The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner should be permitted to take the examination for licensure as a real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact In September 2003, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure by the State of Florida as a real estate sales associate. In an application section titled "Background Information" question 1 asks in relevant part, "[h]ave you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . ." to which the Petitioner responded in the affirmative. "Background Information" question 4 in relevant part asks, "[h]as any license, registration, or permit to practice any regulated profession, occupation, vocation, or business been revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, surrendered, or withdrawn . . ." to which the Respondent replied in the affirmative. Question 1 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the incident(s) by completion of "form 0050-1." Question 4 directs an applicant who responds in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the termination(s) by completion of "form 0060-1." The disclosure forms completed by the Petitioner (if any) are not in the Respondent's files and are unavailable for review. The Petitioner's application package was presented to the Commission on December 16, 2003. After considering his presentation, the Commission denied his application and instructed him to return with additional information related to the disclosed charges. The Petitioner apparently sought reconsideration, and his application package was again presented to the Commission on March 17, 2004. After reconsidering the Petitioner's background, the Commission again denied his application. The Petitioner then sought an administrative hearing to challenge the denial of his application. On or about July 26, 2000, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with stalking. The Commission's records indicate that the Petitioner completed a pretrial program and was sentenced to 50 hours of community service. At the administrative hearing, the Petitioner testified that he was placed on probation for six months, and had to complete a six- month psychological evaluation. The stalking charge was nolle prossed. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that at the time of the stalking charge, he was working at a retail establishment. The object of his attention was a 16-year-old female who was working in the vicinity. The Petitioner was approximately 36 years old. The Petitioner asserted that he did not know the female was 16 years old at the time. He denied that he "stalked" the female, but stated that he merely spoke to her a few times in person and attempted to contact her once by telephone. He continued to express surprise at the stalking charge. On or about June 6, 2001, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, a felony, and criminal mischief. He was sentenced to two years of probation, six months of psychological evaluation, and was required to pay court costs. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. At the hearing, the Petitioner stated that he went to the home of an ex-girlfriend to collect a $500 debt she allegedly owed to him. He testified that he knocked on her door and got no response. As he left her residence, he saw that her automobile was unlocked. He opened the hood of the ex- girlfriend's vehicle and ripped out the spark plug cables. He asserted that he "didn't steal anything" because he threw the cables away and didn't keep them. On or about September 5, 2001, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, entered an order based on the Petitioner's stipulation, revoking his Class "D" Security Officer's License, based on the burglary charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Alfonso Santana, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Fernando Freire 5242 Millenia Boulevard, No. 304 Orlando, Florida 32839 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802 North Orlando, Florida 32808-1900
The Issue Whether Respondent should take final action to deny Petitioner's application for a real estate sales associate license on the ground that Petitioner was found guilty, in the State of Georgia, of the crime of theft by taking.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On June 12, 2006, Petitioner was working as a clerk at a UPS store in Cherokee County, Georgia, when he "gave in to temptation" (as he described it at hearing) and stole $500.00 in cash from an envelope given to him by a customer for shipment to the customer's former wife in Kansas. When the customer's former wife received an empty envelope, she notified the customer, who, in turn, called the police. On June 16, 2006, the police went to the UPS store to investigate the matter. When questioned by the police during their visit to the store, Respondent admitted to stealing the $500.00. He was thereupon placed under arrest and, thereafter, criminally charged. On October 16, 2007, in Cherokee County, Georgia, State Court, Petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor crime of theft by taking and sentenced to 12 months' probation. Among the conditions of his probation was that he provide "proof of repay[ment]" of the $500.00 he had stolen. Petitioner has not been arrested again, and he has returned to its rightful owner the $500.00 he had stolen and has otherwise completed his probation. The record evidence, however, does not reveal how long ago Petitioner's probation was completed; nor, more importantly, does it shed any light on what Respondent has done with his life (other than completing his probation and not getting arrested) since the theft which led to his being placed on probation, or what his present reputation is for honesty, trustworthiness, and fair dealing. The record evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that there is reason to believe that, notwithstanding his commission of the aforementioned theft, it is not likely he would act dishonestly or in any other manner endangering the public were he to be granted the real estate sales associate license he seeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin Vaughn, Jr. 931 Village Boulevard, Apartment 905-203 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Special Counsel Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Roger P. Enzor, Chair, Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, based upon her complaints about a coworker’s conduct perceived by Petitioner to be sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, a female, was employed as a server with Respondent from May 6, 2011, through September 29, 2012. Respondent, Stavro's Pizza, Inc., is a restaurant located in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 individuals at any given time and therefore is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. §§ 760.01-760.l1, Fla. Stat. Early on the morning of Friday, September 27, 2012, it was reported to Martha Trimble, long-time General Manager of Respondent, that a "weird conversation" took place between Petitioner and another employee, Brian Hayes, the previous evening.2/ During this conversation, Mr. Hayes allegedly told Petitioner that “he knew everything about her, including where she lived, and that her favorite color was blue.” Mr. Hayes also allegedly told Petitioner that he was soon to be the new manager of the restaurant. Ms. Trimble approached Petitioner later that day about the alleged incident with Mr. Hayes, and while Petitioner admitted she had had a strange conversation with Mr. Hayes, she denied that she was upset by it. Nonetheless, Ms. Trimble told Petitioner she would investigate the matter and that she took it seriously. Later that same day Ms. Trimble also questioned Mr. Hayes, who denied making the reported comments. And while Ms. Trimble was aware that Petitioner had voluntarily given Mr. Hayes her address,3/ out of caution, Ms. Trimble placed Mr. Hayes on leave while she continued her investigation. The following day, Saturday, September 28, 2012, there was a mandatory meeting for all employees of Respondent. The meeting was mandatory because Ms. Trimble had been made aware of horseplay among some employees, and was concerned that staff training had been inadequate. Notice of the meeting was conspicuously posted in the restaurant for two weeks prior to the meeting. The notice explained that the meeting was mandatory and that all employees were to attend unless they contacted Ms. Trimble prior to the meeting to be excused. Petitioner did not attend the Saturday meeting and was not excused in advance. Four other employees contacted Ms. Trimble ahead of time and explained that they would be unable to attend due to schedule conflicts. Those employees were excused. When Ms. Trimble contacted Petitioner later in the day, Petitioner told Ms. Trimble that she had been ill, and in bed all day. That evening Ms. Trimble also reviewed the security camera video of the one hour period the previous Thursday during which Petitioner and Mr. Hayes had been alone in the restaurant, and during which the suspect comments had reportedly been made. In reviewing the video, Ms. Trimble specifically watched for physical contact, lingering conversations, and body language. At hearing, Ms. Trimble related her observations from the restaurant video as follows: So I watched the tape. Brian basically stayed back in the kitchen. Uh, we have side work we do. We make garlic bread. We make boxes. We do little oil containers for to-go salads. And Brian was back doing that almost the entire time. Once I saw him go up to the waitress station and get a beverage and bring it back. Amanda basically was at the register. She would come back every once in a while, hang a ticket, kind of stand there and chitchat until, uh – until, uh, a salad was given to her or something like that. So, um, but mainly they were both in their own areas. I did not see anything that indicated that there was anything improper going on. Following her review of the surveillance video Ms. Trimble concluded that there was no basis to believe that Mr. Hayes had engaged in any form of sexual harassment against Petitioner. The following day, Sunday, September 29, 2012, Ms. Trimble met with Petitioner regarding her absence from the mandatory meeting the day before. At this meeting Ms. Trimble informed Petitioner that because she failed to attend the mandatory meeting without being excused, and had failed to even call Ms. Trimble to explain she was ill and would be unable to attend, her employment was terminated. A former employee of Respondent, Lindsey Yauch, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Ms. Yauch testified that she had once missed a mandatory meeting called by Ms. Trimble but had not been fired as a result. However, on cross-examination Ms. Yauch could not remember the purpose, date, or any other details surrounding the meeting. Ms. Trimble’s testimony regarding the meeting that Ms. Yauch missed was more precise. Ms. Trimble recalled that it was a “safe-staff meeting”, which is a food-handler’s course that all employees must take. Because all 27 of Respondent’s employees were required to take the class, it was offered on two separate dates, and employees were permitted to choose which session they would attend. Ms. Yaugh had chosen to attend the first session, but overslept and missed the class as a result. Since a second class offering was still available, Ms. Yaugh was permitted to attend the second session, which she did. There is no credible evidence in this record that Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated employees when she was terminated for missing a mandatory meeting. At hearing Ms. Trimble testified that Petitioner's termination had nothing to do with her gender or the alleged comments made by Brian Hayes. Rather, Petitioner’s termination was the result of her missing a mandatory staff meeting without excuse. This testimony is credible. To his credit, in his closing statement counsel for Petitioner candidly acknowledged that, even if true, the comments made by Mr. Hayes would not constitute sexual harassment.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent should be terminated from employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1994, Respondent completed an applicant security check form for employment with the Petitioner. The form specified a series of questions related to past or pending criminal charges to which Respondent was to check either a "yes" box or a "no" box. On each occasion, Respondent checked the "no" box. At the conclusion of the form is a certification as follows: I certify that the above responses are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and are made in good faith. I understand that any incompleteness or false information on this form may be just cause for a rejection of my application for employment or dismissal in the event I am employed by the School Board of Palm Beach County. Respondent did not disclose that in 1987 she was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon. As a result of the charges, Respondent was sentenced to one year probation, required to pay a fine and court costs, and fifty hours of community service. When Mr. Lachance learned of the results of the background search (which differed from Respondent's application), he met with Respondent who admitted the criminal charges but who alleged that she had believed them to be resolved. The recommendation was then made to the Board to terminate Respondent's employment as a bus driver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a final order dismissing the Respondent from her employment with the school district in accordance with the Board action of April 7, 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2884 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esq. School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Ms. Tina King 5030 Elcharo North West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Dr. Bernard Shulman Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1997), by pleading or having been found guilty of a crime which involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. (All Chapter and Section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation and discipline of real estate licensees in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a real estate broker pursuant to license no. 0414405. The last license issued is inactive. On December 15, 1997, Respondent entered into a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Both crimes are third-degree felonies under Sections 784.02(1) and 316.027(1)(a), respectively. The court adjudicated Respondent guilty and sentenced Respondent to two years of community control to be followed by two years probation. Both sentences ran concurrently. The court also imposed miscellaneous fines in the cumulative amount of $255 and ordered Respondent to pay probation costs. On January 13, 1998, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner voluntarily disclosing his plea and conviction. Respondent has no prior disciplinary history. Both convictions involve a single incident which occurred on November 23, 1996, at the Draft House, 1615 Lee Road, Orlando, Florida, a bar in Orange County, Florida. Respondent touched the female owner of the bar on her buttocks. The owner's son took offense to the incident. When Respondent left the bar, the owner's son followed Respondent to Respondent's car in the parking lot. The owner's son hit Respondent in the nose with his fist. Respondent got into his car. The owner's son smashed the windshield of Respondent's car with a steel bar. Respondent left the scene to call for help. When Respondent drove away, Respondent's car struck the owner's son. Respondent did not remain at the scene because he feared for his own safety. Respondent stopped a few blocks away and called 911. The extent of injuries of the person struck by Respondent's car was not established at the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(f), and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Richard F. Ronnick 4271 Biltmore Road Orlando, Florida 32804-2201 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Ideal Security Services, Inc. (“Respondent or Ideal”), retaliated against Petitioner, John Mercurio (“Petitioner”), for exercising his right to file a complaint on an alleged unlawful employment practice pursuant to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2019).1/
Findings Of Fact Ideal is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). While the exact number of employees is not reflected in this record, the evidence established that Ideal employs greater than 15 employees. Ideal provides security officers to different locations for access control and on-site patrol. Petitioner worked for Respondent as a security officer from June 20, 2018, through February 7, 2019. At the time he was hired by Ideal, Petitioner was informed in writing of the company’s “Interchange” practice, which provides: Although employees generally are hired to work at one specific client location or facility, the company (Ideal Services, Inc.) uses its Guard Force INTERCHANGEABLY to meet its needs: In case of cancellation of any accounts, reduction or increase in hours provided, or an employee who may request a transfer. Also Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to point out that they DO NOT guarantee a full 40 hour work week. Overtime is given to employees depending on where the overtime will occur and the availability of employees to work an assignment. Ideal Services, Inc. wishes to also point out that hourly pay rates will depend on job placement as some client assigned jobs will carry higher pay rates than others. It is therefore Ideal Services, Inc.’s policy to inform all individuals who are applying for employment that Ideal Services, Inc. DOES NOT HIRE for only one site at one set pay rate . . . because both of these are subject to change. On the date he was hired, Petitioner signed a copy of the above policy statement, acknowledging that he had read and understood its contents. Petitioner’s first assignment was to provide security at a Krispy Kreme Donuts retail location, an assignment which carried a pay rate of $9.50 per hour. In July 2018, Petitioner was assigned to several other locations, in addition to the Krispy Kreme location. Those new locations were at Daytona Beach Housing Authority apartments, including the Maley, Windsor, and Trails apartment complexes. The public housing assignments carried a pay rate of $8.50 per hour. As of August 2018, Petitioner was no longer assigned to the Krispy Kreme location, but rather was working exclusively at the public housing locations. In December 2018, another Ideal security guard was newly assigned to the same public housing complex as Petitioner. It was clear to Petitioner that this individual was a racist based on his words and actions. While standing next to Petitioner, the new security officer referred to the building residents as "monkeys." It was clear to Petitioner that this remark was made in reference to the African-American residents of the complex. Dan Montrose, the senior security officer and Petitioner’s partner, was also within earshot when the newly assigned officer made the derogatory remark. Petitioner was stunned by the racist comment, especially since Mr. Montrose’s wife is an African-American female. Petitioner also testified that on another occasion, the new officer posted a picture of a Caucasian baby on the common area's fridge with an arrow that said, "Dan" on it, as well as a black finger/arm covering the baby's mouth which said, "Dan's wife." While Petitioner’s first impulse was to report the above racist incidents to his employer, at the request of Officer Montrose he did not immediately do so. However, while the exact date of the conversation is not of record, sometime in the second or third week of December 2018, Petitioner reported the “monkey remark” to Ideal’s Manager and CFO, Diane Cox. Ms. Cox assured Petitioner that she would discuss the racist comment with the offending security guard. Ms. Cox testified that the offending security guard was given a verbal warning for his inappropriate comment, but was not otherwise disciplined because he had worked for the company for many years without incident. When Ms. Cox spoke with the offending security guard about his inappropriate remark, she did not raise the issue of the racist picture that had been posted on the common area refrigerator. According to the testimony of Ms. Cox, this is because she had not been informed by anyone about the existence of the picture, and first became aware of it when she read Petitioner’s Complaint. Ms. Cox testified that had she been informed of the racist picture, disciplinary action would have been taken against the offending employee. Again, while the exact date is not of record, sometime in late December 2018, Petitioner requested a copy of his payroll records from Ms. Cox. While gathering the records for Petitioner, Ms. Cox discovered that Petitioner’s rate of pay had erroneously not been reduced from $9.50 per hour to $8.50 per hour when he was transferred from the Krispy Kreme location to the public housing locations. Upon discovering this accounting error, Ms. Cox informed Petitioner that effective immediately his rate of pay while on duty at the public housing locations would be adjusted to $8.50 per hour, but that Ideal would not be attempting to recoup the overpayments that had been made over the previous months, since the error had been theirs. Respondent offered in evidence payroll records which demonstrated that all Ideal security guards assigned to the public housing locations were paid at the rate of $8.50 per hour. At about the same time as Petitioner’s downward rate adjustment, another Ideal security guard requested that he be assigned an additional eight-hour shift in order to bring him to 40 hours per week. In an attempt to accommodate this request, Ms. Cox contacted several of the Ideal security guards, including Petitioner, to inquire as to whether any wished to relinquish an eight-hour shift. Petitioner advised Ms. Cox that he did not want to give up an eight-hour shift, and that request was honored by Ideal. The timing of Petitioner’s reporting of the racist remarks to Ms. Cox; Petitioner being informed that his hourly rate was being reduced; and Petitioner being invited to give up a work shift; is unfortunate. Because of the temporal proximity of these events, it is understandable that Petitioner concluded that the reduction in his pay rate and attempted reduction in his assigned hours were in retaliation of his reporting the racist remarks. However, the evidence does not prove a causal link between Petitioner's complaint and the adverse action he suffered. Rather, the credible testimony of Ms. Cox established legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for how Petitioner was treated, and there is no evidence that the reasons articulated by Ms. Cox were a pretext for retaliation. Petitioner failed to persuasively prove any incidents of retaliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Ideal Security Services, Inc. did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2020.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on retaliation for participation in a protected activity in violation of Chapter 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner (Holden) is an African-American female. At all times relevant to this petition, Holden was employed in a probationary status by the Florida Department of Corrections at Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI) as a Correctional Officer. Probationary officers are not entitled to progressive discipline, but can be terminated for any reason. At the hearing, Holden withdrew her claims that the Department had discriminated against her based on her race and sex. On or about July 22, 2001, Captain Tullis Scipper responded to a call from the Medical Unit at ACI. Upon his arrival, he observed Officer Holden in front of the Suicide Watch Isolation Cell. She was cussing at the inmate with whom she had a previous confrontation. Scipper explained to her that she was not to argue or verbally abuse the inmate and that she should stay away from the cell. On at least one other occasion that night, Captain Scipper responded to the Medical Unit and observed similar actions by Holden. The next day, Captain Scipper received a call from Warden Adro Johnson, who inquired as to what had happened in the Medical Unit the night before. Warden Johnson had received a complaint from Nurse Carla Weeks that Officer Holden had been cussing the inmates and he was checking into the complaint. Warden Johnson asked Captain Scipper to bring Officer Holden to his office. The purpose of the meeting was not to ascertain whether Officer Holden had been cussing at inmates. The Warden had two eye-witness, staff accounts of her behavior. When confronted, she advised Warden Johnson that she had become angry and had cussed the inmate. Warden Johnson counseled Holden about her behavior. Warden Johnson testified that he felt that Holden was unreceptive to his counseling and that she was argumentative. He believed that she was not displaying the attitude that a good officer displays when he/she is being counseled by a warden. Holden also was upset and crying, and, as a result, Warden Johnson informed her that she needed to adjust her attitude and come back to see him the next day. Warden Johnson testified that he had not made up his mind as to what action he would take against Holden for her actions with the inmate. After the meeting with Warden Johnson, Captain Scipper observed Officers Holden and Shiver arguing with each other. Holden testified that she had asked Shiver about why her tour was changed, and this led to the incident observed by Scipper. In Scipper’s opinion, Holden was the “aggressor” because she continued to advance on Shiver, even though Shiver had his hands in the air and was stating words to the effect that he did not have anything to do with whatever they were arguing about. Knowing that Holden had just had a counseling session with the Warden, Scipper was surprised that Holden would almost immediately be involved in an altercation with a staff member. He relieved Holden of her duties for the rest of her scheduled shift. The next day Holden met as scheduled with Warden Johnson. Captain Scipper did not attend this meeting. Johnson had been informed of the previous day’s incident between Officers Holden and Shiver. He asked Holden if she was willing to change her attitude. He had not determined prior to the meeting if he would take any action at all against Holden. Johnson felt that Holden's response to him was disrespectful, and that she did not have the right attitude. Johnson terminated Holden based on what he perceived to be her poor attitude. He knew that Holden was approaching the end of her probationary status and that if he wanted to terminate her before she attained career service status with its attendant protections, he needed to do so at that time. Petitioner complained in an incident report filed before the Warden the first time that Captain Scipper refused to listen to her when he counseled her about a prior staff altercation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Holden 2103 Vista Road Marianna, Florida 32448 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Levita Parker, was subject to a discriminatory practice by Respondent, Orange County Public Schools (Orange County), in violation of the sections 760.10 and 112.3187, Florida Statutes1/; and, if so, what remedy is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female, who, at all times relevant to the discrimination allegation was (and is currently) employed by the Orange County Public Schools. Petitioner has been employed by Orange County for approximately 18 years. She is under contract as a “classroom teacher,” however she has been working as a behavioral specialist for the last 11 years. Petitioner is certified to teach Exceptional Student Education (ESE), Business Education and Education Leadership. Petitioner, along with the school principal and others, attended a “brain storming meeting” on October 5, 2016.4/ During that meeting, options were discussed on how to address the August 2016 resignation and departure of an ESE teacher. Many options were discussed, and later the assistant principal sent Petitioner an email directing her to assume responsibility for two classes on the following Monday. Petitioner refused to teach the two classes. In November 2016, Petitioner was presented with a “Directive.” In part, the directive provides: Under certain circumstances it becomes necessary to provide written clarification or guidance regarding the expectations of the district. Such letters are referred to as directives, and are not disciplinary in nature. (Emphasis added). Petitioner did not lose any pay for her failure to teach the two classes. For school years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017, Petitioner received “effective” or “highly effective” evaluations. Petitioner failed to identify the alleged protective whistleblowing action in which she participated. Petitioner failed to identify a causal connection between whatever the alleged protected activity was and the alleged adverse employment action. Petitioner failed to present any credible evidence that Respondent discriminated against her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2017.
