The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner Cargor Partners VIII – Long Bar Pointe, LLLP (“Cargor”) is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Notice On February 17, 2017, the attorney for Cargor sent Joseph McClash a letter on law firm stationary. In the first paragraph of the letter it states, “Please allow this letter to serve as notice of Cargor’s intent to seek relief pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (the “Statute”) against you, individually as qualified representative, and the named Petitioner.” Cargor sent an email to McClash on February 28, 2017, reminding McClash that “the 57.105 deadline is March 10, 2017.” McClash referred to a motion for attorney’s fees that he received on or about March 13, 2017, but the motion was not shown to the Administrative Law Judge nor introduced into evidence. On April 5, 2017, the same day that McClash voluntarily dismissed the petition for hearing in DOAH Case No. 17-0655, Cargor filed with DOAH its motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105. Contested Claims The renewal of a FDOW is governed by section 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, which states in relevant part that the FDOW shall be renewed “as long as physical conditions on the property have not changed, other than changes which have been authorized by a permit pursuant to this part, so as to alter the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands.” If the boundaries of wetlands or other surface waters have been altered without a permit, the FDOW cannot be renewed and an application for a new FDOW is required. The SWFWMD reviewer explained in a letter requesting additional information from Cargor: Please be advised that letters of exemption do not qualify as permits issued under Part IV of chapter 373, F.S. and therefore if work has been done on the site that has altered the wetlands or other surface water boundaries in association with a letter of exemption, a new formal determination application will be required. McClash claims Cargor did not qualify for the renewal of its FDOW because Cargor altered the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands on its property after the 2011 FDOW was issued and the some of the alterations were made pursuant to letter of exemption. In its February 17, 2017, letter to McClash, Cargor set forth six grounds for Cargor’s contention that McClash’s petition for hearing should be withdrawn. The first three grounds were described in Cargor’s letter as follows: The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, which is the subject of this Proceeding, does not authorize any construction activity. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. There is no injury in fact and no one is in immediate danger of a direct injury from the issuance of the Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, as of the date and time of filing the Petition in this Proceeding. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, is not a permit, license, or authorization. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented by an association. These were issues of law and they were decided against Cargor in an Order dated February 28, 2017. The fourth and fifth grounds described in Cargor’s letter involve the central issue in the case: Changes in the land have been previously authorized by the Southwest Florida Water Management District (“SWFWMD”) pursuant to existing and final permits including (i) SWFWMD ERP No. 43040157.001, dated August 6, 2014, (ii) SWFWMD CONCEPTUAL ERP No. 49040157.002, dated September 4, 2015, (iii) SWFWMD ERP No. 4304157.003, dated March 31, 2016, and (iv) SWFWMD Notice of Qualification for Permanent Farming Exemption, dated August 30, 2016. Changes in the land are authorized by the identified permits and authorizations. All changes in the land have occurred pursuant to the identified permits and authorizations. Allegations to the contrary are simply false and are not supported by material facts. In 2015, Cargor was issued a “Conceptual ERP” permit, which describes, among other things, planned modifications to some agricultural ditches. However, the conceptual permit does not allow the commencement of construction activities. On August 30, 2016, SWFWMD issued to Cargo a Permanent Farming Exemption, pursuant to section 373.406(13), which authorized Cargor to excavate three agricultural ponds in uplands. In its application for the exemption, Cargor also proposed to modify some agricultural ditches. On March 31, 2017, SWFWMD issued Cargor an ERP Individual Construction Major Modification, which, among other things, authorized work in ditches. This permit was issued just before McClash’s voluntary dismissal and, therefore, could not have authorized the changes on Cargor’s property that McClash described in the petition for hearing. Before filing his petition, McClash consulted with a wetland scientist, Clark Hull, about the merits of McClash’s proposed challenge to the FDOW renewal. Hull gave McClash an affirmative response, but his input was speculative because it was based on assumptions and representations that Hull had not investigated. McClash consulted with another wetland scientist, Pamela Fetterman, who conducted an “aerial, desktop review of publically available Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data.” Fetterman described her initial review as an evaluation of potential undelineated wetlands and other surface waters. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the delineation approved by the 2011 FDOW became final and could not be challenged by McClash. McClash then asked Fetterman to review changes in physical conditions on the property that occurred after the FDOW was issued. Fetterman produced a report (McClash Exhibit R-6), in which she opined that the changes to physical conditions on Cargor’s property “have a high likelihood of affecting the previously delineated landward extent of wetlands and other surface waters.” She stated further: [C]hanges in physical conditions of the property took place prior to issuance of the [FDOW renewal] as purported “exempt agricultural activities”, and include ditch dredging alterations to delineated other surface waters. . . . A Permanent Farming Request for Exemption Confirmation letter was applied for on August 23, 2016 for construction of these ponds and modification of existing ditches, some of which were determined to be jurisdictional other surface waters by the subsequently re-issued [FDOW]. At the final hearing on fees, neither McClash nor Cargor made clear to the Administrative Law Judge: (1) the physical changes to the property that were alleged to be authorized by permit, (2) the physical changes that were alleged to be authorized by exemption, or (3) any physical changes that were alleged to be unauthorized. The sixth ground described in Cargor’s letter is as follows: The picture attached to the Petition as set forth in Paragraph 9, and the stop work allegation set forth in Paragraph 10 are irrelevant and have no factual relationship to any issue in the proceeding. Since any changes in the land have occurred pursuant to identified permits and authorizations, the allegations are simply false and/or intentionally misleading. It is not a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 that an irrelevant photograph was included in a petition for hearing. Moreover, the aerial photograph in McClash’s petition was relevant in this case because it showed the physical conditions of Cargor’s property. In the petition, McClash states that Manatee County issued a stop work order on November 16, 2016, for construction activities commenced on Cargor’s property without a County- approved erosion control plan. This allegation also pertained to physical changes to the property. All evidence about physical changes was relevant in determining whether Cargor was entitled to renewal of the FDOW. Fees Cargor claims fees based on 48.4 hours of attorney time (Edward Vogler) at an hourly rate of $410, and 3.6 hours of attorney time (Kimberly Ashton) at an hourly rate of $385, for a total of $21,230.00. The fees Cargor is seeking include the hours spent on legal issues raised by Cargor that were rejected by the Administrative Law Judge. These fees amount to at least $1,025. See Cargor Exhibit 1, Invoice entries for February 20, 2017. Cargor’s attorney testified that the fees are reasonable. Cargor did not call an expert witness to corroborate the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the reasonableness of the hours expended.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Stipulation of counsel, the exhibits, and the pleadings filed herein, the following findings of fact are made: On December 11, 1998, Ms. Morro, who is the wife of Michael J. Morro, the developer of the property, filed her application with the District for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP), which would authorize the construction of a surface water management system (including one wet-detention pond) to serve a 12-lot, single-family residential subdivision known as Tranquility on Lake Brantley in Seminole County, Florida. In more specific geographic terms, the project is located on the south side of Wekiva Springs Road, on Cutler Road, and on the north side of Lake Brantley near the City of Longwood. The application was assigned number 40-117-0567A-ERP. The exhibits filed herein suggest that Ms. Morro, and not Mr. Morro, owns the subject property. After determining that the Applicant provided reasonable assurance that the proposed activities met the conditions for issuance of a permit and the system was consistent with its review criteria, on July 14, 1999, the District approved the application and issued Permit Number 40- 117-51722-1 (1999 Permit). However, the Permit did not authorize the construction of a retaining wall on Lot 10 of the Applicant's property. There is no record of any third party challenging the issuance of the 1999 Permit. On February 19, 2002, the Applicant submitted "as built drawings" to the District, as required by Condition 10 of the 1999 Permit, to enable the District to verify that the work was completed in compliance with the approved plans and specifications. These as-built drawings did not reflect a retaining wall on Lot 10. Mr. Adley resides and owns property at 880 Lake Brantley Drive, Longwood, Florida, which is "next to" the Morro property. It is fair to say that a less-than-harmonious relationship exists between the two neighbors. Indeed, the exhibits reflect that Mr. Adley, the Applicant, and the Applicant's surveyor "have been involved in several causes of action between them over details of development on this property," and that over the years Mr. Adley has filed numerous complaints with the District regarding alleged violations by the Applicant while she performed work under the 1999 Permit. Mr. Adley is familiar with ERPs and the process for obtaining one, having had ownership interests in businesses that have obtained ERPs from the District, and having participated in the activity undertaken to obtain the permits and then implement the activities authorized by the permits. On May 16, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a letter to Kirby A. Green, III, Executive Director of the District, citing seven issues regarding Ms. Morro's proposed subdivision and asking that he be notified, in writing, "of any modifications to the permit, request for modifications of the permit, notice of violations, change to the approved plan, changes to the Covenants and Articles of Incorporation, any other changes to the proposed construction activities and any public notices that would effect [sic] [his] right to file for an administrative hearing." Mr. Adley also indicated that he had scheduled a meeting with William E. Carlie, Jr., District Compliance Manager, to be held on May 19, 2003, "to discuss these issues with him in person." On May 29, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a letter to Duane Ottenstroer, then Chairman of the District's Governing Board, regarding "the subdivision being constructed next to [his] home." In his letter, he voiced concerns about the recorded conservation easement on the Morro property being significantly different from the easement approved by the 1999 Permit. He also complained that the Applicant had submitted false information with an application submitted to the District in 1991. Finally, he enclosed a copy of the letter previously sent to Mr. Green. On June 6, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a second letter to Mr. Carlie advising that the Applicant was violating the conditions in the 1999 Permit in five respects. The letter confirmed that Mr. Adley would again meet with District staff concerning this matter on June 11, 2003. After conducting an investigation regarding Mr. Adley's allegations of violations by the Applicant, on September 12, 2003, K. Wilford Causseaux, an engineer in the Department of Water Resources, sent a letter to the Applicant's surveyor, Michael W. Solitro (who Mr. Adley says is the former Seminole County Surveyor who loaned the Applicant money in April 1998 to develop the land and then purchased a discounted lot from the Applicant in return for "development services"), affirming the staff's finding that the "construction on [Morro's] residential property on Brantley Drive has encroached on the 100-year flood plain in the rear yard of Lot 11." Also, the letter identified the remedial steps that must be undertaken to correct three "issues associated with [the] residential construction." Finally, the letter noted that Mr. Morro had agreed to remove fill on Lot 7 that violated the "limits of construction" and return the rear-lot grading to its pre-development condition. On September 29, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a third letter to Mr. Carlie confirming that the District had not allowed the Applicant to construct a retaining wall in lieu of a swale on Lot 11 and that if the Applicant wished to construct a wall, she must apply for a modification to the 1999 Permit. The letter also noted that Mr. Carlie agreed to notify Mr. Adley "in writing of any modification to the permit," including "minor" modifications. Finally, Mr. Adley requested the status of the incorrect conservation easement recorded on the property. Apparently in response to that letter, by email dated October 10, 2003, Mr. Carlie notified District counsel that Mr. Adley "has submitted a written request for actual notice of any proposed modification of this permit, will likely object, and potentially will challenge any agency action in this regard to a 120 hearing." On October 24, 2003, Mr. Carlie responded to Mr. Adley's letter of September 29, 2005, and advised him that the staff had determined that "portions of the fill placed for development of [Lot 11] are waterward of the limits of construction" and that this action "is a violation of the permit subject to enforcement action." The letter confirmed that the District understood Mr. Adley's "request to be noticed of any modifications of the reference permit" and promised that "actual notice (mailed notice to your residence) of any action this agency undertakes in this regard" would be given. Mr. Carlie further explained that some modifications to a permit could be issued by letter, while other modifications required an application, fee, and formal agency action. He indicated that the remedial steps outlined in his letter dated September 12, 2003, to Mr. Solitro "may qualify for a permit modification by letter under the provisions of section 40C-4.331 F.A.C." Finally, Mr. Carlie stated that the "District continues to understand your concern about this project and request to be noticed of any modifications of the reference permit. You will be provided actual notice (mailed notice to your residence) of any action this agency undertakes in this regard." Also on October 23, 2003, Mr. Carlie sent a second letter to Mr. Adley outlining in detail the results of the District's investigation of Mr. Adley's concerns expressed in various letters and at least two meetings with staff. On May 3, 2004, Frank J. Meeker, the District's Ombudsman, sent Mr. Adley a letter regarding a Verified Complaint dated April 1, 2004, that Mr. Adley had filed with the Executive Director. (The Verified Complaint was not included in the exhibits which accompanied the Stipulation, but a copy is attached to the Motion.) The letter responded to "six specific objections" Mr. Adley had raised concerning work on the Morro property. It also instructed the District staff to prepare, within thirty days, a letter of modification to the 1999 Permit which addressed the conservation easement, monuments, and 100- year flood elevation issues, together with a recommendation for approval or denial, and to submit the modified conservation easement to the Executive Director for approval or denial. Finally, the letter noted that Mr. Adley would receive "written notice of these actions" and an opportunity to object to these modifications. The record is unclear whether Mr. Meeker's instructions to staff resulted in a letter of modification to the 1999 Permit without further action by the Applicant, or whether it triggered an application by the Applicant to modify her 1999 Permit based upon the staff recommendations. More than likely, the latter occurred. On May 26, 2004, Mr. Meeker provided a follow-up letter to Mr. Adley in which he confirmed that Mr. Adley had been given a copy of the project plans dated June 17, 1999, used by Ms. Morro in securing the 1999 Permit. He further advised that until he received a staff survey "to determine the size of the dock [for purposes of determining if a permit was required] and the location of the red wall and retaining wall," no disposition of those issues could be made. Finally, he advised that no formal request for modification of the 1999 Permit had been filed, but if and when one was filed, he was "directing staff to supply you with a copy of such application." On July 6, 2004, Ms. Morro filed an application with the District seeking to modify her 1999 Permit. (The application noted that Mr. Morro would serve as Ms. Morro's authorized agent to secure the permit.) In the application, Ms. Morrow described the proposed activity as follows: "Alteration of permitted conservation easement[,] to remove easement from lot 11[,] and provide reserved rights for construction of 2 single family docks." This application was assigned number 10-117-51722-2. As noted above, the application did not include a provision for a retaining wall on Lot 10. However, sometime between the time the application was filed in July 2004 and January 21, 2005, the Applicant amended her application to add a request for a retaining wall. By email dated July 12, 2004, counsel for the District notified the reviewer of the application, Anthony Miller, that "I told Mr. Adley to call PDS [Permit Data Services]. Who should I contact there to see what notice was sent? Mr. Adley is going to challenge this so we need to make sure everything is done right." Mr. Miller emailed back the following response: "I have no idea. I assume it was noticed as usual through PDS to those listed to receive notices. Should we do anything more, like contacting Mr. Adley directly?" By letter dated July 15, 2004, Mr. Carlie forwarded a "complete copy" of Ms. Morro's application to Mr. Adley. The letter noted that Mr. Adley's receipt of the letter, attached materials, and notice of rights "shall serve [as] the notice you requested for the purposes of timeframes under Chapter 120, F.S." (A copy of Notice of Rights was enclosed; it set out in detail the process by which Mr. Adley could request a formal hearing.) The enclosed construction drawings did not indicate the inclusion of a retaining wall. During the staff's review process of the application, two Requests for Additional Information (RAI) were sent by the District to Mr. Morro on August 3, 2004, and January 21, 2005. Significantly, item 4 on page 2 of the RAI dated January 21, 2005, noted that "[t]he plans indicate that a retaining wall is proposed. Please provide detailed calculations, and a revised wall detail as necessary, to demonstrate that this portion of the surface water management system will function as intended." (Emphasis added) Copies of both RAIs were sent to Mr. Adley. On February 28, 2005, the Applicant filed a letter and attachments in response to the January 21, 2005 RAI, which included, among other things, plans and details prepared by a professional engineer for a retaining wall to be located landward of the 100-year floodplain, the limit of construction. The Stipulation and exhibits do not indicate whether these documents were ever provided to Mr. Adley at that time.1 However, on March 9, 2005, they were provided to his counsel for review. See Finding of Fact 21, infra. By letter dated January 21, 2005, Mr. Adley's former counsel (Timothy A. Smith, Esquire) made a public records request for inspection of "the district files relating to permit numbers 40-117-51722, 40-117-0567, and any other district permits or applications for such permits relating to the property owned by Frances and Michael Morro on Brantley Drive along the northern shore of Lake Brantley." (The letter indicates that Mr. Smith would meet District counsel in Palatka on January 25, 2005, to review this part of the records request.) The letter also requested that Mr. Smith be allowed to review all files of eleven District employees which related to the various iterations of the Morro project in 1990-1991, 1997-1998, and 1999 to present. The records pertaining to the second part of the request were apparently located in another office and were to be inspected at a later time. According to the Stipulation, in response to the public records request, on March 9, 2005, Mr. Smith reviewed all requested files in the District's main office in Palatka and the District's field office in Altamonte Springs. (As noted above, part of the records were inspected on January 25, 2005, in Palatka.) It is fair to infer that on March 9, 2005, Mr. Smith would have had the opportunity to review the Applicant's plans and details for a retaining wall filed with the District on February 28, 2005. By this time, then, Mr. Adley should have been on notice that the Applicant had modified her application and now sought to build a retaining wall. On March 30, 2005, the District, through its Altamonte Springs field office, approved Ms. Morro's application and issued Permit No. 40-117-51722-2 (2005 Permit). The 2005 Permit authorized the modification of the 1999 Permit "to include the construction of a retaining wall along the rear of Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and the 'lot split' lot, and to amend the easement on Lots 9 and 10, to allow selective clearing and trimming of the conservation easement in accordance with a District approved landscape plan, and to exclude lands no longer under the applicant's control." On April 10, 2005, notice of the issuance of the 2005 Permit was published by Ms. Morro in the Sanford Herald, a newspaper of general circulation in Seminole County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40C-1.1007(1). The Notice provided that "[p]etitions for administrative hearing on the above application must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of publication of this notice or within twenty-eight (28) days of the District depositing notice of this intent in the mail for those person to whom the District made actual notice. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right(s) such person(s) may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. concerning the subject permit." Therefore, if notice was received by publication, petitions objecting to the issuance of a permit were due no later than May 1, 2005, or if written notice was given, petitions were due no later than May 8, 2005. The District did not send Mr. Adley written notice of its intent to issue the 2005 Permit. There is no indication in the Stipulation, exhibits, or Motion as to why notice was not sent, particularly since Mr. Adley had made numerous requests for written notice of any District action on the property, and he had been promised such notices by various District personnel since at least October 2003. On April 25, 2005, Ms. Morro began construction of the retaining wall authorized by the 2005 Permit and construction continued over the next thirty calendar days. It is fair to assume that the wall was completed on or about May 25, 2005. Also on April 25, 2005, or the day construction began, at Mr. Adley's direction, Mr. Smith (his former counsel) telephoned Mr. Carlie to inform him that construction activity on Lot 10 was taking place. Therefore, it is clear that on that date, Mr. Adley had observed that construction on the Morro property had begun. In response to Mr. Smith's telephone call, Mr. Carlie then requested that two District employees, Mr. Casseaux and David Eunice, investigate what was occurring on the Morro property. On the same date that Mr. Smith telephoned Mr. Carlie, Casseaux and Eunice inspected the Morro property and observed that a retaining wall authorized by the 2005 Permit was under construction. It is fair to infer from the stipulated facts that Mr. Carlie reported these findings to Mr. Smith within a short period of time. On an undisclosed date, but presumably within a day or so, Mr. Smith reported to Mr. Adley that he had spoken with Mr. Carlie and was told the construction was in conformance with "the Permit" but that Mr. Carlie did not specifically refer to either the 1999 Permit or the 2005 Permit as authorizing the work. The Stipulation and exhibits do not indicate whether Mr. Carlie advised counsel that the 2005 Permit had been approved. However, given the history of this dispute, it would be highly unusual for counsel not to make inquiry about the disposition of the application, or for Mr. Carlie not to provide this information during the course of their telephone conversations, particularly since Mr. Carlie was well aware of Mr. Adley's long-standing interest in the Morro project. Mr. Adley could not tell from his view of the property whether the exact location of the construction was lakeward of the limits of construction, which was the 100-year floodplain, and therefore could only rely on the District staff. Mr. Adley asserts that he did not learn of the 2005 Permit modification until July 25, 2005, through a conversation with an unidentified neighbor. Whether Mr. Adley (or his counsel) then called the District to verify the accuracy of the neighbor's information is not of record. (The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing simply alleges that "petitioner received notice of the District's action on July 25, 2005, through a conversation with a neighbor.") On August 15, 2005, or twenty-one days later, through counsel, Mr. Adley filed his initial Petition for Administrative Hearing with the District challenging the issuance of the 2005 Permit. (The Amended Petition was later filed on October 12, 2005, as a result of the striking of certain allegations in the first filing.) The District's Motion was then filed on November 16, 2005. (Action on the Motion has been delayed because of substitution of Petitioner's counsel, and delays by the parties in taking discovery and preparing the Stipulation.)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's revocation of Respondent's modified permit, authorizing a cross- fence on Petitioner's fee owned right-of-way, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District (District) is a public corporation in the State of Florida, existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a multi-purpose water management district. The District's principal office is West Palm Beach, Florida. In executing its multi-purpose, the District, as local sponsor for the US Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, acquired canal rights-of-way. The District's rights-of-way were acquired to enable the Corps of Engineers to construct the flood control project and to maintain the system after its construction. The District operates a proprietary-based right-of-way program to manage the various property interests of the canal rights-of-way. The purpose of the District's right-of-way program is, to the extent possible, to allow uses of the rights- of-way that do not conflict with the flood control project. The rights-of way are used by both public and private concerns, including adjacent property owners, governmental entities, and utility companies. Jesus G. Quevedo is a private individual. His address is 2615 North Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. The property at this address was vacant when Mr. Quevedo purchased it, and he has owned the property for approximately ten (10) years. The District has fee simple title to a strip of land on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, immediately west of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge (C-51 Right-of-Way). Mr. Quevedo's property is located at the side of and adjacent to the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is also located within the boundaries of Spillway Park as established in the agreement between the District and the City of Lake Worth. Generally described, Spillway Park includes the District's fee simple owned right-of-way on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, beginning at the west side of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge and continuing to the east side of the Dixie Highway bridge. Mr. Quevedo has no real property interest in the C-51 Right-of-Way. Prior to purchasing his property, Mr. Quevedo was aware that the District owned the C-51 Right-of-Way. Historically, portions of Spillway Park and the C-51 Right-of-Way, in particular, have been a unique and popular location for excellent snook fishing by the public. These areas continue to be considered as such. On February 11, 1993, Mr. Quevedo was issued SFWMD Permit No. 9801 (Permit), a right-of-way occupancy permit, by the District’s Governing Board. The Permit authorized him to make use of the District’s lands and works as follows: 20’ X 50’ BOAT DOCK WITH WALKWAY, BURIED WATER AND ELECTRICAL SERVICE, POP-UP SPRINKLERS, AND SODDING WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE OLIVE AVENUE/FEDERAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE. During the permit application process, but prior to the issuance of the Permit, Mr. Quevedo had discussed with the District's staff the erection of a cross-fence based on allegations of improper or criminal activities by members of the public. Subsequently, in November 1995, Mr. Quevedo again discussed with the District's staff erection of a cross-fence based on the same allegations but he also included a new allegation of public safety as to the C-51 seawall. Based on the concern for public safety, the District's staff recommended that Mr. Quevedo be granted a modification to the Permit for a cross-fence. On November 14, 1996, the District's Governing Board approved, as part of its consent agenda, and issued SFWMD Permit MOD No. 9801 (MOD Permit)3 authorizing the following: CHAIN LINK CROSS FENCE WITH 16’ VEHICULAR GATE ALONG THE WEST PROPERTY LINE WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED AT 2615 NORTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, provides in pertinent part on its face the following: The permittee, by acceptance of this permit, hereby agrees that he shall promptly comply with all orders of the District and shall alter, repair or remove his use solely at his expense in a timely fashion. . . . This permit is issued by the District as a license to use or occupy District works or lands. . . By acceptance of this permit, the permittee expressly acknowledges that the permittee bears all risk of loss as a result of revocation of this permit. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, contained standard limiting conditions, as provided in Rule 40E-6.381, Florida Administrative Code, and special conditions. The limiting conditions provide in pertinent part as follows: Permittee agrees to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this permit, including any representations made on the permit application and related documents. . . . This permit does not create any vested rights, and except for governmental entities and public or private utilities, is revocable at will upon reasonable prior written notice. Permittee bears all risk of loss as to monies expended in furtherance of the permitted use. Upon revocation, the permittee shall promptly modify, relocate or remove the permitted use. In the event of failure to so comply within the specified time, the District may remove the permitted use and permittee shall be responsible for all removal costs. This permit does not convey any property rights nor any rights or privileges other than those specified herein. . . . Having been granted the MOD Permit, Mr. Quevedo erected the cross-fence within and onto the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is located adjacent to Mr. Quevedo’s property, as indicated earlier, and continues westerly to the permitted cross-fence. The C-51 Right-of-Way is enclosed by the cross-fence, preventing access by the public, and is located easterly of the cross-fence. As the C-51 Right-of-Way is located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park, the cross- fence is also located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park. During the time that Mr. Quevedo has owned his home, including prior to and after erection of the cross-fence, he, his family members and/or guests have frequently fished from the C-51 seawall and used the C-51 Right-of-Way enclosed by the cross- fence. Prior to and after the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members have selectively controlled access by the public to the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall. Prior to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo chased members of the public off the C-51 Right-of-Way. Mr. Quevedo and members of his family also called law enforcement officers to remove members of the public who were located on the C-51 Right-of-Way, even if the members of the public were fishing from the C-51 seawall. After the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members continued to engage in this conduct of selective access. Subsequent to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo had a member of the public arrested for trespassing. The person allegedly jumped over or went around the cross-fence to fish from the C-51 seawall in the C-51 Right-of-Way. With the existence of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo has prevented the general public from using the C-51 Right-of-Way, including the C-51 seawall. As a result, he has acquired the exclusive, private use of the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall, which is publicly owned land, and has, almost doubled the size of his adjacent property without the obligations and expense of acquisition, assuming he could acquire the property through acquisition. The District's policy is that public land should be open to the public. Contrary to this policy, Mr. Quevedo's cross-fence precludes access to the District's right-of-way (C-51 Right-of-Way), including the seawall, for passive recreational use. Similar cross-fencing, although not within the boundaries of Spillway Park, have been erected behind residences on the northeast, northwest, and southeast sides of Federal Highway, along the District’s C-51 Canal bank. The cross-fencing prevents public use of the District’s C-51 Canal bank at these locations. The City of Lake Worth made improvements within the boundaries of Spillway Park; however, it made no improvements, and does not intend to make any improvements in the future, at the C-51 Right-of-Way where Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence is located or at the other private lots west of Mr. Quevedo's property. All of the improvements made at Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence at the C-51 Right-of-Way have been made by him even though the C-51 Right-of- Way is located within Spillway Park. The original public safety rationale for authorizing Mr. Quevedo to erect the cross-fence blocking public access was revisited by the District. Additional investigation by safety experts (Risk Management staff) revealed that no unreasonable danger existed by allowing public access to the C-51 seawall at the C-51 Right-of-Way. In the absence of the public safety basis for closure of the C-51 Right-of-Way, such closure was contrary to District policy. As a consequence, the District’s staff recommended to the District’s Governing Board that the MOD Permit, authorizing Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence, be revoked. After conducting two public meetings and receiving comments from Mr. Quevedo, members of the public, and the District’s staff as to the policy issue of pubic access to the C- 51 Right-of-Way, the District’s Governing Board determined that the C-51 Right-of-Way should be open to the public. Consequently, the Governing Board decided to revoke Mr. Quevedo's MOD Permit. Allegations of criminal activity within the general boundaries of Spillway Park and, specifically, in the C-51 Right- of-Way at the cross-fence area, were made by Mr. Quevedo as a basis to not revoke the MOD Permit and allow the cross-fence to remain. Such allegations have no bearing on the revocation of the MOD Permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking SFWMD Permit No. MOD 981 issued to Jesus G. Quevedo. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1999.
The Issue The ultimate legal and factual issue in this matter is whether Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc. (Permittees), have provided the Southwest Florida Water Management District (District) with reasonable assurances that the activities they propose to conduct pursuant to Management and Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017 (the Permit) meet the conditions for issuance of permits established in Rules 40D-4.301, 40D-4.302, and 40D- 40.302, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the issues of fact to be litigated are whether the Project will cause adverse water quality impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands; whether the Project will cause adverse flooding of on-site or off-site property; whether the Project will cause impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities; and whether the Project will adversely affect the property of others.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., are corporations licensed to operate in the State of Florida. The District is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control water resources within its boundaries pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder as Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code. Driscoll resides at 35716 Welby Court, Zephyrhills, Florida 33541, Lot 14, within the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision (Subdivision). Driscoll requested this hearing to show the District that there is a drainage problem on Lots 13 and 14, and the adjacent Geiger property to the south, which should be fixed at this time and as part of the Project. Driscoll wants "Engle Homes to propose a new solution to fix the entire Welby Court Geiger property problem," i.e., from Lots 4 through 14, and not a piecemeal solution as proposed in the Permit modification. The Subdivision Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., developed the Timber Creek 2 Subdivision. Lots 15 through 25 run east to west and are north of Welby Court. Lots 15 and 16 are located north of the cul-de-sac, on the eastern portion of Welby Court. Lots 3 through 14 run west to east, south of Welby Court. Lots 13 and 14 are south of the cul-de-sac on the eastern portion of Welby Court and are across the street and the cul-de-sac from Lots 16 and 15, respectively. Residences exist on Lots 5, and 7 through 14. Driscoll owns Lot 14, a corner lot, which is the southeastern most lot of the Subdivision. Don Geiger (Geiger) owns the land (approximately five acres) south of the property lines of Subdivision Lots 5 through Geiger's northern driveway, essentially a dirt road, runs parallel to Lots 5 through 14. Subsequent to the original construction activity involving the Subdivision, the developer realized that there was an "existing depression" (referenced on Engle Exhibit number 1), south of Lots 7 and 8, and on Geiger's property. Geiger complained to the District about standing water in this area. This depression area is approximately 90 feet long and 30 feet wide which needed to be "drained off" according to Geiger. The depressed area on Geiger's property was most likely caused when Lots 7 through 14 were graded and sodded, which raised the "lots up a few inches" above Geiger's driveway/property. Water is trapped during a storm event between the back yards and the depressed area. As a result, the southern end of the back yards, particularly Lots 7 and 8, and the driveway remain constantly wet. The Project On January 16, 2001, Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., filed MSSW Permit Application No. 49005837.017 with the District, to address the problems with the rear lot grading and the adjacent property. The actual Project area for the permit modification1 includes the southern portions of Lots 4 through 9 and south of the property lot line including Geiger's property. See Finding of Fact 5. The modified permit does not address the drainage area including the back yards of Lot 13 and Driscoll's Lot 14, and the other portion of Geiger's property/driveway to the south. On April 5, 2001, the District issued MSSW Permit No. 49005837.017 to Engle Homes, Inc., and Lake Bernadette, Inc., under the provisions of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40D-40, Florida Administrative Code, for the modification of a surface water management system to serve the Project area. The proposed Project will involve the construction of a concrete inlet box with a safety grate, storm sewers, and grass swales. Specifically, the project is intended to solve the drainage problems associated with the "existing depression" south of the boundary line for Lots 7 and 8 on Geiger's property (although Lots 4 through 9 ("area 1") are included within the Project area), and the back yards of Lots 7 and 8. A catch basin is proposed to be located south and on the lot line between Lots 8 and 9, which is expected to drain off the water in the depression area to the modified surface water management system. The inlet box will be placed in the corner between Lots 8 and 9. The collected water in the inlet box will be routed underground through a series of 18-inch storm sewer pipe straight north through a drainage easement between Lots 8 and 9 to Welby Court. The underground pipe ties into an existing pipe in front of Lot 9 on the street, then runs east along the Welby Court right-of-way and then north between Lots 19 and 20, and eventually north into a large permitted retention pond, located to the north of the Subdivision which will handle the stormwater. Driscoll's Alleged Drainage Problem There is another distinct drainage area, i.e., "area 2," which includes Geiger's property and the southern portions of Lots 13 and 14, where water drains from south to north into a roadside ditch to Geiger Cemetery Road ("area 3"), which runs south to north and east of Lots 14 and 15. During a September 2001 tropical storm, there was standing water on Geiger's driveway, directly south of Lots 13 and 14, which was present for more than 3 days. This was referred to by Mr. Barrett as a "small drainage problem that could easily be corrected." On the other hand, Geiger says that there is standing water on his driveway, south of Lots 13 and 14, "all the time." This caused Geiger to move his driveway "50 or 60 feet" south. According to Geiger, the berm, which runs across Lots 10 through 14, should be lowered and the backyards reconfigured. But this would be quite disturbing to the neighbors. Therefore, Geiger recommends the placement of drains south of Lots 13 and 14, which would direct the water out to the ditch at Geiger Cemetery Road and away from Driscoll's Lot 14. The modified Permit is not intended to solve this problem, although Driscoll wants this problem fixed. It is not necessary to resolve Driscoll's issue regarding whether there is a drainage problem in and around Driscoll's lot. The two drainage areas 1 and 2 discussed herein are not connected, although they are close in proximity. The solution to the first problem has no impact on the second, and there is no cited statutory or rule requirement that both issues must be addressed in this Permit application. This is Driscoll's quandary. Compliance with Rules 40D-4.301 and 40D-4.302, Florida Administrative Code The Project will not impact wetlands or surface waters. The Project will not adversely impact the value of functions provided to fish and wildlife, and listed species, including aquatic and wetland-dependent species, by wetlands or other surface waters and other water-related resources. The Project will not adversely impact the quality of receiving waters such that the water quality standards will be violated. The Project will not cause adverse secondary impacts to the water resources. The Project will not adversely impact the maintenance of surface or groundwater levels or surface water flows established pursuant to Section 373.042, Florida Statutes. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to a work of the District. The Project is capable, based on generally accepted engineering and scientific principles, of being effectively performed and of functioning as proposed. The Project will be conducted by an entity with financial, legal, and administrative capability of ensuring that the activity will be undertaken in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit, if issued. The Project will comply with any applicable special basin or geographic area criteria established pursuant to Chapter 40D, Florida Administrative Code, by the District. The Project will not adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare. The Project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The Project will not adversely affect navigation. The Project will not cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The Project will not adversely affect fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the Project. The Project will not adversely affect significant historical and archeological resources. The Project will not cause unacceptable cumulative impacts upon wetlands and other surface waters. The Project area is less than 100 acres. The Project does not require dredging or filling of wetlands, or construction of boat slips. The Project is not contrary to the public interest. The Project will not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and adjacent lands, and will not adversely affect or impact the property of others, including Driscoll's property, Lot 14. "Area 1," between Lots 4 and 9, is a separate drainage area, and the water from this area does not drain to Lot 14. Driscoll's property is not within the Project area, and the Project was not intended to resolve his alleged drainage problem. The Project will not cause adverse flooding to on-site or off-site property. The Project will not cause adverse impacts to existing surface water storage and conveyance capabilities. Rather, the project is expected to improve the conveyance of water and drainage for "area 1" and the Project area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order issuing Management and Storage of Surface Water General Construction Permit No. 49005837.017. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's certification as a minority business enterprise should be revoked, as proposed by Petitioner in its letter dated December 20, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. (CCT), is a corporation engaged in the business of providing earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control services for prime contractors. The firm was incorporated on April 6, 2000, and until November 2001, it was located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, Florida. The business was then relocated to 3100 Northwest Boca Raton Boulevard, Boca Raton, Florida. The sole owner and shareholder is Bonnie S. Cramer, a female who qualifies as a minority under the Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program) codified in Part VI, Chapter 40E-7, Florida Administrative Code. That Program is administered by Petitioner, South Florida Water Management District (District). CCT's application for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) was filed with the District on December 12, 2000, and was approved on December 15, 2000, in the areas of earthwork, clearing, canal excavation, and erosion control. The certification expires on December 15, 2003. Although the District had "some concerns" regarding Ms. Cramer's knowledge of the business during its review of the application, it gave her "the benefit of the doubt on the application because she had worked in the industry." On August 22, 2001, the District held a "partnering" meeting for all contractors, including CCT, on a pump station project awarded to Beers Stanska, Inc. (the Beers project). CCT was represented at the meeting by Ronald J. Coddington (Ron Coddington), a non-minority professional engineer who had worked on other District projects in the past and owns an earthwork company. Coddington's attendance on behalf of a minority contractor raised suspicions on the part of a District contract administrator, Jessica Flathmann, who also attended the meeting. Ms. Flathmann, who is now on active duty with the military, prepared a short note the same date requesting that the District's compliance section "[p]lease check out [CCT's] information (minority status) with state on-line info." The "state on-line info" refers to the Department of State's web site for Florida corporations. A subsequent name search under the Department of State's corporation records revealed that since at least 1987 Ms. Cramer had been an officer and/or director in a number of other corporations, including Team Land Holdings, Inc. (vice- president, secretary, treasurer, and 50 percent owner), Team Environmental Resources, Inc. (owner, president, vice- president, and secretary-treasurer), Team Land Development, Inc. (treasurer), Team Offshore Services, Inc. (secretary- treasurer), Team Marine Services, Inc. (director and secretary-treasurer), and R.J. Coddington and Associates, P.A. (vice-president). Except for Team Environmental Resources, Inc., Ron Coddington was a principal in, and owner of, all of the other corporations. Because Ms. Cramer had failed to acknowledge a relationship with any other firms on her application, the District decided to conduct an investigation concerning CCT's eligibility for MBE status. Based on a site visit to Ms. Cramer's office, and an interview with her, the District determined that decertification proceedings were appropriate. By letter dated December 20, 2001, as later clarified during discovery, the District alleged that CCT made a material misrepresentation on its original application for certification in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(2), Florida Administrative Code; that CCT "shared resources with a non-minority person or business in the same or an associated field" in violation of Rule 40E- 7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code; and that CCT's owner, Ms. Cramer, "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm." Respondent denies all allegations. It also suggests that the District's real purpose in revoking the certification is because of animosity between certain District personnel and Ron Coddington, with whom Ms. Cramer has had a personal relationship and is now engaged to marry. Material Mispresentation The District first alleges that Petitioner made a material mispresentation on its application for certification by answering Question 20 in the negative. That question reads as follows: ARE ANY OWNERS, PARTNERS OR PRINCIPALS OF YOUR COMPANY AFFILIATED WITH ANY OTHER FIRM(S) AS EMPLOYEES, SHAREHOLDERS, OR DIRECTORS? If Yes, please list below, attach a written explanation of the business relationship and provide a financial statement for the affiliate firm(s). Ms. Cramer answered Question 20 "No." At the end of the application, she executed a lengthy affidavit acknowledging that all of the statements contained in the application were "true, accurate and complete." When the question was answered, Ms. Cramer was a vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and part-owner of Team Land Holdings, Inc., a corporation which owned the building listed as the business address for CCT and two corporations in which Ron Coddington was a principal. As to Team Environmental Services, Inc. and Team Land Development, Inc., however, the parties disagree on Ms. Cramer's status in those corporations at the time the application was filed. The other corporations are not in issue since they are no longer active or Ms. Cramer has resigned as an officer, director, or employee. Ms. Cramer was president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of Team Environmental Services, Inc. and filed the paperwork to incorporate the business. She indicated that the corporation "never did any business," had no income, closed its books in either April or August 2000, and filed its final tax return for calendar year 2000. Even so, Ms. Cramer continued to file annual reports with the Secretary of State for two more years after the corporation allegedly closed its books, and she did not file Articles of Dissolution for the corporation until April 2002, or just before her deposition in this case was taken. Given these circumstances, it is found that Ms. Cramer was still affiliated with an active corporation at the time she filed her application, and this information should have been disclosed. Beginning in 1987 and continuing until May 2000, Ms. Cramer was a director, officer, and employee of Team Land Development, Inc., a firm engaged in the earthwork business and owned by Ron Coddington. However, Ms. Cramer submitted into evidence a letter to Ron Coddington dated May 10, 2000, tendering her resignation as an officer and director. The authenticity of that letter was not challenged. She also testified that she resigned as an employee around March 2000. While the record shows that Ms. Cramer prepared and filed the annual report for the company in 2001, or after she had resigned as an employee, she explained that she was simply helping out by doing some "extra accounting" for the firm even though she was no longer on the payroll. In light of these circumstances, there is less than clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cramer was affiliated with Team Land Development, Inc. at the time she submitted her application for certification, and thus she was not required to disclose her relationship with that entity. One of the purposes of Question 20 is to determine if an applicant has a parent company, affiliates, or subsidiaries. This information is then used by the District to determine whether the applicant has true management and control over the business or whether another entity has actual control over the applicant. The information is also used to determine whether the applicant meets the size standards for MBEs when combined with the affiliates. This is important because District regulations establish certain size thresholds (in terms of net assets and number of employees) which an applicant cannot exceed. It can be inferred from the evidence that for these reasons, the District considers the information in Question 20 to be material since the information is essential in order to properly review a MBE application. Ms. Cramer, who signed the application, suggested that Question 20 was ambiguous and unclear. However, Ms. Cramer never sought guidance from District personnel to clear up any confusion she might have, nor did she read the MBE rule itself. Rather, she interpreted the question as requiring an affirmative response only if she was affiliated with another firm involved "in [a] similar or same field" as CCT. Because the two corporations in which she was then affiliated did not provide the same or similar services as CCT, she responded in the negative. Question 20 is clear and unambiguous. It simply requires an applicant to identify any other corporation or entity in which the applicant is affiliated. The question does not mention, or even suggest, that an affirmative answer is required only if the other entity is in the same or similar field as the applicant's business. Respondent's contention that the question was ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation has been rejected. The only remaining issue is whether the omitted information was "material" so as to constitute a ground for revocation of the certification. As noted above, the District considers the information derived from Question 20 to be material since that information is necessary to carry out its responsibility of determining an applicant's eligibility. Therefore, the failure by Ms. Cramer to disclose her relationship with two corporations was a material omission, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001. Did CCT share resources with a non-MBE? Petitioner next alleges that CCT shared resources with a non-minority person or business which is in the same field of operations in violation of Rule 40E-7.653(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. Those provisions require that the minority owner demonstrate its independence and that the business does not share common ownership, directors, or facilities with a non-minority person or business in the same or related field of operations. Ron Coddington is the owner of Team Land Development, Inc. (TDI), an earthmoving company which performed contract work for the District until January 2002, and for whom CCT was a subcontractor on two District projects. TDI's business address was 1132 Northeast 48th Street, Pompano Beach, which is the same address used by CCT until November 2001. In addition, R.J. Coddington & Associates, Inc., an engineering firm owned by Ron Coddington, also listed that street address as its business address for the years 2000 and 2001. That firm provides engineering services through Mr. Coddington's professional engineering license. Thus, the three corporations shared the same address from April 2000 (when CCT was incorporated) until November 2001. A small office building is located at 1132 Northeast 48th Street and is owned by Team Land Holdings, Inc., a company in which Ron Coddington and Ms. Cramer each owns 50 percent of the stock. The exact configuration of the offices within the building is not clear although Ms. Cramer testified that the building once had three separate "suites," each with a separate entrance, and that CCT occupied an office in the back of the building with a conference table that was used for all CCT meetings. However, when District investigators visited the building for an interview with Ms. Cramer in October 2001, they entered a common entrance, met her in a "front" office area, and were not invited into a separate office in the back of the building. Likewise, when they interviewed Ron Coddington during the course of this proceeding, he also met them in the same front area and did not invite them into a separate office. Respondent contended that the three firms only shared a fax machine and a kitchen area used primarily for storage purposes. Even so, the more clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that three corporations, including at least one engaged in the same business as CCT, were sharing facilities, as prohibited by the rule. Therefore, it is found that from December 2000 when it was first certified, and until November 2001, CCT shared facilities (offices) with a non-MBE business (Team Land Development, Inc.) which was engaged in the same business (earthmoving) as CCT. Did Ms. Cramer possess the knowledge and experience to operate her business? Finally, the District alleges that Ms. Cramer "does not possess the knowledge and technical expertise to manage the day-to-day activities of her firm," as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that Ms. Cramer have "managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education and experience required to make decisions regarding that particular type of work." To support this allegation, the District relies upon a report prepared by the District's Inspector-General on December 6, 2001; the results of an interview with Ms. Cramer conducted in January 2002 by a professional engineer; and the deposition of Ms. Cramer taken during the spring of 2002 in preparation for the final hearing. Ms. Cramer's background is in accounting and bookkeeping. She is not an engineer. Indeed, on her personal income tax return for the year 2000, she listed her occupation as an accountant. She also admits that she is not an expert in earthmoving, nor does she have experience working at job sites overseeing that type of work. According to the resume attached to her application, and before CCT was incorporated, Ms. Cramer was employed in the following positions, some of which were apparently part- time: (1) bank teller and branch manager of a bank (1972- 1981); (2) bookkeeper for an upholstery firm (1981-1998); owner of a music store (1982-1985); accounting assistant for a general contractor (1985-1987); accounting assistant to a certified public accountant (1987-1998); and treasurer of Team Land Development, Inc. (1987-1999). The same resume represents that CCT's "typical work" includes canal excavation, erosion control and dewatering, and wetland construction. It also indicates that the firm provides "earthwork and construction solutions for prime contractors," as well as "skilled, knowledgeable personnel providing a variety of earthwork, erosion control and site environmental mitigation services." In issuing its proposed agency action, the District relied in part upon an investigation conducted by Mr. Sooker, a certified public accountant in its Inspector-General's Office. Mr. Sooker performed an on-site "audit" of CCT on October 30 and 31, 2001. The audit included an interview with Ms. Cramer and the examination of various documentation related to the business. In his report, Mr. Sooker concluded that CCT did not meet eligibility standards for a MBE for several reasons, including an opinion that Ms. Cramer "d[id] not possess the background, experience, and technical expertise to manage and control job site work activities." After the letter of December 20, 2001, was issued, Ms. Cramer requested a meeting with the District to demonstrate that she had the necessary experience to manage the day-to-day operations of an earthmoving company. The meeting was held in January 2002. At that time, a District professional engineer, Mr. Weldon, who has extensive experience in earthmoving, posed a series of questions to Ms. Cramer regarding her knowledge of that business. While Respondent contends that Mr. Weldon's interview was flawed in many respects, it is found that the interview was a reasonable and appropriate way in which to test Ms. Cramer's qualifications to operate an earthmoving business. In response to many of the questions, Ms. Cramer simply stated that she would rely on her foreman and project manager to resolve the issues raised by the engineer. As to the remaining inquiries, she failed to demonstrate any technical expertise in the area. Thus, the meeting reconfirmed the District's preliminary conclusion (found in Mr. Sooker's report) regarding Ms. Cramer's lack of technical expertise in the area for which CCT was certified. During a deposition taken prior to hearing, Ms. Cramer was also asked a series of questions pertaining to earthmoving to ascertain the degree of experience and competence that she possessed. Again, Ms. Cramer failed to demonstrate that she had the requisite experience necessary to manage her business. For example, Ms. Cramer was unfamiliar with the term "shrinkage," a term commonly used in the business; she could not describe a method for estimating canal excavation or factors necessary to make that estimate; she could not state what type of equipment would be used if the material being excavated had dense sand, weak limestone, or cemented shells; she was unaware that soil borings would indicate the presence of rock in the material being excavated; and she could not describe the process for excavating and constructing a berm "with haul that would affect equipment collection." An experienced person in the field of earthmoving would be expected to correctly answer most, if not all, of these inquiries. Thus, Ms. Cramer did not demonstrate any level of experience or firsthand knowledge in operating an earthwork company. While she was able to respond more accurately to some of these same questions at the final hearing, the undersigned assumed that she could do so only because the intervening time between the deposition and final hearing allowed her to consult with experts and prepare her answers. In addition, Ms. Cramer acknowledged that she has never been a project manager for any construction job, including those that CCT has contracted to perform; she has never operated any heavy equipment; she has never personally prepared job estimates involving plans and specifications by herself; she cannot read construction plans and specifications; she has not negotiated any contracts for CCT; and she has never attended any meetings that the District has held for the Beers project. On the Beers project, in which CCT is a subcontractor for the prime contractor, notices of safety violations by CCT employees are sent to Ron Coddington's attention, and the first subcontract agreement between Beers and CCT was also sent to his attention. In fact, in correspondence to CCT, the Beers office manager for the project assumed that Ron Coddington was president of the firm. At the same time, Ms. Cramer relies heavily on her foremen and Ron Coddington (who serves as a $1,600.00 per week consultant) to deal with all technical aspects of her business and to answer questions regarding the Beers project. She further acknowledged that she has delegated a number of tasks on the Beers project to Ron Coddington, such as providing estimates and bid takeoffs; providing on-site project management; preparing project schedules and monthly estimates; making on-site inspections; coordinating on-site surveys and quality control with CCT employees; assuming responsibility for owner and prime contractor conduct on the District pump station projects; and representing CCT at all job coordination meetings. Notwithstanding the above, Respondent contends that the Inspector-General's report dated December 6, 2001, is the primary underpinning for the District's case and that the report is flawed in numerous respects. For example, the Inspector-General's Office has an operations manual which spells out the manner in which investigations shall be conducted. Contrary to specific requirements in the operations manual, Mr. Sooker did not prepare, sign, and file a statement of independence, and he did not maintain and preserve working papers, outlines of questions, and interview notes in the investigative file. These deficiencies were confirmed through the testimony of Respondent's expert, Mr. Kirchenbaum, a certified public accountant, as well as the Inspector-General himself. While Mr. Sooker's investigation admittedly did not fully conform with the operations manual, his conclusions regarding Ms. Cramer's experience were independently verified and reconfirmed through the interview with Ms. Cramer in January 2002 and the answers given by her in the deposition taken in April 2002. Therefore, even if Mr. Sooker's report is ignored, there is other clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations in the letter of December 20, 2001. For the foregoing reasons, it is found that Ms. Cramer does not have managerial and technical capability, knowledge, training, education, and experience required to make decisions regarding the type of business in which she is certified, as alleged in the letter of December 20, 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking the MBE certification of Civil Construction Technologies, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Catherine A. Linton, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Bradford J. Beilly, Esquire Bradford J. Beilly, P.A. 400 Southeast 18th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316-2820
Findings Of Fact On April 22, 1994, Respondent, Southwest Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), published proposed amendments to Rule 40D-4.051 in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, at page 2450. The portions which are the subject of this proceedings are as follows: * 40D-4.051 Exemptions <<(1) Exemptions are found in>> [[The following activities are exempt from permitting under this chapter: The activities specified in]] Sections 373.406, Florida Statutes. (2)-(7) No Change. * Note: In the above quotation, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. On May 13, 1994, Petitioner, Gerald A. Robbins, filed a Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. On May 20, 1994, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition to Challenge Proposed Rule 40D-4.051. In its rule challenge, Petitioner requests that 40D-4.051(1) be rewritten as follows: "Exemptions are as found in Sections 373.406 AND 403.927 Florida Statutes." On July 1, 1994, Respondent withdrew its proposed amendment to Subsection (1) of Rule 40D-4.051. The following Notice of Withdrawal appeared in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, No. 26: Southwest Florida Water Management District RULE TITLES: RULE NOS.: Exemptions 40D-4.051(1) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL Notice is hereby given that the above proposed rule amendment, published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 20, Number 16, on Page 2450, April 22, 1994, have (sic) been withdrawn. This is the sole subsection being withdrawn from rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes. The remainder of the proposed amendments to Section 40D-4.051, Florida Administrative Code remains subject to Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes. By Order dated June 28, 1994, the portion of Petitioner's rule challenge relating to Rule 40D-4.051(7) was dismissed. Petitioner appealed the Order to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Gerald A. Robbins v. Southwest Florida Water Management District, Case No. 94-1717. The court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review of Non-Final Administrative Action by Order dated October 10, 1994.
