Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Peter Thomas Roman. By application dated April 28, 1988, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated October 24, 1988, counsel for Respondent informed Petitioner of Respondent's intent to deny licensure to Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's 1985 arrest and subsequent plea in 1986 to a charge of grand theft, as well as Petitioner's suspension from membership in the Florida Bar. Question number six of the application completed by Petitioner requires a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? Petitioner responded to question number six by disclosing his entry of a plea of nolo contendere in the circuit court for Pinellas County, Florida, on December 29, 1986, to a charge of grand theft. Petitioner related that the incident alleged had taken place in November of 1979. Petitioner further stated that the sentencing court had withheld formal adjudication of guilt and had placed Petitioner on probation. Petitioner, a licensed attorney at the time of the alleged incident, was disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in an opinion issued on June 2, 1988. The Fla. Bar v. Peter T. Roman, 526 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1988). Petitioner's disbarment was based on the same acts which resulted in the grand theft charge. In addition, the Supreme Court found that "[t]his case involves not only theft, but fraud on the court which strikes at the very heart of a lawyer's ethical responsibility." Fla. Bar v. Roman, p. 62. The essential facts of the grand theft charges against Petitioner were that Petitioner falsified the name of an heir in an estate where Petitioner was serving as the personal representative. Funds paid from the estate to the falsified heir were converted by Petitioner to his own use. These matters occurred between January 1978 and January 1980. Petitioner was charged with grand theft in June of 1985. He pled no contest to that charge in 1986. Thereafter adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was sentenced to five years probation a $220 fine and nine months in the Pinellas County Jail. Since the incident which is the basis for the grand theft charges filed against Petitioner, he has not been involved in any incidents or episodes of misconduct. Petitioner has been offered a job as a sales person with a local real estate firm if he is permitted to hold a real estate license. Testimony of character witnesses offered by Petitioner establishes their belief that his reputation in the community is good, despite the one criminal incident in his past, and that they believe neither the public or investors would be endangered by the granting of licensure to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5432 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-9. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-8. Adopted in substance. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Roman, Esquire 2340 Main Street, Suite L Dunedin, Florida 34698 Lawrence Gendzier, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman should be denied because of his alleged criminal record and his false denial (on his application) that he has ever been arrested for or charged with the commission of a crime.
Findings Of Fact On May 17, 1982, petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission. (R-2) Question number six on his application reads: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any muni- cipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? If yes, state details including the out- come in full. He falsely answered this question, "No." (R-2) On February 7, 1976, he was arrested in West Palm Beach for carrying a concealed weapon, a .38 caliber revolver. (TR.-15) On November 2, 1974, he was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol in West Palm Beach. He pled guilty to the charge and adjudication was withheld. (TR.-l6) On March 3, 1973, he was arrested in West Palm Beach for driving while under the influence of alcohol and was later convicted. (TR.-16-17) On June 25, 1965, he was arrested in Palm Beach County for violating his probation. (TR.-l8) In December, 1964, he was arrested in Palm Beach County on charges of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a misdemeanor, indecent exposure and malicious trespass. He pled guilty to malicious trespass; the breaking and entering and indecent exposure charges were dropped. (R-5) On December 26, 1962, he was arrested in Palm Beach County on a robbery charge. He was later convicted of accessory after the fact and sentenced to three years in Florida State Prison. (TR.-19-20) On May 3, 1962, he was arrested for and convicted of drunkenness in West Palm Beach. (Tr.-21) On December 14, 1960, he was arrested in West Palm Beach and charged with resisting a police officer, traffic violations and drunkenness. He was later convicted of these charges. (TR.-21-22) His civil rights, automatically suspended when he was convicted of a felony, have been restored and he is now able to vote in Florida. (Testimony of petitioner)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's application for licensure be denied for failure to show that, at this time, he possesses the honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, and good character required by Section 475.17(1). However, this denial should not prejudice his right to reapply in the future. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondents failed to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account in a federally- insured financial institution, in violation of section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes (2013).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Office of Financial Regulation, is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing chapter 560, Florida Statutes, including part III of that statute, related to money services businesses. Respondent, Moctezuma Envios, Inc. ("Moctezuma Envios"), is a Florida corporation operating as a money services business, cashing checks and acting as a money transmitter, as authorized by License No. FT30800203 issued by Petitioner. Its address of record is 19784 Southwest 177th Street, Miami, Florida 33187. Respondent Liliana Carrascal has a 100 percent controlling interest in, and is the sole officer of, Moctezuma Envios.3/ The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Respondents have been in the money services business, and Moctezuma Envios has been licensed to conduct this business, since 2001. Respondents were doing business with Intermex Wire Transfer LLC ("Intermex"), a money transfer services business, before the events giving rise to this proceeding. Sometime prior to January 2013, Carrascal was approached by representatives of Intermex about opening an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank.4/ Intermex representatives told Carrascal that the account could be used for depositing the checks that Moctezuma Envios cashed and also for paying Intermex for money transfers. According to Carrascal, this offer was attractive to Respondents because U.S. Bank accepted third-party checks, and opening a check-cashing account that accepts such checks is difficult. Additionally, having the account would streamline the process by which Moctezuma Envios paid Intermex to serve as its money transmitting agent, and would enable Carrascal to avoid driving across town carrying large sums of money to deposit cash into Intermex's account. Carrascal testified, credibly, that Intermex representatives told her she would be the owner of the account, that she could deposit payment instruments into and withdraw funds from the account, and that the account would be compliant with the law. On the basis of these representations, Carrascal authorized Intermex representatives to open an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank. The account number was XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that Account No. XX3503 was established as an agent account, with Moctezuma Envios acting as a money transmitter agent for Intermex. As such, Moctezuma Envios was authorized to deposit funds and payment instruments into the account. Robert Lisy and Darryl J. Ebbert, both employees of Intermex, were signatories on Account No. XX3503, and, as such, were the owners of the account. They were authorized to deposit funds into, withdraw funds from the account, and otherwise control the account. The persuasive evidence further shows that Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX3503.5/ Accordingly, they were not authorized to withdraw funds from the account. During the period spanning from January 2013 to late 2014, Respondents deposited payment instruments received through their check-cashing business into Account No. XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that once Respondents deposited the payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of those funds. This is because, as noted above, only Intermex representatives were authorized signatories on the account. When Respondents deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, those funds were thereafter "swept" into Account No. XX7788, which was Intermex's main operating account at U.S. Bank. This means that the funds were removed from Account No. XX3503 and deposited in Account No. XX7788. Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX7788, so did not have access to the funds in that account. As a result of Respondents not being signatories on either Account No. XX3503 or Account No. XX7788, once they deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of the funds paid under those payment instruments. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents deposited approximately ten percent of the payment instruments that they received from their check cashing business into Account No. XX3503 during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding. The other payment instruments were deposited into other accounts that Respondents held at other banks. Carrascal credibly testified that when Intermex first approached her about opening an account at U.S. Bank, she was concerned because she knew that the law required payment instruments to be deposited into the business's own commercial account. Thus, she declined to open such account. When Intermex representatives approached her a second time, they told her that the account would be in the name of Moctezuma Envios and assured her that Moctezuma Envios would be in compliance with the law. She believed them, so authorized them to open Account No. XX3503. Carrascal further testified, credibly and persuasively, that as soon as she received notice that Petitioner believed that Account No. XX3503 did not comply with the law, she closed the account and ceased doing business with Intermex and U.S. Bank. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents did not attempt to conceal any information or mislead Petitioner regarding Account No. XX3503. Carrascal credibly and persuasively testified that she had intended to fully comply with the law. She had received training in order to serve as Moctezuma Envios' compliance officer, and Moctezuma Envios has a legal compliance manual in place to help ensure that it complies with applicable laws. The evidence establishes that Moctezuma Envios has been disciplined twice for previous violations of applicable laws. Specifically, some time prior to December 2008, Moctezuma Envios failed to file currency transaction reports concerning cash received from another chapter 560 licensee and failed to timely file at least two quarterly reports, as required by statute and rule. In 2011, Moctezuma Envios failed to timely file a required quarterly report. Both violations were resolved pursuant to Stipulation and Consent Agreement between Petitioner and Moctezuma Envios, under which Moctezuma Envios paid fines and agreed to comply with the law in the future. Carrascal acknowledged that the violations had occurred, but testified, credibly, that in both instances, Respondents had not intended to violate the law, and that Respondents had cooperated with Petitioner to rectify the circumstances that had resulted in noncompliance. Petitioner has adopted rule 69V-560.1000, which codifies a penalty matrix that authorizes and enables Petitioner to impose a fine for a specific statutory or rule violation, based on the level of fine adopted in rule 69V-560.1000(150) and the number of times a licensee has violated that particular statute or rule. Rule 69V-560.1000(150) establishes a range of $1,000 to $3,500 for a Level A fine; $3,500 to $7,500 for a Level B fine; and $7,500 to $10,000 for a Level C fine. Here, Respondents are charged with having violated section 560.309(3) for the first time. Pursuant to rule 69V-560.1000(85), Respondents are subject to a Level B fine, which ranges from $3,500 to $7,500. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) sets forth the factors, which Petitioner characterizes as "aggravating" or "mitigating," that must be considered in determining the specific amount of the fine within the ranges established in rule 69V-560.1000(150). 29. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) states: In accordance with Sections 560.1141(2) and (3), F.S., the Office shall consider the following circumstances in determining an appropriate penalty within the range of penalties prescribed in this rule for each violation as based upon the citation number. The Office also shall consider these circumstances in determining a penalty that deviates from the range of penalties prescribed for each violation and citation number as a result of such circumstances: Whether the violation rate is less than 5% when compared to the overall sample size reviewed; The degree of harm to the customers or the public; The disciplinary history of the licensee; Whether the licensee detected and voluntarily instituted corrective responses or measures to avoid the recurrence of a violation prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee’s violation was the result of willful misconduct or recklessness; Whether at the time of the violation, the licensee had developed and implemented reasonable supervisory, operational or technical procedures, or controls to avoid the violation; Where the violation is attributable to an individual officer, director, responsible person, or authorized vendor, whether the licensee removed or otherwise disciplined the individual prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee attempted to conceal the violation or mislead or deceive the Office; The length of time over which the licensee engaged in the violations; Whether the licensee engaged in numerous violations or a pattern of misconduct; The number, size and character of the transactions in question; Whether the licensee provided substantial assistance to the Office in its examination or investigation of the underlying misconduct; Other relevant, case-specific circumstances. Andrew Grosmaire, Chief for Petitioner's Bureau of Enforcement, testified that Petitioner proposes to impose a $7,500 fine on Respondents, and explained the basis for that amount. Grosmaire testified that Petitioner did not have any information regarding several of the factors listed in rule 69V-560.1000, so did not "use" those factors in determining the fine to be imposed on Moctezuma Envios.6/ Specifically, Petitioner did not use the factors in subsections (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (l), and (m) in determining the fine. Petitioner did consider subsection (c), regarding the licensee's disciplinary history, in determining the fine. As discussed above, Petitioner presented evidence showing that Moctezuma Envios had been disciplined twice for violations of provisions of chapter 560 and implementing rules, albeit not for the same violation that is the subject of this proceeding.7/ Grosmaire noted that it was "unusual" for a licensee to have two previous violations. Petitioner thus considered Moctezuma Envios' disciplinary history an aggravating factor in determining the applicable fine. Petitioner also considered subsection (k), which addresses the number, size, and character of the transactions in question. According to Grosmaire, "100 percent of the checks were deposited into this account during the period in question," so Petitioner considered this an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate fine. As noted above, pursuant to rules 69V-560.1000(85), (147), and (148), Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Alleged Violation Florida case law holds that the determination of whether alleged conduct violates a statute or rule is a question of ultimate fact. Gross v. Dep't of Health, 819. So. 2d 997, 2002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st SCA 1995). For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondents did not own Account No. XX3503, into which payment instruments from Moctezuma Envios' check-cashing business were deposited. Although Respondents were able to deposit payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they were not signatories on the account so could not withdraw funds from that account. Further, Respondents were not signatories to, and therefore did not have access to funds in, Account No. XX7788, into which Intermex swept the funds from the deposited instruments in Account No. XX3503 on a routine basis. On this basis, it is determined that Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Moctezuma Envios and Liliana Carrascal, by virtue of being an affiliated party pursuant to section 560.103(1), violated section 560.309(3) by failing to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account at a federally- insured financial institution. As discussed above, Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500, the maximum amount that can be imposed for a Level B fine. Petitioner reached this amount taking into account the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(c) and (k), which it considered to be aggravating factors that militated imposition of a higher fine within the Level B range. As discussed above, Carrascal presented evidence regarding several of the factors in rule 69V-560.1000(148) considered in determining the appropriate fine. Specifically, Carrascal testified, persuasively, that no harm to her customers or the public resulted from Respondents' violation of section 560.309(3); that Respondents' violation of the statute was inadvertent and was the result of misrepresentation by Intermex, so that the violation was not the result of Respondents' willful conduct or recklessness; that Moctezuma Envios has in place a professionally-prepared compliance manual to help Respondents avoid future violations, including the type of violation at issue in this proceeding; that once Carrascal became aware that Petitioner believed Account No. XX3503 was noncompliant with section 560.309(3), she cooperated fully with Petitioner's investigation and did not attempt to conceal, mislead, or deceive Petitioner; that as soon as Carrascal became aware of the noncompliance issues with Account No. XX3503, she closed the account and Respondents terminated all business dealings with U.S. Bank and Intermex, the latter with which Respondents had a business relationship that predated the matters giving rise to this proceeding; and that the deposits into Account No. XX3503 constituted only approximately ten percent of the total deposits Respondents made during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding, with the other 90 percent being deposited in other accounts at other financial institutions. As discussed above, the undersigned found Respondents' evidence of mitigation regarding the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(b), (e), (f), (h), (k), and (l) credible and persuasive. Further, the undersigned considers relevant that in this case, Respondents affirmatively were misled into violating the law by Intermex.8/ Petitioners did not present persuasive countervailing evidence rebutting the evidence of mitigation presented by Respondents with respect to the amount of the fine. As noted above, Grosmaire testified that Petitioner considered subsections (c) and (k) as aggravating factors in determining that Respondents should be fined $7,500. Rule 69V- 560.1000(148) does not specifically address how much weight each factor should be assigned in determining the specific fine within the authorized range, and Grosmaire did not explain how the factors Petitioner "used" were weighed in arriving at the $7,500 fine. Considering the "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors on which the parties presented evidence, the undersigned determines that a $4,500 fine should be imposed on Respondents in this proceeding.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding that Respondents, Moctezuma Envios, Inc., and Liliana Carrascal, violated section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $4,250. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact On August 6, 1980, the Respondent Gerald B. Natelson, was charged in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, with violating Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, Title 21, USC, by knowingly and willingly, combining, conspiring, confederating and agreeing with others to distribute and possess with intent to distribute, marijuana, methaqualone and hashish, Schedule I and II controlled substances. The Respondent Natelson pled guilty to violating Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, Title 21, USC, as charged in Count I of the Indictment, by knowingly conspiring with others to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. The amount or quantity of marijuana which was involved in the conspiracy set forth in Count I, is not identified in the Indictment, the Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order entered December 22, 1980, or Judge Aronovitz's Order Granting Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, and Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Natelson v. United States, Case No. 82-542 SMA, entered May 10, 1982. The Indictment, at paragraphs 12, 14 and 22, sets forth the Respondent's involvement in the conspiracy, which consisted of meeting in Hollywood and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on April 1 and 4, 1979, and Phoenix, Arizona, on June 1, 1979, with specifically named co-conspirators. Jose Fanelo, president of Universal Casualty Insurance Company and formerly regional director for the Department of Insurance, and Les Lloyd, regional investigator for the Department of Insurance, established that the Respondent had been a fit and trustworthy insurance agent. Additionally, the Respondent submitted various documents, identified as Respondent's Exhibits 2- 13, which support the opinions expressed by Fanelo and Lloyd that the Respondent is a fit and trustworthy insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing its Administrative Complaint against the Respondent Gerald B. Natelson. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent attempted to obtain his license to practice medicine by fraudulent representations, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(a), Florida Statutes, or if Respondent misrepresented or concealed a material fact during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is what penalty the Board of Medicine should impose.
Findings Of Fact By application dated and acknowledged on December 27, 1993, Respondent applied for a medical license by endorsement. Respondent filed the application with the Board of Medicine on January 12, 1994. Question 6 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Yes No ; a misdemeanor? Yes No . Have any judgments ever been entered against you? Yes No . Have you ever been sued for malpractice? Yes No . In response, Respondent typed X’s in the “No” boxes for the first two questions in Question 6. Immediately above the signature of Respondent and acknowledgement of the notary public, on the last page of the application, is the statement: I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine/surgery in the State of Florida. In fact, on October 24, 1988, Respondent was found guilty, after a three-day jury trial, of 12 misdemeanor counts of failure to remit a total of over $47,000 in state sales taxes due from November 20, 1985, through December 20, 1986. On December 22, 1988, the court sentenced Respondent to pay a fine of $12,000 on all 12 counts and reasonable court costs, and serve six months’ probation on each of the 12 counts, with the periods of probation to run consecutively. Respondent’s explanation for the omission from the application is that he mistakenly believed that the only misdemeanors covered by the question were those involving the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the nondisclosure is unreasonable. Nothing in the language of Question 6 limits the scope of the inquiry to misdemeanors involving the practice of medicine. The preceding question in Question 6 asks about felonies without qualification or limitation, and it is absurd to interpret this question as not asking about any felony, such as bank robbery, even though the felony did not involve the practice of medicine. For the same reason, Respondent knew that he was to have disclosed any misdemeanor, even if it did not involve the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the commission of the crimes is more plausible. Briefly, Respondent testified that he had invested about $100,000 of the total of $250,000 in the acquisition of the Philadelphia franchise of long-distance telephone provider that had emerged immediately following the breakup of AT&T in the mid 1980s. Essentially reselling AT&T long-distance services, the new company paid AT&T at wholesale for the services that it marked up and sold at retail to end users. Respondent explained that he had been an absentee owner for much of the time. Also, the AT&T billing for this new arrangement was confused and irregular. Changes in ownership preceding and following Respondent’s investment in the company further complicated the situation. A Pennsylvania revenue auditor contacted Respondent over a year after he had sold his stock in the company in 1986, gotten married, and been traveling extensively out of state. At this time, Respondent learned of the company’s sales tax problems, which involved a complicated telecommunications excise tax. Respondent’s corporate purchaser was no longer operating the company, which had become bankrupt. Respondent paid the taxes due, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nevertheless prosecuted him for his role in the failure of the company to pay its taxes. After sentencing, Respondent paid the fine and served his probation without incident. He disclosed the misdemeanor convictions to the Pennsylvania agency regulating the practice of medicine and was able to continue practicing medicine there. After consideration of Respondent’s application, the Florida Board of Medicine issued Respondent license number ME 0066606.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Tanya Willaims, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim M. Kluck Carol Gregg Senior Attorneys Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Christopher Grillo 1 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. Respondent was issued certificate number 02-7330 on March 30, 1973. There was no evidence that Respondent's certification had been the subject of any other disciplinary proceeding. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a police officer by the City of Bal Harbour, which is a municipality located in Dade County, Florida. The following events occurred in Bal Harbour, Florida, on January 14, 1989, while Respondent was on duty as a police officer: A few minutes past 7:00 a.m., Respondent encountered a 1975 Plymouth that had broken down on Collins Avenue near its intersection with 102 Street. Respondent observed a young male (who he later learned was 17 year old Haroon Nabee) pushing this disabled car by himself trying to get the car off the street and into an adjacent parking lot. Mr. Nabee was pushing the car with one hand and steering it with his other. Respondent assisted Mr. Nabee by pushing the disabled car from the rear with his patrol car. After the disabled car and Respondent's patrol car were in the parking lot, Respondent asked Mr. Nabee his name and asked to see his registration and his drivers license. Mr. Nabee identified himself as Nevin Maharaj and showed Respondent a registration certificate that reflected that the car was registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Stein. Respondent later learned that Mrs. Stein was Mr. Nabee's sister. While Mr. Nabee looked through his wallet for his drivers license, Respondent observed two credit cards in the name of John J. Mendoza. When asked about the credit cards, Mr. Nabee reported that he had found them. Respondent became suspicious and requested a backup. In response to that request Officer Pamela Robinson Adlet (at the formal hearing, Officer Adlet had reverted to the use of Robinson as her last name) appeared on the scene at 7:20 a.m. After Officer Adlet arrived on the scene, Respondent placed Mr. Nabee under arrest, handcuffed his hands behind his back, searched him, and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's caged patrol car. Respondent then called for a tow truck and requested that Officer Adlet assist him in conducting an inventory of the automobile. The officers inventoried the interior of the automobile, but they could not gain access to the trunk. Because the rear seat was loose, Officer Adlet could observe objects in the trunk, but she was unable to inventory those objects because of her limited access. While waiting for the tow truck, Respondent returned to his patrol car, which was parked immediately behind the disabled vehicle, and began making out the arrest form using the false name Mr. Nabee had given him. Respondent had partially completed the arrest form when the tow truck arrived. Because his patrol car was blocking the tow truck's access to the disabled vehicle, Respondent drove the patrol car to a spot approximately thirty feet from the disabled vehicle. Respondent then walked from his patrol car towards the tow truck and he and Officer Adlet engaged in a brief conversation with the tow truck driver. Officer Adlet told the driver that she and Respondent wanted to get into the trunk of the disabled vehicle and asked if he had a screwdriver they could use for that purpose. 1/ Respondent decided to look into the glove box of the disabled vehicle for the second time because his earlier search of the vehicle had been interrupted by his efforts to help Officer Adlet gain access to the trunk. Respondent found in the glove box a passport which reflected Mr. Nabee's true name and which contained Mr. Nabee's photograph. Respondent showed the passport to Officer Adlet, who confirmed that the passport photograph appeared to be of Mr. Nabee. Respondent returned to his patrol car and began addressing Mr. Nabee in loud, profane language and accused Mr. Nabee of lying to him. Respondent opened the rear door of the patrol car on the driver's side and, while holding the passport in his clenched right hand, made three punching motions with his right hand in the direction of Mr. Nabee. With the first of these three blows the back of Respondent's right hand made contact with the right side of Mr. Nabee's face. (The right side of Mr. Nabee's face was struck because Mr. Nabee had turned towards Respondent when Respondent opened the door of the patrol car.) In reaction to that blow, Mr. Nabee stretched out on the back seat of the patrol car, and, consequently, the other two blows did not make contact with Mr. Nabee. Thereafter, Respondent transported Mr. Nabee to the Bal Harbour police station where Mr. Nabee complained to another officer about Respondent's acts. Mr. Nabee was not injured by Respondent. There was no evidence that he suffered any cut or bruise as a result of the contact with Respondent. Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee because he had lied about his name, which caused Respondent to have to redraft his arrest form. Respondent contends that the contact was accidental and was a result of his gesticulating in an angry fashion after learning that Mr. Nabee had lied to him. This contention is rejected. Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee and that Respondent intentionally struck Mr. Nabee in retaliation for Mr. Nabee's lying to him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent committed a battery upon the person of Haroon Nabee on January 14, 1989, which determines, pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, and which suspends his certification as a law enforcement for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of July, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1991.
Findings Of Fact On October 14, 1988, shortly before 9:00 a.m., Sheriff Deputy William Emral of the Monroe County Sheriff's Office was notified by radio that the Sheriff's Office dispatcher had received an anonymous telephone call advising that two white males were loading what appeared to be narcotics into a white four-door Cadillac, with Florida license plate number 367-ZGX. The caller indicated that the Cadillac was headed northbound on the highway from Lower Matecumbe Key. Deputy Emral then took up a stationary position at mile marker 84 and began watching the northbound traffic. At about 9:05 a.m., he observed the Cadillac described by the anonymous caller. Deputy Emral began to follow the subject Cadillac northbound. He followed the Cadillac for approximately one mile and then activated his emergency lights and pulled the Cadillac over. From the time Deputy Emral first saw the subject Cadillac until the time he pulled the Cadillac over, he did not observe anything about the car or the driver that would have caused him to stop the Cadillac. Had it not been for the information provided by the anonymous caller, Deputy Emral would not have stopped the subject Cadillac. The Respondent, Mark Alfred Herre, was driving the Cadillac at the time Deputy Emral pulled it over. Mr. Herre did not flee and obeyed the directions given to him by Deputy Emral. He produced his driver's license which showed his name as Mark Alfred Herre. The car was rented and, when requested, he produced the rental contract showing that it had been rented by another individual. Deputy Emral reported this information to his base and to his superior, Captain Wilkinson, who later arrived at the scene. Deputy Emral observed two bags, one green and one gray. These were soft sided bags and appeared to be stuffed between the rear and front seats of the rented car, on both the driver and passenger sides. They were relative large, approximately three feet by four feet in size. The rental contract produced by Mr. Herre indicated that the vehicle was rented by a Maryland resident named Robert E. Lee. Mr. Herre could produce no authorization from Mr. Lee that he was entitled to use the vehicle nor could he produce the name of someone who could confirm he was authorized to be driving the subject vehicle. At about this time, Captain Wilkinson arrived at the scene as backup. At this point, Mr. Herre was not suspected of a crime and continued to answer questions from the Deputy. He stated that the bags in the car contained diving gear. Deputy Emral is a certified diver and the story seemed suspicious and inconsistent with the Deputy's previous diving experiences. Mr. Herre did not ask any questions or make other inquiries as to why he was stopped. Deputy Emral did explain that an anonymous tip was received and discussed this information with the Petitioner. At this point, Deputy Emral and Captain Wilkinson conferred and because of the information received by the anonymous tip to the Sheriff's Office and the inability of the Petitioner to prove he had authorization to be driving the rented vehicle, they decided that the vehicle should be taken into custody. In preparation for taking a vehicle into custody, an inventory of the vehicle is made as a standard procedure. Mr. Herre was not placed under arrest at this time. Mr. Herre was asked for, but declined to give, permission for the Deputy to search the vehicle. The vehicle was then searched and it was determined that the two bags in the passenger compartment contained bales of marijuana. Captain Wilkinson then took charge of the vehicle and drove it to the Sheriff's Office. Captain Wilkinson stated that even if no contraband were in the vehicle, he would probably have driven it to the substation to await confirmation that Mr. Herre was actually authorized to be in possession of the rented car and the same was not actually stolen. At the Sheriff's Office, the Cadillac was thoroughly searched and the car and its contents were photographed. Three bales of marijuana were recovered from the back seat and ten bales of marijuana were recovered from the trunk. Samples tested positive for marijuana. For purposes of this case, the parties have stipulated that the marijuana found in the subject Cadillac weighed a total of 300 pounds. On November 17, 1988, the Department issued a Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings to the Petitioner, Mr. Herre. The assessment was based on an estimated retail price for marijuana of $700.00 per pound times the stipulated 300 pounds, which comes to a total estimated retail value of $210,000.00. The tax, surcharge, and penalty assessed against Mr. Herre were as follows: 50% Tax $105,000.00 25% Surcharge 52,500.00 Additional penalty of 50% 78,750.00 Total Amount of assessment $236,250.00 Daily interest on the amount due is $51.78. The Notice of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings described above was properly and correctly prepared and notice of it was properly given to the Petitioner, Mr. Herre. On December 28, 1988, Mr. Herre was sentenced in Case No. 33-88-00446- CF-A to a period of five (5) years probation and to pay $5,000.00 in costs. The sentence in the aforementioned case was as a result of criminal charges arising from Petitioner's arrest for the conduct alleged in the Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings dated November 17, 1988.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue issue a Final Order in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Mark Alfred Herre, is liable for taxes, surcharges, penalties, and interest pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), and assessing the amount of such liability at $236,250.00, plus interest at the rate of $51.78 per day since November 7, 1988. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of March 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen J. Bronis, Esquire 1395 Coral Way Third Floor Miami, Florida 33145 MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March 1991. Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Vicki Weber General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent Agency is a Florida-licensed (Class "A" license number A88- 00297 private investigative agency. Respondent Foreman is the owner of the Agency. He is a Florida-licensed (Class "C" license number C00-02486) private investigator. He has been licensed for approximately the past 20 years. At no time during the period of his licensure has the Department taken any disciplinary action against him. At around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of September 30, 1994, Foreman interrupted his work schedule to drive a male tenant living in an apartment that he owned (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenant") to the Henderson Mental Health Clinic, an outpatient mental health facility located in Broward County, Florida. The Tenant needed to receive treatment at the clinic. After parking his vehicle, Foreman escorted the Tenant to the reception area of the facility. Foreman was wearing a gun belt and a holster. A loaded firearm was encased in the holster. It was a warm day and Foreman did not have on a jacket. 2/ Consequently, the holstered firearm was in plain view. At the time, Foreman had a Department-issued Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License, but he did not have a Class "G" Statewide Firearm Permit. 3/ Detective Joel Maney of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department was working a uniformed off-duty security detail at Henderson Mental Health Clinic that morning. From his position behind the reception counter, Detective Maney observed Foreman enter the reception area with the Tenant and noticed that Foreman was carrying a firearm. Not wanting to cause a disturbance inside the facility, Detective Maney did not immediately confront Foreman. He did, however, monitor Foreman's activity. After informing the receptionist that the Tenant had arrived and was waiting to be seen, Foreman left the facility. Detective Maney followed Foreman outside. As Foreman was walking on the sidewalk toward his vehicle, Detective Maney approached him and asked for identification. Foreman responded to the request by stating that he was a detective/investigator and that he did not have time to talk inasmuch as he was in the middle of an investigation. Eventually, Foreman produced his Florida driver license, his Class "C" Private Investigator License, and his Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License for Detective Maney. He also showed Detective Maney a five-pointed, star-shaped badge. In the center of the badge was a replica of the Great Seal of the State of Florida. The words, "Special Investigator Foreman Investigative," were inscribed around the seal. When Detective Maney first saw the badge, he thought it was a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge because of its shape and because it bore the Great Seal of the State of Florida. Unlike a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge, however, Foreman's badge did not have a map of Florida superimposed on the seal. Moreover, the written inscription on the badge was different than that found on a Broward County deputy sheriff's badge. Throughout the period that he has been licensed, Foreman has used this badge as a means of identifying himself in connection with the performance of his duties as a private investigator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent Foreman committed the violations alleged in Counts II and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, disciplining Respondent Foreman him for having committed these violations by imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00, and (3) dismissing the remaining counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1995.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Michael R. Harrison, committed the violations alleged in an administrative complaint dated June 28, 1996, and if so, what discipline or penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Michael R. Harrison is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement and correctional officer, having been issued corrections certificate number 26101 on December 18, 1985, and law enforcement certificate number 26100 on July 2, 1987. At the time of the incident at issue, Officer Harrison was employed as a deputy with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. On February 14, 1995, around 4:25 p.m., Harrison was parked in the woods on Willow Street in Zellwood, Florida, doing some paperwork. He observed two young black males engaged in what he thought was drug dealing. A yellow car pulled up to them, with a white male driving. The tag on the yellow vehicle was in Harrison’s plain view. Familiar with the area, and knowing that the white male did not live there, Harrison decided to run a check on the tag. The tag itself was slightly lopsided and not well-attached, and Harrison’s instincts made him suspicious of the situation. As soon as Harrison gave the tag number to the teletype operator, the yellow car began to pull away from the scene. It was apparent that the driver had noticed Harrison’s vehicle. Harrison began pursuit of the yellow car as he waited for the teletype response on the tag. By the time the tag response came over the radio, Harrison was totally absorbed with his pursuit. There was rush- hour traffic and the yellow car was on U.S. Highway 441, a busy thoroughfare. When Harrison made the stop and the driver produced his license, the computer check revealed that the license was restricted “for business purposes only.” After a brief inquiry that satisfied him that the suspect was not on his way home from work, Harrison arrested the driver on what he considered was a driver’s license violation. As he waited for a back-up deputy and a tow truck for the yellow car, Harrison searched the car and found a small quantity of marijuana. Harrison then charged the driver with the drug offense. In the meantime, and while Harrison was still pursuing the yellow car, the report on the suspected tag came back “negative” (a valid tag). The dispatcher reported that the tag “...should appear on a ’70 Ford, two-door, yellow in color.” This was the vehicle Harrison was pursuing. Moreover, the person to whom the vehicle was registered was the driver arrested by Harrison. Later, the same day as the arrest, Harrison filled out the arrest report, a form titled “Charging Affidavit.” Under the narrative statement of facts to establish probable cause, Harrison included this statement: “I ran the tag and it came back no record found.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) Corporal McCarthy McCullough was reviewing reports at the end of her shift at Orange County Sheriff’s Office around 1 a.m., February 15, 1995. She read Deputy Harrison’s charging affidavit and questioned the sufficiency of his probable cause for the stop. She called him in to discuss the report. He tried to explain to her what “no record found” meant. Harrison admits that when Corporal McCullough talked to him, he was aware he had made an error on the form. He wanted to talk to his supervisor because Corporal McCullough was new on the job, but the sergeant was at school. Harrison felt he needed to amend the charging affidavit, but never did as “things just started happening too fast, and I didn’t have the opportunity.” (transcript, p.31, ll. 5-7) After Harrison left the shift, Corporal McCullough, still suspicious about the probable cause, ran the tag through the teletype herself and got the response described in paragraph 7, above. The next day she talked to her sergeant, and they got a tape of the message to Harrison from the communications center. The tape reflects the exchange between Harrison and the dispatcher when he gave the tag number to the dispatcher and asked for a “28-29,” which is code for a vehicle registration and check to see if the car was stolen or wanted for any reason. The answer, as acknowledged by Harrison at hearing, was the “negative” with information describing the car and driver stopped by Harrison. The statement by Harrison on his charging affidavit is patently false. Although no one formally administered an oath to him before he signed the form, his signature appears under this printed statement: “I swear and affirm the above statements are correct and true.” His signature is next to that of another law enforcement officer or correctional officer with this statement: “Sworn to and subscribed before me, the undersigned authority”. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) These statements and the title of the form itself were ample notice to Harrison that he was swearing to the truth of his handwritten report of the arrest and its probable cause.i Aside from his specious argument that he was not really “swearing” to the document, Harrison’s defense is that he never intended to make a false statement. Instead, he never listened to the dispatcher’s response, as he was intent on pursuing his suspect and was concerned for his safety in the pursuit. His instincts were that the driver had intended to deal drugs back on Willow Street, an area where he did not belong, and that because the tag was awry, there was some problem with the vehicle. When he was questioned by Corporal McCullough a simple admission that he had not listened properly to the dispatcher would have credited his excuse of a “mistake.” Instead, he stuck to his story and tried to explain what “no report” meant. His account of the incident is disingenuous and supports a finding that the report was intentionally false, perhaps from an overabundance of zeal to justify a stop that yielded two offenses. After the incident was referred to Internal Affairs, Harrison was dismissed from his position. He had been a deputy for six years without any suspensions or discipline for duty work. He and his partner once shared a commendation of “deputy of the month.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Michael R. Harrison knowingly made a false report, imposing one year’s suspension of his certificate and two years’ probation, with the further requirement that he complete appropriate retraining specified by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ Hearings Hearings MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 27th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 H.R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1239 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
