The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether the minor child should be awarded compensation under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association Plan.
Findings Of Fact On October 16, 2018, Petitioner Brandi L. Jennings was admitted to St. Joseph's to deliver her child (Killian). As part of her admission that day, Ms. Jennings signed a Receipt of NICA Information ("Receipt") presented to her by St. Joseph's pursuant to section 766.316. The Receipt notified Ms. Jennings that St. Joseph's was furnishing her information prepared by NICA, and stated that "certain limited compensation is available in the event certain types of qualifying neurological injuries may occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation." By providing Ms. Jennings this Receipt, St. Joseph's complied with the terms of the NICA notice requirement set forth in section 766.316. On October 18, 2018, Ms. Jennings gave birth to Killian at St. Joseph's. Killian was born a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams. However, during the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period, Killian sustained an injury to the brain or spinal cord caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. (Killian was ultimately diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy.) As such, Killian's injury qualifies as a "birth-related neurological injury" as defined in section 766.302(2). Killian was delivered by obstetrician, Kathryn Leenhouts, M.D. Dr. Leenhouts was the only physician who directly provided obstetrical services to Ms. Jennings in the course of her labor and delivery or in the immediate postdelivery period at St. Joseph's. At the time of Killian's birth, Dr. Leenhouts was not employed by St. Joseph's. Instead, Dr. Leenhouts worked for Exodus Women's Center, where she, along with other members of that group, had previously applied for and were granted staff privileges at St. Joseph's. During the year of Killian's birth (2018), Dr. Leenhouts did not pay the assessment set forth in section 766.314, which is required for participation in the NICA Plan. Neither was any evidence offered to establish that Dr. Leenhouts was exempt from payment of the assessment for 2018. Consequently, Dr. Leenhouts was not a "participating physician" in the Plan as that term is defined by section 766.302(7). St. Joseph's, on the other hand, was current with its assessment payments under section 766.314 for 2018. Based on "all available evidence" in the record, Petitioners' claim does not meet the statutory requirements for compensability under the Plan. The evidence produced at the final hearing establishes that the obstetrical services provided at Killian's birth were not delivered by a "participating physician" as defined in section 766.302(7). Therefore, Petitioners' claim does not meet the requirements for compensation under section 766.309(1), and Killian is not eligible for an award of NICA benefits under section 766.31.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation filed November 12, 1993, petitioners and respondent stipulated as follows: COMES NOW, CHARLES PATRICK, ESQUIRE, Attorney for CLYDE RAY, JR., a minor, and LISA TAYLOR and CLYDE RAY SR., individually and as parents and natural guardians of CLYDE RAY, JR., and COMES NOW, MARK J. ZIENTZ, ESQUIRE, Attorney for FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, who hereby stipulate and agree as follows: That pursuant to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, a claim was filed on behalf of the above-styled infant against the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (the Association) on behalf of Clyde Ray, Jr., and Clyde Ray, Sr., and Lisa Taylor (the Petitioners) for benefits under Chapter 766, F.S. That a timely filed claim for benefits complying with the requirements of F.S. 766.305 was filed by Petitioners and a timely denial was filed on behalf of the Association. That the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this claim. That Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, requires an infant to suffer both a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment to fall within the definition of a "Birth-related neurological injury" making said infant eligible for coverage by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The parties agree that the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., does not exhibit substantial physical impairment so as to fit within the strict definition of claims covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association under Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. That the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., was born at Jackson Memorial Hospital on June 17, 1990, and that said hospital was a licensed Florida Hospital and the attending physicians were participating physicians within the meaning of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. WHEREFORE, based upon the above stipulated set of facts, it is respectfully requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings approve the stipulations as being consistent with the evidence in this cause and enter an order denying the claim against the Association on the basis that Clyde Ray, Jr., did not suffer a birth-related neurological injury as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Bryan Siravo has suffered an injury for which compensation should be awarded under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as alleged in the claim for compensation.
Findings Of Fact Bryan Siravo (Bryan) is the natural son of Robert and Mauro Siravo. He was born a live infant on March 13, 1990, at Plantation General Hospital in Broward County, Florida, and his birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. The physician delivering obstetrical services during the birth of Bryan was Edward Buonopane, M.D., who was, at all times material hereto, a participating physician in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Bryan Siravo was delivered by cesarean section because of a breach presentation and maternal obesity. The delivery was without complications and Bryan presented with Apgar scores of 8 at one minute and 9 at five minutes. Resuscitation was not required in the immediate postdelivery period, and there was no evidence of fetal distress. After birth, Bryan was transported to the regular or newborn nursery and was found in a cyanotic state approximately three hours after birth. Bryan was subsequently transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit where he was intubated after about one hour. Bryan's condition continued to deteriorate over the next 24 hours and an echocardiogram revealed the presence of a large patent ductus arteriosus and heart valve insufficiency. Due to the continued deterioration of his condition, Bryan was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital on March 15, 1990. At Miami Children's Hospital, Bryan was diagnosed with respiratory distress syndrome type I, severe; a condition which impairs the ability to breath, and which arises after birth when the infant is required to breath outside the womb. Bryan also underwent multiple ultrasound and CT scans of the brain. These neuroimaging studies revealed the presence of a Grade IV intraventricular hemorrhage. Based on the credible proof of record, it is concluded that Bryan suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Such injury did not, however, occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Rather, the proof demonstrated that the origins of Bryan's hemorrhage and his resultant neurologic injury were a combination of respiratory distress syndrome and patent ductive arteriosus, which began to operate after his delivery. Such mechanism, acting in consort, increased, over time, the pressure in the draining veins from Bryan's brain and, therefore, the pressure in his brain, with the consequent hemorrhage.
The Issue At issue is whether Christian M. Hernandez, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
Findings Of Fact Preliminary findings related to compensability Miguel Hernandez and Lynn Hernandez, are the parents and natural guardians of Christian M. Hernandez, a minor. Christian was born a live infant on March 28, 2005, at Mount Sinai Medical Center, a hospital located in Miami Beach, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's birth by Melvin E. Castillo, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."1 § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioners and NICA are of the view that Christian did not suffer such an injury, whereas Intervenors hold a contrary view. Whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered the Mount Sinai Medical Center records associated with Christian's birth and immediate newborn course, March 28, 2005, to April 2, 2005 (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2), as well as the Miami Children's Hospital medical records associated with his subsequent care, April 2, 2005, to May 11, 2005 (Joint Exhibit 3). The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, electroencephalography, and neurophysiology. (Joint Exhibits 4 and 5). Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records related to Christian's birth and subsequent development, and accurately summarized his history, as follows: . . . The mother, Lynn Hernandez, was a 36 year old G3 P2 admitted at term in early labor. Her cervix was dilated 2 cms. She was taking Synthroid for hypothyroidism and had a previous Cesarean delivery. Meconium was identified with rupture of the membranes. Ampicillin was given during labor. The fetal heart rate pattern on admission had a normal baseline and was reactive. Variable decelerations, to about 90 bpm, developed during the second stage of labor and vacuum assisted delivery was done for this indication. Vacuum was applied and the baby was delivered on the first pull. Delivery was complicated by a tight nuchal cord and mild shoulder dystocia. McRoberts maneuver was required for delivery of the shoulders. Birth weight was 4,180 grams or 9 lbs 3 ozs. No meconium was identified below the vocal cords by neonatal evaluation. Apgar scores were 7/9/9. The baby was floppy at birth, but responded to resuscitation. From the delivery room, the baby was taken to the NICU for possible sepsis and respiratory distress. Retractions and a rapid respiratory rate were present. Neurologic exam was normal. Oxygen saturation was in the 90's on admission, but the baby was unable to maintain adequate oxygenation with hood oxygen. Oxygen saturation dropped to the 50's and intubation and mechanical ventilation was required shortly after being admitted to the NICU (about one hour). Respiratory distress continued with progressively increasing ventilator settings required to maintain adequate oxygenation. The baby was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital for possible ECMO. Diagnoses included meconium aspiration syndrome, suspected viral pneumonia and significant pulmonary hypertension. Chest tubes were placed for pneumothorax. Respiratory distress worsened and ECMO was started. Head ultrasound was done before ECMO and was normal. The baby suffered an intracranial hemorrhage while on ECMO, which required discontinuation of ECMO. The baby was on ECMO for 32 hours. Serial CT scans showed an evolving intracranial hemorrhage with eventual development of a porencephalic cyst. The baby was discharged home on day 43 of life. (Joint Exhibit 4; See also Joint Exhibit 1; Joint Exhibit 2, Discharge Summary; Joint Exhibit 3, Discharge Summary). Based on his evaluation of the medical records, it was Dr. Willis' opinion that Christian did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period, and that the intracranial hemorrhage he suffered while on ECMO, was a complication of the blood thinner (anti-coagulant) required for ECMO therapy.2 (Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 13, 14, and 22). Compare, Orlando Regional Health Care System, Inc. v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(Where infant found to have suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" when it was shown that the infant required active resuscitation from birth until he was placed on ECMO bypass hours after his birth, and that the infant suffered a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired, between the time of birth and the time of being placed on ECMO.). Notably, it was not shown through Dr. Willis' testimony or otherwise that Christian's intracranial hemorrhage was caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, and Dr. Willis offered no opinion regarding the significance of, or any sequelae caused by, the brain injury Christian suffered while on ECMO. (Joint Exhibit 4, p. 14). Dr. Duchowny evaluated Christian on September 28, 2007. Based on his evaluation, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Duchowny was of the opinion that Christian's impairments were, more likely than not, the result of a developmentally based brain disorder, as opposed to a brain injury. Dr. Duchowny was also of the opinion that Christian does not have a substantial physical impairment. Rather his motor function is essentially appropriate for age and he does not currently demonstrate, and is unlikely to demonstrate in the future, a substantial mental impairment. (Joint Exhibit 5). When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Willis and Duchowny were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Christian's impairments was most likely a developmentally based brain abnormality, as opposed to a "birth- related neurological injury," and, regardless of the etiology of his impairments, he is not permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation.").
The Issue Whether Hunter Lewis, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Angel Lewis and Jerry Lewis, are the parents and natural guardians of Hunter Lewis, a minor. Hunter was born a live infant on June 2, 2000, at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, a hospital located in Tallahassee, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Hunter's birth was Arthur S. Clements, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes.1 Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. The cause and timing, as well as the significance of Hunter's neurologic impairment To address the cause and timing of Hunter's neurologic impairment, as well as its significance, Petitioners offered selected medical records relating to Hunter's birth and subsequent development (Petitioners' Exhibit 1); the Verified Medical Opinion of Richard J. Inwood, M.D., a neonatologist (Petitioners' Exhibit 2); and the deposition of Donald C. Willis, M.D., an obstetrician (Petitioners' Exhibit 3). In turn, Respondent offered the deposition of Paul R. Carney, M.D., a pediatric neurologist (Respondent's Exhibit 1). As for the significance of Hunter's impairments, it was Dr. Carney's opinion, based on the results of his neurologic evaluation of November 21, 2002, that Hunter's assessment "indicates substantial cognitive and language impairment," but "very mild long tract neurological findings." Dr. Carney described Hunter's developmental delay as static, as opposed to progressive, and he ventured no opinion as to the cause or timing of Hunter's impairments. As for Dr. Inwood, he was of the opinion that: . . . Hunter Lewis [ ] was delivered by induced labor prior to 38 weeks and had immature lungs. Because of the immaturity of the lungs he suffered hypoxic insult and, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, sustained significant neurological injury. This injury would not have occurred had his delivery been delayed until he had demonstrated lung maturity. His problems are not congenital and did not occur during labor or delivery, but rather after delivery . . . . Notably, Dr. Inwood did not further address Hunter's neurologic injury or, stated otherwise, did not speak to whether in his opinion, Hunter suffered both cognitive and motor impairment and, if so, the significance of each. As for Dr. Willis, he was of the opinion that the medical records revealed no evidence of oxygen deprivation or other trauma associated with labor, delivery, or resuscitation immediately following Hunter's birth. Significantly, the medical records are consistent with the opinions of Doctors Inwood and Willis that the cause and timing of Hunter's impairment was not associated with labor, delivery, or resuscitation, and with the opinion of Dr. Carney that, while Hunter may demonstrate substantial cognitive delay, his motor impairment is mild. Given the record, it must be concluded that the proof demonstrated, more likely than not, that Hunter's impairments were not occasioned by an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in the hospital, and that he is not permanently and substantially physically impaired.
