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MARION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 82-002757 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002757 Latest Update: May 10, 1983

Findings Of Fact MCH was constructed circa 1973 as an acute care hospital and before 1980 had 126 medical-surgical beds authorized including eight intensive care beds. MCH is a for-profit hospital owned by Hospital Corporation of America. It is financially able to fund the proposed addition. In 1980 it received a certificate of need (CON) to add 64 medical-surgical beds for a total bed capacity of 190 medical-surgical beds. These beds came on line in January 1982. MCH here proposes to add a 54-bed unit for oncology patients; to add six operating rooms to use primarily for eye, ear, nose and throat surgical procedures on an outpatient basis; and a new eight-bed surgical intensive care unit located on the first floor adjacent to the existing surgery department. Currently, the hospital has two oncologists on staff who use a 16-bed unit dedicated to the treatment of cancer. Space exists for the additional operating room so the net result is an application for an additional 62 beds. The application also included expansion of general stores and maintenance and the addition of a parking structure, which were granted, leaving only the issue of need for the 62 additional beds requested at a cost of $7 million. When constructed MCH had an eight-bed ICU primarily for coronary care patients located on the second floor of the hospital in the opposite wing from the surgery department on the first floor. It has added a four-bed ICU on the fourth floor by converting two semiprivate medical-surgical rooms. The ratio of ICU beds to total beds in 1973 was 8:126 which is nearly identical to the current ratio of 12:190. The evidence was unrebutted that the ICU at MCH is usually full, that on occasion patients have to wait in the emergency room until a less ill patient can be moved from a bed in ICU, and that the more ICU beds are available the more they will be used. This use was attributed to the doctors desiring their patients to be in an ICU and to testimony that current surgical procedures are more sophisticated than formerly and a greater need exists today for a surgery patient to go to an ICU than existed 15 years ago. In its application for a CON (Exhibit 18) MCH's estimated charge for a medical-surgical bed is $100-150 per day and its estimated charge for ICU beds and SICU beds is $350 per day. The primary service area for MCH is Marion County. Petitioner submitted evidence that nearly 20 percent of the cancer patients diagnosed in Marion County in 1981 came from the surrounding counties of Citrus, Lake, Sumter, and Levy. Accordingly, MCH contends that its primary service area for oncology patients should include these counties. Evidence was also submitted that MCH has been certified by medical associations as an approved cancer treatment hospital; that oncology service is a service generally provided in regional hospitals which provide Level III medical treatment; and, therefore, MCH should be considered on a different scale than Level II services. No evidence was presented that any health systems plan ever considered MCH as a regional cancer hospital or established any bed need for cancer patients at MCH. The evidence was also unrebutted that cancer patients at MCH are primarily treated by chemotherapy; that the drugs used in the treatment are extremely toxic, some have a short life span after being mixed and must be used almost immediately; that having a mini-pharmacy in the cancer ward is highly desirable; that special training of nurses is required to safely administer these drugs to patients; that patients develop nausea, ulcers in the mouth and throat, and present special feeding problems, and because of these special feeding problems it is advantageous to have some facilities in the cancer ward to prepare food at odd hours for patients; that cancer is a "personal" disease, patients desire more privacy, and should have private rooms; that an area away from the patient's room where the patient can visit with his or her family and the family can consult with the doctor in some privacy is desirable; that some newer drugs require hospitalization of the patient for treatment with these drugs, but the hospital stay is shorter and the drugs may be used over longer periods of time; and that the patient needs the security that comes from developing a feeling of trust by the patient of the nurses and doctors who are administering to his needs. MCH has no radiation treatment facilities in the hospital. However, the hospital staff has access to a Linear Accelerator which is located in a private physician's office on MCH's campus. Several witnesses testified to the need for additional beds for cancer patients at MCH; that patients have had to wait several days for a vacant bed; some oncology patients have had to be placed in other wards at MCH; and that special treatment and special training for nurses are required for oncology patients. Marion Regional Medical Center (MRMC) is a nonprofit hospital owned by the Marion County Hospital District, a public body established by statutes with taxing powers in Marion County. MRMC is currently expanding its facilities by 80 beds to the authorized 314-bed hospital pursuant to a CON approved in 1981. The $23 million for that project was financed by revenue bonds issued by Marion County Hospital District. Preliminary bids indicate the original project will be under the estimated cost resulting in a $2-3 million savings. If the additional beds here requested are approved and the construction associated therewith can be accomplished concurrently with the present construction, a saving of nearly $1 million can be obtained. MRMC is the only full service hospital in Marion County and provides medical, surgical, obstetrical, pediatric, psychiatric, intensive care, coronary care, and neurological/neurosurgical services. It has the third most active Emergency Room in the state and receives approximately 45 percent of its admissions through this service. MRMC's proposed project calls for the construction of a sixth floor on the hospital, construction of 66 inpatient beds, and the conversion of a 20-bed pediatric unit for use as a labor and delivery suite, a net gain of 46 beds. As initially proposed, this would provide for eight additional pediatric beds, four pediatric intensive care beds, and 34 medical-surgical beds to be used as a pulmonary medicine unit. Before the hearing the request for additional pediatric beds was withdrawn, leaving a request for 34 additional hospital beds and four pediatric intensive care beds, a total of 38 medical-surgical beds, at a cost of $2.8 million. It was stipulated that both MCH and MRMC provide an acceptable quality of care and operate efficiently. The application satisfied the criteria in Section 381.494(6)(c) with the possible exception of need, and need is the only issue in dispute in these proceedings. Both applicants submitted evidence that they accept all patients regardless of their ability to pay; however, MCH is a private for-profit hospital whose bad debt and charity care amounts to two percent of its gross revenues. MRMC's patient load is four percent indigent and bad debts, and charity care amounts to 12 percent of its gross revenues. Exhibit 18 shows MCH patient utilization to be 61 percent Medicare and one percent Medicaid, and MRMC patient utilization to be 51 percent Medicare and five percent Medicaid, in 1981. There is currently "applicable district plan" or "annual implementation" as provided for in Section 381.494(6)(c)1, Florida Statutes (1982). The implementation of this statute has been stayed by rule challenges. The North Central Florida Health Planning Council, Inc. (NCFHPC), was the Health Systems Agency (HSA) for what was formerly known as Health Service Region II which included only Marion County as a district sub-area. Prior to the July 1, 1982, amendment of Florida's CON law, the HSA reviewed applications and made recommendations with written findings of fact to DHRS. The 1982 CON law eliminated HSA, accordingly the NCFHPC no longer exists. The former HSA recommended approval of the applications of both MCH and MRMC; however, the staff of the HSA recommended disapproval of both applications. For the determination of need in these proceedings, a planning horizon of five years is acceptable and was used by all parties. Thus, the need for the requested CON is assessed for the year 1988. At this time the population of Marion County is forecast to be 165,880. The percentage of persons 65 and older in Marion County is increasing in proportion to the remainder of Marion County's population, and this increase will continue through 1988. This "aging" of the population is occurring throughout the United States as people live longer and demographics change with differing birth rates at differing periods. No evidence was submitted that the percentage of people over 65 is greater in Marion County than in other parts of Florida. MCH has 190 authorized medical-surgical beds and MRMC has 244 authorized medical-surgical beds, for a total of 434 such beds authorized in Marion County in two hospitals across the street from each other in Ocala, Florida. With the 1982 amendment to the CON statute the HSA in Marion County ceased to exist and has been replaced by a local health council. Rule challenges have stayed the promulgation of a comprehensive state health plan and the only Health Systems Plan in being for Marion County is the revised 1983 Health Systems Plan (HSP). This plan was approved by the HSA for Marion County in June of 1982 and contains goals, objectives and standards for planning for the health services required in Marion County. Standard 1-1 provides the need for medical-surgical beds within each Level II planning area (Marion County) should be based on the actual 1980 medical-surgical bed need per 1,000 population in this area. Standard 2-1 provides no additional beds should be added to a community's total bed supply until the occupancy rate of medical- surgical beds in the community exceeds 85 percent if more than 200 such beds are available in the community. The generally accepted standard for occupancy rate above which more beds may be needed is 80 percent. However, where beds are concentrated in one area, which is the case in Marion County where 434 medical- surgical beds are authorized, 85 percent occupancy leaves a reasonable surplus of beds to cover most emergencies or unusual situations that would cause the bed availability to be exceeded. The need for medical-surgical beds per 1,000 population (use rate) in Marion County in 1980 was 2.41. The HSP has a goal of 3.5 beds per 1,000 population and an objective of 4.0 beds per 1,000 population by 1987 in Region II. Applying the 1980 use rate to the 1988 forecast population of Marion County results in a need for 400 medical-surgical beds. The Health Systems Plan update for Marion County defines medical- surgical beds as all hospital beds which are not reserved solely for the use of pediatric, obstetrics, or psychiatric patients. At the time the revised Health Systems Plan for Marion County was promulgated, the two hospitals, MRMC and MCH, had been authorized an additional 80 and 65 beds, respectively, and these beds were being placed in service. By prescribing a use rate for 1980 as the standard to be used in considering applications for additional medical-surgical beds in 1983 and for a year or two thereafter, it would be reasonable to conclude the HSA expected the use rate for the years 1981 and 1982 to be influenced by the addition of the recently authorized 144 beds and to not accurately reflect a reliable use rate for planning purposes. MRMC and MCH presented expert witnesses who, by using different modalities, containing different assumptions, arrived at a need for additional beds in Marion County in 1988 ranging from 97 to 200. Most of these modalities used an occupancy rate of 3.5 beds per 1,000 population and 80 percent utilization of beds. All assume increasing usage of medical-surgical beds by the increasing and aging population. In their application MRMC and MCH planned to finance these projects with rate increases of 11 percent per year (to keep even with inflation) and a continuing increase in the number of patients handled at these higher rates. While inflation may again be up to 11 percent or higher, it is generally accepted today that the current inflation rate is five percent or less. More than 50 percent of both MRMC and MCH patients are presently covered by Medicare, which pays 80 percent of the charges generated by these patients. To assume that this situation will not only continue in the face of current federal deficits, but grow to cover the increased use of these facilities predicted in the assumptions used to show increased bed need for 1988, is not necessarily a valid assumption. Evidence was presented that the number of doctors in Marion County has doubled in the last five years. The ratio of doctors to the population of Marion County for 1977-78 and 1982-83 was not presented nor was the percent increase in the number of doctors in the United States over the past five years. Without some basis for comparison, the fact that the number of doctors in a particular community doubled over a five-year period has no relevancy.

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GAYLE STEVENSON, M.D. vs JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 02-000240 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 17, 2002 Number: 02-000240 Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female African-American who has completed medical school. On March 19, 1997, Petitioner completed an "Application for Residency," seeking to participate in Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program. That program is operated in conjunction with the Public Health Trust. Applicants selected to participate in the residency program become employees of Respondent. The terms and conditions of employment are subject to the policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust. Petitioner's application to participate in the residency program related that she had completed an internship at University of Maryland/Harbor Hospital (Harbor) and two years of anesthesiology residency at King/Drew University, Los Angles (King). Petitioner signed the application on March 19, 1997. On April 30, 1997, Petitioner submitted an "Application for Graduate Medical Education at the Jackson Memorial Medical Center" that required her to "list chronologically your activities from time of graduation from Medical School to present. Specify type of post graduate training if any." Petitioner listed the internship at Harbor and the residency at King. She signed the application under the declaration: "I hereby declare that I have examined this application; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete." Petitioner was accepted into Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program based, in part, on the information reflected in the foregoing applications. That acceptance created an employee/employer relationship between Petitioner and Respondent. On July 17, 1997, Petitioner submitted a completed "Personnel Form" to Respondent. The Personnel Form required her to disclose all her activities since her completion of medical school. On that form Petitioner listed her previous internship at Harbor and her previous residency training at King. She verified it was correct to the best of her knowledge and signed the form. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Brian Craythorne was a Professor of Medicine at the University of Miami and the Chairman of Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology. Dr. Craythorne had supervisory responsibility for Petitioner and was instrumental in selecting her to participate in the residency program. In April 1998, Dr. Craythorne received routine information from the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA) setting forth the number of hours of training from other anesthesiology residency programs for which each resident participating in Respondent's residency program had received credit. The information from the ABA also set forth the number of hours of training for which each resident had received no credit. From that information, Dr. Craythorne learned that Petitioner had a total of 39 hours of residency training in anesthesiology from other programs for which she had received no credit. Three of the 39 hours of training for which she had no training were at King, which was reflected on her application and related paperwork. The training at King is not an issue in this proceeding. The additional 36 hours of residency training for which she received no credit was from Howard Hospital. 1/ The program at Howard, which was equivalent to a three-year program, was not reflected on any application or related document Petitioner submitted to Respondent before April 1998. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard was intentional. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard violated the clear policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust that require applications and related documents to be truthful, correct, and complete. Dr. Craythorne confronted Petitioner about the foregoing omissions in her applications and associated paperwork. In response, Petitioner submitted a letter dated May 27, 1998, in which she tried to explain why she did not obtain credit at Howard and why she had not divulged that information to Respondent. Petitioner asserted that she had sued Howard and had subsequently settled the litigation with instructions from her attorney that she could not discuss the litigation. 2/ Petitioner's letter of May 27, 1998, was not satisfactory to Dr. Craythorne. On June 3, 1998, Dr. Craythorne issued to Petitioner a "Disciplinary Action Report" (DAR) advising he was recommending that Petitioner be dismissed from the residency program (thereby terminating her employment with Respondent). The grounds for the action were her violation of Respondent's policies by making a false statement or statements on her application for employment and related documents and her violation of Public Health Trust Policy #305 pertaining to falsifying records or any other record of the Trust. Referencing Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology, the DAR also contained the following: Our department's recruiting and hiring practices . . . includes a policy/practice not to accept residents [sic] who have had more than one prior anesthesia residency experience for the clinical anesthesia years 1 through 3. [3/]] On June 29, 1998, Dr. Craythorne wrote a letter to Petitioner terminating her employment on the grounds set forth in the DAR. The termination letter advised Petitioner that she could request the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs (Dr. Gerard A. Kaiser) to review the decision to terminate her participation. The letter also advised Petitioner that "[u]nless the Senior Vice President rescinds the proposed action, it will become effective following his review and decision." On July 21, 1998, Dr. Kaiser advised Petitioner that he had reviewed the facts surrounding her termination and agreed with the termination decision. Consistent with her rights pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Petitioner requested and received a hearing before the Peer Review Committee, which was composed of other participants in the anesthesiology residency program. On December 1, 1998, the Peer Review Committee issued its report upholding Petitioner's termination for the reasons cited by Dr. Craythorne. On December 23, 1998, Ira C. Clark, president of the Public Health Trust, advised Petitioner that he had upheld her dismissal based on his review of the Peer Review Committee's findings and recommendation. Petitioner thereafter filed a grievance pursuant to her collective bargaining rights. On October 21, 1999, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before an arbitrator. On November 1, 1999, the arbitrator entered his Opinion and Award upholding Petitioner's termination of employment. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on or about March 27, 2000. The gravamen of the complaint was that Respondent fired her in retaliation for her complaint to Dr. Craythorne that another resident had made a derogatory racial comment towards her. On December 10, 2001, the FCHR entered a determination of "no cause," determining that there was no cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On January 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice with the FCHR. The Petition alleged the following facts in support of her claim of discrimination: On April 1, 1998, a racial remark was made to me by Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, which was, "we know how lazy you Blacks are." I reported it (the statement) to Dr. Craythorne and Dr. Brindle, as well as in writing (copies are in my file). Dr. Craythorne asked me if I had any witnesses, I said yes. The following month they decided to investigate my application, and terminated me on July 1998 (sic). The Petition described the disputed issues of fact as follows: I was terminated because I did not put on my application that I had worked for Howard Hospital in Washington, D. C. They stated the reason I was terminated is because the ABA (American Board of Anesthesiology) requires that you only attend two programs if you have received credit. I did not receive any credit. Please see the enclosed pamphlet from the ABA at page 9. The Petition set forth the following ultimate facts entitling Petitioner to relief: When JMH terminated me, it was because I made a claim of racial discrimination, which I reported prior to investigation of my application. Had I not complained of racial remarks that was made to me by the above Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, it would not have come up about my application. The evidence established that Petitioner complained to Dr. Craythorne that Dr. O'Neal had made the derogatory, racial remark set forth in the Petition. 4/ There was no evidence to establish a link between the complaint made by Petitioner to Dr. Craythorne pertaining to Dr. O'Neal and the decision to terminate her participation in the residency program. Respondent established that Petitioner was terminated because she failed to adhere to Respondent's and the Public Health Trust's clear policies requiring applications and other employment documents to be truthful, correct, and complete.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2002.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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STEVE S. SPECTOR vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 84-001937 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001937 Latest Update: Jan. 15, 1986

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a Certificate of Need ("CON") authorizing establishment of an (ophthalmological) ambulatory surgical center in Palm Beach County, Florida. Subordinate issues are: Whether the proposed facility satisfies the CON criteria of Sections 381.494-499, Florida Statutes, as implemented by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS) rule and non-rule policy; Whether the proposed facility will result in unnecessary duplication of services, underutilization of existing services and increased health care costs to the community; Whether adequate resources are available for the construction and operation of the proposed facility; and Whether the proposed facility is financially feasible.

Findings Of Fact (Numbering corresponds to numbering used in proposed findings.) Preliminary findings: 1-4. Approved. On issue of compliance with applicable criteria: 1-7. Approved. 8. Approved, with caveat that this is subject to supplying an adequate record basis for the policy at hearing. 9-13 Approved. Approved but no presumption of correctness attaches to HRS earlier or more recent evaluation of the application. See, Boca Raton, supra. Approved. Approved but modified to more accurately reflect that HRS takes HMO's into account, but this factor was not used or relied on (in connection with the non-rule policy or standing alone) as the basis for granting Petitioner's application. Approved. 18-32. Approved, in the sense that an HRS expert witness at hearing offered conclusions as to compliance with each statutory criteria; rejected, in that his conclusions (except for those concerning quality of care, financial feasibility, the inapplicability of some criteria, and the cost advantages of modifying an existing facility instead of constructing a new one) are rejected as unsubstantiated by the facts. On the Issue of Need: 1-8. Approved. Approved. Modified to reflect that this is one estimate among several offered by experts. Rejected as unsupported by the credible evidence of record. Approved. Approved. First sentence, approved, in that this is the stated "attempt" of HRS' challenged non-rule policy. Second sentence, rejected as unsupported by the credible evidence; the profitable performance of outpatient surgery at a physician's office does logically compel a conclusion that his office should be licensed as an ambulatory surgical facility. On the issue of adequate resources: 1-8. Approved. On the issue of financial feasibility: 1-19 Approved. 20. Rejected as argumentative. RULINGS ON INTERVENOR'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1-4. Approved. 5. Approved except for reference to equipment costs, of which there will be none. 9-16 Approved. 17. Such broad-brush incorporation of all facts asserted in argument is not susceptible to explicit rulings. RULINGS ON POST-HEARING MOTIONS. Intervenor's "Motion to Stay Issuance of Recommended Order" is denied. Intervenor's "Request for Hearing Officer to Take Official Recognition" of the Final Order of Hearing Officer Robert T. Benton II, in consolidated DOAH Case Nos. 85-2962R, 85-2963R and 85-3193R (attached to a "Notice of Supplemental Authority" dated November 1, 1985) is granted. The order is made a part of the record of this proceeding. A final order entered by another hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings the authenticity of which is not in question, is an appropriate document to be accorded official recognition. See, Health Quest Realty XII v. HRS, 10 FLW 1729 (Fla. 1st DCA July 16, 1985, pet. for reh. pending). COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire 104 S. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee Florida 32301 William B. Wiley, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316

Recommendation Based on the foegoing it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a CON authorizing establishment of an ambulatory surgical facility at his offices in Palm Beach County, Florida, be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.54120.57
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LEESBURG REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 83-000156 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000156 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1984

Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JAYAPRAKASH KAMATH, 91-006669 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 17, 1991 Number: 91-006669 Latest Update: Nov. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having license ME 0036704. He is board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. He has had no prior complaints of any kind against him since he began practicing medicine in Florida in 1980, and he has a reputation for being a competent and caring physician. On the morning of August 1, 1988, while making rounds at Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, the Respondent was paged by one of his partners, Belur Sreenath, M.D. The Respondent returned the call and was asked to see a patient whom Sreenath had just accepted and admitted on a 23-hour basis at Morton Plant. Sreenath reported that the patient was a referral from the Morton Plant emergency room. The patient's regular physician was on vacation, and the regular physician's on-call cover had recommended to the emergency room physician that the patient be referred to the Respondent and Sreenath to treat the patient for diagnosed fecal impaction. It was reported to the Respondent, through Sreenath, that the patient had come into the emergency room at about five in the morning complaining of abdominal pain and constipation. The emergency room physician, Jerry Julius Chase, M.D., had three X-rays done and had done his own "wet reads" of the X-rays before sending them to the radiology department for a definitive interpretation. According to Chase, the X-rays showed "much fecal matter, no obstruction." Chase did not mention any other significant findings. Chase's preliminary diagnosis was "fecal impaction." Sreenath also reported that he (Sreenath) had ordered enemas for the patient. Soon after the Respondent received the call from his partner, the Respondent called Chase, who was still in the emergency room and still had the X-rays. Chase confirmed what Sreenath had told the Respondent, again not mentioning any other significant findings. After talking to Chase, the Respondent visited the patient in his hospital room. By this time it was about 10:00 a.m. The Respondent took a history from the patient, examined the patient, and read the patient's chart. The chart included the results of lab work and the "ER sheet," which included the emergency room physician's diagnosis of abdominal pain and impaction and the results of his "wet-read" of the X-rays, but it did not yet include a report from the radiology department or the X-rays themselves. The Respondent did not contact the radiology department for a definitive interpretation of the X-rays or obtain the X-rays for his own review. By the time the Respondent saw the patient, the patient already had one enema and seemed to be responding to the treatment. Based on the information he had, the Respondent made a diagnosis of fecal impaction, confirmed his partner's orders for enemas for the patient, and added a stool softener. The nursing staff was ordered to monitor the patient's progress. The patient continued to respond satisfactorily to treatment during the day. Between ten and eleven in the evening of August 1, 1988, the patient complained of some abdominal pain or cramping (symptoms that are consistent with a diagnosis of fecal impaction and enema treatments) and the nurses on duty contacted the Respondent's partner, who was on call. Sreenath ordered a combination of demerol and vistaril as an analgesic. One small dose was enough to relieve the patient's pain, and the patient slept through most of the night. He ate 80% of his breakfast the next morning and was not complaining of pain or asking to see a doctor. At approximately 9:15 a.m. on August 2, 1988, a nurse telephoned the Respondent for a decision whether the patient was being discharged or was being admitted as an inpatient. The Respondent still had not seen the patient's X- rays, seen or had reported to him the radiology report on them, or spoken to the radiologist. On questioning, the nurse reported the patient's status to the Respondent. The nurse's report satisfied the Respondent that the patient was responding to the treatment for fecal impaction and could be discharged. The nurse was given orders to have arrangements made for the patient to see his regular physician within a week and to instruct the patient on symptoms to report if they occurred between discharge and seeing his regular physician. In accordance with the Respondent's telephone instructions, the patient was discharged at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 2, 1988. Although there were no clinical signs or symptoms of it during the patient's stay at Morton Plant, the patient had a large aortic aneurysm, approximately eight centimeters in diameter, in his abdomen just below the renal arteries. The aneurysm was readily apparent on the X-rays, yet Chase did not report it to either the Respondent or to his partner, Sreenath. The radiologist either did not contact Dr. Chase to point out to him that the report of Chases's "wet read" of the X-rays omitted the aneurysm or, if he did, Chase did not relay this information to the Respondent or his partner. The radiologist's written report, stating that the X-rays revealed the large aneurysm, was sent to Chase, not to the Respondent, and Chase did not relay the information in it to the Respondent or his partner. If the Respondent had known about the aneurysm, he would have considered the aneurysm to be the patient's most serious medical concern. He might not have accepted the patient or, if he did, he probably would have brought a vascular surgeon into the case and had the vascular surgeon, or perhaps a cardiologist, closely monitor the patient for possible leaking or dissecting or rupture of the aneurysm. The Respondent also would have had to give consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain. In addition to treating the aneurysm as the patient's most serious medical concern, giving consideration to whether the aneurysm was a cause of the patient's abdominal pain, the Respondent would have had to give consideration to altering his diagnosis for the patient had he reviewed the X-rays or the radiologist report, or had spoken with the radiologist. In addition to showing the existence of the aneurysm, the X-rays indicated that the patient technically may not have been impacted. (The gas pattern was non-specific.) With respect to this patient, the Respondent practiced medicine below that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physicians as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (below the standard of care) in that he did not either personally review the X-rays on the patient, read or have reported to him the contents of the radiologist's report, or talk to the radiologist. Instead, he relied totally on the emergency room physician's "wet read." As a result, the Respondent's diagnosis of "fecal impaction" may not have been correct, and he did not give proper consideration to the aneurysm. However, except for the failure regarding the X-rays, the DPR otherwise did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent, who was treating the patient for fecal impaction, to discharge the patient without seeing him on the morning of August 2, 1988, based on the nurse's report to the Respondent. Although it was below the standard of care for the Respondent not to either read the X-rays himself or obtain the radiologist's definitive interpretation, it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the emergency room physician would have told him, and noted in the "ER sheet," that the patient he was being referred had an aneurysm of the kind and size of the one the patient had in this case. Even if the emergency doctor had not initially communicated to the Respondent the existence of the aneurysm, either directly or through the "ER sheet," it was reasonable for the Respondent to expect that, in the normal course, the radiologist reviewing the X-rays would have noted that, according to the "ER sheet," the ER doctor "missed" the aneurysm and would have contacted the ER physician to bring this to his attention, and that the ER doctor then would have contacted the Respondent to advise him of the omission. The patient did not experience abdominal pain after his discharge from Morton Plant, but he began to experience back and groin pain. The aneurysm was becoming symptomatic. The patient's symptoms markedly worsened in the early morning hours of August 4, 1988. The patient's wife had him taken to the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital at approximately half past midnight. The patient was confused, and was complaining of pain in the back and groin area. His blood sugars were three times normal. He was diagnosed preliminarily in the emergency room as having out-of-control diabetes and confusion and as being near sycope. No X-rays were taken in the emergency room at New Port Richey Hospital, and no information was obtained from Morton Plant Hospital. Because the patient and his wife did not know about the aneurysm, they were unable to report it when the emergency room physician took the patient's history. The patient was admitted to New Port Richey Hospital at approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1988. However, the admitting physician did not see the patient or order diagnostic medical imaging at that time. The admitting physician saw the patient at approximately 9:00 a.m., and ordered X-rays and a CAT scan. Before the X-rays or CT scan were taken, at approximately ten o'clock, the patient suffered an acute hypotensive event while in his hospital room. An emergency abdominal sonogram was ordered, and it was determined that the patient was suffering from the rupture of the abdominal aortic aneurysm (the same one that was evident on the X-rays taken at Morton Plant). Surgery was attempted to resect the ruptured aneurysm. The patient was a poor candidate for surgery of that kind due to his age and other health factors. The patient died on August 6, 1988. If the patient knew of the aneurysm, it is likely that his treatment on August 4, 1988, would have been far different. First, when the aneurysm became symptomatic, they probably would have contacted the vascular surgeon, who would have been on the case already, either immediately or on arrival at the emergency room. The aneurysm would have been closely monitored from the time of arrival at the hospital, and the vascular surgeon would have been prepared for surgery when indicated. 2/ At the very least, the patient and his wife probably would have reported the aneurysm during the taking of a history in the emergency room at HCA New Port Richey Hospital, and the emergency room surgeon could have immediately taken appropriate steps, such as contacting a vascular surgeon and immediately ordering appropriate diagnostic medical imaging. 3/ The Respondent did not dictate admission notes for the patient until August 17, 1988. The Respondent did not dictate discharge notes. The DPR did not prove that it was below the standard of care for the Respondent to delay the dictation of admission notes or for him not to prepare a discharge summary for a patient in the hospital on a 23-hour basis. The DPR also did not prove that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Jayaprakash Kamath, M.D., guilty of one count of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), but dismissing the other count of the Administrative Complaint; reprimanding him; and (3) fining him $2,000. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1992.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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ST. JOSEPH`S HOSPITAL, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 83-001280 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001280 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1983

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Based upon an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, and a later addendum, petitioner received Certificate of Need Number 1460 in February of 1981 granting the petitioner the authority to construct 126 additional general medical/surgical beds but to only license and operate 72 of such beds. The instant proceeding involves petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to license and operate the remaining 54 beds which have been previously constructed under Certificate of Need Number 1460. St. Joseph's Hospital is a 649-bed full service major referral hospital in Hillsborough County owned and operated by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny. Its services include a comprehensive community mental health center, a comprehensive pediatric unit with 88 beds, a radiation therapy center, a 60- bed community cancer center, cardiac catheterization, cardiac surgery and a large and active emergency room. It serves a considerable number of indigent patients and participates in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Petitioner is now requesting permission to license the regaining 54 beds which were authorized to be constructed pursuant to Certificate of Need Number 1460. The project involves no additional construction or renovation inasmuch as all 126 beds previously authorized have been completed. No capital expenditure will be required in order to place the 54 beds into operation. If the Certificate of Need is granted, petitioner intends to create two specialty medical/surgical units: a 32-bed cardiac surgical unit to accommodate patients from the open heart surgical program and a 22-bed medical unit for psychiatric patients requiring medical treatment. There currently are no other beds available in the hospital to convert for use for the psychiatric patient or for the cardiac surgical unit. Petitioner has been operating, on occasion, at occupancy levels in excess of 90 percent. At times, it has been necessary to place non-emergency patients in the emergency room and have them remain there until beds become available. There are sometimes up to 40 patients on the waiting list for elective surgery. Due to the shortage of empty beds, petitioner cannot now admit new members to its medical staff. Steady operation of the hospital at occupancy levels exceeding 90 percent can have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the nursing staff and the quality of care offered to patients. Because the bulk of projected growth in Hillsborough County is expected to occur in the center and northwestern area of the county, it is anticipated that the pattern of utilization of petitioner's facility will continue. While the licensing of the 54 additional beds involves no capital expenditure on petitioner's part, it is estimated that, if petitioner is not permitted to license these beds, a total yearly loss of over $3.8 million will be experienced. This figure is the sum of lost net revenues from the beds in the amount of $87,339 and lost net ancillary revenues in the amount of $2.36 million, as well as the absorption of $232,750 in yearly depreciation costs and $1.14 million in committed indirect costs. Petitioner anticipates a loss per patient day, calculated at 100 percent occupancy, of $16.82 if the licensing of the beds is not approved. This would result in an increase of current patient charges by 9.1 percent in order to maintain petitioner's budgeted profit margin. Petitioner is located in HRS District VI which, at the time of the hearing, was composed of Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. Some 81 percent of all beds in the District are located in Hillsborough County. As of the time of the hearing, the District had 3,899 licensed acute care beds, with 606 additional beds having been approved but not yet operational. The generally accepted optimum utilization rate for acute care beds is 80 to 85 percent. For District VI, the overall utilization rate is below the optimum level. In Manatee County, utilization of acute care beds is at 78.3 percent. In Hillsborough County, the utilization level is at 77.4 percent, with the major referral hospitals experiencing a higher level of utilization than the smaller community hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, contains the governing methodology for determining acute care bed needs of the various Districts. Applications for new or additional acute care hospital beds in a District will not normally be approved if approval would cause the number of beds in that District to exceed the number of beds calculated to be needed. Application of the Rule's formula to District VI results in a total acute care bed need of 3,622 projected for the year 1988. Given the 4,505 existing and approved beds in the District, there are 883 excess beds in District VI under the Rule's formula methodology for projecting need. The 1982 Health Systems Plan adopted by the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency makes no bed need projections for other specialty medical/surgical beds," but shows no need for medical/surgical beds. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, provides that other criteria may result in a demonstration of bed need even when the formula approach illustrates no need for beds. When additional beds are approved pursuant to other criteria, those beds are counted in the inventory of existing and approved beds in the area when applying the bed need formula to review future projects. The formula methodology does account for the inflow and outflow of patients in a specific area. While Rule 10-5.11(23) permits the Local Health Councils to adopt subdistrict bed allocations by type of service, the Council for District VI had not adopted its local health plan as of the date of the hearing in this matter. The Rule itself simply addresses the need for general acute care bed needs in the future.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to license 54 acute care medical/surgical beds be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire David Pingree Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein Secretary One Houston Center Department of Health and Suite 1600 Rehabilitative Services Houston, Texas 77010 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ALFRED OCTAVIUS BONATI, M.D., 93-002664 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida May 17, 1993 Number: 93-002664 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1994

The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a physician in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Medicine, through the Agency For Health Care Administration, and formerly the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the practice of medicine and the licensing of physicians in this state. Respondent has been a physician licensed in Florida under license number ME 003824. Starting on January 12, 1988 and continuing thereafter until on or about March 16, 1988, Respondent treated Patient #1 for a condition known as Dupuytren's Contracture of the left hand. This conditions results in the thickening of scar tissues and contracture of fibrous bands in the palm and fingers which pulls the fingers into the palm and constricts their ability to flex or straighten out. Patient #1 had suffered from this condition since 1982. In 1984, a surgeon in New Jersey performed Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery on the patient's right hand, but the results were not altogether satisfactory. Respondent first saw Patient #1 on January 12, 1988. At this initial visit, Respondent discussed the implications of the proposed surgical procedure and advised the patient of the possible adverse consequences thereof. He noted that because the patient had delayed seeking treatment for the left hand, there was a strong possibility of complications as a result of surgery which could involve nerve damage and infection in addition to a possibility of vascular damage and necrosis of the tissue of the hand. On February 10, 1988, Respondent performed a Dupuytren's Contracture release on the patient's left hand at the Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center, (GCOC). This surgery is a complicated, delicate and difficult procedure which in the instant case, was made even more difficult by the extent of the existing contracture of the patient's hand. After the completion of the surgery, Respondent placed Patient #1 on Keflex, an antibiotic, and also prescribed Darvocet for pain. Respondent saw Patient #1 again on February 11, 1988. At this time, the patient was complaining of pain in the hand and of the tightness of the bandage. Respondent examined the wound at this time, cleaned it, placed a plastic platform splint on the hand and re-bandaged it. The patient was also prescribed Percodan for pain and advised to continue the Keflex at a 1,500 mg/day dosage. Patient #1 returned to Respondent again on February 12, 1988, still complaining of pain and that the bandage was too tight. After again examining the hand, Respondent re-bandaged it, placing gauze between the patient's fingers and the splint. He also gave the patient another prescription for Percodan for the pain. On February 17, 1988, the patient again came to the Respondent's office for his third postoperative checkup. When Respondent removed the bandage, he noticed a small greenish area on the palm which was exuding what appeared to be white pus. Respondent thoroughly cleaned the wound by placing the hand in a whirlpool bath of water and Betadine solution for approximately 45 minutes. He did not culture the green area or the white exudation. When he released the patient that day, however, he increased the Keflex dosage to 2,000 mg/day but refused to give him a prescription for additional Percodan for the pain. Instead, he told him to take extra strength Tylenol. He also told the patient to keep the hand elevated but did not suggest the patient call in the event of pain. Respondent did not see Patient #1 again until February 24, 1988 even though the pain had increased during that period. The patient, however, did not call the Respondent to complain, believing the increase in pain was the result of the removal of the prescription for Percodan and the substitution of a lesser strength substance, Tylenol, therefor. The patient assumed, from the Respondent's prior comments, that the pain was normal and to be expected. When Respondent saw Patient #1's hand again on February 24, 1988, he became excited because it appeared there was infection in the left palm which had spread to the PIP joint of the middle finger at which point there was some necrosis. Respondent appeared upset because the Patient had not called him when the pain continued or increased. Patient #1's wife had asked that the patient do so, but the patient decided to wait until the next scheduled appointment on February 24, 1988. At this time, Respondent removed the sutures from the patient's hand and irrigated the wound with a mixture of saline solution and an antibiotic, Kepsol. A culture was also taken at this time. Since Respondent did not have hospital admitting privileges in the area, he arranged through Dr. Alea, an associate in his clinic who did have such privileges, to have Patient #1 admitted to Bayonet Point Hospital for treatment of the infection. The treating physician there was Dr. K. Sundaresh, an infectious disease specialist. The admission was on February 24, 1988. Dr. Sundaresh placed Patient #1 on prolonged antibiotic treatment, obtained a bone scan to document any infection, and directed debridement, incision and drainage of the wound. The bone scan report indicated that Patient #1 "most likely" had developed osteomyelitis, a bone infection, at the base of the middle finger on the left hand. X-rays taken around the same time, on March 1, 1988, revealed findings consistent with osteomyelitis. Following the hospital admission, Respondent departed for Arizona for three days to attend a previously scheduled medical seminar, returning on February 27, 1988. While he was gone, however, Respondent spoke daily with Patient #1 by telephone and consulted with the physicians who were treating him. Dr. Alea suggested that Patient #1 be examined by another orthopedic physician, Dr. Moss, but when Dr. Moss came to see Patient #1 in the hospital, he was told the patient had already seen Respondent. The consult report prepared by Dr. Moss reflects no consult was had because the patient "wants treatment as now arranged under Dr. Bonati." Records of GCOC indicate that on March 1, 1988, Respondent spoke with patient #1's daughter by telephone indicating that if the patient did not come to the clinic that day, he would be released from Respondent's care. In fact, the patient did go to see Respondent on March 1 and 2, 1988 on pass from the hospital, but claims he did not refuse treatment by Dr. Moss. When Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 1, 1988, after noticing a greenish material on the patient's left palm which he thought might be pseudomonas, he elected to continue the antibiotic treatment that was initiated in the hospital. When the patient was released from the hospital on March 4, 1988, the wound was healing well. Dr. Sundaresh arranged for the patient to continue the intravenous antibiotic treatments through a home nursing services. The final diagnosis at the time of discharge was osteomeleyitis of the middle finger of the PIP joint on the left hand due to pseudomonas aeruginosa infection. Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 7, 9, and 16, 1988, after the patient's discharge from the hospital. The patient was scheduled for another visit on March 22, 1988, but cancelled that appointment and also elected to discontinue the physical therapy Respondent had prescribed for him at GCOC. The hospital records show that while there, Patient #1 received daily physical therapy treatments consisting of whirlpool treatments to the hand and sterile dressings, starting on his admission on February 24, 1988, but no range of motion exercises. The physical therapy prescribed at GCOC by Respondent starting on March 8, 1988 included range of motion exercises which he continued until March 15, 1988. At the time of the last visit, on March 16, 1988, Respondent noted that the patient's wounds were healing well, but there was some limited range of motion. One of Petitioner's experts, Dr. Nadler, a board certified orthopedic surgeon with over 17 years experience, who is in practice with Dr. Angelides, to whom he refers all his hand surgery cases, opined that the standard of care for orthopedic surgery such as performed here by Respondent would be for the surgeon to have the ability to admit and follow the patient in a hospital if complications should arise. At very least, the surgeon should have the ability to make arrangements for another orthopedic surgeon to follow the patient in his absence. According to Dr. Nadler, it is not at all unusual for infection to occur in Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery. He concluded that Respondent fell below the standard of care when he performed a complicated surgical procedure on Patient #1 without having the personal ability to admit his patient to a hospital or to follow his patient's progress in the hospital in the event complications, such as an infection, should occur. He also concluded that Respondent's failure to have another orthopedic surgeon available to follow the patient while in the hospital was below standards as well. This opinion was shared by Petitioner's other expert, Dr. Visconti, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who, by his own admission, however, is not a hand surgeon specialist. Respondent's expert, Dr. Angelides, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who specializes exclusively in surgery to the hand and upper extremity, indicated that the presence of a green wound which exudes pus is consistent with infection. The standard of care for treating such an infection consists of cleaning the wound, obtaining cultures of the suspected infection, and seeing the patient again within a day or two for follow-up examination. In Angelides' opinion, Respondent's leaving the bandage on Patient #1's hand from the time of surgery on February 17 through February 24, without taking it off to check on the course of infection was not the way he would have handled the situation. However, he did not go so far as to state the Respondent's failure to do so was inappropriate, and he could find no impropriety in the way Respondent managed this case. Recognizing that the case presented here was about as severe an example of Dupuytren's Contracture as can be seen, Dr. Angiledes opined that the result achieved by Respondent was quite good considering the severity of the problem. He was not put off by the development of necrosis here, accepting that as a common complication in cases of this nature. He was satisfied by Respondent's calling in an infectious disease specialist and with the continuation of antibiotics administration after discharge through home health care. In his opinion, the surgery was appropriate and the ensuing complications common. The admission of the patient through an intermediary was not, to him, inappropriate so long as, as here, the patient continued to be seen by an infectious disease specialist. In substance, Dr. Angelides could see no problems with this case that were not properly handled and nothing that could have been done that was not done.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case finding Respondent not guilty of the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and ordering it dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. & 31. Accepted. 32. - 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. - 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. 39. & 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. & 42. Accepted. 43. Accepted and incorporated herein. 44. & 45. No more than recitations of evidence. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as a classification of Respondent's treatment as "inappropriate." The deposition cited as authority for that comment does not support it. However, the action described and the time frame in question are accurately noted. Accepted. Accepted as a recitation of the witness' testimony. Rejected as to the description "well supported." & 52. Accepted as restatements of testimony. Accepted. See "50" above. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not an evidentiary Finding of Fact. - 14. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 15. - 18. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 19. & 20. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 21A. - O. Not proper Findings of Fact. These are more Proposed Conclusions of Law which are drawn by the Hearing Officer independently in that portion of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven A. Rothenberg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33610 Paul B. Johnson, Esquire Johnson & Johnson, Post Office Box 3416 Tampa, Florida 33601 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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MEDIVISION OF MIAMI, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 84-002306 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002306 Latest Update: Jun. 06, 1986

Findings Of Fact The applicants, MediVision of Miami, Inc., and MediVision of Northern Dade County, Inc., are wholly owned subsidiaries of MediVision Inc., which maintains its corporate offices in Boston, Massachusetts. MediVision, Inc., was incorporated in January, 1984, to promote the development of outpatient eye surgery, in part through the development and operation of outpatient eye surgery centers. MediVision of Miami, Inc., and MediVision of Northern Dade County, Inc., will each be responsible for the development and operation of the projects proposed in their respective applications. MediVision, Inc., was organized by several individuals in response to a study conducted by Bain and Company, a strategic consulting firms as part of a consulting engagement in which those persons were involved. The study disclosed several demographic and health care delivery trends which prompted MediVision management to pursue the development of outpatient eye surgery centers. Those trends are: an overall movement of all types of surgery from an impatient to an outpatient setting; the increase in the nation's elderly population, and the fact that the likelihood of a person developing cataracts increases dramatically with age; the technological improvements in the provision of cataract surgery; the growth in the number of cataract surgeries performed nationally; and, a change in the manner in which Medicare reimburses a facility for outpatient surgery performed upon Medicare recipients. Medicare, since 1982, has reimbursed licensed freestanding ambulatory surgical facilities at a flat rate for the provision of such surgery, with no cost to the patient. For the same surgical procedures performed in a hospital outpatient setting, Medicare will reimburse the facility its costs of providing the surgery; the patient is responsible to pay the Medicare deductible and 20 percent co-insurance. Various subsidiaries of MediVision Inc., presently operate eight outpatient eye surgery centers nationwide; two are located in Florida. Other MediVision subsidiaries are developing three additional centers in Florida, pursuant to certificates of need issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Both parties employed the same quantitative need methodology. The methodology employs the following steps: acquire data regarding number of impatient and outpatient surgical procedures performed by existing providers; using this data, calculate current overall surgical use rate and outpatient surgical use rate for county; using the projected population for the year in question and the current use rate, calculate projected number of surgeries; multiply total projected surgeries by 40 percent to establish total outpatient surgery pool for year in question; subtract from result of step 4, all outpatient surgical procedures projected to be performed in hospitals and operating freestanding ambulatory surgery centers; subtract financial break-evens of all certificate of need approved freestanding outpatient surgery centers from this pool; and, after subtractions the number of surgical procedures remaining are compared to the break-evens of certificate of need applicant at issue. If the pool is larger than break-evens the condition is satisfied. If the pool is smaller than break-evens the condition is not satisfied. The quantitative methodology provides a reasonable approach to the evaluation of need for ambulatory surgical facilities. The basic methodology has been employed by the Department since 1982; in December, 1985, the Department began to employ a "40 percent outpatient factor" in implementing the policy. Accordingly, looking toward the planning horizon of 1988, the methodology projects that 40 percent of all surgeries in Dade County will be performed on an outpatient basis. The 40 percent outpatient factor is reasonable for use in these proceedings. The prevailing literature suggests that 40 percent of all surgeries can be expected to be performed on an outpatient basis. Within Florida, many counties are already performing in excess of 30 percent of all surgeries on an outpatient basis. Trends in health care delivery and reimbursements including the growth in pre-paid health care organizations, such as health maintenance organizations; professional review organizations, which monitor the appropriateness of hospital admissions; and Medicare reimbursement incentives will contribute to an increase in the percentage of surgeries performed in an outpatient setting. While employing the same quantitative need methodology, the parties' health planning experts arrived at different conclusions as to whether the methodology projects need for the facilities at issue in these proceedings. The differences in outcome are attributable to two issues: (1) the calculation of a base-year use rate; and (2) the calculation of "break-evens" for previously approved, but non-operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. Each expert relied upon the same basic data source in calculating a base-year surgical use rate, employing data collected by HRS and reported in the most current State Agency Action Report prepared by the Department relative to Dade County. Such Action Report (CON Action No. 4095) lacked complete data regarding the total number of surgeries performed in Dade County during the base-year (1984-5), in that six of the thirty-three acute care hospitals in Dade County failed to report. Because it is necessary to have complete data in order to establish an accurate base-year surgical use rate, Mark Druash who was engaged to undertake a need analysis by the applicants, referred to earlier State Agency Action Reports to acquire surgical procedure data for the six hospitals which had failed to report. Such documents are reliable data sources upon which to base a need analysis. In calculating a county's surgical use rate, health planners take into consideration the total population within the county. Accordingly, the total number of surgeries provided within the county must also be considered. In that six Dade County hospitals failed to report data and HRS' health planner did not acquire data relative to those facilities, the surgeries performed at those hospitals were not included in his calculation of a surgical use rate. If the total population of a county is considered in calculating a surgical use rate, but something less than the total number of surgeries is considered, the calculation results in an artificially deflated use rate. As the base-year use rate drives all of the remaining calculations in the quantitative methodology, an error in the calculation of the use rate will be carried through the entire methodology. The ultimate effect of a deflated use rate is to project a smaller number of surgical procedures, as compared to a use rate calculated upon complete data. HRS calculated a base-year surgical use rate for Dade County of 78.2 surgeries/1000 population. MediVision calculated a base-year surgical use rate of 92.8/1000 population. The variance in the use rates is attributable solely to the fact that Druash acquired and employed in his calculations surgical procedure data from all Dade County hospitals previously relied upon by HRS; while HRS relied upon incomplete data. In that Druash's calculations are based on a complete data based the surgical use rate of 92.8/1000 population is found to be more accurate and reliable than the rate of 78.2/1000 population calculated by HRS from incomplete data. The parties differ in their calculation of "break- evens for previously approved, but not yet operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. The break-even calculation is an integral part of the quantitative need methodology. The purpose of subtracting from the available outpatient surgical pool the "break-evens" of approved, but not yet operational ambulatory surgical facilities is to assure that there exists need for the project proposed adequate to allow both such project and previously approved facilities to operate in a financially viable manner. The "break-even" approach is also intended to promote competition; rather than assuming that all of the procedures projected by a facility will be performed in such facility; the approach allocates to the facility only that number of procedures it needs to generate sufficient revenues to cover its expenses. Druash who participated in the development of the quantitative methodology during his tenure with HRS, testified that the "break-even" approach was selected because it would promote competition among providers by approving enough applicants so that they would be "hungry" for the residual surgeries projected by the methodology. The purpose of calculating a financial break-even is to ascertain at what point a project's cash flow will equal its expenditures. The generally accepted method for calculating a financial break-even requires that fixed costs be separated from variable costs. The concept of variable costs is the basis for the computation of a break-even. Fixed costs are those which remain constant regardless of the volume of business conducted by an entity; variable costs are those that change directly with volume. In the operation of an ambulatory surgical facility, virtually all expenses related to medical supplies are variable. If no patients are treated, no medical supplies are needed, and no expenses are incurred. If 100 patients are treated, 100 units of medical supplies are needed, with resultant expense. Certain expenses involved in the operation of an ambulatory surgical center are totally fixed, such as debt service and property taxes. All other expenses are variable to some degree e.g. salaries, utilities, and maintenance. Depreciation and amortization of property and equipment are not considered as expenses in a break-even analysis, as those items do not represent cash expenditures. As mere accounting recognitions of prior investment, depreciation and amortization should not be included in a calculation of a cash flow break-even. HRS' methodology for calculating financial break-evens for ambulatory surgical procedures treats all expenses as fixed, and includes amortization and depreciation among those expenses. By HRS' admissions the Department, "in lieu of attempting to determine what is fixed and what is variable . . . will use a somewhat more crude method". Where a financial break-even is calculated treating all costs as fixed, the resulting break-even number is artificially inflated. By the Department's reckoning, the effect of treating all expenses as fixed is to "add a cushion" to its approvals of prior applications. HRS' expert acknowledged, however, that differentiating between fixed and variable costs in performing a financial break-even analysis is the "preferred methods no question". Lovell Jones, a certified public accountant and expert in health care finance, performed revised break-even analyses for previously approved, but not yet operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. Jones first acquired expense and revenue data from the certificate of need applications submitted by previously approved applicants. Then, treating only medical supplies as variable expenses, and excluding amortization and depreciation from the list of fixed expenses, he calculated the actual financial break-even of each approved, but not yet operational, facility. Jones' analysis finds the collective break- even of all previously approved, but not yet operational, facilities to be 17,996 procedures, whereas the Department's "crude" analysis results in a collective break-even of 25,736. Jones' method of calculating break-even, which was agreed to be technically correct by both parties, is more accurate and reliable than the method employed by the Department. Using the agreed-upon quantitative methodology, the surgical use rate calculated by Druash, and the break-even numbers calculated by Jones, there is projected to exist in 1988 a pool of 5006 outpatient surgical procedures that could be provided by the applicants in these proceedings. Subtracting the break-even numbers of the two proposed facilities, there will exist a residual pool of greater than 3600 procedures. Accordingly, there exists a quantitative need for the two proposed facilities. Furthers the residual pool of greater than 3600 procedures represents an adequate "cushion" to satisfy the concerns of HRS that previously approved facilities be given the opportunity to operate in a financially viable manner. The proposed facilities will improve access to services for both Medicare and indigent patients. Medicare patients receiving surgery at the facilities will be treated free of cost, with the Medicare program having full responsibility for payment. All other patients will be treated at the facilities regardless of ability to pay. The proposed facilities will promote competition in that management intends the charges to commercial patients to be less than the prevailing charges in the community. Where an ambulatory surgical facility enters a market, hospital charges for similar services tend to decrease. The proposed facilities will promote cost containment, as it is more costly to render care in a hospital outpatient department than in a freestanding ambulatory surgical facility. Hospital outpatient departments, which are reimbursed by Medicare for their costs of providing services, do not have the same incentive to reduce costs as do freestanding ambulatory surgery facilities, which are reimbursed at a predetermined flat rate for the provision of services. Accordingly, Medicare has encouraged the use of freestanding ambulatory surgical facilities by incurring all responsibility for payments at no cost to Medicare recipients. The Department's sole concern regarding the financial feasibility of the proposed facilities arises out of its position that there exists no need for the facilities. Accordingly, the Department questions whether the facilities will enjoy utilization sufficient to generate the revenues necessary to their viable operation. In that need for the facilities has been found to exist, it follows that the facilities will be able to generate adequate numbers of surgeries to achieve break-even in their second years of operation. Several other factors indicate that the facilities will experience utilization sufficient to achieve break-even in their second years of operation: The marketing and community education activities proposed by the applicants will encourage utilization. In its existing surgical facility in Orlando, MediVision, Inc., has undertaken similar activities, which have resulted in substantial surgical referrals to the facility; There exists a residual pool of approximately 5,000,000 untreated cataracts nationally; Medicare reimbursement policies which allow Medicare recipients to receive treatment at licensed freestanding ambulatory surgical centers at no cost to the recipient will encourage utilization of the proposed facilities; The applicants' pricing structure, for both Medicare and commercial patients, will encourage utilization of the proposed facilities; and Two local ophthalmology group practices have expressed strong interest in performing surgery at the proposed facilities. Each group presently performs in excess of 1000 surgeries annually, which volume is greater than the break-even volume necessary to be achieved at each facility.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawn it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving the applications of Petitioners to establish and operate freestanding ophthalmic ambulatory surgical centers in Dade County, Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire The Perkins House, Suite 101 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.52120.57
# 9
DR. PETER P. MCKEOWN vs UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, 95-001832 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 14, 1995 Number: 95-001832 Latest Update: May 17, 1996

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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