The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intended decision to fund the application of Petitioner Duval Park, Ltd. (Duval Park), is contrary to its governing statutes, rules, policies, or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation that administers low-income housing tax credit programs. As of July 1, 2012, Florida Housing was authorized to use up to ten percent of its annual allocation of low-income housing tax credits to fund high-priority affordable housing developments selected through a competitive solicitation process, such as the RFP. See Ch. 2012-127, § 4, Laws of Fla. (2012)(creating § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat.). Examples of "high priority" affordable housing developments include housing for veterans and their families, and housing for persons with special needs. Prior to issuing the RFP, Florida Housing conducted some demonstration RFPs for developments serving special needs households, but the RFP represents the first actual use of the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits. Previously, low-income housing tax credits were awarded through what was known as the universal application cycle, a process described as cumbersome, lengthy, and inflexible. As part of the universal application cycle, an applicant could indicate by checking a box that it intended to provide affordable housing to special needs households. However, the general universal application process did not lend itself to a targeted proposal detailing how the unique needs of specific special-needs population groups would be addressed. The competitive solicitation process was seen as a way to allow applicants to respond to particular high-priority development needs identified by Florida Housing. In setting forth their development proposals for defined target population groups, applicants would be able to tell their story: applicants would identify and describe the unique needs and household characteristics of the specific special-needs population group that is the focus of their application; applicants could detail and demonstrate their know-how with regard to the resources available in the community where the proposed development is located, to meet the unique needs of the target population; and applicants would be able to discuss the relevant experience of the developer and management teams that make them well-suited to carry out the proposed development and meet the unique needs of the targeted population group. The RFP The RFP solicited responses or applications proposing the development of "permanent supportive housing" (as defined in the RFP) for persons with special needs. Florida Housing issued the RFP with the expectation of funding two or more proposals. The RFP provided that applicants could propose developments for persons with special needs generally, or applicants could choose to focus on serving veterans with special needs. If an applicant chose to focus on veterans with special needs, the applicant was required to pick one of two specific subcategories: either veterans with service-connected disabling conditions transitioning from a Veterans' Administration (VA) hospital or medical center; or chronically homeless/ institutionalized veterans with disabling conditions who were significant users of public resources, such as emergency care and shelter. The RFP specified that it was Florida Housing's goal to fund at least one development proposing to serve veterans with special needs. Preference would be given to proposed developments focusing on serving special-needs veterans in the first subcategory, i.e., veterans transitioning from VA hospitals and medical centers. Duval Park, Osprey, and five other applicants timely submitted applications in response to the RFP. Both Duval Park and Osprey proposed permanent supportive housing developments to serve veterans with special needs transitioning from VA hospitals and medical centers. As described in the RFP, an evaluation committee comprised of Florida Housing employees reviewed and scored the applications. Members of the evaluation committee were instructed to independently evaluate and score the application sections assigned to them. The RFP specified that at least one public meeting would be held at which the evaluators were allowed to discuss their evaluations, make any adjustments deemed necessary to best serve the interests of Florida Housing's mission, and develop recommendations for the Florida Housing Board of Directors. For most application sections, a single evaluator was assigned to review and score the seven responses. For example, Mr. Aldinger was the evaluator who reviewed and scored the two application sections addressing developer and management company experience with permanent supportive housing. Two application sections were assigned for evaluation and scoring by two evaluation committee members. The two evaluators first independently reviewed and scored all seven application responses for the two sections. Then the two evaluators met in a noticed public meeting to conduct a "reconciliation process," in which they discussed their evaluations of the responses to the two application sections and reconciled differences in their scores. The evaluation committee ultimately concluded that Duval Park's application was entitled to a total of 119 points out of 133 possible points, and that Osprey's application was entitled to 117 points. A large gap in scoring separated these two highest-scoring applicants from the other five applicants; the next highest score was 95 points. The evaluation committee presented its recommendation to the Florida Housing Board of Directors, along with a summary of the scores assigned by the evaluation committee. The committee's recommendation was that Florida Housing should award funding to Duval Park for its proposed development. Florida Housing's Board adopted the committee's recommendation. Osprey's Protest Issue Remaining for Determination Following the parties' withdrawal of most of their protest issues, the only remaining disputed issue for resolution in this proceeding is Osprey's claim that Duval Park should have received "at least three" less points than Osprey for the sections addressing developer and management company experience.2/ Mr. Aldinger's assignment as the evaluation committee member responsible for reviewing and scoring these application sections comports with his expertise. Mr. Aldinger has served as Florida Housing's supportive housing coordinator since 2006. In that role, he has been coordinating with governmental bodies and industry stakeholders to develop strategies for focusing Florida Housing's resources on the provision of supportive housing to special needs households. The RFP was developed in furtherance of this effort, and Mr. Aldinger was one of the RFP's authors. Mr. Aldinger assigned the same number of points to the Duval Park and Osprey applications in both sections. Each application received 24 out of 25 possible points for developer experience, and all ten of the points available for management company experience. Osprey's contention is that its narratives for these two application sections show its objective superiority. Osprey's "objective superiority" argument is primarily based on a quantitative comparison, in which its narrative showed experience developing and operating a larger number of permanent supportive housing units than did Duval Park's narrative. Osprey also contends that its narrative was qualitatively better in providing greater detail regarding its experience developing and operating permanent supportive housing. As part of its argument, Osprey contends that Duval Park strayed from the RFP instructions by describing experience with more than just permanent supportive housing, but that the evaluator gave Duval Park credit anyway. The RFP instructions provide the starting point to assess Osprey's contentions. First, the RFP provided the following definition of "permanent supportive housing": Rental housing that is affordable to the focus households with household incomes at or below 60 percent of area median income (AMI), that is leased to the focus households, for continued occupancy with an indefinite length of stay as long as the Permanent Supportive Housing tenant complies with the lease requirements. Permanent Supportive Housing shall facilitate and promote activities of daily living, access to community-based services and amenities, and inclusion in the general community. Permanent Supportive Housing shall strive to meet the needs and preferences of the focus households. This RFP definition was acknowledged to be somewhat broader than how that phrase might be understood by some industry models. For example, Mr. Aldinger testified that transitional housing could be permanent supportive housing within the RFP definition, as long as a lease agreement is used. Permanency is not required, only an "indefinite" length of stay. The fact that leases are for finite terms of 12 or 24 months would not be dispositive; rather, the length of stay would be considered "indefinite" if tenants are not required to leave at the end of their lease terms, if they are not ready to leave and are otherwise in compliance with the lease terms. The provision of supportive services to meet the needs of the focus population is a key part of the RFP definition. The RFP instructions for the developer experience narrative were as follows: Developer Experience with Permanent Supportive Housing (Maximum 25 points): The Applicant must describe the experience of the Developer, co-Developer, and/or Principal in developing and operating Permanent Supportive Housing, and more specifically, housing for the households the Applicant is proposing to serve. Describe the role(s) and responsibilities of any Developer, co- Developer, and/or Principal listed in the Applicant's responses to Items A.2.c. and 3.a. of Section 6 of the RFP, related to the proposed Development, and describe the experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out the roles and responsibilities for this proposed Development. (emphasis added). The RFP instructions for the first application section must also be considered because they tie into the developer/ manager experience sections. The instructions for the first application section required the applicant to provide a detailed description of the focus population group, and the instructions also explained how that description would be used, as follows: [T]he Applicant must provide a detailed description of the resident household characteristics, needs, and preferences of the focus population(s) the Applicant is proposing to serve. This description will provide a point of reference for the Corporation's evaluation and scoring of the Application, providing the foundation for the appropriateness of the experience of the Developer(s) and Management Company, proposed Construction Features and Amenities, Resident services and Access to Community Based Services and Amenities. (emphasis added). As part of this first application section, applicants focusing on special-needs veterans transitioning from VA facilities were required to designate the specific VA facilities with which the applicants expected to be working and coordinating. Osprey, whose proposed development is in Liberty City, Miami-Dade County, designated Miami VA Healthcare System (Miami VA) in Miami. Duval Park, whose proposed development is in unincorporated Pinellas County, designated Bay Pines VA Healthcare System (Bay Pines VA) in Pinellas County, as well as the James A. Haley Veterans Hospital and the Tampa Polytrauma Rehabilitation Center, both in Tampa, Hillsborough County. Osprey and Duval Park both provided extensive narratives describing their target populations and detailing the unique needs and preferences of their target populations. Osprey's narrative described the information learned from interviewing social workers in each of the programs under the umbrella of the Miami VA, with whom Carrfour would be coordinating for transitioning veterans. Osprey's narrative also described a VA grant to Carrfour of $1,000,000 per year for supportive services for veteran families, through which Carrfour provides a comprehensive case management program called Operation Sacred Trust. This program has an outreach team that works closely with social workers throughout the Miami VA. The Duval Park narrative discussed and documented the work of the St. Petersburg Housing Authority Wounded Warrior Community Advisory Group to assess housing needs for veterans. Developer-partner ServiceSource's director of housing was a participant. As part of the assessment, the advisory group conducted veterans' focus groups to hear from the veterans themselves regarding their needs and preferences, including the particular supportive services needed to allow veterans to transition to an independent living setting. The Duval Park narrative also described the information about transitioning veterans learned through ongoing projects with the VA facilities designated for the proposed development, including a Memorandum of Understanding between James A. Haley Veterans Hospital and ServiceSource's Warrior Bridge program. As called for by the RFP instructions, Mr. Aldinger used each application's detailed description of the target population in section one as the foundation for evaluating that application's developer and management experience narratives. The experience narratives were properly evaluated in accordance with the RFP instructions in the context of each applicant's specific proposal to focus on a defined population group transitioning from designated VA facilities, whose unique needs were fleshed out in the first section narratives. Mr. Aldinger reviewed and was impressed with both Osprey's and Duval Park's developer experience narratives, for good reason. As he explained, the two responses took different approaches, but both provided good detail in the limited space allotted. Osprey's narrative described Carrfour, a non-managing member of the applicant entity that will be the developer and, through a subsidiary, manager of the proposed development. Carrfour is a not-for-profit organization created in 1993 by the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, with the mission of developing permanent supportive housing to end homelessness. In setting forth Carrfour's experience, the Osprey narrative took a quantitative approach by enumerating Carrfour's 16 mixed-use housing development projects that included permanent supportive housing. Some details were provided for each development, such as the funding sources, the number of total units, how many of those units were permanent supportive housing units, and how many of the units were currently occupied by veterans. However, the narrative did not explain whether any supportive services provided for these developments were specifically geared to meeting the special needs of veterans. The types of supportive services were not identified for any of the 16 developments. For three developments, the description stated only that "a full array of supportive services" was provided or that "on-site supportive services" were provided. Supportive services were not mentioned in the descriptions of the other 13 developments. Other than providing the number of units then occupied by veterans, Osprey's developer experience narrative had no information to demonstrate experience providing housing specifically developed to meet the unique needs of the focus population for its proposed development: veterans with service- related disabling conditions transitioning from the Miami VA. Duval Park's developer experience narrative did not match Osprey's approach of enumerating individual permanent supportive housing developments and quantifying the units in each development. Duval Park's response chose instead to describe in general aggregate terms the permanent supportive housing experience of the developer-partners. The Duval Park narrative went into more detail to highlight the developer team experience with housing projects specifically designed to meet the unique needs of special-needs veterans transitioning from the VA facilities designated in its application, something lacking in the Osprey response. For example, Duval Park's response described developer- partner Boley's substantial experience since it was founded in 1970, in developing more than 500 units of permanent supportive housing in Pinellas County. The narrative also described the even longer-standing experience of developer-partner ServiceSource, founded in 1959 with a mission to provide services to needy people with disabilities. Initially providing employment, training, rehabilitation, and support services (relevant to the roles described for this developer-partner in operating the proposed development), ServiceSource began a housing program in 1995. ServiceSource's permanent supportive housing development experience was summarized in shorthand as including 20 separate "HUD 202/811 awards." The unrefuted testimony established that this shorthand reference was properly understood by Mr. Aldinger to signify 20 permanent supportive housing developments for persons with disabilities. Two specific supportive housing projects for veterans, developed and operated by Boley working with the Bay Pines VA, were detailed in Duval Park's developer experience narrative. In 2007, Bay Pines VA awarded Boley a contract for "Safe Haven Model Demonstration Project" services, described in the notice of contract award as "a specialty model of HCHV residential care as mandated by the . . . zero-tolerance policy to end homelessness within the Veteran population." Through this contract, Boley acquired and rehabilitated a former 20-unit skilled nursing facility to establish Morningside Safe Haven (Morningside), which provides housing and a residential treatment program with counseling for veterans. Half of the 20 veterans housed there have service-connected disabling conditions, and one-third of the veterans transitioned from VA facilities. Pinellas County and HUD provide funding support for this VA pilot program. Osprey contends that Boley's experience developing and operating Morningside should have been ignored in scoring Duval Park's developer experience, because a residential treatment program is not permanent supportive housing. However, according to Mr. Humberg, Morningside is considered permanent supportive housing under HUD guidelines. Veterans sign a 12-month lease to reside in a unit. Although the intent is that tenants will complete treatment and move on, tenants are not required to leave at the end of their 12-month lease terms; they can stay as long as they need to, if they are otherwise compliant with their leases. Even if Morningside did not technically meet the RFP definition of permanent supportive housing, the discussion of Morningside still would be appropriate for this narrative, pursuant to the RFP instructions. The Morningside experience demonstrates Boley's "experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out" its roles and responsibilities for the proposed development, identified in the same narrative to include mental health counseling, case management, and VA coordination. Also described in Duval Park's narrative was Boley's 2010 development of Jerry Howe Apartments, with 13 units developed specifically for formerly homeless veterans, many of whom have service-connected disabling conditions. Funding for this development was provided by the VA and the City of Clearwater. Boley coordinates with Bay Pines VA in operating this development, with Bay Pines VA providing screening and referral services to identify veterans who are candidates to lease apartment units. Boley's staff members work closely with the veteran tenants to provide supportive services, preparing them for more independent living. Osprey quibbles with whether Jerry Howe Apartments technically qualifies as permanent supportive housing, noting that while the veteran tenants do sign a lease, the intent of the project is to serve as transitional housing for up to 24 months. However, Mr. Aldinger explained that transitional housing would meet the RFP's broad definition of permanent supportive housing if tenants are not required to leave after a finite period of 12 or 24 months. Mr. Humberg confirmed that veterans residing at Jerry Howe Apartments are not required to leave after 24 months, if they are not ready to move on. Mr. Humberg also clarified that Boley owned the apartments before they were redeveloped in 2010, specifically to meet the needs of veterans. Before the 2010 redevelopment, Boley operated the property as permanent supportive housing, just not specifically for veterans. In fact, two of the units remain occupied by prior non-veteran permanent supportive housing tenants, who did not want to move out in 2010 when the property was redeveloped. It is not necessary to debate whether Jerry Howe Apartments technically is permanent supportive housing, although the evidence demonstrated that the development is and has been permanent supportive housing, as defined in the RFP. Certainly, this project demonstrates Boley's experience and qualifications relevant to carrying out its roles and responsibilities for the proposed development and, therefore, is worthy of consideration as part of the developer experience narrative. Duval Park's developer experience narrative also detailed specific veterans' supportive service programs developed by both Boley and ServiceSource. The descriptions of these programs demonstrate experience and qualifications directly relevant to the described roles and responsibilities for Boley and ServiceSource with respect to the proposed development. Duval Park's experience narrative details the many accomplishments of ServiceSource's nationally-recognized Warrior Bridge program, which provides a wide variety of supportive services to veterans. Noteworthy is a 2012 award of over $1,000,000 from the City of St. Petersburg to ServiceSource to expand housing options for wounded veterans. Under this program, in the past year, ServiceSource partnered with Home Depot to modify 16 homes and facilities serving wounded veterans in the Tampa Bay area to increase accessibility, safety, and energy efficiency. This experience translates directly to the role ServiceSource will serve as a participant in designing the proposed housing development specifically to accommodate the unique accessibility and other needs of special-needs veterans with disabling conditions. ServiceSource's Warrior Bridge program also operates the "Veterans' Mall" in the vicinity of the proposed development. At the Veterans' Mall, household appliances, cookware, business attire, and necessities are made available to wounded veterans transitioning to more independent housing settings. According to Duval Park's narrative, the Veterans' Mall has served more than 325 veterans since opening in October 2011, through partnerships with Bay Pines VA and local community organizations serving veterans. ServiceSource's representative testified that ServiceSource recently secured a five-year commitment from T.J. Maxx to stock the Veterans' Mall with new suits for veterans going on job interviews. The Duval Park developer experience narrative regarding the Warrior Bridge program portrays ServiceSource's experience and qualifications to carry out its described roles and responsibilities for the proposed development, which include community outreach, physical disability counseling, employment assistance, job training, and VA coordination. Another program described in Duval Park's developer experience narrative is Boley's Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program. This is a case management, training, and employment program specifically for veterans, conducted by Boley case managers and employment specialists, demonstrating that they are well-suited to carry out the described roles and responsibilities for Boley with respect to the proposed development, which includes the lead case management role. A reasonable person attempting to compare the two developer experience narratives might say that Osprey's narrative demonstrated greater quantitative experience in developing more units of permanent supportive housing generally, but that Duval Park's narrative demonstrated better qualitative experience among the developer-partners in developing supportive housing specifically for veterans with special needs. Duval Park's narrative was more directly focused on specific experience developing supportive housing that addresses the unique needs of those special-needs veterans who are transitioning from VA facilities. In addition, Duval Park's narrative better demonstrated experience and qualifications among the developer- partners that are directly relevant to their described roles and responsibilities in carrying out the proposed development. Both narratives were very good and responsive to the RFP instructions, while taking very different approaches. Mr. Aldinger reasonably applied the RFP instructions, reasonably evaluated the two narratives, and reasonably judged them both to be deserving of the same very high score. The credible evidence does not support Osprey's contention that its developer experience narrative was superior, or that Duval Park's narrative strayed beyond the RFP instructions, or that Duval Park's narrative was judged by different standards than Osprey's narrative.3/ Osprey also takes issue with the scoring of the two applications' narratives describing management company experience with permanent supportive housing. As noted, Mr. Aldinger evaluated these narratives and awarded each application the maximum ten points for this application section. Osprey's narrative identified Carrfour's not-for-profit subsidiary, Crossroads Management, LLC (Crossroads), as the manager for its proposed Liberty Village development. Although Carrfour was established in 1993, Crossroads was not created until 2007. Before Crossroads was created, Carrfour did not manage the housing projects it developed; instead, it turned the developments over to traditional property management companies. As Osprey's narrative acknowledges, this created problems, as the traditional management companies lacked the sensitivity and training to address special needs of permanent supportive housing tenants. Since 2007, Crossroads has been taking over management functions for Carrfour developments and is now managing most of the 16 developments listed in the developer experience narrative. Osprey's application was given credit for proposing management with ideal experience. For Duval Park's application, Boley is identified as the management company. In addition, Boley will engage Carteret Management Company (Carteret), which is owned and operated by James Chadwick, a principal of developer-partner Blue Sky, to assist with tax-credit compliance and other matters within Carteret's expertise during the initial phases of the project. Boley's specific experience managing supportive housing for veterans with special needs, previously detailed in the developer experience discussion above, could not reasonably be questioned. As described in the manager experience narrative, Boley manages 561 units of its own permanent supportive housing. Boley also manages 112 additional permanent supportive housing units owned by other not-for-profit companies (including an 88-unit development owned by ServiceSource). The management narrative describes the profile of the typical Boley-managed housing unit tenant as having mental illness, including post-traumatic stress disorder and/or substance abuse problems, requiring supportive services provided by Boley staff. These supportive services include mental health counseling, case management intervention, and transportation assistance--functions for which Boley will assume responsibility operating the proposed development. The narrative also describes Boley's property management personnel: seven housing staff who handle leasing, income certifications, and other leasing matters; eight maintenance staff to handle property repairs; three drivers who provide transportation; and four accounting staff for property management functions. Osprey does not articulate a specific reason why Duval Park's management company experience narrative should not be entitled to ten points, or why Osprey believes its narrative was qualitatively or quantitatively better than Duval Park's, except to the extent of Osprey's criticisms of the developer experience narratives. Yet Osprey's narrative for manager experience arguably should not fare as well as its narrative for developer experience, given the many more years of management experience demonstrated by Boley and the comparatively few years of management experience by the Crossroads management entity created by Carrfour in 2007. Nonetheless, Mr. Aldinger credited the Osprey application with the maximum points based on Crossroads' management experience since 2007. No credible evidence was presented to support the contention that Duval Park's management experience narrative was not entitled to at least the same number of points as Osprey's management experience narrative. As repeatedly acknowledged by all parties throughout the hearing, Florida Housing was fortunate to have received two excellent proposals by Osprey and Duval Park that were head and shoulders above the other responses. Florida Housing then was faced with the difficult task of deciding which, between two excellent choices, should receive the funding nod, if only one of the two could be funded. Based on the evidence and the findings above, Mr. Aldinger's assignment of the same number of points for developer experience (24 points out of a possible 25 points) and for management company experience (the maximum of 10 points) to the two excellent proposals was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. His conclusion that both applicants demonstrated nearly ideal development experience and ideal management company experience for their proposals was reasonable. The evidence established that Mr. Aldinger made the points assignments he did after evaluating all of the relevant information he was allowed to consider pursuant to the RFP instructions. His scoring of these two application sections was shown to be an honest, good faith exercise of his expert judgment applied to sort out the various pros and cons of the responses. Osprey did not identify any statute or rule that it contends was violated by the scoring of the Osprey and Duval Park developer and management experience narratives. Osprey argued, but did not prove, that the scoring of these two applications was contrary to the RFP specifications. Osprey argued that Mr. Aldinger's evaluation was contrary to the RFP because he considered differences between the two projects in assessing developer experience. Osprey characterized this as double- counting, because the same aspects of the projects were scored in other sections. Osprey also contended that considering the differences between the two proposed developments and the different approaches by the two applicants was tantamount to applying different standards in evaluating the two applications. Osprey's criticism was not borne out by the evidence. Instead, Mr. Aldinger described a reasonable process, consistent with the RFP terms explaining that developer experience would be assessed in the context of the attributes of the target population described in the first section of the application, and also in context with the roles and responsibilities described for the developer team members in carrying out the proposed development. The same RFP instructions and the same standards were applied to the evaluation of the two applications; it was the applications that were different, not the standards.4/ Although not actually raised as a distinct challenge, Osprey suggested an additional argument in its PRO, not articulated in its written protest or in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Osprey argued in its PRO that Florida Housing should have used two evaluators to score the developer and manager experience narratives, as a "check and balance" against arbitrary scoring. Osprey's new argument stands in stark contrast to the only challenge to the evaluation process articulated in Osprey's written protest and in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation. Before the hearing, Osprey challenged the evaluation procedure used for two application sections that were scored by two evaluators. Rather than providing any check-and-balance comfort, the two- evaluator process was viewed as defective by Osprey because the initial scores independently assigned by each evaluator were reconciled in a public discussion meeting at which differences in scores were harmonized, meaning that when the initial scores differed, the evaluators agreed to adjust their initial scores. Osprey has established only that for some application sections, a single evaluator was used, while for other application sections, two evaluators were used and their separate scores were reconciled. No credible evidence was offered to prove that use of two evaluators was better than using one evaluator (or vice versa, as Osprey initially argued).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation, enter a final order consistent with its initial decision to award funding for the Duval Park, Ltd., proposed development, and dismissing the formal written protests of Osprey Apartments, LLC, and Duval Park, Ltd. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
The Issue Whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioners’ failure to appear at the scheduled telephonic final hearing.
Findings Of Fact Upon receipt of the Petitions for Relief at the Division, Initial Orders were issued on October 24, 2012, requiring Petitioners to coordinate a joint response to provide certain information within seven days or to file a unilateral response if a joint response was not possible. Neither Petitioners nor Respondents responded to the Initial Order in either case. Case I was initially set for final hearing on December 17, 2012, by video teleconference at sites in Pensacola and Tallahassee, Florida. Case II was initially set for final hearing on December 27, 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. Prior to consolidation of the cases, Respondent Hamilton requested a continuance of the final hearing scheduled in Case I. Hamilton’s correspondence, which was taken as a motion, represented that Hamilton had attempted to contact Petitioners to determine whether they would agree to a continuance, that Hamilton had left a voice message with Petitioners, and that Petitioners had not responded. At the direction of the undersigned, the Division also attempted to contact Petitioners to determine their position on the requested continuance. Division personnel also left voice messages with Petitioners. On December 10, 2012, Michael Edwards contacted Division staff, identified himself as Petitioners’ son, stated he had received the messages, and represented that Petitioners had no objection to a continuance. Further, Mr. Edwards explained that a continuation would be needed because Myrna Edwards was recovering from major surgery and McArthur Edwards was suffering with complications from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Having received confirmation that Petitioners did not oppose continuance, and would likely have been unable to attend the final hearing as scheduled, the undersigned entered an Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Case in Abeyance on December 10, 2012. The Order required Petitioners to confer with Respondents’ counsel and advise as to the status of the matter no later than January 30, 2013. Further, Petitioners were required to include in the status report mutually-agreeable dates for scheduling the final hearing if Petitioners intended to pursue the matter. The cases were consolidated on December 17, 2012, thus the Order was binding in both cases. Neither the original Notice of Hearing nor the Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Case in Abeyance mailed to Petitioners was returned as “undeliverable.” On January 30, 2013, Respondent Bristol filed a status report representing that Bristol had not been contacted by the Petitioners to coordinate the status report as directed in the Order. Further, Bristol represented that it had attempted to reach Petitioners by phone the previous day and had left a voice message, but had received no return call from Petitioners. Despite the fact that Petitioners did not comply with the Order, the undersigned requested Division personnel to contact Petitioners to determine whether Petitioners intended to pursue the matter. Division staff called Petitioners’ residence and left messages for Petitioners to contact the Division regarding this case. The Division received no return call. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned scheduled the case for telephonic final hearing on February 28, 2013. Telephonic hearing was chosen to afford Petitioners, now residing out of state, every opportunity to be heard on their complaints. The undersigned also issued an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions (Order) requiring the parties to confer no later than seven days prior to the final hearing to determine whether the matter could be resolved amicably and to exchange witness lists and copies of proposed exhibits. Neither the Notice of Telephonic Hearing nor the Order mailed to Petitioners was returned “undeliverable.” On February 20, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed its witness list and served proposed exhibits on all other parties. On February 21, 2013, the same Respondents provided copies of proposed exhibits to the undersigned. On February 21, 2013, Respondent Bristol filed its witness and exhibit lists and provided copies of proposed exhibits to the undersigned. Petitioners filed neither a witness list nor an exhibit list and did not provide the undersigned with any proposed exhibits. On February 21, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed a Notice of Attempt to Comply in response to the undersigned’s Order. The Notice documents Respondents’ unsuccessful attempts to reach Petitioners to confer and exchange witness lists and proposed exhibits. On February 22, 2013, Respondent Hamic filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, to Close the Case. The Motion represented that Petitioners had not contacted Respondents as required by the Order to confer and exchange witness lists and exhibits. The Motion was denied. The final hearing commenced as scheduled, via telephone, on February 28, 2013. Respondents Hamic and Bristol entered appearances. Petitioners did not appear. The undersigned allowed 20 minutes from the noticed hearing time, 9:30 a.m., for Petitioners to make an appearance. None was made. Respondent Hamic offered Exhibits 1 through 41 into evidence, which were received without objection. Respondent Bristol offered Exhibits B-1 through B-8 into evidence, which were received without objection. No witnesses were called. The proceedings closed at approximately 10:00 a.m. No transcript of the proceedings was made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioners McArthur and Myrna Edwards’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner committed the violations alleged in the citations he received on February 6, 1997. If so, what amount, if any, should he be fined.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner owned and operated two apartment buildings located (adjacent to each other) at 732 and 740 Joe Louis Avenue in Pahokee, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the 732 Apartments and the 740 Apartments, respectively). Each building contained ten apartments used to house migrant farmworkers and members of their families, including their children. Among Petitioner's tenants was Speedy Martin. Petitioner paid Martin to help him maintain the buildings and grounds. Michael Menor is a Sanitation and Safety Specialist with the Department. He is assigned to the Department's Belle Glade office. In his capacity as a Sanitation and Safety Specialist, he inspects migrant farmworker housing to ascertain whether there is compliance with applicable statutory and rule requirements. Menor conducted inspections of the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 14, 1997. The inspections revealed the existence of violations at both locations. Following his inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 1997. Before leaving, he handed these inspection reports to one of Petitioner's tenants, Marlo Camble. Approximately a week later, Camble provided the reports to Speedy Martin, who, in turn, notified Petitioner of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. # 5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. 4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Exposed wires [hanging from two] public lighting . . . fixtures [on] west side of b[ui]lding. Exposed wires in meter room. Empty out storage area and repair door under stairs. Repair wall on side of storage area. Repair public lighting on 2nd floor. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Note: Smoke detectors missing [from] Apt. #8. Fire extinguisher missing [from] Apt. #2. All fire extinguishers require reinspection and retag. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of building. Repair heater [in] Apt. #4. Repair broken windows [in] Apt. #4. (2 windows broken). Remove or repair screen door [on] Apt. #3. Repair public lighting. Repair screen [in] Apt. #1. Exposed electrical wires [in] front of Apt. #1. Repair door frame and screen in meter room. Clean room. Provide cover for electrical wires in meter room. Repair overhang [on] corner of b[ui]ld[ing's] west side. Remove wooden poles [on] south side of building. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of building. Repair public lighting [on] 2nd floor. Replace missing screen [in] Apt. #7. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Exposed wire [on] west side of Apt. #6. Repair storage door under stairs and clean storage room. Note: All fire extinguishers require retag and reinspection. Replace fire extinguisher and smoke detector [in] Apt. #2. Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 31, 1997, to conduct follow-up inspections.1 The follow- up inspections revealed that, although Petitioner had remedied some of the problems that Menor had discovered during his January 14, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections), most of the violations found during these earlier inspections had not been corrected. Following his January 31, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 4, 1997. Menor, on February 3, 1997, "faxed" Petitioner copies of the inspection reports. He also spoke with Petitioner and advised him of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. #5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. #4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris [from] east side of building. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Repair door to storage area under stairs. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Provide effective extermination of rodents. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair 2 heaters [in] Apt. #4. Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair public lighting [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair broken window (2)[in] Apt. #6. Repair storage door und[er] stairs. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 4, 1997. The inspections revealed that none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his January 31, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied, with the exception of the violation resulting from the broken heater in Apartment number 2 in the 732 Apartments, which had been repaired since the January 31, 1997, inspections. (One of the heaters in Apartment number 9 in the 732 Apartments, however, was now in disrepair.) Although Petitioner had taken steps to address some of these continuing violations, his efforts, as Menor's February 4, 1997, inspections revealed, were inadequate to correct the targeted problems. Petitioner had ordered meter covers from the City of Pahokee, but he had not yet received them nor had he placed any temporary coverings over the uncovered meters. He had attempted to repair the cracks in the building on the south side of the 732 Apartments; the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 732 Apartments; the overhang in front of Apartment numbers 4 and 5 in the 740 Apartments; the overhang on the west side of the 740 Apartments; the wall on the south side of the 740 Apartments; and the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 740 Apartments; but the repairs he had made had not been done properly. He had put rat poison under the buildings and given tenants rat traps in an effort to alleviate the rodent infestation problem at the 732 and 740 Apartments; however, he had not gone to the expense of hiring a professional exterminator to deal with the problem, even though it should have been apparent to him that the services of an exterminator were needed to effectively eliminate the rat population at the two locations. Following the February 4, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the 732 and 740 Apartments at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 6, 1997. Menor spoke with Petitioner and advised Petitioner of the contents of the inspection reports and what Petitioner needed to do to remedy the violations noted in the reports. Menor returned to inspect the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 6, 1997. Upon his arrival, Menor met Petitioner, who had also just arrived on the scene. In Petitioner's car were screens and light bulbs that Petitioner intended to install in the apartments and public areas that needed them. Notwithstanding Petitioner's intentions, none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had yet been remedied. Inasmuch as the deadline that Menor had given Petitioner to correct these violations had passed, Menor issued Petitioner two citations, one for the continuing violations at the 732 Apartments and the other for the continuing violations at the 740 Apartments. Each citation directed Petitioner "to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00," but provided that Petitioner could "have the amount of the fine . . . reduced or waived completely by demonstrating good faith in correcting the violations or by presenting 'before and after' evidence to the Palm Beach County Public Health Unit within 48 hours of the time of the issuance of th[e] citation." Menor told Petitioner that he would be back to the apartments on Monday, February 10, 1997, to see if the violations had been corrected and if a reduction or waiver of the fines was warranted. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and advised him that he needed an extra day to bring the 732 and 740 Apartments into compliance. Menor responded by telling Petitioner that he would postpone his inspections of the apartments until the following day. The following day, February 11, 1997, Menor paid a return visit to the 732 and 740 Apartments to conduct post- citation inspections. Some of the continuing violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had still not yet been remedied. These unremedied violations created conditions that posed a serious threat to the health and safety of the tenants. Following his February 11, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 17, 1997. Menor provided Petitioner, who was present during the inspections, copies of the inspection reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace covers for water meters. . . . Repair door to storage area. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Repair cracks in building, south side. Screens missing from bathroom window[s]. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side./Repair storage door. Provide covers for water meters. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 17, 1997. The inspections revealed that at neither location had Petitioner yet "provide[d] covers for water meters" or "provide[d] effective extermination of rodents," although he had corrected the other violations Menor had discovered during his February 11, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections). Following his February 17, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections. Copies of these inspection reports were "faxed" to Petitioner on February 18, 1997. On February 24, 1997, Menor received a complaint from a tenant living in Apartment number 4 in the 740 Apartments that there were "rats in [her] refrigerator." Later that day, Menor went to the 740 Apartments to investigate the complaint. His investigation revealed evidence that rats had entered the complainant's refrigerator through a hole. Menor spoke with Petitioner following his investigation and emphasized the importance of Petitioner providing his tenants with effective "pest control." Two days later, on February 26, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and told Menor that he (Petitioner) had made arrangements for a "pest control" company, Glades Pest Control, to provide extermination services at the 732 and 740 Apartments, but that it would not be until March 4, 1997, that such services would be rendered. On April 18, 1997, Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments to ascertain whether the continuing violations that he had discovered during his February 17, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied. The inspections revealed that these violations had been corrected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the February 6, 1997, citations and fining him a total of $1,000.00 ($500.00 per citation) for these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1997.
The Issue The issues are (1) whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-48.002(95) and 67-60.010(3) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; and (2) whether certain statements in Request for Application 2016-113 (RFA-113) issued by Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Florida Housing or agency), are unlawful unadopted rules in violation of section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504. One of its responsibilities is to award low-income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are made available to states annually by the United States Treasury Department and are then awarded pursuant to a competitive cycle that starts with Florida Housing's issuance of an RFA. This proceeding concerns RFA-113. Petitioners ARD and Madison are developers of affordable housing units and submit applications for tax credits. Law and Wolf are principals of a developer of affordable housing units. Berkshire, Hawthorne, and Southwick are limited partnerships that have submitted applications for tax credits. All Petitioners intend to submit applications in response to RFA-113 and will be subject to rule chapters 67-48 and 67-60. Intervenors Heritage and HTG are developers of affordable housing who intend to file applications pursuant to RFA-113. Background On October 28, 2016, Florida Housing published on its website proposed solicitation RFA-113, a 121-page document inviting applications for the award of up to $14,669,052.00 in housing tax credits for the development of affordable, multifamily housing located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. After Petitioners gave notice of their intent to challenge RFA-113, Florida Housing attempted to resolve the dispute by modifying the solicitation on November 13, 2016. The modification did not resolve the dispute. On November 14, 2016, Petitioners timely filed with DOAH two Petitions, each challenging rules 67-48.002(95) and 67-60.010(3) and various statements in RFA-113. On the same date, they filed with Florida Housing two petitions challenging certain specifications in the solicitation. Although the Petitions include allegations that two existing rules are invalid, Petitioners' main concern appears to be directed at various provisions in RFA-113 that they assert limit their ability to be awarded tax credits. These contentions are addressed separately below. C. Rule 67-48.002(95) The federal Low-Income Housing Credit Program is governed by 26 U.S.C.S. § 42 (section 42). The program allocates annually federal income tax credits to states on a per capita basis to help facilitate private development of affordable low-income housing. As the housing credit agency for the State of Florida, Florida Housing has the authority to administer various federal and state affordable housing programs, including the Low-Income Housing Credit Program. See § 420.5099(1), Fla. Stat. Section 42(m)(l)(A)(i) requires each state that administers low-income housing credits to adopt a QAP, which identifies the selection criteria used for distributing the housing credits. To comply with this requirement, rule 67-48.002(95) adopts and incorporates by reference the 2016 QAP. The rule reads as follows: (95) "QAP" or "Qualified Allocation Plan" means, with respect to the HC [Housing Credit] program, the 2016 Qualified Allocation Plan which is adopted and incorporated herein by reference, effective upon the approval by the Governor of the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 42(m)(1)(B) of the IRC and sets forth the selection criteria and the preferences of the Corporation for Developments which will receive Housing Credits. The QAP is available on the Corporation's Website under the Multifamily Programs link or by contacting the Housing Credit Program at 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329, or from http://flrules.org/Gateway/reference/asp?No= Ref-07355. The 2016 QAP is a five-page document that replaces the 2015 QAP and generally describes the process for allocating 2017 housing credits. In summary, it identifies Florida Housing as the housing credit agency for the State, lists the federally- mandated preferences and selection criteria to be used when allocating housing credits, describes in brief terms the competitive solicitation process, describes the process for awarding competitive and noncompetitive housing credits, and describes the procedures for monitoring and reporting a project's noncompliance with IRC requirements. Section 42(m)(1)(C) lists ten selection criteria that must be incorporated into the QAP. To comply with this requirement, section I.B. of the 2016 QAP provides that the following selection criteria will be considered when determining the allocation of housing credits: project location; housing needs characteristics; project characteristics including housing as part of a community revitalization plan; sponsor characteristics; tenant populations with special housing needs; public housing waiting lists; tenant populations of individuals with children; projects intended for eventual tenant ownership; energy efficiency of the projects; and historic nature of project. These criteria are identical to those listed in section 42(m)(1)(C) and are intended to provide general guidance for the entire housing credit program, and not just RFA-113. Other than the ten criteria, the IRC requires no further detail regarding the selection criteria. However, more specific guidance is found in the individual RFAs, tailored to each type of solicitation. Since late 2013, when the RFA solicitation process began, around 15 to 20 RFAs have been issued annually. Petitioners assert the QAP violates the IRC by not listing the RFA criteria. However, neither the Department of Housing and Urban Development nor the Internal Revenue Service has ever told Florida Housing that the QAP does not comply with the IRC or other applicable federal regulations. The rule cites section 420.507 as Florida Housing's rulemaking authority. That statute has 49 subsections that identify the various powers necessary for Florida Housing to carry out and effectuate the provisions of the law. Pertinent to this dispute is subsection (12), a general grant of authority for Florida Housing "[t]o make rules necessary to carry out the purposes of [part V, chapter 420]," which governs the various low-income housing programs administered by the agency. The rule cites section 420.5099(1) as the law being implemented. That provision designates Florida Housing as the housing credit agency for the state, along with its "responsibility and authority to establish procedures necessary for proper allocation and distribution of low-income housing tax credits and [to] exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of such credits." While consistency with section 42 is required in order to satisfy federal requirements, the IRC is not the law being implemented. Petitioners allege the rule exceeds the agency's grant of rulemaking authority and enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented. See § 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. In short, they contend that other than the generic selection criteria required by section 42(m)(1)(C), the QAP fails to include the other selection criteria in RFA-113 that are used during the competitive process. D. Rule 67-60.010(3) Petitioners also challenge rule 67-60.010(3). The entire rule, entitled "Funding Preferences," reads as follows: In connection with any competitive solicitation, where all other competitive elements are equal, the Corporation may establish a preference for developers and general contractors who demonstrate the highest rate of Florida job creation in the development and construction of affordable housing. In any competitive solicitation, the Corporation may prescribe a priority to fund affordable housing projects in the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern and the City of Key West Area of Critical State Concern where, due to challenging environmental, land use, transportation, workforce, and economic factors, it is extremely difficult to successfully finance, develop, and construct affordable housing. The Corporation may establish other funding priorities as deemed appropriate for a competitive program or solicitation. The rule cites section 420.507(12) as the source of rulemaking authority. That statute is a general grant of authority allowing Florida Housing to adopt rules necessary to carry out the purposes of part V, chapter 420, which includes the issuance of tax credits under the Low-Income Housing Credit Program. The rule cites sections 420.507(47), (48), and (49), 420.5087, 420.5089(2), and 420.5099 as the laws being implemented. In their totality, those provisions authorize Florida Housing to adopt rules and procedures for allocating housing credits and loans for programs that it administers pursuant to chapter 420. One authorized procedure is the authority to use RFAs when awarding low-income housing tax credits. See § 420.507(48), Fla. Stat. On the faulty premise that RFA-113 derives its authority from subsection (3) of the rule, rather than statutory law, Petitioners argue that Florida Housing is allocating low- income housing tax credits in a manner that violates section 42 and chapter 420. They contend authority is delegated by the RFA to local governments to choose which developer will receive local funding, thus giving that developer more preferential treatment in the selection process. By doing so, Petitioners assert subsection (3) violates section 120.52(8)(d) by failing to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vesting unbridled discretion in the agency. As the record shows, the authority to allocate tax credits is not derived from a rule. The source of authority is a statute. Subsection (3) simply informs readers that, besides the statutorily-mandated procedures spelled out in subsections (1) and (2), other types of funding priorities or preferences may be enacted at some future time by the legislature. As these changes occur, the reader is told that specific rules will be adopted to implement those changes. Agency Statements The allegations concerning unadopted rules, all in the RFA, are somewhat confusing. In their PFO, Petitioners request that a final order be entered determining "the policies that make up virtually all of RFA 2016-113 are invalid non-rule policies." Pet'r PFO, p. 23. In paragraph 38 of the PFO, they make reference to RFA pages 2, 13, 20, 22, 40-45, 53-54, 62-63, 67-68, 72, and 110, but elsewhere provide the actual text of only six statements and a brief description of a few others. In the parties' Joint Stipulation, Petitioners assert only that "RFA 2016-113 contains numerous provisions that are invalid exercises of non-rule policy and are without a basis in or are contrary to the law implemented." Jt. Stip., p. 2, § B.1. No statements are identified or described. As detailed in endnote 1, however, their initial Petitions identify the text of some statements and provide a brief description of others, along with the page number on which they are found.1/ Only these statements will be addressed. Petitioners contend that Florida Housing must immediately discontinue all reliance upon them, stop the solicitation process, and issue a new RFA. It is unnecessary to recite each statement in full in order to resolve this dispute. An RFA is issued for each solicitation involving low- income housing credits. Before posting an RFA, Florida Housing typically conducts workshops and posts on-line information to inform prospective applicants of all requirements and any new provisions. By reading the RFA, each prospective applicant is placed on equal footing with the others. RFA-113 consists of six sections: Introduction; Definitions; Procedures and Provisions; Information to be Provided in Application; Evaluation Process; and Award Process. The definitions and funding selection criteria being challenged are found in sections Two and Four, respectively. A lengthy Exhibit A is attached to RFA-113, which includes various forms, instructions, and the like. The evidence shows that RFAs in the low-income rental housing program are not always the same, as they vary depending on such things as the type of project, size of the county, applicable selection criteria, proximity of other developments, program being implemented, demographics being served, and economic conditions in the area. Also, changes in the substantive law or federal regulations require a modification of an RFA's terms and conditions from time to time. For example, RFA-113 contains new criteria used by Florida Housing for the very first time. In short, RFA-113 is tailored to a very narrow class of persons in the six-county area who seek tax credits to build affordable low-income rental property in that area. The selection criteria in RFA-113 are not cast in stone and some are subject to discretionary application. And applicants can achieve points in different ways. During the review process, evaluators have the discretion to either waive or enforce irregularities, depending on how they characterize the irregularity. It is fair to assume from the record that different members of the evaluation committee might assign a different score to the same section of an application. Is Rulemaking Impracticable? Petitioners contend that Florida Housing must adopt by rule the detailed selection criteria, preferences, and definitions contained in every RFA. These terms and conditions change from cycle to cycle and would require Florida Housing to engage in repetitive rulemaking each year, which more than likely would unduly delay the solicitation process. Assuming arguendo the statements are a rule, which they are not, under the circumstances presented here, it is not reasonable to adopt by rule precise or detailed principles, criteria, or standards for every solicitation. See § 120.54(1)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat. Attorney's Fees and Costs As a condition precedent to seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs against an agency for having an illegal unadopted rule, the person bringing the challenge must give the agency 30 days' notice before filing a petition under section 120.56(4), which notice must inform the agency that the disputed statement might constitute an unadopted rule. See § 120.595(4)(b), Fla. Stat. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners failed to provide this notice.
The Issue The issue in this supplemental proceeding is whether Respondents Soo Y. and Myung S. Chung, separately or together, retaliated against Petitioners as a result of Petitioners' exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact From August 2012 through January 2015, Petitioners Verdell Carter ("V. Carter") and her daughter Courtney Carter ("C. Carter"), who are African-Americans, rented and occupied a residential unit in Cité Condominiums ("Cité") in Miami, Florida, which served as their principal residence. At all relevant times, the owners of this unit were Soo Y. Chung and Myung S. Chung (collectively, the "Lessor"). Respondent Cité Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association"), oversees the operation of the property. The Association's Board of Directors (the "Board") is its governing body. At all relevant times, a third-party property management company, FirstService Residential Florida, Inc. ("Management"), performed on-site management services at Cité. V. Carter and the Lessor entered into a lease agreement concerning Unit No. 3206 at Cité in July 2012. Pursuant to the applicable declaration of condominium, this lease (like all such leases of units at Cité) was subject to Board approval as a condition precedent of V. Carter's taking possession of the leased premises. To obtain Board approval, V. Carter and the Lessor were required (as were all persons entering into such leases) to execute an Addendum to Lease, which made the Association a third-party beneficiary of the lease and, among other things, bound the lessee to all of the rules and conditions applicable to unit owners. There is some dispute concerning the term of the subject lease. It commenced on or around August 15, 2012——that much is certain. The Carters assert that the lease was for three years, until August 15, 2015. The Association contends that the lease had a one-year term with options to renew annually for up to two additional years. The Association maintains——and acted on the belief——that it had the right to veto any attempt to renew the lease. This particular dispute is immaterial, however, for whether or not the Association could veto a renewal attempt, it clearly had the right to dispossess the Carters if they disobeyed the Association's rules. The Addendum to Lease provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Lessee agrees to abide by this Addendum, the [provisions of the Association's Declaration, By-Laws, Articles of Incorporation, Rules and Regulations, as same may be amended from time to time,] and all applicable laws, ordinances and regulations. If Lessee fails to comply with [any of these], Lessor shall promptly commence action to evict Lessee. If Lessor fails to promptly commence action to evict Lessee, Lessor hereby authorizes the Association . . . to commence eviction proceedings [on Lessor's behalf.] Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Carters repeatedly violated the rules. Early in the lease term, V. Carter brought her dog into the unit without first registering the pet with the Association as required. After Management became aware in November 2012 that V. Carter had an unregistered pet on the premises, it provided her the form for curing the violation, but she failed timely to return the paperwork. As a result, on November 26, 2012, the Association assessed a charge of $56 against the Lessor's account.3/ Meanwhile, C. Carter moved into Unit No. 3206 without informing the Association, which gave rise to a series of violations. Although C. Carter initially occupied the premises as a guest, before long she decided to remain as a resident. In time, Management noticed that C. Carter's stay had exceeded 30 days, making her an "unregistered visitor." Additionally, C. Carter parked her car——which was an "unregistered vehicle"—— in spaces reserved for Cité's owners and tenants (both residential and commercial). This resulted in several $56 charges being posted to the Lessor's account in November 2012 for unauthorized parking and for parking an unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area. In January 2013, the Lessor was again assessed a $56 charge because C. Carter had parked her unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area, along with a separate $56 charge for the presence an unregistered visitor (namely C. Carter). By letter dated January 23, 2013, the Association notified the Lessor that it intended to take steps to terminate the lease between the Lessor and V. Carter due to the Carters' failure to comply with the Association's rules. Before that could happen, however, V. Carter registered her dog, C. Carter became a registered tenant, and C. Carter rented an additional parking space from the Association for her car. The Carters assured the Lessor and the Association that, in the future, they would comply with all of the Association's rules. In due course, the Board agreed to acquiesce to the continuation of the lease, and——with the exception of a few relatively minor issues too trivial to recount——relations between the Carters, Management, the Association, and the Lessor calmed down to a reasonably peaceful state of affairs. This détente ended on Sunday, June 22, 2014. On or around that date, the commercial tenant directly below Unit No. 3206 experienced damage from water intrusion at the ceiling. Minor dampness was observed on the carpet outside the front of Unit No. 3206. Management contacted V. Carter and notified her that maintenance personnel needed to enter her unit immediately to locate the source of the leak, which there were grounds to believe was inside. Management's authority to enter the unit was clear and is not disputed. The Addendum to Lease provides: The Association and/or its authorized agent(s) shall have the irrevocable right to have access to the Unit as may be necessary for inspection, maintenance, repair or replacement of any Common Elements accessible therefrom, or for making emergency repairs necessary to prevent damages to the Common Elements or other units. Claiming that she was in the process of showering and in a state of partial undress, V. Carter refused to admit the maintenance men that Sunday morning. They left, so that V. Carter could finish getting ready. When the repair crew returned a short while later, however, V. Carter turned them away again, explaining that she was leaving for church. First thing the next day, June 23, Management notified the Lessor that V. Carter had refused to let maintenance personnel into the unit so that they could identify and repair the source of a suspected leak. The Lessor authorized Management to access the unit that morning. V. Carter, however, again refused to allow the maintenance men to enter the unit. This obstinacy violated the Association's rules and resulted in the imposition of charges totaling $126, for which the Association billed the Lessor. Eventually, Management gained access to the unit and fixed the problem in the bathroom which had caused the leak. Because V. Carter had refused access to the unit in violation of the Association's rules, the Association notified the Lessor and the Carters that it would not approve an extension of the lease beyond August 15, 2014. On June 25, 2014, V. Carter requested a meeting with the Board to discuss this decision. Her request was denied. By letter dated July 11, 2014, the Lessor notified the Carters that the lease would terminate on August 15, 2014. The Lessor also demanded payment of past due rent for April ($500) and July ($1,500) plus reimbursement of a returned-check charge of $30 that the Lessors had incurred when the Carters' June rent check bounced. A few weeks later, a heavy rainstorm, which took place late at night on Sunday, August 3, 2014, and during the early morning hours of August 4, caused Unit No. 3206 to flood. Other units flooded as well, causing an emergency situation for Management, which by all accounts responded promptly. The Carters claim to have been out of town at the time of this incident. Regardless, V. Carter acknowledges that Management contacted her by phone and requested permission——which she gave——to enter her unit to take remedial measures. Maintenance personnel entered the unit and extracted the water. In doing so, they discovered that the patio drain had been plugged with a flower pot, which likely had allowed water to pool on the patio and ultimately flood into the unit through the patio door. The Carters allege that the maintenance men discriminated against them on the basis or race or color by entering other units before taking care of Unit No. 3206. There is no persuasive evidence, however, of any sort of delay (discriminatory or otherwise) on the part of the maintenance crew, which as mentioned responded quickly and reasonably to an overnight situation affecting multiple units in addition to the Carters'. The Carters did not vacate Unit No. 3206 on or before August 15, 2014. As it happened, however, there was another rainstorm on that day which caused further flooding in the unit. C. Carter was present at the time, and she contacted Management, which addressed the immediate problem. After that, a months-long struggle ensued, during which Management and the Lessor attempted to arrange for repairs to be made to fix the damages that had resulted from the August floods and the earlier, June leak, and the Carters, while demanding that the repairs be made, refused access to repairmen and generally failed reasonably to cooperate. Around this time, as well, the Carters——who in the Lessor's eyes had become holdover tenants as of August 15——stopped paying rent to the Lessor. On August 19, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters a statutory three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises on or before August 22, 2014. The Carters did not leave. On September 12, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters another statutory three-day notice. The Carters, however, did not quit the premises. On or around September 19, 2014, the Lessor commenced an action for eviction in the Miami-Dade County Court. Several months later, the county court entered a judgment of eviction against the Carters, and, on January 20, 2015, a writ of possession was issued. The Carters moved out of Unit No. 3206 on January 23, 2015, but not without incident. Association rules prohibit the use of the stairways when moving furniture and other household goods. Residents who are moving in or out of Cité must reserve (and pay a fee for the use of) the freight elevator and loading dock. The Carters had not arranged to use the freight elevator, preferring instead to use the stairs. Management saw this violation in progress and sought to stop the Carters from moving their belongings down the stairs. The Carters would not be deterred. Management called the police, an officer arrived, and the unauthorized transport of goods through the stairwell was arrested. Meantime, V. Carter's dog urinated on the hallway carpet and on the wall. As a result of this memorable departure, the Association imposed charges against the Lessor's account totaling $950. V. Carter claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, which she characterizes as a "non-visible" disability. C. Carter claims to suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, which she characterizes as a "non- visible" disability. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of the Association's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, the Carters, or either of them, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward V. Carter or C. Carter. There is no persuasive evidence that the Association refused, upon request, to make a reasonable accommodation for either V. Carter or C. Carter. There is likewise no persuasive evidence that any of the Lessor's actions, including bringing suit to evict the Carters, were motivated by discriminatory animus or were taken to retaliate against the Carters for their exercise of a protected housing right. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination or retaliation could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding the Carters no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his handicap contrary to Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a public housing authority that administers the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, known as the “Section 8” program, within Bay County, Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Under the Section 8 program, Respondent uses funds, supplied by HUD, to pay a percentage of the monthly rent on a leased “unit” directly to the landlord. The Section 8 tenant pays the balance of the monthly rent to the landlord. The percentage paid by Respondent on each Section 8 voucher is determined by the family’s size, income, medical expenses and other similar factors. The percentage is reevaluated annually when the voucher holder is “recertified” for continuing eligibility for the Section 8 program by Respondent’s staff. As part of each recertification, the voucher holder signs a form listing “Family Obligations” required by HUD. In part, the “Family Obligations” require a Section 8 tenant to keep utilities on in the unit and to give the landlord and Respondent written notice before moving out of a unit. After Petitioner moved from New Jersey to Panama City, Florida, he received a Housing Choice Voucher from Respondent on March 23, 2005. He executed a lease for a HUD-approved unit on March 22, 2005. The lease was originally for a term of one year and then automatically became a month-to-month tenancy. Paragraph 27 of the lease requires 14-days’ written notice to terminate the lease. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner visited Respondent’s office and spoke with Andrea Lawson, the Assistant Section 8 Coordinator. She knew Petitioner from several re-certifications she had conducted on his voucher, the most recent one being on February 4, 2009. On June 16, 2009, Petitioner told Ms. Lawson that he wanted to move to be closer to friends and family, and that he and Ms. Maldonado were “bored” because there were not enough activities going on in the area. For these reasons, Petitioner wanted his Section 8 voucher transferred to Osceola County, under the "portability" provision of the Section 8 program. As was her normal custom, Ms. Lawson hand-wrote a memo for the file memorializing the conversation. Petitioner's testimony relative to the above-referenced conversation with Ms. Lawson is not credible. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner's apartment flooded in February 2009, or that he requested to have his Section 8 voucher transferred to Osceola County because he was getting sicker and the doctors in Panama City did not "understand" him. The same day as Petitioner’s visit, Ms. Lawson sent an inquiry, via telefax, to the housing authority in Osceola County, asking if they were “absorbing” Section 8 voucher holders. That term means that the receiving housing authority agrees to pay the voucher holder’s rent subsidy in the new locale, and that the original housing authority will have no further obligations to fund the voucher. The housing authority in Osceola County replied that they were not absorbing at that time. Ms. Lawson telephoned Petitioner to inform him of Osceola’s answer. In late fall of 2009, Petitioner telephoned Carol Ramer, a Section 8 Coordinator, several times. He first requested that she again ask the housing authority in Osceola County if it was absorbing, and later twice requested that she ask Orange County if it was absorbing. The replies from both authorities were that they were not absorbing. Letters mailed by Ms. Ramer to the Petitioner, to inform him of the negative replies, were returned to her as undeliverable. In early January 2010, Respondent received a letter from an attorney, on behalf of Petitioner, requesting that Respondent make a reasonable accommodation for Petitioner’s handicap by agreeing to pay the voucher subsidy for him in Osceola County. The situation where the original housing authority agrees to pay for a voucher outside its jurisdiction is referred to in the lexicon of Section 8 as “porting” or “to port”. The letter was the first time Respondent was asked to make an accommodation, or to agree to “porting” the Petitioner. The letter was also the first indication that Respondent received, indicating that Petitioner may have moved to Kissimmee in Osceola County on his own. Because of the letter, Ms. Ramer went to the unit in Parker, Florida, to see if Petitioner was still residing there. She found three United Parcel Service delivery notice stickers affixed to the front door; all three were dated in mid-August 2009. She also found no signs that the unit was occupied. Ms. Ramer then contacted the City of Parker water department and was told the water service to the unit had been shut off at the customer’s request on June 18, 2009. Petitioner and his cousin admitted during the hearing that they put the water “on-hold” before they left. Petitioner asserts that while “passing through the streets” of Kissimmee, he found several apartments that were cheaper than the rent on his unit in Parker. However, he admitted that he did not know if those cheaper units met HUD’s standards for the Section 8 program. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he left his Section 8 unit in Parker on June 18, 2009, re-located to Kissimmee, and has never returned to Bay County. He also admitted that he never gave his landlord or Respondent any written notice that he intended to vacate his unit in Parker. In addition, he admitted he is familiar with the Section 8 Family Obligation rules and signed off that he would comply with them. In recent years, HUD has significantly cut back its Section 8 funding allotted to local housing authorities. At the same time, the downturn in the economy has increased unemployment in Bay County, thus requiring Respondent either to pay a greater percentage of existing Section 8 vouchers or to terminate some vouchers. Increased unemployment has forced Respondent to implement cost cutting measures, including the following: (a) through attrition, reducing the number of families served under the voucher program from over 420 several years ago to only 326 now; (b) issuing no new vouchers; (c) adopting a policy that it would not “absorb” voucher holders moving into Bay County and would not “port” voucher holders to jurisdictions outside Bay County. No one has been "ported" out or "absorbed" in three years. This policy applies across the board to all voucher holders. The only families who have moved out during this period and retained their vouchers are those that were “absorbed” by the receiving housing authorities. Both Osceola and Orange Counties are higher cost areas than Bay County. If Respondent were to agree to “port” a voucher to either of those counties, it would have to pay more than it pays for one family in Bay County, thus reducing its ability to serve as many local residents as possible with its limited funding. Petitioner presented no evidence of quantifiable damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Adalberto Diaz 2307 Boggy Creek Road, Box 38 Kissimmee, Florida 34744 William C. Henry, Esquire Burke Blue Hutchison Walters & Smith, P.A. 16215 Panama City Beach Parkway Panama City, Florida 32413 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact In January 2008, Petitioner filed a “Housing Discrimination Complaint” with FCHR and/or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race (black) and religion (Christian) in its servicing of her home mortgage loan. On or about March 27, 2008, a “Determination” was issued finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner. On April 18, 2008, FCHR sent a “Notice of Determination of No Cause” to Petitioner by certified mail No. 7007 1490 0002 5958 0931. Petitioner received the Notice on April 22, 2008, according to the certified mail receipt included in the case file. The Notice advised Petitioner that “FCHR has determined reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.” The Notice further advised Petitioner that she could request an administrative hearing, and clearly stated that any such request “must be filed with the FCHR within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice.” A “Petition for Relief, in blank” was sent to Petitioner along with the Notice. On May 23, 2008, FCHR received a completed “Petition for Relief” form from Petitioner. The form was signed by Petitioner and dated May 20, 2008. Petitioner stated in her response to the Order to Show Cause that she “never received any paperwork on the above case” and that “the only paperwork that [she] received was on or a about June 9, 2008.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2008.
