Findings Of Fact Puckett reported a discharge of used oil at its site when it filed an early detective incentive program notification application with DER. Puckett, thus, advised DER that it would clean up its site and apply for reimbursement of the costs of that cleanup in accordance with Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). When it received Puckett's application, DER conducted an investigation of the site and determined that a discharge of used automotive crankcase oil had occurred there. DER was advised by Puckett that the discharge had occurred when used automotive crankcase oil was drained into a service bay floor drain. Puckett and the site operator placed the used oil in the drain in the belief that a storage tank was connected to the floor drain to receive and safely store the used oil. Unknown to Puckett, however, the storage tanks previously connected to that floor drain had been removed by a former site owner or operator. The Recommended Order entered by the Hearing Officer contains findings to the effect that Puckett was unaware that storage tanks did not any longer connect with the floor drain in question, in part, at least, because it is the custom and practice in the service station business that used oil collecting persons or entities collect from such storage tanks after the service station hours of operation. Therefore, it was customary for the operator of a service station not to be aware of when used oil was removed from storage tanks. Upon learning that used oil had been spilled at the site due to the lack of a storage tank, where formerly one had been in place, the subject application was filed. DER conducted its site investigation and after it was concluded, on April 16, 1987, issued an order denying reimbursement eligibility to Puckett. DER took this position because it opined that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product", as those terms and substances are defined in Subsections 376.301(9)(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). Puckett then filed a timely petition for administrative hearing as a result of that denial of eligibility. The cause was duly transmitted to the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, formal proceeding. In the discovery phase of that proceeding, requests for admissions were served by Puckett upon DER, in response to which DER admitted that the sole basis for denial of reimbursement eligibility was the fact that the substance discharged was used oil, which, DER contended was not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". DER, thus, took the position that the used oil in question was beyond the scope of reimbursement eligibility allowed by the "Super Act," the statutory provisions cited above. The cause was duly scheduled for hearing for September 9-10, 1987. Shortly prior to the hearing, on August 31, 1987, DER filed a motion for continuance seeking an opportunity thereby to have time to explore the question of whether Puckett was "grossly negligent" in the maintenance of its facility, which is a ground for disqualification from Super Act reimbursement eligibility. This was an issue which had not theretofore been raised in the proceeding. See Section 376.3071(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). That motion for continuance was denied, as found and discussed in the Recommended Order in the underlying proceeding. The cause then came on for hearing as scheduled on September 9-10, 1987. A motion in limine filed by Puckett was granted at the hearing so as to preclude DER from raising any issue concerning "gross negligence" at hearing. The basis for the ruling was that DER had known of the circumstances surrounding the discharge for nearly one year, but that during the discovery process, DER assured Puckett that its position was that gross negligence would not be an issue in the proceedings and that the sole basis for its denial of the reimbursement application was that the substance discharged, being used oil, was not, in its view, "petroleum" or a "petroleum product". Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued the Recommended Order in question finding that used crankcase oil was, indeed, "petroleum", as well as being a "petroleum product", for the purposes of the definitions in the above- cited statutory provisions. It was thus recommended that Puckett be determined to be eligible to apply to DER for reimbursement of the cleanup costs involved. Puckett, 10 FALR at 5540. Certain findings and conclusions made in the Recommended Order are germane to the question of whether DER's actions with respect to the initial and final denial of Super Act eligibility had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the agency action was initiated and finally taken in the Final Order. Those findings include the findings in the Recommended Order that used crankcase oil consists of "petroleum", as that term is defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), with particular emphasis on those findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, incorporated by reference herein, concerning crankcase oil coming within the definition of "other hydrocarbons" for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. Further, DER's own expert witness admitted, and it was found by the Hearing Officer, that the predominant use of used oil is as a fuel, just as is gasoline, diesel, kerosene and certain other grades of fuel oil, which are specifically included in the statutory definition of "petroleum product". See page 20 of the Recommended Order and the transcript of the proceeding below, pages 362-363. It was also established without question that used oil is a "liquid," a "commodity" and a liquid fuel commodity for the reasons delineated in the Recommended Order. It was established further by the record in the proceeding on the merits, and found in the Recommended Order that used oil has no meaningful similarity to the substances specifically, statutorily excluded from the definition of "petroleum product", and that DER has had a policy encouraging the collection and recycling of used oil as a fuel. This was well-known and accepted by DER's own experts before the "policy makers" at DER, who engendered the subject initial agency action, took the position that used oil did not constitute petroleum or a petroleum product. Used oil has not been otherwise regulated as a hazardous waste. DER's interpretation of the statutory definition of "petroleum product" to the effect that the product, as it was initially produced, must be sold or used as a fuel in order to meet that definition, in fact, imposes an additional inconsistent criteria for determining what types of substances are included within the meaning of the term, which criteria is not enunciated in the statute, either expressly or implicitly. DER's restrictive interpretation of the statute further disregards the language of the Super Act. Sections 376.3071(12)(a) and 376.315, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), which requires it to give "such liberal construction to the statute as will accomplish the purposes set forth in this subsection", in other words, to promote the cleanup of as many contamination sites as possible. Further, it was established by the record in the proceeding on the merits and concluded in the Recommended Order that the restrictive interpretation of the statute adopted by DER was inconsistent with existing agency policy which encourages used oil collection and recycling and that the interpretation "is clearly not one expressed or reasonably implied on the face of the statute" and "would frustrate the clear, legislative impetus of the Super Act" and is "illogical". More significantly, DER's policy makers responsible for the initial agency action and decision that used oil is not "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" did not take counsel with certain key expert personnel in DER's own used oil section concerning whether used oil is "petroleum" or a "petroleum product" prior to the initial denial of eligibility and the proceeding and hearing before the Hearing Officer. In fact, the policy makers were apparently unaware of facts critical to the subject determination and to the fact that DER's proposed (and, indeed, final) action was inconsistent with agency policy concerning treatment and definition of used oil, which DER's "in- house" experts had been aware of all along. These findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order demonstrate clearly and in detail why DER's initial agency action and position through the conclusion of the hearing, concerning rejection of Puckett's reimbursement eligibility, did not have a reasonable basis in law and fact. Those findings and conclusions appearing at pages 18-36 of the Recommended Order, which has been stipulated into the record of the instant proceeding, are incorporated by reference and adopted in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Final Order. Despite the findings and conclusions in the Recommended Order, DER, in its Final Order, ultimately denied reimbursement eligibility. Puckett at page 5505. DER found in its Final Order that Super Act coverage is limited to "incidents related to storage", as opposed to incidents where a contaminant is discarded. DER also found that because Puckett did not have a "petroleum storage system" at the site, the discharge was not "related to storage", despite the facility operator's proven and found intention and belief, when he dumped the product in the floor drain, that he was "storing" the used oil in question. DER acknowledged the Hearing Officer's granting of Puckett's motion in limine, which precluded denial of reimbursement eligibility on "gross negligence" grounds, but stated that it was not denying eligibility on this ground at page 18 of its Final Order. Although DER acknowledged in its Final Order that its denial of eligibility did not depend on a finding of gross negligence, this acknowledgment, which appears to re- state its position, taken in the discovery phase, that gross negligence would not be raised as an issue by DER, and is an apparent acknowledgment of the ruling on the motion in limine, is somewhat belied by the following language from the Final Order: Although my decision to deny eligibility for reimbursement to Puckett does not depend on a finding of gross negligence on the part of Puckett, any site owner who fails to ascertain whether an oil drain fitting on site is actually connected to an operational used oil system now has clear notice that it allows used oil discharges to that drain fitting only at its own peril. It is not appropriate that state funds be expended to remediate contamination caused by reckless disregard for elementary waste disposal regulations. In the future, the department will continue to deny eligibility to any site where contamination has resulted from used oil discharges to land in the complete absence of a used oil storage system. (emphasis supplied) See pages 18 and 19 of the Final Order. Puckett then appealed that denial of reimbursement eligibility. The District Court of Appeals reversed DER, finding as follows: DER's assertion that Puckett's eligibility for cleanup reimbursement of the used oil discharge was dependent on whether storage was involved and whether the used oil would be reused or recycled was never made until the final agency order was entered. These issues were not raised by the pleadings, were not litigated at the hearing, were not considered by the Hearing Officer, and were not considered by the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. In addition, the pleadings reflect that DER was asked in a written request for admission to admit the following: 'The Department's only basis for denial of Super Act eligibility for Puckett is that the reported discharge was used oil.' DER admitted that statement. This was the only issue created by the pleadings, and it was the only issue tried and determined by the Hearing Officer. DER cannot raise and decide for the first time in the final agency order issues not previously raised or considered. See Puckett, 549 So.2d at 722 (emphasis in original). The Court then remanded the proceeding to DER for entry of an order determining Puckett to be eligible to apply for reimbursement. Puckett also petitioned the appellate court for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes, arguing that the Final Order was a "gross abuse" of agency discretion, a standard for granting of appellate attorney's fees under that statutory provision. The Court denied that motion on the basis that gross abuse of agency discretion had not been demonstrated. Although reliance on issues improperly raised for the first time in the Final Order may not have been a "gross abuse" of agency discretion supportive of an award of appellate costs and fees pursuant to the above- referenced statutory provision, it is found that DER has not justified as reasonable its rejection of eligibility on additional non-litigated or properly raised grounds in the Final Order. Therefore, DER's reliance on the new issues in the Final Order to deny reimbursement eligibility was not "substantially justified". After issuance of the Court's mandate, Puckett filed a petition for costs and fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, initiating the instant proceeding. DER filed an untimely response conceding that Puckett was a "prevailing small business party" and the other criteria for award of fees and costs provided for in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, with the exception that it did not concede that its denial of reimbursement eligibility in the related proceeding was not "substantially justified". DER did not dispute that the reasonable amount of costs and fees incurred by Puckett exceeded $15,000.00 nor did it assert that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of costs and fees unjust nor that it was a nominal party only. Since Puckett's petition was not timely responded to and since its Motion for Summary Final Order thereon was not answered by DER, the Hearing Officer issued a Summary Final Order awarding $15,000.00 in costs and fees to Puckett. DER appealed and the First District Court of Appeals reversed the award and remanded the proceedings to the Hearing Officer to consider DER's position on the issue of award of fees and costs, based generally upon the Court's view that DER's non- timely response to the petition for fees and costs should be excused, as more particularly delineated in the Court's opinion in Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Company, Inc., 16 FLW D.926 (Fla. 1st DCA April 3, 1991). The cause involving fees and costs, thus, became at issue before the Hearing Officer once again. In the prehearing filings, the parties limited the issues to that concerning whether DER's action on the reimbursement eligibility question was "substantially justified". On July 30, 1991, a hearing was held on this matter, during which the parties presented their arguments and stipulated that the record in this proceeding would be the record on appeal, including the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in the reimbursement eligibility case.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Notice of Violation (NOV) and Orders for Corrective Action (OCA) filed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) against Respondents, Thomas Kerper (Kerper) and All Salvaged Auto Parts, Inc. (ASAP) , in DEP OGC File No. 02-0447 should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact 1. The real property located at 3141 Sharpe Road, Apopka, Florida, is owned by the heirs of Donald Joynt, who owned it for the 30 years prior to his death in 2002. The property consists of approximately 40 acres in the shape of a right triangle with the west side bordered by Sharpe Road, the south side by a potting soil business, and the northeast side (the hypotenuse of the right triangle) bordered by a railroad track. Prior to his death, Joynt used the property primarily for the purpose of operating a junkyard and recycling business ultimately entitled Don's Auto Recycling. 2. At some time before 2000, Joynt became desirous of selling his property. He offered it to a neighbor named José Luis Benitez for $600,000. Benitez counter-offered for between $350,000 and $400,000 because he thought it would cost $200,000 to $250,000 to clean the property up. Joynt rejected the counter-offer, and asked Benitez to help him find a buyer who would pay more than Benitez. At some point, Joynt listed the property with a real estate broker for $600,000. 3. In 1999, Kerper was operating an automobile parts salvage business at a location near Joynt's property. Kerper needed a new location to move his business and inventory. A real estate broker showed him Joynt's property. The broker told Kerper that the seller's broker said the property was clean and had no environmental problems. The broker also told Kerper that Orange County had recently purchased an easement for $300,000 to run a drainage ditch through the property to a local lake, which was true. While this gave Kerper some level of assurance, the broker advised Kerper to have an environmental assessment done before going forward with the sale. 4. After being shown the property by the broker, Kerper spoke with Joynt directly. It was agreed that they could save the real estate commission and split the savings by waiting until the listing expired. Joynt personally assured Kerper that there were no environmental issues, as evidenced by Orange County's purchase of the easement for a drainage ditch. In late March of 2000, after expiration of the real estate commission, Kerper and Joynt entered into an informal agreement allegedly written on a scrap of paper, which was not placed in evidence. Kerper testified that the agreement was for him to buy the property for $500,000, with $100,000 down, and the balance payable over time at seven percent interest. He also testified that the required $100,000 down payment would be payable in installments, with $25,000 payable whenever Joynt cleaned 25 percent of the site to make it usable by Kerper for his business operations. 5. When it came time for Kerper to move onto Joynt's property, Kerper discovered that Joynt had not done any clean-up or removed any of his property from the site. Used cars, car parts, and tires that belonged to Joynt remained throughout the site. According to Kerper, it was agreed that Kerper would help Joynt clean off the western half of the property, which was split approximately in half by a stream, while Joynt worked on cleaning off the eastern half of the property.” 6. Starting from the gate at Sharpe Road, Kerper began removing junk from the western side to the eastern side of the site for Joynt to remove from the property. Pieces of equipment and used car parts that had been left there by Joynt were removed from this section of the property. When enough space was cleared off, Kerper began setting up his auto salvage operations on the western side. He used a bulldozer to level the driveways and spread powdered concrete where the ground was soft. He also used the bulldozer to level an area near the scale house, which was on the western side of the property, but continued to be used by Joynt for Don's Auto Recycling business. In doing this work, his workers encountered steel reinforcement bars, which Kerper had them cut with a torch. Some tires and battery casings also were visible in the ground. Kerper had several truckloads of fill dumped in the area and installed a concrete pad for storing and dismantling automobiles. 7. In September or October of 2000, Kerper was evicted from his prior business location, and he had to move to Joynt's property regardless of its condition. As he increased business operations on the cleared spaces, Kerper continued to clear more space on the western side of the property. Another concrete pad was installed farther to the north. Eventually, Kerper was operating ASAP on approximately ten acres on the western side of the 40-acre site. 8. As Kerper continued to move north, his heavy equipment began encountering assorted kinds of buried material. When a buried propane tank exploded, Kerper stopped working his heavy equipment in the area and confronted Joynt. Joynt denied any knowledge of buried tanks and stated they must have been placed there by someone else. Joynt told Kerper he would let Kerper move his operations to the east side of the property when Joynt finished cleaning it up, and then Joynt would finish clearing the western side for Kerper. Kerper agreed, and continued making payments on the required down payment. According to Kerper, he eventually paid $90,000 of the down payment. 9. By August of 2001, Kerper began to have serious misgivings about Joynt's promises and the condition of the site, and he decided to seek advice. Kerper hired David Beerbower, vice-president of Universal Engineering, to perform an assessment of the northern portion of his side of the site (in the vicinity where the exploding tanks were encountered). During his assessment on August 20, 2001, Beerbower observed various automotive parts including numerous crushed fuel tanks, antifreeze containers, and motor oil containers being excavated from the upper three feet of soil. It was determined by Beerbower, and stated in his written report to Kerper, dated September 21, 2001, that these parts appeared to have been buried there several years ago. This determination, which DEP does not dispute, was based on the high level of compaction of the soil found around these items that could be attributed to either the passing of a significant amount of time or a bulldozer passing over the items. Since the excavations Beerbower observed were in a separate location from where Kerper had already bulldozed, the soil compaction around these items could not be attributed to Kerper's bulldozing. It was stated in Beerbower's letter that the “amount of buried automotive debris qualifies this area essentially as an illicit landfill." ad 10. Mark Naughton from the Risk Management Division of the Orange County Environmental Protection Division (OCEPD), which runs the petroleum storage tank and cleanup program for Orange County under contract with DEP, was also present during the time Beerbower conducted his assessment. Naughton agreed with Beerbower's assessment that Kerper is not liable for the assessment or remediation of this area. Naughton also advised Kerper to move ASAP off Naughton's property and to seek legal advice from attorney Anna Long, who used to be the Manager of OCEPD. 11. Meanwhile, according to Kerper, Joynt changed his position and began to maintain that it was Kerper's responsibility to clean up the western side of the property. Given the newly-discovered environmental condition of the property, Kerper did not feel it was in his best interest to purchase the property "as is," and contacted Long to help him negotiate to extricate himself from his arrangement with Joynt. While negotiations proceeded, Kerper began to scale down ASAP's operations in anticipation of relocating. Kerper began fixing up more whole automobiles for resale, and had a car crusher used in connection with ASAP's business begin crushing more cars for removal from the site for recycling. 12. Eventually, Long had Beerbower conduct another assessment of portions of Joynt's property to try to establish responsibility for contamination as between Kerper and Joynt. On 10 February 13, 2001, Beerbower took a surface water sample froma "drain pipe under the north driveway," a soil sample "where the car crusher was," and another soil sample from "the sandblasting area." The evidence was not clear as to the exact location of these samples, particularly the soil samples, as described in Beerbower's written report to Long dated March 11, 2002. But it appears that the "car crusher" refers to the location of Respondents' car crusher operation in the northern part of the site, just across the northern driveway; it appears that the sandblasting area refers to a location used by Joynt on the eastern side of the property, but located just east of the trailers used by Kerper for his offices. These samples were analyzed and found not to contain volatile organic compounds (VOC) or total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons (TRPH) in excess of Florida's cleanup target levels. 13. Kerper continued to operate his junkyard until the beginning of March of 2002. On March 5, 2002, Long filed a citizen's complaint with OCEPD on Kerper's behalf. While acknowledging that Kerper was operating on the site at the same time as Joynt in recent years, the complaint alleged Kerper's discovery that Joynt had been burying waste batteries, tires, and gasoline tanks on the property and covering the burial sites with broken concrete pieces. The complaint alleged that Kerper had been moving his personal property off of the site since August of 2001, when he backed out of his "lease to purchase" agreement 11 with Joynt, and would be "completely off the property by 3/10/02." 414. It is not clear exactly when Kerper and ASAP were completely off the property. The testimony and evidence on the point is inconsistent. Kerper, after some confusion, placed the date at March 9, 2002. His wife said it was March 2, 2002. An attorney representing Kerper and ASAP in an eviction proceeding filed by Joynt and his wife, filed a notice "that as of the evening of March 15, 2002, [ASAP had] vacated the property." In any event, the evidence seemed clear that Kerper and ASAP did not go on Joynt's property on or after March 15, 2002. 15. On March 15, 2002, DEP representatives inspected Joynt's property in response to Long's complaint. Kerper remained outside the front gate of the property and did not participate in the inspection. This inspection covered the entire property including the section that had been occupied by Kerper and ASAP. 16. doynt told the DEP inspectors that Respondents were responsible for a 55-gallon drum found tipped over on its side on the western half of the site and leaking a substance that appeared to be used oil from a hole in the side of the drum. DEP's inspectors righted the drum, which still was partly full of its contents. There also were several other unlabeled 55-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers "of unknown fluids"; a burn pile containing burned oil filters, battery casings, and electrical 12 wiring; other broken battery casings; and an area of dark-stained soil which appeared to be soaked with used oil. Joynt accepted responsibility for other contamination on the site, but told DEP that Kerper and ASAP were responsible for these items. Kerper denied the allegations. 17. As to the leaking oil drum, Kerper first contended that DEP did not prove that the overturned drum contained used oil. But the evidence was clear that DEP's inspectors were ina position to determine that the liquid was oily. Respondents also contended that the drum would have been empty, not still partly full, if Kerper or ASAP had left it on its side at the site when they vacated the property several days earlier. Kerper alleged that Joynt could have put the hole in the drum and turned it over shortly before the arrival of DEP's inspectors. But, as stated, it was not clear when Kerper and ASAP vacated the site, and it was not clear from the evidence that Respondents were not responsible. 18. Similarly, the other unlabeled drums and containers were in a part of the site occupied and used by Respondents. Despite Kerper's denials, it is not clear from the evidence that they belonged to Joynt or that they were placed where DEP found them after Respondents vacated the site. Testimony that Respondents had containers properly labeled "used oil," "antifreeze," and "gasoline" inside one of the trailers on the site did not negate the existence of unlabeled drums and 13 containers on the site. However, there was no proof whatsoever as to what the closed drums and containers held. But some were open, and DEP's inspectors could see that these held an oily substance (possibly hydraulic fluid), mixed with other substances. 19. As to the dark-stained soil, none of it was tested, and Respondents contended that it was just naturally darker in color or possibly wet from water or some other liquid, DEP's witness conceded could explain the color variation. (Natural reasons such as different soil or rainwater probably do not explain the color variations in the site.) Joynt told DEP's inspectors that the discoloration seen by them on March 15, 2002, was froma hydraulic hose on a piece of heavy equipment that burst earlier. The evidence was not clear who Joynt was saying owned and operated the equipment. But Respondents also blamed Joynt's employees for repeatedly blowing hoses on aged heavy equipment all over the site. It is found that the dark-stained soil probably was the result of one or more releases of hydraulic fluid or motor oil. However, the testimony and evidence was not clear that all of the releases were Joynt's doing and that Respondents bear no responsibility at all for the releases observed on March 15, 2002, in the areas where Respondents were operating. 20. Respondents were able only to produce documentation of proper disposal of 232 gallons of oily water through IPC/Magnum, 14 dated February 13, 2002, and 29 batteries through Battery World, dated March 8 and 14, 2002. 21. The testimony of Kerper and others was that Respondents generally removed gasoline from automobiles and placed it ina marked container for reuse within a day or two by Respondents and their employees. The testimony was that used oil and antifreeze generally also were removed from automobiles and placed in marked containers until proper disposition. The testimony was that batteries were removed from automobiles and that most were given to one of the employees to sell for a dollar apiece. There was no documentation to support this testimony. 22. There was testimony that, when Respondents had cars crushed, E & H Car Crushing Co., Inc., managed the collection and proper disposition of gasoline, used oil, and batteries. But the documentation placed in evidence contained no description of the wastes removed, but only provided a weight calculation of the materials removed from Respondents’ facility. 23. There was testimony that Gabriel Lynch, who was properly licensed, removed freon from automobiles at Respondents’ facility every two to three days, or upon request. Respondents would trade the freon Lynch recovered and used in his business, Gabe's Auto Tech, for repair work on Respondents' vehicles. However, no documentation of these transactions was produced. (Lynch testified that he did not know it was required that he provide documentation to Respondents.) 15 24. Runoff from where Respondents were operating on Joynt's property entered the stream running north-south through the center of the property. Neither Joynt nor Respondents had a stormwater permit or an exemption from stormwater permitting. 25. Kerper argued that his duties were limited to managerial responsibilities for ASAP, and that he was not at any time responsible for ASAP's day-to-day operations and did not conduct any activities that may or could have resulted in hazardous waste or petroleum discharge violations so as to be liable as an "operator." But the evidence was clear that Kerper was involved in ASAP's day-to-day operations. 26. While the evidence did not totally absolve Respondents from the allegations in the NOV, several people testified on Respondents' behalf as to their practice of properly disposing of hazardous materials generated by his business. For example, Rafael Rivera, a former employee, testified that Kerper would get mad at him if any gas or oil was spilled and left on the ground or was not disposed of properly. Meanwhile, it appeared that environmental problems at Joynt's site existed for years before the arrival of Respondents. Mrs. Sandra Lovejoy, a neighboring property owner for the past 30 years, testified that she had experienced problems with her water quality, such as a foul smell or funny taste, for many years before Respondents moved onto Joynt's property. An inspection was conducted by OCEPD in September of 2000, in response to Lovejoy's complaint regarding 16 fuel odor and a drinking well which was no longer in service. In part, OCEPD's written report on the complaint found "[m]any spots of surficial petroleum contamination . . . from gasoline, motor oil and other petroleum products leaking or spilled from the junk vehicles" at Don's Auto Recycling and included a recommendation "referring this site to the FDEP task force that has been put together to inspect and deal with junk yard facilities," although "[n]o Petroleum Cleanup issues were found at [that] time." For reasons not explained by the evidence, it does not appear that Don's Recycling was referred to any task force, or that OCEPD followed up on the reported contamination. 27. Respondents contend that this entire proceeding against them was part of a vendetta against Kerper for going to the local television station to expose the condition of the site, the failure of OCEPD and DEP to follow up on the September 2000, report and recommendation, and Orange County's purchase of a north-south drainage easement through the western portion of the property in 2000. The evidence did not prove this contention. However, it is clear that Joynt was responsible for the condition of most of the 40-acre site, not Respondents, and that Joynt shared responsibility with Respondents for the conditions alleged in the NOV. 28. While this case has been pending, Joynt's heirs have cooperated with DEP in cleaning up the site, and DEP acknowledged in its PRO that several items in the OCA--specifically, those 17 relating to Counts II, III, and VII of the NOV--are moot and unnecessary in light of Respondents' eviction from the property and subsequent cleanup operations by Joynt's heirs. It also is suggested that the corrective actions requested in DEP's PRO to address Counts IV, V, and VI of the NOV--relating to failure to document proper disposal of wastes--are unnecessary. It seems clear that, to the extent such disposals occurred, any available documentation would have been placed in evidence during the final hearing. Ordering that they be produced within 30 days of the Final Order, as suggested in DEP's PRO, would be a futile act. 29. Count VIII of the NOV alleged costs "of not less than $500. In its PRO, DEP requested recovery of $1,367.31 of costs. Some of these costs--$867.31--were itemized in the PRO. The balance appears to relate to the $500 alleged in the NOV. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any of these alleged costs, and the costs itemized in the PRO seem to represent travel costs of counsel for DEP.
Conclusions David J. Tarbert, Esquire Jason Sherman, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford II, Esquire Webb, Wells & Williams, P.A. 994 Lake Destiny Road Suite 102 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order providing: 1. Under Count I of the NOV, Respondents shall be jointly and severally liable, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for cleaning up the releases of used oil evidenced by the discolored soils photographed by DEP's inspectors on 24 March 15, 2002 (DEP Exhibit 20, photographs 5 and 7 on page 2 of the exhibit). As such, they shall be responsible, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for implementation of DEP's Initial Site Screening Plan to assess and remove all contaminated soils resulting from those releases. If the results of the Initial Site Screening indicate that further assessment and/or remediation of the contamination is required, Respondents shall also participate, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, in completing the required work, consistent with the "Corrective Actions for Contaminated Site Cases" (DEP Exhibit 16). 2. Counts II through VIII of the NOV are dismissed. 3. Respondents' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Vane ya J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003. 25
Findings Of Fact Based upon the prehearing statement, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is a Florida corporation in good standing, authorized to do business in this state. The Petitioner owns and controls the site which is the subject matter of these proceedings. Such site is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Department has identified the subject site as DER facility no. 05- 8500985 (the facility). At all times material to this case, the facility consisted of: three underground storage tanks (UST), one 3000 gallon UST used for storing diesel fuel, one 1000 gallon UST used for storing diesel fuel, and one 1000 gallon UST used for storing gasoline; five monitoring wells; and pipes and pumps related to the foregoing system. The facility constituted a storage tank system as defined in Section 376.301, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17-761.200(38), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner holds, and is named insured for, third party pollution liability insurance applicable to the facility. Such insurance was issued pursuant to Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes. The policy for the foregoing insurance, policy no. FPL7622040, was in force from March 22, 1991 through March 22, 1992. The Department issued a notice of eligibility for restoration insurance to Petitioner for the above-described facility. Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner is a participating owner or operator as defined in Chapter 17-769, Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to Section 376.3073, Florida Statutes, Brevard County operates a local program that has been approved by the Department. Such local program is managed by the Brevard County Office of Natural Resources Management (County). In July, 1990, a discharge of diesel fuel occurred at the Petitioner's facility. Petitioner's employees estimated that approximately twenty gallons of diesel fuel filled the pump box overflowed from the pump box across the seawall into the adjacent waters. Upon discovering the discharge, Petitioner shut down diesel fuel dispensing until repairs could be made to the apparent cause of the leak. Additionally, the diesel fuel remaining in the pump box and on top of the tank area was removed. Contaminated soil in the pump box was also removed. The apparent cause of the discharge described above was attributed to cracked pipe fittings which were repaired by Glover Oil Co. within a few days of the discharge. No detailed inspection was made to the system to determine if additional sources of discharge existed. Petitioner did not complete a discharge reporting form (DRF) for the above-described incident until April 18, 1991. The April DRF was completed after Petitioner was directed to do so by Ms. DiStasio, an inspector employed by the County. From August, 1990 until May, 1991, at least one monitoring well at the Petitioner's facility showed free product accumulating in the well pipe. The exact amounts of the free product found are unknown, but reports estimated the level at 100 centimeters. From August, 1990 until September, 1991, the Petitioner did not undertake any measure to explore the origin of the free product found in the monitoring well. Further, the Petitioner did not report the monitoring well testing results as a suspected or confirmed discharge. In April, 1991, an inspection of the Petitioner's facility was performed by Ms. DiStasio. That inspection resulted in a letter to the Petitioner that outlined several violations at the facility. Among those violations listed was the Petitioner's failure to report a suspected or confirmed discharge. At the time of the April, 1991 inspection, Petitioner had reported neither the July, 1990 discharge (a known discharge) nor the monitoring well test results (at the minimum a suspected discharge). In connection with the July, 1990 discharge, following the repairs made by Glover Oil, Petitioner did not have the system pressure tested. Only the area visible from the pump box was checked for leakage. In July, 1991, when Ms. DiStasio performed a re-inspection of the facility, she found Petitioner had not (in the interim period, April through July, 1991) taken any steps to test the system or to remove the fuels from the suspect tanks. Since the free product continued to appear in the monitoring well, a pressure test of the system would have definitively answered the discharge question. Alternatively, the removal of the fuels would have prevented further seepage until the system could be pressure tested. On August 6, 1991, the Petitioner issued a letter that advised the County that it had stopped dispensing fuel at the facility. The tanks were not drained, however, until on or about September 11, 1991. Further, the August, 1991, letter acknowledged that the Petitioner "had proposals for initial remedial cleanup related to diesel contamination in the tank field area." Obviously, the Petitioner must have contemplated a need for such cleanup. On September 11, 1991, at the Petitioner's request, Petroleum Equipment Contractors, Inc. attempted to pressure test the 3000 gallon diesel tank. The purpose of the pressure test was to determine if the diesel system had a leak. The company could not even run the test on the tank because of the defective system. A similar test on the Petitioner's gasoline tank passed without incident. Once the Petitioner learned the results of the test, it initiated Initial Remedial Action (IRA) as described on the IRA report filed by Universal Engineering Sciences. The IRA consisted of the removal of the excessively contaminated soil, approximately 74 cubic yards, and the removal of the USTs. The foregoing work was completed on or about September 15, 1991. On October 4, 1991, the Petitioner filed a discharge reporting form dated October 2, 1991, that identified September 11, 1991, as the date of discovery for the discharge. This discharge discovery was allegedly made incidental to the diesel tank pressure testing failure. No reference was made to the months of monitoring well reports showing a free product. On October 8, 1991, Ms. DiStasio prepared a Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program Compliance Checklist that reported the Petitioner was not in compliance with applicable statutes and rules. When Petitioner applied for restoration coverage under the statute on January 31, 1992, such request was denied by the Department on March 6, 1992. The basis for the denial was as follows: Failure to notify the Department of a positive response to sampling within three working days of testing, pursuant to the rule in effect at the time of the initial response (17-61.050(1), Florida Administrative Code). An inspection by Brevard County on April 17, 1991, revealed that free product had been detected in one monitoring well since July 1990. The discharge reporting form was not submitted until October 2, 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's claim for restoration coverage under the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-2121 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1, 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18 are accepted. Except as found above, paragraph 3 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. It is accepted that Brevard County acted as the local agent in this case. Paragraph 4 is rejected as not supported by the record. With regard to paragraph 5, substituting "A" for "The" and "confirmed" for "discovered" the paragraph can be accepted; otherwise rejected as contrary to the record. Similarly, with the substitution of the word "confirmation" for "discovery" in Paragraph 6, the paragraph can be accepted; otherwise rejected as contrary to the record. No suitable explanation was offered by the Petitioner for why, if a discharge were not reasonably suspected, it retained the company to immediately remove the USTs upon the failed pressure testing. Clearly, the Club had a notion the tanks were a discharge problem. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. While there was some confusion as to the exact volume of free product in the monitoring well, there was clear evidence that such was reported for many months prior to the confirmation in September, 1991. Further, the main confusion regarding the product found in the well was not as to its existence, but as to the individual's knowledge of the metric measurement of it. One hundred centimeters of product in a two or three inch pipe would not be a minute amount. Except as addressed in the foregoing findings, paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Petitioner did not undertake all repairs necessary to abate a discharge problem. Paragraph 10 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant. Clearly, as early as August, 1990, Petitioner knew or should have known of a discharge problem based upon the monitoring well report; that all of the discharge did not necessarily flow from the fittings that had been repaired is irrelevant. Further, Petitioner did no testing to verify that the replaced fittings had solved the discharge problem (especially in light of the well reports). Paragraph 11 is rejected as an inaccurate restatement of the exhibit. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Incidentally, the hearing in this case was in the year 1992. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as a misstatement of the exhibit cited. Paragraphs 13 through 27 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Brigette A. Ffolkes Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Scott E. Wilt MAGUIRE, VOORHIS & WELLS, P.A. 2 South Orange Plaza P.O. Box 633 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Redd’s Cleaners, DEP Facility No. 139502588 is eligible for state-administered cleanup under the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program pursuant to Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Metropolitan Dade County (Petitioner) is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Pursuant to Chapter 24, Metropolitan Dade County Code, Petitioner regulates, among other things, the use, storage, and disposal of industrial wastes and hazardous substances in Dade County. Sekoff Investments, Inc. (Intervenor) is a Florida corporation and is the owner of commercial real property located at 5821 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Coral Gables, Florida. Intervenor is a "real property owner" as defined by Section 376.301(25), Florida Statutes (1995). Florida Department of Environmental Protection (Respondent DEP) is an agency of the State of Florida. Pursuant to Chapters 20, 376, and 403, Florida Statutes, Respondent DEP has jurisdiction, among other things, over the regulation and protection of the State's surface waters, groundwater, and other natural resources. From 1956 to December 1994, Intervenor leased its property to "drycleaning facilities," as that term is defined by Section 376.301(8), Florida Statutes (1995), which operated under the name "Redd's Cleaners" (Respondent Cleaners). Intervenor was not an owner of the drycleaning facilities, nor did it participate in their management or operation. Intervenor's property has never been served by sewers and has a septic tank. Intervenor's property is not in an area served by private drinking water wells or in a cone of influence of a County wellfield. Starting in 1988, Petitioner began inspecting drycleaning facilities and requiring them to obtain operating permits pursuant to Section 24, Metropolitan Dade County Code. On February 28, 1989, Petitioner issued Operating Permit No. IW5-3387-88 to Jen-Dan, Inc., d/b/a Respondent Cleaners. Operating Permit Nos. IW5-3387-89, IW5-3387-90, IW5-3387-91, IW5-3387-92, and IW5-3387-94 were subsequently issued for the period between April, 1989 through April, 1995. On October 14, 1993, Petitioner collected soil and groundwater samples from the septic tank and storm drain/soakage pit at Intervenor's property and discovered elevated levels of perchloroethylene, a "drycleaning solvent," as that term is defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (1995). On March 15, 1994, Petitioner issued Respondent Cleaners and Intervenor a Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action (NOV). The NOV provided that the presence of drycleaning solvents in the septic tank and storm drain/soakage pit violated Sections 24-11, 24-13, 24-14, 24-26, and 24-55, Metropolitan Dade County Code, and ordered Respondent Cleaners and Intervenor to submit a formal plan for the assessment and cleanup of the drycleaning solvent contamination. The cited provisions of the Dade County Code generally provide that it is unlawful to throw, drain, run, seep, or otherwise discharge industrial or liquid wastes into septic tanks, sewers, or waters of the County; to cause or maintain a nuisance or sanitary nuisance as defined by the Metropolitan Dade County Code; or to violate any provision or condition of an operating permit. Intervenor hired the environmental consulting firm, REP Associates, Inc., which prepared and submitted to Petitioner a Contamination Assessment Plan (CAP) dated April 21, 1994. By letter dated May 5, 1994, Petitioner approved the CAP with modifications, and required the immediate pump out and disposal of the contaminated contents of the septic tank and storm drain/soakage pit. In May and June, 1994, Intervenor began collecting soil, groundwater, and sediment samples from the septic tank and storm drain, and installed a groundwater monitoring well, as required by the CAP. The test results disclosed the presence of drycleaning solvents in the soils and groundwater at Intervenor's property. The contaminants in the septic tank and storm drain/soakage pit were a source or a likely source of soil and groundwater contamination at the facility. On May 8, 1994, Respondent DEP announced that it was suspending all enforcement actions against drycleaning facilities based on the Florida Legislature's anticipated passage of the Florida Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Act (Drycleaning Act). On June 3, 1994, the Drycleaning Act became effective. On August 23, 1994, Petitioner mailed Intervenor and Respondent Cleaners a Final Notice Prior to Court Action stating that they were not in strict compliance with the deadlines set forth in the NOV. On September 22, 1994, Intervenor submitted to Petitioner a Report of Sampling and Analysis summarizing the results of the work performed in May and June, 1994. By letter dated September 23, 1994, Intervenor further advised Petitioner that it would be applying for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Program (Drycleaning Cleanup Program) as soon as Respondent DEP promulgated the necessary implementation rules. Intervenor proposed that Petitioner approve a no further action plan pending its notice of eligibility under the Drycleaning Act. By letter dated September 30, 1994, Petitioner disapproved Intervenor's no further action plan. Petitioner again notified Intervenor and Respondent Cleaners that they must immediately remove and dispose of the contents of the septic tank and storm drain. In December, 1994, Intervenor evicted Respondent Cleaners. Since that date, the former drycleaning facility has remained vacant. On July 18, 1995, Intervenor's environmental consultants removed and properly disposed of the contents of the septic tank and storm drain. 18.1 On October 3, 1995, Intervenor's consultants advanced new soil borings and installed a new groundwater monitoring well. Groundwater samples were collected on October 24, 1995. 19.2 On February 21, 1996, Intervenor submitted its Contamination Assessment Report Addendum to Petitioner, summarizing the results of the work performed in July and October, 1995, and requesting a monitoring only plan (MOP). By letter dated February 29, 1996, Petitioner disapproved Intervenor's proposed MOP. 20. In March 1996, Respondent DEP began to accept applications for the Drycleaning Cleanup Program. Intervenor submitted its application for Respondent Cleaners on March 8, 1996. 21.3 By letter dated June 11, 1996, Respondent DEP approved Intervenor's application and determined that Respondent Cleaners' drycleaning facility was eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Cleanup Program. By Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing served July 11, 1996, Petitioner appealed Respondent DEP's eligibility determination. According to Petitioner, Intervenor's failure to timely comply with Petitioner's order to assess and remediate Respondent Cleaners constitutes gross negligence in the operation of the cleaner, thereby precluding its eligibility in the Drycleaning Cleanup Program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order finding Redd's Cleaners, DEP Facility No. 139502588 eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Program.DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1997.
The Issue Whether or not the agency may, pursuant to Section 525.06 F.S., assess $390.04 for sale of substandard product due to a violation of the petroleum inspection laws and also set off that amount against Petitioner's bond.
Findings Of Fact Coleman Oil Co., Inc. d/b/a Shell Oil Co. at I-75 and SR 26 Gainesville, Florida, is in the business of selling kerosene, among other petroleum products. On November 15, 1990, Randy Herring, an inspector employed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and who works under the direction of John Whitton, Chief of its Bureau of Petroleum, visited the seller to conduct an inspection of the petroleum products being offered for sale to the public. Mr. Herring drew a sample of "1-K" kerosene being offered for sale, sealed it, and forwarded it to the agency laboratory in Tallahassee where Nancy Fisher, an agency chemist, tested it to determine whether it met agency standards. The testing revealed that the sampled kerosene contained .22% by weight of sulfur. This is in excess of the percentage by weight permitted by Rule 5F- 2.001(2) F.A.C. for this product. A "Stop Sale Notice" was issued, and on the date of that notice (November 20, 1990) the inspector's comparison of the seller's delivery sheets and the kerosene physically remaining in his tanks resulted in the determination that 196 gallons of kerosene had been sold to the public. Based on a posted price of $1.99 per gallon, the retail value of the product sold was determined, and the agency accordingly assessed a $390.04 penalty. The agency also permitted the seller to post a bond for the $390.04 on November 21, 1990. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed in similar cases.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the $390.04 assessment and offsetting the bond against it. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLINTON H. COULTER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 510 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 MR. RANDAL W. COLEMAN COLEMAN OIL COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 248 GAINESVILLE, FL 32602 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Phillips Petroleum Company, is the owner and operator of two retail gasoline stations situated at 2675 Volusia Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida and 13987 Walsingham Road, Largo, Florida. On July 6, 1989, Respondent's inspector, Ralph Myrick, made a routine inspection of the "super clean unleaded" gasoline at Petitioner's company-owned station at 2675 Volusia Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida. A sample of the super clean unleaded fuel was taken by inspector Myrick and was analyzed by Respondent. The analysis revealed that the super clean unleaded gasoline was contaminated with diesel fuel. On June 20, 1989, Petitioner converted its 4,000 gallon diesel tank to a super clean unleaded gasoline tank. During the conversion, Petitioner used a transport carrier to drain the diesel from the tank to a transport carrier. Petitioner thereafter utilized a maintenance contractor to pump all residue from the bottom of the tank until it was dry. Petitioner thereafter flushed the lines with 100 gallons of new gasoline product before refilling the tank with 3,700 gallons of super clean unleaded gasoline. The diesel which was pumped out and the 100 gallons used for flushing was returned to Petitioner's Jacksonville terminal by a transport carrier. On July 3, 1989, Petitioner received another 1,300 gallons of super clean unleaded gasoline and stored it in the converted tank which had previously been used to store diesel fuel. At the time of Respondent's inspection of the Daytona Beach station on July 6, 1989, Petitioner had sold to the public, at retail, approximately 2,337 gallons of the contaminated fuel. At the time of inspector Myrick's inspection on July 6, 1989, Petitioner was advised of the contamination problem and a "stop order" was issued to correct the problem. In lieu of confiscation, Petitioner posted a refundable bond in the amount of $1,000 and retained the fuel. Petitioner had its transport carrier to again completely drain the converted tank and Petitioner returned 2,663 gallons to its Jacksonville terminal. Petitioner ordered 2,600 gallons of new product which was returned to the subject station for sale. On March 12, 1990, inspector Myrick made a routine inspection of Petitioner's retail station at 13987 Walsingham Road, Largo, Florida. A sample of the detroleum product was taken and analyzed. Respondent's analysis of the sample taken from Petitioner's Largo station revealed that the fuel was below standard. Petitioner's agent Switz admitted that more than 1,000 gallons of fuel had been sold to retail customers at a price at approximately $1.00 or more per gallon. Petitioner placed a $1,000 cash bond in lieu of confiscation to continue operating and to retain the fuel which was analyzed and found to be below standard at its Largo station.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for a refund of the bonds posted in the subject cases. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: R. H. Switz Phillips Petroleum Company 3021 Landing Way Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services May Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John C. Whitton, Chief Bureau of Petroleum Inspection 3125 Conner Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether or not the agency may, pursuant to Section 525.06, F.S. enter an assessment for sale of substandard product due to a violation of the petroleum inspection laws and also set off that amount against Respondent's bond.
Findings Of Fact Frank Hampton, d/b/a Hampton's Gulf Station, has operated at 2610 North Myrtle Avenue, Jacksonville, for many years and has had no prior complaints against it by the Petitioner. Respondent is in the business of selling kerosene, among other petroleum products. The facts in this case are largely undisputed. On November 28, 1990, Bill Ford, an inspector employed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, visited the Respondent's premises to conduct an inspection of the petroleum products being offered for sale to the public. Ford drew a sample of "1-K" kerosene being offered for sale, sealed it, and forwarded it to the agency laboratory in Tallahassee where John Anderson, under the supervision of Nancy Fischer, an agency chemist, tested it to determine whether the sample met agency standards. The testing revealed that the sampled kerosene contained .21% by weight of sulfur. This in excess of the percentage by weight permitted by Rule 5F- 2.001(2) F.A.C. for this product, but it would qualify as "2-K" kerosene. A "Stop Sale Notice" was issued, and on the date of that notice (November 30, 1990) the tank from which the test sample had been drawn contained 3887 gallons of product. It was determined from Respondent's records that 4392 gallons had been sold to the public since the last delivery of 5500 gallons on November 16, 1990. The product was sold at $1.58 per gallon. The calculated retail value of the product sold was determined to be in excess of $1,000.00, and the agency permitted the seller to post a bond for $1,000.00 (the maximum legal penalty/bond) on December 3, 1990. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed in similar cases. On this occasion, Respondent had purchased the kerosene in question from a supplier which is not its usual wholesale supplier. This was the first time Respondent had ever ordered from this supplier and it is possible there was some miscommunication in the order, but Respondent intended to order pure "1-K" kerosene. Respondent only purchased from this supplier due to the desperate need in the community for kerosene during the unusually cold weather that occurred during the fall of 1990. Respondent ordered "1-K" kerosene and believed that "1-K" had been delivered to it by the new wholesale supplier up until the agency inspector sampled Respondent's tank. After posting bond, Respondent originally intended to send the unused portion of "2-K" kerosene back to its supplier, but instead was granted permission by the agency to relabel the remaining product so that the label would correctly reflect that the product was "2-K." Respondent accordingly charged only the lesser rate appropriate to "2-K" kerosene for sale of the remaining 3887 gallons.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Cnsumer Services enter a final order approving the $1,000.00 maximum penalty and offsetting the bond against it. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: FRANK HAMPTON HAMPTON VILLA APARTMENTS 3190 WEST EDGEWOOD AVENUE JACKSONVILLE, FL 32209 CLINTON COULTER, JR. ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES (LEGAL) MAYO BUILDING, ROOM 510 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Miami Yacht Divers, Inc., is entitled to reimbursement for cleanup costs.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering claims against the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund. Petitioner is a company located in Dade County, Florida, which performs commercial diving operations. Such operations include oil pollution containment and clean-up. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Dan Delmonico was the principal officer or owner for the Petitioner who supervised the operations of the company. In April of 1993, Mr. Delmonico discovered a fuel discharge next door to the premises of Defender Yacht, Inc., a company located on the Miami River in Dade County, Florida. The source of the discharge was an abandoned sunken vessel. This derelict vessel had no markings from which its ownership could be determined. Upon discovering the vessel, Mr. Delmonico did not contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the discharge. Instead, Mr. Delmonico contacted several colleagues whose help he enlisted to assist him to clean up the discharge. In this regard, Mr. Delmonico procured the services of a diver and a crane company to remove the vessel from the water. Additionally, Mr. Delmonico utilized a boom and oil absorbent clean-up pads to remove the discharged fuel from the water. In total, Mr. Delmonico maintains it took four work days to complete the removal of the discharge and the salvage of the derelict vessel. At no time during this period did Mr. Delmonico contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the foregoing activities. No official from any governmental entity supervised or approved the clean-up operation or salvage activity which is in dispute. After the fact Petitioner filed a reimbursement claim with the United States Coast Guard. Such claim was denied. Upon receipt of such denial, Petitioner filed the claim which is at issue in the instant case. In connection with this claim with Respondent, Petitioner submitted all forms previously tendered to the Coast Guard including the standard claim form, labor receipts, rental receipts, supply receipts, trailer and storage receipts, cash expenses, a job summary, and photographs. On or about September 20, 1996, Respondent issued a letter denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for expenses associated with the above-described salvage and clean-up activities. The grounds for the denial were the Petitioner's failure to obtain prior approval for the activities and the absence of "good cause" for the waiver of prior approval. Additionally, the Respondent maintained that Petitioner had failed to provide evidence that a pollutant discharge existed and that the removal of the vessel was necessary to abate and remove the discharge. It is undisputed by Petitioner that prior approval for the clean-up activities was not obtained. Petitioner timely disputed the denial and was afforded a point of entry to challenge such decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathelyn M. Jacques Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 N. Paul San Filippo, Esquire Seidensticker & San Filippo Parkway Financial Center 2150 Goodlette Road, Suite 305 Naples, Florida 34102
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Notice of Intent to Issue Order Requiring Access to Property (“Access Order”) issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”) and directed to Glenda Mahaney, as the property owner, is a valid exercise of the Department’s authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Glenda Mahaney is a natural person and the owner of the property identified in the Access Order. The Department is the state agency which has been granted powers and assigned duties under chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, for the protection and restoration of air and water quality and to adopt rules and issue orders in furtherance of these powers and duties. Background The groundwater beneath a parcel of land adjacent to Petitioner’s property was contaminated with petroleum when the land was used in the past for auto salvage operations. Initial groundwater sampling near the border of Petitioner’s property showed groundwater contamination by gasoline constituents which exceeded Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). In other words, the contamination was at levels that required cleanup. However, later sampling showed the concentration of contaminants had decreased below GCTLs, probably as a result of natural attenuation. The existing data suggests that any groundwater contamination beneath Petitioner’s property is probably now at a level that would not require cleanup. However, the Department issued the Access Order because the Department is not certain about the contamination beneath Petitioner’s property and because Petitioner has continually requested further investigation. Petitioner believes contamination from the auto salvage site has caused illness in a tenant and even contributed to other persons’ deaths. However, no expert testimony was received on this subject and no finding is made about whether contamination exists on Petitioner’s property which has caused illness or death. The Department’s Site Investigation Section wants access to Petitioner’s property in order to determine whether contamination has migrated beneath Petitioner’s property and, if it has, the extent and concentration of the contaminants. The Department wants to: (a) install up to five temporary groundwater monitoring wells, (b) collect groundwater samples from the wells, (c) collect a groundwater sample from Petitioner’s potable water well, and (d) remove the monitoring wells after the sampling. The Access Order includes terms related to advance notice, scheduling, and related matters. Liability Although Petitioner believes petroleum contamination is present and wants it cleaned up, she objects to the provision of the Access Order related to liability. Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order provides: Ms. Mahaney shall not be liable for any injury, damage or loss on the property suffered by the Department, its agents, or employees which is not caused by the [sic] negligence or intentional acts. Petitioner insists that she should not be liable under any circumstances for injuries or damages suffered by Department’s agents or employees who come on her property for these purposes. She demands that the Department come onto her property “at their own risk.” At the final hearing, the Department stated that it did not intend to impose on Petitioner a level of liability different than the liability that would already be applicable under Florida law. The Department offered to amend Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order to indicate that Petitioner’s “liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law.” Scope of the Investigation Petitioner objects to the proposed groundwater sampling because she does not believe it is extensive enough. Petitioner also believes the Department should test for soil contamination. The Department’s expert, David Phillips, testified that the proposed monitoring well locations were selected based on the direction of groundwater flow in the area and the wells are along the likely path of migration of any contaminated groundwater from the former auto salvage site. Another Department witness, Tracy Jewsbury, testified that no soil contamination was found on the auto salvage site, so the Department has no reason to expect there would be soil contamination on Petitioner’s property that came from the auto salvage operation. The Department will use the data collected from the wells to determine if contamination is present and whether future contamination assessment and/or remediation activities are necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection withdraw the Access Order or, alternatively, that Paragraph 9(e) of the Access Order be amended to provide that Ms. Mahaney’s potential liability, if any, shall be determined in accordance with Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2017. William W. Gwaltney, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Glenda Q. Mahaney Post Office Box 123 Mount Dora, Florida 32756 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Robert A. Williams, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Legal Department, Suite 1051-J Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed) Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 (eServed
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated certain rules of the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) related to petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria as alleged in the Department’s Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (NOV); whether Respondent is liable for the administrative fines and investigative costs assessed by the Department; whether mitigation of the administrative fine is appropriate; and whether Respondent should be required to take the corrective action described in the NOV.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes (2008),1 and the rules promulgated in Florida Administrative Code Title 62, pertaining to petroleum contamination. Respondent Z.K. Mart, Inc., is a Florida corporation, and owns and operates a retail fueling facility (DEP Facility No. 8507091) located at 5077 Normand Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida (“the facility”). In January 2004, soil sampling in conjunction with the removal of an underground petroleum storage tank at the facility showed petroleum contamination. Respondent reported the contamination to the Department in a Discharge Report Form on January 29, 2004. Respondent removed the tank that was the source of the contamination, conducted source removal activities, and submitted various reports to the Department, including a Site Assessment Report (SAR), submitted in February 2006. In March 2006, the Department determined the SAR was incomplete and requested that Respondent submit a SAR addendum. To date, Respondent has not submitted the SAR addendum. Respondent’s insurer, Mid-Continent Casualty Company, refused coverage for the assessment and cleanup costs associated with the reported discharge, asserting that the contamination “arose out of” the tank removal. Respondent contends that the contamination occurred before the tank removal. In October 2004, Respondent sued Mid-Continent in the circuit court for Duval County for wrongful denial of coverage. Respondent requested that the Department also file suit against Mid-Continent, pursuant to Section 376.309(2), Florida Statutes, for violating financial responsibility requirements. In December 2008, the Department sued Mid-Continent. The litigation is ongoing. Respondent spent over $300,000 to remove 2,503 tons of contaminated soil and to conduct site assessment activities associated with the reported contamination. In August, September, and October 2006, Respondent filed financial affidavits and additional materials with the Department in support of Respondent’s claim that it was unable to pay for additional assessment work. By letter dated November 3, 2008, the Department rejected Respondent’s claim that it was financially unable to undertake the requested site assessment. Respondent submitted a financial affidavit prepared by Abdul Khan, the vice president and secretary of Z.K. Mart, Inc., which states that the net income of Respondent was $36,479 at the end of 2005. Financial information for later years, including 2008, was also submitted by Respondent. However, no financial analysis was included. No evidence was submitted to establish the estimated costs of future site assessment activities. It cannot be determined from the financial information in the record whether Respondent is currently financially able to conduct additional site assessment activities. The Department states in the NOV that Count I constitutes a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 770.800(5). That rule provides that it is a violation of Chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, for a responsible party to fail to submit additional information or meet any time frame “herein.” The Department explained that Count I was intended to charge Respondent with failing to complete site assessment. The only applicable time frame in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800, entitled “Time Schedules,” is in subsection (3), which requires a responsible party to submit additional information within 60 days of the Department’s request for the information. That violation, however, is more specifically charged in Count II. Count II of the NOV charges Respondent with violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(11), which states that, if a SAR is incomplete, the Department shall inform the responsible party and the responsible party shall submit a SAR addendum within 60 days. Counts I and II charge Respondent with the same offense, failing to submit requested information within 60 days of the request. As stated in the Conclusions of Law, Respondent cannot be made to pay administrative fines under a duplicate charge. Count III of the NOV charges Respondent with liability for the Department’s investigative costs of $500 incurred in conjunction with this enforcement matter. These are nominal costs and were never disputed by Respondent.
