The Issue Whether Respondent obtained his real estate license by means of misrepresentation or concealment in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and Title 61J2, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent is and, at all times material hereto, was a duly licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material herein actively engaged in major real estate developments and has also operated on behalf of family owned corporations. During the relevant time period, Respondent has not engaged in the general real estate brokerage business. On August 16, 1984, Respondent was found guilty in federal court of one count of knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully participating in the use of extortionate means to collect and attempt to collect an extension of credit in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 894. Respondent was sentenced to 18 months in prison and fined $2,000. The incident which gave rise to the conviction occurred in and while the Respondent was a resident of Illinois, and prior to the Respondent's being issued his Florida real estate license. Respondent testified that in 1983 he owned a Chicago nightclub. According to Respondent, during that time period someone owed Respondent a gambling debt in the amount of $36,000. The person who owed the money to Respondent said he would pay the debt. Because the Respondent was leaving town, he asked his wife's uncle to pick up the money. The Respondent indicated, that unknown to him, the uncle used unlawful means in an attempt to collect the funds. It was this collection effort which eventually lead to the Respondent's arrest, not guilty plea, and guilty verdict in 1984. The Respondent moved to Florida and, subsequently, on or about January 19, 1994, he applied to become licensed as a Florida real estate salesperson. The application contained an affidavit which provided in part that "such responses are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever." Petitioner's application form contained Question 9 which requested information concerning an applicant's criminal history. In pertinent part the question is as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled or pardoned. * * * Your answer to this will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. In response to this question, Respondent answered in the negative by marking the "no" box. On April 18, 1994, the State of Florida issued Respondent license #0611142 as a real estate salesperson. On January 10, 1994, Respondent signed the application. By his duly notarized signature, the Respondent swore that all answers and information provided on his application were true, correct, and complete. On or about January 16, 1995, Respondent applied to become licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. Respondent, again, checked "no" to Question 9 on his broker's application as to whether or not he had ever been convicted or found guilty of any crime. Also, Respondent again swore that all answers and information contained in his application to become a real estate broker in the State of Florida were true, correct, and complete. Again, the Respondent's signature was duly notarized. The broker's application was approved for the Petitioner. However, a broker's license was not issued because Respondent failed to pass the state examination required to be licensed as a broker. Respondent testified at the formal hearing that the reason he did not disclose his prior conviction on his real estate applications was that he had spoken to his brother who advised him that matters over 10 years old did not have to be disclosed. Respondent did not consult with an attorney, the Division of Real Estate or anyone else other than his brother about how to answer Question 9 on his real estate application. Respondent's stated justification for checking "no" on his license applications lacked credibility given the clear wording of Question 9 on the application form. The Respondent has had no other incidents of criminal problems. Similarly, there have been no civil judgments involving the Respondent and dishonest dealing. Finally, there have been no prior disciplinary matters against the Respondent. The Respondent has served in the military and was honorably discharged and earned a two-year degree in electronics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes; revoking his real estate license; and imposing a fine of $1000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this * day of February, 1998. *Filed with the Clerk undated. -ac COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 July 21, 1999 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Re: Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate vs. Frank Efstathios Touloumis DOAH Case No. 97-3722 Dear Mr. Solares: Enclosed is the Amended Recommended Order issued in the referenced case. It was issued in order to correct a scrivenners error in page 8 of the original order. Please replace page 1 and page 8 enclosing for pages 1 and 8 oriignally sent to you. Please accept my apologies for any inconvenience this might have caused. Sincerely, CSH/scl Enclosures cc: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Edwin Costa held real estate salesman license number 0017520 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent currently uses his license at a real estate firm located in Ocala, Florida. On March 1, 1983, respondent was arrested on various charges relating to bookmaking. On June 27, 1984, respondent pled nolo contendere to one count of bookmaking (gambling), a third degree felony. Adjudication was withheld and Costa was placed on 18 months probation and fined $10,000. After successfully serving all conditions of his probation, and paying the fine, respondent's probation was terminated on March 25, 1985. Respondent has a number of successful business endeavors in Ocala, Florida. Despite his conviction, a cross-section of businessmen testified they would continue to do business with Costa, and had complete trust and confidence with him. His creditworthiness is still considered excellent by a local bank, and Costa has secured a substantial performance bond since his conviction. His reputation in the community is one of being a moral and honest person, and former clientele would not hesitate to use his services as a realtor.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the respondents, Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate , Inc., should be disciplined on charges filed in a six-count Administrative Complaint, three counts for each respondent, and alleging that the respondents: (1) were culpably negligent in allowing their escrow account to have a negative balance, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); (2) failed to maintain trust funds in a properly maintained escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) failed to maintain a proper office sign, in violation of F.A.C. Rule 21V-10.024 and Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.22, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Dorothea L. Prisament and Warricks Real Estate, Inc., are now, and were at all times material hereto, licensed as real estate brokers in the State of Florida. Dorothea L. Prisament was the active real estate broker for the corporate broker, Warricks Real Estate. On or about August 16, 1989, investigator Marjorie G. May conducted an office inspection and audit of the escrow accounts of the respondents. Ms. May also reviewed the outer office of the respondents. The entrance sign did not have the name of Dorothea L. Prisament on it; however, the sign did have Warricks Real Estate correctly identified and identified as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. May advised Ms. Prisament of the fact that Ms. Prisament's name needed to be on the sign and identified as a real estate broker. Ms. Prisament had a new sign made which fully complies with the statutes and rules. There was no evidence introduced at hearing to show that the escrow account of the respondents had a shortage in any amount; directly to the contrary, both the Department of Professional Regulation investigator and Ms. Prisament agreed that there was no shortage in the account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in light of the fact both that the respondents' violation was a very minor and technical one which was immediately corrected and that the respondents had to undergo the costs of defense of this case and suffer the mental duress of defending this case, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint and reprimanding the respondents for a minor and technical violation under Counts V and VI. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine A. Bamping, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire One Urban Centre, Suite 750 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility, and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Paul F. Savich is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0077390 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ernest M. Haefele, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0517821 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On October 1, 1984, the Respondents, purchasers in their individual capacities, entered into a contract for deed to a tract at the Tropical Acres Subdivision, with Tropical Sites, Inc., and Angie S. Crosby and Eugene T. Crosby, at a sales price of $9,046.50. Said amount to be paid at the rate of $90 per month until paid. Pursuant to the agreement, the Respondents agreed not to assign the agreement without the permission of Tropical Sites, Inc. A closing was held on May 8, 1990, and the Respondents transferred possession of the tract by assignment of contract to Leroy H. and Charlotte Beard. A mobile home on the real property was part of the purchase price for a total sales price of $39,000.00 The agreement called for a down payment of $2,000 to the Respondent Savich. The Beards also signed a mortgage note in favor of the Respondents Savich and Haffele, for $37,000. The note was payable at the rate of $373.15 per month. Upon payment in full, Respondents were obligated to deliver a good and sufficient deed to the property to the purchasers. At the closing, Respondent Haefele was not present. The Beards received two documents at closing, a contract for sale and one other document, but did not receive a copy of the original agreement for deed, a disclosure statement, or a title to the trailer on the tract. In addition, Respondent Savich did not seek permission of Tropical Sites, Inc., prior to the closing. Prior to the closing, the Beards moved onto the property, and subsequently began making monthly payments of $373.15 to Respondent Savich. The Beards had purchased two or three pieces of property in the past, but had always gone through a bank. In relation to this agreement, they understood the nature of the transaction at the time of the closing. In early 1991, Mr. Beard made a telephone inquiry to the County property appraiser's office as to the status of the property for homestead exemption purposes. He was advised that Tropical Sites, Inc. was the current owner of the tract, and that he was not eligible for homestead exemption. The Beards did not apply for homestead exemption at the appraiser's office. In August 1991, the Beards stopped making payments to the Respondents on the advice of their attorney, but continued to reside on the premises until December 1991. In November 1991, an attorney acting on behalf of the Beards made a demand upon Respondent Paul F. Savich for the return of the $2,000.00 deposit. The Respondents did not return the $2,000.00 deposit or otherwise pay the money claimed by the Beards. In his dealings with the Beards, Respondent Savich did not withhold information, lie or mislead the purchasers. They simply were unhappy with the agreement, and decided to get out of it when they recognized that they would not receive title to the mobile home and property until the note was paid in full. In early 1992, the Beards quitclaimed their interest to the property to Respondent Savich's former wife, and they were released from their obligations under the note.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents Paul F. Savich and Earnest M. Haefele be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Adopted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7(in part),8,9(in part)10,11,12,13 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 7(in part: the $2,000 was a down payment, not an earnest money deposit), 9(in part: the Beards moved on to the property prior to closing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondent submitted a proposed order with unnumbered paragraphs which partially recounted the testimony of several of the witnesses and combined facts and conclusions of law. Therefore, a separate ruling on Respondent's proposals are not possible. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 J. Stanford Lifsey, Esquire 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1465 Tampa, Florida 33602 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny an application for a real estate broker's license on the grounds that the applicant pled nolo contendere to a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), was adjudicated guilty of the crime, and has not been rehabilitated.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate brokers and sales persons in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent has licensed Petitioner as a real estate sales person since July 1, 1996. Petitioner has also been licensed in the state as a mortgage broker since September 1, 1993. On June 25, 2004, Petitioner applied for a license as a real estate broker. On December 1, 2004, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial. The Notice of Denial proposes to deny the license application on specific grounds. The Notice limits the grounds for denial to those included in the following statement: The Florida Real Estate Commission has determined that the Applicant has been adjudicated guilty of crimes relating to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate, and crimes of moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Specifically it has found that the applicant . . . has been convicted of or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere to: Contributing To The Delinquency of A Minor, 2001 During the hearing, Respondent stipulated that it does not seek denial of the application on the grounds that the alleged crimes relate to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or to fraudulent or dishonest dealing. Respondent relies solely on allegations that Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the misdemeanor charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; that the crime involved moral turpitude; and that Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and has not been rehabilitated.1 It is undisputed that Petitioner pled nolo contendere in 2001 to a first-degree misdemeanor in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Florida, for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The factual allegations in the criminal proceeding were that Petitioner solicited a 13-year-old female (minor female) to pose topless or nude on August 2, 2001, when Petitioner was approximately 38 years old. It is undisputed that the minor female did not pose for Petitioner. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and withheld sentencing. Petitioner paid $353 in costs, served 75 hours of community service, and successfully completed probation of 12 months. The Notice of Denial does not allege that Petitioner actually committed the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Nor does the applicable statute require proof that Petitioner committed the acts alleged in the criminal proceeding as a prerequisite for denial in this proceeding.2 It is legally unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is guilty of the crime to which he pled nolo contendere. The entry of the plea, by itself, is a sufficient statutory ground for the proposed denial. The plea does not operate statutorily as conclusive evidence that Petitioner committed the crime to which he pled nolo contendere.3 No finding is made in this proceeding that Petitioner either did or did not solicit the minor female. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty, and this Recommended Order refers to the solicitation as the adjudicated solicitation. The threshold factual issue in this proceeding is whether the adjudicated solicitation involved moral turpitude. If so, it must be determined whether there is a rational connection between the moral turpitude and Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. If the requisite connection exists, it must be determined whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated and is not a "danger to the public." The adjudicated solicitation involved an act of moral turpitude. Solicitation of a 13-year-old female to pose topless or nude was a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct acceptable in the community, violated the duties owed to society, and was an inherently base or depraved act.4 The base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation did not arise from a desire for monetary gain, as the motive typically is in other crimes, such as grand theft or the intent to sell controlled substances, that have been held to involve moral turpitude.5 Rather, the base or depraved nature of the adjudicated solicitation arose from an attempt to coerce the involuntary compliance of a minor female by exploiting her vulnerability; exploiting a financial relationship over which Petitioner enjoyed financial control; and exploiting a quasi- familial relationship in which Petitioner was imbued with the advantage of an authority figure.6 A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would encourage delinquency and that disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from an appropriate standard of conduct. At age 13, the minor female was nowhere near the 18 years of age required for legal majority. That vulnerability was accentuated during the adjudicated solicitation by Petitioner's age of 38. The minor female was also financially dependent on Petitioner for income as the family babysitter. Petitioner enjoyed the advantage of financial control of that relationship and possessed the power to terminate the relationship. Petitioner also enjoyed the benefit of an authority figure in a quasi-familial relationship. The minor female is the daughter of the brother of Petitioner's wife. The minor female is not legally the niece of Petitioner because the brother never married the mother of the minor female. The minor female is also a long-time friend of Petitioner's daughter. There is no direct evidence of actual intent to exploit the vulnerability of the minor female and any existing relationship. However, Petitioner should have known that the minor female was in a position of vulnerability and that the adjudicated solicitation necessarily exploited her vulnerability and the advantages he enjoyed in their relationship. A person of common understanding would have known there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the solicitation would tend to cause or encourage delinquency. The risk was of such a nature and degree that Petitioner's adjudicated disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the appropriate standard of conduct.7 The moral turpitude evidenced by the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 is not rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to engage in the real estate business. Respondent admits that the adjudicated solicitation is not related to the activities of a licensed broker or sales associate and does not involve fraudulent or dishonest dealing. It is undisputed that the adjudicated solicitation did not impugn Petitioner's fitness to engage in the real estate business. From July 1, 1996, through the date of hearing, Petitioner has functioned as a licensed real estate sales person with no harm to the public before or after the adjudicated solicitation. Petitioner disclosed the adjudicated solicitation to Respondent sometime after June 25, 2004. Respondent did not prevent Petitioner from engaging in the real estate business as a sales person. Respondent cited no evidence or authority to support a finding or conclusion that the misdemeanor disqualifies Petitioner from performing the functions of a real estate broker, but does not disqualify Petitioner from performing the duties and responsibilities of a real estate sales person. As a mortgage broker, Petitioner maintains trust accounts and transfers client deposits to third parties, including surveyors and credit reporting agencies. The absence of a rational connection to the applicant's fitness to practice real estate imbues the allegation of moral turpitude with the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the license application.8 The potential for selective enforcement should be avoided. The issue of whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated is moot in the absence of a rational connection between an act of moral turpitude and the fitness to engage in the real estate business. If it were determined that a rational connection existed between the adjudicated solicitation in 2001 and the fitness of Petitioner to engage in the real estate business, Petitioner has been rehabilitated.9 Petitioner paid the required court costs, served the community service, and completed his probation. Petitioner is a father of three children, has been married for more than 16 years, is a licensed real estate sales person, a licensed mortgage broker, and has not exhibited a pattern or practice of violations before or after the incident on August 2, 2001. Rather, the incident in 2001 stands alone as the only blemish on an otherwise flawless professional record as a real estate agent and a mortgage broker. The issuance of a broker's license to Petitioner does not frustrate legislative intent. The issuance of a license does not expose the public to a dishonest real estate broker that engages in fraudulent practices. The crime for which Petitioner was adjudicated guilty does not impugn the honesty of Petitioner or his ability to deal fairly with the public in the real estate business.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2005. 1/ Transcript at pages 44-45. 2/ The last sentence in Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), states that the court record of conviction is prima facie evidence of guilt. However, the statutory language preceding the last sentence does not expressly require proof of guilt as a prerequisite for denial. The last sentence appears to be a vestige from former statutory language that required a plea of nolo contendere to be treated as a conviction. The legislature deleted the former statutory language from the current statute, but, so far, has not deleted the remaining vestige of the former statute. The issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. If proof of guilt were a statutory prerequisite for denial, evidence Petitioner submitted to overcome the prima facie showing of guilt or to mitigate the prima facie showing of guilt is neither credible nor persuasive to the trier of fact. The relevant evidence consists of Petitioner's own testimony and hearsay statements that the testimony attributes to the minor female, members of her family, and others. The hearsay did not supplement or explain competent and substantial evidence within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). 3/ Cf. McNair v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(plea is not statutorily evaluated as conclusive evidence of the commission of wrongdoing but is, by itself, statutorily sufficient for disciplinary action). This issue is discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 4/ Neither party cited an applicable statute or rule that defines moral turpitude. Judicial decisions generally hold that moral turpitude involves: . . . the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society. (citations omitted) It has also been defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. . . . State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth et al., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 611 (Fla. 1933). 5/ Judicial decisions finding moral turpitude in the exploitation of others for monetary gain are discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 6/ Judicial decisions discussing exploitation of vulnerable persons in professional relationships are discussed further in the Conclusions of Law. 7/ Culpable knowledge is an element in the judicial definition of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Shamrani, 370 So. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (Fla. 1979); Kito v. State, 888 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 8/ By analogy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a rational connection to an applicant's fitness to practice law must be applied to the requirement for good moral character or the requirement could become "a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458-459 (Fla. 1978). 9/ Counsel for Respondent questioned Petitioner in an unsuccessful attempt to show that Petitioner currently lacks veracity and is therefore dishonest. Counsel stipulated that the grounds for denial do not include dishonesty or fraudulent practices. The attempt to show current dishonesty is relevant only to the issue of rehabilitation. See Transcript at pages 36-51. 10/ The agency action in McNair was mandatory but is discretionary in this proceeding. The substantially affected party in McNair pled nolo contendere to a felony while Petitioner entered a similar plea to a misdemeanor. However, those factual distinctions are not material to the absence in the applicable statute of the former statutory infirmity that spawned the requirement of proof of guilt in Ayala and Son. 11/ Unlike the facts in the instant case, the holding in some of the cited cases are arguably ambiguous in that the allegations recite all of the grounds in the applicable statute, and it is not clear in every case whether the decision is restricted to allegations of moral turpitude. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Guy Sanchez, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these Findings of Fact, the Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0317497. In 1985, the Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm, Kline Real Estate, Inc., which acted as a marketing agent for Majestic Builders, a construction company. Both Kline Real Estate, Inc., and Majestic Builders did business in and around the Spring Hill, Hernando County, Florida, area. Majestic Builders was owned by George Orlando. In early 1985, Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor was Stephen Cannon. In early 1985, the Respondent was contacted by the Whitmarshes of Lynchburg, Virginia, who expressed interest in having a modified version of a Majestic Builders model home built on a piece of property in Spring Hill, Florida. Eventually, the Whitmarshes selected a lot on which to have the residence built, and the Respondent brokered the purchase of the lot (from a third party) and the construction contract. Both contracts were entered into on or about April 27, 1985. Both contracts required that the Whitmarshes make a deposit, $1,000 on the lot purchase and $5,000 on the construction contract. Both deposits were made into the escrow account maintained by Kline Real Estate, Inc. The $1,000 deposit was disbursed without incident at the closing of the lot purchase on or about May 7, 1985. The construction contract between the Whitmarshes and Majestic Builders provided in connection with the deposit: DEPOSIT TO FIX HOME PRICE FOR PERIOD OF 6 MOS. [MONTHS), DURING WHICH COMMENCEMENT MAY BEGIN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTIFICATION AND INITIAL PAYMENT OF 30% OF BALANCE. SHOULD COMMENCEMENT BE AFTER 6 MOS., DEPOSIT WILL STILL APPLY BUT TO NEW PURCHASE PRICE OF MODEL AT TIME OF CONSTRUCTION. For the balance of the spring and summer of 1985, the Whitmarshes continued to consult with the Respondent and, primarily through the Respondent, with George Orlando regarding the modifications the Whitmarshes desired to make to the Majestic Builders model, but they were not particularly anxious to commence construction for personal, family health reasons. In addition, they understood and knew from the contract provision and from conversation with the Respondent that their $5,000 deposit was supposed to be credited to the price of the home they eventually built even if commencement was more than six months from the contract date. On or about November 11, 1985, the Respondent advised the Whitmarshes by telephone, confirmed in writing: This [is] notification, that in accordance with your contract, you are legally in default. This letter is written out of legal necessity and has no bearing on your deposit which will bw [sic] applied to the agreed upon purchase price of a Majestic Home. The default merely is to state the builder is no longer held to the prices quoted. And any changes either up or down will be reflected in the new contract price. (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding his November 11 letter, the Respondent withdrew the Whitmarshes' $5,000 deposit from the Kline Real Estate, Inc., escrow account and deposited it in the Kline Real Estate, Inc. operating account. Of the $5,000, $1,000 was used the purchase of a building lot for Majestic Builders, and $1,500 was paid directly to George Orlando, to whom the Respondent believed the $5,000 belonged. 1/ The Respondent is unable to account for the balance of the $5,000. 2/ On or about March 21, 1986, the Respondent received a letter from Mr. Whitmarsh stating: "With this letter I authorize you to use $500 from my escrow account to obtain a new floor plan and prepare a cost estimate for my revised version of your Wind and Wildfire Model Home." The Respondent, who had had a heart attack in September, 1985, and was in the process of closing out Kline Real Estate, Inc., and getting out of the real estate business, passed the letter on to George Orlando. Orlando balked at the request, taking the position that the purpose of the $5,000 was not for use to draw up revised plans. But it is the Respondent's understanding that Orlando eventually relented and agreed not to require the Whitmarshes to pay for the revised plans with new money. It is unclear from the evidence whether revised plans ever were drawn. 3/ In approximately June or July, 1986, the Respondent closed Kline Real Estate, Inc., and got out of the real estate business. He never heard anything else from the Whitmarshes about the transaction and assumed that Orlando and the Whitmarshes had satisfactorily concluded their business dealings. But in fact in approximately early 1987, the Whitmarshes received information that Majestic Builders was not a licensed contractor. Although, on checking, they learned that Majestic Builders then had a licensed qualifying contractor, the Whitmarshes still did not feel comfortable with Orlando and Majestic Builders. In about April, 1987, the Whitmarshes decided to hire another builder and asked Orlando for the return of their deposit. Orlando refused, saying that the Respondent had the money. 4/ Nonetheless, the Whitmarshes never contacted the Respondent for the return of the deposit. Later, the Whitmarshes and Orlando became involved in another dispute arising out of the alleged improper use of Orlando's Wind and Wildfire drawings by the Whitmarshes and the builder they eventually hired, Stephen Cannon, who had been Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor but had left to start his own construction company with the understanding that Cannon would not use any of Majestic Builders' drawings. The Respondent had no knowledge of any of these disputes between Orlando and the Whitmarshes until he was interviewed by a Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) investigator in August, 1988. The DPR had begun an investigation of Orlando on the Whitmarshes' complaint of alleged violations of the laws regulating construction contractors and learned that the dispute involved a deposit that had been held in trust by a licensed real estate broker. DPR then began an investigation of the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding the Respondent, Ronold E. Kline, guilty of violating portions of paragraph (b) and paragraphs (d) and (k) of Sections 475.25(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and suspending his license for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cluett Realty, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0216798 and whose last known address is 4720 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida. The Respondent, Ernest H. Cluett II, is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0191613 and at all material times was employed as a licensed real estate broker by Cluett Realty, Inc. In November, 1981, Mary Ann Knopic was shown a home in Cape Coral by the Respondents. She offered the owners $92,500 for the home with a $500.00 earnest money deposit. When the home was sold to another buyer, the Respondents and Knopic agreed that the Respondents would retain the $500.00 and attempt to find another home for the complainant. In December, 1981, the Respondents showed Knopic the Soviero home and Knopic made an offer on the home and secured the offer with an additional $1,500 security deposit. In late February, 1982, the complainant informed the Respondents that she would not close on the Soviero home. The complainant decided not to close because the cost of renovating the home exceeded the original estimate. Under these circumstances, the complainant was willing to lose her $2,000 deposit rather than spend $6,000 to renovate the Soviero home. On June 8, 1982, after the complainant agreed to the February disbursement, she sent the Respondents a letter demanding either a copy of the contract which amended the earnest money amount or a refund of her $1,500. Walter V. Horn, a Respondent, was not properly served and at final hearing the petitioner agreed that he was not a proper party to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondents, Cluett Realty, Inc., Ernest H. Cluett II and Walter V. Born. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Herbert A. Fried, Esquire 1625 Hendry Street, Suite 103 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Mr. Walter V. Horn 4732 Dee Prado Boulevard Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the complaint, Kevin Bunin was a registered real estate broker and the active firm member for Superior Realty of Broward, Inc. This company was a registered corporate broker and duly licensed at all times relevant. Matthew L. Hirschhorn was a registered real estate salesman and was so registered at all times relevant. Bunin and Hirschhorn entered an agreement in August, 1979, under which Hirschhorn was to operate a branch office of Superior Realty of Broward, Inc. (a Realty World, Inc. franchisee). Bunin was to provide supervision and assist Hirschhorn in obtaining a Realty World, Inc. franchise. Hirschhorn paid Bunin $3,200 for what Hirschhorn understood would entitle him to this franchise. Hirschhorn opened the branch office under Bunin's supervision in September or October, 1979, and operated it through February, 1980, when Bunin and Hirschhorn had a falling out. Hirschhorn complained to petitioner that Bunin converted $1,200 of the $3,200 to his own use instead of paying it to the franchisor as agreed. In retaliation, Bunin threatened to cancel their arrangement, which would leave Hirschhorn without required broker supervision. Hirschhorn, who is a complainant as well as a Respondent, was the only witness who gave substantive testimony in this proceeding. His testimony was entirely self-serving and lacking in credibility. Therefore, it cannot be established how the $3,200 was to be disbursed, nor is it clear at what point Bunin stopped threatening and actually withdrew as the supervising broker of Hirschhorn's branch office.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1982.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, John L. Nuccitelli, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued License Number 0064764, and he was so licensed at all times material to the issue in this proceeding. On August 20, 1979, an arrest warrant was issued in Lancaster County, South Carolina, directing that the Respondent be arrested on the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in that he flew into the Lancaster County Airport in a Douglas DC4 four engine aircraft with approximately 131 bales of marijuana. The Respondent was subsequently indicted for this offense, and on December 4, 1979, he was found guilty in the Court of General Sessions in and for Lancaster County, South Carolina, of the crime as charged. Thereafter, the Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years, and a fine of $5,000, with the provision that the prison term would be reduced to probation for five years upon payment of the $5,000 fine. On July 29, 1982, the Respondent having paid the fine imposed and having fulfilled the conditions of his probation, the Court entered its Order relieving the Respondent from the sentence previously imposed, and discharging him from further probation. The Respondent had not been involved with the law prior to the incident in question, and has not been so involved since this incident. He realizes that he made a serious mistake, one which has adversely affected both himself and his family. He is the sole support of his wife and five children, and he has only done work in the real estate field since leaving the Air Force. The Respondent and his wife have been married eight years. They have two children of their own, and three children by a prior marriage. The Respondent is a caring husband and father. He is trusted by those persons in the community who know him.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that License No. 0064764 held by the Respondent, John L. Nuccitelli, be REVOKED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 1st day of November, 1982. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Huskins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Richard J.R. Parkinson, Esquire 603 East Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds real estate broker license no. 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, he did not act in his licensed capacity in any of the transactions discussed herein. Respondent was involved in a corporate business venture with Donald M. and Darlene Pifalo. He believed the Pifalos had improperly diverted funds from the corporation and filed suit accordingly. In December, 1980, while this suit was pending, Respondent filed a notice of lis pendens against various properties owned by the Pifalos. This action encumbered property in which the Pifalos' equity greatly exceeded Respondent's alleged loss in the business venture. There was no evidence that the Pifalos were planning to leave the jurisdiction or would be unable to make any court ordered restitution. Further, the encumbered property was not at issue in this litigation. Finally, Respondent filed the notice of lis pendens on his own volition and not on the advice of counsel. The notice was subsequently dismissed.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining Respondent $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1982.
