The Issue The issues are (1) whether certain medical expenses incurred by petitioners' daughter should be covered under the state group health insurance program, and (2) whether the state is estopped from denying the claim based upon erroneous misrepresentations made by its agent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Etta Aldridge, is a full-time employee of Sunland Training Center in Marianna, Florida and is a participant in the state group health insurance program (the plan). James Aldridge, her husband and also a petitioner in this cause, and Jerrilyn Aldridge, her daughter, are covered by the plan. On November 3, 1987, Jerrilyn, then around seventeen years of age, was severely injured in an automobile accident near her home in Greenwood, Florida. Among other things, she suffered a skull fracture, abrasions, crushed pelvis and hip, and punctured lungs and stomach. She was initially taken to a Marianna hospital for emergency treatment and then transferred to a Tallahassee hospital for longer-term care. While at the Tallahassee hospital, Jerrilyn was diagnosed by her neurologist as having a closed, diffuse brain injury and brain stem contusions. After Jerrilyn was treated in Tallahassee for two and one-half months, which included one month in the hospital and forty-five days at the hospital's extended care facility, her parents were advised that, due to her poor prognosis, they had a choice of putting her in a nursing facility or taking her to their home. Although Jerrilyn was still in a coma, petitioners decided to take her home and care for her in a bedroom which had been converted into a hospital room setting. After six or seven weeks at home, and contrary to earlier medical expectations, Jerrilyn opened her eyes, made noises and manifested some slight arm movement. Based upon these encouraging signs, petitioners sought further medical advice and were told that, given the foregoing signs of improvement, treatment in a facility that specialized in brain injury rehabilitation would improve their daughter's condition. Petitioners contacted the National Head Injury Foundation and were given a list of health care facilities in the state that provided rehabilitative services for brain injured patients. This list included Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc. d/b/a Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton (MRB), a facility licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility but which specialized in rehabilitating brain injured patients. MRB is the largest brain injury rehabilitation facility in the southeastern united States. Since the Aldridges did not have the financial resources to pay for any additional treatment for Jerrilyn, it was essential that they selected a facility that would be covered by the plan. After James Aldridge spoke with and received information from most of the facilities on the list, and conferred with Jerrilyn's neurologist, he eventually narrowed his choice to several facilities, including MRB, which impressed him because of its good reputation and specialty in head injury rehabilitation. To confirm whether coverage would be provided for further treatment, James Aldridge telephoned the customer service unit of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBS), the plan's administrator. He also contacted MRB and authorized it to make an inquiry with BCBS on his behalf. On March 28, 1989 Aldridge received favorable advice from a BCBS service representative concerning coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn at MRB. This advice was independently confirmed by MBR on the same date, and Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient at the facility effective March 31, 1988. Some three months later, and after some of the bills had been paid, BCBS advised MBR and petitioners that a "computer" error had been made and that the requested benefits applied only when rendered in a licensed hospital and not a skilled nursing facility. BCBS accordingly declined to pay the bills. That prompted petitioners to initiate this proceeding. The bills in question total over $225,000. The Insurance Plan The State has elected to provide a self-insured group health insurance program for its employees and their dependents. The legislature has designated respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Employees' Insurance (Division), as the responsible agency for the administration of the plan. To this end, the Division has entered into an agreement with BCBS to administer the plan. Among other things, BCBS provides verification of coverage and benefits, claims payment services, actuarial and printing services, and medical underwriting of late enrollee applications. Including dependents and retirees, there are almost 300,000 persons who are covered by the plan. Upon enrolling in the plan, all employees, including Etta Aldridge, were routinely given an insurance card with BCBS's telephone number and a brochure entitled "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure" (brochure) containing a general description of the plan. The brochure warns the insured that the brochure is not a contract since it does not include all the provisions, definitions, benefits exclusions and limitations of the plan. It also contains advice that if the brochure does not answer an employee's question, he should telephone the Division's customer service section in Tallahassee. In actual practice, however, if an employee contacts the Division number, he is told to telephone BCBS's customer service unit in Jacksonville regarding any questions as to coverage and benefits, claims or other problems concerning the plan. The Division generally becomes involved only when an employee is unable to resolve a claims problem with BCBS. BCBS has established a service unit that deals exclusively with inquiries regarding coverage and benefits under the state group health plan. There are approximately twenty- eight service representatives in that unit. Each representative receives four weeks of training before being certified as a customer service representative. After being certified, a representative's primary responsibility is to respond to inquiries from state employees, health providers and physicians regarding verification of benefits and coverage under the state group policy. It should be noted that a distinction exists between verification of benefits and coverage. To verify coverage means to verify that a person has an active policy at the time services are rendered. To verify benefits means to confirm that a specific service is covered under the policy. In this case, there was an inquiry by the insured and provider regarding both benefits and coverage. In the event a representative is unsure as to the licensing status of a facility or provider, the representative has access to BCBS's master registry department which maintains the provider number and licensure status of every facility in the state. That registry identified MRB as a skilled nursing home. BCBS representatives have the authority to make decisions regarding benefits and coverage. It is only when an inquiry falls within a "grey area" that the final decision is referred from the unit to either the Legal or Medical Division of BCBS. The Division, with the assistance of BCBS, has prepared a seventy-five page benefit document (document) which governs all claims arising under the plan. However, the document is for BCBS in-house use only and is not given to state employees or providers. The document first became effective on May 1, 1978 and has been subsequently amended from time to time. When Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB, the document effective October 1, 1987 was controlling. The document was further amended effective July 1, 1988, which was three months after her admission to MRB. As is pertinent here, the July 1, 1988 amendments increased the deductibles and narrowed the definition of a "hospital". According to the state benefits administrator, the document is "the final word" on any dispute regarding coverage or claims. The BCBS service unit uses this document to verify coverage and benefits. Included in the document are numerous definitions that are used to resolve disputed claims. Relevant to this controversy is the definition of a hospital at the time Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB: "Hospital" means a licensed institution engaged in providing medical care and treatment to a patient as a result of illness or accident on an inpatient/outpatient basis at the patient's expense and which fully meets all the tests set forth in 1., 2., and below: It is a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, or the American Osteopathic Association or the Commission on the Accreditation of Rehabilitative Facilities; It maintains diagnostic and therapeutic facilities for surgical or medical diagnosis and treatment of patients under the supervision of a staff of fully licensed physicians; It continuously provides twenty-four (24) hour a day nursing service by or under the supervision of registered graduate nurses. It is undisputed that, while MRB may have provided many services comparable to those rendered by a licensed hospital and is considered to be an atypical nursing home, MRB is still licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility. Thus, MRB cannot qualify as a hospital under the benefit document. Payment for services in a skilled nursing facility, such as MRB, are much more limited and restrictive than for a hospital. To qualify for payment of benefits in a skilled nursing facility, the insured must have been hospital confined for at least three consecutive days prior to the day of hospital discharge before being transferred, upon a physician's advice, to a skilled nursing facility. Once admitted to such a facility, the insured's room and board reimbursement is limited to a maximum of $76 per day. Further, payment of services and facilities is limited to sixty days of confinement per calendar year. In contrast, benefits for hospital care include, for example, unlimited days of coverage per calendar year and much higher reimbursement rates for room, board and other services. In this case, besides having been admitted to MRB directly from her home, and not a hospital, Jerrilyn had already used up forty- five of the sixty days of annual benefits at the extended care unit of a Tallahassee hospital. BCBS also has a fee schedule that is used in paying all covered claims. However, the schedule was not introduced into evidence. Estoppel Before he made a final decision as to where to send his daughter, James Aldridge spoke by telephone with several BCBS representatives, including Michelle Sahdala and Rhonda Hall, the unit supervisor and considered its most experienced representative. 1/ Aldridge made these telephone calls because he wanted to positively confirm which facilities would be covered by the plan. During one conversation, Sahdala advised Aldridge that the proposed treatment would not be covered in several facilities named by the National Head Injury Foundation, including New Medico Rehabilitation Center of Florida in Wauchula, Florida and Capital Rehabilitation Hospital in Tallahassee. Aldridge advised BCBS that he might want to place his daughter in MRB, but only if such treatment was covered under his wife's insurance plan. He heard nothing further from BCBS until a week later. Aldridge contacted MRB on March 21, 1988 and advised an MRB representative that he wished to place his daughter in the facility if his wife's insurance covered the treatment at MRB. He also gave MRB the BCBS unit supervisor's name (Rhonda Hall) and telephone number. To verify coverage and benefits, MRB's admission coordinator, Patricia Dear, telephoned Hall on March 22, 1988. Such an inquiry is routinely made by the provider on behalf of the insured and before the patient is admitted to the facility. This is to ascertain if the prospective patient is insured, and if so, to verify the amount of benefits. Dear identified herself and advised Hall that she was requesting benefits information on Jerrilyn Aldridge, an insured. She told Hall that MRB was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the nature of services that would be provided to Jerrilyn and her need to determine whether such services would be covered under the plan before Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient. When asked if she would need further information in hand concerning MRB before determining the amount of benefits, Hall responded affirmatively. Accordingly, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail a letter and brochure describing the facility's services. They were received by BCBS the next morning, or March 23. The letter included information concerning MRB, the fact that it was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the type of services that MRB provided, a summary of the expected charges for treating Jerrilyn (from $600 to $850 per day), the average length of stay of a patient (3 to 9 months), and an offer to answer any additional questions that BCBS might have. When Dear heard nothing further from Hall within the next few days, she made a follow-up telephone call to Hall on March 28 to see if Hall had any questions and to verify benefits coverage. Hall acknowledged receiving the letter of March 22 with attachment. After Dear discussed each of the disciplines and types of services to be provided and their expected cost, including physician services, physical therapy, neuropsychology, central supply, pharmacy, laboratory services and a room and board charge of $351 per day, Hall advised Dear that the only policy exclusions on coverage would be occupational and speech/language therapy. She added that all charges would be subject to medical necessity, and ambulance costs to transport Jerrilyn to the facility would be covered. The two also discussed the fact that there were no time limitations under the policy and that almost $475,000 in lifetime coverage still remained. Hall represented that after the Aldridges satisfied their $1500 deductible on which BCBS paid only 80% of the bills, BCBS would thereafter pay 100% of all medically necessary charges. In making that representation, Hall did not disclose the fact that BCBS has a fee schedule and that all payments were subject to the limitations specified in that schedule. After verifying that Hall had cited all policy limitations, and consistent with her longtime experience in verifying benefits with other insurance carriers, Dear properly assumed that if the policy contained a provision which limited payment to something less than 100% of covered services, Hall would have said so. Dear asked Hall if there was any reason not to admit Jerrilyn and Hall replied "no." Dear also asked Hall if she (Hall) was in a position to verify benefits and Hall represented that she was. Dear then told Hall that Jerrilyn would be presented to the admissions committee the next day and, if clinically appropriate, she would be admitted. Dear ended the conversation by advising Hall that a letter confirming their understanding would be sent after Jerrilyn was admitted. After speaking with Hall, Dear had a clear understanding that coverage and benefits had been approved and, except for occupational and speech/language therapy, BCBS would pay 80% of all medically necessary charges until the Aldridge's $1,500 deductible was met, and then to pay 100% of all remaining medically necessary charges. 2/ After receiving the favorable advice, Dear telephoned Aldridge the same day and told him the results of her conversation with Hall. Within a few moments after speaking with Dear, Aldridge received a telephone call from an unidentified female BCBS representative who informed him that BCBS would pay for his daughter's treatment at MRB. Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient by MRB's admissions committee on March 28, 1988. Both the provider and the insured relied upon Hall's representations in admitting Jerrilyn to the facility. Had Jerrilyn not been covered by the plan, the committee would not have approved her admission. Also, if the Aldridges had known that the treatment at MRB was not covered, they would have sent their daughter to another facility covered by the plan. On April 4, 1988, and pursuant to her last telephone conversation with Hall, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail the following letter: This is to confirm the admission of Jerrilyn Aldridge on March 31, 1988, to the specialized head trauma rehabilitation program at Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton, Florida. The following benefits information has been verified by you and Patricia Dear, R. N., Admissions Coordinator on March 28, 1988. Effective date: 10/1/79 Benefits: After $1,500 - out of pocket/yr- 100% coverage Days available: Unlimited days Monies available: $474,533.79 Exclusions: Occupational Therapy, Speech- Language Therapy Limitations: Treatment subject to "Medical Necessity" If I do not hear from you, I will consider you to be in agreement with the above information. Please place this in the client's file. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. (Emphasis supplied) Although BCBS's records reflect that Dear's letter was received, Hall did not advise Dear that there were any problems concerning Jerrilyn's coverage and benefits under the plan or that Dear's understanding of the benefits to be paid was inaccurate or in error. Of some note is the fact that Hall is considered one of the most knowledgeable BCBS representatives on state health plan benefits and recognizes that her statements concerning benefits are relied upon by providers. Even though Hall was specifically advised both orally and in writing that MRB was licensed as a nursing home, and she had access to BCBS's master registry to confirm MRB's licensure status, she failed to discern that a nursing home was not a covered facility for the requested services within the meaning of the plan. Indeed, she later acknowledged by deposition that she knew that "the state does not pay for nursing homes" and that she had made a mistake by failing to properly "investigate" the matter more thoroughly. By failing to convey accurate advice to James Aldridge and MRB and to note that the proposed treatment would not be covered if rendered by a nursing home, Hall failed to use reasonable care and competence in responding to the inquiry. Three months after Jerrilyn's admission, James Aldridge received notice that BCBS had changed its position and now asserted it was not going to pay for Jerrilyn's rehabilitation and treatment at MRB. Proposed agency action confirming this decision was later issued by the Division on October 21, 1988. Miscellaneous All medical services received by Jerrilyn were medically necessary within the meaning of the benefit document. The necessity of Jerrilyn's placement in a rehabilitation facility was established by Dr. James D. Geissinger, her Tallahassee neurologist, who based it upon Jerrilyn's improvement after leaving the Tallahassee hospital and made her a candidate for brain rehabilitation. Doctor Geissinger also noted that, as a result of receiving treatment at MRB, Jerrilyn had made "remarkable" improvement and was able to partially regain her language function, use her left arm and hand, and improve her "activities of daily living." There are expectations that she will be able to walk again within a year. Further, based upon the testimony of an MRB staff physician, the services and treatment received by Jerrilyn at MRB were medically necessary to facilitate her neurologic and functional recovery. Given the nature of her injury and MRB's nursing staffing ratios, the required intensive medical rehabilitation and monitoring of Jerrilyn's medical and neurological condition was comparable to care in a hospital intensive care unit. These matters were not contradicted. On April 1, 1988, the Aldridges executed a standard financial agreement with MRB whereby they agreed to indemnify MRB for all charges which were not paid by BCBS. As is normally done, they also authorized MRB to directly bill BCBS for all charges incurred by Jerrilyn while being treated at the facility. Finally, the Aldridges authorized MRB to make inquiries on their behalf with BCBS to verify insurance coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn. MRB submitted to BCBS all bills for services and treatment given to Jerrilyn during her five or six month stay at the facility. A summary of the dates of service, charges, payments made by BCBS and balance due is contained in petitioners' exhibit 17. In all, there are thirty-eight outstanding bills totaling $227,139.27. The parties have stipulated that the bills in exhibit 17 represent services that were actually performed and supplies that were actually received by the patient. As noted in finding of fact 21, all such supplies and services were medically necessary. For the reasons given in the conclusions of law portion of this recommended order, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies, and petitioners are entitled to be reimbursed for all unpaid bills filed with BCBS in accordance with the representations of agent Hall. These include room and board charges (at the intensive care room rate), physician services, neuropsychology, physical therapy, central supply, pharmacy and laboratory charges as more fully described in petitioners' exhibit 17. Such reimbursement should be not be subject to the limitations prescribed in the fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the amended petition of Etta and James Aldridge be GRANTED, and the Division order Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. to reimburse petitioners $227,139.27 as reflected in petitioners' exhibit 17. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1989.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, WANDA DIRKS, was licensed in the State of Florida as a health insurance agent and was authorized to solicit health insurance policies on behalf of National States Insurance (National States) and on behalf of American Integrity Insurance Company (American Integrity). John Rickard was born March 18, 1905, and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, lived in Fort Pierce, Florida. On February 25, 1988, Respondent sold to Mr. Rickard a Medicare supplement policy and a nursing home insurance policy, both issued through National States. On March 28, 1988, Respondent sold to Mr. Rickard a cancer insurance policy and a medical expense insurance policy, both issued through National States. In December 1988, Mr. Rickard suffered a stroke which left him partially paralyzed and which resulted in his having a colostomy. Following his hospitalization he was placed in a rehabilitation center. In February 1989, Mr. Rickard was transferred from the rehabilitation center to the Fort Pierce Care Center, which is a nursing home. Mr. Rickard was a continuous resident of that nursing home (except for a brief hospitalization which is not pertinent to the disposition of the issues herein) from the date of his admission to his death on December 22, 1989. Friends took Mr. Rickard on day trips away from the nursing home on occasion. From February 1989 until his death, Mr. Rickard was confined to a wheelchair and required assistance with his activities of daily living. Mr. Rickard had poor vision, but he could occasionally read with the assistance of a large magnifying glass. Prior to his admission to the nursing home, Mr. Rickard resided in his mobile home located at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Dee James was a friend and former coworker of Mr. Rickard who assisted him with the payment of his bills. Ms. James was the primary beneficiary of Mr. Rickard's estate. In April 1989, Ms. James' grandson and his girlfriend were living in Mr. Rickard's mobile home. On April 18, 1989, National States cancelled all of its policies of insurance that Respondent had sold to Mr. Rickard. The letter of cancellation provided, in pertinent part, as follows: During the course of routine investigation into your claims, it has come to our attention that the health history portions of the applications for your coverage are inaccurate and incomplete. Specifically, health history was not shown on the application. Had we been aware of your medical conditions we would not have issued this coverage. Consequently, we have no alternative but to rescind your coverage as of its effective date and to make full premium refund. Accordingly, we are enclosing our check in the amount of $4,005.80. Between April 18, 1989, and April 24, 1989, Respondent was contacted by Ms. James and advised of the cancellation of Mr. Rickard's policies of insurance by National States. Ms. James, at the request of Mr. Rickard, asked Respondent for her assistance and set up a meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard. On April 24, 1989, Respondent met with Mr. Rickard and prepared an application for a Medicare supplement policy of insurance to be issued by American Integrity. The application for the American Integrity policy contained the following caveat: "IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IS 'YES', THE APPLICANT IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR COVERAGE". All of the questions that followed pertained to the medical history of the applicant and were answered in the negative. Respondent answered the questions on the application form based on information given to her by Mr. Rickard. The following were among those questions: Are you presently confined to a hospital or nursing home, or have you been hospitalized 4 times or more in the past 2 years? Are you presently bedridden or wheelchair confined? The location of this meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard is in dispute. Petitioner contends that the meeting occurred at the nursing home. This contention is based on evidence that Mr. Rickard was a continuous resident of the nursing home from the date of his admission except for the brief hospitalization. If Petitioner's contention is accepted, it follows that Respondent knew that Mr. Rickard was in the nursing home when she filled out the application. Respondent contends that the meeting occurred at Mr. Rickard's residence at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce and that she had no knowledge that Mr. Rickard was a nursing home patient when she filled out the application. Her contention is supported by evidence that friends took Mr. Rickard from the nursing home on occasion and by Respondent's testimony. The dispute is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard on April 24, 1989, occurred at the nursing home. Respondent's version of the meeting is accepted, and it is concluded that the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard occurred at the mobile home Mr. Rickard owned at 164 Port St. Lucie Boulevard, Fort Pierce. It is further concluded that the evidence failed to establish that Respondent had actual knowledge that Mr. Rickard was residing in the nursing home when she filled out the American Integrity application. Ms. James set up the meeting between Respondent and Mr. Rickard, but neither she nor anyone other than Mr. Rickard was present when Respondent arrived at Mr. Rickard's mobile home on April 24, 1989. Respondent reviewed the American Integrity policy with Mr. Rickard and filled out the application that was submitted. Both Respondent and Mr. Rickard signed the application and he paid for the premium in the amount of $1,045.00 with a check that had been given to him by Ms. James. On April 24, 1989, Mr. Rickard was unable to ambulate and was confined to a wheelchair. He was unable to come to the door when Respondent knocked and he remained in a wheelchair during the meeting. It should have been apparent to Respondent when she completed the application for the American Integrity policy that Mr. Rickard was confined to a wheelchair. She knew or should have known that the application contained a false representation as to Mr. Rickard's physical condition and that he was not eligible to purchase this policy. The following appears on the application form above the Respondent's signature: I hereby certify that I have (1) accurately recorded the information supplied by the applicant; and (2) given an Outline of Coverage for the policy applied for and a Medicare Supplement Buyer's Guide to the applicant. Respondent testified that she read the questions on the application to Mr. Rickard, that he answered the questions, and that she wrote his answer on the application. She further testified that he reviewed the completed application with the use of his magnifying glass. The American Integrity policy would not have been issued had Respondent answered question 10 of the application in the affirmative. The American Integrity policy was subsequently issued. It was rescinded on November 11, 1989, after Ms. James notified American Integrity that Mr. Rickard resided in a nursing home, and Mr. Rickard received a full refund of the premium he had paid. Mr. Rickard and Ms. James filed no complaint with the Petitioner regarding Respondent. Neither blamed Respondent for the cancellation of the National States policies and both appreciated her efforts to be of assistance. The investigation into Respondent's actions was triggered by a complaint that Mr. Rickard, with the assistance of Ms. James, filed against National States. There was no evidence that Respondent's licensure had been subject to discipline prior to this proceeding. Respondent has a favorable reputation for service to her community and to her clients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, and which suspends her licensure and her eligibility for licensure for a period of three months. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-8 and 10-12 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The remaining proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence and as being contrary to the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5-6, 9, and 18 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4, 7, 14, 26-27, 29, 33-34, 36- 37, 39, 41-42, 45-52, 58-61 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8, 10, 13, 15, and 17 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being either subordinate to the findings made or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 11-12, 16, 19-22, 24-25, 28. 35, and 53 are rejected as being either unnecessary to the conclusions reached or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 23 are rejected as being argument and as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 43 and 44 are rejected as being argument and as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 30 and 40 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 31 and 32 are rejected as incomplete recitations of testimony. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 57 are rejected as being argument based on unsubstantiated facts. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Wanda Sue Dirks 25 North Causeway Drive Ft. Pierce, Florida 34946 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resigned from State Government on July 23, 1987. At the time of his resignation, Petitioner was covered under the Florida State Group Health Insurance Plan. His wife, who is a diabetic, was also covered under Petitioner's insurance. Upon termination Petitioner was eligible for continuation of coverage benefits under the federal COBRA Act. However, prior to receiving any notice of his COBRA rights, Petitioner elected to continue his State Employees' Insurance for two months from July 1, 1987 and then begin coverage under his new employer's insurance plan. 2/ Petitioner made advance payment on the 2 months additional coverage. The payments carried his State Employees' health insurance through September 1, 1987 when it was terminated. DOA notified Petitioner on August 27, 1987, of his right to elect continuation of coverage under the COBRA Act. This notice complied with the notice requirements under the COBRA Act. COBRA provides continued health insurance coverage for up to (18) months, after a covered employee leaves employment. However, coverage does not continue beyond the time the employee is covered under another group health plan. COBRA simply fills the gap between two different employers group health insurance plans so that an employee's group health insurance does not lapse while the employee changes jobs. Petitioner's new employer's health coverage began around September 1, 1987. After Petitioner had begun coverage under his new insurance plan, he discovered that his wife's preexisting diabetic condition would not be covered. However, no evidence was presented that Petitioner, within 60 days of September 1, 1987 requested the Division of State Employee's Insurance to continue his insurance coverage pursuant to COBRA. Moreover, Petitioner's COBRA rights terminated when he began his coverage under his new employer's health plan.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for continuation of coverage under COBRA. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1989.
The Issue Whether respondent is obligated to remit to petitioner, administrator of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Program, an alleged underpayment of insurance premiums in the amount of $435.81, covering the period from October, 978,through June, 1983.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order requiring respondent to remit $435.81, for total insurance premium underpayments, within 90 days, failing which respondent's insurance coverage under the State Employees Insurance Program should be cancelled and the underpayment obtained through certified payroll deductions from any salary due the respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Brown, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wyatt Wyatt Department of English University of Central Florida Post Office Box 25000 Orlando, Florida 32816 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether petitioner owes respondent premiums on account of insurance coverage (Family I) under the State Employees Group Health Insurance Program from March 1, 1979, to August 31, 1981? If so, whether petitioner is obligated to pay the underpayment as a condition of continued insurance coverage?
Findings Of Fact Until December 6, 1978, petitioner, who has worked as a forest ranger for Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services since 1967 or 1968, was married to Betty R. Brogdon, the mother of his two children. Betty Brogdon was employed by Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services at the time of the dissolution of her marriage to petitioner. A provision of the dissolution decree required petitioner to maintain health insurance in effect for the children. During the marriage, in April of 1978, petitioner applied for, and received Family I insurance in the Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, continuing the coverage under a predecessor policy. Petitioner paid a premium for the Family I coverage reduced by certain employer contributions, after formally bringing to his supervisor's attention the fact that Betty R. Brogdon was also a state employee, and signing forms to that effect. Before August 1, 1979, the employer contributed 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage for each employee. From August 1, 1979, until August 1, 1980, the employer contributed, in addition, 25 percent of the family premium. On and after August 1, 1980, the employer contribution for each employee increased to 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage plus 50 percent of the family premium. Since this amount exceeds the total premium for Family I, families with this coverage in which both spouses work for state government have paid no insurance premium for Family I coverage since April 1, 1980. After the marriage ended, Betty Brogdon applied, on February 6, 1979, for Individual I health insurance, by submitting a form through the personnel office at the Sunland Center in Marianna, where she was employed. Since she had been a beneficiary under the family policy that her husband kept in force while they were married, her application reflected no change in that policy. When it reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration, it was indistinguishable from any other new application by an employee who had not signed up when beginning work. After medical approval on May 7, 1979, she received Individual I coverage for herself only. Petitioner works with four other forest rangers and a supervisor at a site seven miles west of Marianna. There is no "personnel technician" stationed there and none visits. He told his supervisor of the divorce and, on March 2, 1979, filled out a "personnel action request" form furnished by a district office of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in Bonifay, Florida, indicating "[m]arital and dependent change," which reached the Director of the Division of Forestry on March 9, 1979. Like other forms of its kind, this form never reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration. The Bureau of Insurance did receive, however, on August 13, 1981, a "change of information" form reporting the Brogdons' dissolution of marriage on December 6, 1978. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Effective the following month, on advice of the Bureau of Insurance, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services subtracted from petitioner's paychecks the same insurance premium other employees not married to state employees paid for Family I coverage. The Bureau of Insurance lacks authority to make such deductions itself. Between March of 1980 and December 31, 1982, the only claims submitted under the policy were for petitioner himself. But for the $100.00 deductible, these claims were paid. The difference between what a state employee married to another state employee paid for Family I insurance coverage between July 1, 1979, and August 31, 1981, and what a state employee not married to another state employee paid for the same coverage amounts to $864.42.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent direct petitioner to pay the sum of eight hundred sixty-four dollars and forty two cents ($864.42) within ninety (90) days of entry of final order. If petitioner fails to make timely payment, that respondent cancel his Family I State Employees Group Health Insurance Program policy. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Although Petitioner did not identify a specific issue on which he sought resolution, and failed to request any specific remedy, counsel for the Respondent offered the following interpretation of the issue: whether the Petitioner is entitled to retroactive enrollment in the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance Plan for any time during the period October 16, 1997 through February 13, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security from October 16, 1997 through February 13, 1998; and by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation from February 20, 1998 through March 26, 1998. Respondent's Exhibits 1-6. During all relevant times, the Division of State Group Insurance was responsible for contract management and day-to-day management of the state employee health insurance program, which contains various insurance options. Section 110.123(3)(d), Florida Statutes. Merrill Moody, Assistant Director of the Division of State Group Insurance (hereafter the "Division") testified. According to his agency's interpretation of the relevant rules and statutes, neither the Division nor an employing agency is responsible for making certain that employees timely enroll in an insurance plan in which they wish to subscribe. Approximately 30,000 employees per year opt not to enroll in a state insurance plan. The state plans, like public insurance companies, require that the enrollee file the necessary enrollment forms. Mr. Moody testified that the Division does not waive the 60-day filing deadline for insurance enrollment of new employees imposed by Rule 60P-2.002, Florida Administrative Code, because to do so would subject the Division to federal penalties, and would risk the pre-tax status of the plan. The Petitioner did not allege that he was misinformed about what forms were required to be filed in order to enroll in an insurance program. He also did not dispute the validity of the 60-day enrollment period for new employees. Patsy Kinsey, a Personnel Services Specialist of the Department of Labor and Employment Security (hereafter "DLES") testified. Although employees were not required to file a statement declining insurance coverage when they did not wish this benefit, she specifically remembered having discussed insurance enrollment requirements with the Petitioner. He first complained about his lack of insurance in May of 1998, more than 6 months after he began employment with DLES and more than 3 months after leaving that Department to begin working for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereafter "DBPR"). Petitioner admitted to her that he had not enrolled in an insurance plan with the State at any time during his employment with DLES. Ms. Kinsey remembered that the Petitioner informed her that he elected not to enroll because he had Medicaid coverage, and did not consider the additional coverage necessary. Ms. Kinsey personally authored the June 19, 1998, letter introduced as Respondent's Exhibit 3, for Ms. Louise Lambert's signature. While preparing the letter, Ms. Kinsey verified with another DLES employee, Ms. Angela Gray, that the Petitioner had actually declined insurance coverage during his 60-day enrollment period. Mr. Parmar testified that he did not have a copy of any form on which he claimed to have requested insurance coverage within the first 60 days of his eligible employment with DLES. Petitioner testified that he had filed such a form. Petitioner also testified that he kept copies of all important documents. Petitioner was permitted to file evidence of coverage after the hearing as a late-filed exhibit, but did not do so. The Petitioner denied having told Ms. Kinsey or anyone at DLES that he did not wish to enroll in an insurance plan. Mr. Moody testified that Petitioner received notice on each paycheck that insurance costs were not being deducted. Insurance cards are mailed out to all new enrollees. The Petitioner's statements conflict with Ms. Kinsey's statement that the Petitioner admitted to her that he had not filed the enrollment form during his enrollment period, and with the testimony of Ms. Kinsey and Mr. Moody, who each stated that employing agencies enter enrollment information into the system as a matter of course. The Petitioner did not complain about his lack of insurance until approximately six months after he began his full- time with DLES, at which time he could not be covered until the next open enrollment period. The Department of Management Services (DMS) is responsible for developing uniform rules to implement Section 110.217, Florida Statutes, regarding such issues as appointments and reassignments. According to Rule 60K-4.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, a change in employing agencies within the Career Service System is not considered a new appointment when not more than 30 days elapse between the separation form the first agency and the beginning of work with the new agency. It is considered a reassignment appointment. Rule 60P-2.010(1), Florida Administrative Code, states that "(a) change from one state agency does not constitute new employment; therefore, enrollment or coverage eligibility does not change." Loriane Irvin, Senior Personnel Manger at DMS, testified regarding her agency's interpretation of its rules. She testified that according to Rules 60K-4.0021 and 60K- 4.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner's leaving employment with DLES and beginning employment with DBPR less than 30 days later is not considered a new appointment. Therefore, Petitioner was not eligible to enroll after he changed jobs. Merrill Moody testified regarding the interpretation of Rule 60P-2.002(a), Florida Administrative Code. Employees are permitted to make enrollment changes "during the first sixty (60) calendar days of state employment or a new term of office." Rule 60P-2.002(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitles employees to make enrollment changes within 31 days after experiencing a "qualifying status change of losing other group health coverage." 1/ Ms. Irvin confirmed Mr. Moody's statement regarding the Agency's interpretation of Rule 60P-2.002, Florida Administrative Code, concerning the Petitioner's change of agencies in February of 1998. According to the Agency's interpretation, a reassignment neither begins an employee's term of state employment, nor does it begin a "new term of office." If the Petitioner sought insurance coverage for medical costs he had incurred, he had to submit invoices documenting such costs within 60 days of the hearing pursuant to the post-hearing order. The Administrative Law Judge informed Petitioner at the hearing that without evidence of the medical treatments rendered and the corresponding costs incurred, a determination could not be made as to the damage suffered by the Petitioner. 2/ If retroactive coverage were ordered, as a result of this proceeding, the Petitioner would have to submit all of the required premiums for the remainder of the year in which he had enrolled in insurance coverage as a pre-requisite for reimbursement. This amount would depend on whether individual or family coverage were selected, and the premiums could exceed the amount of reimbursement to which an insured might be entitled for medical costs. Mr. Moody explained that not all medical procedures are covered under any insurance plan offered by the State, and that 100 percent of covered costs are paid according to the plans.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is proposed that a final order be entered dismissing the petition and confirming the denial of insurance coverage sought by Petitioner dating back to October 16, 1997, and extending through February 13, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1999.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's claim for medical expenses from August 6, 1982 through February 27, 1983 should be approved, pursuant to the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan. Petitioner appeared at the hearing accompanied by legal counsel. The Hearing Officer thereupon explained his rights and procedures to be followed in the administrative hearing. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood his rights and elected to represent himself. Petitioner testified in his own behalf at the hearing and the parties stipulated to the introduction of Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2. A late filed exhibit, Respondent's Exhibit 3, was also admitted in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of one witness, William R. Seaton, Benefit Analyst for the Respondent's Bureau of Insurance.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Thomas J. Appleyard, III, is a former state employee who retired with disability in 1976 as a result of cardiac disease. At the time Petitioner retired, he maintained coverage in the state Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan under which the Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. serves as the administrator of the plan for the state. Petitioner also receives disability benefits under the Medicare program for medical expenses. (Testimony of Petitioner) The State Group Health Self Insurance Plan provides in Section X, COORDINATION OF BENEFITS, that if an insured has coverage under Medicare, the benefits payable under the state plan will be coordinated with similar benefits paid under the other coverage to the extent that the combination of benefits will not exceed 100 percent of the costs of services and supplies to the insured. Paragraph D of Section X provides that the state plan will be the secondary coverage in such situations and will pay benefits only to the extent that an insured's existing insurance coverage does not entitle him to receive benefits equal to 100 percent of the allowable covered expenses. This provision applies when the claim is on any insured person covered by Medicare. (Testimony of Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 3) Petitioner was hospitalized at the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center on three occasions in 1982-33. His Medicare coverage paid all but $261.75 of the hospital expenses. In February 1983, Petitioner also incurred medical expenses to his cardiologist, Dr. J. Galt Allee, in the amount of $248.33. Petitioner was originally denied his remaining hospital expenses by the administrator of the state plan under the erroneous belief that he was receiving regular Medicare benefits for persons over the age of 65. In addition, Dr. Allee's bill was only partially paid by Medicare, subject to the receipt of additional information from the physician. Payment under the state plan was limited to an amount sufficient to reimburse petitioner 100 percent of the amount originally allowed by Medicare. (Testimony of Seaton, petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1, 3) Respondent does not receive information on claims filed under the state plan until contacted by an employee. In February 1984, Petitioner requested assistance from William R. Seaton, Benefit Analyst, of Respondent's Bureau of Insurance, regarding his difficulties in receiving proper claims payments. Seaton investigated the matter with the Insurance administrator for the state, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, and discovered that the latter had not coordinated the hospital expense balance with Medicare. They thereafter did so and as of the date of hearing, there was no longer a balance due to Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center. Seaton also gave written instructions to Blue Cross to review all of Petitioner's claims and make sure that they were paid properly, and to install controls on his and his wife's records. (Testimony of Petitioner, Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 1-2) The full claim of Dr. Allee had not been paid by Medicare since it had been awaiting requested additional in formation from the physician. Such information was provided after a personal visit had been made to Dr. Allee by Seaton and Medicare then recognized additional eligible expenses. However, a balance of $36.00 is still owed to the physician due to the fact that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had not received the necessary payment information from Medicare as of the day before the hearing. (Testimony of Seaton, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Section XVII of the state's Group Health Self Insurance Plan benefit document provides that an employee who wishes to contest decisions of the state administrator considering the employee's coverage under the plan may submit a petition for a hearing for consideration by the Secretary of Administration. (Respondent's Exhibit 3)
The Issue The ultimate issue in this case is whether Respondent's proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-149.022(3), which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Before that issue may be reached, however, it is necessary to determine whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the proposed rule.
Findings Of Fact The Financial Services Commission ("Commission") is a four-member collegial body consisting of the governor and cabinet. The Office of Insurance Regulation ("Office") is a structural unit of the Commission. Giving rise to this case, the Office initiated rulemaking and made recommendations to the Commission concerning an amendment to rule 69O-149.022, which would incorporate by reference Form OIR-B2-2112, titled "Consumer Notice [Regarding] The Impact of Federal Health Care Reform on Health Plan Costs" ("Form 2112"). Whenever the Commission or the Office engages in rulemaking, the members of the Commission serve as the agency head. The Commission thus has the ultimate responsibility for approving and adopting the proposed rule. CHAIN is a nonprofit corporation which operates solely within the state of Florida. CHAIN is subject to the oversight of a voluntary board of directors. As a health-care advocacy organization, CHAIN is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and derives its income primarily from grants and contributions. CHAIN provides services to low- and moderate-income individuals who lack health insurance coverage or perceive their coverage to be unaffordable or inadequate. CHAIN provides health insurance purchased through Florida's small-group health insurance market to each of its five full-time employees. Greg Mellowe is a full-time employee of CHAIN who receives health insurance coverage through such employment. During the 2013 regular session, the Florida Legislature passed a bill, which the governor approved, enacting section 627.410(9), Florida Statutes. This section requires that insurers provide to policyholders of individual and small-group nongrandfathered plans a notice that describes the estimated impact of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA")——popularly and more commonly known as Obamacare——on monthly premiums.1/ An insurer that issues a nongrandfathered plan must give this notice one time——when the policy is issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2014——on a form established by rule of the Commission. (A "nongrandfathered" plan is a health insurance plan that must comply with all of Obamacare's requirements. For ease of reference, such plans will be referred to as "compliant plans.") Having been directed to act, the Office commenced rulemaking to establish the form of the notice to be sent to persons insured under compliant, individual and small-group plans, eventually proposing to adopt Form 2112. The Commission approved this form at a hearing on August 6, 2013. Form 2112 fills a single, one-sided page2/ and looks like this: CHAIN will receive the Obamacare notice when it renews its small-group health insurance plan, or purchases a new plan, on or after January 1, 2014.
The Issue Whether the surgery to correct complications from non- covered cosmetic surgery are covered under the State of Florida self-insured health plan?
Findings Of Fact Sharon Lett, Petitioner, was initially hired by the State of Florida on October 1, 1986, and began participating in the State's self-insured health plan known as the State Employees' Preferred Provider Organization Plan, or State PPO Plan. Pre-existing conditions were covered after 365 days. In June 1985, Lett had bilateral silicone breast implants placed under the pectoral muscles. This occurred before she was covered under any of the state-sponsored health insurance plans. The implant surgery was performed for purely cosmetic reasons. Lett continued to work for the State until her retirement and was covered under the State's health insurance plan. Upon her retirement she continued her coverage under the State PPO Plan. In 1997, while covered by the plan, Lett sought medical intervention for problems related to the implants. She had concerns about the implants leaking and there were indications in the form of "lumps" and x-ray images which indicated the implants were leaking. There are some clinical studies which indicate that leaking implants are a potential health problem. The "lumps" and leakage decrease the ability to properly diagnose breast cancer. For patients who have a higher risk for breast cancer, these difficulties in diagnosis place the implanted patients at greater risk. Lett is diagnosed as being at greater risk for breast cancer. Both of her implants have leaked. Lett sought removal of the implants beginning in 1997. The State's PPO Plan has denied approval of the surgical procedure to remove the implants because the implant surgery was originally for cosmetic purposes. The latest denial was by letter dated September 27, 2002. The Division of State Group Insurance (DSGI) is responsible for the management of the State's group insurance programs, to include the PPO Plan. The State's PPO Plan is administered under contract by Florida Blue Cross and Blue Shield. In support of her latest request for payment for the surgery to remove the implants, Lett provided DSGI the following: Medical Report of Marguerite Barnett, M.D., (Respondent's Exhibit 4), dated May 23, 2002. Clinical Record Progress Notes by Frank B. Vasey, M.D., for visit on April 15, 2002. Lett also provided a diagnostic report by Mary E. Swain, M.D., dated June 1, 2000. The DSGI agrees that the reports of Drs. Barnett and Vasey accurately describe Petitioner's medical condition and accurately identify the etiology of the condition that necessitates the surgery Petitioner seeks. At the time Lett initially enrolled in the State PPO Plan, the benefits document in effect was State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Benefit Document, as Amended on October 1, 1986. Section VII, Exclusions, of the 1986 Benefits Document provides: Services for cosmetic surgery or treatment unless the result of a covered accident as provided in Subsection VIII.A. However, cosmetic surgery is a covered service if it is: in connection with the correction of a congenital anomaly for an eligible dependent born while family coverage is in force and performed while the Plan is in force, a medically necessary procedure in the correction of an abnormal bodily function, or for reconstruction to an area of the body which has been altered by the treatment of a disease, provided such alteration occurred while the insured was covered under the Plan. Section VIII, Limitations, of the 1986 Benefits Document provides: The following limitations shall apply under the Plan: A. Cosmetic surgery or treatment necessary for the repair or alleviation of damage to an insured is covered by the Plan if such surgery or treatment is the result of an accident sustained while the insured is covered under the Plan and actually performed while the Plan is in force, except as provided under Section XIII and XIV of this Benefit Document. Section XIII deals with termination of an insured's coverage and is not applicable here. Section XIV deals with termination of the program and is not applicable here. At the time Lett requested approval for the surgery to remove the implants, the benefits document in effect was State Employees' PPO Plan Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document effective January 1, 2000 (hereafter, 2000 Benefits Document). The 2000 Benefits Document states regarding services not covered by the plan that cosmetic surgery is not covered unless it is: A result of a covered accident if the accident happens and the surgery or treatment is performed while the person is covered by this health insurance plan, For correction of a congenital anomaly for an eligible dependent born while the employee has family coverage and performed while the dependent is covered by this health insurance plan, A medically necessary procedure to correct an abnormal bodily function, For reconstruction to an area of the body that has been altered by the treatment of a disease, provided the alteration occurred while the person was covered by this health insurance plan, For breast reconstructive surgery and the prosthetic devices related to a mastectomy. "Mastectomy" means the removal of all or part of the breast for medically necessary reasons as determined by a licensed physician, and "breast reconstructive surgery" means surgery to reestablish symmetry between the two breast, . . . Complications resulting from non-covered services, except complications of pregnancy defined on pages 49-50, are excluded from coverage generally. See 2000 Benefit Document, page 31, paragraph 53. It is noted that the 1986 Benefit Document does not have a provision similar to that cited in paragraph 21, above. Under the 1986 Benefit Document, cosmetic surgery would not have been covered, but surgery necessary to address complications from non-covered services was not limited or excluded. The problems suffered by Lett did not arise until after the time limit excluding pre-existing conditions had expired or run.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Lett 240 Starmount Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William Simon, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a health insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Michael Halloran, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a health insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Life Insurance Company (NSLIC) and Transport Life Insurance Company (TLIC). He was also under contract with Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida until that firm terminated his agency appointment on May 5, 1989. This proceeding involves the sale by respondent of various health insurance policies to four customers in January and February 1989. In 1987, Raymond H. Koester, a Largo resident, purchased from respondent a supplemental Medicare policy for both him and his wife. Their first policy was issued by American Integrity. A year later, respondent persuaded the Koesters to replace that policy with one issued by Garden State Insurance Company on the ground the latter policy represented an "improvement" over their existing policy. On January 10, 1989 respondent met with the Koesters for the purpose of selling them new health insurance coverage. During their meeting, respondent advised the Koesters that a new NSLIC policy would provide unlimited custodial and home health care, a type of coverage desired by the Koesters. Relying upon respondent's representation, the Koesters agreed to purchase two new policies. They filled out an application and paid Halloran $2,628 which was the premium for the first year. When the application was completed, respondent answered "no" to the question of whether the new policies were intended to replace existing coverage. This was a false representation. In June 1989 the Koesters learned that they had a problem with their new policies. This advice was conveyed to them by petitioner's investigator who advised them that the policies sold by Halloran loran did not provide any custodial or home health care benefits. Had the Koesters known this, they would not have purchased the insurance. On January 18, 1989 respondent visited Grace Miller, an elderly resident of Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. At that time Miller had an existing policy in force since 1983 which provided supplemental Medicare coverage. Respondent advised Miller that her existing coverage was inadequate and that more coverage was needed. More specifically, Halloran represented that a new NSLIC policy would supplement her basic Medicare coverage and increase her overall health insurance coverage. Based on that representation, Miller agreed to purchase a replacement policy issued by NSLIC. As it turned out, the policy sold to Miller was of little or no value to a Medicare recipient, such as Miller, and simply filled in the gaps on a major medical policy. Had Miller known this to begin with, she would not have purchased the policy. Respondent also persuaded Miller to purchase a long-term care policy from TLIC. She allowed respondent to fill out the application using information from her old policy. Without telling Miller, respondent misrepresented on the application her date of birth as December 2, 1921 when in fact she was born on December 2, 1911, or ten years earlier. By doing this, Halloran was able to reduce Miller's premium from $1,159.92 to $441.72. Had Miller known that she was responsible for paying a much higher premium, she would not have purchased the policy. On February 25, 1989 respondent accepted another check from Miller in the amount of $773.00 for an unknown reason. At about the same time, respondent submitted to NSLIC an application for a medical-surgical expense policy dated the same date purportedly executed by Miller In fact, Miller had not executed the policy and her signature was forged. NSLIC declined to issue a new policy to Miller since she already had a policy of that type in effect. On January 20, 1989 respondent visited Gertrude Simms, an elderly resident of Fort Myers. Simms desired to purchase a hospital expense insurance policy with a provision for dental insurance coverage. Simms desired such coverage because she had a medical condition that required her to have her teeth cleaned frequently to avoid an infection. Respondent was aware of this condition. Nonetheless, Halloran prepared an application with NSLIC for a limited medical-surgical expense insurance policy which did not provide any dental coverage. Respondent accepted a $1,100 check from Simms which he represented to her was the first year's premium. In fact, the first year's premium was only $506. Although respondent was supposed to return to Simms' home to explain the policy provisions, he never returned. At about this same time, TLIC received an application on behalf of Simms for a long-term care insurance policy bearing the signature of respondent as agent. However, Simms had no knowledge of the application and did not wish to purchase such a policy. The information contained in the TLIC application misrepresented Simms' age so that the premium was lower than it should have been. Although TLIC issued a policy and sent it to respondent, Halloran never delivered it to Simms. On February 1, 1989 respondent visited Velma Sonderman, who resided in Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. She had become acquainted with respondent through Grace Miller, who is referred to in finding of fact 4. Sonderman was then covered by a supplemental medicare insurance policy issued by United American Medicare. According to Sonderman, respondent gave a "snow job" and represented he could sell her better coverage through NSLIC. Sonderman agreed to purchase a new policy for supplemental medicare coverage to replace her existing policy and signed an application filled in by respondent. However, the application submitted by respondent was for a NSLIC limited benefit health insurance policy rather than the medicare supplement insurance policy Sonderman believed she was purchasing. Respondent also convinced Sonderman to purchase a long-term nursing home care policy issued by TLIC. When filling out the application on her behalf, but without telling Sonderman, respondent misrepresented Sonderman's birth date as July 11, 1915 instead of the correct date of July 11, 1911. By doing this, Sonderman's premium was reduced from $999.36 to $599.04 per year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's license as a health insurance agent be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 4 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4 day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-3. Substantially used in finding of fact 1. 4-17. Substantially used in findings of fact 4, 5 and 6. 18-29. Substantially used in findings of fact 9 and 10. 30-33. Substantially used in findings of fact 2 and 3. 34-45. Substantially used in findings of fact 7 and 8. 46. Substantially adopted in finding of fact l. Copies furnished to: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James A. Bossart, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Mr. Michael Halloran 2519 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, FL 34621 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire Department of Insurance Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
