The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation (hereinafter "Petitioner") properly issued Notices of Violation to Respondent as alleged in Notice Numbers 09 BU720, 09 BU721, 09 BU723, 09 BU724, 09 BU726, and 09 BQ032 for outdoor advertising billboard structures located adjacent to US 1 and I-95 in Brevard County, Florida. Specifically at issue is whether Respondent's outdoor advertising signs: (1) were removed from the locations for which they were permitted and re-erected at the same locations; (2) are nonconforming and cannot be relocated; were destroyed by an act of God; and (4) are destroyed nonconforming signs which cannot be re-erected (the signs have been re-erected), all in violation of Rule 14-10.007, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Whiteco Metrocom, now known as Chancellor Media Whiteco Outdoor Corporation ("Respondent"), owns and maintains four off- premise outdoor advertising signs located along Interstate 95 in Brevard County, Florida. Respondent also owns and maintains two off-premise outdoor advertising signs located along U.S. Highway 1 in Brevard County, Florida. These six off-premise outdoor advertising signs are generally hereinafter referred to as the "signs." Outdoor advertising is a lawfully recognized business which is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, by Petitioner. Respondent is licensed by Petitioner in the business of outdoor advertising. The Division of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DOF") is governed by Chapter 590, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for fire protection, fire control, and land management. DOF is charged with the protection of life, property, and natural resources. Petitioner classified the signs as "non-conforming" outdoor advertising signs at all times relevant to this proceeding. The six signs were maintained under the following Department of Transportation ("Department") sign permit tag numbers and were located as follows at all times relevant to this proceeding, each within 660 feet of the first named highway or interstate and each within Brevard County, Florida. Sign Permit # Location BQ 032-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.725 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road 46 BU 726-55 West of Interstate 95, 1.572 miles north of NEB700138/066 Aurantia Road BU 723-55 West of U.S. Highway 1, 0.324 miles north of County Road 5A BU 724-55 West of U.S. Highway 1, 0.339 miles north of County Road 5A BU 721-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.601 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road 46 BU 720-55 West of Interstate 95, 3.667 miles north of NEB700136/060 State Road Each of the signs was lawfully permitted by Petitioner at the described location during the relevant time period. Each of the six signs was used for leasing advertising space to third parties and each individually generated income to Respondent. The signs located along Interstate 95 were erected in 1971 and the signs located along U.S. Highway 1 were erected in 1964. The signs located along Interstate 95 were located less than 1,000 feet from another outdoor advertising sign on the same side of the highway maintained under a sign permit granted by the Department. Each of the signs located along U.S. Highway 1 was located less than 500 feet from another outdoor advertising sign on the same side of the highway maintained under a sign permit granted by the Department. None of the signs were located in an area designated for commercial or industrial use. Interstate 95 is an interstate highway and U.S. Highway 1 is a federal primary highway. The upright supports of each of the six signs were wood, and such signs are structures. In June and July of 1998, an extensive wildfire burned in the area of Brevard County located generally north of State Road 46. During the evening of June 26, 1998, a thunderstorm passed through the area of Brevard County west of the signs. The weather conditions at that time were extremely dry. An event constituting an act of God is any sudden manifestation of the forces of nature without human intervention. The best evidence for the cause of the fire is that lightning during the storm started two wildfires in remote areas west of the signs. The fires were identified by DOF as the Freshwater and Break 5 (or Break 10) fires. Each fire initially spread west. DOF began efforts to combat the Freshwater Fire and the Break 5 fire on June 27, 1998. However, the fires expanded as a result of weather conditions. Because of the hot, dry weather conditions and erratic winds, and despite the continuing efforts of DOF, the fires continued to expand and burned together on June 29, 1998. The combined fires were referred to as the Farmington Fire. On the evening of June 30, 1998, rapid winds from the west caused the Farmington Fire to expand and travel to the east and northeast. As the fire continued to rapidly expand on July 1, 1998, DOF determined that it was unsafe to locate firefighting equipment in the path of the fire. On or about July 1, 1998, the Farmington Fire burned through the area where the signs that Respondent maintained under sign numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, and BU 724-55 were located. On or about July 2, 1998, the Farmington Fire burned through the area where the sign that Respondent maintained under sign permit number BU 726-55 was located. On or about July 1, 1998, the Farmington Fire substantially burned all of the upright supports of each of the signs that Respondent maintained under sign permit numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, and BU 724-55. On or about July 2, 1998, the Farmington Fire substantially burned all of the upright supports of the sign that Respondent maintained under sign permit number BU 726-55. None of the six signs was struck by lightning prior to their destruction. The Farmington Fire spread through the areas where the six signs were located as a result of drought conditions and weather factors. Interstate 95 and U.S. Highway 1 were closed to the public before the signs were destroyed. Respondents attempted to access each of the six signs but could not reach the signs because of road closures by governmental authorities. A burnout is a way of fighting a fire wherein fire is deliberately set and used in a countering measure to burn the fuel in front of a wildfire. The purpose of a burnout is to establish control over a wildfire by eliminating fuel in the existing fire's path. If a burnout is unsuccessful, more strength is added to the wildfire because the wildfire has gained momentum. It is possible for a prescribed burn to become a wildfire. DOF set a fire to "burn out" an area of land involved in the Farmington Farm on the evening of June 28, 1998. This "burnout" fire was set by Ranger Weis in his capacity as an employee of DOF. The fire continued to travel after the burnouts were conducted. The burnout did not contribute to the spread of the Farmington Fire, but temporarily helped to impede the it. The Farmington Fire spread over 5,000 to 6,000 acres. Approximately 200 firefighters were involved in fighting the Farmington Fire. Bulldozers, fire engines, helicopters, retardant, and tankers were used in the firefighting efforts. Many homes, businesses, and other property in the area of the Farmington Fire were saved from fire damage. Some were not saved. The only fire in the area of the Farmington Fire that was set by someone other than Ranger Weis did not contribute to the spread of the Farmington Fire or burn the signs. The Farmington Fire was contained on July 2, 1998. If the same measures that had been used to protect other property from damage had been used on the billboards, the billboards could possibly have been saved from fire damage. The measures that were taken on homes, businesses, and other structures to protect them from fire damage were not used around the subject signs. The steps taken by DOF and firefighting crews to save homes and businesses included creating defensible space around the structures by clearing vegetation and spraying the structures with water. House Bill 1535, which contains amendments to Chapter 590, Florida Statutes, allows for nonconforming buildings, houses, businesses, or other appurtenances to property destroyed by the wildfires of June and July 1998 to be re-erected in kind. House Bill 1535 (Section 24 to revised Chapter 590, Florida Statutes) is applicable to Respondent's signs because each sign constitutes a business which, on its own, would require a state license under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and which individually generates advertising revenue. Nonconforming signs destroyed by vandalism or tortious acts may be re-erected in kind. The term "tortious acts" is not defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. After the signs were destroyed, Respondent re-erected each of the six signs with substantially the same type of materials as had previously composed the structure of each sign, and at the same location as the destroyed signs. The materials used to re-erect the signs were not part of the sign structures immediately before the signs were destroyed by the Farmington Fire. Respondent's signs were re- erected in kind. Respondent does not own the property where any of the six signs are located. Under the terms of each agreement with the property owners under which Respondent has the right to maintain the signs, upon expiration or termination of the agreement, Respondent may remove all of its sign materials from the property, and may, unless otherwise agreed, no longer maintain the signs. Excluding the signs, Respondent conducts no other business activities on the property upon which the signs are located. Petitioner's witness, Ronald Weis, a Senior Forest Ranger with the Division of Forestry, had personal knowledge of the wildfires that occurred in Brevard County during June and July 1998 and participated in the investigation, management, and fighting of the wildfires in Brevard County in the areas where the subject signs are located. Respondent's witness, Dennis R. Dewar, based upon his years of experience and education in various fire fighting and teaching capacities, is qualified as an expert to testify in the areas of fire fighting training, fire fighting operations, the spread of fires, and the cause and origin of fires. The opinion testimony of Mr. Dewar, concerning the cause of the damage to the signs and the cause, origin, and spread of the Farmington Fire, was not persuasive. DOF regulates prescribed burns. However, it cannot mandate prescribed burns on private property. A prescribed burn is the controlled application of fire to property. One of the primary purposes of prescribed burning is to reduce the fuel load and, therefore, reduce fire hazard. The failure to prescribe burn increases the possibility of a wildfire. It is foreseeable that if prescribed burns are not done in an area over time the possibility of the spread of wildfire is foreseeable. A wildfire is any fire over which DOF has no control. Typically, a fire started by lightning can be controlled and contained. When a lightning strike starts a fire, the spread of that fire is influenced by human intervention. Property usually can be protected from damage as a result of a fire started by lightning.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order that the outdoor advertising signs maintained by Whiteco Metrocom, now known as Chancellor Media Whiteco Outdoor Corporation, under outdoor advertising sign permit numbers BQ 032-55, BU 720-55, BU 721-55, BU 723-55, BU 724-55, and BU 726-55 are illegal and must be removed pursuant to law. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. 612 East Colonial Drive, Suite 350 Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary ATTN: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether the structure described in the Department of Transportation's Notice of Violation No. 10B DB 2000 007 (Notice) is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and therefore subject to removal pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an outdoor advertising company that was formerly known as AK Media. On December 10, 1998, Petitioner (while still known as AK Media) entered into an agreement with NWT Partners, Ltd., the owner of the New World Tower (Building), a "thirty story four (4) sided building" located at 100 North Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, to lease certain portions of the Building. The lease agreement contained the following provisions, among others: Effective Date. This Lease shall become effective on the later of (x) the date that Tenant provides written notice to Landlord that Tenant has obtained all permits, license and governmental approvals necessary or required to enable Tenant to construct, maintain and operate the Wall Faces and Wall Structures, as hereinafter defined or (y) January 1, 1999 (the "Effective Date"). Tenant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Lease to obtain all such permits, licenses and approvals or the Landlord may cancel this Lease. Purpose. The purpose of this lease is for Tenant to construct, maintain and operate painted, printed, illuminated and/or electrical signs on the north and south wall faces of the Building (the "Wall Faces"), and all other uses not inconsistent therewith, including all necessary supporting structures, devices, illumination facilities and connections, service ladders and equipment, and other appurtenances (the "Wall Fixtures"). All construction to the Building, and advertising thereon, including construction drawing and artwork to be furnished by the Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's written approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant's Right to Enter and Use. For the duration of this Lease, Tenant shall have the non-exclusive right to enter onto the Property and into the Building and use the Wall Faces for the purposes described in this Lease and any other purposes allowed or required by this Lease and Tenant has the exclusive right to use the Wall Faces Property for advertising. In exercising Tenant's rights hereunder, Tenant may hang or attach the Wall Fixtures to the roof and exterior structure of the Building. Tenant shall maintain the Wall Fixtures at Tenant's cost and expense. Tenant shall pay all utility charges in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Wall Fixtures. Tenant shall be responsible for damage to the Building which is caused by Tenant's operation and maintenance and removal of the Wall Fixtures and shall repair any such damage and restore the Building to the condition it was in immediately prior to such damages at the expiration or termination of this Lease. Term. The term of this Lease is for five (5) years from the "Rent Commencement Date," as hereinafter defined, to the last day of the month during which the fifth anniversary of the Rent Commencement Date occurs (the "Term"). Rent. Tenant shall pay Landlord rent annually, in accordance with the schedule (the "Rent Schedule") set forth on Exhibit "B" hereto, inclusive of all taxes . . . . Contracts. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, Tenant will use its best efforts to obtain contracts (the "Contracts") for advertising on the Building which exceed the amount of the Guaranteed Rent, as set forth on the Rent Schedule. . . . 9. Ownership/Removal. At all times, Tenant is and shall remain the owner of the Wall Fixtures and all signs and permits of any kind in relation thereto, and has the right to remove the Wall Fixtures at any time. . . . Exhibit "B" Rent Schedule Tenant shall pay annual rent to Landlord in an amount equal to the greater of (x) Fifty-five percent (55%) of the gross revenues attributable to advertisements displayed on the North Wall and the South Wall of the Building less any agency fee or commissions not greater than 16 2/3% to bona fide third parties (the "Net Revenues") associated with such advertisements (the "Percentage Rent") or (y) the minimum guaranteed annual rent (the "Guaranteed Rent") hereinafter set forth as follows: . . . The Landlord may terminate the Lease Agreement upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to Tenant if either Wall is vacant for more than one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days during the Term of the Lease and the Tenant has failed to obtain a contract, before the expiration of such notice period, for advertising on the North Wall or South Wall, as the case may be, pursuant to which the projected Percentage Rent under such contract would exceed the Guaranteed Rent. . . . Subsequently, Petitioner (while still operating under the name AK Media) entered into a "bulletin contract" with New York Outdoor, an advertising agency acting on behalf of Supreme International, in which Petitioner agreed, for a fee, to produce and maintain an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. Supreme International sells "Perry Ellis" and "Perry Ellis for Men" brand fashion apparel. In accordance with the "bulletin contract," Petitioner produced an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. The "outdoor advertising display" that Petitioner produced was a large mural more than 100 feet high and more than 60 feet wide. Such a product is referred to in the outdoor advertising industry as a "wallscape." The "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International consisted of artwork (a picture of a young woman) and print (the words "Perry Ellis for Men") on a "canvass-type" material that was mounted on a "picture frame" support structure attached to the north wall of the Building. It was located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a roadway, US Highway 1 (also known, in that location, as North Biscayne Boulevard), which is a part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The artwork and print could be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity travelling on US Highway 1 in the vicinity of the Building. At no time has Petitioner applied for, or obtained, a permit from the Department authorizing it to erect and maintain a "sign," as that term is used in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, on the north wall of the Building. Petitioner, however, did seek and obtain a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami. The permit was granted by the Miami City Commission, through the passage of Miami City Commission Resolution 99- 828, at its October 26, 1999, meeting. The printed agenda distributed in advance of the meeting stated the following concerning the permit for which Petitioner had applied: Consideration of approving Class II Special Permit No. 99-0142 for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard for a sign of a graphic or artistic value. This will allow a mural containing a commercial message. The resolution passed by the Miami City Commission at the meeting read as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION APPROVING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF CLASS II SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. 99-0142, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO WRITING PERMITTED WITH THE MURAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100 NORTH BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO SECTION 401 OF ORDINANCE NO. 11000, AS AMENDED, THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, AS AMENDED. WHEREAS, the Director for the Department of Planning is recommending approval of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and WHEREAS, Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami, Florida, requires City Commission approval of the Class II Special Permit as hereinafter set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful consideration of this matter, finds the application for a Class II Special Permit does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to approve the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to uphold the issuance of the Class II Special Permit, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this section. Section 2. The recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to issue Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, is hereby approved, and the City Commission finds that the issuance of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended. Section 3. The Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Inasmuch as the words "Perry Ellis for Men" were on the "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International, this "wallscape" was not in compliance with the condition imposed by the Miami City Commission, in issuing the Class II Special Permit to Petitioner, that there "be no writing permitted with the mural." On February 22, 2000, Bernard Davis, who, at the time, was the Department's District 6 Roadside Outdoor Advertising Administrator, issued a Notice of Violation (Notice No. 10B DB 2000 007) alleging that the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building (described above) was "in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, which requires a permit for all outdoor advertising signs not exempted by Section 479.16, Florida Statutes" and directing that the sign be removed within 30 days. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, the artwork and print on the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building were changed. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building contained a picture of a man and part of a woman and the words "Perry Ellis," underneath which was written "www.perryellis.com," Supreme International's website address. The Monday and Tuesday before the final hearing (February 5 and 6, 2001), Mr. Davis' successor, C. Jean Cann, went inside the Building to determine whether Supreme International had an "on-premises presence." On Monday, February 5, 2001, Ms. Cann entered the Building at approximately 1:15 p.m. After obtaining information from the Building's Electronic Directory that "Perry Ellis" occupied room 2128, she took the elevator to the 21st floor. After getting off the elevator, she walked down a hallway, where she saw a paper sign on a door which read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128." When she knocked on the door, no one answered. She waited 10 to 15 seconds and then knocked again, with the same result. She then, unsuccessfully, attempted to open the door. At around 1:45 p.m., she left the Building. Ms. Cann returned to the Building the following day at approximately 11:40 a.m., at which time she spoke to a security guard, who informed her that "Perry Ellis" "was in 2126." She then again went up to the 21st floor, and, on the same door that she had seen the "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128" sign the day before, she saw a paper sign that read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2126." Her knocks on the door, like those of the previous day, went unanswered, and she was again unable to open the door. At around 12:00 noon, she exited the Building. At no time during either of her two visits was Ms. Cann able to ascertain what, if any, business activity Supreme International was engaging in inside the Building.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the "wallscape" on the north side of the Building is a "sign" that was erected and is being maintained without the Department-issued permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and that it therefore is a public and private nuisance that must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's predecessor in interest leased property along the I-275 in October 1973 (Exhibit 3) and erected an outdoor advertising sign thereon. One witness testified that at the time this sign was erected in 1973 there was no other sign within 500 feet of this sign. The sign was erected within the city limits of Tampa, Florida and no permit other than a city building permit was required for this sign. In 1974 DOT required permits for all signs including those located within city limits, but no fee was collected for the permits issued for signs within the city limits. This regulation was not enforced by DOT until 1976- 1978, although in 1974 DOT had advised sign owners that permits were required for all signs and how they were to apply for permits for those signs located within the city limits (Exhibit 4). In 1975 National Advertising Company, in accordance with DOT instructions for obtaining permits for signs located in incorporated areas, submitted a renewal application in which it listed the sign located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign (Exhibit 5). When no permit was issued by DOT, National Advertising Company, by letter dated September 1, 1977 (Exhibit 6), called to DOT's attention that they had not been issued permits for signs within city limits for which they had applied. Application for a sign permit for their sign along the I-275 located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign was submitted by National Advertising Company on 31 March 1980 (Exhibit 7) and approved by DOT. This application showed the sign to have been erected prior to 1972. At this hearing Petitioner introduced as Exhibit 1 a copy of an Advertising Sign Permit application dated 9-1-76 executed by its predecessor in title, Martin Outdoor Advertising Company. The only indication on this application that it was received by Respondent is a received stamp dated April 15, 1980. During the period 1976-1979 considerable confusion existed in the outdoor sign industry respecting permits for signs and particularly for those signs located within city limits despite notification to sign companies (Exhibit 4). In an effort to clarify the situation, Respondent sent out circulars with the annual renewal notices advising all sign owners that signs along Interstate and Federal Aid Primary Highways within incorporated towns and cities required permits. In the circular dated December 18, 1978 (Exhibit 8), sign owners were told to submit applications for all unpermitted signs prior to February 17, 1979, and that failure to do so could result in the removal of the unpermitted signs. This was followed up by another circular dated October 31, 1979 (Exhibit 9) in which the deadline for applying for permits for those unpermitted signs was extended to January 1, 1980. Neither of these circulars which were enclosed with renewal notices were delivered by Petitioner's mail room to Petitioner's real estate section. Instead, they were forwarded to accounting with renewal notices. Upon an inspection of signs along the I-275 in March 1980, Petitioner's sign was observed without a permit and in violation of the spacing requirements. Notice of alleged violation dated 3 April 1980 was forwarded to Petitioner (Exhibit 10). Petitioner then applied for a permit for the sign which was disapproved and request for this hearing followed.
The Issue What final agency action should the Department of Transportation take on Petitioner's Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The proposed sign that is the subject of the instant controversy (Proposed Sign) is located off of I-95 in the City of Miami (City) at 328-334 Flagler Street on a parcel of land leased by Petitioner from CanPartners Realty (CanPartners Parcel). Section 10.4.5 of the City's Zoning Ordinance (Section 10.4.5), which has been in effect since 2002, prohibits "new signs of outdoor advertising," except in limited circumstances. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: For the purposes of this section, "Outdoor advertising signs" are signs used in the conduct of the outdoor advertising business; an outdoor advertising business, for the purpose of this section, is defined as the business of receiving or paying money for displaying signs where the sign copy does not pertain to the use of the property, a product sold, or the sale or lease of the property on which the sign is displayed and which does not identify the place of business as purveyor of the merchandise or services advertised on the sign. Except as otherwise provided in Articles 4 and 10 and/or the City Code, or, pursuant to this subsection, no new freestanding "Outdoor advertising signs," as defined above shall be allowed. * * * Notwithstanding any provision of this Zoning Ordinance to the contrary, permits for outdoor advertising signs may be issued pursuant to a Settlement Agreement authorized by Resolution passed by the City Commission, in conjunction with the settlement of related litigation, which expressly authorizes issuance of such permits for said outdoor advertising signs, and then only under the terms and conditions of settlement agreements that result in a net reduction in the party to the settlement's number of outdoor advertising signs located in the City of Miami. . . . The City has entered into "Settlement Agreements" of the type described in the last paragraph of Section 10.4.5 with three sign owners: Carter Pritchett Hodges, Inc., d/b/a Carter Outdoor Advertising, Inc.; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. d/b/a/ Clear Channel Outdoor; and Intervenor. The City does not have a such a "Settlement Agreement" with Petitioner. The City entered into its Settlement Agreement with Intervenor (City/CBS Settlement Agreement) on July 18, 2008. The City/CBS Settlement Agreement contains the following provisions, among others: 4. Amended Permits. In recognition of CBS's [Intervenor's] removal of the numerous Sign structures and Sign faces described in this Agreement and waiver of just compensation thereof, the City will amend a maximum of 15 existing sign permits (the "Amended Permits") to allow CBS to transfer the permit rights associated with such Signs to new locations with a maximum of two (2) Sign faces each on the terms and conditions set forth below: The City will amend up to a maximum of 15 permits for Signs based on CBS's removal of Signs on a two for one basis: for every two bulletin faces removed, one bulletin face may be erected with an Amended Permit. . . . * * * c. Upon application by CBS showing compliance with the provisions of this paragraph, the City will amend existing Sign permits to allow the transfer of permit rights associated with such Sign or Signs to locations within the same or a less restrictive Zoning District. For all Initial Amended Permits and Amended Permits, CBS will submit FDOT Form 575-010-04 to the City, which will be stamped on the date received. The City's signature on the FDOT Form 575-010-04 shall constitute approval of the location of the sign, and no further approvals from the City shall be required. All Sign permits will be processed "first in, first out," such that no other FDOT Forms may be signed or authorized for a subsequent application which would interfere with the location secured by a previously approved FDOT Form 575-010-04. If an FDOT permit is not issued within 280 days of the City's signature, the City's approval will become null and void for that particular application. * * * 19. Miscellaneous. * * * f. Assignments/Binding Nature. This Agreement will be binding upon and will inure to the benefit of the any successor or permitted assigns of the parties hereto. CBS shall have the right of assignment of rights and obligations under this Agreement. However, no attempted assignment by CBS will be valid unless: (1) the assignee shall execute an Agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to accept all of the rights and obligations of CBS under this Agreement; and (2) the assignment is approved in writing by the City Commission, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, delayed or conditioned. The parties acknowledge that the City Commission shall have the right to reject proposed assignment if the assignee does not fully adopt the terms of this Agreement. Any such assignment shall not relieve CBS of its obligations under this Agreement . . . . Any attempted assignment in violation of this Section shall be void. In anticipation of the finalization of the City/CBS Settlement Agreement, Intervenor (through Joseph Little) and Petitioner (through Harkley Thorton) had signed, on May 1, 2008, a Letter of Understanding (LOU) "set[ting] forth the understanding between [Intervenor] and [Petitioner] concerning new sign locations to be utilized in conjunction with the Settlement Agreement between [Intervenor] and the City of Miami." The first numbered paragraph of the LOU explained: CBS is negotiating and attempting to finalize a Settlement Agreement with the City whereby the City will issue 15 amended permits for the construction of new monopole signs with double faces, on expressways located within the City, in return for which CBS will remove 2 existing (or previously removed) sign faces for each new sign face constructed pursuant to an Amended Permit, subject to the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement between CBS and the City. Paragraph 2 of the LOU read, in pertinent part, as follows: With respect to the Settlement Agreement with the City, CBS and OM [Petitioner] agree as follows: * * * Under the Settlement Agreement, CBS seeks to obtain 7 Initial Amended Permits (as defined in the Settlement Agreement) one of which is tentatively agreed to be located in Jose Marti Park. Provided there is no term in the Settlement Agreement and the City does not otherwise require CBS to develop a site in the Jose Marti Park, CBS will abandon its proposed Jose Marti Park site and instead accept a site owned by Brickell Land Development Company, located at approximately 300 SW 8th Street (the "Brickell Site"), which is or will be subject to a lease with OM that allows construction and operation of a sign in accordance with the terms of paragraph (2c) below. . . . Provided OM obtains four (4) additional sites for placement of signs pursuant to Amended Permits under the Settlement Agreement, CBS agrees to accept said four sites provided CBS deems each site to be commercially viable. . . . For each of the sites accepted by CBS, CBS will enter into a sub-lease agreement with OM, whereby OM will be the sub-lessor and CBS will be the sub-lessee. . . . Provided that OM produces the Brickell Partners Site and four (4) additionally Commercially Viable Locations, CBS will assign the rights to one (1) of its amended permits under the Settlement Agreement with the City. CBS will assign to OM, and OM will assume, CBS's rights and obligations under the Settlement Agreement to said amended permit except for CBS'[s] obligations pursuant to paragraphs (7a-7d), (8a), and (12a). CBS will provide for the removal of two (2) of its existing sign structures to allow the City to issue the said Amended Permit to OM under the Settlement Agreement. * * * h. CBS'[s] acceptance of the four (4) Commercially Viable Locations referenced in 2c above is expressly conditioned upon the City's approving all locations on Exhibits B and B-1, as amended from time to time, as appropriate removals for Amended Permits in the Settlement Agreement. The penultimate paragraph of the LOU (Paragraph 6) provided as follows: This letter is a Letter of Understanding and binding between the parties and establishes the major business points and conditions of the Parties' agreement for this transaction. However, it is not all inclusive in that it does not contain all the deal points. The Parties agree to expand upon this Letter of Understanding in good faith to prepare a full agreement that can be executed within thirty (30) days of the date of this Letter of Understanding. Such agreement shall be consistent with the terms of this Letter of Understanding and contain such further terms and conditions as are mutually acceptable to the Parties. However, the failure of the Parties to complete a full agreement shall not invalidate the terms of this Letter of Understanding or excuse either Party from performing its obligations and responsibilities as set forth herein. The record is devoid of evidence that Intervenor and Petitioner ever executed a "full agreement," as contemplated by paragraph 6 of the LOU. Intervenor has not executed (pursuant to Paragraph 2e. of the LOU), nor has the City Commission approved (pursuant to Paragraph 19f. of the City/CBS Settlement Agreement), any assignment to Petitioner of Intervenor's rights under the City/CBS Settlement Agreement (although Petitioner believes that it is entitled to such an assignment and has so argued in circuit court litigation in which it is currently involved with Intervenor). On May 2, 2008, Intervenor (through Mr. Little) sent a letter to the City, which read as follows: CBS Outdoor, Inc. [Intervenor] and Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC [Petitioner] have signed a letter of understanding dated May 1, 2008 (The "Agreement"). Please accept this letter as confirmation that in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, CBS Outdoors, Inc. consents to Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC filing Applications for Outdoor Advertising Permits with the Florida Department of Transportation on our behalf. Thereafter, Petitioner submitted to the City's Zoning Administrator, Lourdes Slazyk, (on the version of FDOT Form 575- 010-04 then in effect) Petitioner's Application, requesting that Ms. Slazyk complete and sign the "Local Government Permission" section of the form. Obtaining such "Local Government Permission" is among the prerequisites for receiving an outdoor advertising sign permit from the Department. To erect an outdoor advertising sign in the City after the Department issues a permit, a City building permit (which is "something other than" the "Local Government Permission" referred to above) is required. Ms. Slazyk completed and signed the "Local Government Permission" section of the form, as requested, on May 22, 2008. It was not until almost a year later that Petitioner's Application was submitted to the Department. In completing the form, Ms. Slazyk checked the box indicating that the "outdoor advertising sign identified in this application: [was] in compliance with all duly adopted local ordinances and has been or will be issued the necessary permits." She did so based upon her understanding that the application (which named Petitioner as the applicant) was actually being filed by Petitioner on behalf and with the consent of Intervenor (in accordance with Mr. Little's May 2, 2008, letter) and that Petitioner was "traveling under" the City/CBS Settlement Agreement. Had Intervenor not notified the City that Petitioner was, with Intervenor's consent, "filing Applications for Outdoor Advertising Permits with the Florida Department of Transportation on [Intervenor's] behalf," Ms. Slazyk would not have checked the "compliance" box on the form, given the requirement of Section 10.4.5 of the City's Zoning Ordinance that "permits for outdoor advertising signs" may be issued only "pursuant to a Settlement Agreement" of the type described in Section 10.4.5 (to which Petitioner, unlike Intervenor, was not a party). On August 28, 2008, Intervenor (through Mr. Little) sent a letter to the City, which read as follows: CBS Outdoor, Inc. herewith withdraws its blanket letter of consent dated May 2, 2008 authorizing the City to approve FDOT application forms by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC on our behalf. A copy of that letter is attached. Henceforth, any FDOT outdoor advertising application form submitted to the City by Outlook must include a specific authorization from CBS Outdoor indicating our approval and authorizing the City to process the FDOT form pursuant to our Settlement Agreement with the City. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. By letter dated October 24, 2008, Intervenor (through its attorney, Glenn Smith, Esquire), advised the City, among other things, that it was "withdraw[ing]" certain applications for outdoor advertising sign permits from the Department, including Petitioner's Application, that either it or Petitioner, on Intervenor's behalf, had previously submitted to the City to obtain the "Local Government Permission" required for such a Department permit. On February 13, 2009, Petitioner (through its attorney, Amanda Quirke, Esquire) sent a letter to Ms. Slazyk, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: As you are aware, under Section 4(c) of the CBS Settlement agreement with the City of Miami, the City's approval of a location becomes null and void if an FDOT permit is not issued within 280 days of the City's signature on FDOT Form 575-070-04. In addition, FDOT requires local government approval within 6 months of the application to FDOT. Therefore, Outlook Media is requesting the renewal of the approval of the City of Miami for the following locations: * * * CanPartners Realty * * * Applications are attached for each one of the aforementioned locations. Please stamp the attached applications received today, and advise when we can pick up the stamped received copies for our files. Thank you for your assistance. Intervenor had not authorized Petitioner to make such a request on Intervenor's behalf. Accordingly, (through Mr. Smith) it sent Ms. Quirke the following letter, dated February 18, 2009: As you are aware, this firm represents CBS Outdoor, Inc. ("CBS"). This letter is submitted in response to your February 13, 2009, letter to Lourdes Slazyk at the City of Miami ("City") seeking the approval of the City of the Renewal Applications. CBS has issued no authorization to OM [Petitioner] to submit the Renewal Applications to the City. Therefore, the February 13, 2009 Letter is ultra vires, and OM is directed to withdraw same. If OM desires to obtain CBS's authorization to process the Renewal Applications to the City, OM is directed to submit to CBS a written request for authorization to do so. OM's written request for authorization should address, among other things, the following: CBS's original authorization to OM to submit the FDOT Application to the City was to authorize OM to make submissions on behalf of CBS. Please confirm that any submission of Renewal Application by OM to the City will likewise be on behalf of CBS. Many questions remain relative as the various locations identified in the February 13, 2009, Letter as to whether the locations are "commercially viable." See Attachment A hereto. Please contact the undersigned to schedule a meeting to discuss resolution of these remaining questions. Can Partners Realty: As you know, the City has agreed to approve the Lummis Site. Therefore, the CanPartners Realty site is no longer under consideration and is not to be renewed. OM is hereby specifically directed to take no action to renew the FDOT Application for this site. CBS and its representative are available to discuss the February 13, 2009 Letter, the Renewal Applications and the contents of this letter. If OM desires to discuss same, please contact the undersigned for that purpose. That same day (February 18, 2009), Intervenor (through Mr. Smith) also sent a letter to Ms. Slazyk, in which it stated the following: As you are aware, this firm represents CBS Outdoor, Inc. ("CBS"). This letter is being sent to you on behalf of CBS in response to the February 13, 2009 Letter to you from counsel for OM. In the February 13, 2009 Letter, counsel for OM requests approval by the City of Miami (the "City") of the Renewal Applications under the CBS Settlement Agreement with the City. Please be advised that CBS has not authorized OM to present the Renewal Applications to the City. Therefore, CBS requests that the City take no action on the Renewal Application until the City receives further communications regarding same from CBS. Notwithstanding Intervenor's directive (communicated in its February 18, 2009, letter to Ms. Quirke) that "the CanPartners Realty site . . . not . . . be renewed," on that same date (February 18, 2009), Petitioner (through Ms. Quirke) sent a follow-up letter to Ms. Slazyk, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: In accordance with the request of CBS, please accept this revised request for the renewal of the outdoor advertising applications, originally submitted on February 13, 2009. This revised request is a clarification that Outlook is requesting the renewal of the approval of the following applications on behalf of CBS. As you are aware, under Section 4(c) of the CBS Settlement agreement with the City of Miami, the City's approval of a location becomes null and void if an FDOT permit is not issued within 280 days of the City's signature on FDOT Form 575-070-04. In addition, FDOT requires local government approval within 6 months of the application to FDOT. Therefore, Outlook Media of South Florida, on behalf of CBS, is requesting the renewal of the approval of the City of Miami for the following locations: * * * CanPartners Realty * * * Applications are attached for each one of the aforementioned locations. Please stamp the attached applications received today, and advise when we can pick up the stamped, received copies for our files. Thank you for your assistance. The following day, February 19, 2009, Ms. Slazyk wrote back to Ms. Quirke, stating the following: I am in receipt of a faxed letter with back up from your office dated February 13, 2009 and faxed again, as modified, dated February 18, 2009 requesting renewal of certain outdoor advertising signs. I am informing you that, per the attached letters from CBS, and their representatives, the request is not authorized. Petitioner appealed Ms. Slazyk's denial of its renewal request to the City Zoning Board, which upheld the denial. Petitioner thereafter took a further appeal to the City Commission, but Petitioner subsequently withdrew this appeal. It is the City's position "today" (as expressed by Ms. Slazyk at hearing) that Petitioner does not have "Local Government Permission" from the City for the Proposed Sign. On May 4, 2009, almost a year after Ms. Slazyk had signed the "Local Government Permission" section of Petitioner's Application, Petitioner's Application was submitted to the Department.5 The Department contracts with Cardno TBE "to do physical inspections of potential advertising sites" that are the subject of permit applications. For the past 11 years, Matt Barnes has been employed by Cardno TBE as an outdoor advertising inspector responsible for conducting such inspections for the Department. Mr. Barnes was assigned the task of inspecting the CanPartners Parcel (the site where, according to Petitioner's Application, the Proposed Sign would be located). Using two different distance measuring devices,6 Mr. Barnes measured the distance "along the highway [I-95]" from a point directly above the Proposed Sign location (as indicated by a "wooden stake [sticking] about two feet out of the ground" that had been placed there by Petitioner) to the "nearest permitted sign" on the same side of the "highway" (which was to the south and bore tag numbers 412 and 413).7 He "came up with 970 feet both times." On May 19, 2009, the Department issued its Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application, announcing its intention to deny Petitioner's Application because, in pertinent part, the "[Proposed] [S]ign [did] not meet spacing requirements" and the "Local Government Permission" was given "more than six (6) months prior to [the Department's] receipt [of the application]." Petitioner subsequently requested a "formal administrative hearing" on the matter. On May 21, 2009, Intervenor filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for a sign to be located at 350 Northwest Second Street in the City on a parcel leased to Intervenor by Lummus Park Associates, LLC (Lummus Sign). Because of its proximity to the location of the Proposed Sign, the Lummus Sign would violate minimum spacing requirements and thus not be permittable were Petitioner's Application to be granted. Accordingly, Intervenor's application is being held in "pending status" by the Department until final action is taken on Petitioner's Application.8 On June 17, 2009, Petitioner (through one of its principals, Santiago Echemendia, Esquire) sent a letter to the City, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: This law firm represents Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC ("Outlook"). As you may be aware, Section 14 of SB 360 provides that any local government issued development order or building permit that has an expiration date of September 1, 2008 through January 1, 2012, is extended and renewed for a period of two years following its date of expiration. In accordance with Section 4(c) of the Settlement Agreement between CBS Outdoor, Inc. and the City of Miami (attached), "[i]f an FDOT permit is not issued within 280 days of the City's signature, the City's approval will become null and void for that particular application." FDOT also takes the position that the local government permission on FDOT Form 575-070-04 must be issued within 180 days of application to FDOT for an FDOT tag for a sign location. On behalf of Outlook, pursuant to Section 14 of Senate Bill 360, please accept this letter as notification that Outlook is extending the local government permission provided on FDOT Form 575-070-04 for the following locations: * * * Site: CanPartners Folio Number: 01-4137-036-0020 Local Government Permission: 05/22/08 FDOT 180 Day Expiration: 11/18/08 2 Year Extension of FDOT 180 Day Expiration: 11/18/10 Original 280 Day Expiration: 02/26/09 2 Year Extension of City of Miami Expiration: 02/26/11 * * * This 2 year extension notification applies to extend both the FDOT 180 Day Expiration, as well as the 280 Day Expiration set forth in the CBS Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the expiration date for the aforementioned sign locations is extended until the dates listed in the columns entitled "2 Year Extension of FDOT 180 Day Expiration" and "2 Year Extension of City of Miami Expiration." A copy of the FDOT Form 575-070-04 for each of the sign locations is attached for your convenience. . . . On October 5, 2009 (approximately five months after the filing of Petitioner's Application with the Department), the City Commission, on second reading, adopted a resolution (Resolution File Number 09-01061) to enable it to participate in the "pilot program" established by Section 479.07(9)(c), Florida Statutes, "under which the distance between permitted signs on the same side of an interstate highway may be reduced to 1,000 feet if [certain] requirements . . . are met." The resolution, which is still in effect, provides as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION EXPRESSING ITS INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN A PILOT PROGRAM ALLOWING 1,000 FOOT SPACING OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SIGNS ALONG EXPRESSWAYS IN THE CITY OF MIAMI ("CITY"), SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS; FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE CITY MANAGER TO NOTIFY THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE CITY'S INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH PILOT PROGRAM. WHEREAS, Section 10.4.5 of the Miami Zoning Ordinance prohibits new freestanding "Outdoor advertising signs" as defined therein, except for Outdoor advertising signs permitted pursuant to a Settlement Agreement that results in a net reduction in the number of Outdoor advertising signs located in the City of Miami (hereinafter "qualified settlement agreement"); and WHEREAS, by separate Resolutions, the City Commission has authorized the City Manager on behalf of the City of Miami ("City") to enter into qualified settlement agreements with the following sign owners: Carter Pritchett Hodges, Inc. d/b/a Carter Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Carter"), Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. d/b/a/ Clear Channel Outdoor ("Clear Channel"), and CBS Outdoor, Inc. (hereinafter "CBS"); and WHEREAS, at the time the qualified settlement agreements were approved by the City Commission, Section 479.07(9)(a), F.S. (2008), required new Outdoor advertising signs to be located at least one thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side on an interstate highway (hereinafter "1,500 foot spacing"); and WHEREAS, by House Bill 1021, the Florida Legislature recently amended s. 479.07(9)(c), F.S., in the 2009 Legislative Session, to include the City within a pilot program permitting new Outdoor advertising signs on an interstate highway to be located within one thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the interstate highway (hereinafter "1,000 foot spacing") under certain enumerated conditions, to wit: "(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1), there is established a pilot program in Orange, Hillsborough, and Osceola Counties, and within the boundaries of the City of Miami, under which the distance between permitted signs on the same side of an interstate highway may be reduced to 1,000 feet if all other requirements of this chapter are met and if: The local government has adopted a plan, program, resolution, ordinance, or other policy encouraging the voluntary removal of signs in a downtown, historic, redevelopment, infill, or other designated area which also provides for a new or replacement sign to be erected on an interstate highway within that jurisdiction if a sign in the designated area is removed; The sign owner and the local government mutually agree to the terms of the removal and replacement; and The local government notifies the department of its intention to allow such removal and replacement as agreed upon pursuant to subparagraph 2." and WHEREAS, the City Commission deems it in the best interest of the City to participate in the pilot program authorized by s. 479.07(9)(c), F.S. (2009), which would permit 1,000 foot spacing for Outdoor advertising signs under the guidelines provided in this Resolution; NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are adopted by reference and incorporated as if fully set forth in this Section. 2. Pursuant to s. 479.07(9)(c)(2), F.S. (2009), the City hereby adopts a pilot program encouraging the voluntary removal of signs within the boundaries of the City, which provides, subject to the conditions stated below, for a new or replacement sign to be erected on an interstate highway, with 1,000 foot spacing, if other Outdoor advertising signs within the boundaries of the City are removed. Section 3. Any sign owner seeking permission to erect an Outdoor advertising sign with 1,000 foot spacing under this pilot program shall meet the following conditions: The sign owner must have a qualified settlement agreement with the City; Any application for a new sign under the pilot program must be in accordance with all terms and conditions of the qualified settlement agreement unless otherwise specified in these conditions; In no event may an application for a new sign under the pilot program exceed the limitation on the number of signs otherwise permitted under the qualified settlement agreement; The duration of the pilot program will not exceed the term of the qualified settlement agreement; No LED Sign may be erected with 1,000 foot spacing unless allowed by an amendment to the sign owner's qualified settlement agreement pursuant to applicable provisions of the Miami Zoning Ordinance; Sign owners must specify in advance of applying for a 1,000 foot spacing application the locations of the signs proposed to be removed or already removed; Sign owners may not be delinquent on any financial obligation to the City as per their qualified settlement agreement; All Outdoor advertising signs erected with 1,000 foot spacing shall be designed with aluminum plating (example attached) or be subject to design review per Manager's designee or designees. Section 4. Should s. 479.07(9)(c), F. S. (2009) be repealed by the Florida Legislature, this pilot program shall automatically expire. Section 5. The City Manager is authorized (1) to notify the Florida Department of Transportation of the City's intention to allow removal and replacement of Outdoor advertising signs under 1,000 foot spacing as provided in this Resolution. Section 6. This Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Petitioner has not entered into "a qualified settlement agreement with the City" providing for the removal and replacement of outdoor advertising signs (as required by Section 3(a) of Resolution File Number 09-01061), nor has it at any time, much less "in advance" of having submitted its application (as required by Section 3(f) of Resolution File Number 09-01061), "specif[ied]" what sign(s) would be removed and replaced if the Proposed Sign were to be permitted. In or around November 2009, Petitioner retained the services of Mario Prats, a Florida-licensed surveyor since 1982, to measure how far the Proposed Sign location was to the nearest existing sign directly to the south of this location. When Mr. Prats went to the CanPartners Parcel, he did not see the stake that had been there in May 2009, when Mr. Barnes had done his measurements; nor did he see any other object marking the location of the Proposed Sign. He relied on a "drawing" to "approximate" where the sign would be. Using a "Topcon [measurement] device" and measuring, not along I-95, but the ramp to I-95, Mr. Prats determined that the distance between the Proposed Sign location and the closest sign south of this location was 1,032 feet. The only measurements offered and received into evidence to establish the distance between the Proposed Sign location and the nearest permitted sign (on the same side of the highway) were those taken by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Prats (as discussed above). Neither Mr. Barnes, nor Prats, determined that this distance was 1,500 feet or more.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation issue a final order denying Petitioner's Application for the reasons set forth above. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010.
Findings Of Fact In August of 1995 Champion International Corporation gave Petitioner permission to place a sign advertising The Outpost on property that Champion owned in Walton County. The sign was to be located at the corner of the south side of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. State Road 20 is a federal-aid primary road. Black Creek Boulevard is a county maintained road. Petitioner subsequently erected a 4' X 8' outdoor advertising sign on Champion's property. The sign was located on the south side of State Road 20, two miles east of U. S. 331 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. The sign was double-sided with east and west faces. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent requesting a permit for the 4' X 8' sign already erected on the south side of State Road 20 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. On September 22, 1995 Respondent issued a Notice of Denied Application informing Petitioner that it could not have a permit for a sign on the south side of State Road 20 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. Respondent denied this permit for two reasons: (a) the location was zoned "agricultural" which was an un-permittable land use designation; and (b) the proposed sign was located on the state's right-of-way. After receiving the Notice of Denied Application, Petitioner removed the 4' X 8' sign. On or about January 29, 1996 Petitioner filed a sign permit application with the Walton County Building Department. The application was for an off- premises sign to be located fifty (50) feet south of State Road 20 along Black Creek Boulevard. The application states that: If the proposed sign is located along a federal aid primary road, a permit from the Florida Department of Transportation (904/638-0250) must be obtained before a Walton County building permit is issued. The applicant must obtain a letter from Walton County to submit to the Department of Transportation to submit with the application. Petitioner did not apply for a permit from Respondent for this proposed sign. The Walton County Building Department issued Petitioner a permit to erect the proposed sign on January 29, 1996. Petitioner subsequently erected a second sign on the south side of State Road 20, one foot off of the right-of-way, and about fifty (50) feet from the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. It was 8' X 8', two-sided, mounted in concrete, with red, black and white copy advertising The Outpost on both sides. The sign was placed so that it could be read by east and west bound traffic along State Road 20. Only the east face of the sign could be read from Black Creek Boulevard. The subject sign was located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 20. It did not qualify as an on-premise sign because the Outpost RV Park was located two miles away. Respondent never received a permit application from Petitioner for the 8' X 8' sign. There was no material difference in the location of Petitioner's previously removed 4' X 8' sign and the new 8' X 8' sign. On May 13, 1996 Respondent issued Notice of Violation No. 10BME1996110 to Petitioner for the west facing of the 8' X 8' sign. Respondent also issued Notice of Violation No. 10BME1996111 to Petitioner for the east facing of the same sign. Each Notice of Violation contained a location description for a sign which was the same as the location description contained in Petitioner's previously denied sign permit application. The basis for both violations was that neither sign had the permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. The notices directed Petitioner to remove the sign structure within thirty (30) days. Respondent subsequently removed the 8' X 8' sign because Petitioner failed to do so within the prescribed time. Respondent's right-of-way on the north and south side of State Road 20 is the area that Respondent maintains which is approximately fifty (50) feet. Respondent's right-of-way map showing the maintained area is available to the public at Respondent's Right-Of-Way Office. In the past, Petitioner erected other signs along U. S. Highway 331 without obtaining a permit. Respondent issued a permit for at least one of these signs after Petitioner filed the appropriate application. Respondent required Petitioner to remove any sign that was not eligible for a permit. Respondent's inspector issued more than ten (10) notices of violation to owners of other outdoor advertising signs in the same general vicinity as Petitioner's 8' X 8' sign on May 13, 1996. These signs have been removed. There is a Reddick Fish Camp sign located on the south side of State Road 20 and west of the intersection of State Road 20 and County Road 3280. That sign is located six miles from the sign at issue here. Another sign has been nailed to a tree three-quarters of a mile west of the subject sign. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether these signs are illegal because they do not have a permit. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent issues violations to Petitioner when it erects an off-premises sign without a permit but allows illegal signs of other property owners to exist without issuing similar notices of violation. Even if Petitioner had filed a permit application for the sign structure at issue here, it would have been ineligible for issuance of a permit because the location's land use designation was agricultural. If the property had been zoned commercial or industrial, Petitioner would have been required to have a permit because the sign did not qualify for any exceptions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner erected a sign with two faces in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul T. Davis 4576 Highway 3280 Freeport, Florida 32439 Andrea V. Smart, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transporation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Chapter 479 and the rules promulgated pursuant to that chapter establish the authority for Petitioner to regulate outdoor advertising in Florida. This regulatory function includes signs which are located on Interstate 75 in Florida. Interstate 75 is part of the interstate highway system in the United States as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Respondent is in the outdoor advertising business and is subject to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All signs which are in dispute in these cases are located adjacent to Interstate 75 in Alachua County, Florida and are or were owned by Respondent at all relevant times. The signs within the relevant time frame associated with this dispute could be seen from Interstate 75. Bartley Burch is a property and outdoor advertising inspector who routinely inspects the signs in question on a weekly basis. During the roughly three years which he had been performing inspections in the area in question he had inspected the seven signs a minimum of 200 times. His inspection schedule for the signs was on a weekly basis. His inspections led to the citations of those signs belonging to the Respondent. The basis of the citations are described in the Statement of the Issues. The citations date from July 18, 1990, based upon inspections performed July 12, 1990. The citations were received by Respondent on July 23, 1990. As described, Respondent having served the citations, this prompted the formal hearing. The sign in 5871T is located on Interstate 75 North, 22.4 miles north of the Marion County line. It advertises the Red Lobster restaurant. It is depicted in the photographs consisting of Petitioner's exhibits 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C. Concerning the complaint, Burch discovered what he considered to be a lack of permit through his inventory or inspection activities that are routinely performed mentioned before. In conducting these inspections Burch used a computer printout issued by Thomas N. Brown, district outdoor advertising administrator in the Petitioner's district where the subject signs were found. That printout indicates the sign location and whether the signs are permitted or not. The printout also includes signs which Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, describes as nonconforming signs. The sign in 5871T did not show up on the computer printout as having been permitted. Burch does not recall that a permit tag was attached to the sign in 5871T. In addition to checking his printout Burch contacted Petitioner's Tallahassee office to see if that office had any record of a permit being issued to the sign in 5871T. He was told that the Tallahassee records did not reflect a permit issuance. From the tenor of his remarks, Burch also examined records in the district office where he works to ascertain whether a permit had been issued for the sign in 5871T. Those records dated back to 1987. They did not reveal the issuance of a permit. In his contacts with the Tallahassee office of Petitioner, he did not determine how far back in time those records went. Neither did he go to Tallahassee to examine the records which were held by the Petitioner on this subject. The methods of looking at his inventory list, available information at the district level where he works and contacts with Tallahassee, in Burch's attempts to ascertain whether permits had been issued were the same in 5873T and 5876T as they were in 5871T concerning the basic methods which Burch employed to find out if permits had been issued for the latter two signs. The sign in 5873T is at Interstate 75 North at mile 5.93. It is a Red Lobster advertisement. It is depicted in Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits numbers 2A through 2C, photographs of the sign. The photographs taken of this sign and all other signs which are Petitioner's exhibits were made by Burch on July 12, 1990. The photographs which are Respondent's exhibits were made by Andrew Wayne Lee on August 23, 1990. In 5873T a permit tag is not attached to the sign or any of its supporting posts. Burch noted at hearing that if an application was made at that point in time to have a new permit issued it would not be approved because of a spacing problem. In 5876T, the sign in question is a Red Lobster advertisement. The sign is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.49. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign in 5876T. The Respondent's photographs depict attached permit tags. The details of those permit tags may not be discerned by examining the photographs. Burch had no recollection of those tags at the time that he made his inspection. His attempts to determine if a permit had been issued for this sign are as previously described. These attempts did not lead to the confirmation that a permit had been issued. In 5872T, the sign is at Interstate 75 North at mile 23.46. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign. They depict a blank sign face which has been painted. At no time during the inspections which Burch made did he observe any advertising on the sign face. The sign had been painted before the formal complaint was made concerning the allegation of being void of advertising for 12 months or longer. The sign had a permit tag attached dating from 1974. It is classified as a nonconforming sign. In addition to the date of the permit tag being 1974, the spacing which Burch measured pointed out that the sign was nonconforming. According to Burch, the sign at 5872T became void of advertising approximately two years before the hearing date. What he meant was whatever was on the sign was not legible to Burch. What the witness said was that approximately two years ago is when he noticed that he was unable to read the message on the signboard even though there was something written there. That is the reason why he began to believe that it was void of advertising. Legibility to Burch means that the message is dilapidated, faded or the paint pealing off, things of that nature. He is unaware of any policy by the Petitioner by way of a memorandum which sets out standards of what it means to be void of advertising as a definitional matter. From the record there does not appear to be any standards by Petitioner which further describe the meaning of void of advertising beyond what is stated in Rule 14-10.007(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. In 5874T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 North at mile 21.79. It is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C, photographs of the sign. Unlike the situation in 5872T, this sign does have information which is portrayed; however, the message that is being presented is unclear. In his inspections Burch has never viewed advertisement that he considered legible. His statement of legibility equates to the notion of clarity evidenced by the photographs referred to. The sign also had a spacing problem and was nonconforming for that reason. Again, this sign had been void of advertising in terms of legibility for approximately two years before the hearing date, according to Burch's observations. In 5875T the sign in question is located at Interstate 75 North at mile 22.39. The sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibits 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C. This sign is in disrepair in that some of the panels are missing. The sign while it contains writing is unclear in its message or lacking in legibility when observing the photographs. Respondent's Exhibits No. 2A and B show permit tags affixed. Those tags cannot be read as to their contents concerning dates upon which the permit tags were issued. Burch confirmed that the sign was void of advertising for over 12 months by making weekly inspections. The sign in question is nonconforming because of spacing problems. In 5877T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.44. This sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 and Respondent's Exhibit No. 2A-2C. The photographs show that the sign has been painted and has no message portrayed. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2B shows certain tags affixed. The uppermost tags on the pole bear dates of 1973 and 1974. This sign had been painted before the complaint was issued concerning the alleged violation. The sign is a nonconforming sign based upon spacing problems. No prior action had been taken concerning the signs that have been discussed, as Burch understands it, based upon the Petitioner's policy of not filing complaints against a Respondent unless the process may be concluded by removing the signs that are offending. Brown supervises Burch. He rides Interstate 75 and conducts periodic inspection or inventories in the same areas where his inspectors perform their duties. This had made Brown familiar with the signs in question. As Brown describes it, if there is no permit tag, and the inventory related to signs based upon computer records at the district level don't include questioned signs, resort is made to the records in Tallahassee to ascertain whether a permit exists for a questioned sign. If the records checks locally and in Tallahassee do not reveal that a permit was issued then the district officials conclude that the sign is illegal. Alternatively, at times the sign owner may have records which will verify the existence of a permit and that would be available to the Petitioner. Copies of applications for permits are available to Brown and in the absence of an approved application this is further evidence that the permit was not issued. It may also be evidence that the approved application has been lost. At the end of each year a list of signs held by companies such as that of the Respondent is prepared and sent to the sign owner for billing purposes, the collection of fees. This gives an indication of permits that are held by the sign owner and the sign owner assists in verifying the ownership by remitting annual fees to pay for the sign operation and through such remittance clarifying the status of permitted signs which are held by that vendor. As Brown describes, Petitioner also becomes aware of the status of signs through transfers of permit tags from one owner to another related to a given sign. Brown employed general methods for researching the question of whether a permit had been issued for the questioned signs as was described before. In particular related to 5871T, 5873T and 5876T he checked for original applications and could find none. He called Tallahassee and tried to get research information from Tallahassee concerning permits being issued and was unable to find any information. He went through old filing cabinets at the district level and found nothing. This search in the filing cabinets was a manual search in addition to the computer search which he had made at the district level. None of these attempts led to verification of a permit being issued for the signs in question. There was information which suggested that the signs may have been in violation as far back as 1983. He did find one permit that had been issued related to 5871T, that permit belonged to the National Company for a Manatee County sign. It was not for a permit for the Alachua County sign owned by Respondent. The 1971 permit tag belonging to National can be seen in the photographs by Respondent, his Exhibit No. 2. That same tag number is referenced in an affidavit requesting a new tag permit for a loss permit that relates to that location and is found as Petitioner's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. It was submitted on August 6, 1990 and will be further discussed in describing the testimony of Andrew Wayne Lee at hearing. The computer records at the district level at times include unpermitted signs as well as those that have permits. This is not an indication that a permit had been issued for the sign upon some former date. Mr. Brown believes that the idea of a sign void of advertising is a sign which has no copy on the sign, an example is a sign that is painted blank for a period of one year. In 5874T Brown recalls this sign as being void of advertising for five and a half years, this is taken to mean illegible. When shown the photographs depicting the sign in 5874T he described that sign as looking the same way as depicted in the photographs for a period of five and a half years. He said that in driving 55 or 60 miles an hour he could not read what was on that sign. He also remarked that in 5875T he couldn't read some of the letters in that sign well enough to tell what was written. Brown described the speed limit in the area of the signs in question as being 65 miles per hour. His representation is accepted. Brown describes the fact that when the owner of the signs do not pay the annual fees the signs are found in violation and a "take down" order is issued. In making his record search to discover whether the signs which were charged with having no permit had ever been recorded as permitted, Brown indicated that the records of the Petitioner went back as far as 1971 but that they were not complete. This incompleteness as to some of the records refers to the absence of a paper record or a computer entry record. Brown acknowledges certain contacts with Respondent or members of his family. He does not recall that Respondent or members of the family were requested to submit Respondent's proof of permitting for the three signs that are the subject of a claim that no permits were issued for them. Notwithstanding this lack of inquiry, the hearing presented the opportunity for the Respondent to submit any information it had regarding the matter of permits being issued for those three signs in defending against the allegations. In the annual billing lists which are submitted to the vendors such as Respondent, they include properly permitted signs or signs in good standing as well as signs that are considered in violation. The idea of in violation would include the problem of not having permits issued for the sign. This is borne out by Respondent's exhibit number 4 which is a billing list which Respondent had which refers to the three signs in question for which permits are said to be lacking. For that reason permit numbers are not found on that page of the exhibit which describes the signs. Andrew Wayne Lee, son of Respondent described how he is in the cattle business, the outdoor advertising business and that he buys and sells properties. He says his family has been in the outdoor advertising business since about 1965. His involvement in the outdoor advertising business has been more extensive in the last three or four years. He became involved because his father was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease in or around April or May of 1985. Before that date the son had very little participation in the outdoor advertising business. Respondent's son made an attempt to find records which would verify the status of the signs in question, especially those which Petitioner claims to not have permits. He describes that a number of records concerning the outdoor advertising business had been stored in a family residence around 1972 and in 1981 an accidental fire occurred and those records were burned up. He says that other records were put in different places by his father and that he is unable to converse with his father about where those additional records may be found given his father's illness. Lee points out in 5871T, the photograph Respondent's 2B showing the 1971 tag permit. As stated that tag permit is the incorrect tag permit for the sign. In 5873T, Respondent's 2A and 2C show markings on the pole where permit tags were probably affixed, according to Lee. Unfortunately it is unclear what happened to those permit tags and whether they were the appropriate permit tags for the sign at the time they were affixed. It may well be that they were the inappropriate permit tags as was the case of the 1971 permit tag which was affixed to the sign in 5871T at the time Lee took photographs on August 23, 1990. In 5876T Lee refers to Respondent's exhibit 2C which shows two permit tags. He did not describe the idea that these two permit tags were the appropriate permit tags for the sign in question. He made no mention of those permit tags when he attempted to obtain a new permit tag for that sign by submission of an affidavit on August 6, 1990 as depicted in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in 5876T. It is unexplained why Respondent in making an affidavit in furtherance of its attempt to gain a new permit tag for the sign in 5876T would not refer to the older permit tags affixed to the sign and their numbers in an attempt to verify that a permit had been issued in the past. On the other hand, resort to that information found on the preexisting permit tags located on the sign post would be unavailing if they were not associated with that sign when they were issued or if they could not be cross-referenced with the older records held by the Petitioner that established the permits on the signpost as being related to the sign in question. Neither party made connection in the record between the permit tags on the sign post and the idea of a permit having been issued specifically for that sign at that location. In his attempt to bring the signs in compliance by making affidavits seeking the reissuance of a tag permit for the three signs in question where Petitioner claims permits did not exist, Lee described his methods. Having found no record held by Respondent which would describe the issuance of permits for those three signs, in preparing the affidavit in 5871T, he used a 1971 permit tag number that was found on the sign because it was the only number he had available. He was hopeful that the Department could use that as some sort of cross reference to verify the existence of a permit. He believed the three signs were permitted, but felt that he had no means of tracking down the proper numbers. In addition to searching the records held by Respondent he went up and down the road trying to ascertain the appropriate permit numbers. Lee also went to Tallahassee and examined Petitioner's files. He noted that the amount of records concerning the activities of his father in the outdoor advertising business, which is much more extensive than the seven signs in question, were not the same as on other occasions when he and his father had visited the Petitioner's office in Tallahassee. This refers to records held by the Petitioner. The comparison of what he saw on the occasion of his attempt related to the present cases and what he found on trips made by Lee and his father differed in that on prior occasions he found considerably more material than he found on the latter trip. In describing the permit affidavit for obtaining a new permit tag in 5871T, Lee describes this as having been involved in an agreement with Peterson Outdoor Advertising. This is in addition to his remarks about the use of the 1971 tag which have been stated before. The significance of this swap agreement, if one existed with Peterson Outdoor Advertising, as it relates to the question of an appropriate sign permit having been issued in 5871T was not explained in the hearing. In 5873T, as with 5871T and 5876T Lee prepared an August 6, 1990 affidavit requesting a new tag permit. This is found in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in case number 5873T. The several affidavits submitted in an attempt to gain new permit tags for the three signs Petitioner claims do not have permits were rejected. All affidavits were returned. In summary, Lee believes that the three signs in question had permits issued but has no proof from any source which would confirm that belief. In the signs which are the subject of the claims of being in jeopardy for reasons that they are void of advertising, the signs in 5874T and 5875T have been removed by Petitioner. The signs in 5872T and 5877T have been painted but have not been leased given the pendency of these proceedings. Robert Still is construction manager and supervisor for Respondent. He has worked for that concern for over 18 years. Still describes the painting of the signs at 5872T and 5877T in June of 1990. The sign in 5872T had copy related to McDonald's and the sign related to 5877T had copy related to Sonny's Bar-B-Q before they were painted over in the blank color described in the photographs. Still offered no comments concerning the legibility of the McDonald's copy in 5872T and the Sonny's Bar-B- Q copy in 5877T before that copy was painted over in June, 1990. Still's relationship with the Respondent's company did not extend to being responsible as records custodian for information associated with permit issuance and permit renewal fees. He expresses, as did Lee, the belief that the three signs in question were permitted at one time or another but has no records to verify this belief. He does recall placing permit tags on the signs in question. In 5876T he makes mention of the fact of the older permit tags which are shown in the photographs by Respondent. He states that the sign in 5871T had a permit at one time which was a 1974 permit. This was as distinguished from the 1971 permit which was found on that sign on August 23, 1990 depicted in Respondent's photographic exhibit. Still has worked with the sign in 5871T for about 12 years; the sign in 5876T for 12-14 years and the sign in 5873T since 1973. In spite of the remarks by Lee and Still concerning their belief that permits had been issued for the signs in 5871T, 5873T, and 5876T, on balance based upon the record and the facts found herein, permits were not issued for those signs.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign permit applications should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' Prehearing Stipulation (which contains a "Statement of Admitted Facts"),1 and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner's Signs On or after July 21, 1998, Petitioner filed outdoor advertising sign permit applications for two signs2 (Petitioner's Signs) located on property it owns on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95, one-half mile south of Northlake Boulevard, and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least August of 1967. Palm Beach County is the local governmental entity with authority to adopt a comprehensive land use designation for the property on which Petitioner's Signs are located (Property). From the time the Signs were erected in 1987, through the present, the Property (on which Petitioner conducts no business activities) has been zoned or designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. Petitioner's Signs, each of which exceeds eight square feet in area, contain advertising messages for Petitioner. The messages can be read without visual aid by motorists of normal acuity traveling on I-95. Previously, the Signs indicated the Property was for sale, but they have not been used for such purpose since December 14, 1994. The Department denied Petitioner's permit applications because the Signs are located in an "unpermittable land use designation" inasmuch as the Property is designated for residential, not predominately commercial or industrial, use. Other Signs Subsequent to December 8, 1971, the effective date of Chapter 71-971, Laws of Florida,3 the Department has issued and/or renewed outdoor advertising sign permits for other signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, notwithstanding these signs' location in areas not designated primarily for commercial or industrial use. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. Among these signs are six signs (three sign structures with two facings each) that, like Petitioner's Signs, are located on the west side of I-95, south of Northlake Boulevard and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in an area designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. The Department has annually renewed the sign permits for these signs since at least 1973. The 1974 annual permit renewals are the earliest records the Department has for these signs. (The Department has neither an original, nor a copy of, the initial applications or the initial permits, for these signs.) The signs currently have the following permit numbers: AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. According to Palm Beach County Building records, these signs were all constructed before January 27, 1972, and four of the signs were constructed in the late 1960's (in or sometime after July of 1968). These signs are in the same location as when originally permitted, and that location has been zoned or designated for residential use since before the time the signs were constructed and permitted. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35 Two signs (one sign structure with two facings) located within 660 feet of the westerly right-of-way of I-95, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north or Seventeenth Avenue North, in Palm Beach County, Florida, were permitted by the Department in August of 1984. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least April of 1976. The two signs were erected after August of 1984. They currently are assigned permit numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35. The initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications that were filed with the Department for these signs (in August of 1984), unlike the applications submitted by Petitioner in the instant case, indicated that the signs were to be located in an area that was "commercial or industrial zoned." On each application, the applicant "certif[ied] that the statements made and the information given in this application [were] true and correct." In accordance with the Department's standard operating procedure, a review of these applications was conducted by Department staff and the information contained therein, including that relating to the zoning of the area in which the signs were to be located, was determined to be accurate. Accordingly, the permits were issued. Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing in this case, it appears that, contrary to the determination made by the Department, the zoning information provided by the applicant was inaccurate inasmuch as the area in which the signs were to be located was actually (and still is) an unzoned residential area. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AX549 and AX550 State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, has been part of the federal-aid primary system since at least January of 1973. There are two signs (one sign structure with two facings) that are located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, in an area not designated for predominately commercial or industrial use (State Road 80 Signs). These signs currently are assigned permit numbers AX549 and AX550. The Department issued sign permits for the predecessors of the State Road 80 Signs (Predecessor Signs) on April 15, 1979. An examination of the initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications filed with the Department (in April of 1979) for the Predecessor Signs reveals that each application has the entry "8/67" in the space for showing the "date [the sign is] to be erected,"4 and has the handwritten notation, "grandfathered," on that portion of the application to be filled out by the Department. The Department uses the term "grandfathered" to refer to signs which existed legally prior to a change in the law rendering them nonconforming, but which, notwithstanding such change, are still treated as lawful (albeit nonconforming) signs. The Department has a policy of permitting or "grandfathering" signs that existed (in compliance with the then- existing law) prior to the effective date of the aforementioned January 27, 1972, agreement between the State of Florida and the United States Department of Transportation (which is referenced in Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes), provided no changes are made to the signs. The State Road 80 Signs are in the same general location (but not the identical location) where the Predecessor Signs were located, and all of the property in that general location is now, and has been since before the Predecessor Signs were permitted, zoned or designated for some use other than commercial or industrial. In 1986, the property on which the Predecessor Signs were located was acquired (for $42,000.00, excluding attorney's fees and costs) by the Department as a result of a settlement reached by the Department and the property owner in an eminent domain proceeding. In recommending (in writing) that the Department settle the matter, the Department's trial attorney stated the following with respect to the Predecessor Signs: The settlement figure of $42,000.00 dollars is a reasonable Award in light of the real estate and severance damages. Due to the specific difficulties involved in this matter, for instance the importance of a particular type of advertising sign combined with the fact that this advertising sign was grandfathered in and since the sign has been put up, restrictions had occurred in Palm Beach County which would have prevented a similar sign from being put up. Accordingly all parties had to work within the constraints of the original sign location with slight adjustment and renovation in order to make effectively a new sign into a renovated sign for purposes of seeking whatever variance. As the trial attorney had suggested in his written recommendation, the Predecessor Signs, with the Department's approval, had been removed from their original location and reconstructed (in or about June of 1986) on a part of the property that was not subject to the eminent domain proceeding. Signs Along the Florida Turnpike State Road 91 (the Florida Turnpike) in Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as a part of the National Highway System by the United States Congress on November 28, 1995. It thereupon was deemed by the Department to be a part of the federal-aid primary highway system in the state. Before November 28, 1995, starting at least as early as 1973, the Department had issued at least 95 sign permits for signs located in Palm Beach County, which were within 660 feet of the Florida Turnpike right-of-way and not located in areas zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use at the time the permits were issued. Many, or all, of these signs are still in areas not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. With the concurrence of the Federal Highway Administration, the Department did not require signs along the Florida Turnpike to meet the requirements applicable to signs located along federal-aid primary highway system roadways, provided a permit application for these signs was received by the Department prior to July 1, 1996. A sign located within 660 feet of the edge of the westerly right-of-way of the Florida Turnpike, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north of Lake Worth Road (State Road 802), in Palm Beach County, Florida, was issued outdoor advertising sign permit number BM818 by the Department on May 28, 1996. The application for this permit had been received by the Department on May 8, 1996. At the time of the issuance of the permit, the sign was located in an area not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. The sign is presently in the same location, which continues to be not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's applications for outdoor advertising sign permits for his Signs. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999.
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a permit for an outdoor advertising sign should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Poz), filed an application dated June 19, 1996, with the Department of Transportation (Department) for an outdoor advertising sign permit. The application stated that the sign was to be located at I-95 approximately 2500 feet north of Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. Additionally the application provided that the sign would not be located within city limits. The Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to Poz on July 16, 1996, stating the application was not approved because the “site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade," citing Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department uniformly interprets Rule 14- 10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. In the mid-80’s, the Department's central office sent out a diagram and instruction memo to all district staff explaining the measurement and distance requirements in Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5. Based on the methodology used by the Department for measuring compliance with Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, the site of the sign proposed by Poz is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. The area where I-95 crosses or intersects with Midway Road is called an interchange. Petitioner claims that the Department has approved other signs which are within 500 feet of a restricted interchange, namely, signs with permit numbers BM 097 and BM 096, located at the east side of I-95 and State Road 514; signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 516; and signs with permit numbers BM 825 and BM 826 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 514. The signs with permit numbers BM 096 and BM 097 are located within the city limits of Palm Bay according to the approved applications for those signs. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 825 AND BM 826 are located within city limits. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820, are located within city limits. Petitioner also claims that the sign located at the interchange of I-95 and State Road 60 was within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. This sign is located in an unincorporated area of Indian River County. A sign was erected in this location in 1973 and was replaced with another sign at the same location in 1991. The county building permit for the restructured sign was issued conditioned upon the applicant receiving approval from the “State of Florida Right of Way Administration.” No evidence was presented to show that such approval was sought from or given by the Department. No evidence was presented to establish that the Department was aware that the sign had been restructured. Richard Pozniak, the husband of one of the owners of Poz, testified that a former sign inspector for the Department, Vanna Kinchen, had showed him how to measure for proposed sign sites. Ms. Kinchen rode out with Mr. Pozniak to a location about five miles from the interchange at issue and taught Mr. Pozniak how to measure from the interchange. Ms. Kinchen was not involved with the site at issue and was no longer a sign inspector at the time that Poz made the application for a permit of the site at issue. All interchanges are not constructed alike. Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara, measured the site which is at issue. Mr. Pozniak computed the distance from the interchange to the site by measuring 500 feet from the safety zone or gore area on I-95. The gore area is located on the inside of an entrance or exit ramp rather than along the outside of the widening of the pavement. In determining whether the site is within 500 feet of the interchange, the Department measures 500 feet beyond the widening of the entrance ramp onto I-95. The site proposed by Poz was located in the area before the widening of the ramp ends. A sign cannot be placed in the area. The logo program is a federally funded program. The requirements for the issuance of an outdoor advertising permit is different from the requirements for a business to display its logo in the logo program. In the logo program, the business is limited to displaying its logo on a Department sign structure located on the interstate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc.’s application for a permit for an outdoor sign at I-95 and Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May, 1997. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
