The Issue Whether the proposed amendment to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact In July 1996, the Governing Board of the Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), adopted Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code, which is called the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule. Rule 40E-7.611(1), Florida Administrative Code sets forth the purpose of the rule as follows: The rules under this Part establish policies and procedures designed to remedy documented disparities in District contracting and the present effects of past marketplace discrimination. The rules under this Part implement specific recommendations of the District's Minority Business Availability and Utilization Study ('Study') as developed by MGT of America, Inc., dated August, 1995 and made a part of the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program ('Program'). The rules under this Part shall apply to all competitive solicitations for commodities, construction, professional, and other contractual services, including change orders and amendments. The Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule became effective September 25, 1996. Prior to the effective date of the rule, the District had a minority and women business enterprise (M/WBE) program, but had no rules governing the program. Under the pre-rule policy governing the M/WBE program, the standards for determining eligibility for certification were less stringent than those adopted by rule in 1996. Beginning in October 1995, the District issued certification eligibility determinations for three-year periods. Prior to that time certifications were for a period of one year. The District maintains a database of firms which have been certified as M/WBE's and uses that database to generate lists of eligible firms for specific solicitations. The list for any particular solicitation is project-specific based on the opportunities for M/WBE participation afforded by the project. For example, if a contract calls for plumbing, but not electrical services, the list of eligible M/WBE firms would be limited to plumbing contractors. At the time that the Supplier Diversity & Outreach M/WBE Contracting Rule was adopted in July 1996, the District did not address in the rule how pre-rule certified M/WBE firms would be affected by the certification eligibility requirements in Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. Based on the District's database, there were approximately 370 to 380 firms which had been certified as M/WBE's prior to September 25, 1996, the effective date of Chapter 40E-7, Part VI, Florida Administrative Code. Some of the pre-rule certified firms are presently providing services to the District under existing contracts. On December 19, 1997, the District gave notice by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly of proposed amendments to Rule 40E-7.653, Florida Administrative Code. A Notice of Change was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 28, 1998. The proposed amendment to Rule 40E- 7.653, Florida Administrative Code, which is at issue states: For purposes of this rule, a firm shall be considered a District certified M/WBE only if the firm has applied for and been granted certification by the District after September 25, 1996. Firms certified prior to September 25, 1996, shall be counted toward the M/WBE goal attainment only if: the firm is either a prime contractor or subcontractor for a particular District contract executed prior to the effective date of this rule; or the firm is listed on the M/WBE vendor list for particular District solicitation issued prior to the effective date of this rule. In either case, the firm shall only be counted toward M/WBE goal attainment for that particular contract or solicitation. As part of the proposed rulemaking process, the District sent notice to all potentially affected firms recommending that the firms voluntarily apply for recertification prior to the effective date of the proposed rule. Carolyn Williams, the Director of the Office of Supplier Diversity and Outreach at the District, described the notification process as follows: We, when we initially entered into rule adoption, we sent a notice to all those interested and impacted firms and advised them that the District was undertaking this process and asked them to voluntarily submit their application for recertification, because at some point if the proposed rule was adopted, there would be an effective date and those firms then who had not come in to reapply for certification and did not fall within the exceptions under this proposed rule would no longer be considered certified by the District. The firms who fell within the two exceptions in the final rule language would be protected, and those firms who came back in to be recertified before the effective date of this rule would be protected, but anyone who did not would fall off the list. The rule initially had a May 1 effective date. We put a time, a series of dates in place to try to ensure that we notified all persons appropriately so they could get their certifications in, the application in. We had a March 30 deadline for all firms interested in recertifying prior to the effective date of the proposed rule, which was May 1. So again, if you didn't fall within the exceptions, the two exceptions, and you were certified prior to the rule, the original date of the rule, if you did not reapply by that May 1 date or we had not made a decision with regard to your status by that time, you would no longer be considered by the District. Gulf Construction, Inc. (Gulf), was sent notice but did not submit an application for recertification. During the final hearing, counsel for the District acknowledged that Gulf was a pre-rule certified M/WBE. (Transcript at 66 and 67).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1986, Radar Corporation, owned by Ronald Ross, bought the assets of United Water Consultants, Inc., and continued the business of selling water purifiers under the fictitious name, United Water Consultants. As part of the agreement to purchase the United Water Consultants' assets, Ross, who had no experience in the business, insisted that the seller arrange to have an experienced manager agree to stay on and work for Radar at least until either Ross was able to learn the business adequately or could hire another suitable manager. The seller recommended, and Radar hired as manager, a man named Robert Gillette, who had about 30 years experience in the business. One of the first orders of business for Radar and Gillette was to hire staff, including telephone solicitors, the heart of the business. Among-those Gillette hired were the petitioners--Leisha F. Fickes, Petitioner in Case No. 87-2605, hired in early June, 1986; Marian C. Norz, Petitioner in Case No. 86- 2606, hired in late May, 1986; and Eileen A. Warner, Petitioner in Case No. 86- 2607, hired approximately May 20, 1986. Fickes, Norz and Warner (like all other United Water Consultants personnel) signed agreements shortly after they began work stating that they were independent contractors. But the main purpose of those agreements, as Gillette explained to them, was to help justify Radar's failure to take federal income tax withholding and social security out of their pay checks. Functionally, the petitioners had the attributes of employees. They were under the close supervision, direction and control of Gillette in the day-to-day details of their work. They were paid a salary based on an hourly wage, plus commissions on telephone solicitations that resulted in sales. Soon after the petitioners began work, Gillette began making advances towards them. At first, Gillette was not too bold and some of his advances were innocent enough to be in public. He would do things like come up behind one of them and gently massage her shoulders and neck. This type touching was not entirely unwelcome, especially to someone who had been sitting in one place making telephone calls for some length of time. But very quickly, Gillette began to subject the petitioners to coarse and unwelcomed sexual advances in private. On one occasion, Gillette came in the room where Fickes was working and, after massaging her shoulders, began to try to kiss her neck. On another occasion, Gillette loaned Fickes $20 and implied she could pay him back with sexual favors. Later, he began to take opportunities to drop pens and similar articles down her blouse and offer to retrieve them himself. One day Gillette came up behind Warner after posting recent sales and began to rub her breasts, saying "see what I got for you?" Warner pushed him away, and he angrily stormed out of the office. On one Friday, Gillette offered Warner $20 for oral sex and asked her to think about it. On Monday, Gillette followed up his offer and, when Warner declined the offer, said he thought she probably did it for her husband for free. Later, to punish Warner for her refusal to give him sexual favors, Gillette began to give her customer lists for solicitation bearing the names of people who recently had declined to buy a water purifier, and Warner's commissions dropped. When Warner complained, Gillette hold her, "you do for me, and I'll do for you." When Norz asked Gillette for higher commissions, Gillette also told her that he would get her more money in return for sexual favors. He also told her, when she refused his requests that they go out socially together, that he did not know why she was married to an "old man." As Gillette's conduct worsened, all three of the petitioners separately went directly to Ross to complain. Ross said he would look into the allegations and "take care of it." In fact, Ross did nothing. Although most of Gillette's coarser sexual advances were made in private, Norz once observed Gillette rubbing Warner's shoulders as he closed the door of the room they were in, and Warner once observed Gillette drop an article down Fickes' blouse. As they talked with one another, the petitioners began to realize the extent of Gillette's conduct and decided to approach Ross together to see if they could be more persuasive. On July 11, 1986, the petitioners met Ross in the parking lot as he came in to work and demanded to speak to him. They reiterated the facts and demanded that Ross fire Gillette or move him out of the telephone room or they would quit. Ross asked them to come back after lunch. Meanwhile, Ross confronted Gillette for the first time, and Gillette denied the allegations. Gillette demanded a direct confrontation with the petitioners, thinking they would back down. At the meeting after lunch, the petitioners re-asserted their allegations, and Gillette angrily stormed out of the room, expressing an ultimatum that it looked like it would have to be him or them. Ross, whose business would be seriously adversely affected by the departure of Gillette, his manager, told the petitioners that he would have to discuss the situation with his "colleagues" and would get back with them. They told him that they were anxious to hear from him because they (especially Warner and Fickes) needed the work but that they would no longer work under Gillette. When the petitioners did not hear from Ross, Fickes telephoned him and was told that they all had been fired, allegedly because a customer list had turned up missing. (If true, the petitioners had nothing to do with it.) Later, Ross would maintain that the petitioners voluntarily quit on July 11, 1986. Fickes and Warner earned approximately $220 per week and Norz earned approximately $195 per week at United Water Consultants. Norz made no real effort to mitigate damages by seeking other employment after July 11, 1986. Warner and Fickes, both of whom were pregnant, were unable to find other employment before the birth of their babies in August and November, 1986, respectively. Warner took about six weeks off after childbirth and worked three different jobs from late October, 1986, through July, 1987, each of which paid her approximately $140 per week. Fickes did not return to work until March, 1987, when she began earning approximately $170 per week at a restaurant. /1 At least from the time Radar took over the United Water Consultants business through at least December, 1986, at least five employees worked for the business each and every week. Radar operates the United Water Consultants business out of an address located in Largo, a municipality in Pinellas County other than the City of Clearwater.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Community Relations Board of the City of Clearwater, acting as the Commission that administers Pinellas County Ordinance 84-10, codified under Chapter 17.5 of the Pinellas County Code, enter a final order: Holding the respondents, Radar Corporation and United Water Consultants, guilty of having violated Section 2-17.5-3, Pinellas County Code, by discriminating against the petitioners, Leisha F. Fickes, Marian C. Norz and Eileen A. Warner, in employment on the basis of sex; and Ordering the respondents, Radar Corporation and United Water Consultants, jointly and severally, to pay to Leisha F. Fickes $7,740 and to Eileen A. Warner $5,880 as actual damages RECOMMENDED this 6th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1987.
The Issue Whether a consumptive-use permit for the quantities of water applied for should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Applicant, by Application No. 7500025, applied for a consumptive-use permit for an average daily withdrawal of 138,000 gallons of water from one (1) well penetrating the Florida Acquifer. This is an existing use. Exhibits were entered without objection, as follows: Original application with attachments, marked "Exhibit 1". Proof of Publication, marked "Exhibit 2". There were no written objections. The witness for permittee, George Szell, Hydrologist, was questioned at length by the staff attorney on issues to be resolved under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder by the Southwest Florida Water Management District, and particularly Rule 16J-2.11, Conditions for a Consumptive-Use Permit. A typed transcript of the testimony has been examined and made a part of the record for this hearing. The witness for the Board, Mr. Szell, objected to the granting of the permit on the grounds that the water crop was exceeded by 3.24 percent. Upon request of the Hearing Officer, the parties agreed to consider their differences and file a joint stipulation enumerating conditions upon which the parties agree. A joint stipulation signed by both parties was filed with the Division is marked "Supplement to the Record" and made a part of this recommended order. Mr. Szell recommended that the permit be granted consistent with the conditions in six (6) above.
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 61G15- 21.009(1)(b) and (3) and 61G15-20.0015(3) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts submitted by the parties and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers ("Board") is the state agency responsible for the licensure and regulation of professional engineers in Florida. §§ 471.007, 471.008, 471.013, and 471.031, Fla. Stat. (2005).1 Mr. Hursh is an individual who applied for licensure by endorsement with the Board to be licensed as a professional engineer. Mr. Hursh is licensed in another state, so he applied for licensure by endorsement pursuant to Section 471.015(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Mr. Hursh failed to pass the required Principles and Practice Examination, provided by the National Council of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors ("NCEES") five times since October 1, 1992, in an effort to become licensed as an engineer in Florida. In April 2004, Mr. Hursh passed the NCEES examination in Delaware, met Delaware's other licensing criteria, and, on July 14, 2004, was issued a license to practice engineering by the State of Delaware. In August 2004, Mr. Hursh filed his application for licensure by endorsement with the State of Florida and subsequently provided all supporting documentation as requested by the Board, including a Verification of Licensure from the Delaware Association of Professional Engineers. Mr. Hursh did not provide a copy of the Delaware licensing requirements. On January 19, 2005, the Application Committee of the Board denied Mr. Hursh's application, citing as the reason "5 time failure - need 12 hrs. of courses prior to endorsement." Delaware's licensing criteria was never reviewed by the Board to determine if the Delaware licensing criteria was substantially the same as Florida's licensing criteria. On February 10, 2005, the Board filed a Notice of Denial of Mr. Hursh's application for licensure by endorsement, citing as the basis for the denial that Mr. Hursh had failed the examination five times and needed to meet the additional college credit requirements of Section 471.013, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15.21.007.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's revocation of Respondent's modified permit, authorizing a cross- fence on Petitioner's fee owned right-of-way, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District (District) is a public corporation in the State of Florida, existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a multi-purpose water management district. The District's principal office is West Palm Beach, Florida. In executing its multi-purpose, the District, as local sponsor for the US Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, acquired canal rights-of-way. The District's rights-of-way were acquired to enable the Corps of Engineers to construct the flood control project and to maintain the system after its construction. The District operates a proprietary-based right-of-way program to manage the various property interests of the canal rights-of-way. The purpose of the District's right-of-way program is, to the extent possible, to allow uses of the rights- of-way that do not conflict with the flood control project. The rights-of way are used by both public and private concerns, including adjacent property owners, governmental entities, and utility companies. Jesus G. Quevedo is a private individual. His address is 2615 North Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. The property at this address was vacant when Mr. Quevedo purchased it, and he has owned the property for approximately ten (10) years. The District has fee simple title to a strip of land on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, immediately west of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge (C-51 Right-of-Way). Mr. Quevedo's property is located at the side of and adjacent to the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is also located within the boundaries of Spillway Park as established in the agreement between the District and the City of Lake Worth. Generally described, Spillway Park includes the District's fee simple owned right-of-way on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, beginning at the west side of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge and continuing to the east side of the Dixie Highway bridge. Mr. Quevedo has no real property interest in the C-51 Right-of-Way. Prior to purchasing his property, Mr. Quevedo was aware that the District owned the C-51 Right-of-Way. Historically, portions of Spillway Park and the C-51 Right-of-Way, in particular, have been a unique and popular location for excellent snook fishing by the public. These areas continue to be considered as such. On February 11, 1993, Mr. Quevedo was issued SFWMD Permit No. 9801 (Permit), a right-of-way occupancy permit, by the District’s Governing Board. The Permit authorized him to make use of the District’s lands and works as follows: 20’ X 50’ BOAT DOCK WITH WALKWAY, BURIED WATER AND ELECTRICAL SERVICE, POP-UP SPRINKLERS, AND SODDING WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE OLIVE AVENUE/FEDERAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE. During the permit application process, but prior to the issuance of the Permit, Mr. Quevedo had discussed with the District's staff the erection of a cross-fence based on allegations of improper or criminal activities by members of the public. Subsequently, in November 1995, Mr. Quevedo again discussed with the District's staff erection of a cross-fence based on the same allegations but he also included a new allegation of public safety as to the C-51 seawall. Based on the concern for public safety, the District's staff recommended that Mr. Quevedo be granted a modification to the Permit for a cross-fence. On November 14, 1996, the District's Governing Board approved, as part of its consent agenda, and issued SFWMD Permit MOD No. 9801 (MOD Permit)3 authorizing the following: CHAIN LINK CROSS FENCE WITH 16’ VEHICULAR GATE ALONG THE WEST PROPERTY LINE WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED AT 2615 NORTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, provides in pertinent part on its face the following: The permittee, by acceptance of this permit, hereby agrees that he shall promptly comply with all orders of the District and shall alter, repair or remove his use solely at his expense in a timely fashion. . . . This permit is issued by the District as a license to use or occupy District works or lands. . . By acceptance of this permit, the permittee expressly acknowledges that the permittee bears all risk of loss as a result of revocation of this permit. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, contained standard limiting conditions, as provided in Rule 40E-6.381, Florida Administrative Code, and special conditions. The limiting conditions provide in pertinent part as follows: Permittee agrees to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this permit, including any representations made on the permit application and related documents. . . . This permit does not create any vested rights, and except for governmental entities and public or private utilities, is revocable at will upon reasonable prior written notice. Permittee bears all risk of loss as to monies expended in furtherance of the permitted use. Upon revocation, the permittee shall promptly modify, relocate or remove the permitted use. In the event of failure to so comply within the specified time, the District may remove the permitted use and permittee shall be responsible for all removal costs. This permit does not convey any property rights nor any rights or privileges other than those specified herein. . . . Having been granted the MOD Permit, Mr. Quevedo erected the cross-fence within and onto the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is located adjacent to Mr. Quevedo’s property, as indicated earlier, and continues westerly to the permitted cross-fence. The C-51 Right-of-Way is enclosed by the cross-fence, preventing access by the public, and is located easterly of the cross-fence. As the C-51 Right-of-Way is located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park, the cross- fence is also located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park. During the time that Mr. Quevedo has owned his home, including prior to and after erection of the cross-fence, he, his family members and/or guests have frequently fished from the C-51 seawall and used the C-51 Right-of-Way enclosed by the cross- fence. Prior to and after the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members have selectively controlled access by the public to the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall. Prior to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo chased members of the public off the C-51 Right-of-Way. Mr. Quevedo and members of his family also called law enforcement officers to remove members of the public who were located on the C-51 Right-of-Way, even if the members of the public were fishing from the C-51 seawall. After the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members continued to engage in this conduct of selective access. Subsequent to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo had a member of the public arrested for trespassing. The person allegedly jumped over or went around the cross-fence to fish from the C-51 seawall in the C-51 Right-of-Way. With the existence of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo has prevented the general public from using the C-51 Right-of-Way, including the C-51 seawall. As a result, he has acquired the exclusive, private use of the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall, which is publicly owned land, and has, almost doubled the size of his adjacent property without the obligations and expense of acquisition, assuming he could acquire the property through acquisition. The District's policy is that public land should be open to the public. Contrary to this policy, Mr. Quevedo's cross-fence precludes access to the District's right-of-way (C-51 Right-of-Way), including the seawall, for passive recreational use. Similar cross-fencing, although not within the boundaries of Spillway Park, have been erected behind residences on the northeast, northwest, and southeast sides of Federal Highway, along the District’s C-51 Canal bank. The cross-fencing prevents public use of the District’s C-51 Canal bank at these locations. The City of Lake Worth made improvements within the boundaries of Spillway Park; however, it made no improvements, and does not intend to make any improvements in the future, at the C-51 Right-of-Way where Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence is located or at the other private lots west of Mr. Quevedo's property. All of the improvements made at Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence at the C-51 Right-of-Way have been made by him even though the C-51 Right-of- Way is located within Spillway Park. The original public safety rationale for authorizing Mr. Quevedo to erect the cross-fence blocking public access was revisited by the District. Additional investigation by safety experts (Risk Management staff) revealed that no unreasonable danger existed by allowing public access to the C-51 seawall at the C-51 Right-of-Way. In the absence of the public safety basis for closure of the C-51 Right-of-Way, such closure was contrary to District policy. As a consequence, the District’s staff recommended to the District’s Governing Board that the MOD Permit, authorizing Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence, be revoked. After conducting two public meetings and receiving comments from Mr. Quevedo, members of the public, and the District’s staff as to the policy issue of pubic access to the C- 51 Right-of-Way, the District’s Governing Board determined that the C-51 Right-of-Way should be open to the public. Consequently, the Governing Board decided to revoke Mr. Quevedo's MOD Permit. Allegations of criminal activity within the general boundaries of Spillway Park and, specifically, in the C-51 Right- of-Way at the cross-fence area, were made by Mr. Quevedo as a basis to not revoke the MOD Permit and allow the cross-fence to remain. Such allegations have no bearing on the revocation of the MOD Permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking SFWMD Permit No. MOD 981 issued to Jesus G. Quevedo. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1999.
The Issue The ultimate legal and factual issue in this matter is whether Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc. (Permittees), have provided the Southwest Florida Water Management District (District) with reasonable assurances that the activities they propose to conduct pursuant to Management and Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017 (the Permit) meet the conditions for issuance of permits established in Rules 40D-4.301, 40D-4.302, and 40D- 40.302, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the issues of fact to be litigated are whether the Project will cause adverse water quality impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; whether the Project will cause adverse flooding of on-site or off-site property; whether the Project will cause impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and whether the Project will adversely affect the property of others.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., are corporations licensed to operate in the State of Florida. The District is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control water resources within its boundaries pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder as Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code. Driscoll resides at 35716 Welby Court, Zephyrhills, Florida 33541, Lot 14, within the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision (Subdivision). Driscoll requested this hearing to show the District that there is a drainage problem on Lots 13 and 14, and the adjacent Geiger property to the south, which should be fixed at this time and as part of the Project. Driscoll wants "Engle Homes to propose a new solution to fix the entire Welby Court Geiger property problem," i.e., from Lots 4 through 14, and not a piecemeal solution as proposed in the Permit modification. The Subdivision Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., developed the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision. Lots 15 through 25 run east to west and are north of Welby Court. Lots 15 and 16 are located north of the cul-de-sac, on the eastern portion of Welby Court. Lots 3 through 14 run west to east, south of Welby Court. Lots 13 and 14 are south of the cul-de-sac on the eastern portion of Welby Court and are across the street and the cul-de-sac from Lots 16 and 15, respectively. Residences exist on Lots 5, and 7 through 14. Driscoll owns Lot 14, a corner lot, which is the southeastern most lot of the Subdivision. Don Geiger (Geiger) owns the land (approximately five acres) south of the property lines of Subdivision Lots 5 through Geiger's northern driveway, essentially a dirt road, runs parallel to Lots 5 through 14. Subsequent to the original construction activity involving the Subdivision, the developer realized that there was an "existing depression" (referenced on Engle Exhibit number 1), south of Lots 7 and 8, and on Geiger's property. Geiger complained to the District about standing water in this area. This depression area is approximately 90 feet long and 30 feet wide which needed to be "drained off" according to Geiger. The depressed area on Geiger's property was most likely caused when Lots 7 through 14 were graded and sodded, which raised the "lots up a few inches" above Geiger's driveway/property. Water is trapped during a storm event between the back yards and the depressed area. As a result, the southern end of the back yards, particularly Lots 7 and 8, and the driveway remain constantly wet. The Project On January 16, 2001, Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., filed MSSW Permit Application No. 49005837.017 with the District, to address the problems with the rear lot grading and the adjacent property. The actual Project area for the permit modification1 includes the southern portions of Lots 4 through 9 and south of the property lot line including Geiger's property. See Finding of Fact 5. The modified permit does not address the drainage area including the back yards of Lot 13 and Driscoll's Lot 14, and the other portion of Geiger's property/driveway to the south. On April 5, 2001, the District issued MSSW Permit No. 49005837.017 to Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., under the provisions of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40D-40, Florida Administrative Code, for the modification of a surface water management system to serve the Project area. The proposed Project will involve the construction of a concrete inlet box with a safety grate, storm sewers, and grass swales. Specifically, the project is intended to solve the drainage problems associated with the "existing depression" south of the boundary line for Lots 7 and 8 on Geiger's property (although Lots 4 through 9 ("area 1") are included within the Project area), and the back yards of Lots 7 and 8. A catch basin is proposed to be located south and on the lot line between Lots 8 and 9, which is expected to drain off the water in the depression area to the modified surface water management system. The inlet box will be placed in the corner between Lots 8 and 9. The collected water in the inlet box will be routed underground through a series of 18-inch storm sewer pipe straight north through a drainage easement between Lots 8 and 9 to Welby Court. The underground pipe ties into an existing pipe in front of Lot 9 on the street, then runs east along the Welby Court right-of-way and then north between Lots 19 and 20, and eventually north into a large permitted retention pond, located to the north of the Subdivision which will handle the stormwater. Driscoll's Alleged Drainage Problem There is another distinct drainage area, i.e., "area 2," which includes Geiger's property and the southern portions of Lots 13 and 14, where water drains from south to north into a roadside ditch to Geiger Cemetery Road ("area 3"), which runs south to north and east of Lots 14 and 15. During a September 2001 tropical storm, there was standing water on Geiger's driveway, directly south of Lots 13 and 14, which was present for more than 3 days. This was referred to by Mr. Barrett as a "small drainage problem that could easily be corrected." On the other hand, Geiger says that there is standing water on his driveway, south of Lots 13 and 14, "all the time." This caused Geiger to move his driveway "50 or 60 feet" south. According to Geiger, the berm, which runs across Lots 10 through 14, should be lowered and the backyards reconfigured. But this would be quite disturbing to the neighbors. Therefore, Geiger recommends the placement of drains south of Lots 13 and 14, which would direct the water out to the ditch at Geiger Cemetery Road and away from Driscoll's Lot 14. The modified Permit is not intended to solve this problem, although Driscoll wants this problem fixed. It is not necessary to resolve Driscoll's issue regarding whether there is a drainage problem in and around Driscoll's lot. The two drainage areas 1 and 2 discussed herein are not connected, although they are close in proximity. The solution to the first problem has no impact on the second, and there is no cited statutory or rule requirement that both issues must be addressed in this Permit application. This is Driscoll's quandary. Compliance with Rules 40D-4.301 and 40D-4.302, Florida Administrative Code The Project will not impact wetlands or surface waters. The Project will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife, and listed species, including aquatic and wetland-dependent species, by wetlands or other surface waters and other water-related resources. The Project will not adversely impact the quality of receiving waters such that the water quality standards will be violated. The Project will not cause adverse secondary impacts to the water resources. The Project will not adversely impact the maintenance of surface or groundwater levels or surface water flows established pursuant to Section 373.042, Florida Statutes. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to a work of the District. The Project is capable, based on generally accepted engineering and scientific principles, of being effectively performed and of functioning as proposed. The Project will be conducted by an entity with financial, legal, and administrative capability of ensuring that the activity will be undertaken in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit, if issued. The Project will comply with any applicable special basin or geographic area criteria established pursuant to Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code, by the District. The Project will not adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare. The Project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The Project will not adversely affect navigation. The Project will not cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The Project will not adversely affect fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the Project. The Project will not adversely affect significant historical and archeological resources. The Project will not cause unacceptable cumulative impacts upon wetlands and other surface waters. The Project area is less than 100 acres. The Project does not require dredging or filling of wetlands, or construction of boat slips. The Project is not contrary to the public interest. The Project will not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands, and will not adversely affect or impact the property of others, including Driscoll's property, Lot 14. "Area 1," between Lots 4 and 9, is a separate drainage area, and the water from this area does not drain to Lot 14. Driscoll's property is not within the Project area, and the Project was not intended to resolve his alleged drainage problem. The Project will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities. Rather, the project is expected to improve the conveyance of water and drainage for "area 1" and the Project area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order issuing Management and Storage of Surface Water General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001.
Findings Of Fact On April 22, 1994, Respondent, Southwest Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), published proposed amendments to Rule 40D-4.051 in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, at page 2450. The portions which are the subject of this proceedings are as follows: * 40D-4.051 Exemptions <<(1) Exemptions are found in>> [[The following activities are exempt from permitting under this chapter: The activities specified in]] Sections 373.406, Florida Statutes. (2)-(7) No Change. * Note: In the above quotation, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. On May 13, 1994, Petitioner, Gerald A. Robbins, filed a Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. On May 20, 1994, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. In its rule challenge, Petitioner requests that 40D-4.051(1) be rewritten as follows: "Exemptions are as found in Sections 373.406 AND 403.927 Florida Statutes." On July 1, 1994, Respondent withdrew its proposed amendment to Subsection (1) of Rule 40D-4.051. The following Notice of Withdrawal appeared in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, No. 26: Southwest Florida Water Management District RULE TITLES: RULE NOS.: Exemptions 40D-4.051(1) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL Notice is hereby given that the above proposed rule amendment, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, on Page 2450, April 22, 1994, have (sic) been withdrawn. This is the sole subsection being withdrawn from rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes. The remainder of the proposed amendments to Section 40D-4.051, Florida Administrative Code remains subject to Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes. By Order dated June 28, 1994, the portion of Petitioner's rule challenge relating to Rule 40D-4.051(7) was dismissed. Petitioner appealed the Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Gerald A. Robbins v. Southwest Florida Water Management District, Case No. 94-1717. The court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review of Non-Final Administrative Action by Order dated October 10, 1994.
