did not answer), and both of the two possible points on part (c) (which the Petitioner answered correctly), for a total of four out of the ten possible points on question 125. The Petitioner's score on question 125 was consistent with the scoring plan, which also was applied to all of the other candidates. Both question 125 and the scoring plan were provided by the National Council of Examiners of Engineers and Surveyors. A primary purpose of the scoring plan is to ensure consistently rational scoring. To eliminate the chance of bias, questions are graded "blindly," using the scoring plan. Statistically, question 125 has achieved reliable test results. The candidates scoring higher on the examination overall also scored better on question 125. The Petitioner contended that there is a better scoring plan for question 125 under which she would have scored six out of a possible ten points. While the Petitioner's proposed scoring plan is logical, and may even be a better scoring plan, the Petitioner did not prove that the scoring plan utilized by the Department was arbitrary or devoid of logic. One of the multiple choice questions the Petitioner chose to answer during the afternoon session, number 423, had ten parts, each worth one point. The Petitioner received no credit for her answers to parts (2) and ( 3 ), Parts (2) and (3) of question 423 are prefaced by a descriptor of the characteristics of a freeway section. One of the characteristics is a "V/C" of 0.60; another is a peak hour factor (PHF) of 0.90. Part (2) of question 423 asked for the "maximum number of vehicles going west during a one-hour period under these conditions." To answer the question, the Petitioner solved for "maximum service flow," assuming ideal conditions. The Petitioner did not apply the PHF of 0.90; as a result, her answer did not take PHF into consideration. It is found that part (2) of question 423 is at least ambiguous. It asked for "maximum number of vehicles . . . during a one-hour period," not the actual number of vehicles. This could lead one to believe that it asked for "maximum service flow, extended over one entire hour, without considering the PHF. On the other hand, the question specified vehicles "going west . . . under these conditions," implying the actual volume and the application of the PHF. Only 31% of the candidates answering question 423 answered part (2) correctly. (43.6% gave the same answer as the Petitioner.) In and of themselves, those statistics do not prove that the question was invalid or unreliable. But they support the finding that the question was at least ambiguous. Part (3) of question 423 asked the candidates to assume a capacity in passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl) and to solve for the "average travel speed . . . under these conditions." The Petitioner solved for the average speed at the volume of traffic that would result from the given number of pcphpl, under "ideal conditions," without applying the "V/C" ratio of 0.60. It is found that part (3) of question 423 also is at least ambiguous. After having given the candidates the characteristics of the road in the preface to question 423, including a "V/C" of 0.60, part (3) asked the candidates to assume a pcphpl. It is not clear whether the given pcphpl was intended to override, or be the result of the application of the V/C' factor of 0.60, or whether the "V/C" factor was supposed to be applied to the pcphpl. On part (3) of question 423, 52.6% of the candidates answering the question chose the answer for which credit was given; 28.3% chose the Petitioner s answer. Those statistics do not prove that the question was invalid or unreliable. But neither was there any evidence that they would be inconsistent with a finding that the question was at least ambiguous.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers, enter a final order granting the Petitioner's examination challenge in part, to the extent that parts (2) and (3) of question 423 of the October, 1993, Principles and Practices of Civil/Sanitary Engineering Examination are found to be ambiguous, but nonetheless finding that the Petitioner did not successfully complete the examination. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J.LAWRENCE J JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected, as not proven, that the Petitioner's proposed scoring plan is only 'appropriate, reasonable, and fair deduction for a math error," or that the deduction of two points was "a 50% deduction, or a "totally unfair and unreasonable percentage" or that it is "inappropriate . . . to tie the solutions or partial solution together." Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that the two-point deduction for a math error is a 50% deduction and is clearly inconsistent with" the reference material. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that the Petitioner received a 50% deduction on question 125, or that the NCEE scoring plan was inconsistent and should be considered arbitrary by problem chosen." Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and argument. Rejected, as not proven, that NCEE's "two point (20%) increment grading scale is an unfair, unlogical, and unreasonable means to evaluate" or that it is "too rigid to fairly evaluate detailed engineering solutions." Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven. 9.-10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that question 423(2) asked for "maximum volume or "service volume," or that the PHF was added "arbitrarily, and for no reason." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that 43.6% is a majority. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and found that question 423(3) is ambiguous. Rejected as not proven that LOS "Et" conditions should be assumed or that "A" is the best answer, or that 423(3) is "devoid of reason, capricious, and a 'trick' question." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and found that question 423(3) is ambiguous. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. However, PHF is used to determine actual maximum numbers of vehicles, not maximum service flow or maximum possible numbers of vehicles. Rejected. (It asked for average speed.) Rejected as contrary to facts found that an adjustment necessarily and unambiguously follows. Rejected as not established by the evidence that they are statistically valid, only that they are not statistically invalid. COPIES FURNISHED: Jane A. Caldera 5414 Deerbrooke Circle Tampa, Florida 33624 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0764
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sat for the Civil/Sanitary Engineer Examination on April 15, 1988. He received a failing grade with an original score of 41 raw points. Since that time, he has been awarded an additional 3 raw points and has a score of 44 raw points. A passing grade is 48 raw points and is, therefore, 4 raw points from passage. Petitioner contests the score given him on three of the problems on the examination. They are problems 120, 122, and 421. He did not have the test booklet he used at the examination available to him at the hearing. Though he recognizes that the grader who assessed his scores was not allowed to look at his test booklet during the scoring process, many of his calculations for problems 120 and 122 were made in it. Problem 120 requires the examinee to compute 6 stations and the coordinates of the 6 points of the two involved curves on a railroad spur line. Petitioner computed the six points to what he considers an acceptable tolerance and had also started to compute the coordinates as required by Requirement (b). His solution page for Requirement (a) of this problem reflects only the six points, of which 5 are marked incorrectly, and bears the grader comment, "show computations." The second page, relating to Requirement (b), on which the first 3 calculations are marked as incorrect, reflects only cursory calculations and bears the grader comment, "Incomplete." Petitioner was awarded a score of "4" for his solution to problem 120. According to the National Council of Engineering Examiners Standard Scoring Plan Outline, the guideline relating to "4", "BORDERLINE UNQUALIFIED", reads: Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in one or more categories. For example, approach may be correct but the solution is unreasonable. Significant constraints may have been overlooked. Solution is unacceptable but marginally so. The scorer's remarks concerning Petitioner's solution state: A solution which fails to demonstrate an adequate understanding of horizontal curve geometry as a result of logic errors, math errors, and failure to complete several parts. According to Petitioner, he used the Civil Engineering Reference Manual in his calculations. He also contends that Requirement (a) is far more important to the problem than is Requirement (b). Once the former is achieved, it is easy to achieve the latter. Admittedly, Petitioner did not complete Requirement (b) and, therefore, does not expect credit for it. However, he contends that having completed Requirement (a) correctly, he should have been awarded more than 40% credit. Petitioner also contends that the use of the term, "Not To Scale" in the test problem was deliberately deceptive which was not necessary to test engineers at this level of achievement. In this case, Petitioner contends the lack of availability of the examination test booklet in which he did many of his calculations hinders him in demonstrating the correctness of his solution. These computations, he contends, would show his computations in Requirement (a) were "close enough" to be graded correctly and without these computations, the scorer would not know if he did them or merely copied the answers. He would not, also, have any way of knowing if Petitioner has knowledge of horizontal curve geometry. Mr. Lippert, a licensed registered engineer testifying on behalf of Petitioner, believed that the answers to the problems to be more important than the computations. In a practical application he may be correct. However, in the instant case Petitioner is a candidate for certification as a Professional Engineer and was being examined on his qualifications for that status. In such a situation, it is not at all unreasonable to expect the candidate to demonstrate his method of arriving at his solution to demonstrate his understanding of the concept sufficiently to indicate his answer was neither copied nor a fluke. Since the candidate is seeking a higher degree of recognition, a requirement that he demonstrate a higher degree of professional skill is not unreasonable. Under the fact situation demonstrated here, the award of a "4" as a grade for Petitioner's solution to this problem is appropriate. In Problem 122, the candidate was required to use and show equations for his calculations of (a), the average maximum and minimum sanitary wastewater flows expected, in gallons per day, for the total complex in issue; (b), the theoretical full flow capacity and velocity with no surcharge; and (c), depth and velocity of flow for the estimated maximum flow rate. The candidate was instructed to conclude, if possible, that the sewer is not overloaded. The problem deals with a troublesome wastewater disposal system for a retirement community of 490 units with a population of 1,475. Here, Petitioner was awarded an a score of "8" and feels he should have received more. As to (a), Petitioner cited in his answer the reference manual he was using, a manual used by many engineers and one accepted in the profession, yet the grader apparently felt that the use of only the title was insufficient. He wanted the author's name, publisher, date of publication, and other salient information. Petitioner felt this was unnecessary in light of the well known status of the book. In (b), the problem calls for 10" UCP pipe. All pipe, depending upon the material from which constructed, has a different diameter. Petitioner's solution was marked at least partially incorrect because he assumed the interior diameter of the pipe as .83' when the problem stated the interior diameter was 10". Petitioner contends that even with that unnecessary calculation based on an incorrect assumption, his solution of 2.295 feet/second velocity was sufficiently close to the grader's solution of 2.35 feet/second to be marked correct. Similarly, Petitioner contends his velocity in (c) was within a "tolerable" margin and that his conclusions is "OK". While the grader considered his method in this section as "OK", he marked the calculation almost entirely wrong. This may be related to the formula used by Petitioner in (b) which, he admits, is wrong. He contends he must have brought the wrong number over from his calculations which he accomplished in his test booklet. This booklet is not now available, but, in any case, would not have been seen by the scorer. Petitioner also claims that the gallons per capita per day figure of 100 is the standard "everyone uses" to calculate problems involving sewage. Here, because he was taking an examination, he used a figure of 112.5 gallons per day, a compromise between 100 and 125, which he took from the reference manual without citing page number from which taken. Consequently, he contends the grader's comment that his figure is too high is in error but even if it was too high, he ran the calculations correctly and should be given full credit. It is his position that in a case like this, error on this high side, which would give greater capacity, is better than being short. Being correct would be even better, and Petitioner's solutions was not correct. In the scoring plan outline for this problem, an "8" is described as: QUALIFIED; All categories satisfied, errors attributable to misread tables or calculating devices. Errors would be corrected by routine checking, Results reasonable though not correct. and a "9" is described as: QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied, correct solutions but excessively conservative in choice of working values; or presentation lacking in completeness of equations, diagrams, orderly steps in solution, etc. The scorer's comments were: CQ. Fundamentals are correct. Solutions are basically correct and complete but contain math, unit, or tolerance errors making answers unacceptable; or the record is different, or in combination. Here, Petitioner contends that his ultimate solution, only .05 feet/second off in velocity is so close that the error is insignificant. It is close but the difference between an "8" and a "9" lies in the correctness of the ultimate solutions. "Close" is not "correct" and Petitioner's errors are not attributable to misread equations or devices but to his own improper assumptions. Because his calculations were done in a test booklet which is not now available it cannot be determined where the error originates which caused (c) to be marked as it was. Under the circumstances shown here, the score of "8" awarded is not inappropriate. Problem 421 calls for the candidate to find the required volume in cubic feet of on site storage so that post development flows on the parcel of land in question do not exceed the pre-development flows to the existing stream for the 25 year frequency rainfall. Petitioner determined the pre and post development numbers correctly but did the retention area in the old fashioned way resulting in his solution equating to 1/2 of the correct solution. The grader indicated that Petitioner's "procedures [sic] [were] in error here." Petitioner has a one page solution to the problem and got credit for his answer of "4.22" to the first stage of the problem as well as his answer to the second part. He admits, however, that his third step was wrong and that threw the problem answer off. He contends, however, that he was undergraded when awarded a "4" and while he admits to not deserving a "6", feels he should have received a "5". Grades for this problem were awarded on a 2-4-6-8-10 point scale. A "5" was not an authorized score. The scoring plan for this problem describes a "4" as: BORDERLINE UNQUALIFIED; Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in one or more categories. For example, approach may be correct but the solution is unreasonable. Significant constraints may have been overlooked. Solution is unacceptable but marginally so. A grade of "6" is described as: MINIMALLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied at a minimally adequate level. Here the scorer indicated: Pre and post calculation OK. An attempt at detention calculation made but no significant progress toward conclusion. Fails to demonstrate knowledge necessary to calculate detention as existing. Detention calculations fail to demonstrate knowledge of hydrograph [sic] nature of storage calculations. Only one data point obtained. The comments of the grader on the Petitioner's answer sheet clearly indicate that the answer given was incorrect and that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge of the procedures in issue. Since there is no provision made to award any grade between "4" and "6", and since Petitioner's answer clearly, and by his own admission, does not qualify for a "6", the awarded score of "4" is appropriate. Based on the above, it is found that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the scores given him on the problems in issue were incorrect, unsupported, or inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered affirming the score awarded to Petitioner on questions 120, 122, and 421, respectively, of the Civil/Sanitary Engineer Examination administered to him on April 15, 1988. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of April, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard A. Smally Longboat Key, Incorporated 501 Bay Isles Road Longboat Key, Florida 33548 H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue This case concerns a dispute between the Petitioner and Respondent on the question of whether a certain underground utility operated by the Petitioner, namely a sanitary sewer force main, unreasonably interfered with the construction of an additional lane on the west side of Pasadena Avenue, between Huffman Way and Matthews Road in the City of South Pasadena, Florida. See Section 338.19, Florida Statutes. If it is found that the utility unreasonably interfered with the road construction, then a decision must be reached on the propriety of the $21,604.45 charge which the Respondent has placed against the Petitioner for the removal of the underground utility at the instigation of the Respondent. See Section 338.20, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action, City of South Pasadena, is a municipal corporation located in Pinellas County, Florida. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, is a governmental department within the State of Florida, which has, among other functions, the construction and maintenance of roadways within the State. This dispute arises between the parties based upon the Department of Transportation's decision to construct an additional lane on the west side of Pasadena Avenue, between Huffman Way and Matthews Road in the City of South Pasadena, Florida, and the associated removal of an underground utility which was owned and operated by the City of South Pasadena. The underground utility was a sanitary sewer force main. In the absence of the removal of this utility by efforts of the Petitioner, the Respondent had those utilities removed at a cost of $21,604.45, of which $14,666.95 was acknowledged by the City as representing a reasonable cost of removing the utilities in question, should removal be found to be necessary. The remaining $6,937.50 is contested by the City as being an unreasonable cost of removal, even if it is determined that it was necessary to remove the utilities in the first instance. The facts reveal that as early as 1975, the Department of Transportation was desirous of knowing of the existence and whereabouts of underground utilities in the City of South Pasadena along Pasadena Avenue from Corey Causeway to the south to Park Street in the north. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 26, dated October 18, 1975, is a letter from the district utility engineer of the Respondent addressed to an official in the City of South Pasadena indicating possible improvements from Corey Causeway to Park Street along Pasadena Avenue and requesting information about the possible necessity to relocate or adjust utilities in the area of the proposed highway construction. Again, on July 1, 1977, in anticipation of the improvements to Pasadena Avenue in the aforementioned area, subject to funding, the Respondent requested the City to identify its utilities which might require relocation or readjustment in view of possible highway construction. A copy of correspondence addressed from the district utility engineer of the Respondent to a City official which deals with this subject matter may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. The private consulting engineers and architects employed by the City responded to this request by correspondence of August 22, 1977, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence, and it had attached certain drawings indicating the location of utilities; however, those drawings did not depict the subject sanitary sewer force main between Huffman Way and Matthews Road. The drawings may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The sanitary sewer force main had been placed there sometime in the period of the years 1971 and 1972, and was to be found anywhere from ten (10) inches to three (3) feet underground. Both the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 18 and the Respondent's Exhibit No. 4 demonstrate that the sewer force main was within the "right-of-way" granted to the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. The two exhibits spoken to are site plans depicting the "right- of-way" limits. Although the parties entered into a relocation agreement for utilities along Pasadena Avenue above the disputed area (see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17, admitted into evidence), they did not have an agreement to relocate the utility in dispute. By September 5, 1978, the Respondent had decided to undertake project No. 15590-3609 which was to construct a third lane from Huffman Way to Matthews Road along Pasadena Avenue, as a traffic aid. This is evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14, correspondence carrying the date September 5, 1980, from the resident engineer of the Department of Transportation to the district design engineer in the Department. Final plans on the overall Pasadena Avenue work referred to the construction of the third lane premised upon available construction funds, as shown in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 19, admitted into evidence. On October 24, 1978, Pinellas County, Florida, in the person of the Board of County Commissioners, by resolution, authorized the utilization of secondary gas tax funds to extend the Pasadena Avenue project to accomplish the lane construction. A copy of this resolution may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 15 admitted into evidence. This item's expansion of the lane was advertised for bid on March 28, 1979, and on September 15, 1980, construction was commenced. As stated before, at the time the construction began, there was no written agreement between the parties to remove the sanitary sewer force main and indeed the Department of Transportation was without knowledge of the existence of that utility, although employees of the Department of Transportation and their private contractor for the project had encountered a "valve box" associated with the sanitary sewer system prior to the commencement of construction and had concluded that the possibility existed that the "valve box" apparatus might be removed without hindering the road construction. There is some dispute between the parties on the question of the point in time at which the officials within the City of South Pasadena learned of the installation of the third lane. The Department of Transportation claims that a preconstruction conference dealing with the overall work to be done on Pasadena Avenue made mention of the disputed item as early as May 8, 1979, and that officials for the City were in attendance. Again at a meeting in March, 1980, the Department urges that the project at issue was discussed. The officials for the City dispute this, and after considering the testimony of both parties, it can not be concluded that the City specifically knew of the construction in March of 1980. Nonetheless, in late September, 1980, the City clearly became aware of the project and the Department of Transportation learned of the unpermitted sanitary sewer force main within the "right-of-way" between Huffman Way and Matthews Road in the third lane expansion of Pasadena Avenue. Sometime around September 23, 1980, the construction company's underdrain crew came in contact with the sanitary sewer line, and the line was found to be an interference with the road construction. At that point, the contractor removed the work crews and did not return until November 7, 1980, at a time when they worked through November 17, 1980, achieving job items that did not conflict with the sanitary sewer line. This work could have been achieved at anytime after September 23, 1980. The Department of Transportation gave the contractor the premission to remove the underground utility line on December 5, 1980, and in between December 10, 1980, and December 17, 1980, the utility line was removed. On December 22, 1980, the contractor resumed the construction of the roadway known as the south bound extension between Huffman Way and Matthews Road. Around September 25, 1980, the City of South Pasadena was made aware of the conflict between the road construction and the sewer main, and the fact that the road construction could not be completed without the removal of that line. Having discovered the conflict between the main and the road construction and the fact of the road construction between Huffman Way and Matthews Road, the City Council held a meeting on September 29, 1980, at which time discussion was held on the removal of the subject sanitary sewer force main and the cost to be incurred by the City. An excerpt of the minutes of that meeting may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence, a copy. On September 30, 1980, the Mayor of the City of South Pasadena, by correspondence, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, transmitted copies of resolutions Nos. 174 and 175 of the City of South Pasadena, copies of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 4 and 5, respectively, and through these resolutions voiced the opposition of the City of South Pasadena to the road widening. On October 1, 1980, the consulting engineer for the City of South Pasadena wrote to the Department of Transportation indicating his opinion that the extension under construction was "an unnecessary extension of the present project." A copy of that correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. There followed correspondence from the Deputy District Engineer for operations of the Department of Transportation by a letter dated October 10, 1980, addressed to the Mayor of the City of South Pasadena. That correspondence acknowledges the receipt of Resolutions Nos. 174 and 175, and states the Department of Transportation's intention to proceed with the construction. A meeting was held between the City and the Department of Transportation on October 14, 1980, at which meeting the City indicated that they did not intend to pay the cost of relocating the sewer force main. On October 22, 1980, the Deputy District Engineer for the Department of Transportation, by correspondence with attachments, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10, admitted into evidence, wrote to the Mayor of the City and referred to the attached Sections 338.17 through 338.20, Florida Statutes, on the subject of the responsibility of the utility owner to relocated or adjust utilities that conflict with road improvements within a public "right- of-way." That correspondence asked that the City adjust, at the earliest date possible, the utilities in conflict to allow the conclusion of the construction. The correspondence closed by indicating the availability of officials within the Department of Transportation to meet with City officials to clarify the adjustments to be made. On October 31, 1980, the Petitioner was informed by registered letter that it was directed to remove, relocate or adjust the subject utility and granted twenty (20) days to request a hearing on the question of that disposition of the utility, and by doing so alluding to the opportunity for hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Finally, the correspondence noted that failure to request a hearing would promote action by the Department of transportation. By correspondence dated October 31, 1980, a copy of which is admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, the Mayor of the City of South Pasadena wrote the Department of Transportation and stated that the City of South Pasadena would not take any action to remove the force main, for reason that there was no budgetary provision for that expense in the City's 1980-81 budget. This lead to the removal of the underground utilities by the contractor employed by the Department of Transportation to construct the road improvements. The underground utility was an unreasonable interference found in the "right-of-way" at the location where the additional lane was being constructed between Huffman Way and Matthews Road on Pasadena Avenue and the necessity to remove it was not discovered until the project was underway, and in that respect, its removal was coincidental and not incidental to the construction. It having been determined that it was necessary to remove the utility, there remains in contest the $6,937.50 charge for removal. These removal charges are reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, a copy of the statement of charges drawn by the contractor and forwarded to the Department of Transportation. On the second page of that document, which was admitted into evidence, are found Items 2, 3 and 4. Item 2 is a charge in the amount of $4,000.00 entered by the contractor due to the necessity to stop the paving operation when they encountered the sanitary line, and to remove the asphalt crew and, in turn, bring the asphalt crew back to conclude the work. Item 3, constitutes a charge of $937.50 for the rental of barricades from September 23, 1990, to November 6, 1980, and from November 17, 1980, to December 18, 1980. Item 4 speaks of setback charges caused by "long delay and waiting for the City of S. Pasadena and the DOT to resolve the force main matter-2 months field office expense and job overhead $1,000.00" and indicates cost of $2,000.00. Other than this summary explanation of the charge found in the document, no other indication was given as to the meaning of Item No. 4 and consequently, its true meaning is not understood.
Recommendation Based upon a full consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein and in keeping with the terms and conditions of Sections 338.19 and 338.20, Florida Statutes, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges as set out in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, which have been allowed, be upheld as an assessment against the City of South Pasadena, Florida, occasioned by the necessity to remove a sanitary sewer force main along Pasadena Avenue between Huffman Way and Matthews Road. 3/ DONE and ENTERED this 31st of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1981.
The Issue Whether Luis A. Gonzalez earned a passing grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988?
Findings Of Fact Luis A. Gonzalez took the Professional Engineer Examination administered by the Department of professional Regulation on April 14-15, 1988. By notice dated July 22, 1988, Mr. Gonzalez was informed by the Respondent's Office of Examination Services that he had failed the Professional Engineer Examination. Question 122 on the Principles & Practices of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, provided the following: SITUATION: An old, large, retirement community apartment complex has reported sewer overflow and plumbing discharge problems. You are an engineer assigned to review the flow and sizing of the one main sanitary sewer exiting and carrying the total flow of the complex, with the objective of correcting the problem. Review with the manager, and inspection of the plans, reveal there are 490 residential units with an estimated continuing residence population of 1,475. Water bills are paid individually. REQUIREMENTS: NOTE: Use and-show equations for calculations. Do not use a nomograph or hydraulic slide rule. Citing your assumptions and sources, calculate the average, maximum, and minimum sanitary wastewater flows expected, in gallons per day, from the total complex. You measure the main sewer from the project and examine the plans and find it is 10" round ID, VCP, with a slope of 0.0045. Inspection leads to an estimate of n 0/015 (fair) because of age. Calculate theoretical full flow capacity and velocity with no surcharge. Calculate depth and velocity of flow for your estimated maximum flow rate, if you can conclude the sewer is not overloaded. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 122. The citations included by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (a) of Question 122, although questioned by the grader of Question 122, were adequate. Mr. Gonzalez failed to list assumptions which he should have taken into account in answering part (a) of Question 122, concerning inflow, infiltration or exfiltration. In answering part (a) of Question 122, Mr. Gonzalez determined "estimated flow." In calculating estimated flow, Mr. Gonzalez multiplied the population of the complex (1,475) times an estimated water use per person of 100 gallons per day. In support of Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per person water use, Mr. Gonzalez cited the Civil Engineering Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, and the ASCE Manual on Engineering Practice No. 36. Mr. Gonzalez also provided other references at the formal hearing to support his use of 100 gallons per day. The use of 100 gallons a day per person in answering part (a) of Question 122 by Mr. Gonzalez would be correct only if the problem involved a residential community. The citations used by Mr. Gonzalez indicate that 100 gallons per day is generally acceptable for residential communities or "[i]n the absence of any better basis . . . ." Question 122, however, involves an apartment complex and not a residential community. The weight of the evidence presented at the formal hearing indicates that for an apartment complex an estimated water use of 60 to 80 gallons per day per person should be used. Even some of the references provided by Mr. Gonzalez at the formal hearing support this conclusion. For example, Petitioner's exhibit 5 indicates that a wastewater flow of 67 to 79 gallons per person per day should be used for "[m]ultiple-family dwellings (apartments)." Mr. Gonzalez's use of 100 gallons per day in answering part (a) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez failed to demonstrate an adequate understanding of flow in answering Question 122. Although Mr. Gonzalez demonstrated an understanding of full flow, he failed to demonstrate an understanding of partial flow. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (b) of Question 122 was adequate. Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (c) of Question 122 was incorrect. Mr. Gonzalez did not dispute this conclusion at the forma1 hearing. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 4 for his solution of Question 122. Question 122 was graded pursuant to the National Council of Engineering Examiners Standard Scoring Plan Outline (DPR Exhibit #4). This Outling provides that a grade of 4 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: UNQUALIFIED: Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY. BU. Fails to demonstrate an understanding of flow and velocity calculations for pipes flowing full or partially full; or contains multiple errors; or one part is missing or wrong with other gross or multiple errors; or the record is deficient; or in combination. A grade of 5 was to awarded under circumstances similar to the circumstances for awarding a score of 4, except that a score of 5 is appropriate only if an "[a]pplicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in [only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 4 for his answer to Question 122 and not a score of 5. Mr. Gonzalez failed to "demonstrate an understanding of flow . . . calculations for pipes flowing . . . partially full . . . ." His answer also "contains multiple errors" and at least "one part is . . . wrong." Finally, Mr. Gonzalez's answer to Question 122 "failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in more than one ASPECT of one CATEGORY" as opposed to "[only] one ASPECT of one CATEGORY." [Emphasis added]. Question 123 of the Principles & Practice of Engineering Examination, Form 8804, involving Civil/Sanitary/Structural engineering, includes parts (a) through (j). Mr. Gonzalez questioned parts (b), (d) and (e) of Question 123. In pertinent part, Question 123 provides the following: SITUATION: In a detailed study of traffic flow on one lane of a 2-lane urban freeway, the following data were collected: Average Distance between the front bumper of successive vehicles 75 feet Space Mean Speed = 33 mph Time Mean Speed = 32 mph REQUIREMENTS: (b) Determine the traffic density. Assuming that the 30th highest hourly volume is to be used for design purposes on this highway, what is a reasonable estimate of the 30th highest hourly volume in one direction on this facility? Briefly justify any assumptions made. Determine the most widely accepted value of the capacity of a freeway lane operating under ideal conditions of uninterrupted flow. Mr. Gonzalez was instructed to include assumptions and citations in support of his answer to Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez answered part (b) of Question 123 by calculating a density of 70.40. The grader of Question 123 circled this answer and wrote "DECIMAL." The Respondent agreed at the formal hearing that the use of decimals by Mr. Gonzalez was insignificant. In answering part (d) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez failed to include adequate assumptions. Although the statements made by Mr. Gonzalez in answering part (d) of Question 123 are correct, his equation is wrong. Mr. Gonzalez did not offer adequate proof at the formal hearing that his response to part (d) of Question 123 was correct. In answering part (e) of Question 123 Mr. Gonzalez assumed a capacity of 2,000 cars per hour. The grader of Question 123 indicated that this capacity is an "obsolete value." The Solutions to be used in grading the Professional Engineer Examination and, in particular, Question 123, indicates the following: Based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual or other similar sources, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions is 2,000 vehicles per hour. ANSWER Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with this solution, the capacity of a multi-lane freeway lane operating under ideal conditions, based on the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual is actually 2,800 vehicles per hour and not 2,000 vehicles per hour. The answer to part (e) of Question 123 provided in the Solutions used by graders of the Professional Engineer Examination and Mr. Gonzalez's answer are therefore incorrect. The Solutions provided to graders are to be used only to assist graders and are not binding on them. Although Mr. Gonzalez's answer to part (e) of Question 123 is consistent with the Solutions provided, the answer is incorrect. Therefore, the grader properly took into account Mr. Gonzalez's incorrect solution to part (e) of Question 123. Even if Mr. Gonzalez is given credit for his response to part (e) of Question 123, his grade for Question 123 will not change. Mr. Gonzalez correctly answered parts (a)-(c) and (f)-(j) of Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez was awarded a score of 8 points for his answer to Question 123. Question 123 was graded pursuant to a Six Level Item Specific Scoring Plan (155P). The Plan provides that a grade of 8 is to be awarded under the following circumstances: CLEARLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied with at least one at a higher than minimum level. Correct approach but a solution with math errors or answers outside allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) or An [sic] slightly incomplete solution. The next highest grade which can be awarded for Question 123 is 10 points, the maximum award possible for Question 123. Ten points are to be awarded under the following circumstances: HIGHLY QUALIFIED: All categories satisfied. -Presentation -may lack in completeness or equations, diagrams, orderly steps in solution, etc. Results within allowable tolerance. Correct approach and correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), (e), and (h) and correct interpretation of results. All parts complete. The Respondent properly concluded that Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to a score of 8 for his answer to Question 123 and not a score of 10. Mr. Gonzalez did not satisfy all categories and he failed to arrive at the "correct solution within allowable tolerances for parts (d), [and] (e) . . . " in answering Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should have been awarded a score of 10 for Question 123. Mr. Gonzalez failed to prove that he should be awarded an additional point on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14-15, 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Engineers issue a final order concluding that Luis A. Gonzalez's grade on the Professional Engineer Examination of April 14- 15, 1988, was a failing grade. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 88-6056 Mr. Gonzalez has submitted a letter dated March 21, 1989, containing proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. Mr. Gonzalez's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Paragraphs 1-2, 6 Not proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 3 The first sentence is a statement of the issue concerning Question 122. The second and third sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation established water per day usage is for regulatory purposes and not necessarily consistent with the engineering principles to be used in answering questions on the Professional Engineer Examination. References which should have been used in answering Question 122 indicate that a water use rate of 67 to 79 gallons per day should have been used for apartments. The letter referred to was not accepted into evidence and can not form any basis for a finding of fact. Paragraph 4 The first and fifth sentences are accepted in findings of fact 20 and 21. The second and fourth sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The third sentence is based upon a letter apparently received after the formal hearing. It cannot be taken into account in this proceeding. The sixth sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The grader used the correct information and not "personal conviction." Although it is true that Mr. Gonzalez used the most recent data he was aware of concerning vehicles per hour, the fact remains that the value he used at the time of the examination was incorrect. Paragraph 5 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Gonzalez included two references with his letter of March 21, 1989, which were not offered at the formal hearing. Those references cannot be relied upon in this case and have played no part in making the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Luis A Gonzalez 7419 Sandy Bluff Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein, Kristina V. Tignor, took the Professional Engineers Examination for the State of Florida in Orlando on April 9 and 10, 1987. On July 22, 1987 she was advised by the Department of Professional Regulation's Office of Examination Services that she had failed the examination and was given a cummulative score of principles and practice of 69.1 percent. In her initial request for review and reconsideration, Petitioner objected to the points assigned to her solutions for three problems on the test, Numbers 425, 421, and 124. She contended that as a working engineer, certain criteria and assumptions must be made in approaching any engineering problem and, because the portion of the examination in issue is graded subjectively, her answered should be reconsidered and evaluated in that light. At the hearing, Petitioner contested only the grading of questions number 124 and 421, thereby accepting the grade given for question 425. With regard to Question 124, Ms. Tignor was awarded a score of 5 on her solution to this problem. The National Council of Engineering Examiners, in its Standard Scoring Plan Outline awards a "qualified" evaluation to scores from 10 down to 6 on this question. Scores from 5 to 0 are rated, "unqualified." A score of 5 indicates the applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge in one aspect of one category. Specifically, a rating of 5 in this question indicates that the examinee displayed an inadequate knowledge of weight/volume and concrete mix design. Her computations were displayed and an incomplete or erroneous solution was arrived at which gave a generally unrealistic result. Dr. Bruce A. Suprenant a civil engineer registered in four states and who teaches engineering at the University of South Florida, reviewed the question, the Petitioner's solution, the solution proposed by the examiners, and the grading scheme for this problem and found a number of illogical items in Petitioner's solution which, to him, were difficult to understand. He found several items which had no basis and which were possibly assumed. As to Part a of Petitioner's answer, a mixture of answers, (correction for moisture), which should have been in Part b, was located in Part a. As to density, the value used by Petitioner does not appear to be reasonable based on information provided in the problem. In Dr. Suprenant's opinion, there are at least three approaches to this problem. One is the water/cement ration method. Another is the weight method. The third is the absolute volume method. The water/cement ratio method would be difficult to apply here and neither Petitioner nor the examiners used it. As to the weight method, much the same problem exists. There is insufficient information provided to satisfactorily apply this method and while the examiners did not use it, Petitioner did. Petitioner's answer has a correction for moisture in the absolute volume method on the first page of the solution form at the top. The calculations by Petitioner are assumed information not known, (volume). In addition the correction for moisture in the second part of page one is included on the top of page two. It is not a part of the solution for subpart a and should not be there. Petitioner used 150 pounds per cubic foot for concrete density in her solution and this choice is not explained. Most publications utilized by engineers suggest using tables which were not provided to the examinees and it is, therefore, illogical to assume concrete density with no history for that assumption. Petitioner's answer of 5.41 cubic yards is only slightly off the suggested answer of 5.44 cubic yards but the fact that the answers are close does not justify her assumption. It might well not come so close in other cases. As to Part b of the question calling for the water/cement ratio, the corrections for moisture of fine and coarse aggregate on page one are acceptable. On the second page, a problem arises in when the correction for moisture should decrease. Petitioner got the right factor but applied it in the wrong manner. As a result, her answer to Part b of the examination question is wrong. Her answer was 4.40 as opposed to the correct answer of 4.34. This small degree of error can be attributed to the smallness of the amount in question. Were the amounts greater, the error would be greater. As to part c of the question, which deals with the cement factor in a yard of concrete, Petitioner's approach of dividing sacks of cubic yards is correct, but the cubic yard content was determined from Part a of the question, and Dr. Suprenant does not agree with how she got her solution. He therefore questions her carryover. The standard weight of a sack of concrete is 94 pounds. The individual grading Petitioner's response to Question 124 indicates she displayed inadequate knowledge and reached a solution which gives "unrealistic results." Dr. Suprenant agrees, contending that Petitioner's performance in regard to this question indicates inadequate knowledge of weight/volume relationship. She made inadequate assumptions in formulating her answer to the question. The fact that in this problem she arrived at a solution close to the correct one does not indicate that in other problems, she would achieve the same closeness using the same procedure. In his opinion, Petitioner showed some confusion regarding the basis for solving this problem and Dr. Suprenant believes that a grade of 5 as awarded by the examiner is correct. Petitioner questioned the fact that the various technical weights and volumes, such as 94 pounds in a sack of concrete, 8.33 pounds for a gallon of water, and 27 cubic feet in a cubic yard do not appear in the problem statement. This, in the opinion of Dr. Suprenant, compounds the gravity of Petitioner's deficiency. They are routine "givens" generally accepted in the practice by engineers and it would be difficult to assume that anyone familiar with the practice of engineering would use different "givens" for these specifics. Petitioner's employer, Mr. Bishop, himself a registered civil engineer in Florida since 1958, also reviewed Petitioner's solution to Question 124. He admits that on the first page of the answer sheet, Petitioner began solving the problem in an inappropriate way. Her calculations for moisture content were correct, however. On the second paged the correction factor was put in with the wrong sign and the aggregate was given the wrong factor. As a result, the answer was off. In his practice, however, the error committed by Petitioner in these regards is both minimal and acceptable. Her choice of 150 pounds per square foot is reasonable and produced a close result, and while it is true that if the project were of a greater scale, the error might be significant for a test question, as here, the error, in his opinion, is insignificant. He feels much the same way regarding the error in Part c of the examination question. While the factors used by petitioner were wrong, the process used was correct and the answer was not unreasonably incorrect for a test solution. In an examination situation, the calculations are not being done on a continuous basis, and he feels the grade of 5 awarded is unduly harsh since the error was numerical rather than operational. In his opinion, a more reasonable grade would have been a 6 or 7. Petitioner began her solution to this problem by using one similar to that used by the examiners in their publications. Shortly, however, she realized she would not get the answer she needed by doing so and abandoned her solution. She forgot to cross it out, however, and now recognizes she should have done so. She thereafter began to accomplish a series of new calculations on the first page of the answer sheet but did not necessarily utilize that data for her solution to Part a. She admits she made an error in calculation for moisture on the second page. In that calculation, she used the study manual and admits now that she should have cited the figure she used. As to Parts b and c, her use of some figures from Part a may have thrown her answer off somewhat. However, the 5 awarded her, indicating her solution was unrealistic, is, in her opinion unfair as she considers her answer to be quite realistic. The problem did not state what solution method to use and she feels her use of givens from recognized manuals such as the 150 pounds, should not be held against her. 94 pounds for a sack of cement used by the grader was also not given and her use of other accepted numbers should not, she contends, be held against her. Petitioner believes a grade of 7 would more accurately describe the quality of her answer. A 7 means that the examinee obtained an appropriate solution but chose a less than optimum approach. The solution is, therefore, awkward but nonetheless resonable. Ms. Tignor believes that while her approach may have been awkward, she achieved reasonable solution demonstrated by the fact that it was only slightly off the correct figure. Therefore, she believes a grade of 6 would be appropriate. This examination was an open book examination and Petitioner had her manuals with her. She could have easily determined the appropriate weights an "givens" from these manuals without choosing those she used. Ms. Tignor's conclusions that her results are realistic are contradicted by the Board's expert. Realistic results are, in engineering practice, not only the figure reached but also the method used in arriving at that figure. Here, though Petitioner's results are close, the approach utilized in arriving at her solution is unrealistic. Her approach showed an inadequate knowledge of weight/volume and calculations. Consequently it is found the grade is valid and was not arbitrarily assigned. According to the Standard Scoring Plan Outline, each score from 10 through 6 has an indispensable criteria that all categories must be satisfied. Since Ms. Tignor's examination response did not satisfy all categories, the best she can be given is a 5 and that award appears to be justified by the evidence presented. Question 421 was a four part drainage problem. Petitioner used as a part of her solution calculations based on a 100 year storm and this was determined by the examiners to be inappropriate. Ms. Tignor was awarded a grade of 8 and contends she was not given appropriate credit. She relates that even Mr. Smith, the Executive Director of the Board of Professional Engineers, advised her she may not have been given full credit for her answer. She was given full credit for Part a but lost two points for part c which included a calculation error to which Petitioner admits. She contends however, it was so minor, only one point should have been deducted. Were Petitioner to receive an additional one point on this question, she would pass the examination which she failed by only one point. However, this issue must be resolved on the basis of lawfully admitted evidence and Mr. Smith's comment, being unsupported hearsay evidence, cannot itself sustain the rasing of the grade. The Standard Scoring Plan Outline for this question reflects that to receive an 8, the examinee must demonstrate that all categories are satisfied, that errors are attributable to misread tables or calculating devices, and that errors would be corrected by routine checking. The results must be reasonable if not correct. For a 9, the examinee must demonstrate that all categories are satisfied; that a correct solution is arrived at but the examinee has been excessively conservative in the choice of working values; and that examinee's presentation is lacking in completeness or equations diagrams or orderly steps in solution, etc. Subqualifications for a 9 indicates that the answer is correct but that the organization of the solution is not logical. One error in calculation in any of the Parts from a to d, which does not affect the other parts of the solution, is acceptable. Mr. Kenneth Weldon, the Assistant State Drainage Engineer for the Department of Transportation, an expert in the area of drainage to which this problem relates, reviewed the question and the Petitioner's answer thereto and would award a grade of 8 to her answer. He found various numerical mathematical errors which led to the wrong solution. In addition, Petitioner made various assumptions that, though supposedly supported, were, he felt, in error through her misinterpretation. In general, none of the actual solutions she arrived at were correct. Specifically, that portion of the problem to determine the cross sectional area of the waterway for establishing normal depth flow was done incorrectly. Because the Petitioner used incorrect equations throughout the problem, the depth flow computed is high. Petitioner did no analysis to determine whether or not any of the several situations relating to flow control were pertinent. Mr. Weldon initially felt Petitioner's answer to the question merited a grade of 6. This means that the examinee knew all the proper steps but failed to interpret some of the criteria properly. He could not award her a grade of 9 which would indicate all categories were satisfied and the solution was correct, if conservative. Petitioner's solutions were incorrect. He subsequently changed his award to an 8, however, on the basis that the Petitioner's errors were attributable to a misread table or calculating device and would be corrected by routine checking. The result was reasonable, though not correct. Mr. Weldon did not like this question even though he believed it appropriate for a one-hour exam. As written, it involves establishing and making judgements beyond what someone minimally competent would be expected to do. It requires materials that are beyond what are normally available to someone taking the exam. However, Petitioner failed to make proper provision to protect herself in a case where the question is inappropriate or incomplete. If she felt something was wrong with the question, she should have clearly stated the assumption she was making to solve the problem. This was her responsibility and she failed to do so. In Mr. Weldon's opinion, Petitioner's answer might merit a grade slightly higher but not significantly higher. His reasoning is that Petitioner misinterpreted the criteria she stated for writing the problem. Her comment that the Department of Transportation uses 100 year storm criteria was incorrect even though that statement is made in outdated Department of Transportation publications. The basis for her answer is not well established or correct, or based on engineering calculations or judgement, and at best he could award no more than an 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered affirming the score awarded to Petitioner on questions 124 and 421, respectively, of the Civil Engineering Examination administered to her in April, 1987. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5110 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner None For the Respondent Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated except for the characterization of several assumptions as guesses. No evidence exists to support such a characterization even though they are incorrect. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristina V. Tignor, pro se 2160 North Oval Drive Sarasota, Florida 34239 H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director DPR, Board of Professional Engineers 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner should receive additional credit for his answers to questions 121 and/or 222 on the civil/sanitary engineer examination administered on April 18 and 19, 1997.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Board of Professional Engineers was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of professional engineers in this state and for the regulation of the engineering profession. Petitioner graduated from the University of South Florida in December 1990, with a degree in geo-technical engineering, a sub-specialty of civil engineering. He is not, nor does he claim to be, a structural engineer. He has practiced in the field of geo-technical engineering since his graduation and has taught soil mechanics at the master’s level at the university. He sat for the professional engineer’s examination administered by the Respondent in April 1997. Thereafter, by grade report dated July 29, 1997, the Department’s Bureau of Testing notified Petitioner that he had earned a score of 69.00 on the examination he had taken. Since a passing score for the examination which Petitioner took is 70.00, Petitioner failed the examination. Petitioner requested a formal hearing to challenge the grading of examination questions numbers 121 and 222, on each of which he earned a score of four. The maximum obtainable score on each question is ten. On question 121, the candidate is given a situation involving a sheet-pile wall section, and is asked to (a) sketch and dimension the earth pressure diagram acting on the wall after the proposed dredging has been completed; and (b) determine the factor of safety against the kick-out after the dredging. Scoring of the Petitioner’s examination was done by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying (Council). The Council determined that, with regard to requirement (a), Petitioner’s pressure distribution was of the correct form, but the labeling of the distribution had a major error. Petitioner assumed an incorrect factor which was deemed to be a major error calling for, under the approved scoring plan, a minimum four-point deduction. With regard to requirement (b), Petitioner chose not to solve for the factor of safety as he was required to do. This resulted in a minimum reduction of two additional points. This evaluation was concurred by Mr. Adams, the Board’s expert witness, in his testimony at hearing. Mr. Adams noted that where, as here, the engineer is dealing with soil mechanics, the at-rest conditions are one thing. The active and passive (A and P) conditions are the more dynamic, and here, where the problem calls for removal of soil from in front of a retaining wall, A and P pressures should have been used instead of at-rest pressures. Adams also concluded that Petitioner’s cited authority was not valid in this case. This authority used the at-rest pressure coefficient when all the authorities Mr. Adams could find used the A and P pressure coefficient. Petitioner admits that the coefficients utilized in determining earth pressures are A, P and at-rest (O). In this case, the whole problem must be considered. A tie-back system is presented, and in that case the sheet pile and the tie-back are assumed to hold the soil behind the wall in an at-rest condition so long as the sheet-pile wall does not move or deflect. Petitioner contends that Mr. Adams’ determination that removing the soil would destroy stasis and cause the wall to move is erroneous. In fact, he contends, the sheet-pile wall and the anchor system must move before the Board’s argument holds. He cites an authority in support of his position which was also cited to the Council scorer who, at Petitioner’s request, rescored his answer. The Council official who rescored Petitioner’s answer did not have access to Petitioner’s cited authority but rejected the citation as either incorrectly cited or incorrect in itself. Petitioner’s error called for a four-point reduction in score as to (a). Further, as to requirement (b), Petitioner, though asked to solve for the factor of safety against rotation, chose not to do so. This calls for an additional two-point reduction. Independent review of Petitioner’s answer, including an evaluation of his cited authority, and consideration of the other evidence pertinent to this issue, including his testimony, that of his witness, and the rescoring results by the Council, does not satisfy the undersigned that Petitioner’s answer merits additional credit. The score of four, as awarded, is appropriate. Question 222 deals with a cantilevered retaining wall with a wide foundation and piling in two rows, some in front and some in back, to support it. The candidate is required to determine the total lateral thrust per linear foot acting on the wall in issue; to determine the vertical load on a front row pile; and to explain possible ways that the pile foundation can resist the lateral thrust. According to Mr. Adams, Petitioner incorrectly calculated the lateral load by omitting the proper depth of the wall. With regard to the vertical loading, the Petitioner did not get to the proper vertical load on the front pile but received partial credit for other calculations he performed. As for the last requirement, one part of Petitioner’s answer was incorrect in that he did not explain passive pressures properly. What Petitioner mentioned was incorrect, and he did not mention battering of the piles, which was expected to be noted. According to Mr. Adams, Petitioner got two parts of the question correct, each of which is worth two points. Therefore, he received a score of four points. Petitioner contends that the Board and the Council are being too restrictive in their approach to the problem and not taking into account the whole problem. He claims that though he arrived at the wrong figure in calculating the lateral load, that does not justify his receiving no credit for that segment since the method he used for calculating the thrust was correct. He admits to having erroneously neglected the weight of the soil, but contends that his method of determining the solutions to resist lateral thrust is as good as that of the Board and the Council. Petitioner was given only partial credit for his use of the correct equation to calculate the lateral thrust because he used the wrong depth. His answer to the second part was wrong in that he completely neglected the weight of the soil and calculating the pile load, even though he used the correct figure to multiply the load per foot of the wall. His answer to the third requirement, dealing with lateral resistance of the pile, was insufficient to warrant a full award. Taken together, his answer, in the opinion of the Council’s scorer, merited only an award of four points. Petitioner did not show sufficient basis for increasing this award. The evidence presented by the Board clearly established that both questions in issue provided enough information to allow the candidate to answer them correctly, and both are questions that a candidate for licensure should be able to answer. The scoring plan for these questions was not shown to be inappropriate, and there is no evidence that it was not properly utilized.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a Final Order in this matter denying Petitioner additional credit for his answers to Questions 121 and 222 on the April 1997 Civil Engineer Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri V. Jean 3273 Tanglewood Trail Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Oliver J. Turzak violated statutes and rules governing the practice of engineering as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed with the Clerk of the Florida Board of Professional Engineers (the “Board”) on October 4, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is charged with regulating the practice of engineering pursuant to chapter 455, Florida Statutes. The Administrative Complaint at issue was filed by the Florida Engineers Management Corporation (“FEMC”) on behalf of Petitioner. FEMC is charged with providing administrative, investigative, and prosecutorial services to the Florida Board of Professional Engineers pursuant to section 471.038, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and at all times material to these proceedings has been, a licensed professional engineer in the State of Florida, having been issued license number PE 18230. Respondent’s last known address is 5405 Water Street, New Port Richey, Florida 34652. On April 20, 2008, Respondent signed, sealed, and dated a Settlement Stabilization Plan for the Fish Residence located at 11251 Knotty Pine Drive, New Port Richey, Florida (“Fish Residence Project”). On June 10, 2008, Respondent signed, sealed, and dated an engineering opinion letter (“Letter”) which was addressed and sent to Champion Foundation Repair, the entity which was Respondent’s client for the Fish Residence Project. The Letter stated in material part: [Respondent], whose signature appears below, has verified placement of twenty-seven (27) exterior piers and twenty-five (25) interior jack pins as located on the drawings by the same job number. The piers all achieved sufficient load bearing characteristics to transfer the house weight to the piers and to close cracks substantially and stabilize the foundation. The remediation program was developed according to geological data supplied by Central Florida Testing Laboratories, Inc., dated November 2007. Similar pier reports on numerous structures with similar problems have demonstrated long term success without additional settlement. Therefore, it is the opinion of the [Respondent] that the location has been repaired and stabilized and, further, that there is no evidence of new sinkhole activity at the location. In compliance with Florida Statute 627.707, the report and remediation program was prepared under the supervision of a Registered Professional, whose field of expertise is a Geo-Technical Engineer. The Board has adopted Responsibility Rules of Professional Engineers (“Responsibility Rules”). These rules are contained in Florida Administrative Code Chapters 61G15-30 through 61G15-35. Professional engineers, who perform services covered by the Responsibility Rules, are required to comply with those rules. Rule 61G15-30.002(1) mandates that Respondent, as the structural engineer of record, is professionally responsible for the documents prepared for the Fish Residence Project. As such, Respondent is responsible for producing a document that complies with the applicable portions of the Responsibility Rules. Respondent acted as Engineer of Record of the Structure for the Fish Residence Project as that term is defined in rules 61G15-31.002(1) and 61G15-31.003(1). As such, all structural documents prepared, signed, sealed, and dated by Respondent must contain the information set out in rule 61G15-31.002(5), as mandated by rule 61G15-31.001, setting out the General Responsibility standards for engineers designing structures. Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, provides that an engineer is subject to discipline for engaging in negligence in the practice of engineering. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-19.001(4) provides that negligence constitutes “failure by a professional engineer to utilize due care in performing in an engineering capacity or failing to have due regard for acceptable standards of engineering principles.” Rule 61G15-19.001(4) also provides that: [F]ailure to comply with the procedures set forth in the Responsibility Rules as adopted by the Board of Professional Engineers shall be considered as non-compliance with this section unless the deviation or departures therefrom are justified by the specific circumstances of the project in question and the sound professional judgment of the professional engineer. Respondent’s June 10, 2008, Letter is an engineering “certification” as that term is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-18.011(4): statement signed and sealed by a professional engineer representing that the engineering services addressed therein, as defined in section 471.005(6), F.S., have been performed by the professional engineer, and based upon the professional engineer’s knowledge, information and belief, and in accordance with commonly accepted procedures consistent with applicable standards of practice, . . . . “Certifications” are subject to the standards set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-29.001, which require that if an engineer is presented with a “certification” that “involve[s] matters which are beyond the engineer’s scope of services actually provided” that the engineer must “decline to sign . . . such certification.” Section 471.033(1)(a) provides that an engineer is subject to discipline for “[v]iolating . . . [a] rule of the [B]oard.” Section 471.033(1)(e) provides, in material part, that a professional engineer is subject to discipline for “[m]aking or filing a report or record that the licensee knows to be false” when the report is “signed in the capacity of a licensed engineer.” Rule 61G15-19.001(6) provides that: A professional engineer shall not commit misconduct in the practice of engineering. Misconduct in the practice of engineering as set forth in Section 471.033(1)(g), F.S., shall include, but not be limited to: * * * (b) Being untruthful, deceptive, or misleading in any professional report, statement, or testimony whether or not under oath or omitting relevant and pertinent information from such report, statement or testimony when the result of such omission would or reasonably could lead to a fallacious conclusion on the part of the client, employer or the general public; . . . . The Fish Residence In 2007, the residence located at 11251 Knotty Pine Drive in New Port Richey, Florida (the “Fish Residence”), experienced structural damage from subsidence in the ground underlying the home. As a result, a claim was made to Fish’s insurance company, and an investigation was commenced. Central Florida Testing Laboratories, Inc. (“CFTL”), a geotechnical engineering firm, performed an in-depth analysis and found, in a signed, sealed, and dated engineering report issued on November 20, 2007, that the subsidence was likely caused by a number of factors, including sinkhole activity. As a result, the Fishes hired a contractor, Champion Foundation Repair (“Champion”) to remediate the damage. Champion hired Respondent to perform the engineering services necessary to obtain a permit for the remediation, inspect the construction, and complete a report certifying the adequate completion of the work. Respondent had a long history of providing similar services to Champion in the past, having performed engineering services in over 200 projects for Champion. Respondent created, signed, sealed, and dated on April 20, 2008, a Settlement Stabilization Plan (“Plan”), which formed the design basis for the work Champion carried out. Well into the project, the Fishes became dissatisfied with the work done by Champion. Champion was terminated as the contractor before the work was finalized and before Respondent was able to perform a final inspection of the property. Litigation was commenced and Bracken Engineering (“Bracken”), a forensic structural/civil engineering firm was engaged to perform an investigation of the work performed by Champion and Respondent for the pending litigation. Bracken issued a lengthy engineering report (“Bracken Report”), under engineering seal, on June 20, 2011. The Bracken Report found Respondent’s Plan deficient, that Respondent was not adequately knowledgeable about the site, that Champion’s implementation of the Plan, and Champion’s construction work as a whole was flawed and inadequate. Subsequent to the issuance of the Bracken Report, a complaint was filed with the Board, and these proceedings were initiated. Settlement Stabilization Plan for the Fish Residence Roger Jeffery opined that the Plan failed to meet required engineering standards. The parties agree that when a structure, such as the Fish Residence Project, is initially built, the loads are directly transferred to the foundation, which then transfers the loads directly and uniformly as a continuously supported structure to the underlying soil. However, when, as occurred in this case, the structure’s loads are no longer transferred directly and uniformly to the ground through the foundation, but are transferred through pins which underlie the foundation, the foundation itself now acts as a beam or beams and is subject to the stresses applied to the beams. Respondent asserted that the foundation load would remain continuous, and therefore stable, since grouting had been poured under the Fish Residence to consolidate and stabilize the soils. However, Respondent’s plan did not call for grouting to be used. Moreover, according to the Bracken Report, no grouting was ever placed under the Fish Residence, even though it was called for in the CFTL Report to stabilize the structure. Respondent’s failure to perform a final inspection resulted in an inaccurate assumption and opinion. Respondent’s claim that grouting placed in the void under the structure reconstituted the original soil conditions is rejected, especially in light of the fact that Respondent also analyzed the pins and foundation in a beam configuration--a simple span beam. Further, Respondent’s analysis must be discounted because the calculations justifying his conclusion that the structure was adequately supported was performed in December 2013, well after these proceedings commenced and more than five years after the Plan had been created by Respondent. As a result of the changed structural support system (from ground support to pins), the position of the pins is critical to the stability of the structure. If the pins are too far apart for the strength of the foundation’s materials to accommodate the foundation, now acting as a beam or beams, the foundation will be overstressed. Cracking, at a minimum, or collapse, at a maximum, can occur. Cracking or collapse can occur because the concrete slab foundation used at the Fish Residence does not have any existing top reinforcing steel in it. When asked if perhaps reinforcing steel might have been placed within the slab itself, Mr. Jeffery stated he had never seen such use of steel in over 40 years. No evidence to support the steel within the slab theory was presented. When the newly installed pins become the structural support, a negative bending moment is introduced to the top of the foundation, now acting as a beam. The top of the foundation is made only of concrete, which has little ability to resist the induced negative moment. As a result, deflection, racking, and ultimate failure will be the result if the pin placement and the spans created by the placement are inadequately designed. Respondent’s after-the-fact calculations do not address this issue. Using a continuous beam analysis, the preferred method to evaluate the beam/pin assemblage design in structures like the Fish Residence, the spacing of the pins (usually ten feet apart) designed by Respondent coupled with the loads generated by the foundation and the lack of reinforcing steel in the top portion of the foundation would result in stress that would exceed the strength of the concrete and, at a minimum, the concrete would eventually crack. Dr. Ahmed Said, Respondent’s expert, agreed with this conclusion. Even using a simple beam analysis, the design method Respondent testified he used and that Dr. Said agreed was commonly used, movement, resulting in cracks at the foundation slab, would occur. Again, since no reinforcing steel exists at the top of the slab, as a matter of simple physics, the concrete would have to respond to the deflection that would occur at the bottom of the foundation and, concrete being weak, would likely crack or worse at the top. Respondent provided no persuasive rebuttal to Mr. Jeffery’s analysis. First, Respondent claimed that elevations taken at the site in 2013 showed minimal deflective movement, proving the Plan design was sufficient. However, Mr. Jeffery noted that subsequent elevations taken at the completed structure would have little meaning regarding the adequacy of the design since: the design stands alone and is not affected by how the contractor implemented it; and no one could know whether the design, as constructed, would withstand the required stresses until it was subjected to full design loading, which would have to include the full wind loads to which the structure was designed. There is no evidence the structure was ever subjected to such stress in the period between its construction in 2008 and the later recorded elevations. Next, Respondent claimed the 3-foot “spreaders” attached to the pins would reduce the span of the foundation acting as a beam and thus would overcome the lack of reinforcing steel in the top of the foundation and the resulting overstress. The problem with this assertion is that the Plan does not call for “spreaders” to be placed in the design by any notations that are readily and universally cognizable. Respondent admitted that the symbol regarding the use of the spreaders was agreed to only between Champion and him, and was not included in the Plan. However, even if the notations used by Respondent could be interpreted as calling for the use of the “spreaders,” the “spreaders” would not materially impact the fact that the foundation, acting as a beam, would be overstressed, since a negative moment would still exist due to the lack of reinforcing steel at the top of the foundation. Finally, Respondent asserted that Mr. Jeffery’s analysis was flawed since Mr. Jeffery had assumed the Fish Residence was a masonry structure whereas Respondent claimed the structure was a wood frame covered with a stucco exterior. This issue is confused by the fact that both the CFTL and Bracken Reports, upon which Mr. Jeffery relied, both stated the Fish Residence was a masonry structure, although the CFTL Report notes the structure was initially constructed as wood frame. In any event, Mr. Jeffery testified that regardless of the masonry versus wood frame question, the structure would still be overstressed. Changing the construction from masonry to wood frame/stucco veneer might lessen the overstress, but not materially. In addition to the overstress created by failing to address the induced negative moment at the top of the foundation, Respondent’s design also resulted in a shear load which exceeded the maximum allowable under the American Concrete Institute 318 Concrete Code; and, since that code is incorporated into the Florida Building Code (“FBC”), the requirements of the FBC as well. The shear load factor is especially relevant since Respondent did not assure that the pins would not be placed under windows and doors where this issue is critical. Respondent did not address the shear issue as it applied to windows and doors in his after-the-fact calculations. The Plan is also deficient since it did not indicate the placement of windows and doors in the Fish Residence Project. By not doing so, the pins, when put in the ground, could be placed underneath these internal spaces which do not then form a continuous roof/wall/foundation assembly. If that occurred, and it apparently did in the Fish Residence on four occasions, the shear problem described above is exacerbated, since at either side of a door or window a point load is created and the shear stress increased. The Plan also fails to include required information. While the Plan calls for the use of a “FastSteel” product, the Plan does not include any product specification number or the strength of the material to be used. Although Respondent stated that the contractor, based upon its experience, knew what was intended, ultimately Respondent admitted that the required information was not in the Plan. Similarly, the Plan did not include the design loads and criteria used in the design and provided no building codes and standards. Respondent admitted the Plan lacked this required information. The missing information is important. Only by including such information on design documents can the engineer adequately communicate to the reviewing building code plans examiner or a contractor what the design engineer intended. By not including this required information, the reviewer can be uncertain as to whether the engineer used the correct loadings or designed the structure in accordance with the correct edition of the building code. Similarly, failing to provide sufficient information concerning the products to be used may lead a contractor to utilize the wrong product during construction. The Plan was submitted to Pasco County for issuance of a permit. The county building department issued a permit for the work to be performed. Mike Mosher of Champion believed the Plan included all the specifications he needed to identify the components to be used and the manner in which the work was to be performed. He also testified the work was completed consistent with the Plan. The June 10, 2008, Certification Letter Respondent issued the June 10, 2008 Certification Letter (“Letter”) under seal to his client before he completed the inspections necessary for the conclusions in the Letter to accurately reflect the opinions contained in it. Both Respondent and his client, Champion, agree that since the client had been denied access to the Fish Residence Project, no final inspection of the site by Respondent ever occurred. As a result, Respondent admitted that, when he signed, sealed, and issued the Letter, the engineering services, upon which the certification in the Letter was based, had not yet occurred. The evidence proved that Respondent’s last appearance at the Fish Residence Project occurred on or about May 5, 2008, and that most of the work done at the site occurred after that date with the final construction finishing on or about May 30, 2008. As a result, the conclusions and opinions contained in the Letter were not based upon accurate and contemporaneous engineering analysis. Since the Letter purports to be grounded in engineering inspections, the statements in the Letter were not fully based upon the services Respondent actually provided. While not entirely clear from the evidence and testimony, had Respondent had the ability to perform a final inspection, he would have had the opportunity to discover several deficiencies in the construction. The Bracken Report detailed several deficiencies and non-conformances with the Remediation Plan. These deficiencies included: 1) failure to drive 5/6ths of the pilings to the depth prescribed by the notes to the Plan; a large number of pins found beneath door and window openings; mis-installation of pins and pin assemblages; and 4) no grouting placed in the ground although Respondent intended that grouting be used. Respondent agreed that at least some of the Bracken Report conclusions were warranted. Respondent asserts that, although the Letter was issued prematurely, Respondent should not be held accountable since the Letter “never went public.” This contention is rejected. The Letter was a final engineering report/certification and, upon issuance to Respondent’s client, Champion, was fully subject to all engineering standards, rules, and statutes. Since the Letter contained conclusions that were inaccurate and based upon information that was not collected under Respondent’s direct supervision, issuance of the Letter constituted negligence and misconduct in the practice of engineering. Respondent’s Prior History of Discipline Respondent has previously had discipline imposed. The instant case is the first in more than 40 years of Respondent practicing engineering that involved a subsidence remediation plan. Respondent’s first prior discipline was in FEMC Case No. 00-0086. In that case, Respondent was hired to correct building code issues identified by a county building department. The drawings he made violated the building code requirements, contained deficiencies, and were not in compliance with the standard practice of engineering. Respondent proceeded to hearing without benefit of legal counsel. A final order was entered by the Board reprimanding his license, fining him $1,000, plus costs of $302.93, placing him on probation for one year, and requiring he complete a course in professionalism and ethics while on probation. Respondent’s second prior discipline was in FEMC Case No. 01-0079. That matter was based upon drawings that were dated February 16, 2001. Respondent was not represented by counsel in that proceeding. In that proceeding, no proof was presented that the structure depicted in the plans by Respondent was ever built. Therefore, no direct risk of harm to the public was proven. Respondent entered into a Settlement Stipulation in that matter which was approved by the Board of Professional Engineers. He agreed to pay a total administrative fine of $7,000, plus $316.67 in costs and receive a reprimand on his license. He also received a one-year suspension of his license, followed by two years’ probation, and continuing education requirements. The other instance of discipline imposed against Respondent was in FEMC Case No. 2004037005. That complaint arose from plans that were signed by Respondent in June 2004. He was charged with signing plans he had not personally prepared or were not prepared under his supervision. Respondent entered into a Settlement Stipulation in that case that was approved by the Board. He paid a $5,000 administrative fine and costs of $750; received a reprimand on his license; received two years of probation; and was required to make detailed reporting to the FEMC during the probationary period. No additional evidence of prior disciplinary matters was offered other than the three cases described above.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Oliver Turzak’s Professional Engineer license be reprimanded, and that the license shall be suspended for a period of one year. Upon termination of the suspension, Respondent shall be reinstated under terms and conditions of reinstatement as the Board determines are appropriate, including two years of probation with terms the Board deems appropriate. Respondent shall also be fined $1,000 per count ($2,000 total fine). Finally, Petitioner shall be entitled to assess costs which are related to the investigation and prosecution of this case, other than costs or fees associated with an attorney’s time, as provided in section 455.227(3), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Zana Raybon, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite B-112 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Michael Flury, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 David P. Rankin, Esquire Law Office of David P. Rankin, P.A. 18540 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33548 John Jefferson Rimes, III, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite B-112 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
