The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD” or the “Agency”), to the Petitioners, G.B., Z.L., through his guardian K.L., J.H., and M.R.
Conclusions This matter is related to the promulgation of proposed rules 65G-4.0210 through 65G-4.027 (the “Proposed Rules”) by the Agency in May 2013 in its effort to follow the mandate issued by the Florida Legislature concerning the iBudget statute, section 393.0662, Florida Statute (2010). Petitioners challenged the Proposed Rules in DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP. The Proposed Rules were upheld by the Administrative Law Judge, but Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal (the “Court”). The Court’s decision was rendered July 21, 2014. G.B. v. Ag. for Pers. with Disab., 143 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The Fee Order was entered by the Court on the same date. The Fee Order had been entered upon the filing of a motion for appellate attorney’s fees filed with the Court by Appellants/Petitioners. The motion set forth three bases for an award of fees, to wit: Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Challenges to Proposed Agency Rules Pursuant to Section 120.56(2).– If the appellate court or the administrative law judge declares a proposed rule or portion of a proposed rule invalid pursuant to s. 120.56(2), a judgment or order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. An agency’s actions are “substantially justified” if there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the actions were taken by the agency. If the agency prevails in the proceedings, the appellate court or administrative law judge shall award reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees against a party if the appellate court or administrative law judge determines that a party participated in the proceedings for an improper purpose as defined by paragraph (1)(e). No award of attorney’s fees as provided by this subsection shall exceed $50,000. Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes, which provides: Appeals.– When there is an appeal, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to the prevailing party if the court finds that the appeal was frivolous, meritless, or an abuse of the appellate process, or that the agency action which precipitated the appeal was a gross abuse of the agency’s discretion. Upon review of the agency action that precipitates an appeal, if the court finds that the agency improperly rejected or modified findings of fact in a recommended order, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to a prevailing appellant for the administrative proceeding and the appellate proceeding. Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, which provides: All pleadings, motions, or other papers filed in the proceeding must be signed by the party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s qualified representative. The signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, based upon reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the presiding officer shall impose upon the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expense incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. The Court did not specifically address which of Petitioners’ stated bases for award of attorney’s fees was being relied upon when granting Petitioners’ motion. Petitioners assert that it must therefore be presumed that the Court granted the request for fees on the basis of all three of Petitioners’ bases. There is no other support for that presumption, as the Fee Order is silent on the issue. It could equally be presumed that only one of the bases was relied upon by the Court. Thus, a determination of the appropriate basis for fees is critical in the determination of the amount of fees to be awarded, as will be set forth more particularly below. The Fee Order establishes only that attorney’s fees are awarded, with leave for the parties to determine the appropriate amount or, failing to do so, obtain direction from an Administrative Law Judge on the matter. There is no issue as to whether Petitioners are entitled to fees or costs, only the amount to be awarded. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding under the August 6, 2014, Mandate of the First DCA, and under section 120.595(2). Although it is herein determined that section 120.595(2) is the appropriate provision to be considered for fees in this case, each of the other statutory sections argued in Petitioners’ motion for fees will be addressed nonetheless. Section 120.595(5) If section 120.595(5) is to be the basis for fees, it must be shown that Respondent is guilty of a “gross abuse” of its discretion. “Gross abuse” is not defined in statute. As stated by the Court in Allstate Floridian Insurance Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), “The troublesome nature of our review here is the admittedly high ‘gross abuse of discretion’ standard. . . . However, we have no definition of what a ‘gross’ abuse of discretion includes or how it differs from an abuse of discretion. We can only assume that it is more egregious than a typical abuse of discretion.” The Court cited Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), in which the Supreme Court iterated that if reasonable men could differ on an issue, there was no abuse of discretion to act one way or the other. Other courts, looking at the issue of “abuse of discretion” in administrative matters, have struggled with a definitive description or definition. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., et al. v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, 401 U.S. 402; 91 S. Ct. 814; 23 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), the Court was trying to determine whether the Transportation Secretary had acted within his discretion. The Court decided it “must consider whether the decision was based on clear error or judgment. [citations omitted] Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id., at 416. And, as found by another Court, whether an act is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion is “far from being entirely discrete as a matter of the ordinary meaning of language. . . . Rather than denoting a fixed template to be imposed mechanically on every case within their ambit, these words summon forth what may best be described as an attitude of mind in the reviewing court one that is ‘searching and careful’ . . . yet, in the last analysis, diffident and deferential.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., et al. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, et al., 606 F.2d 1031, 1034, U.S. App. DC (1979). In Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC, v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 53 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the Court awarded fees under section 120.595(5). In that case, the agency denied party status to the applicant for services. The Court said, “The position taken by the Division in the dismissal order, and maintained in this appeal, is so contrary to the fundamental principles of administrative law that, by separate order, we have granted Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes.” The Court did not, however, define gross abuse of discretion any more specifically than that. Likewise, in Salam v. Board of Professional Engineers, 946 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the Court found that an agency’s intentional delay on acting upon a petition for formal administrative hearing warranted fees under the statute. The Salam Court did not further define gross abuse of discretion; it merely found that such abuse existed under the circumstances of the case. Gross abuse of discretion must, by definition, be more difficult to ascertain than simple abuse of discretion. Gross abuse implies that the Agency first believed its intended action was improper, yet engaged in the action despite that knowledge. That is, that the Agency acted intentionally to do something it knew to be wrong. Proof of such intent would be extremely difficult.1/ One need only look at the plain language of the Court’s opinion in the rule challenge appeal at issue here to see that there was no gross abuse of discretion. The Court ultimately held that although the Agency’s rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language” concerning development of an algorithm to assist with the distribution of funds to needy Floridians, “[W]e recognize the difficulty in adhering to the Legislature’s command to create an algorithm solely capable of determining each client’s level of need. Further, we accept that [Respondent] is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” G.B. et al., supra, 143 So. 3d 454, 458. Nothing in that language suggests that the Agency knew its proposed rule was improper or that it was doing anything intentionally wrong. Rather, the language of the Court’s decision indicates that Respondent was certainly attempting to exercise its discretion properly in the adoption of the Proposed Rules. Despite the Agency’s attempts to justify the rules both at final hearing and on appeal, the Court found that the Proposed Rules did not comport with the specific authorizing statute. That failure did not, ipso facto, establish that there was a gross abuse of the Agency’s discretion. Besides, upon hearing all the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the undersigned initially upheld the Proposed Rule; that, in and of itself, is some indication that the Agency’s efforts were legitimate. Thus, in the present matter, there is no rational basis for finding that gross abuse of discretion was involved in the Court’s award of attorney’s fees. Section 120.569(2)(e) As for section 120.569(2)(e), there is no evidence to support Petitioners’ contention that the proposed rule addressed in the rule challenge proceeding (DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP) was interposed for any improper purpose. The appellate court said, “[W]e accept that APD is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” Id. Clearly, the Agency did not act for an improper purpose; its best efforts to follow the Legislative mandate for an iBudget simply fell short. The Proposed Rules contravened certain specific requirements of the governing statute. In order to find a way to meet its mandate, the Agency made a Herculean effort, yet failed. Although Petitioners argue that an “improper purpose” was implied by the Court in the Fee Order, there is no substantive support for that position. Not only was APD’s attempt to find a “reasonable way” to discharge its responsibility found wanting by the Court, experts in the field who testified at the underlying hearing disagreed as well. There was no dispute about the intended purpose of the Proposed Rules, only as to how that intent was to be effectuated. There was never any dispute as to the Proposed Rules’ intended purpose; they were meant to find a way to serve the tens-of-thousands of people in need. There is nothing in any of the Agency’s actions in this case that would be even arguably described as “interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” This attorney’s fee section does not apply to the facts of this case. Section 120.595(2) Finally, in section 120.595(2), the Legislature has declared that if an appellate court or administrative law judge declares all or part of a proposed rule invalid, an order will be entered awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (unless the agency demonstrated that its actions were substantially justified). The Court ultimately concluded that the proposed rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language.” That being the case, the Court seems to be finding that the Agency’s actions--promulgating the Proposed Rules--was not substantially justified, even if the Court did recognize the difficulty faced by APD in its efforts to comply with the statutes at issue. By process of elimination, section 120.595(2) is the basis for the Court’s award of attorney’s fees in the present case. That being so, the award is capped at $50,000. The Agency has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to at least $50,000 in fees, as well as costs in the amount of $41,609.65. There remains the issue of whether each of the four Petitioners is entitled to an award of the maximum fee. In their (singular) Petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of Proposed Rules, the parties sought the following relief: That a Final Order be entered finding the Proposed Rules to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; and That Petitioners be awarded their reasonable attorney’s fees; and Such other relief as the Administrative Law Judge deems appropriate. That is, the relief sought by each of the Petitioners was the same: invalidation of the proposed rules. It cannot be argued that each Petitioner in his or her own right was seeking individual redress or damages. Collectively, they wanted the proposed rules invalidated so that they could return to the status quo concerning their benefits from the State. In fact, only one of the four Petitioners presented testimony at the underlying administrative hearing as to the impact of the Proposed Rules. There was no issue as to each Petitioner’s standing in the underlying administrative hearing. As stated by the Agency in its Proposed Final Order in that case: “Petitioners are each recipients of Medicaid Services under the DD waiver program and have been or will be transitioned to the iBudget system. Stip., pp. 23-24. Thus, Petitioners have standing to challenge the substance of the Proposed Rules.” Petitioners contend that each of the 25,000-plus recipients of benefits from the Agency could have filed petitions challenging the Proposed Rule. That is true. But in the rule challenge proceeding there were four petitioners (ostensibly representing those other 25,000), each seeking the same relief, i.e., invalidation of the proposed rules. And only one of those, K.L., testified at final hearing in the underlying rule challenge proceeding. Thus, there is no justification for an award of fees to each of the Petitioners under section 120.595(2). In light of the findings and conclusions above, and based upon the Order as stated below, the issue of contingency multipliers is not relevant to the discussion of fees herein. As a general rule in Florida, fees and costs incurred in litigating entitlement to attorney’s fees are collectible although time spent litigating the amount of the award is not compensable. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Parma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (1993). § 92.931, Fla. Stat.; Stokus v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Inasmuch as the Agency does not dispute entitlement to attorney’s fees, no fees for the fee case are warranted. The amount of fees sought in this administrative rule challenge by the Petitioners is, as set forth in their Proposed Final Order: $255,614.39 for the DOAH rule challenge proceeding; $154,662.35 for the appeal but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $309,324.70; $62,850.00 for the fee case but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $94,275.00; and $41,609.65 in taxable costs, for a total of approximately $660,000.00. While the amount of fees and costs allowed under the appropriate statute is well less than what Petitioners sought, it has been deemed legally sufficient by statute.
Findings Of Fact Rebecca Lillien is a 32-year-old developmentally disabled person who was involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' (hereinafter "HRS") Residential Care Program. HRS has placed Rebecca Lillien at the Lyall Group Home in Opa Locka, Florida, under the Community Residential Training program. Rebecca Lillien also attends a day training program at United Cerebral Palsy in Miami, Florida. Under contract, HRS pays Lyall Group Home $411 per month to provide residential care (room, meals, and supervision) for Rebecca Lillien. Rebecca Lillien's total income consists of Social Security survivor's benefits and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter "SSI") disability benefits totaling $345 per month. The SSI Program is a federal welfare program administered by the Social Security Administration. The SSI Program provides up to $345 per month in cash benefits to elderly, blind, or disabled persons who also meet financial eligibility requirements (income less than $345 per month and countable resources of less than $1,600). Audrey Lillien is the mother of Rebecca Lillien and is the representative payee of Rebecca's Social Security and SSI benefit checks. Audrey Lillien's total income consists of Social Security and SSI benefits totaling $345 per month. Rebecca Lillien is an adult client. She is unmarried and is considered to be a family of one since she is over the age of 18, has not been declared legally incompetent, does not have a guardian, and has no dependents. The Social Security and SSI benefits she receives are legally hers. On February 17, 1983, HRS granted a total waiver of fees for the residential care of Rebecca Lillien at the Lyall Group Home, retroactive to July 23, 1982. At the time the fee waiver was granted in 1983, Rebecca Lillien's only income was from Social Security and SSI benefits., From February 1983 until March 31, 1985, HRS did not bill Audrey Lillien for Rebecca's care. During that same time period, HRS did not require the annual submission of a completed Maintenance Fee Information Form, HRS Form 280, in order to determine the continued eligibility of Rebecca Lillien, for a total fee waiver or a reduced fee. In 1983, the Fee Collection Review Committee, in determining whether to grant a fee waiver or reduction, improperly considered personal expenses paid by parents for adult children. Due to serious fiscal impact and budget deficits in HRS District Eleven (the district within which Rebecca Lillien resides), the Pee Collection Unit was reorganized and received training on fee collections. It was discovered at that time that the Fee Collection Unit and the Fee Collection Review Committee were not following proper procedures for assessing a fee and were misinterpreting state law. Specifically, they were not requiring that a client's income based on benefit payments is to be applied first to the cost of care and maintenance of the client. In 1985 fee collections began to be implemented by District Eleven in a uniform manner in strict accordance with the regulations and policies of HRS. The provision that required as priority that room, board, and maintenance be offset was strictly enforced. This change in interpretation and implementation of the fee collection regulations and policies is not in violation of or contrary to any existing statute, regulation, or rule; rather, it is in compliance with the existing statutes, regulations, and rules. In March 1985, HRS assessed a monthly fee of $295 for the care and maintenance of Rebecca Lillien. The fee was calculated on the total income of Rebecca Lillien minus $50 personal allowance. The fee was assessed against Audrey Lillien in her capacity as representative payee. The personal allowance is an amount of $50 given to residential care clients for personal needs such as clothing, recreation, hygiene products, and miscellaneous needs. In March 1985 the personal allowance was $40 per month, but it was increased to $50 per month as of July, 1985. If a client's personal needs exceed $50 per month, HRS is authorized to allow $28 more per month as an incidental allowance, payable to the group home. In March, 1985, Audrey Lillien was notified by HRS that the monthly fee for Rebecca's maintenance would be $295. HRS further notified Audrey Lillien that Rebecca was responsible for that fee retroactively and interest would be assessed on the retroactive balance. At the final hearing in this cause, HRS properly waived any claim for retroactive payment and therefore any claim for interest. HRS is required to develop an habilitation plan each year for Rebecca Lillien. This annual habilitation plan sets forth the treatment and therapeutic objectives for the coming year based upon the needs of Rebecca Lillien. On April 3, 1985, an habilitation plan was developed for her. The HRS team that evaluated Rebecca Lillien determined that a group home was the most appropriate placement for her. The evaluation team also determined that Rebecca Lillien should continue regular visitation with her mother as long as it remains beneficial to her and that she should continue to participate in activities she enjoys, such as musical programs, movies, and going to restaurants. The evaluation team further determined that Rebecca Lillien needs training in daily living skills and in self-care skills. The daily-living goal is for Rebecca to be able to verbalize and demonstrate appropriate behavior in stores, and the goals for self-care skills include grooming and the ability to independently choose pieces of clothing that coordinate. There is no mention in the habilitation plan that any items must be purchased, however. Further, the daily living skills and self- care skills are part of the training Rebecca receives at the United Cerebral Palsy Program, the cost of which is paid by HRS. It is beneficial to Rebecca for her mother to reinforce the training that Rebecca receives in the day training program so as to support her continued progress in the development of those skills. The habilitation plan also calls for routine medical and dental care and vitamin C supplements. HRS and Medicaid pay for all medical and dental expenses of the client, including prescriptions. Rebecca Lillien is a healthy person who has good teeth and, as such, does not have extraordinary or unusual medical or dental expenses. There is no evidence that Rebecca Lillien has required any dental or medical care at all over the last several years. Petitioners did introduce one bill for a "consultation" but presented no evidence as to the reason for that consultation and, therefore, no evidence that that charge should have been incurred. Although Audrey Lillien does purchase vitamin C for Rebecca Lillien, she does not purchase any prescription drugs for her. The habilitation plan developed on April 30, 1986, contains the same goals and recommendations as the 1985 plan. HRS does not pay for Rebecca Lillien's clothes, personal care items, recreation needs (other than those provided by the group home), spending money, transportation to visit her mother, food, and shelter expenses not incurred at the group home, or medical and dental costs not covered by medicare or medicaid. Audrey Lillien uses Rebecca Lillien's income to cover her own household expenses and transportation, as well as to provide Rebecca with the items enumerated in the preceding Finding of Fact. Rebecca Lillien stays with her mother Audrey Lillien approximately every other weekend and on holidays. Audrey Lillien purchases two different sets of clothing for Rebecca. One set is for use at the group home and the other is for use at Audrey Lillien's home. Based upon Petitioners' income and the totality of circumstances, duplication of wardrobes is excessive and unwarranted. Rebecca Lillien has a hobby of making beaded jewelry. In a four-month period Audrey Lillien spent almost $300 on beads for Rebecca, including a total of $226 on a single day--March 6, 1986. 8ased upon Petitioners' income and the totality of circumstances, expenditures of this amount are excessive. Audrey Lillien spends approximately $100 per month for groceries for Rebecca for the days that Rebecca is visiting her. In addition, she and Rebecca also dine at restaurants while Rebecca is visiting. Such a food expense is excessive. Audrey Lillien claims-transportation expenses as expenses incurred on Rebecca's behalf. Audrey Lillien's testimony as to the expense of maintaining her personal automobile is conflicting, and her testimony that 98% of her automobile expenses are attributable to Rebecca's transportation is simply not credible. In view of Rebecca's regular visits with Audrey Lillien, however, allowance should be made for some reasonable expense of transporting Rebecca between the Lyall Group Home and her mother's home, with that expense being paid out of an incidental allowance. Audrey Lillien has monthly household expenses of approximately $52 (mortgage on her condominium), $65 (condominium maintenance fee), and $100 (utilities). Her mortgage payment and maintenance fee are fixed and have no relationship to whether Rebecca is visiting. Although her utility bill may vary somewhat depending upon the frequency and duration of Rebecca's visits, no evidence was introduced to show what portion of Audrey Lillien's utilities bill might be attributable to Rebecca. Audrey Lillien gives Rebecca Lillien $30 a month for "whatever she wants. n This amount is less than the standard personal allowance of $50 given by HRS to each of its residential clients and is, indeed, in addition to the $50 personal allowance paid by HRS. Audrey Lillien pays for Rebecca Lillien's haircuts. These cost $8 every four to six weeks. She also pays for some special shampoo and skin cream which Rebecca needs. The evidence is unclear as to whether the shampoo and skin cream are medically required. If they are, it may be that these items should be billed to medicaid or to HRS as covered prescriptions. Upon receiving notice in 1985 of the assessed fee of $295 per month ($345-$50=$295), Audrey Lillien requested a review of that fee for purposes of being granted a reduction or a waiver of the fee. The HRS Fee Collection Unit, which determines what fee is to be charged, does not have authority to assess a lower fee than the fee calculated by deducting the personal allowance from the total monthly income. The HRS Fee Collection Review Committee may review an assessed fee and, based upon allowable expenses and other criteria, may grant a reduction or waiver of that fee. For example, the fee may be reduced or waived if the client can show severe, unusual and unavoidable expenses or obligations that warrant special consideration. The personal need allowance of $50 per month is not sufficient to meet the personal needs of Rebecca Lillien in view of the fact that Rebecca spends a fair amount of her time residing with Audrey Lillien rather than at the Lyall Group Home where HRS pays for her support. Fifty dollars is the amount of personal allowance paid by HRS, apparently regardless of whether it is needed. However, Rebecca has unusual needs in that, as opposed to other clients, she incurs regular transportation costs between the Lyall Group Home and her mother's home, food must be purchased for her while she is at her mother's home, and her mother must pay increased utilities while she is there. HRS will pay an additional $28 a month (in addition to the $50 personal allowance) for unusual expenses. Clearly, Rebecca's food, transportation, and utility costs while at her mother's logically exceed $28 per month and Rebecca is, therefore, entitled to the extra $28 payment from HRS. Petitioners are not entitled to a reduction in the assessed fee, however, since they have failed to prove the reasonable costs of Rebecca Lillien's unusual expenses of transportation, food, and utilities attendant to her visits with her mother.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Rebecca Lillien's request for a waiver of fee; assessing a fee of $295 per month, effective upon entry of a Final Order in this cause; and granting to Rebecca Lillien the sum of $28 per month as an incidental allowance in addition to the $50 per month standard personal allowance to assist in the unusual expenses related to her visits with her mother, effective upon entry of a Final Order in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1986, LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rena R. Magnolnick, Esquire 2138 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 206 Miami, Florida 33137 Carmen Dominguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2200 N.W. 7th Avenue Miami, Florida 33127 Leo PloLkin, Esquire 2085 U.S. 19 North Suite 314 Jenniffer Complex Clearwater, Florida 3357
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, from Respondents, Bernard Spinrad and Marien Spinrad (Spinrads), and their counsel, related to litigation between the parties in DOAH Case No. 13-2254.
Findings Of Fact The Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 13-2254, including the Preliminary Statement, the Findings of Fact, and the Conclusions of Law contained therein, and the Department of Environmental Protection’s Consolidated Final Order in OGC Case No. 13-0858 are incorporated herein by reference as the facts underlying this Final Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was represented by in this case by Michael Linsky, Esquire, beginning in April 1988. Two complaints of discrimination had been brought against the Department of Corrections by Petitioner. Linsky is an experienced trial lawyer having been admitted to the Florida Bar in 1970. However, he had no experience with discrimination cases prior to these proceedings. The Florida Commission on Human Relations found the Department had committed an unlawful employment practice when it assigned Petitioner to perimeter post duty and transferred him to Polk Correctional Institution in retaliation for having filed a discrimination complaint. Linsky originally took Petitioner's case on a contingency fee basis, but later it was decided between Linsky and Petitioner that the fee would be whatever was awarded by the Commission. Petitioner was only to be responsible for costs. Linsky submitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 a list of dates and hours expended on this case. However, this exhibit was prepared by Linsky's secretary some months after the events depicted and appear grossly exaggerated in some instances. Linsky claims a total of 159.35 hours expended. Linsky testified that his billing rate from April 1988 to December 1988 was $175 per hour, and thereafter it was raised to $190 per hour. Petitioner's expert witnesses contend the average billing rate in the Tampa area for this type of case ranges from $125 to $175 per hour. Respondent's expert witnesses contend the fees awarded run from $100 to $150 per hour. I find the appropriate fee in this case to be $135 per hour. Although Linsky claims to have spent 159.35 hour on this case, including the attorney's fees portion, 1 find that only 100 hours are reasonable. Costs of $423.60 is not disputed.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Department of Corrections be directed to pay Sefsick's attorney $13,500 attorney's fees and $423.60 costs in these proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted, except: 3. This proposed finding is accepted as a recital of the testimony presented, but rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #8. 5. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #7. 6 and 7. Accepted as legal argument, but rejected as a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Linsky, Esquire 600 North Florida Avenue Suite 1610 Tampa, FL 33602 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Richard L. Dugger Secretary Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Section 11B(3) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2004 Second Edition, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The petitions filed by FFVA and TIC challenge the validity of Section 11B(3) of the 2004 Manual,4/ which prior to October 1, 2007, was adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1) was amended effective October 1, 2007, to adopt by reference the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition ("the 2006 Manual"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1), as it existed when the petitions were filed and as it currently exists, adopts by reference the 2006 Manual, not the 2004 Manual. The 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, or any other rule. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in the reimbursement dispute initiated by HRMC against FFVA under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on October 24, 2007, which was attached to FFVA's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 07-5414. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in a reimbursement dispute involving TIC under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on January 9, 2008, which was attached to TIC's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 08-0703.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the two-count Administrative Complaint, dated April 17, 2007, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (the "Department"), is the state agency charged with enforcing the statutory provisions pertaining to persons holding real estate broker and sales associate's licenses in Florida, pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, except where specifically noted, Respondent Mathew Johnson was a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL3149081. Respondent first obtained his real estate associate's license in 2003 and worked under the license of broker Jacqueline Sanderson in Orlando. When he married and his wife became pregnant, Respondent believed that he needed a more steady income than his commission-based employment with Ms. Sanderson provided. Respondent left Ms. Sanderson's employ on good terms and commenced work as the marketing manager for the downtown YMCA in Orlando. While working at the downtown YMCA, Respondent met a member of the YMCA named Tab L. Bish ("Mr. Bish"), a broker who owns First Source, Inc., an Orlando real estate sales company (sometimes referred to as "FSI Realty"). Respondent became friendly with Mr. Bish, and expressed an interest in getting back into the real estate business. Mr. Bish offered Respondent a job at First Source. Respondent had allowed his sales associate's license to lapse while he was working at the YMCA. Respondent informed Mr. Bish of that fact, and told Mr. Bish that he required a salaried position in order to support his young family. Respondent testified that Mr. Bish was happy to hire him as an office manager, because Mr. Bish wanted Respondent to perform a marketing role for First Source similar to that he had performed for the YMCA. Respondent started working at First Source in May 2005, as a salaried office manager. Mr. Bish agreed that he initially hired Respondent as an office manager, but only on the understanding that Respondent would take the necessary steps to reactivate his sales associate's license and commence selling property as soon as possible. Respondent took the licensing course again. Mr. Bish believed that Respondent was taking too long to obtain his license, and cast about for something Respondent could do during the interim. In order to make profitable use of Respondent's time, Mr. Bish began to deal in referral fees from apartment complexes. Certain complexes in the Orlando area would pay a fee to brokers who referred potential renters to the apartments, provided these potential renters actually signed leases. Among the apartment complexes offering referral fees was the Jefferson at Maitland, which in 2005 offered a referral fee of half the first month's rent. Mr. Bish placed Respondent in charge of connecting potential renters with apartment complexes, showing the apartments, following up to determine whether the potential renters signed leases, and submitting invoices for the referral fees. Mr. Bish did not authorize Respondent to collect the payments. Respondent initiated contact with the Jefferson at Maitland and began sending potential renters there. Respondent would submit invoices to the Jefferson at Maitland, payable to First Source, for each referral that resulted in a lease agreement. Respondent estimated that he submitted between 12 and 15 invoices for referral fees to the Jefferson at Maitland during his employment with First Source. Respondent obtained his license and became an active sales associate under Mr. Bish's broker's license on November 16, 2005. Mr. Bish began a process of weaning Respondent away from his salaried position and into working on a full commission basis. Respondent stopped showing apartments under the referral arrangement and began showing properties for sale. The last lease for which First Source was due a referral fee from the Jefferson at Maitland was dated December 5, 2005. In early February 2006, it occurred to Respondent that he had failed to follow up with the Jefferson at Maitland regarding the last group of potential renters to whom he had shown apartments during October and November 2005. Respondent claimed that he "hadn't had the opportunity" to follow up because of the press of his new duties as a sales associate and the intervening holiday season. However, nothing cited by Respondent explained his failure to make a simple phone call to the Jefferson at Maitland to learn whether First Source was owed any referral fees. Respondent finally made the call to the Jefferson at Maitland on February 9, 2006. He spoke to a woman he identified as Jenny Marrero, an employee whom he knew from prior dealings. Ms. Marrero reviewed Respondent's list and found three persons who had signed leases after Respondent showed them apartments: Mike Tebbutt, who signed a one-year lease on October 26, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $532.50; Terry Ford, who signed an eight-month lease on November 14, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $492.50; and Juan Sepulveda, who signed an eight-month lease on December 2, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $415.00. However, there was a problem caused by Respondent's failure to submit invoices for these referral fees in a timely manner. Respondent testified that Ms. Marrero told him that the Jefferson at Maitland had reduced its referral fee from 50 percent to 20 percent of the first month's rent, effective January 2006.2 Ms. Marrero could not promise that these late invoices would be paid according to the 2005 fee structure. According to Respondent, Ms. Marrero suggested that the Jefferson at Maitland's corporate office would be more likely to pay the full amount owed if Respondent did something to "break up" the invoices, making it appear that they were being submitted by different entities. She also suggested that no invoice for a single payee exceed $1,000, because the corporate office would know that amount exceeded any possible fee under the 2006 fee structure. Ms. Marrero made no assurances that her suggestions would yield the entire amount owed for the 2005 invoices, but Respondent figured the worst that could happen would be a reduction in the billings from 50 percent to 20 percent of the first month's rent. On February 9, 2006, Respondent sent a package to the Jefferson at Maitland, via facsimile transmission. Included in the package were three separate invoices for the referral fees owed on behalf of Messrs. Tebbutt, Ford, and Sepulveda. The invoices for Messrs. Tebbutt and Sepulveda stated that they were from "Matt Johnson, FSI Realty," to the Jefferson at Maitland, and set forth the name of the lessee, the lease term, the amount of the "referral placement fee," and stated that the checks should be made payable to "FSI Realty, 1600 North Orange Avenue, Suite 6, Orlando, Florida 32804." The invoice for Mr. Ford stated that it was from "Matt Johnson" to the Jefferson at Maitland. It, too, set forth the name of the lessee, the lease term, and the amount of the referral fee. However, this invoice stated that the check should be made payable to "Matt Johnson, 5421 Halifax Drive, Orlando, Florida 32812." The Halifax Drive location is Respondent's home address. The package sent by Respondent also included an Internal Revenue Service Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification, for Mr. Bish and for Respondent, a copy of Respondent's real estate sales associate license, a copy of Mr. Bish's real estate broker's license, and a copy of First Source, Inc.'s real estate corporation registration. Approximately one month later, in early March 2006, Mr. Bish answered the phone at his office. The caller identifying herself as "Amber" from the Jefferson at Maitland and asked for Respondent, who was on vacation. Mr. Bish asked if he could help. Amber told Mr. Bish that the W-9 form submitted for Respondent had been incorrectly filled out, and that she could not send Respondent a check without the proper information. Mr. Bish told Amber that under no circumstances should she send a check payable to Respondent. He instructed her to make the payment to First Source. Amber said nothing to Mr. Bish about a need to break up the payments or to make sure that a single remittance did not exceed $1,000. Mr. Bish asked Amber to send him copies of the documents that Respondent had submitted to the Jefferson at Maitland. Before those documents arrived, Mr. Bish received a phone call from Respondent, who explained that he submitted the invoice in his own name to ensure that Mr. Bish received the full amount owed by the Jefferson at Maitland. On March 10, 2006, after reviewing the documents he received from the Jefferson at Maitland, Mr. Bish fired Respondent. On March 29, 2006, Mr. Bish filed the complaint that commenced the Department's investigation of this matter.3 At the hearing, Mr. Bish explained that, even if Respondent's story about the need to "break up" the invoices and keep the total below $1,000 were true, the problem could have been easily resolved. Had Mr. Bish known of the situation, he would have instructed the Jefferson at Maitland to make one check payable to him personally as the broker, and a second check payable to First Source, Inc. In any event, there was in fact no problem. By a single check, dated March 15, 2008, First Source received payment from the Jefferson at Maitland in the amount of $1,440, the full sum of the three outstanding invoices from 2005. Respondent testified that he never intended to keep the money from the invoice, and that he would never have submitted it in his own name if not for the conversation with Ms. Marrero. Respondent asserted that if he had received a check, he would have signed it over to Mr. Bish. Respondent and his wife each testified that the family had no great need of $492.50 at the time the invoices were submitted. Respondent's wife is an attorney and was working full time in February 2006, and Respondent was still receiving a salary from First Source. In his capacity as office manager, Respondent had access to the company credit card to purchase supplies. Mr. Bish conducted an internal audit that revealed no suspicious charges. Respondent failed to explain why he did not immediately tell Mr. Bish about the potential fee collection problem as soon as he learned about it from Ms. Marrero, why he instructed the Jefferson at Maitland to send the check to his home address rather than his work address, or why he allowed a month to pass before telling Mr. Bish about the invoices. He denied knowing that Mr. Bish had already learned about the situation from the Jefferson at Maitland's employee. The Department failed to demonstrate that Respondent intended to keep the $492.50 from the invoice made payable to Respondent personally. The facts of the case could lead to the ultimate finding that Respondent was engaged in a scheme to defraud First Source of its referral fee. However, the same facts also may be explained by Respondent's fear that Mr. Bish would learn of his neglect in sending the invoices, and that this neglect could result in a severe reduction of First Source's referral fees. Respondent may have decided to keep quiet about the matter in the hope that the Jefferson at Maitland would ultimately pay the invoices in full, at which time Respondent would explain himself to Mr. Bish with an "all's well that ends well" sigh of relief. Given the testimony at the hearing concerning Respondent's character and reputation for honesty, given that Respondent contemporaneously told the same story to his wife and to Ms. Sanderson that he told to this tribunal, and given that this incident appears anomalous in Respondent's professional dealings, the latter explanation is at least as plausible as the former. Respondent conceded that, as a sales associate, he was not authorized by law to direct the Jefferson at Maitland to make the referral fee check payable to him without the express written authorization of his broker, Mr. Bish. Respondent also conceded that Mr. Bish did not give him written authorization to accept the referral fee payment in his own name. Respondent has not been subject to prior discipline.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: Dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent; and Suspending Respondent's sales associate's license for a period of one year for the violation established in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Golfcrest Nursing Home (Golfcrest), is a properly licensed 67-bed nursing home located in Broward County, Florida. Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), was the state agency responsible for administration and implementation of the Florida Medicaid Program. Those responsibilities have been transferred to the Agency For Health Care Administration. Golfcrest participates in the Florida Medicaid Program and provides inpatient nursing home services to Medicaid eligible persons. Golfcrest is entitled to reimbursement in accordance with the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Plan) which has been adopted and incorporated by reference in Rule 10C-7.0482, Florida Administrative Code. The Plan contains provisions which authorize a nursing home participating in the Medicaid Program to request an interim change in its Medicaid reimbursement rate when it incurs property related costs which would change its reimbursement rate by one percent (1 percent) or when it incurs costs resulting from patient care or operating changes made to comply with existing state regulations, and said costs are at least $5,000 or one percent (1 percent) of its reimbursement rate. In 1980 Americare Corporation (Americare) purchased Golfcrest. In 1983 or 1984, Americare did some cosmetic renovations at Golfcrest. Portions of the facility are 45 years old. Americare contracted with Diversicare Management Services to manage the operations of Golfcrest. In 1988-1989, Joann Verbanic, a regional vice- president for Diversicare Management Services, recommended to the Board of Directors of Americare that major renovations to the Golfcrest facility be done. On March 19, 1990, Americare sent a team to Golfcrest to survey the facility for needed renovations. Later a plan was presented to Americare's Board of Directors and permission was given to proceed with a major renovation. In May of 1990 and July of 1991, HRS conducted its annual licensure surveys at Golfcrest. As a result, HRS identified several licensure deficiencies. Correction of these deficiencies was mandated by HRS. Failure to correct these deficiencies would have resulted in sanctions against Golfcrest's nursing home license, including administrative fines, a reduction in licensure rating, other civil penalties, and a reduction in Medicaid reimbursement. In order to correct the licensure deficiencies, Golfcrest incurred substantial property costs and costs due to patient care and operating changes. By letter dated January 6, 1992, Golfcrest submitted to HRS a request for an interim rate increase for patient care costs, operating costs, and property costs incurred or to be incurred to comply with existing state regulations and to correct identified licensure deficiencies. By letter dated April 14, 1992, Golfcrest provided additional information which had been requested by HRS. Golfcrest requested that the following costs be included in the calculation of its interim rate: Operating Costs Office Furniture $ 896.45 3 Laundry Carts 696.31 Office Door 125.00 Light Fixtures 1,067.30 Laundry Table 482.00 Structural Repairs 100.00 Repairs for Boiler 390.00 42 Overhead Lights 11,861.07 Patient Care Costs 57 Hi-Lo Beds 19,301.40 Blinds 5,145.02 Dining Room Furniture 3,167.70 Lobby Furniture 2,500.00 Bedspreads 3,404.78 Valances 3,472.05 Cubicle Curtains, Tracks 9,579.51 Activity Furniture 1,000.00 Property Costs Bldg. Imp. Depreciation 16,356.00 HRS denied in part and granted in part, Golfcrest's interim rate request by letter dated June 15, 1992, as revised by letter dated July 1, 1992. HRS granted the patient care costs for the 57 Hi-Lo beds and for the cubicle curtain and tracks and the property costs for the building improvement depreciation. In its proposed recommended order, Golfcrest withdrew its request for costs of the boiler leak, the lobby furniture, folding table for the laundry, and structural repairs. Golfcrest incurred the costs for which the interim rate is requested. Golfcrest requested that the purchase of office furniture be accepted as an allowable cost. Golfcrest did not specify what office furniture was purchased nor did it adequately relate such a purchase to a cited deficiency in either the 1990 or the 1991 survey. Additionally, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the office furniture was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for office furniture. In the 1990 survey report, Golfcrest was cited for having linen stored on dressers in residents' rooms. There was insufficient space to store the linen in the laundry area so Golfcrest purchased three laundry carts to store the linens in the hallways. The purchase of the laundry carts was necessary to correct the deficiency cited in the 1990 survey. However, no evidence was presented to establish that the amount paid for the laundry carts was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the item. In the 1991 survey, Golfcrest was cited for having exit doors with screens missing and broken jalousie slats; therefore, it did not meet the requirement that the facility must provide housekeeping and maintenance services necessary to maintain an orderly and comfortable interior. Golfcrest relies on this cited deficiency to support its claim for the cost of replacing a new office door. Golfcrest's reliance is misplaced. The deficiency is the failure to perform ordinary maintenance services. The replacement of the office door is not necessary to comply with the cited licensure requirements. Golfcrest stated in its plan of correction that it would repair the cited doors by replacing the screens. Additionally, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the door was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the door. Rule 10D-29.121(7)(d), Florida Administrative Code, required that renovations to restore a nonconforming building to its condition previous to deterioration must minimally meet standards for a new facility. The unrebutted testimony was that termites had damaged the wall studs and the walls had to be torn out and replaced. In order to meet the required NFPA standards and building code requirements for lumens and wiring, it was necessary to replace 42 overbed lights and 14 light fixtures for 3-bed wards. The purchase of this lighting was necessary to correct deficiencies that would result if the old lighting were retained after the renovations. However, no evidence was presented that would establish that the cost of the lighting fixtures was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the lighting. In the 1990 survey report, Golfcrest was cited for having broken venetian blinds in rooms 6 and 33. Golfcrest stated in its plan of correction that "broken blinds are repaired/replaced as needed." Golfcrest requested that in its interim rate request that $5,145.02 be considered an allowable cost for the replacement of blinds. Although there was a deficiency noted concerning broken venetian blinds, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost for the blinds was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the blinds. In the 1991 survey, Golfcrest was cited for not being adequately furnished in the dining areas and not having sufficient space to accommodate all activities. In order to provide more space in the dining areas, Golfcrest purchased ten collapsible dining tables which could be easily removed to provide more space for large group activities in the dining room. The purchase of the dining tables was necessary to correct the deficiency of inadequate space, however, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the dining tables did not exceed the level of what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for dining tables. Golfcrest purchased 67 dining room chairs. However, Golfcrest did not establish how the purchase of the dining room chairs corrected the cited deficiency and did not establish that the cost of the dining room chairs was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for dining room chairs. In the 1991 survey report, Golfcrest was cited for not providing clean beds. As an example of this deficiency, the survey listed torn blankets, threadbare sheets, pillow cases and towels and sunrotted sheets. Golfcrest purchased 104 bedspreads to replace all the bedspreads in the facility and to maintain an inventory of bedspreads to be used while bedspreads was being laundered. The purchase of the bedspreads were related to a cited deficiency, but Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the bedspreads was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the bedspreads. Golfcrest requested that the purchase of valances be considered an allowable cost in its interim rate request. In its proposed recommended order, Golfcrest relied on the deficiencies cited in the 1991 survey report relating to the life safety survey dealing with privacy curtains which did not have netting at the top for support of its request for the valances. Golfcrest did not establish that the valances purchased were part of the cited privacy curtains. Given the fact that Golfcrest's request for replacement of cubicle curtains and tracks, was a separate request from the valances, it is reasonable to infer that the valances did not relate to the licensure requirement relied upon by Golfcrest. Additionally, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the valances was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for valances. Golfcrest requested that the purchase of furniture for the activities area be considered an allowable cost in the calculation of its interim rate. Golfcrest did not establish what furniture was purchased for the activity area; thus, it did not establish how the purchase of the furniture was necessary to correct the deficiency that Golfcrest did not provide sufficient space and equipment and did not adequately furnish recreation and program areas to enable staff to provide residents with needed services as required. Additionally, Golfcrest did not establish that the cost of the furnishings for the activity room was what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer would pay for the furnishings. In its January 6, 1992 letter requesting an interim rate request, Golfcrest used 22,676 patient days to calculate the per diem rate for property costs. This number was taken from the July 31, 1990 cost report. HRS used 23,010 patient days to calculate the per diem rate. This number was taken from the last cost report dated July 31, 1991 and is the appropriate number to use in calculating the interim rate. The total per diem reimbursement rate for Golfcrest which was in effect at the time of the interim rate request was $71.2565. The per diem reimbursement for the property component is not one percent or more of Golfcrest's total per diem reimbursement rate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration as successor in interest for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services determining the interim rate for Golfcrest to be $1.2551. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-847 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-6: Accepted. Paragraph 7-9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraph 11-16: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 17-19: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraph 22: Accepted in substance. HRS had allowed the cost of the Hi-Lo beds, thus, those costs were not in dispute. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance as to the blinds but not as to the shades and shower curtains. The shades and shower curtains were not part of the interim rate request, thus whether they were necessary to correct a deficiency is not addressed in this Recommended Order. Paragraph 24: Accepted in substance as it relates to the dining tables but not as to the dining chairs. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: Accepted in substance as it relates to the cubicle curtains and tracks but not as it relates to the valances. The cubicle curtains and tracks were allowed by HRS as a cost and thus was not in dispute. Paragraphs 27-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 32 and 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The third, fifth, sixth and seventh sentences are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. The fourth sentence is accepted. Paragraphs 35-36: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 37: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 39: With exception of the last sentence the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary detail. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 2-9: Accepted. Paragraph 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12-22: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 23-28: Accepted in substance except in paragraph 24 the reference to floor coverings should be to light fixtures. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31-33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 36-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfred W. Clark, Esquire 117 South Gadsden, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karel Baarslag, Esquire HRS Medicaid Office 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Six, Room 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Atrium Building, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to its authority to regulate water and sewer rates, charges and rate structures embodied in Chapters 367, Florida Statutes, and 25-30, Florida Administrative Code, the Public Service Commission entered Orders numbered 16971 and 17058, which adopted specific guidelines and conditions for utilities to implement certain income tax impact charges for contributions-in-aid- of-construction ("CIAC gross-up charges"). (See Orders numbered 20409, p.3; 16971, p.2-4; and 17058). One of these conditions requires that utilities submit appropriate tariff sheets (rates and charges sheets) for the Commission's approval prior to implementation of the CIAC gross-up charge. CIAC is the payment or contribution of cash or property to a utility from a customer or entity seeking service from that utility in order to secure the provision of such services or to reserve it for a future time. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 changed the treatment of CIAC from being non-taxable to being taxable as income. A CIAC gross-up charge is a method by which a utility can recover that tax expense, represented by the income tax assessed against collected CIAC, through approved rates and charges to customers. The amount of CIAC tax impact funds collected by a utility is not itself treated as CIAC for rate-making purposes. The Respondent, St. Johns North Utility Corp., collected gross-up charges which were not authorized by its filed and approved tariff schedules (rate schedules), and without securing the requisite approval from the Commission. (See Orders numbered 20409 and 20762). The Commission was made aware of the charging of unauthorized CIAC gross-up charges by the Utility Respondent when a developer, Fruit Cove Limited, communicated with the Commission concerning its doubts about utility service being available for one of its subdivisions, when required, from the Respondent. Fruit Cove Limited had paid CIAC gross-up charges to St. Johns. On June 3, 1988, the Commission, through its staff, contacted Mr. Joseph E. Warren, the General Manager for the Respondent, and explained the Commission's requirements regarding the requisite pre-approval of the charging of CIAC gross-up charges. Mr. Warren agreed to file a written request for authorization to implement such charges. No request was filed, despite repeated admonitions and solicitations by the Commission and its staff and a lengthy opportunity to comply. Finally, Order No. 20409 was issued by the Commission on December 5, 1988, requiring the Utility to file a written request for authorization to implement CIAC gross-up charges within thirty (30) days of that Order. A written request was not timely filed, however. The Utility finally filed its written request for approval of these charges on September 5, 1989. The accompanying tariff sheets representing such charges were ultimately filed in response to Orders numbered 16971 and 20409, and Show Cause Order No. 20762. They became effective on September 15, 1989. The Commission, through its staff, also made repeated inquiries to the Utility regarding certain service availability charges and practices, initially by letter of July 29, 1988. The Utility was allowed until August 19, 1988 to make the requested responses. The letter was addressed to Mr. Joseph Warren at the Utility's mailing address of record. The Utility, however, did not provide written responses to the comments and questions by the Commission, despite repeated assurances that it would do so. Order No. 20409, issued on December 5, 1988, required the Utility to provide the full written responses to the July 29, 1988 letter within thirty (30) days of the date of that Order. The responses were not timely made. Order No. 20762 was issued on February 17, 1989, requiring the Utility to show cause in writing on or before March 13, 1989 why it should not be fined up to $5,000.00 per day, in accordance with the Commission's penalty authority, for failure to comply with the provisions of Order No. 20409, regarding the necessity for written responses to the Commission's specified questions and the submission of a written request to implement the CIAC gross-up charges referenced above. The first item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to seek approval, including submission of proposed rate tariff sheets for authorization to implement the CIAC tax impact charge referenced above. That item was responded to on September 5, 1989, more than eight months after the deadline set by Order No. 20409. The second item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide the names and addresses of financial institutions in which gross-up charge funds were being retained. That item was responded to as requested. The third item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide a listing of all gross-up monies received from each contributor. No response was ever provided by the Respondent. The significance of the information requested by the Commission is that it would provide identity of the individuals who were entitled to a refund of the unauthorized CIAC gross-up charges collected by the Utility, as provided in Order No. 20762. The fourth item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide a copy of all current developer agreements. That item was responded to within the deadline set by Order No. 20409. The fifth item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to file revised tariff sheets indicating the actual legal description of the Utility's certificated service territory. No response was ever provided. Order No. 20762 was ultimately issued on February 17, 1989 imposing a $5,000.00 fine on the Utility for serving outside of its authorized service area. Order No. 20409 requested the Utility to indicate to the Commission whether, with regard to the developer agreement between the Respondent and Fruit Cove Limited, the charges listed in the various paragraphs of that agreement would, upon completion of the real estate development involved, be adjusted to reflect actual utility service costs incurred. No response to that request was ever provided by the Utility. Additionally, in that Order, the Commission requested information concerning a so- called "step tank", which was referenced in paragraphs 12C and 13D of the developer agreement with Fruit Cove Limited. That request, in Order No. 20409, was never responded to. A certain fee was charged for installation of the step tank by the Utility to Fruit Cove Limited, and no response was given to the Commission's inquiry as to why that fee was omitted from the Utility's approved tariff on file with the Commission. The significance of the requested information was that the omission of the step tank installation fee from the Utility's tariff of rates and charges could cause the developer agreement to constitute a "special service availability agreement", which can only be approved in advance by the Commission. It is not a matter, approval of which has been delegated by the Commission to its staff members. The Order referenced last above also requested an explanation for why a meter installation fee, referred to in that same developer agreement, does not include a "curb stop" or a meter box. This information is significant because it is necessary in order for the Commission to determine whether the charge involved is reasonable. A cost breakdown for the meter installation, including the various hardware components and other charges, was necessary and was not provided by the Utility. Additional information concerning the area of service availability, required to be provided to the commission by Order No. 20409, included the requirement that approval be obtained from the Commission for the CIAC gross-up charge in the developer agreement with Fruit Cove Limited. As stated above, that approval was not requested in writing, as required by the Order, for more than eight months after the deadline set by that Order. By Order No. 20762, St. Johns was fined $5,000.00 for three separate violations of the statutes and rules, and the Orders enumerating them, for a total of $15,000.00. The Utility was fined for serving outside of its authorized service territory, for collecting unauthorized CIAC gross- up charges, and for failing to file its developer agreements with the Commission as required by law. The developer agreements were only submitted after repeated efforts by the Commission's staff which culminated in Order No. 20409 and which were either unresponded to or not properly responded to by the Utility. Additionally, by Order No. 21559, issued on July 17, 1989, St. Johns was fined $5,000.00 for failure to file an application for an extension of its territory as required by Order No. 20409. In the meantime, by Order No. 22342, issued on December 26, 1989, the Commission approved a transfer of the Utility's assets from St. Johns to Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corporation ("Jacksonville Suburban"). That Order did not authorize transfer of the liabilities of the Respondent to Jacksonville Suburban. The Order specifies that St. Johns, and not Jacksonville Suburban, will remain liable for the previously imposed refund obligations and fines. Only in the event that there remained sales proceeds in excess of the certain debt of St. Johns owed to its institutional lender would funds from the Jacksonville Suburban sale be applied toward payment of the refund and fines found to be due and owing by the above-cited Orders, by way of escrow or otherwise. Any excess proceeds, absent Order No. 22342, were to be paid to St. Johns. Order No. 22342 does not make Jacksonville Suburban liable for the refund and fines at issue. It is speculative whether there will be any sales proceeds available from the sale, after payment of the debt, to be applied toward the refund and fines. The sales price was made dependent upon establishment of the Utility's "rate base" amount, to be established in that transfer proceeding at a point in time after entry of Order No. 22342. That Order, however, specifically preserves the liability of St. Johns for the refund and fines and does not provide for the extinguishment of such liability in the event that the sales proceeds prove to be insufficient to pay them.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that St. Johns be assessed a penalty of $5,000.00 for knowingly and willfully failing to comply with Order No. 20409. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1990. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 14th day of June, APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-24. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Respondent filed no proposed Findings of Fact) Copies furnished to: David Schwartz, Esq. Florida Public Service Commission Legal Division 101 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Joseph E. Warren, Esq. 1930 San Marco Boulevard Suite 200 Jacksonville, FL 32207 Mr. Steve Tribble Director of Records and Recording Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Mr. David Swafford Executive Director Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street, Room 116 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Susan Clark, Esq. General Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street, Room 212 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850