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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MERCEDES M. POWERS AND PATRICIA A. FLECK, 98-002878 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Jun. 29, 1998 Number: 98-002878 Latest Update: Jul. 12, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on May 20, 1998.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Mercedes M. Powers and Patricia A. Fleck, were both licensed as real estate brokers, having been issued license numbers 0151412 and 0027277, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Fleck served as qualifying broker for Patricia A. Fleck Real Estate, 5466 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida, while Powers was employed as a broker-salesperson at the same firm. Douglas K. Rogers, a Spring Hill resident, was interested in purchasing a lot in a Spring Hill subdivision and observed a "for sale" sign on Lot 7 at 12287 Elmore Drive. The lot was owned by Wayne and Faith Ryden, who resided in North Hero, Vermont. Rogers contacted the Rydens by telephone in mid or late March 1997 to ascertain the price of the lot. Rogers had also seen a nearby lot for sale carrying a sign from Respondents' firm. On March 23, 1997, he telephoned Powers and inquired about another lot in the same subdivision. Powers contacted the owners but learned that they did not want to sell. After relaying this advice to Rogers, she told him that she had a listing on Lot 6; however, Rogers was not interested in Lot 6 and merely indicated he would "get back" to her later. On April 3, 1997, Rogers again telephoned Powers and told her he was interested in purchasing Lot 7, which was owned by the Rydens. Powers invited Rogers to come to her office where she would call the sellers. Powers then "ran the public record" and learned that the Rydens owned the lot. On Friday, April 4, 1997, in the presence of Rogers, Powers telephoned Mrs. Ryden and spoke with her for three or four minutes. In response to an inquiry from Mrs. Ryden, Powers indicated that if the Rydens listed the property with her, she would represent the sellers; otherwise, she would represent the buyer in the transaction. Based on Mrs. Ryden's response, Powers was led to believe that the Rydens wanted Powers to represent them in the transaction. Accordingly, she explained the arrangement to Rogers, and he voluntarily signed an Agency Disclosure form which acknowledged that he understood, and agreed with, that arrangement. With Powers' assistance, that same day Rogers executed a contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 7 for a price of $8,500.00. The contract called for the sellers to accept the offer no later than April 7, 1997, or three days later, and that the contract would close by May 15, 1997, unless extended by the parties. The contract further called for Rogers to provide a $200.00 cash deposit, which was "to be placed in escrow by 4-7-97." The contract, listing agreement, and expense report were all sent by overnight mail to the Rydens the same day. Because Rogers did not have sufficient cash for a deposit with him, he advised Powers that he would return with a check the following Monday, or April 7. Notwithstanding the language in the contract, he gave Powers specific instructions that when he delivered a check, she was to hold it until the Rydens signed the contract, and then deposit the money. This is confirmed by a contemporaneous note made by Powers which read: "Mr. Rogers will bring check Monday. Then to hold until Rydens sign contract, then deposit it." Rogers testified that he delivered check no. 3497 in the amount of $200.00 to a receptionist in Respondents' office approximately two hours after he executed the contract. He also says he got the receptionist to make a copy of the face of the check, which has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. If in fact a check was actually delivered to a receptionist that day, that person lost the check and never advised Powers or Fleck (or anyone else) that one had been delivered. Indeed, until June 6, 1997, Respondents were not aware that one was purportedly delivered, and they never saw a copy of the face of the check until they received the Administrative Complaint, with attached exhibits, in May 1998. The original check has never surfaced, and it was never presented for payment to the bank. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Respondents to deposit the check in the firm's escrow account, as required by rule and statute. According to a Division investigator, there have been other instances where a realtor denies receiving a deposit from the buyer. It can be fairly inferred from his testimony that when this occurs, if the realtor's denial is accepted as being true, the realtor will not be held accountable. At no time did Respondents ever intend to violate any rule or statute governing the deposit of escrow funds; had they known that a check had been delivered to the firm, it would have been handled in an appropriate manner. The contract technically expired on April 7, 1997, when the Rydens had not yet accepted the offer. However, on April 8, 1997, Powers again contacted Mrs. Ryden by telephone since Powers had not received a reply. Based on that conversation, which led Powers to believe that the Rydens may not have received the first set of documents, Powers re-sent by overnight mail copies of the contract, agency disclosure, and expense sheet to the Rydens with a request that they either accept or refuse the contract, but in either event, to return the contract and let her know their decision. The Rydens, however, never extended her the courtesy of a reply. It is fair to infer from the evidence that by now, Rogers had again contacted the Rydens by telephone about purchasing the lot in a separate transaction so that the parties would not have to pay a realtor's commission. Rogers telephoned Powers once or twice in April or May 1997 to ask if the contract had ever been returned by the Rydens. He made no mention of his check. Those inquiries are somewhat puzzling since Rogers was well aware of the fact that the parties intended to negotiate a separate agreement. In any event, on the reasonable belief that the contract had never been accepted, and no deposit had ever been made by Rogers, Powers did nothing more about the transaction until June 6, 1997, when Rogers telephoned her at home that evening asking for "his check." By then, he had a separate binding contract with the Rydens for the sale of the lot; he had already stopped payment on the check a week earlier; and he knew that it had never been deposited. Powers advised Rogers that if in fact his check was at the office, he could drop by the next day at 10:30 a.m. and get it from the broker. Rogers came to the office the next morning, but he arrived at around 8:45 a.m., or well before Powers expected him. In Powers' absence, the on-duty receptionist was unsuccessful in locating his file (which was in Powers' office) and the check. On June 14, 1997, Rogers sent a complaint to the Division. That complaint triggered this proceeding. It is fair to infer that Rogers filed the complaint to gain leverage in the event Respondents ever brought an action against him to recover their lost real estate commission. Unknown to Respondents, on June 10, 1997, the sale was completed, and the Rydens executed and delivered a warranty deed to Rogers and his wife conveying the property in question. For all their efforts in attempting to accommodate Rogers, Respondents were deprived of a real estate commission through the covert acts of the buyer and seller, and they were saddled with the legal costs of defending this action. In terms of mitigating and aggravating factors, it is noted that Fleck was never involved with this transaction until the demand for the check was made in June 1997. There is no evidence that Powers has ever been disciplined by the Real Estate Commission on any prior occasion. On an undisclosed date, however, Fleck received a fine and was required to complete a 30-hour broker management course for failing to adequately supervise a "former rental manager" and failing to "timely notify FREC of deposit dispute." Neither Rogers or the Rydens suffered any harm by virtue of the deposit check being lost, and the parties completed the transaction on their own without paying a commission. During the course of the investigation, Respondents fully cooperated with the Division's investigator.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Charlie Luckie, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 907 Brooksville, Florida 34605-0907 William M. Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57475.01475.25 Florida Administrative Code (3) 61J2-14.00961J2-14.01061J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RANDOLPH E. KOUT AND MARY ANN BERLIN, 80-000889 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000889 Latest Update: Aug. 28, 1980

Findings Of Fact After Respondent Kout was unsuccessful in his judicial review of the Board's Order suspending his real estate salesman's license, the Board confirmed his sixty-day suspension commencing November 20, 1978. The license that was suspended had expired on September 30, 1978, and had not been renewed. During November, 1978, Kout submitted an incomplete application which was returned, corrected and resubmitted; the Hoard received this on January 10, 1978, and subsequently issued a license with an effective date of November 20, 1978. The Board's computer, records notwithstanding, did not know of the suspension until March, 1978, and did not know of the issuance of the license until August, 1978, when the Keyes Company forwarded Kout's affidavit that his Registration Certificate had been stolen. Keyes was informed that the license was suspended as no renewal had been received. Application was made and Kout's license reissued. Until his license was stolen, along with his wallet, Kout carried the license issued in January, 1979, and assumed he had been reinstated on January 19, 1979, at the end of the sixty-day suspension. Conclusions The Board contends that under the above facts, Kout operated without a valid current real estate license between November 20, 1978, and August 21, 1979, and specifically during June, 1979, regarding the Bentkowski sale, discussed under Count I, as required by Section 474.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977 and 1979)(misdemeanor), and therefore contrary to Sections 457.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), and 474.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes (1979)(revocation/suspension for violating the real estate law). There is no doubt that confusion existed between the Board's records and computer as to what the current status of Kout's license was during the period in question. However, absent rebutting evidence by the Board of the testimony of Kout, the allegations of the Board are not supported by the evidence.

Recommendation It is , therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Count I and Count II of the Petition of the Board of Real Estate be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. HAROLD E. SMITHERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed this 28th day of August with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Nancy Kelley Wittenberg Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. C.B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Board of Real Estate 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David M. Rogerio, Esquire Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick and Hoehl 2400 AmeriFirst Building One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ALFRED RIFFLARD, JR., AND THOMAS L. NAROG, 83-002748 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002748 Latest Update: Apr. 04, 1984

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the posthearing memorandum and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: Respondent, Alfred Rifflard, Jr., during times material herein, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman and is the holder of license number 0338064. Respondent, Thomas L. Narog, during times material herein, was a licensed real estate salesman and is the holder of license number 0309097. On approximately May 24, 1982, Respondent Narog represented to John F. Wodalski that Respondent Rifflard, as an investor, was interested in purchasing certain real property owned by Wodalski. Based on discussions with seller Wodalski, Wodalski and Respondent Alfred Rifflard entered into a deposit receipt and contract for sale and purchase of the Wodalski property. The purchaser is listed on the deposit receipt contract as Alfred Rifflard and/or assigns." (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The negotiations for the sale of the subject property were conducted at the bar of a country club where both Respondent Naroq and seller Wodalski were employed. Respondent Rifflard was aware that the subject property had been on the market for approximately eighteen months. Seller Wodalski expressed (to Respondent Narog) disenchantment that he was unable to move the property as he had planned to purchase other properties with the proceeds received from the sale of the subject property. Respondent Narog attempted to sell the Wodalski property to enable him (Wodalski) to purchase the other property. During the negotiations for the sale of the subject property, Respondent Wodalski tendered a copy of his business card to seller Wodalski. That business card reflected that Respondent Rifflard was a licensed real estate salesman. Following the execution of the deposit receipt contract by Respondent Rifflard, Respondent Rifflard showed the property to approximately three prospective purchasers in an effort to sell the property prior to the purported closing date. Federal Land Title Corporation of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida was commissioned to handle the closing of the property from seller Wodalski to Respondent Rifflard and/or his assigns. This is confirmed by a letter dated August 19, 1982 to seller Wodalski wherein loan processor Kathy Bradley advised the seller that she expected to expedite the closing of the Wodalski property. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) Upon receiving the above-referred letter from Federal Land Title Corporation, seller Wodalski demanded a tender of the $1,000 earnest money deposit which is referred to in the deposit receipt contract executed by Respondent Rifflard. At that time, Respondent Narog was told that no monies could be disbursed to him prior to closing. Seller Wodalski called off the closing based on his claim that another broker advised him that it was illegal for an undisclosed licensed real estate salesman to purchase property in his name. Based on the testimony of Respondents Rifflard and Narog including the testimony of the Petitioner's investigator, Anthony Nicola, who investigated the subject complaint, it is specifically found herein that the Respondents disclosed the fact that Rifflard was a licensed real estate salesman at the time the deposit receipt contract was executed herein. In making this finding, consideration was given to seller Wodalski's testimony to the effect that he was busy 2/ at the time that he entered the deposit receipt contract and that it was indeed possible that Respondent Rifflard tendered a business card to him at the time he entered the subject contract. Paragraph two of the deposit receipt contract reveals that the method of payment includes a $1,000 deposit, in the form of a note, which would be returned to the buyer at closing. It is undisputed by the Respondents that no earnest money deposit note in the amount of $1,000 was given the buyer's attorney to be held in trust until the closing was completed. The Respondents acknowledged that it was an error on their part to fail to execute the earnest money deposit as Respondent Rifflard agreed in the subject deposit receipt contract. Further, Respondent Rifflard urges that his failure to execute a note was an oversight on his part.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents, Alfred Rifflard, Jr. and Thomas L. Narog, be privately reprimanded by the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, based on their failure to place in deposit, to be held in trust, a $1,000 earnest money deposit in connection with the transaction surrounding the deposit receipt and contract for sale and purchase entered into by Alfred Rifflard, Jr., as purchaser of certain real property owned by John Wodalski. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. WINFIELD EZELL, SR., AND EZELL REALTY, INC., 85-000140 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000140 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ezell Realty, Inc., was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0231943 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Winfield Ezell, Sr., held real estate broker's license number 0309739 issued by petitioner and was the sole qualifying broker and officer of Ezell Realty, Inc. The firm is located at 1512 West Gore Street, Orlando, Florida. Grover Crawford was an acquaintance of Ezell who was interested in purchasing certain rental property on Coretta Way in Orlando, Florida. When he was unable to purchase the property Crawford told Ezell to let him know if anything else became available in that area. Ezell happened to own a rental house at 1121 Coretta Way which he had just purchased several months earlier in a foreclosure proceeding, and the two eventually began discussions concerning a possible sale. At all times relevant thereto, the house was rented to tenants, and Crawford intended the property to remain as investor-owned property rather than owner-occupied property. Ezell initially agreed to sell the property for $70,000 and the two entered into a contract on January 8, 1983, using this sales price. However, the lender's appraisal of the residence came in far below this figure, and the parties eventually agreed on a sales price of $55,450. A second contract for sale and purchaser was executed on June 22, 1983. Although the contract provided that Crawford would pay a cash deposit of $2,300 to be held in escrow by Ezell Realty, none was paid since Ezell was given $2,300 by the tenants of the house to make needed repairs to the property prior to the sale. This arrangement was agreeable with Crawford. The contract also required the seller (Ezell) to pay all closing coats. Therefore, Crawford was not required to pay any "up front" costs in order to buy the property. Under the terms of the second contract, Crawford was to obtain FHA financing on the property in the amount of $53,150. This type of financing is the most desirable from an investor standpoint since the mortgage can be easily transferred to another buyer for a small transfer fee without lender approval. After executing the first contract on January 8, 1983, Ezell and Crawford executed an "Addendum to Contract For Sale and Purchase" on the same date which provided in pertinent part: This contract is for the sole purpose of having the buyer obtain an assumable FHA mortgage for the seller and reconveying title to the seller. The seller hereby irrevocably assumes the said FHA mortgage from the buyer immediately after closing and the buyers hereby agree to that assumption. For this, Crawford was to receive $1,000. The parties agreed that this addendum would apply to the second contract executed on June 22, 1983. At the suggestion of Ezell, Crawford made application for a $53.150 FHA loan with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC) in Maitland, Florida, a lending institution which Ezell had done business with on a number of prior occasions. However, Ezell was not present at any meetings between Crawford and RFC. When Crawford applied for the mortgage, he indicated the property would be used for investment purposes and would not be owner-occupied. For some reason, RFC assumed the property would be owner-occupied and structured the-loan in that manner. Because of this, Crawford's down payment was slightly less than 5% of the value of the property with the remainder being financed by the institution. Had RFC treated the loan as an investor-loan, the down payment would have been increased to around 15%. Neither Crawford or Ezell advised RFC of the Addendum to the contract which required Crawford to reconvey the property to Ezell for $1,000 once the FHA mortgage was obtained. Had RFC known of this it would not have approved the loan. There was no competent evidence that such an agreement was illegal or violated any federal laws or contravened any real estate industry standard or ethical consideration. The loan was eventually approved, and a closing held on September 22, 1983. After closing, Crawford retained the property in his name with Ezell making all payments from the rent proceeds. This was consistent with an oral agreement between the two that such an arrangement would last for an indefinite period as long as the payments were current. When Crawford later received several notices from the lender stating that mortgage payments were in arrears, he hired an attorney and demanded that Ezell fulfill the terms of the Addendum. He also filed a complaint against Ezell with petitioner which precipitated the instant proceeding. After the closing, Ezell had intended for the tenants to assume the mortgage since they had expressed an interest in buying the property. However, such a sale never materialized. In July, 1984, the property was reconveyed to Ezell, and Ezell paid Crawford $1,000 as required by the Addendum.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Julius L. Williams, Esq. P. O. Box 2629 Orlando, FL 32802 ================================================================ =

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs LORI WALK AND STARS AND STRIPES REALTY, INC., 90-002468 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Hollywood, Florida Apr. 25, 1990 Number: 90-002468 Latest Update: May 08, 1991

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Lori Wilk has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0349551. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. At all times material hereto, Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0253076. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wilk has been licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, as owner, had listed for sale certain real property with Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc./Gil Amara. Respondents obtained LPS Investments, Inc., as purchaser pursuant to a sales contract which was accepted by the seller on March 14, 1989. LPS Investments is owned by Leo and Patricia Scarola. Patricia Scarola was a former salesperson for Respondents. That Contract for Sale And Purchase of Real Property provided that a total of $500 as deposit monies was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract which acknowledged receipt of the first $100 of the deposit monies. Respondents' escrow account deposit slips reveal the first $100 was deposited into Respondents' escrow account. No proof of receipt of the additional $400 exists among the escrow account deposit slips admitted in evidence; however, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that Respondents received in trust a total earnest money deposit in the sum of $500. Thereafter, LPS Investments, Inc., refused to close, alleging misrepresentation by the seller of the property. Although the property had been advertised as a "handyman special" and the Contract provided that the property was accepted in an "as is" condition, the Scarolas who never saw the property before they entered into the Contract to purchase it discovered that it would cost more to improve the property than they had guessed. They decided not to close. Rather, Pat Scarola instructed Respondents to transfer the $500 earnest money deposit to another piece of property not involving Gwendolyn Taylor- Herbert. Without the prior knowledge or consent of the seller or of the listing broker, Respondents transferred the Scarolas' earnest money deposit to another transaction for the benefit of the purchaser (LPS Investments, Inc.) and not involving the same seller. This was done without even considering whether the seller or the seller's agent might have an interest in the deposit. At no time prior to the time that the Respondents' transferred the deposit to a different property did the Respondents give the listing broker or the seller an opportunity or notice to make a demand upon the Respondents for the deposit. After the transfer, and after the contract failed to close, the seller and the seller's agent made a demand that the $500 deposit be accounted for and delivered. It was not. On June 1, 1989, Respondents obtained an offer from Herb Sider, as purchaser, for the property owned by Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. That offer was accepted by the seller. The Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that a total deposit of $1,000 was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed that portion of the Contract acknowledging that the first $100 of the earnest money deposit had been received by Respondents. That representation was false. Sider never gave Respondents the earnest money deposit specified in the Contract, and Respondents failed to advise anyone that the representation in the Contract was false. Although Respondent Wilk testified that she would "normally" keep $100 of Sider's money in her escrow account to be applied to the various contracts that he entered into through her, there is no evidence that there was $100 in Respondents' escrow account at the time or that it was available to be applied to this Contract. Rather, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that she never received either the initial $100 or the additional $900 deposit monies from Sider for this property. Herb Sider refused to close. The seller, Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, agreed to lower the sales price, and a modified contract was executed between Taylor-Herbert and Sider. Thereafter, Sider again refused to close. At no time did Respondents notify anyone that they did not have an earnest money deposit in escrow for the Taylor-Herbert/Sider transaction. Diane Quigley, branch manager of Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., sent a letter dated July 11, 1989, to the Respondents transmitting release of deposit receipt forms and instructing Respondents to release the $500 earnest money deposit of LPS Investments, Inc., and the $1,000 earnest money deposit of Herb Sider to the seller Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. Respondents ignored that demand letter. By letter dated August 25, 1989, Quigley again wrote to Respondents demanding the release of the Sider and the LPS Investments, Inc., deposits to the seller. That letter referred to the July 11th letter which Respondents had ignored and the numerous phone calls placed by Quigley to Respondents which had not been returned. On September 13, 1989, Respondents for the first time notified Petitioner of possible conflicting demands. That letter misrepresented the facts of the situation and suggested that the seller and buyer might still be able to strike a deal. On October 3, 1989, Respondents again wrote to the Florida Real Estate Commission advising that "there is now a conflicting demand" on the deposits relative to the Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert property. Respondents' letters reveal a lack of understanding of the basics of a real estate contract. Neither letter advised the Commission that Respondents did not have any of the monies in escrow at any rate. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Wilk made an offer to purchase real property from Bel-Properties, Inc., which offer provided that $100 earnest money deposit would be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., and an additional $2,050 earnest money deposit would be placed in the Stars and Stripes escrow account within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property acknowledging that the initial $100 deposit had been received. That representation was false. The Contract which she prepared listed as the buyer "Lori Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns." The offer was accepted by the seller on December 30, 1988. In connection with that offer, Respondent Wilk represented that she was the purchaser when, in fact, she was acting on behalf of the actual purchaser HBS Investments, Inc., a corporation owned, controlled, and operated by Herb Sider. Immediately upon the acceptance of Respondent Wilk's offer, she assigned the sales contract to HBS Investments, Inc. At no time did Respondent Wilk or HBS Investments, Inc., place the $2,150 earnest money deposit in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., as represented by Respondent Wilk to the seller and as required by the Contract. Further, at no time did Respondents advise the seller that they did not have an earnest money deposit in the Stars and Stripes escrow account. On November 28, 1988, Respondent "Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns" made an offer to purchase real property from Darlene Farris. Farris accepted that offer on December 6, 1988. That Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that an initial deposit of $100 had been placed in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty and that an additional earnest money deposit of $1,900 would be placed in escrow within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract acknowledging that she had received the initial $100 earnest money deposit. That representation was false. In fact, Respondent Wilk never placed any of the $2,000 earnest money deposit in her escrow account and never advised the seller or the seller's listing broker that no earnest money deposit had been made. On or about February 2, 1989, Respondents solicited and obtained Willy Pearson as a tenant for the Farris property. Respondents represented to Pearson that the lessor was HBS Investments, Inc. Respondent Wilk prepared a Memorandum to Enter Into a Lease acknowledging the receipt of $550 as a deposit from Pearson, although Respondent Wilk only received $250 from Pearson. When Respondent Wilk received half of the rental deposit, she gave Pearson both a receipt and immediate possession of the property. Respondents obtained the tenant without the prior knowledge and consent of Darlene Farris, owner of the property. Further Respondents did not notify Farris or Farris' broker that Respondents had rented Farris' property until sometime after Respondents had received the $250 deposit from Pearson and had given him possession of Farris' property. Neither Respondent Wilk nor HBS Investments, Inc., ever closed on the Farris property. Further, Respondent Wilk never obtained authority from Darlene Farris to obtain or place a tenant in Farris' property.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and revoking the licenses of Respondents Lori Wilk and Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2468 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-21 and 23-28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 22 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2-9, 19, and 23 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 15, and 27 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 20-22, 24, 25, 28, and 30 have been rejected as not been supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 26, and 29 have been rejected as being irrelevant to determination of the issues involved in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N-308 Hurston Building - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Monte K. Rassner, Esquire Rassner, Malove, Rassner, Kramer & Gold Plaza 7000, Suite 500 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue South Miami, FL 33143 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. JOHN A. SIRIANNI AND SIRIANNI INVESTMENTS, INC., 87-003690 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003690 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 1988

The Issue The issues for determination are whether Respondents violated subsections 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes by neglecting to inform the agent of a seller that a deposit was not cash; and whether Respondents violated subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, Section 475.22, Florida Statutes and Rule 21V- 10.022, by failing to maintain an office while licensed as an active broker

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, John A. Sirianni was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0132568 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, c/o Sirianni Investments, Inc., with a home address of 300 Valley Drive, Longwood, Florida, 32779. Respondent, Sirianni Investments, Inc. was at all times pertinent to the charges a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0207206 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. For some undetermined period the corporation license was inactive. At various times, the addresses for the corporation on file at the Division of Real Estate were: 213 West Park Avenue, Winter Park, Florida; 301 Montgomery Road, Suite 301, Altamonte Springs, Florida; and most recently, 147 W. Lyman Avenue, Winter Park, Florida. At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent John A. Sirianni was licensed and operating as qualifying broker and officer for Respondent Sirianni Investments, Inc. In October, 1986, Ruth Pelegatto, a real estate broker salesman employed by W. W. and Company, had a listing to sell a parcel owned by Xebec, Inc. and located in Apopka, Florida. On October 12, 1986, Respondents submitted to Ruth Pelegatto a written offer to buy from U.S. EquiGrowth Corporation. The offer, reflected on a form contract for sale and purchase, stated a purchase price of $100,000.00; a $1,000.00 deposit to be held in escrow by Sirianni Investments, Inc. "on acceptance"; a $75,000.00 purchase money mortgage; and $24,000.00 balance to close. The offer also included a contingency clause, giving the buyer 60 days from final acceptance to determine the feasibility of developing the site. If the buyer claimed the site conditions were unacceptable, the contract would be null and void. (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) The time for acceptance was October 15, 1986, reflected in paragraph III of the contract. The seller signed the contract on September 22, 1986, after making several changes in its terms. The purchase money mortgage figure was struck through and initialled and the balance to close was changed from $24,000.00 to $99,000.00, and was initialled. The seller, according to Ms. Pelegatto, did not want to "hold any paper." By the time the contract came back, Sirianni had learned that the property was not appropriate for the development. He claims that Ms. Pelegatto knew that, as he had spoken with her prior to her trying to reach him about the counteroffer. Ms. Pelegatto claims that the refusal of the counteroffer was never communicated to her. She does not claim that acceptance was made, and no evidence of such is apparent on the face of the two copies of the contract in the record, one photocopy and one carbon copy. There are initials by the changes, and a date, 9/24/8- (the second digit does not appear on either copy). The initials and date were not explained. The sale to EquiGrowth was not made. Ms. Pelegatto tried unsuccessfully to reach Sirianni on several occasions. He felt she was trying to salvage the deal and did not respond. Sometime in April, 1987, Xebec asked Ruth Pelegatto for the $1,000.00 deposit. She was still unable to reach Sirianni. The deposit, either a check or promissory note according to Sirianni, had previously been returned by him to the prospective buyer. John Sirianni admitted at the hearing and to DPR investigator, Chris Olsen, that the deposit was never placed in trust as the contract was never accepted. Chris Olsen interviewed Sirianni on June 22, 1987, when Sirianni voluntarily responded to his call and came in to the agency office. Sirianni told him he had closed his brokerage office and was working out of his home. The office closed approximately 30 days before Sirianni talked with Olsen.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the administrative complaint against both Respondents be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Darlene F. Keller DPR, Division of Real Estate Executive Director Post Office Box 1900 DPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John A. Sirianni 1740 Carlton Street Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Longwood, Florida 32779 Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (4) 120.57455.225475.22475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. GEORGE SHERBON, 88-004688 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004688 Latest Update: Apr. 26, 1989

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George Sherbon, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued broker's license number 0348688 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for V. P. Stone, Inc., a real estate firm located at 5905 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. On April 1, 1987, Paul D. and Anna Martin entered into a listing agreement with Century 21 Spinning Wheel Ent., Inc. (Century 21) to sell their home at 2543 58th Terrace South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The listing agent was Cheryl Coudry, now known as Cheryl Hutton, a licensed salesperson with Century 21. On September 11, 1987 respondent solicited and obtained a contract for sale on the Martin property executed by Frank Dicenzo, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who had a daughter living in the St. Petersburg area. Dicenzo had responded to an advertisement run by Sherbon in a Pittsburgh newspaper. After a week or so of negotiations, the parties eventually agreed to a sales price of $92,500, and the final contract was executed on September 20, 1987. The contract called for Dicenzo to make an initial $100 deposit when the contract was executed and an additional deposit of $19,900 by September 25, 1987, or a total deposit of $20,000. Dicenzo gave respondent the initial $100 which was deposited into the escrow account of V. P. Stone, Inc. The contract provided further that the sale would be contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a $72,500 first mortgage. Finally, in accordance with Dicenzo's request, the contract provided that Dicenzo could take occupancy of the premises four weeks after the loan was approved. It is noted that Dicenzo initially asked for occupancy by October 16, 1987. On September 18, Sherbon introduced Dicenzo to Tony Black, a loan officer at Savings of America, a local lending institution, for the purpose of Dicenzo making a loan application. On September 24, or the day before the additional deposit was due, Dicenzo became ill with what he described as a bleeding ulcer and decided to return to Pittsburgh and stay at his mother's home. Before he left, Dicenzo did not make the additional deposit as required by the contract. According to Dicenzo, he placed no great significance on the September 25 due date and felt that if the deposit was made "within a reasonable time," it would be okay. Respondent was aware of the September 25 deadline and attempted to get a check for the $19,900 deposit from Dicenzo's daughter but was unsuccessful. Respondent contends he kept trying to contact Dicenzo in Pittsburgh during the next five week period but was unable to reach him. Dicenzo acknowledged he knew that Sherbon was trying to contact him but still made no effort to talk to Sherbon. Instead, he simply told his daughter he would take care of the matter when he returned to Florida in late October. Whether this message was conveyed to Sherbon is not of record. Sherbon prepared contemporaneous notes concerning the transaction and used these to refresh his recollection at hearing. He pointed out that such notes were kept on all real estate transactions. According to his notes, he telephoned Coudry and Black on September 24 concerning Dicenzo's illness and the fact that he was having difficulty obtaining the additional deposit from Dicenzo. Although Black recalled talking with Sherbon, he denied that Sherbon told him that there was no deposit and said such information was a material item that would have prompted him to stop processing the application until the deposit could be verified. Likewise, Coudry, who could not recall many aspects of the transaction, did recall speaking with Sherbon but remembered Sherbon simply telling her that he was in the process of showing Dicenzo various commercial properties and would be obtaining the deposit at that time. Their testimony is deemed to be more credible and persuasive and is hereby accepted. Coudry assumed that Sherbon had received the additional deposit since she was never specifically told otherwise by Sherbon. Accordingly, she did not contact the Martins until several weeks after the September 25 due date. Coudry did not learn that no deposit had been collected until mid-January 1988 when Anna Martin disclosed to her this fact. In the meantime, although the Martins knew the contract was contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a loan, they nonetheless assumed that Dicenzo would have no problem securing a loan and that such a loan would be approved in a week or so. Also, they knew the contract called for possession of the property by Dicenzo four weeks after the loan was approved. Because of these assumptions, and having received no advice from Coudry that the full deposit had not been made on September 25 as required by the contract, the Martins made application around September 28 to buy another home in a nearby modular home park and asked that the application be expedited. Unfortunately for the Martins, they were far more successful than Dicenzo in securing prompt approval of their loan application. Once approved, and after a closing was held, the Martins had the utilities hooked up, erected a storage shed, and incurred other expenses. Also, they began making mortgage payments on the second house. On October 24, 1987 the Martins telephoned Sherbon and told him their listing with Century 21 had expired. During the conversation, Sherbon did not mention that Dicenzo had failed to make the $19,900 deposit. Dicenzo's application with Savings of America was denied on October 30, 1987 because of Dicenzo's "ratio of ... expenses to ... total income." By this time, Dicenzo had returned to Florida and had spoken with Sherbon. At respondent's urging, Dicenzo reapplied to the same institution and was turned down a second time on November 12, 1987. In addition, at Coudry's suggestion, Dicenzo had already visited another lender in October but refused to pay a $250 application fee and consequently did not file an application. Also, through Sherbon, Dicenzo was given the name of a mortgage lender suggested by the Martins but, after three visits, decided not file an application. Information regarding the second Savings of America denial was conveyed to Coudry around mid-November but, for whatever reason, she did not contact Sherbon regarding the status of the contract. It is noteworthy that at that time Sherbon did not tell Coudry that Dicenzo had still failed to make an additional deposit as required by the contract. Despite the loan application denials, Sherbon encouraged Dicenzo to keep trying to arrange financing so that the deal could go through. Dicenzo agreed to do so but, as noted in the following finding of fact, at that point Dicenzo considered the contract to be "null and void." Sherbon's efforts to find financing continued until mid-January 1988. When the loan application was denied on November 12, Dicenzo construed the contract to be void since the financing contingency was not met. According to Dicenzo, he did not believe the property was tied up while his contract was pending, felt no obligation to make the $19,900 deposit because it meant he would have to transfer funds from a money market account he purportedly maintained in Pittsburgh, and felt no moral obligation to the Martins even though by then they had committed themselves to a second home. The Martins were advised by telephone on the evening of November 12 of the second turn down of Dicenzo's loan application. By then, however, they were already committed to the second purchase. They claimed they did not learn of Dicenzo's failure to make the $19,900 deposit until mid-January 1988 when Sherbon visited their home and disclosed this fact. This is also borne out by a letter from the Martins' attorney to Dicenzo on December 1, 1987 advising Dicenzo that the contract was void and a claim might be made on his deposit for damages. When the Martins learned that only $100 had been deposited, they filed a complaint with the Division. That prompted this proceeding. Because of the failed contract, the Martins were unable to maintain two mortgage payments and were ultimately forced to give up the second home at a substantial monetary loss. They have since returned to their first home. The evidence shows that in the real estate trade, it is not customary or proper for the buyer's realtor to personally contact the seller. Rather, the practice and custom is for the buyer's agent to advise the listing broker of all pertinent developments and the listing broker then relays any necessary information to the seller. Thus, Sherbon had no responsibility to personally advise the Martins of any information pertaining to the contract. Rather, this responsibility rested with Coudry. Respondent contended he kept Coudry abreast of all developments concerning Dicenzo and that he assumed Coudry would advise the Martins that no deposit had yet been collected. To the extent this version of events conflicts with previous findings, it is not accepted. Sherbon expressed sympathy for the Martins' plight but maintained he was not at fault. There is no evidence that Sherbon has been subjected to prior disciplinary action by the Division.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) to the extent noted in the conclusions of law and that his broker's license be suspended for three months. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4688 Petitioner: 1-2. Covered in finding of fact l. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. 5-7. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 7. Rejected since respondent owed a duty to Coudry, and not the Martins, to keep her abreast of all pertinent matters. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 12. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in findings of fact 6 and 10. Rejected as being subordinate to other findings. Covered in finding of fact 11. 18-19. Covered in finding of fact 6. Respondent: Respondent's proposed order contains sections entitled "admitted facts", "unrebutted facts" and "uncontested facts". They are ruled upon in that order. Admitted facts: Covered in finding of fact l. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in background. Unrebutted facts: Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 10. 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected since Sherbon learned of the loan denial even though he did not receive a written copy of the turn-down letter. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected since the testimony of Anna Martin is accepted as being more credible on this factual issue. Uncontested facts: Rejected as being cumulative. Partially covered in findings of fact 6, 7 and 16. The remainder is rejected as being cumulative, argument of counsel or not supported by the more credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel B. Schuh, Esquire 248 Mirror Drive St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs KENNETH A. NORBERG, T/A ARDEN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES, 91-001713 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Mar. 15, 1991 Number: 91-001713 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1991

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, Kenneth A. Norberg, should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all pertinent times, Respondent, Kenneth A. Norberg, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued License Nos. 0143669 and 0243001 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last licenses issued to Respondent were as a broker t/a Arden Real Estate Associates, 525 West Lantana Road, Lantana, Florida 33462. Respondent operates both an insurance business and a real estate business out of his office. There is a large sign outside the office near the street that indicates both "INSURANCE" and "REAL ESTATE" in large letters. Beneath those words in smaller print, are the words "Arden Insurance" Association and "Ken Norberg Real Estate". This sign is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit 1 and has been in place for approximately fifteen years. Sometime prior to March of 1989, Joe Ann Shoop was awarded ownership of a corporation known as Jerraang Enterprises, Inc. as part of a divorce settlement. That corporation owned certain property located at 7967 Overlook Road, Hypoluxo, Palm Beach County, Florida. There are two small cottages located on the property. Ms. Shoop's attorney is an officer of the corporation, but it is not clear whether he is a stockholder. Ms. Shoop visited Respondent's office in order to inquire about insurance for the property. While she was in Respondent's office, Ms. Shoop asked Respondent if he would be interested in listing the property for sale. She explained that she did not need the property and was anxious to sell it in order to get some cash. Respondent agreed to list the property. Sometime in March of 1989, Respondent received an offer to purchase the property from Bernadette Butler. Included with that offer was a $500.00 earnest money deposit. Respondent placed the $500.00 deposit into his escrow account maintained at the Bank of South Palm Beaches, Hypoluxo, Florida. Ms. Shoop accepted Ms. Butler's offer and a contract was agreed upon in March of 1989 with an anticipated closing date in May of 1989. The contract price was $30,000. The specific terms of that initial contract have not been established. Neither party offered the contract into evidence at the hearing. The parties agreed to extend the closing date of that contract and a new written contract was entered on June 23, 1989. That new contract indicated that the closing was to take place on July 26, 1989. The second contract provided that the sale was contingent upon the purchaser obtaining financing in the amount of $21,000.00. The purchaser was unable to arrange financing and the transaction failed to close by July 26, 1989. The parties verbally agreed to extend the contract, however, the evidence is inconclusive as to how long an extension was agreed to. By October of 1989, it became clear that the transaction would not close. At that time, Ms. Shoop demanded the deposit and began efforts to sell the property to someone else. Ultimately, the property was sold at auction for $15,000. Ms. Shoop claims that she was not advised and would not have agreed to a contract that was contingent upon the buyer obtaining financing. As indicated above, the terms of the first contract have not been established. However, it is clear that the second contract did provide a contingency for financing. On October 31, 1989, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Butler indicating that Ms. Shoop had requested the release of the deposit to her. Respondent enclosed a copy of a Release of Deposit Receipt form for Ms. Butler to execute. Ms. Butler did not execute the form and/or authorize the release of the deposit to Ms. Shoop. Respondent retained the deposit in his escrow account for several more months. During this time, Ms. Butler continued her attempts to obtain financing and also began searching for additional properties. Ms. Butler indicated to Respondent her intention to apply the money held in escrow to any new purchases that may arise if the contract with Ms. Shoop did not close. On several occasions in late 1989 and early 1990, Ms. Shoop attempted to contact the Respondent and determine the status of the escrow money. Respondent did not answer her inquiries. On September 10, 1990, an investigator from the Department visited Respondent's office to conduct a random audit of Respondent's business and his escrow account. During this audit, the investigator discovered the deposit being held in escrow without a current contract. She advised Respondent that he needed to be sure to comply with the requirements of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes and Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code. In October of 1990, the Respondent sent a letter to both Ms. Butler and Ms. Shoop enclosing a Release of Deposit Receipt form pursuant to which he suggested that the parties divide the deposit equally. Respondent sent a copy of this letter to the Department to notify it of his attempt to resolve the dispute over the deposit. By letter dated October 11, 1989, Gerri E. Barnoski, an analyst for the Florida Real Estate Commission, (the "Commission") advised Respondent of his options. In this letter, Ms. Barnoski told Respondent that he had to either (1) arrange for arbitration, (2) place the matter before a civil court or (3) request an Escrow Disbursement Order from the Florida Real Estate Commission. The Respondent subsequently requested an Escrow Disbursement Order from the Florida Real Estate Commission and the matter is currently pending resolution by the Commission in Case No. E902949. The deposit remains in Respondent's escrow account. In sum, the evidence demonstrated that Respondent failed to promptly notify the Commission of the conflicting demands to the escrow deposit. Respondent claims that he never received a formal written demand from either party. However, the evidence is clear that by at least October of 1989, Respondent was aware of the conflicting demands for the deposit. After delay of approximately one year, Respondent finally attempted to resolve the matter in an appropriate manner. Respondent says he was concerned that attorney's fees would consume the entire deposit. However, this concern does not excuse the delay. There is no indication that Respondent was manipulating the transaction for his own personal gain and/or that he was trying to defraud either party. There is no indication that Respondent ever used the escrow account for improper purposes or withdrew money from the escrow account for his own personal or business use. At the time Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's office in September of 1990, there was no sign immediately outside the entrance door to Respondent's office. The large sign alongside the roadway (which is described in Finding of Fact 2 above) was in place and there was a trademark indication of a Realtor on the entrance door. However, a sign which had previously been on the wall immediately next to the entrance door was missing. The evidence established that the sign at the entrance door was temporarily missing due to unusual circumstances. Respondent was in the middle of a hotly contested divorce. Respondent and his former wife had previously worked out of the office together. The sign next to the entrance door had both of their names on it. Respondent taped over the name of his former wife and the sign was subsequently vandalized. Respondent had delayed obtaining a new sign until the divorce proceedings were concluded. The evidence indicates the road side sign was in place approximately fifteen feet from the entrance. Visitors to the office were sufficiently alerted to the identity of the real estate broker within. In view of all the circumstances, Respondent was not in violation of the requirement that he have a sign on or about the entrance to the real estate office.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, finding Respondent guilty of Counts II and III, reprimanding him, placing him on probation a period of one year and imposing a fine of $250.00. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of June, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15-18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7-15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 10-17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth A. Norberg Arden Real Estate Associates 525 West Lantana Road Lantana, Florida 33462 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.22475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs PASQUALE A. VERONA AND P. A. VERONA AND ASSOCIATES, INC., 90-002244 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Apr. 13, 1990 Number: 90-002244 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Pasquale A. Verona (Verona), is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0389728 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). He is the qualifying broker and an officer of respondent, P. A. Verona and Associates, Inc., which holds broker's license number 0251674. The real estate firm is located at 3828 Seago Lane, Fort Myers, Florida. In May 1988 Donna Jean and Barry C. Minnich were shopping for a residential lot in Carillon Woods, a subdivision in Fort Myers, Florida. After seeing a lot advertised by Verona s firm, Donna Jean telephoned Verona's office and made an appointment to inspect the lot on May 13, 1988. After inspecting the lot, Donna Jean decided to purchase the same and, on the same date, she and Verona orally agreed upon a purchase price of $49,000 with a closing date of May 25, 1988. Verona desired to close on that date since he had a previously planned trip to California with his family beginning on May 26, 1988. The oral agreement was reduced to a written contract and executed by the parties on May 13, 1988. At Verona's request, and at the same time the contract was executed, an addendum was prepared by the Minnichs' attorney which provided, in part, that a $54,000 sales price would be used but that at closing Verona would refund $5,000 to the Minnichs. This refund was to be taken out of Verona's real estate commission and rebated to the buyers. Thus, the net sales price was still $49,000 as originally agreed to by the parties. As earnest money, the Minnichs gave Verona $5,000 which was deposited into Verona' s trust account. The Minnichs immediately made application for a loan with John E. Smith, a vice-president of a local C & S bank. On May 18, 1988 they placed an order for a title commitment with Southwest Title, Inc., a Fort Myers title company designated by the parties to prepare the title insurance and handle the closing. The title company was placed on notice that the contract called for a May 25 closing date. According to Mary Jane Kalpin, a Southwest Title, Inc. employee who worked on this transaction, there were unsatisfied water and sewer assessments on the lot owed by Verona to the City of Fort Myers. However, she said this was not unusual and happened quite frequently in subdivisions such as Carillon Woods. As it turned out, however, the city employee who oversaw these assessments was on vacation the week prior to the May 25 closing date, and Kalpin could not obtain payoff figures from any other city employee. In addition, Kalpin needed Verona to furnish her with a certificate of good standing on the property. 1/ He did not do so by May 25. Therefore, she was unable to prepare a closing package by the contract closing date. On May 23, 1988, C & S issued a loan commitment to the Minnichs. In the meantime, Kalpin had completed her title search and on May 23 she spoke with Verona who advised her the deal must close by May 25. When she responded she could not get payoff figures from the City by that date, Verona told her it was a "dead deal". On or about May 24, Donna Jean spoke with Verona and, after being told of the problems encountered by the title company, reiterated her desire to buy the lot. She requested that Verona extend the time for closing so that the missing items could be obtained. Although Verona denies that he gave such an extension, and nothing was reduced to writing, it is found that Verona orally agreed to an extension of time prior to leaving for California. This is supported by the fact that, after returning from California, Verona's wife delivered a certificate of good standing to the title company on June 9, and the title company representative was under the impression a closing would be held at 1:00 p.m. the same date. However, at Verona's insistence, the closing did not take place. On June 15, Verona sent the Minnichs a letter with a check in the amount of $5,000 which represented the deposit on the property. In his letter, Verona stated that he "realize(d) that the delay in the closing on Lot #6, Carillon Woods is not being caused by anything you have done" and that those things occurred whenever "we place a transaction in the hands of another". He added that he had received another offer in the amount of $58,000 from another party and if the Minnichs were willing to pay a "net figure of $56,000", he would give them the opportunity to purchase the lot. The Minnichs chose not to cash the check but instead advised Verona they intended to seek legal advice on their rights under the original contract. Donna Jean deposited the check around June 22 but learned the next day that Verona had stopped payment on the check. On June 24, 1988 Verona again wrote the Minnichs and advised them to reconsider their threat to take legal action since he had "never lost a real estate dispute". He also advised them that, pursuant to the contract, he was claiming the $5,000 as liquidated damages due to their failure to close by May Finally, he pointed out that the original contract "was terminated on June 15 by letter". On an undisclosed date, but prior to September 1988, Donna Jean spoke with Verona by telephone and requested a refund of her deposit. Her request was denied. The Minnichs then filed a complaint with the Division. On September 2, 1988 Verona advised the Division there was a dispute concerning the deposit and requested the issuance of a disbursement order. On January 11, 1989, the Division, through its counsel, wrote Verona and advised him that, because of disputed facts a disbursement order could not be issued, and he must immediately seek arbitration or file an interpleader action in circuit court. Choosing to utilize arbitration, Verona contacted the Miami office of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) on February 15, 1989 and requested a "package" from which an agreement to arbitrate could be prepared. After receiving a package of documents, Verona sent an agreement with a letter to the Minnichs on February 24, 1989. They did not respond to his offer to arbitrate. On March 6 he sent a follow-up letter again requesting the Minnichs to arbitrate. On March 9 Verona learned that AAA would not arbitrate the dispute. As of that date, Verona was aware of the fact that his only remaining alternative was to file an interpleader action in circuit court. On March 23, 1989 the Division, through its counsel, sent a second letter to Verona advising him that he had apparently ignored the earlier letter and that he must immediately take action to resolve the dispute. On May 5, 1989 Verona sent his attorney, George Knott, a check in the amount of $5,000 with a request that Knott "handle the interplea (sic) action as to the disposition of $5,000 previously held in my real estate firm's escrow account". The suit was eventually filed by Knott in circuit court on September 8, 1989. The suit requested that Verona be awarded the $5,000 deposit plus "damages" and attorney's fees. When asked at hearing why the suit had not been filed earlier, Verona responded that, once the matter was turned over to his attorney, he had no control over the actions of his attorney. He also acknowledged that he has never instructed his attorney to attempt to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. As of the date of hearing (June 20, 1990), the matter was still pending in circuit court. There is no evidence that Verona did not maintain the $5,000 deposit in his firm's escrow account until the money was turned over to his attorney on May 5, 1990. There is also no evidence that respondents have ever been disciplined by the Division.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 21V-10.032, Florida Administrative Code (1987), and that their brokers' licenses be suspended for six months and thereafter be placed on one year's probation. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1990.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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