The Issue Whether Petitioner, Marilyn Nelson, the surviving spouse of Melton Nelson, is entitled to in-the-line-of-duty death benefits.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Marilyn Nelson, is the surviving spouse of Melton Nelson, who died on May 7, 1998. Petitioner and Melton Nelson had been married since June 15, 1997. At the time of his death, Mr. Nelson was employed by Nassau County as the Assistant Road and Bridge Superintendent. He had been so employed for about 3 years. Donald B. Twiggs, M.D., was Mr. Nelson's treating physician. Dr. Twiggs, completed Mr. Nelson's Death Certificate, which states that Mr. Nelson died from cardiopulmonary arrest and coronary artery disease. There was no autopsy to determine the cause of death. During the course of his employment, Mr. Nelson was absent due to colds and other minor illnesses. His absences were not excessive and he had not complained either to his supervisor or to the personnel office of stress on the job. Further, Mr. Nelson did not advise his employer that his job was affecting his health or request accommodations based upon his physical condition. Marilyn Nelson was not aware that Mr. Nelson had heart problems. Mr. Nelson was being treated by Dr. Twiggs for adult onset diabetes, hypertension, and anxiety. As Assistant Road and Bridge Superintendent, Mr. Nelson's job was demanding and he often was on call due to road and bridge repairs. He supervised and assigned crews, but was not required customarily to do physically demanding work. Mr. Nelson was a "laid-back" supervisor who did not confront or correct his staff. He had the backing of management to discipline his subordinates. The employer was satisfied with Mr. Nelson's work performance. There were no confrontations or arguments between Mr. Nelson and his supervisor, and he was never "dressed-down" or threatened with loss of his job. Mr. Nelson reported to work about 7:00 a.m. on May 7, 1998. After a brief conversation with fellow workers and some of his subordinates, he walked back to his truck and collapsed. William Johnson, one of his subordinates, observed that Mr. Nelson "did not look good" and was "kinda red in the face." However, there had been no altercation, argument or confrontation, and Mr. Nelson did not appear upset. The Respondent denied Marilyn Nelson's application for in-line-of-duty (ILOD) death benefits, advising that, although Mr. Nelson suffered a heart attack while on the job, which resulted in his death, the heart attack was not caused by any job-related accident or injury. Marilyn Nelson's claim for death benefits was also denied by Workers' Compensation, which found that the injury was personal in nature and not job related. Marilyn Nelson presented no expert medical testimony to support her claim that Mr. Nelson's death arose out of the performance of his job duties.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement holding that Petitioner's application for ILOD death benefits from the account of her late husband, Melton Nelson be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Emily Moore, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedar Executive Center, Building D 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Gary Baker, Esquire Post Office Box 1177 Callahan, Florida 32011 Ron Poppell, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change his retirement to in-line-of-duty disability benefits pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.002(4).
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department. The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. On or about January 3, 1983, Gordon B. Williams began his employment as a Vocational Instructor III for the Florida Department of Corrections. By reason of his employment, Mr. Williams became a member of FRS. Over the course of his career, Mr. Williams suffered a number of on-the-job accidents which resulted in various bodily injuries. On or about February 4, 1998, a Form FR-13a, signed by Sherry Rogers, Personnel Technician I, at Lake Correctional Institution was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. The form indicated "regular" disability. By letter dated August 27, 1998, Mr. Williams tendered his resignation from his employment. His employment with the State of Florida terminated effective on or about September 23, 1998. Mr. Williams resigned because he was unable to continue performing his duties in light of his physical disabilities. Mr. Williams earned approximately 15.75 years of service credit in the FRS. Mr. Williams called the Division of Retirement to discuss his retirement twice: on or about October 22, 1998, and November 4, 1998. On or about December 14, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Division an application for FRS early service retirement. His effective retirement date was November 1, 1998. However, the application received by the Department was not signed. On the unsigned form, immediately above where Petitioner should have signed the application, was the following statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original.) On January 8, 1999, the Division of Retirement notified Petitioner that his application was not signed in the presence of a notary public, and provided another application for him to complete and have properly notarized. This letter also indicated, in all-cap, bold-face type, "Once you retire, you cannot add additional service or change options. Retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited!" On January 29, 1999, a second Application for Service Retirement was filed with the Division of Retirement, signed by Mr. Williams and notarized on January 18, 1999. This application bore the same statement regarding the applicant's understanding of the inability to change retirement options or type as that quoted in Finding of Fact 9. A third application was submitted in approximately February 1999, to correct a problem related to the notarization of Petitioner's signature. This third application also contained the same statement identified in Finding of Fact 9. On or about March 24, 1999, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department a Health Insurance Subsidy Certificate and a withholding certificate for pension payments. Petitioner began receiving benefit payments in March 1999 and these payments were direct deposited to Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner did not apply for disability retirement prior to applying for service retirement. On or about December 28, 2007, a new Form FR-13a, signed by Luz Veintidos, Personnel Specialist, at the Department of Corrections Region III Personnel Office, was completed on behalf of Mr. Williams. This new Form FR-13a indicated "in-line- of-duty" disability. Attached to the new Form FR-13a was the original Form FR-13a completed in February 1998. On or about January 22, 2008, Mr. Williams completed and filed with the Department an application for in-line-of-duty disability retirement, along with a letter requesting that his type of retirement be changed from service retirement to disability retirement. Respondent's records do not indicate and no competent testimony indicates that Respondent received any documents related to Petitioner's claim for disability retirement prior to January 2008. While Petitioner inquired about disability retirement, no application was filed requesting it until 2008. By letter dated February 8, 2008, the Division of Retirement advised Mr. Williams that a retired member could not change his type of retirement after a benefit payment has been cashed or deposited and therefore the Division of Retirement could not honor his request. By letter dated February 25, 2008, Mr. Williams contended that he was "following Division of Retirement instructions when he applied for early service retirement instead of disability retirement" and that his October 1998 telephone conversation with the Division "was, in effect, a denial of application for benefits." He could not, however, identify who he talked to at the Division of Retirement that instructed him regarding his choice to file for early retirement. Nor did he indicate that at any time he understood that an application for retirement could be processed by an individual agency as opposed to the Division of Retirement, or processed by telephone without a written application. By letter dated April 11, 2008, the Division advised Mr. Williams of its final decision to deny his request to change his type of retirement from service retirement to disability retirement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying Petitioner's request to change his retirement status to in-line-of-duty disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon B. Williams 19607 North Highway 27 Clermont, Florida 34715 Geoffrey Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent wrongly presumed that Petitioner's father had been "killed in the line of duty," which presumption entitled the surviving spouse of Petitioner's father to receive "in line of duty" death benefits during her lifetime, to the exclusion of the rights of her late husband's children, whom he had named as his primary beneficiaries.
Findings Of Fact On December 14, 2005, Douglas Ulmer, Sr. ("Mr. Ulmer"), died as a result of complications from coronary artery disease and hypertension. At the time of his death, Mr. Ulmer was married to Cynthia Andrews-Ulmer ("Mrs. Ulmer"). His other survivors included two children: a son named Douglas Ulmer, Jr. ("Douglas"), who had been born on July 13, 1991; and a daughter named Kayla Ulmer ("Kayla"), who had been born on October 3, 1983. Mrs. Ulmer was not the mother of either Douglas or Kayla. From February 1993 until his death, Mr. Ulmer had been employed as a fireman in Palm Beach County, Florida. Through that employment, be had become a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which is administered by Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"). After having been offered the job as a fireman, Mr. Ulmer had undergone a "post-offer physical" examination. This examination, which had taken place on January 15, 1993, had revealed no evidence of any medical abnormalities; specifically, the physician had found Mr. Ulmer's "heart and vascular system" to be "normal." In October 2004, Mr. Ulmer had experienced chest pain while lifting equipment at work and been taken to the hospital. Thereafter, diagnosed as having heart disease, Mr. Ulmer had gone on disability and never returned to work full time. About one month before his death, Mr. Ulmer had completed a Pension Plan Beneficiary Designation Form in which he had named Douglas and Kayla as his primary beneficiaries for retirement benefits payable under the FRS. After Mr. Ulmer passed away, Mrs. Ulmer submitted an application to the Division for "in line of duty" death benefits, which are available under the FRS to the surviving spouse of a member "killed in the line of duty." In July 2006, the Division gave notice that it intended to approve Mrs. Ulmer's application. For reasons that will soon be made clear, the Division's intended decision deprived Kayla of any benefits under the FRS, and it threatened to deny benefits to Douglas, even though the children's father had named them as his primary beneficiaries. Consequently, Douglas timely requested a hearing to contest the payment of "in line of duty" benefits to his father's widow. (Kayla would later intervene in this proceeding, on the eve of the final hearing.) Sadly, Mrs. Ulmer died suddenly on September 24, 2006, before the dispute over Mr. Ulmer's retirement benefits could be resolved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order: (a) finding that Mr. Ulmer died in the line of duty; (b) awarding Mrs. Ulmer's estate the benefits to which Mrs. Ulmer, as the surviving spouse of a member killed in the line of duty, was entitled under Section 121.091(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes; and (c) providing for the payment of benefits to Douglas Ulmer, Jr., in accordance with Section 121.091(7)(d)2. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2007 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2007.
The Issue Should Petitioner Alma Slocum receive either the Option 3 or Option 4 retirement benefits retroactive to the death of Clyde Slocum in March 1975?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Clyde Slocum (Slocum), deceased, was a member of the State and County Officers Retirement System (SCOERS) under Chapter 122, Florida Statutes. Slocum was employed by the Suwannee County School Board as a school bus driver until he became physically unable to work in June 1970. Slocum married Alma Sanchez in October 1934, and was continuously married to her until his death on March 30. 1975. By letter dated May 6, 1968, Slocum made an inquiry to the Division regarding the benefits he would be eligible for if he retired from his employment as a school bus driver with the Suwannee County School Board. Slocum noted in the letter that he was not ready to quit work but wanted to know what benefits would be available, if and when he retired. The Division, by letter dated June 20, 1968, notified Slocum of the amount of his contributions on file and the benefits he would be eligible for under Options 1 through 4. It was pointed out that Options 3 and 4 would provide a smaller monthly benefit. However, these options would provide survivor benefits for his wife. It was also stated that proof of age for Slocum and his wife, Alma Slocum, would be required, if he selected Option 3 or 4. The following information was provided to Slocum: (a) Option 1 would provide $43.60 a month, but upon his death, no further benefits would be paid; (b) Option 2 would be 13 cents lower at $43.47, but in the event he died, his beneficiary would receive any balance of the amount of his contribution ($1,006.81) not paid; (c) Option 3 would provide a reduced monthly payment of $35.58 and one-half of that amount ($17.79) to his wife upon his death; and (d) Option 4 would provide for a payment of $30.08 and the same benefit to the wife upon his death. By letter dated August 5, 1970, Lavada Reuthinger, daughter of Slocum, sought information on the three different ways that Slocum could receive his retirement benefits. By letter dated August 7, 1970, Elizabeth Smith, Supervisor, Benefits Section, notified Slocum of the availability of an option election that would provide benefits for his wife after his death. The letter also notified Slocum that proof of his age was required, and if he chose benefits for his wife, then proof of her age was required as well. An estimate, dated September 22, 1970, of benefit amounts, similar to the estimate sent to Slocum in 1968, was prepared by the Division, and sent to Slocum. This estimate of benefits was for Options 1 an 2 only, and did not set forth a benefit amount for Options 3 and 4. The letter stated: "Only the first two options apply in your case." Apparently, the Division assumed that Slocum was retiring under disability. By letter dated October 2, 1970, the Division was notified by Dr. G. L. Emmel that Slocum was disabled and was not able to work. Elizabeth Smith notified Dr. Emmel of the statutory language requirement for an application for disability. Using a form provided by the Division, Slocum, on October 10. 1970, also under the assumption that he was retiring on disability, elected to receive benefits under Option 2. At this point, Slocum had been advised by the Division that neither Option 3 or Option 4 were available to him. Dr. Emmel provided the Department with the requested documentation that Slocum was permanently disabled. On October 26, 1970, Elizabeth Smith requested that Slocum submit proof of his age. By letter dated November 13, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he had failed to furnish proof of his age, but instead he had furnished his wife's birth certificate. Slocum's wife's birth certificate was returned by letter dated November 13, 1970. By letter dated November 21, 1970, Elizabeth Smith advised Slocum that he could not retire under disability because he had reached normal retirement age, but that he could retire under Option 3 or Option 4 which would provide monthly payments to his wife upon his death, if he accepted a reduction in the amount of benefits. Smith further advised Slocum that he would need to furnish proof of his wife's age if he selected Option 3 or Option 4. Smith further stated that: "It was thought you were retiring under disability when proof [of your wife's age] was returned to you." Smith also advised Slocum that if he waited until June 30, 1970, he would receive the five-year average. The letter does not indicate what the payment amounts would be for the four different options, and the letter does not indicate that a option election form was included with the letter. Furthermore, the letter does not refer to the Option 2 selection form that Slocum had previously submitted to the Division. Slocum responded to Smith's letter on November 30, 1970, and enclosed a copy of his wife's birth certificate. Slocum also requested "the necessary forms concerning his retirement." Additionally, he notified the Division that since he had not worked since June 1970 he wanted retirement benefits to be paid as soon as possible. The Division did not comply with Slocum's request for the "necessary forms concerning his retirement." A warrant was mailed to Slocum on December 31, 1970, for retirement benefits from July 1, 1970, through December 31, 1970, at $59.17 a month. This benefit amount was the Option 2 retirement benefit amount furnished to Slocum on September 22, 1970, by the Division when it was assumed that he was retiring under disability. No explanation was given to Slocum if, or that, the Division was using Option 2 benefit selection that Slocum had signed and submitted to the Division on October 1970, prior to the time the Division had notified Slocum that he could choose Option 3 or Option 4. Slocum and his wife were both under the impression that since Slocum had furnished the Division a copy of his wife's birth certificate that she would receive retirement benefits after his death. Slocum died on March 30, 1975, five years after he retired. The Division advised Alma Slocum by letter dated May 19, 1975, that her husband had retired under Option 2 and, therefore, no benefits would be paid to her. A copy of his option election and the computation of his monthly benefits were enclosed in the May 19, 1975, letter from the Division. Thereafter, Petitioner repeatedly inquired of the Division why she was not entitled to retirement benefits as Slocum's widow. These inquires were made from the time of Slocum's death in 1975 through the present. In response to each inquiry the Division replied that Slocum had selected Option 2, and no benefits were payable to Petitioner under that option. In February 1999, Petitioner and her granddaughter, Theresa L. Crosby, visited the Division's office in Tallahassee, Florida and reviewed Slocum's file. After they reviewed the file, it was their position that Petitioner was entitled to receive survivor benefits and made a demand on the Division for Petitioner to receive those benefits. At no time prior to February 1999, had the Division advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a formal hearing on the matter. A final agency action letter dated March 26, 1999, was mailed to Petitioner which pointed out that her husband elected and received Option 2 benefits from 1970 until his death in March 1975 and there was no provision under SCOERS, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, to change the option choice at this time. This letter is the first written notice to Petitioner that she was entitled to request a formal hearing if she disagreed with the Division's decision. A Petition for Formal hearing contesting the Division's denial of a survivor's benefit for Petitioner was received by the Division on April 19, 1999. When Slocum made the selection for Option 2 retirement benefits he did so because he was advised by the Division that only Option 1 or Option 2 were available to him since he was retiring under disability. Once Slocum became aware that his wife could receive retirement benefits after his death, it is clear that he intended to select an option which would provide his wife with benefits after his death. Furthermore, after it was determined that he could not retire under disability, which had limited his options, the Division failed to give Clyde Slocum an opportunity to make a selection of the options offered for retirement benefits, either initially in writing or verbally by telephone with a follow-up written option, notwithstanding any testimony to the contrary which, lacks credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order finding Alma Slocum eligible to receive retirement benefits under Option 3 retroactive to Clyde Slocum's death on March 30, 1975, making adjustments for the higher rate paid Clyde Slocum during the years 1970 through his death in 1975, and any adjustments for interest that may be applicable to the benefits paid Clyde Slocum or those benefits that should have been paid to Alma Slocum. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra E. Allen, Esquire 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the application for disability in line of duty retirement be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 31 day of March, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Counsel for Respondent J. Anthony Reinert, Esquire Underwood, Gillis, Karcher, Reinert & Cordon, P.A. 150 South East Second Avenue Suite 1405 Miami, Florida 33131 Counsel for Petitioner
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The central issue for determination is whether the Petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits which she claims as surviving spouse. Although she does not provide evidence that her husband earned sufficient creditable service to vest in the system, Petitioner claims entitlement based on two alternate theories: that approximately 480 hours of sick leave accrued at the time of her husband's death should be added to his creditable service to meet the ten-year requirement; and her husband should have been eligible for disability retirement prior to his death, but was prevented by his employer from making a timely application.
Findings Of Fact Robert L. Carruthers was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) at the time of his death on May 26, 1988. His membership commenced on September 13, 1979, when he was employed by the Brevard County District School Board. On June 30, 1980, he transferred to the Orange County District School Board and remained in that employment until his death. Joy Ruth Carruthers is the surviving spouse of Robert L. Carruthers. During his employment with the two school boards, Mr. Carruthers earned 8.75 years of creditable service in the FRS. Mrs. Carruthers is unaware of any other employment which might be credited as service. The Division of Retirement has no information of other employment which might be credited as service in the FRS. As the result of a complaint by Carol Stearns, the mother of Joy Carruthers, Robert Carruthers was placed on "relief of duty, with full pay and benefits" as of February 18, 1988, by the Orange County School Board. Prior to that time he had worked as an ROTC instructor at Evans High school. He was on the "relief" status at the time of his death. Sometime in late February 1988, Robert Carruthers became paralyzed from the waist down, and could not walk, as the result of a progressive illness. He had formerly walked with a cane. He had worked at the school up through the day he was given his "relief from duty" papers. Mrs. Carruthers claims that when he was placed on relief status, her husband was forbidden to go anywhere near the school or school board offices and was thus prevented from filing an application for retirement disability benefits. No witness substantiated that claim, and the letter from Dennis Reussow, Assistant to the Superintendent for Employee Relations and Administrative Services, to Mr. Carruthers states, ". . . . During this time you are directed to remain away from the Evans High School campus and to avoid contact with students assigned to the school. . . ." (Petitioner's exhibit #4.) This prohibition appears to be limited to the school and would not include the administrative offices. In early May the school board received a statement from Robert Carruthers' doctor that he would not be able to return to work indefinitely. Shortly thereafter, John B. Hawco, the Orange County School Board Administrator for Employee Relations, went to Carruthers' home with insurance forms. They were able to communicate and Carruthers signed some forms. It is not clear from the record whether a disability retirement application was completed on that occasion, but at some point a scribbled, illegible signature for Robert Carruthers was obtained on an FRS application for disability retirement. The application is dated May 25, 1988. The employer's statement of disability attached to the application was completed by John B. Hawco on May 26, 1988. When he completed the form, John Hawco did not know that Robert Carruthers had died the same day. The application form was date-stamped at the Division of Retirement on May 31, 1988. The employer's statement of disability is stamped June 6, 1988. (Petitioner's composite exhibit #3.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter its Final Order denying Petitioner's request for benefits. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joy R. Carruthers Post Office Box 680-151 Orlando, Florida 32858 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Office of General Counsel 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
The Issue Is Petitioner, Cheryl Walker, entitled to an Option Two retirement benefit from the account of the deceased member, Mary Fowler (Fowler), in the Florida Retirement System (FRS)?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On January 8, 1975, Fowler began employment with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida (Clerk) as an Administrative Secretary. On January 8, 1975, Fowler enrolled in the retirement plan (Plan) that was being offered by the Clerk for her position. Fowler made regular payments to the Plan and remained current until the Clerk offered the Plan as a benefit package and paid the premiums on behalf of his employees. Fowler purchased her previous years employment with the Neighborhood Service Center for retirement purposes. On September 29, 1997, Fowler, due to a serious health condition took a medical leave of absence and went on no-pay status. While on no-pay status Fowler's salary was reported for creditable service in the FRS and the Clerk's office paid Fowler's life and health insurance premiums except for certain supplemental health and life insurance premiums. On October 31, 1997, Dr. Greenberg advised Fowler that she was suffering from terminal lung cancer and prescribed certain pain medication. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fowler was eligible for retirement with the FRS. After Fowler was diagnosed as having terminal cancer, Petitioner moved in with Fowler and Petitioner became her caretaker. Petitioner's testimony that she held a durable-family power of attorney for Fowler and made all business decisions for Fowler after she was diagnosed with terminal cancer lacks credibility based on Petitioner's own testimony and the testimony of Grace Burmeister (Burmeister) and Victoria Spence (Spence), both of whom worked with Fowler before her illness and consulted with Fowler during her illness concerning her retirement. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to show that Fowler advised the Clerk's office that Petitioner held a durable-family power of attorney for her and that Petitioner would be taking care of Fowler's business and business affairs. Fowler was never declared incompetent, and there is no evidence that she was incompetent to handle her own business affairs, notwithstanding that she was taking treatment for the cancer and taking pain medication. Sometime around November 3, 1997, Fowler notified the Clerk's office that she was terminally ill and would not be returning to work. At this time, Fowler was eligible for retirement under the FRS. On November 18, 1997, Petitioner talked to Burmeister concerning Fowler making a change of beneficiary for FRS and for life insurance benefits. Certain information concerning the rights of joint annuitants and beneficiaries was provided to Fowler by letter dated November 19, 1997. On November 19, 1997, Burmeister, Spence, and Neva Merckle, from the Clerk's office visited Fowler at her home and provided Fowler with certain forms to be completed for her retirement. Among those forms was a form to facilitate the change of beneficiary which Fowler completed and signed on November 19, 1997, naming Petitioner as beneficiary for her retirement benefits. Also among the forms provided to Fowler by Burmeister on November 19, 1997, was an Application for Service Retirement (Application). The Application was not completed by Fowler on November 19, 1997, as she apparently had not decided on the exact date for her retirement. In fact, Fowler, according to Spence, did not appear be interested in retiring on November 19, 1997, but agreed to consider retiring. Also at the meeting with Fowler at her residence on November 19, 1997, both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler, among other things, that her date of retirement would occur on the first day of the month following her date of termination and that should her death occur before her date of retirement then there were serious consequences as far as the beneficiary was concerned. One of those consequences was that since Fowler did not have a joint annuitant, no one would receive the monthly benefit, except for monies Fowler had contributed to her retirement in the FRS. Both Burmeister and Spence advised Fowler to move forward immediately to set her date of termination so that her date of retirement would occur on December 1, 1997. Apparently, the comment expressed by Petitioner that the Clerk's office was attempting to push Fowler out the door had some impact on her decision not to fill out the retirement application until later. By letter dated December 2, 1997, Fowler gave the Clerk formal notice of her intent to resign December 31, 1997, for the primary purpose of retirement effective January 1, 1998. Although Burmeister could not remember going to Fowler's home but on one occasion, which was November 19, 1997, Spence was very clear in her testimony that she and Burmeister went to Fowler's home on two occasions to discuss Fowler's retirement. Although Spence could not remember the exact dates of their visits, apparently, the date of the second visit was on December 3, 1997, when Fowler completed and signed the Application in the presence of Burmeister, who notarized the Application, notwithstanding Petitioner's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in that regard. Fowler selected Option 2, whereby she would receive a slightly reduced benefit payable monthly for her lifetime. However, should Fowler die before receiving 120 monthly payments, her designated beneficiary, Cheryl Walker, would receive the monthly benefit until the total number of monthly benefits paid to Fowler and to Cheryl Walker equaled 120. Fowler, either through documents furnished to her by the Division concerning retirement or information furnished by Burmeister during her visits on November 19, 1997, and December 3, 1997, had available to her sufficient information concerning retirement in order to make an intelligent decision concerning, among other things, her date of termination, date of retirement, and her Options. The FRS received Fowler's Application on December 9, 1997. However, an attempt to change the date of termination to November 30, 1997, and thereby change the date of retirement to December 1, 1997, was rejected by the FRS in that the FRS did not recognize retroactive terminations. Even though the Clerk's office was paying certain life and health insurance premiums, there is no evidence that this influenced Fowler's decision on retirement. Fowler died on December 14, 1997, and was an active member of the FRS at that time. Therefore, her termination date was established as the date of her death. Fowler also changed her life insurance and deferred compensation documents to name Cheryl Walker as the primary beneficiary. There is no provision in the FRS, nor is the FRS funded to provide a "death benefit" for the beneficiary of an active member who dies before the active member's effective retirement date, unless the beneficiary is a spouse or dependent beneficiary of the deceased member. By letter dated January 29, 1998, the Division notified Petitioner that since Fowler died before her retirement date, the only benefit available to her was a refund of retirement contributions paid by Fowler in the amount of $3,811.98. The Division also advised Petitioner that in order to receive the refund she would need to complete an application for beneficiary refund. Petitioner completed and filed the beneficiary refund application with the Division in February 1998. A warrant in the amount of $3,811.98 was mailed to Petitioner, which she cashed on April 8, 1998. Subsequently, Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the Division's position and this proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding Petitioner, Cheryl Walker not eligible for an Option 2 benefit from the account of Mary Fowler. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Pobjecky, Esquire Post Office Drawer 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7323 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, was a classroom teacher in the Clay County public school system until 1993, and says she had a total of nineteen years of service. During that time period, she participated in the Florida Retirement System, which is administered by respondent, Division of Retirement (Division). In 1992, petitioner was suffering from a number of illnesses, including chronic kidney failure and congestive heart failure, which impaired her ability to continue working as a teacher. She also suffered from depression. These conditions continued into 1993. During this time period, she was hospitalized on at least two occasions. Because her work was very stressful, and tended to exacerbate her medical condition, petitioner accepted her physician's advice and decided to resign her teaching position effective April 14, 1993. On April 21, 1993, or a week later, she executed her application for retirement and opted to take early retirement effective May 1, 1993, when she was fifty-four years of age. Even though the local school board had periodically distributed information booklets to all teachers, including petitioner, concerning early, normal and disability types of retirement, and the various retirement options were discussed annually at each school's in-service training seminar, petitioner says she was still unaware of the disability retirement option. Thus, she elected to take early retirement on April 21, 1993. Because of her age, her retirement benefits were reduced by forty percent, or five percent for each year under the normal retirement age of sixty-two. Assuming she was qualified, had she elected to take disability retirement, there would have been no penalty because of her age. At or about the time petitioner decided to resign her teaching position, her daughter, who was assisting petitioner in her personal affairs, telephoned the local school board in an effort to ascertain potential retirement options for her mother. She spoke with an unknown individual in the school personnel office who the daughter says was not "very knowledgeable." The two discussed "in general what (her) mother could do" with respect to retirement, but the daughter says she received no specifics other than the fact that her mother would be "entitled to partial pay." She also requested that an application for service retirement form be mailed to her mother. The daughter then relayed this sketchy information to her mother. Because of financial constraints, and in order to receive her benefits immediately, petitioner decided to take early retirement rather than wait until normal retirement age. After selecting the option 1 benefit, which entitled her to benefits for her lifetime only, petitioner carried the form to her school's personnel office where she executed it on April 21, 1993, before the principal's secretary, a notary public. Although the secretary could not recall the specific event, she affirmed that she would not allow anyone to sign a document who did not appear to be competent. In selecting option 1, which gave the highest monthly benefits for early retirement, petitioner acknowledged she understood the ramifications of making that choice when she did so on April 21, 1993. Thus, on that date she possessed sufficient mental capacity to know that these benefits would last only during her lifetime, and her daughters would not receive any benefits after her death. At final hearing she confirmed that, prior to executing the form, she had reviewed the various options under early retirement and selected the first option since she "figure(d) (she had) done enough for them all (of her) life, they can take care of themselves." In June 1994, petitioner read an article in a teacher trade publication and learned that a number of states offered disability retirement as an option and did not penalize retirees for early retirement due to a disability. This article prompted petitioner the following month to write a letter to the Division. When petitioner made inquiry with the Division in July 1994 concerning a change from early (service) to disability retirement, she was told that under Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, she could not do so after cashing her first check. By then, petitioner had long since cashed the first retirement check mailed to her at the end of May 1993. That advice prompted her to eventually challenge the Division's rejection of her claim on the theory that she was "incapacitated" when she made her decision to take early retirement. In support of her contention that in 1993 she lacked the necessary mental capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her retirement, petitioner presented the testimony of three health professionals from whom she was receiving care in 1993. Their deposition testimony is found in petitioner's exhibits 1-3 received in evidence. Dr. Hardin, a family physician, was petitioner's primary treating physician from February 1992 until April 1993. In the spring of 1993, he recalled petitioner as being "confused," "in an imbalanced state," suffering "mental duress," dependent on explicit instructions for appointments, and taking a variety of prescribed medications for tobacco cessation, chronic renal failure, congestive cardiac condition, high blood pressure, cardiomyopathy, tremors, anxiety and migraine headaches. Because of these conditions, Dr. Hardin found it difficult to believe that she could "handle" a more complicated matter such as choosing a retirement option. Dr. Hardin acknowledged, however, that during the spring of 1993, he had little chance "to follow her" since another physician, Dr. Stoneburner, was managing petitioner's most important illness, renal failure. Dr. Stoneburner, a nephrologist and internist who has treated petitioner for a kidney disease since 1985, felt that in the spring of 1993 she "was not in a very good position to make a competent decision based on her emotional state." Just prior to her retirement, he observed petitioner as having "significant depression" and "a lack of desire to work." She was also taking as many as six or seven medications at one time which could "possibly" cause "someone to be confused." Based on these circumstances, Dr. Stoneburner opined that petitioner was not competent to make a rational judgment. However, Dr. Stoneburner conceded that if petitioner had been given retirement options explained in layman's terms, and had someone to assist her in explaining the various options, she could have made an intelligent decision. Kristina Crenshaw, a licensed mental health counselor, met with petitioner on four occasions between February 18 and April 12, 1993. Ms. Crenshaw found petitioner to have "significant difficulty with depression," in an "agitated, very stressed, (and) overwhelmed" condition, and with a "strong sense of uncertainty about her future." While the witness believed that petitioner would have understood a pamphlet describing her retirement options, she would not have "necessarily understood all the implications to her own personal life." The witness agreed, however, that once petitioner made a decision to resign her job, she seemed more "upbeat" and "positive." Further, petitioner had told her by telephone on April 15, 1993, that she felt "much better" after retiring from her job. The counselor did not know if petitioner was mentally competent when she opted for early retirement a week later. Nothwithstanding the testimony of the health professionals, the findings in paragraph 7 are deemed to be more compelling on the critical issue of competency, and it is found that on April 21, 1993, petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her acts, and she was capable of binding herself by the retirement application. Therefore, her request to have rule 60S-4.002(4) waived, or to have her "contract" with the Division set aside, should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order determining that petitioner was mentally competent when she elected to take early retirement and that her request to have rule 60S-4.0002(4) waived so as to permit her to file a request for disability retirement be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4841 Petitioner: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 4-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Covered in preliminary statement. 14-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 21-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 32-37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 40. Covered in preliminary statement. 41-43. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: Rejected since the evidence shows that petitioner was employed by the Clay County School Board and not the Duval County School Board. Also, the only evidence of record as to years of service is the testimony of petitioner that she had nineteen years of service. However, this fact is not necessary to resolve the dispute. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for the resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark H. Levine, Esquire 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
