Findings Of Fact Findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order are approved and adopted and incorporated herein. There is competent substantial evidence to support the findings of fact.
Conclusions The Administrative Complaint has charged, concerning patient No. 1, that the Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The Respondent failed to perform the procedure to which the patient consented, a bilateral salpingo- oophorectomy. He did not document in the record that he informed or explained to her that the procedure was not performed and why. His records do not show why the procedure was or was not medically necessary. Additionally, he performed a D&C procedure which was not authorized by the patient; and the records contain no documentation of the fact that he informed her of performing that procedure nor the medical reasons why it was indicated, if it was. Because of this and because he failed to perform the procedure to which the patient had consented, the BS&O, without explanation in his records, it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent is guilty as charged in Count I of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by departing from the medical practice standard mentioned in the paragraph above. It was not established, however, that he failed to inform the patient that the procedure which she consented to was not performed, the records merely do not show that she was informed. Moreover, although her eventual death from ovarian cancer stemmed from the organs which he failed to remove surgically when the patient had authorized them to be removed, it was not shown that they were in a cancerous or pre- cancerous condition at the time he performed the surgery or otherwise that the lethal cancer condition resulted directly from his failure to remove the organs at the time of the surgery some five years prior to the patient's death. It was not shown that he should, for some reason, have foreseen that the organs might become cancerous and ignored the risk or that their removal was then medically necessary. In light of the above Findings of Fact, which are supported by the clear and convincing evidence of record, it has been established that Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1979), now substantially reenacted as Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, has been violated by the Respondent's failure to keep written medical records justifying his course of treatment of patient No. 1 by failing to document any reasons for his plan to perform the BS&O procedure, to document any symptoms or complaints by the patient, or to document why he changed his plans and did not perform the planned procedure authorized by the patient. This situation is distinguished from that of Breesman v. Department of Professional Regulations, 567 So.2d 469 (1st DCA 1990), which held that the above statutory section was not violated where a physician failed to document other courses of treatment which he elected not to employ. Here, the Respondent planned the BS&O procedure and then changed his plan during surgery. The basis for the change was unexplained in his records. He did not keep written records containing any description of the patient's fallopian tubes or ovaries, as observed during the operation, nor why he performed a D&C to which the patient had not consented, or why the procedures performed were not discussed with the patient. Concerning Count III, the Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence, which culminated in the above Findings of Fact, describing in detail the Respondent's practice and treatment related to patient No. 2, that the Respondent is guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, by administering the legend drug, marcaine, to patient No. 2 other than in the course of his professional practice. The administering of a legend drug inappropriately (here, by epidural catheter) or in excessive or inappropriate quantities (12 milliliters of a 0.75% solution in a patient described as, and under the circumstances of, the above Findings of Fact) was not in the best interest of patient No. 2 and was thus not within the proper course of the Respondent's professional practice. The inappropriate administration and the excessive concentration and volume of marcaine for patient No. 2 prescribed and administered under the circumstances delineated in the above Findings of Fact constitutes a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count IV, because the Respondent has been proven by clear and convincing evidence to have failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under those conditions and circumstances in light of the above factual findings pertaining to this patient. Count V of the complaint involves the charge that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying his course of treatment of patient No. 2. This is a violation of former Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1983), now substantially reenacted as Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes. The above Findings of Fact, supported by clear and convincing evidence of record, demonstrate that the Respondent failed to document any justification for using a highly-concentrated and dangerous agent, such as marcaine, in a volume which was excessive under the circumstances with which the patient presented (regardless of the allowable maximum dose indicated in a general fashion in the PDR). It was an excessive volume for a patient of this size and weight and medical circumstance, including the circumstance that she gave every indication of being able to accomplish a routine vaginal delivery and thus clearly did not need such an excessive volume and concentration of this drug, given the attendant risks, delineated in the above Findings of Fact, which, indeed, came to pass. The Respondent additionally failed to keep any anesthetic record concerning his evaluation of the patient, a description of his anesthetic technique, nor any justification for his anesthetic plan. Unrefuted testimony from an expert anesthesiologist (Dr. Cross) establishes that an obstetrician who prescribes, dispenses, and administers the anesthetic during a surgical, obstetrical procedure is held to the same standard with regard to anesthetizing patients, caring for patients, and documenting the anesthesia portion of his practice with regard to a patient, as is an anesthesiologist. In Count VI, the Respondent is charged with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, concerning patient No. 3. As delineated in more detail in the above Findings of Fact, the Respondent failed to take an adequate history and to document the performance of an adequate physical examination of this patient. He failed to correctly assess the patient's laboratory results, to obtain appropriate diagnostic studies and failed to adequately assess, monitor, or treat the patient's pregnancy-induced hypertension, as elaborated in greater detail in the above Findings of Fact. He failed to obtain an adequate or complete history and failed to perform an adequate physical examination. He did not adequately assess or monitor the pregnancy-induced hypertension, failed to adequately treat that condition, failed to order appropriate diagnostic studies to accurately determine fetal status prior to initiating therapy to prolong the patient's pregnancy, failed to adequately assess the patient's laboratory test results, and when there was evidence that the baby was in distress, failed to deliver the pregnancy immediately. The above Findings of Fact show, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that the Respondent prescribed, dispensed, administered, mixed or otherwise prepared legend drugs inappropriately or in excessive or inappropriate quantities, not in the best interest of the patient, by prescribing aldomet for the patient. This may have decreased placental perfusion or blood flow. Prescribing lasix for the patient also can decrease placental blood flow and create electrolyte imbalances. It was also inappropriate to prescribe yutopar to prolong the high-risk pregnancy and to prescribe a corticosteriod cream for the patient as treatment for her condition (swelling), which the Respondent had never diagnosed nor assessed. This amounts to prescribing, dispensing, administering, etc. legend drugs not in the course of the Respondent's professional practice, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes. Concerning Count VIII of the complaint, clear and convincing evidence, supportive of the above Findings of Fact, established that the Respondent's written medical records do not justify the course of his treatment of patient No. 3, including, but not limited to, the patient's history, examination test results, and the failure to document any justification for the Respondent's failure to adequately assess, monitor and treat the PIH. They do not contain justification for the failure to order appropriate diagnostic studies to accurately determine fetal status prior to initiating therapy to prolong pregnancy; the failure to assess and diagnose the swelling and the failure to adequately treat the patient during the C-section. They contain inaccurate documentation to the effect that the patient had a "saddleblock" anesthesia, when other medical records reveal that it was an epidural anesthesia. The records do not document that the patient's laboratory test results were adequately assessed; and there is no documentation of either an initial assessment of the infant or his resuscitation efforts shortly after delivery. This recordkeeping deficit amounts to a violation of Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1981) (now Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes). Concerning Count IX of the complaint, for all of the reasons delineated in the above Findings of Fact with regard to patient No. 4, it has been demonstrated that the Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. This is shown by the failure to obtain an adequate or complete history, to perform an adequate physical examination on the various dates delineated above, to adequately assess, diagnose and treat the patient by failing to attempt a vaginal delivery, and the failure to obtain informed consent from the patient for sterilization prior to C-section. Additionally, the Respondent failed to adequately assess, diagnose and treat the lacerated cervix, and failed to adequately treat the patient during her postoperative recovery period. Thus, a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, has been established by clear and convincing evidence in these particulars. It has also been so demonstrated that by prescribing the antibiotic, garamycin, without ordering attendant renal function studies (because of the potential for kidney damage) and by changing the route of that medication to a less effective means (oral), even though the patient remained febrile, amounts to prescribing, dispensing, administering, etc. a legend drug, other than in the course of his professional practice and inappropriately, for purposes of Section 458.331(1) (q), Florida Statutes (Count X). Concerning Count XI, it was established, as shown by the above Findings of Fact, that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of patient No. 4. He failed to document a complete history of the patient and failed to make an adequate or complete physical examination. He recorded no justification for the failure to attempt to deliver the patient vaginally; to document any justification for continued use of the nasogastric tube after the patient began eating; to document any justification for not ordering renal function studies with the use of the above- named antibiotic and failed to document any justification for changing the route of administration of that antibiotic in a febrile patient. He recorded statements in the discharge summary which are directly contradicted by the Respondent's statements in the medical records; and failed to document any explanation for the contradictory statements contained in these records. This constitutes a violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes. Concerning Count XII of the complaint, the Petitioner has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, culminating in the above Findings of Fact, that the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, and negligence, in violation of Section 458.1201(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1977), now incorporated into Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1989). Unprofessional conduct shall include any departure from or the failure to conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice within a physician's area of expertise, as determined by the Board, in which proceeding actual injury to a patient need not be established when the same is committed in the course of a physician's practice. There is no question, given the above Findings of Fact, that the Respondent did not conform to standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice within his area of expertise in his conduct of the care and treatment of patient No. 5. Thus, he has committed a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, as well as the disciplinary guidelines and the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as provided for in Rule 21M-20, Florida Administrative Code, official recognition of which was taken; to wit, the exposure of the patient to injury or potential injury, the number of counts of separate offenses proven, and the disciplinary history of the licensee, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes, as concluded hereinabove, with regard to Case No. 90-2680, but, in consideration of the above-referenced circumstances, that no penalty be imposed. With regard to Case No. 89-6489, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating the above enumerated subsections of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, as concluded above, and that the Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 89-6489 and 90-2680 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Case No. 90-2680 1-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 7-8. Accepted. Rejected, as not in accordance with clear and convincing evidence. Accepted. 11-12. Accepted. 13. Rejected, as not in accordance with clear and convincing evidence. 14-20. Accepted. Case No. 89-6489 1-7. Accepted. 8. Rejected, as it was not established with clear and convincing evidence what the patient believed. 9-13. Accepted. 14. Rejected, as not entirely supported by the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. 15-28. Accepted. 29-69. Accepted. 70-83. Accepted. 84-95. Accepted. 96. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 97-103. Accepted. 104-120. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Case No. 89-6489 Accepted, except as to time period noted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence. Case No. 90-2680 Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Mary B. Radkins, Esq. Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Elliott F. Monroe, M.D. 2709 Arden Panama City, FL 32401
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), in DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL; Subsections 456.072(1)(l), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), in DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL; and Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), in DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relating to the three Administrative Complaints at issue, Dr. Kachinas was a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 65595. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4678PL In 2002, Dr. Kachinas was working at several clinics that were owned by the same individual. He received payment from Sarasota Women’s Health Center and Tampa Women’s Health Center. His primary office was located in Sarasota, but he rotated through the offices located in Clearwater and Tampa. He was advised that he would be attending a patient in the Tampa office. One of the medications that he used in his method of sedating patients, Propofol, was not available in the Tampa office. He took a vial of the Propofol and took it to the Tampa office, holding the vial in his hand. While at the Tampa office, Dr. Kachinas drew the Propofol into a syringe. He did not have to use the Propofol for the patient. He placed the syringe filled with Propofol inside the sock that he was wearing. Dr. Kachinas transported the syringe back to the Tampa office. He used this method of transport so that the office manager in the Tampa office would not know that he was transporting the drug. When he got back to the Tampa office, he placed the filled syringe in a secure place. Propofol must be used within 24 hours after being drawn into a syringe. The next day it was decided that the drug would not be used on another patient, and Dr. Kachinas wasted the syringe filled with Propofol. At the clinics where Dr. Kachinas worked, there were no logs to keep track of the drugs, except for the drug Fentanyl. Dr. Kachinas acknowledged in a letter dated January 30, 2007, to the Department of Health that his method of transporting Propofol was “unorthodox.” In the same letter, Dr. Kachinas acknowledged that “a reasonable and prudent doctor would not generally transport medication in that manner, but foolishness seemed reasonable in that aberrant environment.” DOAH CASE NO. 09-4679PL On March 26, 2004, B.S. presented to Premier Institute for Women’s Health (Premier) for an elective termination of pregnancy. Dr. Kachinas was the physician who handled the procedure. Dr. Kachinas maintained records relating to B.S. at Premier. In 2004, Petitioner subpoenaed B.S.’s records from Dr. Kachinas’ office. Petitioner received a packet of documents, which purported to be B.S.’s medical records. In July 2006, Lori Jacobs, an employee of Premier, sent Petitioner another copy of the documents sent in 2004. Neither the records provided in 2004 nor the records provided in 2006 contain progress notes for B.S.’s treatment on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. For the first time on November 5, 2009, Dr. Kachinas produced a three-page document, which he claimed was part of B.S.’s medical records that had been misplaced in B.S.’s insurance file. Two of the pages purported to be progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004. The third page, which is also labeled as a progress note, is dated June 29, 2004, and appears to relate to insurance claims. The two pages relating to March 26 and 27 are on paper which is a different color from the progress note relating to insurance claims and the progress notes which were previously furnished in 2004 and 2006.1 Additionally, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, contain a break in each of the ruled lines on the sheets on both the right and left sides of the sheets. The insurance progress note and the progress notes furnished in 2004 and 2006 do not have such breaks in the ruled lines. Dr. Kachinas completed a Laminaria Insertion report documenting procedures done on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. The March 26, 2004, report documents the insertion of Laminaria and administration of medications. The comment section of the report documents the removal of the Laminaria and administration of medications on March 27, 2004. The comment section continues to document the administration of medications and the taking of vital signs after the removal of the Laminaria and also the transfer of the patient to Doctors Hospital. The detail on the comment sections suggests that Dr. Kachinas was making his progress notes in the Laminaria Insertion report. The failure to produce the purported progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, until November 5, 2009; the difference in the color of the paper of the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress notes and the other progress notes in Dr. Kachinas’ records; the presence of breaks in the ruled lines on the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress reports, which do not appear on the other progress notes; and the detail of the comments on the Laminaria Insertion report support the conclusion that the progress notes submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 were not done contemporaneously with the treatment given to B.S. on March 26 and 27, 2004, but were prepared for this proceeding. Thus, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, are not credited. Dr. Kachinas determined B.S.’s pregnancy to be at approximately 23½-to-24 weeks’ gestation, the last week of the second trimester. He confirmed by sonogram that the gestation period was 24 weeks. On March 26, 2004, Dr. Kachinas began the induction of labor ordering the insertion of ten Laminaria, which are osomotic cervical dilators which cause the cervix to open and allow easier emptying of the uterus. Dr. Kachinas’ records do not show that B.S.’s medical history was taken prior to the insertion of the Laminaria. However, Dr. Kachinas did take a medical history of B.S. at the time of her admission to Doctors Hospital, and the history is recorded in the medical records. Prior to the insertion of the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas’ records do show that a limited physical examination of B.S. was done. The Laminaria Insertion report shows that B.S.’s baseline blood pressure, temperature, and pulse were taken and recorded. There was no expert testimony of what other physical examination should have been done. Dr. Kachinas injected the fetus with Digoxin, which is injected directly into the fetus to stop the fetal heartbeat, causing an Intrauterine Fetal Demise (IUFD). The injection of the Digoxin was not documented in B.S.’s medical records. B.S. was then released from Premier. On March 27, 2004, B.S. returned to Premier. Prior to removing the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas did an ultrasound and determined that there was still fetal heart activity and fetal movements. Dr. Kachinas continued the labor induction procedure by removing the Laminaria and administering Cytotec and high dosages of Pitocin. When the Laminaria were removed, there was a rupture of membranes with a loss of essentially all the amniotic fluid. Sometime during the afternoon of March 27, 2004, Dr. Kachinas did another ultrasound and determined that there was no fetal heart activity. Based on the length of time from the Digoxin injection to the ultrasound showing no fetal heart activity, the loss of amniotic fluid, and the administering of medication to cause contractions, Dr. Kachinas determined that the Digoxin injection was not the cause of death. On March 27, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dr. Kachinas transferred B.S. to Doctors Hospital and had her admitted to the hospital for failure to progress with the induction of labor procedure. While at the hospital, B.S. continued to experience pain. On March 28, 2004, Dr. Kachinas performed the following procedures on B.S.: mini-laparotomy, hysterotomy, removal of products of conception, and a modified Pomeroy bilateral tubal ligation. In his description of the procedures, he stated that the fetal demise was at least of 48 hours duration. However, Dr. Kachinas’ records do not reflect the time of the fetal demise. Jorge Gomez, M.D., Petitioner’s expert witness, credibly testified that a physician is required to document the time of the fetal demise. In the hospital records following B.S.’s surgery, Dr. Kachinas listed the post-operative diagnosis as a failure to induce labor, an intrauterine fetal demise, a thin umbilical cord, and asymmetric intrauterine growth retardation, a condition in which the fetus is smaller than expected for the number of weeks of pregnancy. An autopsy was performed on the fetus. A surgical pathology report was also issued. The pathology report showed mild infarcts on the maternal side. On the fetal death certificate, Dr. Kachinas listed the immediate causes for the IUFD as a possible cord incident and multiple placental infarctions. Dr. Kachinas did not document the elective termination or the Digoxin injection on the fetal death certificate. Dr. Gomez disagrees with the reasons for IUFD given on the death certificate. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that the infarcts were severe enough to have contributed to the fetal demise. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that there was any evidence of a cord incident. Dr. Gomez is of the opinion that the cause of death should have been listed as elective termination. Dr. Gomez’ opinion is credited. However, Dr. Gomez did not give an opinion on whether the fetal demise was caused by the injection of Digoxin. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4680PL On December 13, 2005, K.M. was seen by Walter J. Morales, M.D., at Florida Perinatal Associates, which specializes in internal fetal medicine. Dr. Morales performed an ultrasound on K.M., who was pregnant with twins as a result of in vitro fertilization. The ultrasound revealed that the twins were fraternal, meaning that each twin had a separate placenta and a separate sac. One of the twins, Twin A, had an anomaly called a cystic hygroma, which results from an obstruction, causing the lymphatic fluid, which normally drains into the juglar vein, to accumulate in the neck area. Approximately 50 percent of the fetuses which have this anomaly in the first trimester also have a chromosomal anomaly, such as Down syndrome. The decision was made to have K.M. return to Florida Perinatal Associates in three weeks for further evaluation. On January 3, 2006, Edgard Ramos-Santos, M.D., a partner of Dr. Morales, performed another ultrasound on K.M. Dr. Ramos-Santos found that Twin A, a male, had a cystic hydroma, a thickening of the nuchal fold2, and shortened femur and humerus. These findings are soft markers for abnormal chromosomes. The ultrasound also revealed a possible heart defect. At the time of the ultrasound, Twin A was cephalic bottom, meaning that Twin A was positioned lowest in the uterus. Dr. Ramos-Santos also performed an amniocentesis on Twin A on the same date as the ultrasound. The amniocentesis showed that Twin A had an abnormal chromosome pattern compatible with trisomy 21 or Down syndrome. Both ultrasounds showed that Twin B, a female, appeared to be normal. At the request of K.M., no amniocentesis was performed on Twin B on January 3, 2006. At the time of the ultrasound performed on January 3, 2006, the presentation of Twin B was cephalic right. The findings of the January 3, 2006, ultrasound were discussed with K.M. and her husband. On January 9, 2006, Dr. Ramos-Santos discussed the results of the amniocentesis with K.M.’s husband. It was decided that a selective feticide would be performed on Twin A. Selective feticide is a procedure in which a solution of potassium hydroxide is injected into the fetus’ heart to make the heart stop beating. K.M. was referred to Dr. Kachinas at Premier for the selective feticide. On January 10, 2006, Roberta Bruce, a nurse at Florida Perinatal Associates, sent to Premier by facsimile transmission the January 3, 2006, ultrasound report for K.M. and K.M.’s insurance information. The cover page for the facsimile transmission included a note from Ms. Bruce, which stated: “* FYI Fetus have different gender. The male is the affected one.” The standard of care as specified in Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2005), requires a physician performing a selective feticide to correctly identify the affected fetus. Dr. Kachinas did not correctly identify Twin A prior to performing the selective feticide and performed the procedure on Twin B, the normal fetus. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound on K.M., but failed to identify the correct position of Twin A in relation to K.M. The ultrasound done on January 3, 2006, by Dr. Ramos-Santos showed that Twin A was located at the bottom and Twin B was located to the right of K.M. In his progress notes, Dr. Kachinas placed Twin A on the right and Twin B on the left. Although it is possible for twins to shift positions, it is not probable that the twins shifted from left to right. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound, but failed to identify that Twin A was the fetus with multiple anomalies. Although the standard of care required Dr. Kachinas to do a Level 2 ultrasound evaluation, a Level 1 ultrasound evaluation would have identified the cystic hygroma, the shortened long bones, and the sex of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas failed to perform an adequate ultrasound evaluation by failing to identify the anomalies and the gender of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas’ notes do not show whether Twin A or Twin B had anomalies. His notes did not identify the sex of each of the twins. His notes did not document the attempts that Dr. Kachinas made to identify the anomalies such as a recording of the length of the long bones or any examination made to identify the sex of each of the twins. On January 24, 2006, K.M. returned to Florida Perinatal Associates for another consultation. Dr. Morales performed another ultrasound, which revealed that Twin A, who had the anomalies, was still viable. The ultrasound revealed the continued presence of a cystic hygroma, the thickening of the nuchal fold, shortened extremities, and a congenital heart defect. The ultrasound also showed that the viable twin was male. The presentation of Twin A was shown by the ultrasound as cephalic bottom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2002); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsections 456.072(1)(l) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003); imposing an administrative fine of $1,000; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), by committing gross medical malpractice; finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 and placing him on probation for one year for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); and revoking his license for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005). DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010.
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Respondent is charged with having violated the following statutory provisions: Sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.331(t), and 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, licensed as a physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0043763. The Respondent specializes in general medicine and is not board certified. On November 25, 1996, patient A. J., a 28-year-old female, presented to the Respondent for the purpose of having a physical examination performed by a physician. The patient A. J. sought the physical examination for the purpose of complying with requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). The patient A. J. brought with her an INS physical examination form. The form included instructions to the person to be examined, as well as instructions to the physician who would perform the examination. The instructions to the person to be examined included: "The doctor will examine you for certain physical and mental health conditions. You will have to take off your clothes." The instructions to the physician performing the examination included the following: Please medically examine for adjustment of status the individual presenting this form. The medical examination should be performed according to the U. S. Public Health Service "Guidelines for Medical Examination of Aliens in the United States" and Supplements, which have been provided to you separately. The Respondent was familiar with the INS guidelines for medical examination of aliens in the United States, because he had previously performed such examinations on numerous occasions, and he was a physician who had been approved by the INS to perform such examinations. At the time of the examination of the patient A. J., those guidelines were incorporated in a document titled Technical Instructions for Medical Examination of Aliens in the United States, dated June 1991. At page I-1, the technical instructions included the following in a description of the role of the civil surgeon: The civil surgeon is responsible for reporting the results of the medical examination and all required tests on the prescribed forms. The civil surgeon is not responsible for determining whether an alien is actually eligible for adjustment of status; that determination is made by the INS officer after reviewing all records, including the report of the medical examination. (Emphasis added.) At page II-2 the technical instructions included the following description of the required physical examination: d. a physical examination, including an evaluation of mental status, sufficient to permit a determination of the presence and the severity of Class A and Class B conditions. The physical examination is to include a mental status examination that includes, at a minimum, assessment of intelligence, thought, cognition (comprehension), judgment, affect (and mood), and behavior. a physical examination that includes, at a minimum, examination of the eyes, ears, nose and throat, extremities, heart, lungs, abdomen, lymph nodes, skin and external genitalia. all diagnostic tests required for the diagnosis of the diseases identified as communicable diseases of public health significance and other tests identified as necessary to confirm a suspected diagnosis of any other Class A or Class B condition. At all times material to this case, for purposes of INS physical examinations, Class A conditions were: Chancroid, Chronic alcoholism, Gonorrhea, Granuloma inguinale, Hansen's disease (infectious), HIV infection, Insanity, Lymphogranuloma venereum, Mental defect, Mental retardation, Narcotic drug addiction, Previous occurrence of one or more attacks of insanity, Psychopathic personality, Sexual deviation, Syphilis (infectious), and Tuberculosis (active). Class B conditions were: Hansen's disease (not infectious), Tuberculosis (not active), and "Other physical defect, disease or disability." At page II-2, the technical instructions clarified that: "The responsibility of the civil surgeon is only to conduct the examination and testing required to determine the alien's status regarding Class A and Class B conditions and to complete the medical report form. . . . If the alien needs further evaluation or treatment for conditions not relevant to the medical examination, the physician should advise the alien of this and should make recommendations for appropriate diagnostic evaluation and treatment." The patient A. J. had an appointment for 5:00 p.m. She had requested a late afternoon appointment to minimize the time she would miss from her work. When the patient A. J. arrived at the Respondent's office, the Respondent was the only other person present in the office. During the entire time that the patient A. J. was in the Respondent's office on November 25, 1996, the only people in the office were the patient A. J. and the Respondent. Upon her arrival, the Respondent took the patient A. J. to an office, where she filled out some paperwork, including her name, address, and telephone number. The Respondent inquired as to exactly where on her street her residence was located. The Respondent made repeated inquiries about the location of the patient's residence and even asked the patient to draw a map to her residence. The Respondent asked the Patient A. J. if he could stop by her house sometime. The patient A. J. said, "No." The Respondent also asked the patient A. J. if she was married and if her marriage was "real." After finishing the paper work, the Respondent took the patient A. J. into a laboratory room, where he drew blood for two of the tests, and also administered the agent for the skin test for tuberculosis. The Respondent then took the patient A. J. to an examination room, gave her a gown, and instructed her to remove her clothing. The patient A. J. inquired as to whether she should remove her underpants. The Respondent replied, "Only if you want me to do a pelvic." The patient A. J. thereupon told the Respondent that she was due for a PAP test and that she needed birth control pills. The Respondent told the patient A. J. that it would be a good idea for her to start using birth control pills, in case she wanted to do anything while her husband was not around, because the pills would be added protection against pregnancy. The patient A. J. told the Respondent that she did not sleep around, to which he replied, "You can never tell what will happen." During the entire time the patient A. J. was in the Respondent's office, there was music playing in the office. The physical examination included an examination of the patient's breasts. While examining the patient's breasts, the Respondent sang along with the music. The Respondent also commented to the patient A. J. that the singer on the background music, Luther Vandross, was the greatest love song singer of all time. Following the examination that was required by the INS, the Respondent performed an internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. This was an examination that involved the insertion of instrumentation and the insertion of the doctor's fingers into the vagina of the patient. The Respondent took an excessive amount of time in performing the internal pelvic examination. During the course of the internal pelvic examination, the Respondent told the patient A. J. that she had a heavy discharge. He then proceeded to ask her how often she became sexually aroused and how easily she became sexually aroused. During the course of the internal pelvic examination the patient A. J. became worried and asked the Respondent if the two of them were the only people in the office. The Respondent replied in the affirmative. The patient then began to feel afraid when it was confirmed that she was alone with the Respondent. Her fear arose from the fact that she was alone with a physician who had been making what she considered to be inappropriate comments and questions about her marriage, her affairs, and her sexual arousal. The internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. was not required by the INS. The Respondent would not have conducted an internal pelvic examination of A. J. if she had not requested that such an internal examination be performed. The specific reasons for which A. J. requested, and consented to, an internal pelvic examination was to have a PAP smear performed and to determine if she had any condition that would contra-indicate the use of birth control pills. The patient A. J. believed that a physician could not, or would not, prescribe birth control pills without first conducting a PAP smear and an internal pelvic examination. The patient was correct in this belief. Acceptable standards of medical practice mandate that a physician perform a PAP smear and conduct an internal pelvic examination prior to prescribing birth control pills to a patient. If the Respondent was not going to perform a PAP smear and was not going to prescribe birth control pills, there was no reason for him to perform an internal pelvic examination of the patient A. J. During the course of the internal pelvic examination, the Respondent did not do a PAP smear of the patient A. J. The Respondent also refused to prescribe birth control pills for the patient A. J. When the patient repeated her request for a prescription for birth control pills, the Respondent replied that he could not prescribe the birth control pills for "personal reasons." When the patient inquired as to what he meant by "personal reasons," the Respondent said that he did not want to establish a doctor/patient relationship with the Respondent "because you can never tell what the future might bring." The Respondent also said to the patient A. J. that "in the future we might get involved," and he went on to explain that if that were to be the case, he could get in trouble if he were to be her doctor. The Respondent also told the patient A. J. that she was "too charming" to be his patient, and mentioned again that he didn't want to prescribe the birth control pills for her "because he didn't know if in the future we might have an affair," and for that reason he did not want to get into a doctor/patient relationship with the patient A. J. During a discussion following the examination, the Respondent asked the patient A. J. to return the following Friday (the day after Thanksgiving) to obtain the results of her blood tests and to have her skin test read. The patient told the Respondent she had plans for the long weekend and asked if she could return on Wednesday. The Respondent agreed that she could return on Wednesday. He also inquired about her weekend plans. The patient A. J. told the Respondent that she was going on a fishing trip with a girlfriend. Thereupon the Respondent asked the patient if she would go fishing with him sometime. He went on to mention that someone had given him some new fishing equipment that he had never had a chance to use. When patient A. J. asked how much she owed for the examination, the Respondent replied, "the cost is usually $2,000.00, but for you it will only be $120.00." As the patient A. J. was exiting the Respondent's office, the Respondent followed her out to her car. The patient had not asked the Respondent to escort her to her car and his presence made her nervous because she did not know his purpose in following her out to the car. As a result of the Respondent's comments and conduct, the patient A. J., in her words, "felt violated." The patient felt that many of the Respondent's comments and questions were inappropriately personal. She also felt that the Respondent had taken advantage of her by conducting an internal pelvic examination for the purported purpose of performing a PAP smear and determining if there was any condition that contra-indicated her use of birth control pills, and then not performing a PAP smear and not prescribing birth control pills because of the Respondent's interest in the possibility that they might have a future affair. Two days later, on Wednesday, November 27, 1996, the patient A. J. returned to the Respondent's office for the purpose of obtaining the results of the blood tests and to have her skin test read. On this occasion the patient was not alone with the Respondent at any time and she had only minimal contact with him. The Respondent did notice that the patient seemed to have a hostile attitude. On Friday, November 28, 1996, the Respondent called the home telephone number of the patient A. J. The patient was home, but she did not answer the telephone. The Respondent left a message on the patient's answering machine to the effect that he was just calling to "touch base" and that he would call her again later. There was no medical purpose for the telephone call. The comments and questions the Respondent made to the patient A. J. regarding such matters as whether her marriage was real, commenting that she was charming, asking her to go fishing with him, suggesting the possibility of a future affair, requesting a map to her house, asking if he could come visit her, and asking about her sexual arousal, all constitute inappropriate and unacceptable conversation by a physician to a patient. Comments and questions of this nature may reasonably be interpreted by the patient as being sexual in nature. It is a departure from accepted standards of medical practice for a physician to perform an internal pelvic examination on a patient without also having a third person in the examination room. A reasonably prudent, similar physician acting under similar conditions and circumstances would not perform an internal pelvic examination on a patient without also having a third person in the examination room. It is a departure from accepted standards of medical practice for a physician to perform an unnecessary internal pelvic examination on a patient. A reasonably prudent, similar physician acting under similar conditions and circumstances would not perform an unnecessary internal pelvic examination on a patient.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent has violated Sections 458.331(1)(j) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts One and Two of the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing a penalty for those violations consisting of (a) a letter of reprimand, (b) an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00, (c) suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year, and (d) placement of the Respondent on probation for a period of one year immediately following the period of suspension, with probation terms to be established by the Board of Medicine. Further, during the period of suspension, the Respondent should be required to attend courses to be determined by the Board of Medicine covering the subject matters of the patient-physician relationship and medical ethics. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999.
