Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner (Randolph) is an African-American female. 2. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 2, 1997, and was terminated by Respondent from her employment on September 30, 1997. 3. When initially hired, Petitioner’s official employment class title was Other Personnel Services (OPS) Paralegal Specialist. 4. On July 1, 1997, approximately one month after her date of employment, Petitioner’s official employment class title was changed to Administrative Secretary and Petitioner’s pay plan status was changed from OPS to Career Service. 5. On September 1, 1997, Petitioner's class title was reclassified to Paralegal Specialist. 6. From July 1, 1997, until the date of her termination, Petitioner was employed in a probationary status by DOAH with her primary job responsibilities being that of a proofreader. 7. Probationary employees are not entitled to progressive discipline and can be terminated at will pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. 8. Ann Cole, the clerk of DOAH, interviewed all candidates for the newly created proofreader position. 9. There were several applicants for the proofreader position and after a series of tests and interviews Ann Cole determined that Petitioner was the best applicant for the proofreader position and Petitioner was hired for the job. 10. Approximately one month after Petitioner was hired, a second proofreader (Dr. Rappendelli) was hired. Dr. Rappendeli is a white female. 11. Both Petitioner and Dr. Carol Ripandelli were supervised at DOAH by Ann Cole. ATTENDANCE HISTORY 312. During the first month of her employment Petitioner shared a work area in DOAH’s mailroom with current DOAH employee Elma Moore, an African-American female. 13. Elma Moore typically arrived at work between 7:00 and 7:15 a.m. even though the required start time for employees of the clerk’s office was 8:00 a.m. 14. Elma Moore was able to directly observe the times during which Petitioner arrived at work. Ms. Moore noted that Petitioner reported to work forty-five minutes late on her first day. Ms. Moore further noted that Petitioner would often be late. 15. Elma Moore was relocated to another part of the clerk’s office when Dr. Rappendelli was hired. 16. Elma Moore, even from her new workstation, continued to be situated such that she was able to observe the times at which Petitioner customarily arrived at work. 17. Elma Moore testified that during the four month period that Petitioner worked for DOAH, at least two to three times each week, Petitioner would arrive at work approximately ten to thirty minutes beyond the mandatory 8:00 a.m. start time for employees. 18. The testimony of Elma Moore is further corroborated by the affidavit of Deanna Hartford. 19. Ms. Hartford, who was the Deputy Clerk Supervisor for DOAH during Petitioner’s period of employment, stated that she observed Petitioner arrive to work late, without notice, on several occasions during her OPS employment and during her career service probationary employment. 20. Ms. Hartford stated in her affidavit that around the first week of September 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to observe Petitioner’s attendance. Ms. Hartford noted that during this period of observation Petitioner arrived to work at’ the following times on the dates as indicated: September 8, 1997, 8:20 a.m.j; September 9, 1997, 8:25 a.m.; September 10, 1997, 8:10 a.m.; and September 17, 1997, 8:20 a.m. 21. Ms. Hartford reported to Ann Cole, Petitioner's supervisor, that Petitioner was frequently late for work. 22. This is consistent with Elma Moore’s testimony that Petitioner, at least two to three days per week, was customarily late for work in excess of ten minutes. 23. Petitioner attempted to contradict the testimony of Elma Moore and the affidavit of Deanna Hartford by testifying that she was told by her supervisor, Ann Cole, to make up her tardy time thereby excusing the fact that she was habitually late for work. 24. Ms. Cole stated the importance of proofreaders being punctual to work, and testified that she and Petitioner had at least two meetings where they discussed Petitioner’s tardiness issue prior to her termination. 25. Ms. Cole stated that she spoke with Petitioner about her timesheet and attendance, and the need for Petitioner to tell her when she is late and how she plans to make up her time. 26. Ms. Cole stated that Petitioner’s communication regarding her promptness and plans to make up time never improved. 27. Ms. Hartford stated that she never observed Petitioner disclose her late arrivals to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. On more than one occasion, Ms. Hartford stated, she reported Petitioner’s tardiness to Ms. Cole, who indicated she was unaware of the late arrival. PHONE USE 28. Unlike some of the other jobs in the clerk's office, the proofreader’s duties and responsibilities did not require the utilization of the telephone. 29. Elma Moore stated that during the time that she shared an office with Petitioner, her desk was in close proximity to Petitioner’s desk and that on several occasions she noticed that Petitioner was talking on the telephone. 30. Elma Moore stated that Petitioner was using the telephone for personal calls frequently. 31. Elma Moore further testified that she knew that the responsibilities and duties of the proofreader did not require Petitioner to use the telephone. 32. Deanna Hartford noted in her affidavit that she personally observed that Petitioner was always on the phone. 33. Ms. Hartford also noted in her affidavit that other employees at the Clerk’s office had complained to her about Petitioner’s excessive use of the telephone. 34. Ms. Hartford advised her supervisor Ann Cole about Petitioner’s excessive phone use. 35. In response to the complaint about Petitioner's excessive use of the telephone, Ms. Cole contacted DOAH’s information services department and requested that they audit all of the telephone extensions for the clerk’s office. 36. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 85.5 outgoing phone calls. 37. Petitioner, however, had 294 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this period. Dr. Carol Ripandelli, the other proofreader, had 79 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this same period. 38. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 1.6 outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration. 39. The number of outgoing calls exceeding ten minutes in duration that were attributed to Petitioner's extension during the audit period totaled thirteen. Dr. Carol Ripandelli had only two outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration attributed to her extension during the audit period. 40. Petitioner denied having made the number of phone calls attributed to her extension. Petitioner also charged that it was possible that other employees could have made outgoing calls from the phone on Petitioner’s desk. 41. Elma Moore testified that it was neither the practice nor the custom of employees of the clerk’s office to regularly use the telephone of other employees. INITIATIVE 42. Deanna Hartford, in her affidavit, noted that in July of 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to provide additional training to the proofreaders. 43. Petitioner and the other proofreader were instructed to inform Ms. Hartford when they were caught up with their work so that the additional training could be provided. 44. Dr. Carol Rappendeli, the OPS proofreader, sought and received additional training in several areas including filing, assisting in the quarterly file purge and destruction, outgoing docketing procedures, and maintaining the Florida Administrative Code supplements. 45. Petitioner never sought additional training as requested. 46. Ann Cole observed Petitioner nodding off on at least three occasions while in an important proofreading standards meeting. 47. Ms. Cole observed Petitioner cutting coupons at her desk the morning of September 22, 1997, during business hours. 10 48. Elma Moore also testified to the fact that Petitioner, during business hours would frequently work on a personal book when she wasn’t proofreading. DISRUPTIVE AND RUDE BEHAVIOR 49. Ms. Cole testified that along with the attendance problems and telephone usage, Petitioner also had attitude problems. 50. On two occasions, Petitioner felt the need to apologize for rude comments made to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. 51. Ms. Cole observed rude behavior by Petitioner directed toward Dr. Ripandelli when they were discussing proofreading on a particular order. 52. Ms. Cole stated that when Petitioner gets in one of her moods, teamwork between Petitioner and Dr. Ripandelli is ineffective. 53. Ms. Cole testified that she had to speak with Petitioner about her radio and that it was so loud it caused a disturbance in the break room. 54. Dr. Ripandelli testified that Petitioner’s radio was so loud that she bought herself headphones in order to drown out Petitioner’s radio. i 55. In contrast, Ms. Cole testified that Dr. Ripandelli gets along with all the judges and that Dr. Ripandelli interacts fine with her. TERMINATION 56. Ms. Hartford stated that Petitioner never discussed with her any need to accommodate her for a disability or for her religion. 57. Ms. Hartford further stated that Petitioner never mentioned that she was being discriminated against for any reason. Ms. Hartford never observed Petitioner walk with a limp, or have sores or bandages on her legs. 58. Petitioner was terminated on September 30, 1997, due to her chronic tardiness, excessive use of the telephone, and her general failure to demonstrate initiative.
Conclusions Petitioner: Ms. Audrey Randolph, Pro Se 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209-2431 904-713-9913 For Respondent: Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850-414-3300 ext. 4650
Recommendation 29 In the present case, Respondent showed a legitimate reason for discharging Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her race, religion, disability or marital status. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner engaging in an activity that was protected by Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4A day of Vabir ; 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, kative Law Judge sd Way, Bin A-0 32398-1703 Filed with the clerk of the Florida Commission of Human Relations this 2" day of December 2003. 30 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Audrey Randolph 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209 Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Harry Hooper Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Secretary of Commission Mike Hanson Room 1801, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discharging the Petitioner from his position with the Respondent. Petitioner contends that he was discharged on account of his sex. Respondent contends that Petitioner was discharged on account of a severe attendance problem. Petitioner contends that female employees with similar or worse attendance problems were not terminated.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a corporation which does business in the State of Florida. The Respondent is a distribution warehouse for Seven-Eleven Stores. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977. Petitioner is a male citizen of the United States. He was employed in various capacities by the Respondent from January, 1974, until he was discharged on November 24, 1981. At the time of his discharge, he was employed as a receiving clerk in one of the Respondent's warehouse facilities. Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations concerning his discharge in a timely manner. A determination of reasonable cause was issued by the Commission, effort at conciliation failed, and Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief in a timely manner. From late in 1978 until the time that Petitioner was discharged, all of the Petitioner's supervisors at the Respondent experienced difficulties with Petitioner due to a poor attendance record. At the time, the Respondent followed a four-step disciplinary procedure. Step 1 was employee counseling. Step 2 involved issuance of what was called a "pink slip," or unsatisfactory employee report. At Step 3, a final letter of warning would be issued. Step 4 was discharge. The first formal record that Respondent entered Step 1 of the disciplinary procedure was an employee counseling record issued October 31, 1978. It was therein noted that Respondent had failed to call in prior to an absence from his work shift. The second employee counseling record was issued April 4, 1978. The Petitioner's supervisor discussed repeated tardiness and absences with him on that occasion. Additional counseling records were issued April 11, 1979, and April 30, 1979, and raised the same problems. While these were apparently the only formal records of employee counseling, the Petitioner had been counseled on numerous other occasions regarding excessive tardiness and absenteeism. Respondent entered Step 2 of the disciplinary procedure on November 28, 1979, when a "pink slip," or unsatisfactory performance report, was issued. It was therein noted that the Respondent had been counseled about excessive absenteeism and that his performance had not improved. Petitioner's record did not improve, and on March 19, 1980, a warning letter was issued, thus placing Petitioner in the third step of the disciplinary process. The Petitioner's record regarding excessive tardiness and absenteeism was set out in the warning letter, and it was stated that if Petitioner did not improve, it could lead to termination of his employment. Despite issuance of the warning letter, Petitioner's performance did not improve. He continued to be frequently absent or tardy. A second warning letter was issued January 28, 1981. It was therein stated: As indicated to you on your performance review January 14, 1981, you have shown little or no improvement in your attendance since the warning letter of March 19, 1980. Since several months have passed without action, you are being given this letter to serve as formal notice that you remain at the third step of our disciplinary policy. If immediate improvement in [sic] not shown it could lead to termination of your employment. Despite the second warning letter and continuing efforts by Respondent's supervisor to counsel Petitioner, Petitioner's record of excessive absenteeism and tardiness continued. On November 24, 1981, his employment was terminated. At the time of Petitioner's termination, the Respondent did not have an established policy regarding how many times an employee could be late or absent without being subjected to various stages of the Respondent's disciplinary process. The Respondent did, however, have good grounds for counseling, reprimanding, warning, and ultimately terminating Petitioner. The Respondent's supervisors were lenient with Petitioner. He was counseled continuously and warned twice, once more than usual, before he was terminated. Petitioner alleged that three specific female employees of the Respondent had absentee problems as severe or more severe than Petitioner's, but were not terminated. The evidence does not support this allegation. Each of the three female employees, Theresa Roberts, Lisa Watt, and Gloria Sanders, had attendance problems. Each was subjected to disciplinary action by the Respondent. Sanders had received a Step 3 warning in October, 1981. Roberts had received a Step 2 unsatisfactory performance report in November, 1981. Watt had been counseled respecting her problem. None of these three female employees had attendance problems as severe as Petitioner's. Furthermore, each showed some improvement following counseling, unsatisfactory performance reports, or warnings. Nothing in the treatment of these three women vis-a-vis the Respondent's treatment of Petitioner demonstrates any sex-based bias, or discriminatory action, on the part of Respondent. The Respondent now has a set policy that includes a point system regarding discipline based upon excessive absences. The policy was not in effect when Petitioner was terminated. Some people with absentee problems less severe than Petitioner's were terminated for excessive absences during the years 1977 through 1981. Other employees with attendance problems more severe than Petitioner's were not terminated. It does not appear that this disparity had any basis other than the fact that Respondent had no set policy regarding excessive absences and dealt with the issue through its individual supervisors subjectively on a case-by-case basis. In 1981, the Respondent had approximately 170 laborers or unskilled workers in its warehouse. Forty-four of them were females. During the period 1977 through 1981, 20 employees at the warehouse were terminated for excessive absences or tardinesses. Thirteen of them were male, and seven were female. Five of the seven women who were terminated had fewer absences or tardinesses than Petitioner after receipt of the Step 3 warning. Neither these statistics nor any specific evidence regarding disciplinary action taken by Respondent demonstrates any sex-based bias or discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Prior to her termination on July 18, 1983, petitioner, Pacharee K. Hasper, was a member of the Senior Management Service employed as Chief of the Bureau of Research and Analysis with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Employment Security. She held this position for approximately one and a half years and her managerial effectiveness rating was "outstanding". In December of 1982, petitioner's request for maternity leave without pay from March 14, 1983 through July 15, 1983 was approved by her then Division Director, Katie Tucker. By letter dated February 28, 1983, Ronald Villella, the new Division Director, advised petitioner that her request for maternity leave was confirmed and that "we will search for a suitable position to which you can be appointed upon completion of the leave period. If successful, you will be returned from leave of absence to the new assignment. If a suitable position cannot be located, you will be returned from leave of absence for one workday and then separated from the Senior Management Service in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12. To avoid any unauthorized overlap in the Chief of Research and Analysis position, should you require use of sick leave during the maternity leave, we are requesting Secretary Orr to authorize a 30-day overlap in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.06(A) and Chapter 22K-9 F.A.C." Director Villella had previously told petitioner that he needed her position for a person who had helped with the Governor's campaign. When petitioner returned to work from her maternity leave on Monday, July 18, 1983, she was not permitted to go to her prior office and was told that she would be terminated at the end of that day. Thereafter, she received a letter dated July 18, 1983, from Director Villella, reading in pertinent part as follows: "We have not been successful in locating a suitable position to which you could he appointed upon the expiration of your leave of absence. Therefore, in accordance with the terms of my letter to you dated February 28, 1983 (copy enclosed), you will be separated from the Senior Management Service in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12, F.A.C., effective 5:00 p.m. July 18, 1983. By copy of this letter, I am requesting our personnel officer to pay you for any unused annual leave in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12, F.A.C." Petitioner has filed a petition with the Department of Labor and Employment Security requesting a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and seeking reinstatement to her position as Chief of the Bureau of Research and Analysis with back pay and interest.
The Issue The central issue in this cause is whether Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned his career service position at Children, Youth, & Families Services.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner was employed as a counselor working with the District XI Children, Youth, & Families (CYS) Services. Petitioner was assigned to monitor approximately twenty-five foster care children. After some past employment disputes, Petitioner was reinstated by the Department effective March 31, 1987. Petitioner returned to work on April 17, 1987, however, he was not satisfied with the working environment. In a memorandum dated April 22, 1987, Petitioner alleged: The same pattern of capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory practices which led to my previous illegal dismissal from services at a time I was disable, as the result of an accident which had occurred while fulfilling my duties for this Department, are still present. All my fundamental rights have been thoroughly violated. Even workman compensation has been denied to me. With so painful experience and in light of outstanding losses I have consequently suffered, any idea of subsidizing HRS with my own car, car insurance, car repairs and advance funding for gasoline purchase as an obligatory condition for employment at CYF is being rejected as unfair practices; and violate the equal Employment Opportunity Laws. Various efforts made to have this abusive situation corrected have been met with the flagrant opposition of fierce administrators of this department, totally obstinated not to let fairness and logic prevail. In light of all these facts, it is my conclusion that my interests can be better preserved by my abstention from any involvement at HRS until these matters are properly attended by your diligence in the best of the delays, or by a court of law. In consequence effective Friday April 24, 1987 I have decided to temporarily not to be in attendance at Unit 462 Foster Care. In response, the District Program Manager for Social Services, Frank Manning, wrote to Petitioner on April 23, 1987, and advised him that failure to report to work as scheduled would be cause for action pursuant to Chapter 22A- 7.010(2). Petitioner failed to appear or to call in to work for hour consecutive work days, to wit: April 27-30, 1987. Petitioner was not authorized to take leave during the time in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order affirming the decision that Petitioner abandoned his position and thereby resigned from the Career Service. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Morton Laitner, Esquire Dade County Health Unit 1350 North West 14th Street Miami, Florida 33215 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louis C. Germaine 308 Northeast 117th Street Miami, Florida 33161 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Petitioner was formerly employed as an Unemployment Compensation (UC) Adjudicator in Respondent's Miami UC office. In this capacity, he interviewed claimants seeking unemployment compensation and made initial determinations regarding the validity of their claims. Petitioner was often absent because of illness. When he was at work, however, he performed his duties competently. Petitioner and his fellow employees at the Miami UC Office were required to notify supervisory personnel no later than the beginning of the workday if they were going to be absent that day. Petitioner was made aware of this requirement on various occasions prior to the absences that led to the termination of his employment with Respondent. On Tuesday, September 5, 1989, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor and told her that he would be absent that day because of an ankle injury he had sustained. He did not indicate during the conversation whether he would be at work the following day. On Wednesday, September 6, 1989, and Thursday, September 7, 1989, Petitioner neither reported to work nor contacted his supervisor at any time during the day to give notification of his absence. On Friday, September 8, 1989, Petitioner again failed to report to work. He did, however, telephone his supervisor concerning his absence, but he did not do so until 4:50 p.m., 20 minutes after the shift to which he was assigned had ended. By letter dated September 11, 1989, Respondent notified Petitioner that it had determined that Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective the close of business September 8, 1989, in view of his unauthorized absence from work on September 6, 7, and 8, 1989. It is this determination that is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his UC Adjudicator position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of February 1990. STUART H. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact To the extent that Petitioner asserts in his letter that he contacted his supervisor on September 5, 1989, and again on September 8, 1989, his proposed findings of fact have been accepted and incorporated in substance in this Recommended Order. To the extent that he claims that he "did not have 3 consecutive days of unauthorized absences," his proposed factual findings have been rejected because they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact First Sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second Sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First and second sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Cooper 1601 Northwest 17th Street, #2 Miami, Florida 33125 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent based on her race, national origin, or in retaliation for participating in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016);1/ and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Ana-Marie Encui, is Caucasian, a native of Bucharest, Romania, and speaks with a Romanian accent. Petitioner’s son and daughter both reside with her. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner’s son was 13 years old and her daughter, 11. Petitioner was first employed by Respondent, Department of Children and Families (“Department” or “Respondent”) as a Child Protective Investigator (“CPI”) in the Office of Family Safety in Brevard County, Region 5, on October 26, 2012. Petitioner and her children relocated to Pace, Florida, in Santa Rosa County in 2014. Petitioner was again employed by the Department as a CPI in neighboring Escambia County, Region 1, from May 9, 2014, until her resignation effective February 16, 2017. A CPI’s responsibilities are to investigate allegations of child abuse, neglect, and/or abandonment, received through the Department’s central abuse hotline and other sources. CPIs investigate allegations of abuse and neglect by interviewing children and adults involved in the allegations, as well as “collaterals,” such as relatives living outside the home, teachers, and other caregivers. Through investigation, CPIs assess the validity of allegations, document living conditions, and determine the steps needed to protect children from unsafe environments. CPIs also coordinate with, and refer clients to, social services for support, and conduct follow-up visits to ensure the safety of children is being maintained and supports are in place. CPIs may be called upon to testify in court regarding the circumstances of cases under investigation. Abuse Complaint Involving Petitioner’s Household On August 15, 2016, the Department received an anonymous complaint through the central abuse hotline regarding Petitioner’s household. Petitioner was not named as the perpetrator of abuse or neglect of children in the household. The complaint implicated other adult members of the household. Department Policy 170-16 (the “Policy”), Chapter 5, governs the procedure to be followed when Department employees are the subject of a report of abuse, neglect or exploitation. Such reports are designated as “special handling” reports. When a “special handling” report is received, the hotline supervisor must notify the appropriate manager, in this case the Region 1 Program Administrator, who must review the report immediately upon receipt. Section 5-6b. of the Policy provides, as follows: To maintain confidentiality, provide an objective assessment, and avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Circuit or Regional Program Administrator or Program Manager shall determine if the report needs to be reassigned to a different region or county. According to the Policy, in all cases in which the employee is the alleged perpetrator, the employee must be removed from customer contact while the investigation is pending, and the employee’s access to the Florida Safe Families Network (“FSFN”) database must be restricted by the close of business the following day. The Policy further provides that investigative activities on “special handling” cases “shall be expedited to ensure a timely but thorough investigation.” The decision regarding when, or if, the employee may return to assigned duties is at the discretion of the appropriate manager, which, in the case at hand is the regional manager. Stacy Amaro, DCF Region 1 Program Administrator, was notified of the “special handling” report involving Petitioner’s household. She approached Santa Rosa CPI, Katelyn Paschal, who was in line for assignment of the next case in the normal course of business. Ms. Amaro questioned Ms. Paschal about whether she knew Petitioner, who was a CPI in neighboring Escambia County. Ms. Amaro determined that Ms. Paschal had never worked directly with Petitioner, although the two had collaborated on out-of-town inquiries (“OTIs”) over the phone and via electronic mail, and may have attended Department trainings events together. Ms. Paschal was not friends with Petitioner, did not have social or personal interactions with Petitioner, and did not discuss Petitioner’s family or personal life with Petitioner. Ultimately, Ms. Amaro determined Ms. Paschal would be impartial and investigate the report fairly and thoroughly. Ms. Amaro decided to keep the report in the Santa Rosa office and assign it to Ms. Paschal for investigation. Ms. Paschal investigated the complaint from the date it was assigned to her--August 16, 2016--through October 22, 2016, when she closed the investigation finding the allegations of maltreatment of Petitioner’s children non-substantiated. During her investigation, Ms. Paschal interviewed Petitioner’s son at his school. Ms. Paschal asked Petitioner’s son questions about all the members of the household, activities in the household, arguments between adults, and the adults’ use of alcohol. During this interview, Petitioner’s son shared with Ms. Paschal that his sister had a learning disability. What Ms. Paschal said in response to that information was a subject of debate at the final hearing and is the crux of Petitioner’s complaint in this case. According to Petitioner, in Ms. Paschal’s subsequent interviews with collaterals, Ms. Paschal referred to her daughter as “slow” or “retarded,” or both. Ms. Paschal denied ever referring to Petitioner’s daughter as either “slow” or “retarded.” Petitioner’s Whistleblower Complaint On December 9, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department’s Inspector General’s Office (“IG’s Office”), in Tallahassee, alleging the Department failed to follow correct procedures in investigating the abuse complaint involving her family. Petitioner alleged, and insisted at final hearing, that the complaint involving her family should have been assigned to a “neutral” county. Petitioner further alleged the CPI disclosed confidential health information regarding her daughter during interviews with collaterals, and failed to follow Department policy in other aspects of the investigation. On January 31, 2017, after a “preliminary review” of the complaint, the IG’s office responded to Petitioner in writing, as follows: [T]his office has determined that your complaint “does not demonstrate reasonable cause to suspect that an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor has violated any federal, state, or local law, rule or regulation, thereby creating and presenting a substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, safety, or welfare or has committed an act of gross mismanagement, malfeasance, misfeasance, gross waste of public funds, or gross neglect of duty” as required under section 112.3187-112.31895, Florida Statutes, also known as the “Whistle- blower’s Act.” The IG’s office simultaneously forwarded Petitioner’s complaint to the Department’s Northwest Region Manager, Walter Sachs, for “any action deemed appropriate by [his] office.” Finally, because Petitioner’s complaint raised the possibility of a HIPPA violation, the IG’s office also forwarded Petitioner’s complaint to Herschel Minnis, Human Resources Administrator, Civil Rights Division. Petitioner’s Corrective Action Plan On January 24, 2017, Petitioner was presented with a Performance Corrective Action Plan, or PCAP, by her supervisor, Shavon Terrell. The PCAP noted seven different performance expectations for which Petitioner had fallen short, along with a summary of the particular reasons Petitioner’s performance was substandard. In each and every section, the summary included, “see write up for specific case information.” The “write-up” referred to an Employee Disciplinary Action Proposal Form, completed by Julie Yeadon, Ms. Salter’s assistant. The Form summarized specific cases with deficiencies in case follow-up, danger assessments, and case notes, and documented untimely submission of her cases to her supervisor when danger was identified. The Form documented Petitioner’s historic case backlog and past efforts to address the backlog by transfer of her cases to other CPIs. The PCAP period was two months--January 24 through March 24, 2017--during which Petitioner was expected to correct the noted performance expectation deficiencies by completing the specific corrective actions noted in the plan. The PCAP expressly stated the corrective actions must be taken “to attain satisfactory performance in your current position.” The PCAP expressly stated, “Non-compliance may result in: Disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal may be initiated.” The PCAP provided that the plan was in accordance with “Standards of Conduct and Standards of Disciplinary Action for Department Employees CFOP 60-55, chapter 1.”2/ Petitioner refused to sign the PCAP agreeing to participate in the corrective action plan. Petitioner’s Resignation On January 31, 2017, Petitioner informed Ms. Terrell that she would not agree to the PCAP and would, instead, resign her position. In her resignation letter, Petitioner explained that she was resigning due to retaliation, unfair treatment, and negative job action taken against her for expressing her concerns regarding the “unlawful, unprofessional, and disrespectful manner that [her] children and family were approached and treated” during the investigation of the complaint involving her household. Petitioner’s resignation was effective February 16, 2017. Retaliation Claim Petitioner maintains the PCAP was a means of retaliation against her for filing the IG Complaint with the Department. Respondent presented Petitioner with the PCAP on January 24, 2017, 26 days after Petitioner filed the IG Complaint on December 9, 2016. The decision to place Petitioner on a PCAP was made by the following employees of the Escambia County office: Petitioner’s supervisor, Ms. Terrell; Operations Management Consultant, Julie Yeadon; and Program Administrator, Ms. Salter. Although the IG Complaint concerned the actions of, and was investigated by personnel in, the Santa Rosa office, Ms. Salter was aware in December 2016 that Petitioner had filed the IG Complaint. Ms. Yeadon was not aware of the IG Complaint until she began preparing for testimony in the instant proceeding. The record does not support a finding of whether Ms. Terrell had knowledge of the IG Complaint prior to participating in the decision to place Petitioner on a PCAP. Between May 2014 and September 2015, Petitioner was supervised in the Escambia County office by CPI Supervisor (“CPIS”) Tonja Odom. On January 28, 2015, Ms. Odom issued Petitioner a Documented Counseling for Poor Performance. The following excerpt is notable: As you are aware, the Family Functioning Assessment (FFA) is a valuable tool we use to help determine whether a child is safe or not. If a child is determined to be unsafe, then the family is referred to services with a Family First Network (FFN) provider. We have 14 days to complete [the FFA] and turn the case over to our FFN provider. Lately, you have missed the 14 day deadline and have cases that have exceeded 30 days. * * * In one of the overdue cases, (14-316539), the children were deemed unsafe; yet your FFA documents were not complete and the transfer to the provider did not take place timely. On January 22, 2015, this case was scheduled to be heard [by a judge] for a Case Plan approval. Your lack of action resulted in the FFN caseworker not being able to fulfill their duties and could have potentially harmed a child. Fortunately, the agency did not receive a penalty and the children are safe. Prior to this latest incident, I had several conversations with you, individually and within our group, stressing the importance of completing the FFA timely. The families we serve do not receive the needed services available if the FFA is not completed timely. * * * Your actions are unacceptable and any future violations may result in disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal. Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the Documented Counseling by her signature dated January 28, 2015. Ms. Salter was the Program Administrator in 2015 and was aware of the performance issue with Petitioner and issuance of the Documented Counseling. Ms. Salter testified, credibly, that Petitioner’s performance improved “for a brief while” after the Documented Counseling. Within a couple of months, Ms. Salter and Petitioner’s then-supervisor, Ms. Terrell, were discussing with her again the importance of timely follow up with victims and inputting notes in the system. In October 2016, the Department reassigned a number of Petitioner’s cases to other CPIs in order to address Petitioner’s backlog. When the cases were reviewed upon reassignment, the Department discovered that follow-up investigations had not been conducted timely, victims were not being seen according to protocols, OTIs were not processed timely, and documented appropriately, and there was an overall lack of documentation of Petitioner’s cases. In October and November 2016, Ms. Salter, Ms. Yeadon, and Ms. Terrell embarked on an effort to get Petitioner back on track with her investigations and case work. Following a meeting in which Department management discussed how to address backlogs with a number of CPIs, Ms. Yeadon, at Ms. Salter’s direction, reviewed Petitioner’s case files and documented specific deficiencies in follow up and documentation. That documentation was recorded on the Employee Disciplinary Action Form which was later used in conjunction with Petitioner’s PCAP. Ms. Yeadon subsequently drafted the PCAP which is the subject of the instant proceeding. Prior to presenting the PCAP to Petitioner, Ms. Yeadon discussed the PCAP with Petitioner’s supervisor, Ms. Terrell; Ms. Salter; and, ultimately, the Northwest Region Operations Manager for District 1. The PCAP provided Petitioner with specific performance improvement objectives to be performed within a two-month period. The PCAP provided that failure to comply may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. PCAP as Pretext Petitioner claims the PCAP and the Department’s allegations of poor work performance in late 2015 through 2016 are false and a mere pretext for unlawful retaliation. Petitioner argued that her performance evaluations from the Department were very good. Further, she argued that the Department would not have continued to assign her heavy caseloads in 2015 and 2016 if her performance were substandard as the Department represented. In support of her argument, Petitioner introduced spreadsheets reporting individual monthly totals of cases assigned to CPIs for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016 in the Escambia office. Petitioner was assigned only 64 new cases in calendar year 2015; however, in 2016, Petitioner was assigned a total of 231 new cases. For 2016, out of 44 CPIs, Petitioner was one of only nine assigned more than 200 cases. Twice in late 2016, Ms. Salter directed the transfer of cases from Petitioner in order to address her case backlog. Ms. Salter first directed the transfer of 40 of Petitioner’s cases, followed by another 20 in late December to Ms. Yeadon for management. Three of Petitioner’s relevant performance evaluations were introduced in evidence. For the review period July 1 through December 31, 2013, Petitioner received an overall rating of Satisfactory, scoring 3 out of a possible 5. Notably, the supervisor commented, “CPI Encui at times struggles to provide timely information to bring her cases to closure. She is actively working to improve in this area.” For the review period January 1 through June 30, 2014, Ms. Odom rated Petitioner Satisfactory, assigning a score of 3 out of 5. This performance evaluation was made prior to Ms. Odom’s January 2015 Documented Counseling to Petitioner. For the review period July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015, Ms. Odom again rated Petitioner Satisfactory, assigning a score of 3 out of 5. Ms. Odom made the following relevant comments: Ana has improved greatly in completing her assignments timely. She is learning how to prioritize her workload. * * * If provided a weekly list of cases needed to be submitted, Ana works diligently to get these files submitted to supervisor on time. * * * Ana’s cases have been submitted for closure prior to the 60 day deadline with supervision from management. Ana often needs to be prompted by management to complete her FFA corrections within 24 hours. This performance evaluation was made during the year in which Ms. Odom issued the Documented Counseling to Petitioner. No performance evaluation for FY 2015-2016 was introduced in evidence. Tina Cain is the Northwest Region Operations Manager for Circuit 1. She transferred to the Escambia County office as Program Administrator in June 2016. At that time, Ms. Cain was confronted with a number of employees with performance issues including a number of CPIs with case backlogs. Evaluations were due to be performed in June and July, but, as Ms. Cain explained, unless an employee was on a performance improvement plan prior to their evaluation, the employee could be rated no lower than Satisfactory, a 3 out of 5. Ms. Cain met with her supervisors and instructed them to prepare improvement plans for employees who were not meeting expectations. She directed her supervisors, many of whom were new, to coordinate with Human Resources to prepare the plans appropriately. Ms. Yeadon was instructed to assist Ms. Salter in preparation of Petitioner’s PCAP, as well as plans for other employees under her supervision. Ms. Yeadon prepared the specific case “write-up” on the Employee Disciplinary Action Form out of ignorance, as she was not familiar with the correct forms to use. Once the error was brought to her attention, Ms. Yeadon prepared the PCAP form with reference to specific case notes on the “write-up.” At Ms. Cain’s direction, PCAPs were developed for several employees in the Escambia office in October, November, and December 2016. Petitioner did not prove the PCAP was a pretext for retaliation. The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner’s performance issues were documented in the years prior to Petitioner’s IG Complaint, and that Petitioner’s supervisor and other management discussed and began preparing the PCAP to improve Petitioner’s performance months prior to Petitioner’s IG Complaint. PCAP as Disciplinary Action The Department contends that the PCAP itself is not disciplinary action. The Department follows a progressive disciplinary policy. The first step is a verbal counseling. If the issue is not resolved after a verbal counseling, it is followed by a documented counseling. If the issue is not resolved following a documented counseling, the employee is placed on a performance improvement plan. Ms. Salter testified that, if the employee fails to meet the expectations in a performance improvement plan, the employee may be subject to discipline in the form of termination or placement on a probationary period. The PCAP form stated, “Non-compliance may result in: Disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal[.]” The PCAP did not materially alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of Petitioner’s employment. Racial Discrimination Claim Petitioner was directly supervised in Escambia County first by Ms. Odom, an African-American female, then by Ms. Terrell, also an African-American female. Ms. Salter, also an African-American female, supervised Ms. Odom and Ms. Terrell and directly participated in the decision to place Petitioner on a PCAP. Ms. Salter’s second in command was Ms. Yeadon, who is a Caucasian female. Ms. Yeadon directly participated in drafting Petitioner’s PCAP. Ms. Cain, who is a Caucasian female, directed Ms. Yeadon and Ms. Salter to prepare Petitioner’s PCAP. Petitioner contends that her African-American supervisors discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment and disciplining her unfairly. When asked to recount specific remarks made by her supervisors that were derogatory in nature, Petitioner could only recall references such as “this type of people” or “those people.” Petitioner admitted that the remarks were not “really clear cut” discrimination. National Origin Discrimination Claim Finally, Petitioner claims her supervisors discriminated against her and created a hostile work environment based on her national origin. Specifically, Petitioner claims that her supervisors and other employees made fun of, or picked on her about, her accent. When asked by the undersigned to identify the specific individuals and statement made by them, Petitioner identified Ms. Odom as rude and disrespectful to her for the entire period in which Ms. Odom was Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated Ms. Odom frequently responded to Petitioner’s questions with, “I think this is a language problem” or “This must be a comprehension problem.” Petitioner identified no additional specific comments made by Ms. Odom regarding Petitioner’s national origin or her accent. Petitioner never complained to anyone at the Department regarding Ms. Odom’s treatment of her prior to her resignation. Ms. Odom was Petitioner’s supervisor from May 2014 to September 2015. Ms. Terrell became Petitioner’s supervisor in September 2015 and continued as Petitioner’s supervisor until Petitioner’s resignation. Although Petitioner testified that Ms. Terrell made derogatory remarks about Petitioner’s national origin and her accent, she was unable to give any specific example. Petitioner also complained that Ms. Salter made fun of her accent, but could not remember any specific statement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Petitioner against Respondent in Case No. 201700691. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2017.
The Issue Barkley has petitioned for the determination of the invalidity of Section 1101.1.3.2-15.i of the LES Personnel Manual. That section provides standards for disciplinary action when an employee commits the offense designated "falsification of records." The issues, therefore, are whether the standard is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(15) F.S. and whether Barkley is substantially affected by the standard. If the answer to both questions is yes, then it necessarily follows that the "rule" is invalid, as the parties have stipulated that the standard was not adopted as a rule.
Findings Of Fact Earnest O. Barkley, Jr. was employed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security in June 1980, and was continually employed until October 13, 1987. At the time of his separation he worked as a Statistician I, a position within the Florida career service system. During the course of his employment Barkley and other employees were given copies of the LES Standards for Disciplinary Action and were told that these would apply in agency discipline cases. The LES Standards for Disciplinary Action comprise section 15 of a much larger LES Personnel Manual. The Forward to that manual provides as follows: FOREWARD The LES Personnel Manual transmits to Managers, Supervisors and employees, the personnel policies and procedures for staff in the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. This manual provides direction and information in the areas of retirement, employment and pay administration, attendance and leave, employer/employee relations, employee benefits, labor relations, training and classification and pay. Further, this manual is to be utilized constructively to better manage and enhance the efficiency of the department's human resources. (Respondent's Exhibit #1) The Forward is signed by former DLES Secretary, Wallace E. Orr. The preamble to Section 15 provides as follows: 15. Standards for Disciplinary Action Included below are standards for the administration of disciplinary actions for various types of offenses. The list includes the most commonly occurring offenses and is not meant to be all inclusive. The disciplinary actions for the listed offenses have been established to help assure that employees who commit offenses receive similar treatment in like circumstances. Within each level of occurrence, a range has been provided to allow the supervisor flexibility in selecting appropriate discipline in order to take into consideration mitigating circumstances. * * * (Joint Exhibit #1) According to Floyd Dorn, DLES Personnel Officer and Ken Hart, Deputy Secretary and former General Counsel for 15 years, the disciplinary standards are utilized for precisely the purposes set out in the Forward and in the preamble. The standards are not considered the legal authority nor the basis on which the agency takes disciplinary action. That authority is found in the statutes and rules governing the Florida career service system. The standards are viewed by the agency as guidelines, with specific actions in each case governed by the unique circumstances. The termination letter dated October 13, 1987, does not reference the standard, but rather cites Rule 22A-7.010(7) F.A.C. as authority for the agency's action. The text of the section at issue reveals a wide range of discretion: Falsification of Records Includes misrepresentation, falsification or omission of any fact, whether verbal or written, on such records as, but not limited to: time and attendance (leave) , employment status, employment application, travel vouchers, and work and production. First occurrence Written reprimand to dismissal Second occurrence 3-day suspension to dismissal Third occurrence Dismissal (Joint Exhibit #1) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.56 and 120.57(1) F.S. Subsection 120.56(1) F.S. provides: (1) Any person substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. "Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" is defined as "... Action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply: (a) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rule making procedure set forth in S. 120.54; * * * Subsection 120.52(8)(a) F.S. (1987) The threshold question, therefore, is whether the LES disciplinary standard is a rule. Section 120.52(15) F.S. defines "rule", with certain exceptions, as "... each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. * * * Citing State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2nd 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and McDonald v. Dept. of Banking and Finance 346 So.2nd 569, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the First District Court in State, Department of Administration v. Harvey, 356 So.2nd 323, 325 (1978) explains the definition: Whether an agency statement is a rule turns on the effect of the statement, not on the agency's characterization of the statement by some appellation other than "rule." The breadth of the definition in Section 120.52(14) indicates that the legislature intended the term to cover a great variety of agency statements regardless of how the agency designates them. Any agency statement is a rule if it "purports in and of itself to create certain rights and adversely affect others," Stevens, [citation omitted] or serves "by [its] own effect to create rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of law." McDonald v. Dep't. of Banking & Fin. [citation omitted]. See also Straughn v. O'Riordan, 338 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1976); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Some ten years later these cases are still good law. Both parties rely on Harvey, and on two cases decided by the First District Court of Appeal on the same day in 1981. In Department of Highway Safety v. Fla. Police Benevolent Association, 400 So.2nd 1302 (Petition for cert. den. 408 So.2nd 1093), the Highway Patrol's general orders prescribing standards of physical fitness for patrolmen and guidelines for supervisors in assessing discipline were held not to be rules, since, unlike the "bumping" guidelines in Stevens and the minimum training and experience requirements in Harvey, the general orders were "... effective in themselves only as guidelines, subject in application to the discretion of the enforcing officer." p. 1303. In Florida State University v. Dann, 400 So.2nd 1304, the document setting forth procedures for awarding merit salaries and other pay increases was held to be a rule, as the procedures were self-executing and were issued by the agency head for implementation with little or no room for discretionary modification. Under the evidence elicited in this case, the LES Disciplinary Standard is not self-executing; it does not, in and of itself create or adversely affect certain rights; and it does not have the direct and consistent effect of law. Like the Highway Patrol's order prescribing disciplinary guidelines in Police Benevolent Assn., supra, the LES Disciplinary Standard is inchoate and unenforceable without the authority of Rule 22A-7.010(7) F.A.C., and Section 110.227 F.S., governing dismissals of career service employees for cause. 19. Section 110.227(1) F.S. (1986) provides: 110.227 Suspensions, dismissals, reductions in pay, demotions, layoffs, and transfers. Any employee who has permanent status in the career service may only be suspended or dismissed for cause. Cause shall include, but not be limited to, negligence, inefficiency or inability to perform assigned duties, insubordination, willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules, conduct unbecoming a public employee, misconduct, habitual drug abuse, or conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude. Each agency head shall ensure that all employees of the agency are completely familiar with the agency's established procedures on disciplinary actions and grievances. Rule 22A-7.010(7) F.A.C. provides in pertinent part: Dismissals. A dismissal is defined as the action taken by an agency against an employee to separate the employee from the Career Service. An agency head may dismiss any employee for just cause. Just cause shall include, but not be limited to, negligence, inefficiency, or inability to perform assigned duties; repeated and/or gross substandard performance of assigned duties; insubordination; willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules; conduct unbecoming a public employee; misconduct, habitual drug abuse, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Neither statute nor rule specify that falsification of records is just cause. The LES standard therefore, provides guidance to employees and their supervisors that this violation is one that might result in dismissal. This does not, however, make the standard a rule. Depending on the generality of the statute, an agency definition of a statutory term not set forth as a promulgated rule may or may not constitute a "policy" statement. Island Harbour v. Dept. of Natural Resources 495 So.2nd 209, 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The LES standards satisfy the requirements of Department of Administration Rule 22A-10.003 F.A.C., that agency heads establish "rules and procedures" including ranges of penalties for various types of work deficiencies and offenses to insure reasonable consistency in disciplinary actions. The policy relied upon the agency in this instance is found in the promulgated rules of the Department of Administration and the statute governing dismissals of career service system employees. In each, the non-exclusive examples of just cause are specific enough to compel the conclusion that in certain circumstances falsification of records will constitute just cause for dismissal. Whether those circumstances exist here is a matter for determination in a different proceeding, for rule or no rule, the employee is entitled to a due process hearing de novo on the ultimate question of whether he has been permissibly fired. Rule or no rule, the agency bears the burden of justifying its action. Department of Administration v. Nelson 424 So.2nd 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), and Nelson v. Department of Administration, 424 So.2nd 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Section 1101.1.3.2.-15.i of the LES Personnel Manual is not a rule and is not subject to the adoption requirements of Section 120.54, F.S. This conclusion determines, as well, the standing of Petitioner in this proceeding. His "substantial effect" flows from the promulgated rules and statute rather than from the broad guidelines found in the personnel manual. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, ORDERED: That the Petition of Earnest O. Barkley, Jr. be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Woolfork, Esquire The Murphy House 317 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dan Turnbull, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Donna Poole, Esquire General Counsel 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code The Capitol - 1802 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedure Committee 120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
