The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Hardin Hammock Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Hardin"), discriminated against Petitioner, Ms. Celeste Washington (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Washington), on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Celeste Washington is a black adult. Hardin is a housing rental complex with 200 single- family residences. Hardin is located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Hardin provides "affordable housing" to lower-income individuals and, therefore, its residents are required to meet certain income requirements in order to be eligible for a residence at Hardin. At the times material to this proceeding, Hardin was managed by Reliance Management Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Reliance"). At the times material to this proceeding, Salah Youssif, an employee of Reliance, acted as the property manager at Hardin. Mr. Youssif is himself black, having been born in Sudan. Ms. Washington's Charge. On or about August 29, 2002, Ms. Washington filed a Complaint with the Commission. After investigation of the Complaint, the Commission issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause, concluding that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred" and dismissing the Complaint. On or about May 5, 2003, Ms. Washington filed a Petition with the Commission. Ms. Washington alleged in the Petition that Hardin had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.36, Florida Statutes. In particular, Ms. Washington alleged that Hardin had "violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, in the manner described below": Washington was told that the waiting list at Hardin Hammock Estates was closed. She visited this development twice and was told the waiting [sic] was close [sic]. At that time she viewed the wating [sic] list and the majority of the names are [sic] Hispanic. Islanders do not consider themselves as Black Americans. The "ultimate facts alleged & entitlement to relief" asserted in the Petition are as follows: Hardin Hammocks has willful [sic] and [knowingly] practice [sic] discrimination in there [sic] selection practice and a strong possibility that the same incomes for Blacks & others [sic]. Black Americans rent is [sic] higher than others living in these [sic] developments. At hearing, Ms. Washington testified that Hardin had discriminated against her when an unidentified person refused to give her an application and that she believes the refusal was based upon her race. Management of Hardin; General Anti-Discrimination Policies. The residence selection policy established by Reliance specifically precludes discrimination based upon race. A human resource manual which describes the policy has been adopted by Reliance and all employees of Reliance working at Hardin have attended a workshop conducted by Reliances' human resource manager at which the anti-discrimination policy was addressed. An explanation of the Federal Fair Housing Law of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is prominently displayed in the public area of Hardin's offices in both English and Spanish. As of July 1, 2002, approximately 52 of Hardin's 200 units were rented to African-American families. Hardin's Application Policy. When Mr. Youssif became the property manager at Hardin, there were no vacancies and he found a disorganized, outdated waiting list of questionable accuracy. Mr. Youssif undertook the task of updating the list and organizing it. He determined that there were approximately 70 to 80 individuals or families waiting for vacancies at Hardin. Due to the rate of families moving out of Hardin, approximately one to two families a month, Mr. Youssif realized that if he maintained a waiting list of 50 individuals it would still take approximately two years for a residence to become available for all 50 individuals on the list. Mr. Youssif also realized that, over a two-year or longer period, the individuals on a waiting list of 50 or more individuals could change drastically: their incomes could change; they could find other affordable housing before a residence became available at Hardin; or they could move out of the area. Mr. Youssif decided that it would be best for Hardin and for individuals interested in finding affordable housing that Hardin would maintain a waiting list of only 50 individuals and that applications would not be given to any person, regardless of their race, while there were 50 individuals on the waiting list. Mr. Youssif instituted the new waiting list policy and applied it regardless of the race of an applicant. If there were less than 50 names on the waiting list, applications were accepted regardless of an individual's race; and if there were 50 or more names on the waiting list, no application was accepted regardless of an individual's race. Lack of Evidence of Discrimination. The only evidence Ms. Washington presented concerning her allegations of discriminatory treatment is that she is black. Although Ms. Washington was refused an application for housing at Hardin,3 the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Washington's race played any part in the decision not to give her an application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Celeste Washington's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Century Realty Funds, Inc., violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapters 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to install a poolside chairlift as requested by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is physically disabled and protected for the purposes of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the owner of Plantation Landings Mobile Home Park ("Plantation Landings") in Haines City, Florida. Plantation Landings is a 55-year-old and older community. It owns and leases the lots to the owner-tenants of Plantation Landings. Because Respondent owns the Plantation Landings real estate and the subject swimming pool, it has the sole discretion to approve the requested improvements. The swimming pool area is handicap accessible. It is a public swimming pool and regulated by the State of Florida, Department of Health. It was built approximately 30 years ago; there are no known existing construction plans for the pool. The swimming pool is surrounded by a wheelchair-accessible path, and the pool itself has two separate sets of handrails; one for the deep end and one for the shallow end. There are steps leading into the shallow end of the pool and a ladder leading into the deep end. The swimming pool does not have a poolside chairlift. The swimming pool area is not supervised by life guards. Plantation Landings does not provide any supportive services to its residents, such as counseling, medical, therapeutic, or social services. The owner-tenants of Plantation Landings are members of the Plantation Landings Mobile Home Park Homeowners' Association ("Homeowners' Association"), which is a voluntary homeowners' association. Petitioner and his wife are members of the Homeowners' Association. Petitioner and his wife purchased a home in Plantation Landings and leased a lot from Respondent on February 8, 2001, pursuant to a Lease Agreement of the same date. Petitioner is a paraplegic and is able to move about by wheelchair. He is able to access the swimming pool common area in his wheelchair. However, he is not able to get in and out of the pool by himself. He has attempted to get into the swimming pool with the assistance of other residents. He would like to be able to have access into the swimming pool without relying upon the assistance of other residents so that he can exercise. In April 2003, Petitioner discussed the feasibility of installing a poolside chairlift at the swimming pool with Respondent's agent. Petitioner offered to pay for the poolside chairlift and installation at his own expense. On April 1, 2003, Petitioner submitted a written request to Respondent requesting that Respondent install a poolside chairlift. Petitioner delivered his April 1, 2003, written request, literature, and video regarding the poolside chairlift to Respondent's agent. The request did not include any specifications or engineered drawings, nor did it state the proposed location for the poolside chairlift. The poolside chairlift initially proposed by Petitioner was the Model IGMT, which was an in-ground manually-operated lift with a 360-degree seat rotation. In its consideration of Petitioner's request, Respondent determined that the design and construction of the pool and the surrounding common areas were in compliance with all state and federal statutes and regulations and that the pool area and common areas to the pool were accessible by wheelchair. Respondent determined that it was not required to install a poolside chairlift for access into the pool. Respondent also learned that the IGMT model was not Americans With Disabilities Act compliant. It was Respondent's conclusion that the poolside chairlift was cost-prohibitive and a dangerous hazard. When Petitioner returned to Plantation Landings in November 2003, he was advised of Respondent's decision not to provide the requested poolside chairlift. In March 2004, Petitioner requested the assistance of James Childs, president of the Homeowners' Association, for the purpose of making a second request to Respondent for the installation of a poolside chairlift. On March 7, 2004, Mr. Childs, on Petitioner's behalf, wrote Respondent requesting a poolside chairlift. On May 3, 2004, Respondent wrote Mr. Childs denying the request. Over the several years Petitioner has resided in Plantation Landings, he has requested modifications to accommodate wheelchair accessibility. These requests included modifications to the ramp at the front of the clubhouse, modifications adding an additional wheelchair ramp to the back of the clubhouse for access into the clubhouse, and modifications to the handicap parking spaces in front of the clubhouse. All of Petitioner's requests for modifications were honored. In May 2006, Petitioner, again with the assistance of Mr. Childs, made a third request to install a poolside chairlift. This third request was identical to his two prior requests made in 2003 and 2004. This request was denied by letter on April 27, 2006. On December 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by refusing to allow him to install a poolside chairlift at his own expense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent, or, alternatively, that the claim is time-barred and that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2008.
Findings Of Fact The Petition filed herein, among other matters, alleges, in pertinent part, that: This is a petition for determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). The 1,000 members of the FMHA may be sub- jected to this rule and Gerry Barding as an individual are substantially affected in that the rule has the effect of allowing the DBR to schedule a mediation or arbitration if the request "does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules." Section 723.037 limits the substantial rights of a party who fails to mediate or arbitrate a dispute under Section 723.037 with the DBR . . . . * * * The substantial rights of the members of FMHA will be affected if the DBR is allowed to grant mediation or arbitration requests when the mobile home owners have not complied with the provisions of Section 723.037, Fla. Stat. (1987). The proposed rule of the DBR enlarges, modifies, or otherwise contravenes the statu- tory authority granted by Chapter 723, Fla. Stat. (1987), and is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Petitioner, FMHA, is an incorporated association not for profit whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners. All of the mobile home park members of FMHA own mobile home parks which contain greater than 25 mobile home lots which are offered for lease. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA on a regular basis annually increase the lot rental amount in their mobile home parks. The residents of the FMHA members' mobile home parks are entitled to and may request mediation of lot rental amount increases pursuant to Sections and 723.038, F.S. (1987), and the rules of the Florida Department of Business Regulation. Requests for mediation have been made in the past by homeowners residing in FMHA members' mobile home parks and many of those mediation proceedings have not yet been completed. Petitioner, Gerry Barding, is the owner of Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park located in Jensen Beach, Florida. In the past, Mr. Barding has increased the lot rental amount in Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park and expects to do so in the future. In September 1987, a request for mediation from Pinelake Village residents was not filed within 30 days of the meeting between the park owner and the residents. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes reviewed the request for mediation and determined that it was willing to mediate the dispute. The Division requested that Mr. Barding advise it of his willingness or refusal to participate in the mediation. Mr. Barding declined to agree to mediation of the dispute, and the mediation file of the Division was closed. Sections 723.037(4), F.S. (1987), provides in pertinent part that: Within 30 days of the date of the scheduled meeting described in subsection (3), the home owners shall request that the dispute be submitted to mediation pursuant to Section if a majority of the affected home owners have designated, in writing, that: The rental increase is unreasonable; The rental increase has made the lot rental amount unreasonable; The decrease in services or utilities is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in rent or is otherwise unreasonable; or The change in the rules and regulations is unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes does not interpret Section 723.037(4), F.S., as depriving it of authority to mediate when the request for mediation is filed more than 30 days after the referenced meeting. Section 723.037(6), F.S., provides that: No action relating to a dispute described in this section may be filed in any court unless and until a request has been submitted to the Division for mediation and arbitration and the request has been processed in accordance with Section 723.038. Section 723.037(7), F.S., provides that: If a party refuses to agree to mediate or arbitrate, or fails to request mediation, upon proper request, that party shall not be entitled to attorney's fees in any action relating to a dispute described in this section. Section 723.004(4), F.S., provides that: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the enforcement of a right or duty under this section, Sections 723.022; 723.023; 723.031; 723.033; 723.035; 723.037; 723.038; 723.061; 723.0615; 723.062; 723.063; or 723.081 by civil action after the party has exhausted its administrative remedies, if any. Existing Rule 7D-32.005(3), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: The homeowners' committee shall request mediation, or the homeowners' committee and the park owner may jointly request arbitration, by mailing or delivering the following items to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007: A completed Form DBR 405, which becomes effective on the same date as this rule and which may be obtained by writing to the Division at the above address, and A copy of the written designation required by Rule 7D-32.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(4), Florida Statutes; and A copy of the notice of lot rental increase, reduction in services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations which is being challenged as unreasonable; and A copy of the records which verify the selection of the homeowners' committee in accordance with Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. [Emphasis supplied] Proposed Rule 7D-32.005(4), F.A.C., which was published in Volume 14, No. 4, Florida Administrative Law Weekly (January 29, 1988), and which is here challenged, provides that: A request for mediation or arbitration shall be denied if the request does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules. The word "may," which is struck through, is to be deleted from the existing rule now in effect. The underlining indicates that the words "shall" and "substantially" are amendatory language to be added. Rule 7D-32.005(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: If the homeowners' committee requests media- tion, a copy of the four items required by subsection (3) of this rule shall be furnished to the park owner by Certified U. S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested, at the time the request is filed with the Division. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in scheduling of a mediation meeting until the required items have been furnished to the park owner. [Emphasis supplied] Rule 7D-32.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides: Within 10 days from the date that the park owner or his agent receives copies of the documents required to be furnished to him pursuant to subsection (5) of this rule, the park owner shall advise the Division in writing of his willingness or refusal to participate in the requested mediation. If the park owner is of the opinion that the home owners or the homeowners' committee have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, or the requirements of these rules he may indicate his willingness to participate in the mediation process without waiving his objections to the procedures used by the homeowners' committee. Rule 7D-32.005(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: A decision by the Division to grant or deny a request for mediation does not constitute an adjudication of any issues arising under Section 723.037, Florida Statutes. Any dispute concerning the applicability of Section 723.037(6)-(7), Florida Statutes, must be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction in the event that judicial proceedings are initiated. Rule 7D-32.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: `Mediation' means a process whereby a mediator provided by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes partici- pates in discussions with a homeowners' committee and a park owner concerning the reasonableness of an increase in lot rental amount, change in park rules and regulations, or a decrease in services or utilities. The purpose of the mediator's participation is to assist the parties in arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement of their differences.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice by "lock[ing] [Petitioner] out of [his] apartment" at the Arena Hotel, as alleged in Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint, and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a black male. Since 2000, he has maintained a residence at the Arena Hotel (Establishment), a rooming house (with 22 rooms) located in Miami, Florida. Respondent is the former owner of the Establishment. He purchased the Establishment approximately three years ago. At the time of the purchase, there were only a small handful of blacks residing in the Establishment (including Petitioner). The percentage of black residents increased significantly during his ownership. Respondent lived in Israel when he owned the Establishment (as he does now). Every several months he traveled to Miami and visited the Establishment. Respondent had an on-site manager to take care of the day-to-day affairs of the Establishment for him. Respondent also had a brother living in the area on whom he could call to check on the Establishment. The brother, Gil Terem, worked for Majestic Properties, Inc., a Miami-based real estate brokerage firm. Gil Terem assisted in Respondent's sale of the Establishment. From the time Respondent purchased the Establishment until the time he sold it, Petitioner regularly complained to management and various governmental agencies about the conditions in his room and the common areas. Petitioner's complaints were not the only ones management received during this time frame. There were also complaints from residents of the Establishment who claimed that Petitioner was acting aggressively and harassing them. On November 6, 2002, government inspectors conducted an inspection of the Establishment. Later that same day, November 6, 2002, City of Miami police were called to the Establishment by management to look into an allegation of harassment made against Petitioner. Gil Terem was on the premises of the Establishment when the police arrived. Respondent was not present. He was in Israel. Upon their arrival, the police confronted Petitioner and spoke with him. Although the police did not arrest Petitioner or take him into custody, Petitioner was under the impression, following his discussion with the police, that he was not free to reenter his room and that he had to vacate the premises. He therefore left the Establishment without returning to his room. Notwithstanding what Petitioner may have believed, there was no intention to evict him. Petitioner pursued legal action in Miami-Dade Circuit Court alleging that he was illegally removed from his room in the Establishment. On December 4, 2002, in the case of David Powell v. Majestic Properties, Inc., Case No. 02-27703CA30, Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Barbara Levenson issued an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief, which read as follows: This cause having come on to be heard on Dec. 4, 2002 on Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief and the Court having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise advised in the premises, its is hereupon, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said Motion be, and the same is hereby, granted. A temporary restraining order is in effect pending the setting of a further hearing. [Plaintiff] is allowed to return to his residence. Following the entry of this Order, Petitioner returned to his room in the Establishment. Because there was a new lock on the door that had been installed during his absence, he was not able to enter the room until Gil Terem came by with a key to let him in. Subsequent to his return to the Establishment, Petitioner initiated various judicial and administrative actions, including the instant one,1 claiming that Respondent and others conspired to unlawfully discriminate against him by depriving him of the opportunity to enjoy the privileges of residing at the Establishment. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner was in any way discriminated against on the basis of race or handicap or that any adverse action was taken against him in retaliation for his claiming that he was the victim of housing discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that no "discriminatory housing practice" has been committed and dismissing Petitioner's complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2004.
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Joseph H. Clempson had resided in the trailer park long enough to come with the purview of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act. Joseph H. Clempson owned and occupied a one bedroom, one bath, trailer with a living room, located on a 30x40 foot lot (1200 sq. ft.) in Port Everglades Over Night Trailer Park. The Department of Transportation was acquiring real estate (for highway construction) in the area where Mr. Clempson's trailer was located. The trailer was a 1978 model, with exterior dimensions of 8x31 feet. The Department's Household Survey indicated the trailer was in good condition, met the decent, safe and sanitary standards and could be moved. Mr. Clempson had lived in his trailer for approximately 5 years and had resided at the Port Everglades Park for 7 years. He paid $130 monthly for the lot when he first moved there and was paying $130 monthly when he left. Rent included water, garbage and septic utilities. Mr. Clempson worked as a night manager at the park the last two years he was there. He was paid $4.00 per hour and worked approximately 15 hours per week. The rent for anyone new coming into the park would be $170.00 per month. William H. Brown, former operations manager for the Port Everglades Park acknowledged that Mr. Clempson received special consideration for rent because he was a long-standing good tenant. Mr. Clempson did not receive special consideration because he worked there. It is noted that Mr. Clempson did not work for the park during his first five years there and his rent was not increased. Mr. Brown testified that Mr. Clempson's rent would have stayed at $130.00 even if Mr. Clempson had stopped working for the park. Bernard Davis, Right of Way Specialist, Department of Transportation, did the evaluation of comparable locations for the relocation of Mr. Clempson. His income was not low enough to come under the 25 percent factor because 25 percent of Mr. Clempson's gross monthly income exceeded his monthly rent at the trailer park. It was Mr. Davis' responsibility to find a park that would be similar or comparable to the subject park, close to commercial and public facilities. He went to other parks but found a park, Mobile Home Country Club, where three comparables were computed to be the best in all respects. Mobile Home Country Club had 25x55 foot lots available for a monthly rental of $145, water and sewer included. There were no common bathing facilities at the park and the park did not allow pets. The Mobile Home Country Club was selected because it was close to commercial and public facilities within a reasonable distance from the subject, approximately 8 miles. The Household Survey indicated Mr. Clempson's trailer met decent, safe and sanitary standards, it was in good condition and could be moved. It had a toilet and bath facilities. It was standard procedure with the Department that all three comparables could be determined at the same general location for mobile home (trailer) parks, residential or apartments. The park where the comparables were determined would accept mobile homes or trailers. The size of the lot in the park was a little larger than the lot Mr. Clempson had at Port Everglades Park. Kathleen Roach, Right of Way Specialist, Department of Transportation, inspected Mr. Clempson's trailer at the Port Everglades Park and updated the Household Survey on March 15, 1983. She met with Mr. Clempson and measured the trailer to determine how many square feet were inside. Ms. Roach went through the trailer and noted the bathroom was in very good condition. Mr. Clempson informed her the bathroom facilities functioned but he preferred to use the common bathrooms at the park because of his size. She noted the trailer was four years old, structurally sound, decent, safe and sanitary and could be moved. Ms. Roach was aware that Mr. Clempson had a cat but could not recall the exact date when she was so informed. The pet would not change the calculations of Mr. Clempson. This was due to an instructional memorandum from the Federal Highway Administration that indicated pets cannot be considered in raising the rent supplement. Also, there is no requirement that a location be used in determining comparables where pets can stay. Mr. Clempson purchased a single wide mobile home, 51 feet long, with 3 bedrooms, a living room and a bath and a half in Rexmere Village where he is presently living. The Department did not determine (pursuant to federal and state standards) that the lot in this mobile home park was comparable to his prior accommodation and did not tell Mr. Clempson to move to this park. Rexmere Village allows pets but has no common bathing facilities. Mr. Clempson's current location has a front yard and back yard. The current lot would be considerably larger than his Port Everglades lot to accommodate a larger dwelling (three bedroom mobile home 51 feet long), and to provide a front and back yard. Mr. Clempson pays a rent of $180 plus approximately $27 a month for water and sewer. The lot at Rexmere Village is not comparable to the lot at Port Everglades Park. Mr. Clempson sold his trailer at the first park before he bought his new mobile home. Mr. Clempson indicated he had to sell his trailer at a $3000.00 loss because of its condition. He said that the roof leaked and it had termites (or ants) in it in late 1982. He did nothing to correct the problem except set off some bug bombs. He did not call in any pest control services. He did nothing because he intended to get rid of the trailer. Mr. Clempson told Ms. Roach about the termites but was unsure about when she was told. He thought he told her in telephone conversations when he was telling her about a mobile home he wanted to buy but he could not recall a specific time. He testified that Ms. Roach was in his trailer several times but he never pointed out to her where the termites were. Ms. Roach testified that the trailer was structurally sound when she inspected it and indicated there was nothing in her contact notes to show she had received information from Mr. Clempson about problems with the trailer. Having weighed the credibility of the witnesses, it is found that the trailer was decent, safe and sanitary when it was inspected and that any economic loss suffered by Mr. Clempson was the result of his actions and not those of the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order authorizing payment of replacement housing benefit of $720.00. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald H. Benson, Esquire 301 Southeast 10th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for consideration in this case concern the petition and challenge to the validity of Rule 7D-32.001(4); Rule 7D-32.003 and Rules 7D- 32.004(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for the challenge is premised upon an alleged vagueness, inadequacy in the establishment of standards for agency decisions, the vesting of unbridled discretion in the agency and the contention that the rules are arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Lake Waldena Resort, a mobile home park located in Marion County, Florida. That park is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a mobile home park owner within the definition set out in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. In addition, Petitioner is presently charged, through a notice to show cause/administrative complaint, with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 7D- 32.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, by his alleged refusal to meet with a designated homeowners' committee within 30 days of the giving of notice of a proposed increase of lot rental. That disciplinary case was heard on the same date as the present case and is awaiting disposition through a recommended order. If Petitioner is found to have violated provisions within Chapter 723, Florida Statutes and Chapter 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, he may be subjected to a civil penalty or have other administrative sanctions imposed. The rules that are under challenge are related to the formation of the homeowners committee; the activities of that committee in ascertaining the basis for the park owners' reason for a lot rental increase; the obligation of the park owner to meet with the committee and the opportunity of the park owner to request certification of the committee's selection to participate in the meeting envisioned by Section 737.0037(3), Florida statues. Respondent by the authority set forth in Section 732.006(6), Florida Statutes, is authorized to promulgate rules which it deems to be necessary to implement, enforce, and interpret the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. In accordance with that authority and the authority set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, it enacted the rules which are the subject of this dispute. Intervenor is a Florida non-profit corporation which represents over 150,000 mobile home owners and tenants in Florida and has as its purpose the representation of those mobile home owners in various activities, to include legal issues. The Petitioner and Respondent and the mobile home owners whom the Intervenor represents are substantially affected by the decision concerning the validity of the aforementioned rules.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intended decision to fund the application of Petitioner Duval Park, Ltd. (Duval Park), is contrary to its governing statutes, rules, policies, or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation that administers low-income housing tax credit programs. As of July 1, 2012, Florida Housing was authorized to use up to ten percent of its annual allocation of low-income housing tax credits to fund high-priority affordable housing developments selected through a competitive solicitation process, such as the RFP. See Ch. 2012-127, § 4, Laws of Fla. (2012)(creating § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat.). Examples of "high priority" affordable housing developments include housing for veterans and their families, and housing for persons with special needs. Prior to issuing the RFP, Florida Housing conducted some demonstration RFPs for developments serving special needs households, but the RFP represents the first actual use of the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits. Previously, low-income housing tax credits were awarded through what was known as the universal application cycle, a process described as cumbersome, lengthy, and inflexible. As part of the universal application cycle, an applicant could indicate by checking a box that it intended to provide affordable housing to special needs households. However, the general universal application process did not lend itself to a targeted proposal detailing how the unique needs of specific special-needs population groups would be addressed. The competitive solicitation process was seen as a way to allow applicants to respond to particular high-priority development needs identified by Florida Housing. In setting forth their development proposals for defined target population groups, applicants would be able to tell their story: applicants would identify and describe the unique needs and household characteristics of the specific special-needs population group that is the focus of their application; applicants could detail and demonstrate their know-how with regard to the resources available in the community where the proposed development is located, to meet the unique needs of the target population; and applicants would be able to discuss the relevant experience of the developer and management teams that make them well-suited to carry out the proposed development and meet the unique needs of the targeted population group. The RFP The RFP solicited responses or applications proposing the development of "permanent supportive housing" (as defined in the RFP) for persons with special needs. Florida Housing issued the RFP with the expectation of funding two or more proposals. The RFP provided that applicants could propose developments for persons with special needs generally, or applicants could choose to focus on serving veterans with special needs. If an applicant chose to focus on veterans with special needs, the applicant was required to pick one of two specific subcategories: either veterans with service-connected disabling conditions transitioning from a Veterans' Administration (VA) hospital or medical center; or chronically homeless/ institutionalized veterans with disabling conditions who were significant users of public resources, such as emergency care and shelter. The RFP specified that it was Florida Housing's goal to fund at least one development proposing to serve veterans with special needs. Preference would be given to proposed developments focusing on serving special-needs veterans in the first subcategory, i.e., veterans transitioning from VA hospitals and medical centers. Duval Park, Osprey, and five other applicants timely submitted applications in response to the RFP. Both Duval Park and Osprey proposed permanent supportive housing developments to serve veterans with special needs transitioning from VA hospitals and medical centers. As described in the RFP, an evaluation committee comprised of Florida Housing employees reviewed and scored the applications. Members of the evaluation committee were instructed to independently evaluate and score the application sections assigned to them. The RFP specified that at least one public meeting would be held at which the evaluators were allowed to discuss their evaluations, make any adjustments deemed necessary to best serve the interests of Florida Housing's mission, and develop recommendations for the Florida Housing Board of Directors. For most application sections, a single evaluator was assigned to review and score the seven responses. For example, Mr. Aldinger was the evaluator who reviewed and scored the two application sections addressing developer and management company experience with permanent supportive housing. Two application sections were assigned for evaluation and scoring by two evaluation committee members. The two evaluators first independently reviewed and scored all seven application responses for the two sections. Then the two evaluators met in a noticed public meeting to conduct a "reconciliation process," in which they discussed their evaluations of the responses to the two application sections and reconciled differences in their scores. The evaluation committee ultimately concluded that Duval Park's application was entitled to a total of 119 points out of 133 possible points, and that Osprey's application was entitled to 117 points. A large gap in scoring separated these two highest-scoring applicants from the other five applicants; the next highest score was 95 points. The evaluation committee presented its recommendation to the Florida Housing Board of Directors, along with a summary of the scores assigned by the evaluation committee. The committee's recommendation was that Florida Housing should award funding to Duval Park for its proposed development. Florida Housing's Board adopted the committee's recommendation. Osprey's Protest Issue Remaining for Determination Following the parties' withdrawal of most of their protest issues, the only remaining disputed issue for resolution in this proceeding is Osprey's claim that Duval Park should have received "at least three" less points than Osprey for the sections addressing developer and management company experience.2/ Mr. Aldinger's assignment as the evaluation committee member responsible for reviewing and scoring these application sections comports with his expertise. Mr. Aldinger has served as Florida Housing's supportive housing coordinator since 2006. In that role, he has been coordinating with governmental bodies and industry stakeholders to develop strategies for focusing Florida Housing's resources on the provision of supportive housing to special needs households. The RFP was developed in furtherance of this effort, and Mr. Aldinger was one of the RFP's authors. Mr. Aldinger assigned the same number of points to the Duval Park and Osprey applications in both sections. Each application received 24 out of 25 possible points for developer experience, and all ten of the points available for management company experience. Osprey's contention is that its narratives for these two application sections show its objective superiority. Osprey's "objective superiority" argument is primarily based on a quantitative comparison, in which its narrative showed experience developing and operating a larger number of permanent supportive housing units than did Duval Park's narrative. Osprey also contends that its narrative was qualitatively better in providing greater detail regarding its experience developing and operating permanent supportive housing. As part of its argument, Osprey contends that Duval Park strayed from the RFP instructions by describing experience with more than just permanent supportive housing, but that the evaluator gave Duval Park credit anyway. The RFP instructions provide the starting point to assess Osprey's contentions. First, the RFP provided the following definition of "permanent supportive housing": Rental housing that is affordable to the focus households with household incomes at or below 60 percent of area median income (AMI), that is leased to the focus households, for continued occupancy with an indefinite length of stay as long as the Permanent Supportive Housing tenant complies with the lease requirements. Permanent Supportive Housing shall facilitate and promote activities of daily living, access to community-based services and amenities, and inclusion in the general community. Permanent Supportive Housing shall strive to meet the needs and preferences of the focus households. This RFP definition was acknowledged to be somewhat broader than how that phrase might be understood by some industry models. For example, Mr. Aldinger testified that transitional housing could be permanent supportive housing within the RFP definition, as long as a lease agreement is used. Permanency is not required, only an "indefinite" length of stay. The fact that leases are for finite terms of 12 or 24 months would not be dispositive; rather, the length of stay would be considered "indefinite" if tenants are not required to leave at the end of their lease terms, if they are not ready to leave and are otherwise in compliance with the lease terms. The provision of supportive services to meet the needs of the focus population is a key part of the RFP definition. The RFP instructions for the developer experience narrative were as follows: Developer Experience with Permanent Supportive Housing (Maximum 25 points): The Applicant must describe the experience of the Developer, co-Developer, and/or Principal in developing and operating Permanent Supportive Housing, and more specifically, housing for the households the Applicant is proposing to serve. Describe the role(s) and responsibilities of any Developer, co- Developer, and/or Principal listed in the Applicant's responses to Items A.2.c. and 3.a. of Section 6 of the RFP, related to the proposed Development, and describe the experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out the roles and responsibilities for this proposed Development. (emphasis added). The RFP instructions for the first application section must also be considered because they tie into the developer/ manager experience sections. The instructions for the first application section required the applicant to provide a detailed description of the focus population group, and the instructions also explained how that description would be used, as follows: [T]he Applicant must provide a detailed description of the resident household characteristics, needs, and preferences of the focus population(s) the Applicant is proposing to serve. This description will provide a point of reference for the Corporation's evaluation and scoring of the Application, providing the foundation for the appropriateness of the experience of the Developer(s) and Management Company, proposed Construction Features and Amenities, Resident services and Access to Community Based Services and Amenities. (emphasis added). As part of this first application section, applicants focusing on special-needs veterans transitioning from VA facilities were required to designate the specific VA facilities with which the applicants expected to be working and coordinating. Osprey, whose proposed development is in Liberty City, Miami-Dade County, designated Miami VA Healthcare System (Miami VA) in Miami. Duval Park, whose proposed development is in unincorporated Pinellas County, designated Bay Pines VA Healthcare System (Bay Pines VA) in Pinellas County, as well as the James A. Haley Veterans Hospital and the Tampa Polytrauma Rehabilitation Center, both in Tampa, Hillsborough County. Osprey and Duval Park both provided extensive narratives describing their target populations and detailing the unique needs and preferences of their target populations. Osprey's narrative described the information learned from interviewing social workers in each of the programs under the umbrella of the Miami VA, with whom Carrfour would be coordinating for transitioning veterans. Osprey's narrative also described a VA grant to Carrfour of $1,000,000 per year for supportive services for veteran families, through which Carrfour provides a comprehensive case management program called Operation Sacred Trust. This program has an outreach team that works closely with social workers throughout the Miami VA. The Duval Park narrative discussed and documented the work of the St. Petersburg Housing Authority Wounded Warrior Community Advisory Group to assess housing needs for veterans. Developer-partner ServiceSource's director of housing was a participant. As part of the assessment, the advisory group conducted veterans' focus groups to hear from the veterans themselves regarding their needs and preferences, including the particular supportive services needed to allow veterans to transition to an independent living setting. The Duval Park narrative also described the information about transitioning veterans learned through ongoing projects with the VA facilities designated for the proposed development, including a Memorandum of Understanding between James A. Haley Veterans Hospital and ServiceSource's Warrior Bridge program. As called for by the RFP instructions, Mr. Aldinger used each application's detailed description of the target population in section one as the foundation for evaluating that application's developer and management experience narratives. The experience narratives were properly evaluated in accordance with the RFP instructions in the context of each applicant's specific proposal to focus on a defined population group transitioning from designated VA facilities, whose unique needs were fleshed out in the first section narratives. Mr. Aldinger reviewed and was impressed with both Osprey's and Duval Park's developer experience narratives, for good reason. As he explained, the two responses took different approaches, but both provided good detail in the limited space allotted. Osprey's narrative described Carrfour, a non-managing member of the applicant entity that will be the developer and, through a subsidiary, manager of the proposed development. Carrfour is a not-for-profit organization created in 1993 by the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, with the mission of developing permanent supportive housing to end homelessness. In setting forth Carrfour's experience, the Osprey narrative took a quantitative approach by enumerating Carrfour's 16 mixed-use housing development projects that included permanent supportive housing. Some details were provided for each development, such as the funding sources, the number of total units, how many of those units were permanent supportive housing units, and how many of the units were currently occupied by veterans. However, the narrative did not explain whether any supportive services provided for these developments were specifically geared to meeting the special needs of veterans. The types of supportive services were not identified for any of the 16 developments. For three developments, the description stated only that "a full array of supportive services" was provided or that "on-site supportive services" were provided. Supportive services were not mentioned in the descriptions of the other 13 developments. Other than providing the number of units then occupied by veterans, Osprey's developer experience narrative had no information to demonstrate experience providing housing specifically developed to meet the unique needs of the focus population for its proposed development: veterans with service- related disabling conditions transitioning from the Miami VA. Duval Park's developer experience narrative did not match Osprey's approach of enumerating individual permanent supportive housing developments and quantifying the units in each development. Duval Park's response chose instead to describe in general aggregate terms the permanent supportive housing experience of the developer-partners. The Duval Park narrative went into more detail to highlight the developer team experience with housing projects specifically designed to meet the unique needs of special-needs veterans transitioning from the VA facilities designated in its application, something lacking in the Osprey response. For example, Duval Park's response described developer- partner Boley's substantial experience since it was founded in 1970, in developing more than 500 units of permanent supportive housing in Pinellas County. The narrative also described the even longer-standing experience of developer-partner ServiceSource, founded in 1959 with a mission to provide services to needy people with disabilities. Initially providing employment, training, rehabilitation, and support services (relevant to the roles described for this developer-partner in operating the proposed development), ServiceSource began a housing program in 1995. ServiceSource's permanent supportive housing development experience was summarized in shorthand as including 20 separate "HUD 202/811 awards." The unrefuted testimony established that this shorthand reference was properly understood by Mr. Aldinger to signify 20 permanent supportive housing developments for persons with disabilities. Two specific supportive housing projects for veterans, developed and operated by Boley working with the Bay Pines VA, were detailed in Duval Park's developer experience narrative. In 2007, Bay Pines VA awarded Boley a contract for "Safe Haven Model Demonstration Project" services, described in the notice of contract award as "a specialty model of HCHV residential care as mandated by the . . . zero-tolerance policy to end homelessness within the Veteran population." Through this contract, Boley acquired and rehabilitated a former 20-unit skilled nursing facility to establish Morningside Safe Haven (Morningside), which provides housing and a residential treatment program with counseling for veterans. Half of the 20 veterans housed there have service-connected disabling conditions, and one-third of the veterans transitioned from VA facilities. Pinellas County and HUD provide funding support for this VA pilot program. Osprey contends that Boley's experience developing and operating Morningside should have been ignored in scoring Duval Park's developer experience, because a residential treatment program is not permanent supportive housing. However, according to Mr. Humberg, Morningside is considered permanent supportive housing under HUD guidelines. Veterans sign a 12-month lease to reside in a unit. Although the intent is that tenants will complete treatment and move on, tenants are not required to leave at the end of their 12-month lease terms; they can stay as long as they need to, if they are otherwise compliant with their leases. Even if Morningside did not technically meet the RFP definition of permanent supportive housing, the discussion of Morningside still would be appropriate for this narrative, pursuant to the RFP instructions. The Morningside experience demonstrates Boley's "experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out" its roles and responsibilities for the proposed development, identified in the same narrative to include mental health counseling, case management, and VA coordination. Also described in Duval Park's narrative was Boley's 2010 development of Jerry Howe Apartments, with 13 units developed specifically for formerly homeless veterans, many of whom have service-connected disabling conditions. Funding for this development was provided by the VA and the City of Clearwater. Boley coordinates with Bay Pines VA in operating this development, with Bay Pines VA providing screening and referral services to identify veterans who are candidates to lease apartment units. Boley's staff members work closely with the veteran tenants to provide supportive services, preparing them for more independent living. Osprey quibbles with whether Jerry Howe Apartments technically qualifies as permanent supportive housing, noting that while the veteran tenants do sign a lease, the intent of the project is to serve as transitional housing for up to 24 months. However, Mr. Aldinger explained that transitional housing would meet the RFP's broad definition of permanent supportive housing if tenants are not required to leave after a finite period of 12 or 24 months. Mr. Humberg confirmed that veterans residing at Jerry Howe Apartments are not required to leave after 24 months, if they are not ready to move on. Mr. Humberg also clarified that Boley owned the apartments before they were redeveloped in 2010, specifically to meet the needs of veterans. Before the 2010 redevelopment, Boley operated the property as permanent supportive housing, just not specifically for veterans. In fact, two of the units remain occupied by prior non-veteran permanent supportive housing tenants, who did not want to move out in 2010 when the property was redeveloped. It is not necessary to debate whether Jerry Howe Apartments technically is permanent supportive housing, although the evidence demonstrated that the development is and has been permanent supportive housing, as defined in the RFP. Certainly, this project demonstrates Boley's experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out its roles and responsibilities for the proposed development and, therefore, is worthy of consideration as part of the developer experience narrative. Duval Park's developer experience narrative also detailed specific veterans' supportive service programs developed by both Boley and ServiceSource. The descriptions of these programs demonstrate experience and qualifications directly relevant to the described roles and responsibilities for Boley and ServiceSource with respect to the proposed development. Duval Park's experience narrative details the many accomplishments of ServiceSource's nationally-recognized Warrior Bridge program, which provides a wide variety of supportive services to veterans. Noteworthy is a 2012 award of over $1,000,000 from the City of St. Petersburg to ServiceSource to expand housing options for wounded veterans. Under this program, in the past year, ServiceSource partnered with Home Depot to modify 16 homes and facilities serving wounded veterans in the Tampa Bay area to increase accessibility, safety, and energy efficiency. This experience translates directly to the role ServiceSource will serve as a participant in designing the proposed housing development specifically to accommodate the unique accessibility and other needs of special-needs veterans with disabling conditions. ServiceSource's Warrior Bridge program also operates the "Veterans' Mall" in the vicinity of the proposed development. At the Veterans' Mall, household appliances, cookware, business attire, and necessities are made available to wounded veterans transitioning to more independent housing settings. According to Duval Park's narrative, the Veterans' Mall has served more than 325 veterans since opening in October 2011, through partnerships with Bay Pines VA and local community organizations serving veterans. ServiceSource's representative testified that ServiceSource recently secured a five-year commitment from T.J. Maxx to stock the Veterans' Mall with new suits for veterans going on job interviews. The Duval Park developer experience narrative regarding the Warrior Bridge program portrays ServiceSource's experience and qualifications to carry out its described roles and responsibilities for the proposed development, which include community outreach, physical disability counseling, employment assistance, job training, and VA coordination. Another program described in Duval Park's developer experience narrative is Boley's Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program. This is a case management, training, and employment program specifically for veterans, conducted by Boley case managers and employment specialists, demonstrating that they are well-suited to carry out the described roles and responsibilities for Boley with respect to the proposed development, which includes the lead case management role. A reasonable person attempting to compare the two developer experience narratives might say that Osprey's narrative demonstrated greater quantitative experience in developing more units of permanent supportive housing generally, but that Duval Park's narrative demonstrated better qualitative experience among the developer-partners in developing supportive housing specifically for veterans with special needs. Duval Park's narrative was more directly focused on specific experience developing supportive housing that addresses the unique needs of those special-needs veterans who are transitioning from VA facilities. In addition, Duval Park's narrative better demonstrated experience and qualifications among the developer- partners that are directly relevant to their described roles and responsibilities in carrying out the proposed development. Both narratives were very good and responsive to the RFP instructions, while taking very different approaches. Mr. Aldinger reasonably applied the RFP instructions, reasonably evaluated the two narratives, and reasonably judged them both to be deserving of the same very high score. The credible evidence does not support Osprey's contention that its developer experience narrative was superior, or that Duval Park's narrative strayed beyond the RFP instructions, or that Duval Park's narrative was judged by different standards than Osprey's narrative.3/ Osprey also takes issue with the scoring of the two applications' narratives describing management company experience with permanent supportive housing. As noted, Mr. Aldinger evaluated these narratives and awarded each application the maximum ten points for this application section. Osprey's narrative identified Carrfour's not-for-profit subsidiary, Crossroads Management, LLC (Crossroads), as the manager for its proposed Liberty Village development. Although Carrfour was established in 1993, Crossroads was not created until 2007. Before Crossroads was created, Carrfour did not manage the housing projects it developed; instead, it turned the developments over to traditional property management companies. As Osprey's narrative acknowledges, this created problems, as the traditional management companies lacked the sensitivity and training to address special needs of permanent supportive housing tenants. Since 2007, Crossroads has been taking over management functions for Carrfour developments and is now managing most of the 16 developments listed in the developer experience narrative. Osprey's application was given credit for proposing management with ideal experience. For Duval Park's application, Boley is identified as the management company. In addition, Boley will engage Carteret Management Company (Carteret), which is owned and operated by James Chadwick, a principal of developer-partner Blue Sky, to assist with tax-credit compliance and other matters within Carteret's expertise during the initial phases of the project. Boley's specific experience managing supportive housing for veterans with special needs, previously detailed in the developer experience discussion above, could not reasonably be questioned. As described in the manager experience narrative, Boley manages 561 units of its own permanent supportive housing. Boley also manages 112 additional permanent supportive housing units owned by other not-for-profit companies (including an 88-unit development owned by ServiceSource). The management narrative describes the profile of the typical Boley-managed housing unit tenant as having mental illness, including post-traumatic stress disorder and/or substance abuse problems, requiring supportive services provided by Boley staff. These supportive services include mental health counseling, case management intervention, and transportation assistance--functions for which Boley will assume responsibility operating the proposed development. The narrative also describes Boley's property management personnel: seven housing staff who handle leasing, income certifications, and other leasing matters; eight maintenance staff to handle property repairs; three drivers who provide transportation; and four accounting staff for property management functions. Osprey does not articulate a specific reason why Duval Park's management company experience narrative should not be entitled to ten points, or why Osprey believes its narrative was qualitatively or quantitatively better than Duval Park's, except to the extent of Osprey's criticisms of the developer experience narratives. Yet Osprey's narrative for manager experience arguably should not fare as well as its narrative for developer experience, given the many more years of management experience demonstrated by Boley and the comparatively few years of management experience by the Crossroads management entity created by Carrfour in 2007. Nonetheless, Mr. Aldinger credited the Osprey application with the maximum points based on Crossroads' management experience since 2007. No credible evidence was presented to support the contention that Duval Park's management experience narrative was not entitled to at least the same number of points as Osprey's management experience narrative. As repeatedly acknowledged by all parties throughout the hearing, Florida Housing was fortunate to have received two excellent proposals by Osprey and Duval Park that were head and shoulders above the other responses. Florida Housing then was faced with the difficult task of deciding which, between two excellent choices, should receive the funding nod, if only one of the two could be funded. Based on the evidence and the findings above, Mr. Aldinger's assignment of the same number of points for developer experience (24 points out of a possible 25 points) and for management company experience (the maximum of 10 points) to the two excellent proposals was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. His conclusion that both applicants demonstrated nearly ideal development experience and ideal management company experience for their proposals was reasonable. The evidence established that Mr. Aldinger made the points assignments he did after evaluating all of the relevant information he was allowed to consider pursuant to the RFP instructions. His scoring of these two application sections was shown to be an honest, good faith exercise of his expert judgment applied to sort out the various pros and cons of the responses. Osprey did not identify any statute or rule that it contends was violated by the scoring of the Osprey and Duval Park developer and management experience narratives. Osprey argued, but did not prove, that the scoring of these two applications was contrary to the RFP specifications. Osprey argued that Mr. Aldinger's evaluation was contrary to the RFP because he considered differences between the two projects in assessing developer experience. Osprey characterized this as double- counting, because the same aspects of the projects were scored in other sections. Osprey also contended that considering the differences between the two proposed developments and the different approaches by the two applicants was tantamount to applying different standards in evaluating the two applications. Osprey's criticism was not borne out by the evidence. Instead, Mr. Aldinger described a reasonable process, consistent with the RFP terms explaining that developer experience would be assessed in the context of the attributes of the target population described in the first section of the application, and also in context with the roles and responsibilities described for the developer team members in carrying out the proposed development. The same RFP instructions and the same standards were applied to the evaluation of the two applications; it was the applications that were different, not the standards.4/ Although not actually raised as a distinct challenge, Osprey suggested an additional argument in its PRO, not articulated in its written protest or in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Osprey argued in its PRO that Florida Housing should have used two evaluators to score the developer and manager experience narratives, as a "check and balance" against arbitrary scoring. Osprey's new argument stands in stark contrast to the only challenge to the evaluation process articulated in Osprey's written protest and in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Before the hearing, Osprey challenged the evaluation procedure used for two application sections that were scored by two evaluators. Rather than providing any check-and-balance comfort, the two- evaluator process was viewed as defective by Osprey because the initial scores independently assigned by each evaluator were reconciled in a public discussion meeting at which differences in scores were harmonized, meaning that when the initial scores differed, the evaluators agreed to adjust their initial scores. Osprey has established only that for some application sections, a single evaluator was used, while for other application sections, two evaluators were used and their separate scores were reconciled. No credible evidence was offered to prove that use of two evaluators was better than using one evaluator (or vice versa, as Osprey initially argued).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation, enter a final order consistent with its initial decision to award funding for the Duval Park, Ltd., proposed development, and dismissing the formal written protests of Osprey Apartments, LLC, and Duval Park, Ltd. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
