The Issue The issue is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for filing a prior complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as defined by Section 760.01(7), Florida Statutes (2006). Respondent manufactures various animal-related products, such as horse tack and pet collars. Petitioner is an African-American female. Beginning on January 13, 2003, and at all times relevant here, Respondent employed Petitioner as a production-line assembler. Martha Robinson, a white female, has worked for Respondent for over 17 years. Ms. Robinson was Petitioner’s direct supervisor for most of the time that Petitioner worked for Respondent. JoAnn Lake is Respondent’s production manager. Ms. Lake was Ms. Robinson’s immediate supervisor. On December 27, 2005, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with FCHR. The charge alleged that Respondent had discriminated against Petitioner based on her race. On April 20, 2006, FCHR entered a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's discrimination charge. Respondent has a disciplinary point system which is described in Respondent’s Employee Handbook. Under the system, employees are assessed points for unexcused absences, tardiness, or leaving work early. Employees can recoup lost points after a 30-day period without a disciplinary occurrence. When employees accrue 20 points, they are subject to a three-day suspension. Employees are subject to suspension or termination the second time they accumulate 20 disciplinary points. All supervisors and Penny Peterson, Respondent's personnel director, are responsible for tracking the disciplinary-point totals for employees. Supervisors send Ms. Peterson a written notice every time they assess disciplinary points. When there is a discrepancy in the point total between the supervisors' records and Ms. Peterson's personnel records, Respondent first reviews supporting documentation. If the supporting documentation supports Ms. Peterson's calculation of points, her total point count becomes official. If the supporting documentation does not support Ms. Peterson's total, the supervisors' calculation of points becomes the official count. During Petitioner’s employment, Respondent issued Petitioner five verbal warnings and nine written warnings for accumulating too many disciplinary points. Petitioner typically carried a high balance of disciplinary points. On May 10, 2006, Respondent suspended Petitioner for three days for accumulating 22 points. When she returned to work, Petitioner thanked her supervisors for giving her a five- day vacation for Mother's Day. On July 27, 2006, Petitioner asked Ms. Robinson how many disciplinary points Petitioner had accrued. Ms. Robinson erroneously informed Petitioner that she had 14 points. Petitioner then left work before the end of her work day. Ms. Robinson subsequently assessed Petitioner an additional three points and sent the notice to the personnel office. Contrary to Ms. Robinson's records, Petitioner actually had 18 points on July 27, 2006. When Respondent assessed another three points for leaving work early, Petitioner had a total of 21 disciplinary points. On or about August 7, 2006, Ms. Robinson was on leave. Therefore, Ms. Lake informed Petitioner that she had 21 points and was due to be suspended. Petitioner protested the suspension, stating that she only had 17 points according to Ms. Robinson. Ms. Lake checked Ms. Robinson's records that showed Petitioner had 17 points. Ms. Lake sent Petitioner back to work and conferred with David Brakefield, the plant manager, and Ms. Peterson. Petitioner's personnel records confirmed that she had accumulated 21 disciplinary points. Ms. Lake enforced Petitioner's three-day suspension on August 8, 2006, through August 10, 2006. Petitioner had a doctor's excuse for missing work on August 11, 14, and 15, 2006. Petitioner returned to work on August 16, 2006. That same day, Petitioner informed Ms. Robinson that she was quitting her job because it was too stressful. Petitioner told Ms. Robinson that she was resigning based on her psychologist's recommendation. During the hearing, Petitioner presented no evidence, not even her own testimony, to contradict Ms. Peterson's point total, showing that Petitioner had 21 disciplinary points on July 27, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's charge of retaliation. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Brenda Lissimore Simmons 1818 Northwest Martin Luther King Avenue Ocala, Florida 34475 Garry D. Adel, Esquire Blanchard, Merriam, Adel & Kirkland, P.A. Post Office Box 1869 Ocala, Florida 34478 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denis Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear this cause alleging that Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact 1. Following a May 23, 2003, "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief as more fully described below. On or about July 3, 2003, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and scheduled for a disputed-fact hearing on the merits for August 25, 2003. 2. On July 17, 2003, Respondent served by mail its Motion for a Summary Final Order. 3. On August 12, 2003, Respondent served by mail its Supplemental (Second) Motion for a Summary Final Order. 4. On August 14, 2003, Respondent filed and served its Notice of Filing Supplemental Materials In Support of its (Second) Motion for Summary Final Order. 5. The foregoing pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto, together with the "Determination: No Jurisdiction," which is part of the referral package from the Florida Commission on Human Relations, suggest on their face(s) that the Commission, and derivatively, the Division of Administrative Hearings, is without jurisdiction to determine this case. 6. Petitioner did not timely respond in opposition to the Motion for Summary Final Order as permitted by Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, and in a telephonic conference call convened by the undersigned on August 19, 2003, Petitioner represented that she had never received that Motion. Petitioner offered to pick it up at Respondent's attorney's office later on August 19, 2003. 7. Petitioner had received the Supplemental (Second) Motion for Summary Final Order, but from her oral representations in the telephonic conference, it appeared that she did not open the envelope containing it. As of August 19, 2003, Petitioner still had, pursuant to rule, until August 26, 2003, to respond in writing. Also, if Respondent's supplemental materials were to be considered, Petitioner had until August 28, 2003, per rule, to respond. 8. The undersigned is without final order authority in this type of proceeding, and accordingly, the pending Motions have been treated as Motions for a Recommended Order of Dismissal. 9. On August 21, 2003, an Order Canceling Merits Hearing and Permitting Future Filings was entered. That Order provided, in pertinent part: The disputed-fact hearing is now scheduled for August 25, 2003, and all jurisdictional issues could be addressed at the commencement of that hearing, but that hearing is subject to cancellation due to Petitioner's failure to file a unilateral pre-hearing statement. Moreover, it is not cost-effective to require both parties to appear with all their witnesses, prepared for a disputed-fact hearing, when a short delay may obviate the need for such a hearing. If that hearing is cancelled, it will be possible to re-schedule this case for trial within the aspirational time frame established by the legislature, if such re- scheduling is necessary. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. The disputed-fact hearing now scheduled for August 25, 2003, is hereby cancelled. 2. The pending motions will be treated as Motions for Recommended Order of Dismissal. 3. Petitioner is permitted to, and until, September 2, 2003, to file, in writing, any response in opposition to Respondent's Motion for a Summary Final Order, and Respondent's Supplemental (Second) Motion for a Summary Final Order, including the Supplemental Materials Filed August 14, 2003. 4. In her response, Petitioner should address all factual and legal arguments posed by Respondent. She may attach exhibits supporting her position. 5. In the event the undersigned requires any further oral argument or advice from the parties, another telephonic conference call will be scheduled for that purpose, and a formal notice of hearing will be issued. 6. In the event no further oral argument or advice is required, the issues presented in the motions and response will be disposed of, pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, without hearing; and a disputed-fact hearing on the merits will be re-scheduled only if necessary and appropriate. 10. Petitioner did not file any response to dispute any legal or factual issue raised by Respondent. Petitioner did not file any response attacking the validity of any of Respondent's exhibits. Petitioner did not file any response attacking any portion of the Commission's referral package. Therefore, the filed items may be presumed to be authentic, and the pending Motions may be addressed without an evidentiary hearing. 11. Petitioner filed with the Commission a charge of discrimination against Respondent Employer. That charge was assigned FCHR Case No. 2003342, and was dismissed by the Commission on or about December 6, 2002. 12. On October 18, 2002, Petitioner filed with the Commission a second charge of discrimination, the charge of discrimination underlying the instant case. The Commission assigned the instant charge FCHR Case No. 23-00222. 13. This instant charge of discrimination herein states that Petitioner was notified on October 14, 2001, that she would be terminated by the Employer on October 18, 2001. This charge of discrimination was signed by Petitioner on October 18, 2002. Therefore, it could not have been filed with the Commission before October 18, 2002. The date of October 18, 2002, is more than 365 days after October 14, 2001. See Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes. 14. By a "Determination: No Jurisdiction" entered May 23, 2003, the Commission's Executive Director found and concluded that all jurisdictional requirements for coverage had not been met, to wit: : The Complainant was notified on October 12, 2001, that she would be terminated effective October 18, 2001, and she received a termination letter on October 14, 2001. Thus the 365-day period for filing a claim with the Commission commenced on October 12, 2001. Complainant, however, filed her complaint on October 18, 2002, which is 370 days from the date she first received notice. 6. The Commission does not have jurisdiction over the complaint because it was filed more than 365 days from the date the Complainant received notice that she would be terminated. 15. While the Director's foregoing findings/conclusions do not bind this forum's de novo proceeding, the Commission's acknowledgement that the instant charge of discrimination was not filed with it until October 18, 2002, constitutes competent evidence of that filing date and is relevant in this proceeding. 16. Attached to Respondent's first Motion for Summary Final Order is a copy of the instant charge of discrimination which shows the Commission's "October 18, 2002," date stamp. Also attached thereto is a Disciplinary Action Report dated October 12, 2001, which shows that Petitioner saw the report but refused to sign it on the same date of October 12, 2001. This report is, in effect, a notice of termination to take effect on October 18, 2001. Another exhibit to this pleading is Petitioner's October 12, 2001, written request to the Employer for a pre-termination hearing. All of these items indicate that Petitioner had notice on October 12, 2001, that she would be terminated, effective October 18, 2001. 17. No one has explained what effect a pre-termination hearing would have had on the planned termination date. No evidence that a pre-termination hearing was ever held has been presented. 18. Petitioner was effectively terminated by Respondent on October 18, 2001. 19. A "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," entered by the Clerk of the Commission on May 23, 2003, provided: The parties are advised that the Complainant may request that a formal, post- investigative proceeding be conducted. The Request for Hearing/Petition for Relief must be filed within 35 days of the date of mailing of this Notice and should be in compliance with the provision of Rule 60Y- 5.008 and Chapter 60Y-4, Florida Administrative Code. A Petition for Relief form in enclosed. If you elect to file a Petition for Relief, it may be beneficial to seek legal counsel prior to filing the Petition. This action will not become final until time has expired for Complainant to file a Request for Petition for Relief. Failure of Complainant to timely file a petition for relief will result in dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.006, Florida Administrative Code. 20. Accordingly, the last date for filing a Petiton for Relief on the instant charge was June 27, 2003, per Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, and 60Y-5.008, Florida Administrative Code. 21. Petitioner FAXED her Petition for Relief to the Commission. Petitioner's FAX cover sheet indicated that, Ms. Razavi, I am faxing this again, since I'm not aware that you have rec'd it yet. I first sent it on Thurs. 26th to a different fax #. The young lady sitting in for Barbar gave me this one. Thanks. 22. On July 1, 2003, the Commission date-stamped receipt of the foregoing cover letter and the Petition for Relief, which it transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings on the same date. 23. An Affidavit of Violet D. Crawford, Clerk of the Florida Commission on Human Relations, states that Petitioner's Petition for Relief was received by way of facsimile to the Commission on June 30, 2003, but that it was clocked-in on July 1, 2003.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Michelle Burt, pro se 2121 West Pensacola Street, PMB 538 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 For Respondent: William Haselden, Esquire City of Tallahassee 300 South Adams Street, Box A-5 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Lahn alan ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2003. 12 COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michelle Burt 2121 West Pensacola Street, PMB 538 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William Haselden, Esquire City of Tallahassee 300 South Adams Street, Box A-5 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent, Lavern W. Burroughs, began work with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on July 1, 1987, and that she was not present for work on July 22, 25, or 26 of 1988. Between March 3, 1988, and July 7, 1988, Ms. Burroughs, a clerk typist, was absent on fourteen occasions. Each time "LW" was entered beside her name on an attendance and leave sheet. "LW" is used when an employee has used up all sick and annual leave, but is nevertheless authorized to take leave. The designation LW means leave without pay, but it does not indicate whether leave was authorized or unauthorized. In December of 1987, Ms. Burroughs had received a "conference letter," HRS' Exhibit No. 1, after discussing her attendance problems with Mr. Weston and his immediate supervisor, Mr. Mathis. On April 15, 1988, Mr. Weston sent her a letter in 4 which he reprimanded her for being absent without leave. HRS' Exhibit No. 2. The letter stated: It is hoped that you will view this disciplinary measure in a constructive manner and there will not be a recurrence of this nature. However, you are cautioned that further offenses of this standard will result in more stringent disciplinary measure of a ten (10) days suspension without pay up to dismissal. Mr. Mathis testified that the ordinary practice, if petitioner's absenteeism had been handled as a career service matter, would have seen a ten (10) day suspension as HRS' next response, in the event of another unauthorized absence; and that dismissal would not have occurred, unless the ten (10) day suspension failed to cure the problem. On Thursday, July 14, 1988, Ms. Burroughs went to work, as it turned out, for the last time. The next morning she called in, shortly after 9:00 o'clock, to report that she had received notice of judicial proceedings designed to foreclose on her house. Unable to reach Mr. Weston, she asked for his supervisor, Mr. Mathis. Unable to reach him, she spoke to Ms. Evan Gibson, Mr. Mathis' secretary, and told her that she would not be coming to work. Ms. Gibson said she would relay the message. Ms. Burroughs left for Georgia in an effort to obtain money from a cousin with which to retain a lawyer to represent her in the foreclosure proceedings. The next Monday, July 18, 1988, Ms. Burroughs' daughter, Sheronda, telephoned HRS' Jacksonville offices. Apparently she spoke to Mr. Weston when she reported that Ms. Burroughs had trouble with her eye. On July 20, 1988, Ms. Burroughs telephoned herself. Again unable to reach Mr. Weston, she ended up telling Ms. Gibson that her eye was running and painful. Also on July 20, 1988, she visited the Riverside Clinic, received a prescription for erythromycin, and filled it that day. A nurse filled out a form employee's medical excuse saying that Ms. Burroughs had been under the care of a doctor at the clinic "and may return to work on 7/21/88." Joint Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Weston has never denied an employee's request for sick leave. Ms. Burroughs had been granted sick leave on more than three occasions and had produced a doctor's statement on each occasion. On Thursday, July 21, 1988, Ms. Burroughs called and spoke to Mr. Weston. In a telephone conversation that lasted perhaps two minutes, she told him about the problem with her eye, and also spoke to him about the threatened foreclosure. She did not say when she would return to work, but it was clear that she was not coming in that day. After Mr. Weston responded, "Okay," his only contribution to the conversation, Ms. Burroughs said goodbye and hung up. She did not explicitly ask for leave, even as she had never done before. Her eye stopped running on July 25, 1988, a Monday. On July 26, 1988, Ms. Burroughs set out for work, having spent, she testified, all her money, except for a quarter she had with her, on gasoline, for transportation to and from work that week. When her car overheated on 1-495 she was obliged to cut her journey short. She used her only quarter to telephone her brother's house, where a sister also lived. She asked this sister to call work to tell them what had happened. Instead, a friend, Wanda Stewart, learned the circumstances from Ms. Burroughs' sister, and made the telephone call to report why petitioner would not be in that day. Anna Williams, who worked in Mr. Weston's unit last summer, took the call. Because he was not in the office, she relayed the message to Mr. Mathis' secretary. When Ms. Burroughs' called herself, on July 27, 1988, she was informed she no longer had a job.
The Issue Whether Petitioner timely filed her Employment Complaint of Discrimination ("Complaint") with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR"), and, if so, whether FCHR has jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner's Complaint on the merits.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was previously employed by Respondent as an attorney in its Miami, Florida office. On November 13, 2012, Petitioner tendered her resignation via correspondence entitled a "Notice of Constructive Discharge." The correspondence provided that her resignation would be effective on November 23, 2012. Petitioner's last date of employment with Respondent was November 23, 2012, and she was paid through that date. Petitioner completed a FCHR form entitled Technical Assistance Questionnaire for Employment Complaints ("Questionnare") and signed the same on November 20, 2013. The Questionnare provides on its face the following langauge: "REMEMBER, a charge of discrimination must be filed within 365 days of the alleged act of discrimination." Additionally, the Questionnare describes the principal purpose of the document as follows: The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit information about claims of employment discrimination, determine whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations has jurisdiction over those claims, and provide charge filing counseling, as appropriate. On December 23, 2013, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination ("Complaint") against Respondent with FCHR. The Complaint was stamped as received by FCHR on December 23, 2013 at 4:47 p.m. In the Complaint, under section C——"Cause of Discrimination"——Petitioner checked the boxes for sex and retaliation. Petitioner alleged discrimination pursuant to chapter 760 of the Florida Civil Rights Act. The Complaint further alleges that November 23, 2012, was the date that the "most recent discrimination took place." On March 20, 2014, following the completion of its investigation, FCHR issued a Determination: No Jurisdiction, on the grounds that "[t]he complaint was not timely filed."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety due to lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dietrich Renee Jenkins, Esquire Unit 1503 1861 Northwest South River Drive Miami, Florida 33125 Laurie Michele Chess, Esquire Jones Walker, LLP Suite 2600 201 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Kenneth E. Walton, II, Esquire The Walton Law Firm 1999 Southwest 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33145 Elizabeth M. Rodriguez, Esquire FordHarrison LLP 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the petition for relief filed on April 19, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, petitioner, Arthur R. Jones, alleges that in October 1993, when he was fifty-four years of age, he was unlawfully terminated from his position as a welder with respondent, Progress Rail Services, Inc. (PRS), on account of his age. After conducting a preliminary investigation of the claim, the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. Petitioner then filed his petition for relief realleging the same disparate treatment. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of refurbishing railroad cars and is located in Green Cove Springs, Florida. Although there is no direct evidence as to the number of persons employed by PRS, through representation of its counsel in his opening statement, it can be inferred that PRS employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the year when the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or in the preceding calendar year. After taking a welding test, petitioner began employment with PRS in April 1992. Initially, he worked as a carpenter, but he was later transferred to a "weld out" position. The latter position involved physically demanding work and required petitioner and a co-worker, working as a team, to weld steel tops onto railroad car frames. During petitioner's tenure as a PRS employee, PRS had a progressive discipline policy which provided that an employee would receive a verbal warning, followed by a written warning, which was then followed by placement on probation. The fourth and final step was termination of employment. PRS's absenteeism and tardy policy was based on a point system. Employees received one point for tardy or early leave, and two points for absences. When the employee reached eight points, a verbal warning was given in accordance with the progressive discipline policy. A total of twelve points resulted in a written warning while sixteen points resulted in a period of probation. Eighteen points resulted in termination. On November 17, 1992, petitioner was given his first verbal warning regarding absenteeism. On March 24, 1993, petitioner again received a verbal warning for failing to report to work on time. On the March 24 disciplinary action form, petitioner was admonished by his supervisor to "come to work on time." On May 12, 1993, petitioner was given a written warning for absenteeism. On the disciplinary action form, the supervisor noted that petitioner "need(ed) to improve on come (sic) to work all work day." As of May 24, 1992, petitioner had accumulated seventeen points, and thus he was placed on probation for excessive absenteeism. His supervisor again warned him in writing "not (to) be late or absent," and if he was, "(i)t will result in your termination at (PRS)." All of the foregoing disciplinary actions were taken by supervisor O'Bryant. Sometime after May 24, 1992, petitioner began working under a new supervisor, Thomas M. Martin. On December 12, 1992, petitioner was given a verbal warning by Martin for "not wearing safety shoes." The warning was justified since petitioner was not wearing lace-up safety shoes as required by company policy. In May 1993, petitioner was transferred to a "weld-out" position under the supervision of Randy Cochran. On September 3, 1993, Cochran gave petitioner a written warning for "not doing (the) job assign(ed) to him!" Petitioner had been instructed to clean out a storage boxcar but was found reading a newspaper. He was advised in writing that he "need's (sic) to perform the job assign(ed) to him!" On October 1, 1993, petitioner was placed on probation for poor "work performance" due to not meeting established time standards for a particular job. Specifically, he was charged with "taking too long to do the work" by "spend(ing) 5.0 hours on (a job that) should have taken 2.0 hours to complete." He was told in writing to "(d)o (his) job within the time standards," or face possible "termination." After observing petitioner continually failing to meet established time standards during the next few days, on October 6, 1993, Cochran verbally warned petitioner that unless he "made the time standard" on the job he was working that morning, he would be terminated. When Cochran later observed petitioner "way behind" on his job, petitioner was terminated for poor "work performance." According to the disciplinary action form, petitioner was "not able to complete work within time standards." These time standards were uniformly applied to all welders regardless of age, and the dismissal was in conformity with PRS's progressive discipline policy. There is no credible evidence that PRS was motivated by discriminatory animus when it made this employment decision. Whether petitioner was replaced by another person, and if so, the age of that person, is not of record. When an employee leaves employment with PRS, an exit interview is conducted to identify any problems with employment policies and procedures, including management practices. Complaints made by the employee regarding unfair treatment, such as discrimination, are recorded on the exit interview form. When petitioner was discharged, an exit interview was conducted. During the interview, petitioner made no complaints regarding suspected age discrimination. Petitioner was not employed from the time of his discharge until November 16, 1994. On that date, he began collecting Social Security disability benefits. During the years 1991 through 1994, PRS discharged eighty-one employees. Of those, twenty-four were age forty or over. In 1995, respondent had one hundred fifty-seven employees, of which sixty-one were age forty or older. At hearing, petitioner contended that Randy Cochran, his supervisor from May 1993 until his termination, made discriminatory comments regarding his age. Specifically, petitioner contended that, on more than one occasion, Cochran called him an "old man" and threatened to fire him on account of his age. These allegations, however, are not deemed to be credible and are hereby rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the the Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Arthur R. Jones Post Office Box 8 Satsuma, Florida 32189 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice (discrimination under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes) against Petitioner on the basis of his race (Black/African-American), handicap, or retaliation, and if so, what is the remedy? Although cases arising under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) may be instructive for interpreting and applying the handicap provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, Petitioner's claim under ADA and any allegations of libel and slander are not within the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lawrence James, Jr., is a Black/African- American. Respondent, The Alachua County Department of Criminal Justice Service, is an "employer" within the definition in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent operates the Alachua County Jail. Respondent maintains a paramilitary command, advancement, and ranking system for its employees. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a Correctional Officer and rose to the rank of Sergeant. On March 2, 1994, an inmate escaped from the Alachua County Jail during the evening shift. As a result of the inmate's escape, several correctional officers were disciplined. Petitioner was disciplined by a reduction in rank April 26, 1994. (P-37) There were allegations that harsher discipline had been meted out to the Black/African-American officers, and the matter was arbitrated, pursuant to the union collective bargaining contract. As a result of the arbitration, in the summer of 1994, it was recommended that Petitioner be returned to his position at the Jail with restoration of rank, but without any back pay. However, at the time of that recommendation, Petitioner already had been terminated for "a non-related infraction of county policy." (P-37) The "non-related infraction of county policy" reason for Petitioner's 1994 termination was not established on this record, but neither was any discriminatory reason proven.2 After Petitioner's 1994 termination, further proceedings ensued, and Petitioner was ultimately restored to his rank and position at the Jail. As part of this restoration, it was agreed the Respondent employer would conduct training and re-orientation sessions for Petitioner, since he had not actively been performing his duties at the Jail for approximately two years. The present case only addresses the discrimination Petitioner allegedly suffered due to race, handicap, or retaliation concerning his leave requests in 1996, and his 1997 termination for unauthorized absence. After his second successful arbitration(s) and/or grievance procedure, Petitioner was eligible to return to work on February 19, 1996. He did not return on that date. Respondent ordered Petitioner back to work on March 13, 1996, at which time Petitioner requested, and was granted, leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). It is not clear if Petitioner ever made Respondent aware that he suffered from high blood pressure, but from the evidence as a whole, it is found that Petitioner notified Respondent in March 1996, that he was suffering from a prior on- the-job injury to his back, diabetes, and depression. Diabetes, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Clinical depression, as experienced by Petitioner, is a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner contended at hearing that his clinical depression in 1996 was due to his 1994 demotion and termination and the procedures to get his job back and also due to the hostile work environment he anticipated he would face if he returned to work daily in 1996 with people whom he perceived as having lied about him and who had tried to terminate him. It should be noted that Petitioner did not clearly include "hostile work environment" in either his 1998, Charge of Discrimination or his 2000, Petition for Relief. The Florida Commission on Human Relations only considered and referred the instant case upon allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, and retaliation. From Petitioner's description of his back ailment, it is found that condition also constituted a "handicap" within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. From Petitioner's description of how his back injury affected his daily life and job performance, it is very doubtful that Petitioner was able to physically fulfill the requirements of being a jailor at any time in 1996 until he was terminated in 1997. No evidence was presented with regard to the workers' compensation consequences of this situation. By an April 1, 1996, letter, Respondent's Interim Director of Criminal Justice Service, Richard Tarbox, informed Petitioner that he had exhausted his sick leave credits as of the pay period ending March 31, 1996; that based on Respondent's records, Petitioner would exhaust the balance of his accrued sick leave at the rate of forty hours per week during the pay period ending May 12, 1996; that he was expected to know his available accrued leave credits and to contact his immediate supervisor at least one week prior to the expiration of the current leave period to request leave without pay if he anticipated not returning to work; and that he had been placed on FMLA leave for an indefinite period, not to exceed twelve weeks, which would expire on June 6, 1996. (R-30) The April 1, 1996, letter specifically informed Petitioner that failure to come to work or contact Respondent could be considered abandonment of his position. (R-30) The foregoing instructions concerning "abandonment of position" parallel Alachua County's Personnel Regulations and Disciplinary Policy, hereafter sometimes referred to collectively as "personnel regulations." (P-1). Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; c. Group III Offenses No. 8, at pages 5-6, of the personnel regulations had existed prior to Petitioner's 1994 termination, and was in effect at all times material. It provided, Absence of three consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ. The personnel regulations also provided in Chapter XIX. 3. OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; a. Group I Offenses No. 8, at pages 3-4, that the following offense would subject an employee to progressive discipline: Absence without authorization or failure to notify appropriate supervisory personnel on the first day of absence. (Emphasis supplied). This regulation also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994, and was in effect at all times material. Progressive discipline for the first such offense was written instruction, counseling and/or one-day suspension. For the second occurrence, one to five days' suspension was specified. For the third occurrence, up to five days' suspension or discharge was specified. These provisions also had remained unchanged since Petitioner's last employment with Respondent in 1994 and were in effect at all times material. Petitioner was also familiar with the long-standing progressive discipline system of Respondent's personnel regulations. Basically, this system required that discipline first be proposed in writing by a superior. The proposed discipline would go into effect and become actual discipline if the employee did not appear at a hearing to dispute the charges or the proposed discipline. If the employee prevailed at the hearing, the proposed discipline would be rescinded or altered. If the employee did not prevail, the proposed discipline would be reduced to writing in another document, and the employee then had the option of filing a grievance pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement or of appealing through the personnel system to a citizens' board. While Petitioner had been absent in 1994-1996, a new requirement had been added to the personnel regulations, under Chapter A-299, which required that employees who planned to be absent, must notify their immediate supervisor no later than 30 minutes from the time they are scheduled to report for work. (Emphasis supplied) The "immediate supervisor" or "appropriate supervisory personnel" in Petitioner's situation would have been the lieutenant on his shift. However, Petitioner and Lt. Little, who became his supervisor, concurred that the custom at the Jail always had been to require that employees contact the shift sergeant on the shift preceding an emergency absence, or if that were not possible, to contact the employee's own shift sergeant or anyone else on that shift. Jail custom also provided that the employee who was going to be absent could rely on any person on his shift to deliver his oral message to the employee's supervising lieutenant and that approval or disapproval paperwork would be handled by that lieutenant after notification. On June 6, 1996, Petitioner still had not returned to work. Instead, he requested leave without pay until June 15, 1996. Respondent granted Petitioner's request. This constituted an accommodation of Petitioner's handicap(s) in that he had no remaining earned leave or entitlement to FMLA leave, yet his employer held his position open for his return. On or about June 10, 1996, Anthony F. Greene, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at Vista Pavilion, a free-standing psychiatric facility, released Petitioner to return to work. He wrote to Respondent's Risk Manager that Petitioner continued to have problems with depression, which might prove "volatile" in a work environment with superiors Petitioner believed had harassed him by terminating and blaming him for the 1994 escape. At approximately the same time, Richard Greer, M.D., medical specialty unexplained, also released Petitioner to return to work, upon the conditions that Petitioner continue to see Dr. Greene on a weekly basis and continue to take his prescriptive medications. By a July 17, 1996, letter (P-4), Interim Director Richard Tarbox notified Petitioner to report for work at the Jail on the evening shift of July 22, 1996. The letter required Petitioner to continue his sessions with Dr. Greene; to continue to take his prescriptive medications; and to take the re- training and re-orientation specified as a result of the resolution of his 1994 termination and return to work. (See Finding of Fact 7.) The July 17, 1996, letter also included the sentence, We are in the process of contacting Dr. Greene to establish a procedure to verify that you continue your sessions with him. Petitioner interpreted this sentence as the employer's promise "[T]o get all my leave slips, find out when I was going to the doctor, my mental condition, and also my medical condition." (TR-Vol.II, pages 175-176) Petitioner's interpretation of this sentence was unreasonable in light of its express language, the context of the remainder of the July 17, 1996, letter, the instructions of the April 1, 1996, letter (See Findings of Fact 16-17), and what Petitioner already knew of the County's personnel regulations and/or the Jail custom requiring him to call in and/or apply for leave to be subsequently approved or disapproved by his supervisor. Nothing in the July 17, 1996, letter altered the requirements of the personnel regulations or the April 1, 1996, letter. Petitioner bore the responsibility to ask for medical leave sufficiently in advance of his absences. On July 22, 1996, Petitioner reported for work at the Jail as instructed and was assigned to an evening shift supervised by Lt. Stover. According to Sgt. Babula, Petitioner also worked under Shift Sgt. Withey at some point in July 1996. However, by July 1996, Petitioner was an insulin- dependent diabetic. He needed to self-administer a shot of insulin each morning and night. To ensure ideal spacing of these two shots, Petitioner almost immediately requested to work the day shift. Respondent accommodated this request concerning Petitioner's handicaps and assigned him to the day shift under Lt. Little and Sgt. Babula, as shift sergeant. Petitioner claimed his handicaps were not accommodated by Respondent, but in addition to approving leave for him from February 19, 1996, to July 22, 1996, not replacing him during that period, and the change of shift made in July 1996, at Petitioner's request, Sgt. Babula testified to approving special shoes for Petitioner due to his diabetes. By September 1996, Petitioner again had used up all of his accrued leave. Accordingly, he had to ask for leave without pay to visit his various doctors, including Dr. Greene. On September 9, 1996, during a therapy session, Petitioner told Dr. Greene that he had been threatened on the job and that he was pursuing resolution of the incident through appropriate channels. The same day, Dr. Greene wrote to Lt. Little, telling him of the threat. The nature of this alleged threat or who made it was not stated in Dr. Greene's letter or at hearing. The letter cleared Petitioner to return to work September 12, 1996. This out-of-court statement to his psychotherapist at that time does not establish the truth of the statement or that Petitioner's superiors made the alleged threat. Also, the threat, if one existed, could not have related to Petitioner's written leave requests, because Petitioner's earliest dispute about leave did not occur until September 13, 1996. (See Finding of Fact 41). The September 9, 1996, date was not related by testimony to any oral or written request for leave or any disciplinary matter in evidence. Petitioner testified to having been threatened on the job sometime prior to September 9, 1996, but he never testified what the threat was, why the threat was made, or by whom the threat was made. Petitioner's witness, Alfred Dickerson, also is African-American. He testified generally that it was "pure hell" at the Jail for anyone who, like himself and Petitioner, had been disciplined due to the 1994 escape and who had prevailed in the resultant grievance activities, but he could not remember any specific incidents involving Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Dickerson was out of the Jail, on workers' compensation leave, from May 1996 to October 1997, the whole of the material time frame for this case.3 On September 16, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay to Lt. Little, his supervisor, for the previous dates of September 13 and 15, stating thereon that he had been ill those days and that the request was being made because his request to work his days off to make up for the 16 hours of leave he had used on September 13 and 15 had been denied. The request does not specifically mention "flex time." (P-6) "Flex time," as described by both Petitioner and Lt. Little, would have permitted Petitioner to work his days off, instead of taking time off without pay to make up time used to go to his doctors on days he was scheduled to work. However, if an employee asked to use flex time in this way, another employee had to trade days with him, and the exchange would be worked out by the supervising lieutenant. On October 1, 1996, Petitioner was given a "Letter of Warning" by Lt. Little. The Warning reflected that Petitioner's advising a sergeant other than his immediate supervisor, Lt. Little, on September 24, 1996, that he was not coming to work until some personal matters were taken care of, was insufficient notice and was being treated as "absence without authorization" in violation of the personnel regulations. It also stated, It has been standard practice and understood that you must notify your immediate supervisor . . . please be advised that any further violations of this nature may result in docked pay and progressive disciplinary action . . . Attached to this document was a Notice of Disciplinary Action, also prepared October 1, 1996, stating, Disciplinary action taken as a result of the Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action dated blank not filled in. (Except for WARNING) WARNING (Reasons for warning): Violation of Alachua County Personnnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, a., Group I, Offense No. 8 'Absence without authorization'. (P-8) The same document notified Petitioner that he had a right to appeal the Warning pursuant to either the personnel regulations or the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement, as appropriate. Petitioner did not acknowledge receipt of this latter document until October 7, 1996. (P-8/R-19) Also on October 1, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for leave without pay for September 23- 26 and for September 29-30, to Captain King. The reason for Petitioner's absence September 23-26 was not stated on the formal request, but Petitioner did again state thereon that his request to "flex" his days off had been denied, presumably by Lt. Little. The time for September 29-30 was requested for "personal business and emergency family leave without pay" due to his mother's seeing a doctor about her detached retinas. (P-7) Respondent is not obligated under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, to accommodate Petitioner's family's handicaps.4 On October 21, 1996, a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action" was issued by Lt. Little, apparently covering the same date, September 24, 1996, as his October 1, Warning, and adding other dates. The reasons for the proposed discipline given in this October 21, 1996, Notice differ slightly from the content of the October 1, Warning. The October 21, 1996, Notice related that on September 23, Petitioner had spoken to Captain King and Lt. Little, and because his request for leave had been made in advance, Petitioner had been granted the day off; that on September 24, Petitioner had failed to report to work and failed to request an extension of leave, and he was therefore considered to be "absent without authorization" for September 24, 1996. The October 21, Notice further stated that on September 25, Petitioner had called Captain King, requesting leave without pay for September 25 and 26, and because Petitioner had requested leave in advance, Captain King had granted the request covering those two days, but that on his October 1, leave request (see Finding of Fact 44) Petitioner had included two more days, September 29 and 30, which had not been previously authorized. Finally, the October 21, Notice indicated that on September 30, Petitioner had called Lt. Stover to say that he would be reporting to work as soon as he was through testifying to the Grand Jury that afternoon, and that his failure to request leave in advance was being treated as "absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." As of this October 21, 1996, Notice, the proposed disciplinary action became suspending Petitioner without pay. Petitioner was offered an opportunity to contest the proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on November 19, 1996. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of this document on October 24, 1996. (R-21) On October 22, 1996, Petitioner wrote to the Interim Director of the Jail, Richard Tarbox. In his letter, Petitioner complained that he had not yet received the agreed re- orientation and re-training. He also discussed his medical problems, including problems with recent changes in his medications and his five-year-old back injury. He requested flex time and related that his life had been threatened by employees on the job (see Findings of Fact 37-40), and that Lt. Little had been informed of the threats and flex time request, but the letter again did not indicate by whom Petitioner was threatened or why. (P-10) Despite Petitioner's after-the-fact written requests for flex time, Lt. Little had no recollection of Respondent ever asking him for flex time. There is no evidence that Lt. Little, Mr. Tarbox, or any other representative of Respondent contacted Petitioner concerning the alleged threat against him or specifically addressed the issues of re-orientation/re-training or flex time. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Greene also wrote Mr. Tarbox. He described Petitioner as cooperative and not evidencing any inappropriate behavior. He reported that Petitioner had voiced no homicidal or vengeance ideation to him. He felt that Petitioner's supervisors' requirement that Petitioner use leave to attend the mandatory therapy sessions with him constituted a paradox and a stressor for Petitioner. He felt that other stressors were the employer's failure to offer re-orientation/ re-training to Petitioner and the employer's failure to contact him, Dr. Greene, to verify treatment purposes and schedules. Dr. Greene requested that Mr. Tarbox clarify Petitioner's treatment and work status to both him and to Petitioner in a timely manner because not doing so was exacerbating Petitioner's physical condition, headaches, and diabetes. He further stated that he could release Petitioner for work without further psychological treatment and that further psychological treatment was not necessary to ensure Petitioner's fitness for work or to prevent his being a risk to others, but that Petitioner would continue in therapy for other purposes. (P-11) Neither Mr. Tarbox nor any other representative of Respondent specifically replied to Dr. Greene's October 25, 1996, letter. However, all leave disputes pending on that date were addressed in a November 22, 1996, letter to Petitioner from Captain King. (See Findings of Fact 57-59.) On October 31, 1996, Petitioner submitted an "after the fact" request for eight hours leave without pay for leave he had taken on October 30, 1996, for "emergency dr. app't for work related injury, and lab work for diebetic [sic] condition." (P-14) At some point, a leave form for eight hours leave without pay on November 9, 1996, was prepared. It indicates that Petitoner was "unavailable to sign." This form was disapproved by Lt. Little and by Mr. Tarbox on November 12, 1996. Apparently Petitioner only signed the request on November 26, 1996. (P-21) On November 14, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 15, 1996, for "work related condition, Dr. Greene." (P-15) On November 19, 1996, Petitioner submitted a request for two hours leave without pay for November 22, 1996. The request was approved by a supervisor on November 19, 1996. (P-17) On November 22, 1996, Captain King issued a "Letter of Warning" to Petitioner. It stated that on November 19, 1996, a disciplinary hearing had been held (see Finding of Fact 47) regarding the October 21, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action, addressing Petitioner's absences on September 29-30, 1996, and that because Petitioner had proven that he had attempted to contact his supervisor in advance of his absence, the September 29 violation was being withdrawn. With regard to the September 30 violation charged, it was found that Petitioner had contacted Lt. Stover and informed him that Petitioner would return to work after testifying before The Grand Jury, and since Petitioner had not returned to work on that day after testifying, he was being found guilty as charged for violation of Alachua County Personnel Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3. a. Group I, Offense No. 8, "Absence without authorization and failure to request leave without pay in advance." The November 22, 1996, letter went on to warn Petitioner that future violations would be more carefully scrutinized for strict adherence to the policy of notification and that failures on Petitioner's part might result in progressive disciplinary action being taken. (P-20) Because prior discipline had been overturned or rescinded, the November 22, 1996, Letter of Warning was technically Petitioner's first violation/discipline. Also on November 22, 1996, Petitioner submitted to Lt. Little a leave request form, dated the same day, labelled "FOR INFO.," with supporting documentation, including Dr. Hunt's certificate showing Petitioner had been treated on November 4, and November 22, 1996, had office management of HTN/NIDDM hematuria, a pending IVP and urology consult, and would need to be seen again by Dr. Hunt in 4-6 weeks. The language of one attachment showed Petitioner "is under Dr. Hunt's continual care," but nothing specified any period of time Petitioner intended to take off from work for the pending consultation or any other purpose. (P-19) Petitioner testified that his November 22, 1996, leave request was not intended to request any leave at all when he submitted it, but that it should have alerted his supervisors that Petitioner had a growth between his legs that was potentially malignant and that he needed an operation sometime in the future. A reasonable person would not have concluded this from the four corners of the November 22, 1996, written request with attachments dated for past medical appointments. Petitioner also testified that by submitting the November 22, 1996, leave request "in blank" and explaining orally to Lt. Little what he intended to do was his effort to comply with the requirement that he ask for leave in advance of taking it. This testimony shows that Petitioner at this point understood the employer's prior instructions to request leave in advance. Apparently, Petitioner envisioned only having to phone in to get any member of his shift to fill in the blanks on his November 22, 1996, request form, but he admitted he had never before used a blank leave request in this way. Petitioner further testified that he had told Mr. Tarbox and other supervisors at a meeting (probably one of his disciplinary hearings) before Christmas 1996, that he "did not know how long he could work." While this representation of Petitioner is credible and it may be reasonably inferred that Mr. Tarbox understood Petitioner was debilitated to some degree by the growth and might need an operation sometime in the near future, it does not logically follow that all those hearing Petitioner at that time understood that his oral statement related to the November 22 blank leave request which had attached to it only information about past doctors' appointments and potential, undated, future consultations. Petitioner's vague statement at the meeting/hearing did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail for requesting leave. The blank November 22, 1996, leave request marked "FOR INFO" also did not comply with the letter of the personnel regulations nor the custom at the Jail. There is no requirement that Respondent grant Petitioner an open-ended request for leave or one that specifies no time period at all. Petitioner's November 22, 1996, blank leave request was never approved. On November 26, 1996, Petitioner also acknowledged receipt of a "Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action," by which Lt. Little and Mr. Tarbox recommended that Petitioner be suspended without pay.5 Petitioner was again offered an opportunity to contest this proposed disciplinary action at a hearing on December 3, 1996. (P-18) The record is silent as to whether a disciplinary hearing was actually held on December 3, 1996. Petitioner submitted a leave form on December 6, 1996, for 2.5 hours "vacation" leave without pay on December 3, 1996, for a "Conference with doctor to try an [sic] stop continued disciplinary action because of illness doctor approved." (P-23) On December 3, 1996, Petitioner had telephoned Lt. Little to ask if his message had been received. He then reported to work at 10:00 a.m. Respondent's business records (P-22) show the following: Petitioner worked December 4-5, some of December 6, and all of December 7, 1996. He was not required to be at work on December 8-9. He called in sick on December 10-11. On December 12, he reported for work and attended five hours of drug policy training. Then he left for medical reasons and later called in to say he was too sick to return to work. On Friday, December 13, Petitioner called in sick, saying he was going to the doctor for a cut foot. He later called in again and was told that he needed to do his timesheet and it was agreed he would do it and have it in the following Monday. Petitioner was absent on Saturday, December 14. He was not required to be at work on December 15-16, 1996. On Monday, December 17, Petitioner did not phone or appear for work. On December 18, Petitioner phoned in, saying he had to wear bedroom slippers and had domestic problems. On December 19, Petitioner called in late and left a voice message on the Jail phone. On Friday, December 20, Petitioner called in on time but said he would not be in until Tuesday of the following week. He gave no reason. He was not required to be at work on December 22-23. On December 24, 1996, Petitioner did not come to work or call in. On Christmas Day, Petitioner called in before shift and stated he would not be in that day or the following day, December 26, 1996, until 10:00 a.m. On December 26, December 27, and December 28, Petitioner did not report for work or call in. Petitioner was not required to work December 29 or 30, 1996. On December 31, Petitioner called and said that he would not be in that day but would call back to talk to the shift lieutenant. He did not do so. Also, Petitioner did not report for work or call in for January 1 through 4, 1997. Most of this business record was substantiated by the direct testimony of Sgt. Babula and Lt. Little who observed the events and wrote most of the business record. The matters that were not confirmed in their direct testimony were supported by the type of hearsay that explains or supplements direct evidence and is admissible in this type of proceeding. Petitioner acknowledged that the business record was essentially correct as to days he was absent in December 1996, and January 1997. Petitioner's testimony only varies the foregoing business record to the effect that on December 10, 1996, not December 13, 1996, Petitioner called and spoke with Sgt. Withey, stating that he would not "be back [to work] until [he had] seen and heard from [his] doctors," and related to Withey that he had some problem with his foot. Petitioner assumed that his superiors would get this message and would understand that he meant he was exercising the blank November 22, 1996, leave request. (See Findings of Fact 60-66). His superiors did not infer from this message what Petitioner had hoped they would. A reasonable person would not infer all that from the information Petitioner says he provided Sgt. Withey. It is uncontested that Petitioner did have an injury to his foot at this time and that such injuries can be particularly hazardous to persons who, like Petitioner, suffer from diabetes. From December 4, 1996, onward, Petitioner did not speak directly with his lieutenant, although he had been repeatedly instructed to do so in order to request advance leave. Petitioner did not return to work after December 7, 1996. Despite the personnel rules, custom at the Jail, and prior direct orders by warning and disciplinary action letters, Petitioner submitted no leave slips directly to his superiors after December 6, 1996. Instead, he submitted them to his union shop steward and to a County Commissioner, although he had no reason to believe the Commissioner had any authority over Jail personnel matters. Respondent never authorized leave for Petitioner after December 13, 1996. Petitioner's extended absence without authorization was in violation of Respondent employer's long-standing "three day abandonment rule." There had been no word from Petitioner since December 31, 1996, so between January 17 and January 24, 1997, a "Notice of Disciplinary Action" was issued against Petitioner for [V]iolation of Alachua County Personnel Rules and Regulations, Chapter XIX, Section 3, c., Group III, Offense No. 8 'Absence of three (3) consecutive work days without proper authorization at which time the employee is considered to have abandoned the position and resigned from the County's employ.' The proposed discipline was termination, and again, Petitioner was offered the opportunity to contest the proposed final agency action at a hearing to be convened on February 18, 1997. (P-25) Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner saw a Master of Social Work, because Dr. Greene was on educational leave. Petitioner was so upset that the social worker advised him to focus on his medical problems. Apparently, Petitioner leapt to the conclusion that meant his doctors would handle all his leave-related problems. Sometime in January 1997, Petitioner had successful surgery on the growth between his legs. On January 27, 1997, Dr. Greene saw Petitioner in therapy and notified Mr. Tarbox in writing that, Mr. Lawrence James was seen for an appointment today in my office. He is apparently unable to continue working in what is perceived to be a hostile work environment at the jail. Compounded by his medical problems and what seems to be a lack of responsivity and accommodation by the administration, Mr. James' level of emotional distress has considerably increased since our last communication. It is strongly recommended that he take a leave of absence from the workplace until his condition is improved. He is scheduled to return next week for continued intervention. Thank you for your time and attention. (Emphasis supplied) (P-26) Dr. Greene testified that it was Petitioner's combined mental and physical circumstances which caused him to recommend the leave of absence. The January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action was mailed to the last address Petitioner had given Respondent. On January 30, 1997, Petitioner's mother signed the certified mail receipt for the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action. Sometime thereafter, she delivered the Notice to Petitioner, who no longer lived with her. He refused to deal with it. Dr. Brient removed a suture from Petitioner's leg on February 4, 1997. This seems to have related to Petitioner's post-surgery release after removal of the growth between his legs. Petitioner did not then return to work. Because Respondent's principals had not recognized Petitioner's mother's name on the certified mail receipt, they caused the January 24, 1997, Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to be served on Petitioner by a Deputy Sheriff. Petitioner received this personal service on February 5, 1997, and told the Deputy that he would not deal with the Notice of Disciplinary Action, but his doctors would. Having been released as a result of his operation, there was no physical reason Petitioner could not have appeared for the February 18, 1997, hearing to present any opposition to his proposed termination based on "the three day abandonment rule." He did not appear. On February 21, 1997, Petitioner was mailed a "Notice of Dismissal," effective that date and signed by Harry Sands, a new Interim Director, for abandoning his position, in violation of the personnel regulations. The Notice of Dismissal gave Petitioner the option of appealing his termination through the employee appeal system or the collective bargaining grievance procedure. Petitioner did not take either appeal route. However, Petitioner did suggest to another Jail officer that those who had done this to him might need to get a pine box, i.e. coffin. The threat was not deemed worthy of prosecution by the State Attorney's Office. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that he never received the promised re-orientation or re-training associated with re-instatement to his job. No witness gave any clear indication of what the re- orientation and re-training, as contemplated by the re- instatement agreement (see Finding of Fact 7) or as contemplated by Mr. Tarbox's July 17, 1996, letter (see Finding of Fact 29), was supposed to include. Lt. Stover did not remember any specific training he gave Petitioner, nor did Lt. Little, but Lt. Little testified that he was present when, before Petitioner first arrived on Lt. Stover's shift in July 1996, the Captain had ordered them both to "bring [Petitioner] up to speed." Petitioner suggested that failure to re-orient and retrain him evidenced Respondent's discrimination against him. His post-hearing proposal also asserts that due to Respondent's failure to train him in "new" personnel regulations, combined with Respondent's requirement that he adhere to those regulations which Jail custom did not normally follow, constituted disparate treatment and/or discrimination against him on the basis of his race or due to retaliation, and/or failure to accommodate his handicap. This perception is unpersuasive in light of the employer's repeated correspondence urging him to take the training, whatever that training might have been. Despite Mr. Tarbox's failure to reply to Petitioner's October 22, 1996, inquiry about training (See Finding of Fact 48), Petitioner's perception of discrimination was not established as fact. From the evidence as a whole, it is more probable that any failure to train Petitioner was the result of his request to change shifts, and thus, lieutenant-supervisors in July or his frequent absences. The record does not make clear whether the re-orientation/re-training requirement was unique to Respondent, who returned in 1996, or applied to all four of the returning African-American officers restored in 1994, but Petitioner did not demonstrate that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than he did. He did not establish that any White/Caucasian or non-handicapped employee ever got any more re-orientation/re-training than the other restored African-American officers, handicapped or otherwise. He also did not establish that any other restored African-American officer, handicapped or otherwise, received more re- orientation/re-training than he did. Moreover, contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Sergeant Babula testified credibly that he had at least instructed Petitioner with regard to the new payroll forms when Petitioner changed shifts in July 1996. Payroll forms include calculating hours worked and monies owed. Testimony and business records also show Petitioner had five hours of drug policy training. (See Finding of fact 72). Also, Respondent did not discipline Petitioner for his failure to request leave of specific personnel as required by the only new personnel regulation, until after Petitioner had been instructed in writing to do so. These written instructions may not have constituted complete "re-orientation" or "re- training," but they were direct orders sufficient to instruct Petitioner what was expected of him. (See Findings of Fact 16, 29, 43, 46-47, 57-59). Lastly, based on Petitioner's testimony that even if he had known he was required by a new regulation to request leave from his lieutenant-supervisor he would not have followed that regulation but instead would have considered himself bound by his union contract and by the custom of asking for leave of anyone on his shift at the Jail, it appears that any failure of Respondent to specifically "train" Petitioner concerning new personnel regulations had no effect on his subsequent failure to comply with the employer's expectations concerning its leave policy. Petitioner had admitted in evidence a certified copy of a "Second Superceding Indictment" issued by a federal Grand Jury on February 27, 2001. It was not established that this was the same Grand Jury before which Petitioner testified in 1996. (See Finding of Fact 47). The indictment (which is only a charging document, not a conviction) named Nate Caldwell, Respondent's former Director; Samuel Krider, Respondent's former Assistant Director; Garry M. Brown, a former Captain with Respondent; and Charles Scott Simmons, a former Lieutenant with Respondent, for conspiracy to obstruct justice by violating 18 USC Section 1503, by hindering the court and jury in a federal civil rights action brought by Mr. Dickerson against the Alachua County Board of County Commissioners. Mr. Dickerson's federal case arose out of Mr. Dickerson's demotion in rank with Petitioner in connection with the 1994 escape. It was not established that any of the indicted officials held office during the time material to Petitioner's instant case, 1996- 1997, or that any of them had anything to do with Petitioner's 1996 leave disputes or 1997 termination. Indeed, it was established that Sands or Tarbox was Interim Director at all times material. The indictment mentions Petitioner and Captain King, a superior of Petitioner at all times material, but neither Petitioner nor Captain King were indicted. Despite the lack of clarity of Petitioner's and Mr. Dickerson's testimony, the undersigned infers from their testimony and the indictment that Petitioner testified concerning the same matters before the Grand Jury in 1996 and that prior to 1996 Petitioner had been a witness in Mr. Dickerson's federal discrimination case against the County Commissioners. However, Petitioner testified that his retaliation allegation herein is not based on his 1996 testimony before the Grand Jury. Rather, Petitioner asserted at hearing that he believed he had been retaliated against by his superiors in 1996-1997 for speaking at 1993 meetings of the County Commission concerning structural and staffing problems at the Jail, and otherwise he did not know why he had been retaliated against. (TR-Vol. I pp. 229-233).
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Petitioner has not proven discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2001.
Findings Of Fact John Stewart is a correctional officer with permanent status. He filed a timely appeal on his five-day suspension with the Career Service Commission. Franklin Ashe, Assistant Food Service Director, was Stewart's immediate supervisor and rater at the time in question. Stewart had transferred to kitchen duties shortly after his initial rating as a Correctional Officer I in March, 1976. Ashe prepared Stewart's first rating as a Correctional Officer I working in the kitchen as a steward on April 25, 1977. At that time Stewart had worked in the southwest unit kitchen since the and of March, 1977. His duties in the southwest unit kitchen were direction and supervision of inmate cooks and cook's helpers. Prior to his transfer, Stewart's duties were to take the noon meal to the prisoners working on work details outside the prison. However, Ashe had also supervised Stewart prior to his transfer to the southwest unit kitchen. His performance of his initial duties were presumably satisfactory because this was apparently a good assignment and Stewart performed these duties until March, 1977. The benefits of this job included no shift work and weekends off. In late March, 1977, Stewart who was active in a union organizational effort received oral warning from D. E. Carter concerning passing out union material on the premises of the prison. Shortly thereafter, Stewart who was an alternate to the bargaining talks, was moved from his duties serving prisoners on work detail and assigned to shift work. Shortly after that he was moved to the southwest unit kitchen. The evaluation involved in this case followed shortly thereafter. Ashe's evaluation of Stewart was delivered to Ashe by one of the Correctional Officers II or sergeants who were assigned duties in the kitchen. Ashe was displeased about the rating and asked the sergeant about speaking to Ashe. A meeting occurred between Ashe and Stewart in Ashe's office shortly after Stewart came to work on May 23, 1977. This meeting lasted about five minutes. Stewart states that he asked Ashe about the rating and Ashe replied that it was self-explanatory and that he just called the facts the way they were. Beyond this Ashe gave no explanation of the basis for his rating of Stewart. Ashe does not deny this, but alleges that Stewart was abusive and insubordinate by stating that he (Ashe) was full of shit. Ashe then attempted to terminate the meeting by leaving. Ashe stated that Stewart blocked his way out of the door and told him that he was a baby not a man and that if they met on the street, Ashe had better move over. Stewart denies having used vulgar or threatening language with Ashe, but admits that be did stand in the door way and did say Ashe was a baby not a man. Stewart never received an explanation of his rating. Based upon the foregoing Stewart was suspended for five days.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer finds that good cause existed for disciplinary action against Stewart. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond Gearey, Esquire Department of Offender Rehabilitation 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Walter Thomas, Esquire Voyager Building 2255 Phyllis Street Jacksonville, Florida Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Petitioner was formerly employed as an Unemployment Compensation (UC) Adjudicator in Respondent's Miami UC office. In this capacity, he interviewed claimants seeking unemployment compensation and made initial determinations regarding the validity of their claims. Petitioner was often absent because of illness. When he was at work, however, he performed his duties competently. Petitioner and his fellow employees at the Miami UC Office were required to notify supervisory personnel no later than the beginning of the workday if they were going to be absent that day. Petitioner was made aware of this requirement on various occasions prior to the absences that led to the termination of his employment with Respondent. On Tuesday, September 5, 1989, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor and told her that he would be absent that day because of an ankle injury he had sustained. He did not indicate during the conversation whether he would be at work the following day. On Wednesday, September 6, 1989, and Thursday, September 7, 1989, Petitioner neither reported to work nor contacted his supervisor at any time during the day to give notification of his absence. On Friday, September 8, 1989, Petitioner again failed to report to work. He did, however, telephone his supervisor concerning his absence, but he did not do so until 4:50 p.m., 20 minutes after the shift to which he was assigned had ended. By letter dated September 11, 1989, Respondent notified Petitioner that it had determined that Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective the close of business September 8, 1989, in view of his unauthorized absence from work on September 6, 7, and 8, 1989. It is this determination that is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his UC Adjudicator position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of February 1990. STUART H. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact To the extent that Petitioner asserts in his letter that he contacted his supervisor on September 5, 1989, and again on September 8, 1989, his proposed findings of fact have been accepted and incorporated in substance in this Recommended Order. To the extent that he claims that he "did not have 3 consecutive days of unauthorized absences," his proposed factual findings have been rejected because they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact First Sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second Sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First and second sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Cooper 1601 Northwest 17th Street, #2 Miami, Florida 33125 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801
