The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated from disqualifying offenses, and whether Respondent’s intended agency action to deny her request for an exemption from disqualification is an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Parties Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating employment of persons who provide direct service to APD clients. APD clients are a vulnerable population of individuals whose developmental disabilities include intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, cerebral palsy, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down syndrome. Respondent’s clients are often incapable of adequately communicating their needs or whether they have been harmed. Therefore, employment as a direct service provider to Respondent’s clients is considered a position of trust. A person seeking employment in a position of trust must undergo a pre-employment Level 2 background screening to ensure the person has not been convicted of crimes that may pose a threat to vulnerable persons. Petitioner is a 35-year-old female who seeks to qualify for employment with a direct service provider (Right Direction Christian Center, Inc.) in a position of trust. The position for which she applied required that she undergo Level 2 background screening. The Level 2 background screening revealed that Petitioner committed five disqualifying offenses between July 1, 2004, and August 4, 2005, which were described as follows: Count I: Aggravated Child Abuse with a Deadly Weapon (first degree felony); Count II: Aggravated Child Abuse by Great Bodily Harm (first degree felony); Count III: Child Neglect (third degree felony); Count IV: Child Neglect (third degree felony); and Count V: Child Neglect (third degree felony). Disqualifying Offenses The events leading to the disqualifying offenses occurred 11 years ago, when Petitioner was 24 years old. She had two biological children, a son (age 6) and a daughter (age 3), at the time of the events. Each of the disqualifying events involved Petitioner’s children. On August 4, 2005, the paternal aunt of Petitioner’s son observed injuries to the son’s foot and contacted the Leon County Sherriff’s Office to report suspected child abuse. The responding officer recorded his observations in a police report.2/ Petitioner’s son indicated that Petitioner struck him with a metal mop handle on his feet, legs, and arms as punishment. The deputy observed a three-quarters inch, circular-shaped laceration, with two smaller lacerations beside it on the inside of the son’s left heel. On August 16, 2005, a detective continued the investigation. During an interview with the detective, Petitioner’s son indicated that Petitioner struck him with a hanger causing “marks” on his back, which the detective photographed. The detective observed the “marks.” Petitioner’s son also complained of a toothache. He indicated Petitioner placed a heated hairpin in his tooth to resolve the tooth decay. The detective noted in his report that the tooth appeared to be decayed to the root. Petitioner also left her son and daughter at home without supervision, while Petitioner was at work. At the conclusion of the investigation, Petitioner was arrested and charged with child abuse and neglect. On October 26, 2005, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to all five disqualifying offenses described above. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment of 70 days (with 62 days credited for time served), imposed 42 months of probation with special conditions that she: 1) follow orders of the Department of Children and Families; 2) complete parenting and anger management classes within one year; and 3) pay court costs and fees. Petitioner completed all terms and was released from probation on July 30, 2009. On May 10, 2016, Petitioner paid the civil judgment related to costs and fees imposed for her 2005 offenses and the court issued a Satisfaction of Judgment. Non-Disqualifying Offense In addition to disqualifying offenses, agencies may also consider criminal events that occur after the disqualifying offense. The background screening revealed one non- disqualifying offense. On June 13, 2006, Petitioner was charged with Violation of Probation (“VOP”) for driving without a valid driver’s license. As a result of the VOP charge, on November 16, 2006, the court issued an Order modifying the probation. The Order of modification added 30 days in jail with credit for time served and prohibited Petitioner from early termination of probation. Exemption Request/Agency Review By letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment because of her criminal offenses. She requested an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner filed her Request for Exemption with the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). DCF conducts the background screening and prepares an exemption investigation file on Respondent’s behalf. A DCF background screener compiled the investigation materials and forwarded the exemption review file to Respondent. Petitioner’s file was assigned to Lynne Daw for a recommendation regarding the exemption request. Ms. Daw is the regional operations manager for the Northwest region. She has been employed in that position since April 2012. Her job responsibilities include overseeing operations of the region, background screening, and eligibility for direct service providers. Ms. Daw reviewed Petitioner’s exemption request file, which included the exemption review summary, court documents, police reports and supporting affidavits, Petitioner’s exemption questionnaire, notice of termination of probation supervision, affidavit of good moral character, character reference letters, reference check verification form, high school diploma from Cornerstone Christian Correspondence School, and certificate of completion for a parenting class. Respondent considers the nature of the disqualifying offenses when evaluating a request for exemption. At hearing, Ms. Daw testified that the nature of the disqualifying criminal charges were concerning due to the vulnerability of the clients Respondent serves. In her review, Ms. Daw relied upon statements contained in the police report made by a physician who examined Petitioner’s son. Those statements are hearsay within hearsay. Because the statements do not meet any hearsay exception, they cannot be considered for a finding of fact. Respondent also considers the history of an applicant since the incident and other evidence or circumstances indicating whether the applicant would present a danger to Respondent’s clients if employment is permitted. Respondent considers counseling a factor, when the nature of the offense involves acts of anger. Ms. Daw testified that there was no evidence in the exemption packet to show Petitioner completed an anger management course. During the hearing, however, Petitioner refuted this contention and stated she completed an anger management course. The evidence in the record includes a notice of termination of supervision from Petitioner’s probation officer. Completion of an anger management course was a term of Petitioner’s probation. Therefore, a reasonable inference could be drawn that she completed the anger management course. Ms. Daw also expressed concern for safety of Respondent’s clients who could be transported by Petitioner. Of note, Petitioner’s background screening revealed several traffic violations. However, none of the violations involved injuries to passengers or others. Subsequent to the disqualifying offenses, Petitioner has furthered her education by earning a general education diploma (also known as GED) on December 1, 2011, and a certified nursing assistance (CNA) certification on November 16, 2015. She is not eligible to take the certification exam due to the Level 2 screening results. Petitioner also maintained employment after her convictions until June 4, 2015. From April 3, 2006, to June 4, 2015, Petitioner worked at Big Lots as a recovery associate. From April 8, 2012, to May 6, 2014, Petitioner worked at Vector Connect (Cutco) as a sales representative. She described her duties as selling cutlery. Petitioner provided favorable reference letters in support of her request for exemption. The first letter described Petitioner as patient, dependable, and trustworthy. The author indicated that Petitioner served as the primary caregiver for her physically disabled mother. It is not clear, however, the length of time Petitioner provided the care to the author’s mother or whether Petitioner was paid for her work. The second letter indicated Petitioner is kind and professional. The author of that letter is described as a friend. Overall, the letters indicated Petitioner may be a good employee but were not helpful on the issue of rehabilitation. Ms. Daw concluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, there was no clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner could work in a position of trust without posing a safety risk to Respondent’s clients. As a result, Ms. Daw recommended the request for exemption be denied and submitted the exemption file to the agency director, Barbara Palmer, for final determination. The agency director issued the notice of denial on May 27, 2016, notifying Petitioner of Respondent’s determination to deny her request for exemption. Given the nature of harm due to physical abuse and the potential of harm due to neglect, Petitioner’s actions raise concern about her ability to work with vulnerable persons. Absent compelling evidence that such serious behavior will not be repeated, Petitioner has not met her burden. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence in this case did not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses. Despite Petitioner’s statements that she accepts full responsibility for her actions, she continues to shift blame to her son’s aunt for her arrest and continues to deny that she left her young children at home alone. To her credit, Petitioner has taken steps to improve her life by earning a GED and CNA certificate and by volunteering with the elderly in the community. However, such evidence is not sufficient clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation. Respondent did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for exemption from the disqualifying offenses because, on these facts, a reasonable person would reach the same conclusion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Shimika King’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from employment disqualification, thereby allowing him to work in a position of special trust or responsibility.
Findings Of Fact When Petitioner was a very young child, his mother was a drug addict with a criminal history for stealing. When Petitioner was in the fifth grade, he went to live with his father, a public school teacher, and his grandmother in Palm Beach County, Florida. In December 1989, Petitioner was a 13-year-old middle school student. Petitioner became involved with other boys who had a bad influence on him. On one occasion, Petitioner was present when the group tried to bully another student into giving up his lunch money. The victim did not sustain any significant physical injury. As a result of that incident, Petitioner was charged with attempted strong arm robbery. In a subsequent trial in juvenile court, a circuit judge in Palm Beach County, Florida, determined that Petitioner had committed the delinquent act of battery on a minor as the lessor included charge of attempted strong arm robbery. The judge withheld adjudication of a delinquent act, placing Petitioner in a community control program under the supervision of a counselor. The judge required Petitioner to complete 20 hours in a community service work program. Most importantly, the judge instructed Petitioner to have no further contact with certain people. On August 13, 1990, the circuit judge entered an Order terminating Petitioner's supervision in Case No. CJ-90-0281-JK. The Order states that Petitioner had successfully fulfilled all conditions of the community control program for a reasonable period of time. After graduating from high school, Petitioner went to college in August 1995. From June 1995 through June 1998, Petitioner worked for Target Department Stores in West Palm Beach, Florida. His job title was loss prevention specialist, which involved monitoring the store for shoplifting and preparing data on the inventory losses. Petitioner quit his job with Target Department Stores to attend college at Bethune-Cookman College in Daytona Beach, Florida. While he was enrolled at Bethune-Cookman College, Petitioner became the primary custodian of his infant son. On February 12, 1999, Petitioner was on his way home from class in Daytona Beach, Florida. Based on a case of mistaken identity, Petitioner was stopped and arrested for robbery. Soon thereafter, the authorities realized that Petitioner was not the perpetrator of the robbery. On March 23, 1999, the state attorney for Volusia County, Florida, filed an Announcement of No Information in Case No. 99-30708CFAES, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida. The state attorney directed the police department to hold all physical evidence because charges were to be filed against the actual perpetrator. Petitioner's mother was released from prison in 1998. Petitioner and his sister, a public school teacher, decided that they would try to help rehabilitate their mother. On November 11, 1999, Petitioner went to a department store in Volusia County, Florida, with his girlfriend, his mother, his mother's boyfriend, and one of his mother's male friends. Petitioner was the last member of the group to enter the store. Petitioner spoke to his mother and went to the restroom in the store. Petitioner then shopped for a shirt but left the store with the group without buying anything. Clear and convincing evidence indicates that Petitioner and his girlfriend were not engaged in shoplifting while they were in the store. Petitioner's testimony that he was unaware that his mother, his mother's boyfriend, and his mother's other male friend were shoplifting is also clear and convincing. As the group left the store, the store's security officer approached the group, demanding the return of all stolen merchandise. Petitioner immediately showed the security officer that he did not have any merchandise. The security officer gave Petitioner permission to leave the premises. Petitioner's mother, her boyfriend, and her other male friend were in possession of stolen merchandise. The two male friends took off running through the parking lot. Petitioner's mother returned the stolen merchandise in her possession to the security officer and got in the car with Petitioner and his girlfriend. As Petitioner left the parking lot with his two passengers, the police arrived on the scene. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that it was wrong to let his mother leave the premises with him after he learned about her theft of merchandise. Petitioner's girlfriend subsequently returned to the department store to inquire about the boyfriend and other male friend of Petitioner's mother. Petitioner's girlfriend also went to the police station to determine whether the two men had been arrested. After she began to make these inquiries, Petitioner's girlfriend was arrested. About a month after the incident, a warrant was issued for Petitioner's arrest for grand theft. Petitioner turned himself in to the authorities as soon as he learned about the warrant. Petitioner's arrest for grand theft was based on a statement in a police report that merchandise valued at approximately $600 was stolen from the store on November 11, 1999. However, there is no persuasive evidence as to the actual value of merchandise stolen from the store. In regard to the charges against Petitioner for grand theft, Petitioner subsequently entered into a pretrial intervention agreement with the state attorney in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida, in Case No. 99-35807-CFAES. After successfully complying with the terms of the agreement, the state attorney issued a Notice of Completion of Pretrial Intervention and Nolle Prosequi in that case on March 12, 2001. Petitioner graduated from Bethune-Cookman College in July 2000. He earned a bachelor of science degree in criminal justice. On or about May 2, 2001, Petitioner applied for employment with Respondent as a senior juvenile detention officer. He applied for vacant positions at the Volusia County Regional Juvenile Detention Center in Volusia County, Florida, and the St. Johns River Juvenile Detention Center in St. Augustine, Florida. The position of senior juvenile detention officer requires caretaker/direct contact with juveniles. In Petitioner's employment application, he indicated that he had never had the adjudication of guilt withheld to a crime which was a felony or a first-degree misdemeanor. This was not a true statement because adjudication was withheld in Palm Beach County Circuit Court Case No. CJ-90-0281-JK for battery on a minor, which is a first-degree misdemeanor pursuant to Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. Petitioner signed the application, certifying the following in relevant part: I am aware that any omissions, falsifications, misstatements, or misrepresentations about may disqualify me for employment consideration and, if I am hired, may be grounds for termination at a later date . . . I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief all of the statements contained herein and on any attachments are true, correct, complete, and made in good faith. By letter dated May 3, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent's Inspector General that a background investigation would reveal Petitioner's 1990 conviction for battery on a minor as a lesser included offense of strong arm robbery, both of which are disqualifying offenses for employment with Respondent. The purpose of writing this letter was to request an exemption from employment disqualification. Respondent received this letter on or about May 9, 2001. On May 10, 2001, Petitioner signed a notarized application affidavit, which states as follows in pertinent part: I fully understand that in order to qualify as a Juvenile Justice direct care employee, I must comply with the provisions of Section 985.406, Florida Statutes, as follows: * * * 3. Not have been convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving perjury or false statement, not have received a dishonorable discharge from any of the Armed Forces of the United States. Any person who, after October 1, 1999, pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is found guilty of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving perjury or false statement shall not be eligible for employment or appointment as a direct care employee, not withstanding suspensions of a sentence or withholding of adjudication. * * * In addition, I attest to the following: Yes No I understand that by executing this document I am attesting that I have met the qualifications as specified and have provided documentation of proof of my qualifications to the above listed employing agency. Yes No I have read my employment application and it is true and correct, and all other information I will furnish in conjunction with my application is true and correct. NOTICE: This document shall constitute an official statement within the purview of Section 837.06, Florida Statutes, and is subject to verification by the employing agency and/or the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. Any international [sic] omission when submitting application or false execution of this affidavit shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree and disqualify you from employment as a juvenile justice direct care employee. I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information that I entered on this form is true. Petitioner signed this affidavit and circled the word "Yes" in the above referenced attestation. On May 10, 2001, Petitioner signed a form giving his consent for Respondent to perform background screening of Petitioner's criminal history, driver's license history, and delinquency reports (juvenile criminal history). The form clearly states that Respondent has access to all criminal records, even those which have been sealed or expunged. On May 10, 2001, Petitioner signed a form entitled Affidavit of Good Moral Character. In this affidavit, Petitioner acknowledged that his record contained "one or more of the disqualifying acts or offenses" listed in the affidavit. Specifically, Petitioner's conviction for battery on a minor in 1990 was a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. That statute was listed in the affidavit as a disqualifying offense. On or about May 21, 2001, Respondent completed the investigation of Petitioner's background. In addition to the 1999 conviction for battery on a minor, the investigation revealed Petitioner's arrests in 1999 for robbery and grand theft. By letter dated May 25, 2001, Respondent advised Petitioner that he could request a desk review of his background screening application. The letter requested Petitioner to submit the desk review request form and any supporting documentation within 30 days. Specifically, Respondent requested Petitioner to furnish the following in pertinent part: CERTIFIED police reports and/or arrest reports and CERTIFIED judgement/disposition from the Clerk of Courts for disqualifying criminal offense, as well as for any other criminal offenses to which the [sic] you have either pled guilty or no contest or been found guilty. If these documents cannot be obtained, you will need to present certified statements from the courts and law enforcement agencies indicating the records is [sic] not available or does [sic] not exist. Offense Date Authority Arrest 1: Robbery, Reduced 1/16/90 Juvenile to Battery on Adj. W/H Minor A detailed, written and notarized description of the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the disqualifying criminal offense. The time period which has elapsed since the offense. Whether there was any harm caused to victims and the nature of that harm. Your personal history since the offense (work, education, civic, religious history, etc.) And, such other circumstances as shall be sufficient to indicate that you will not present a danger to the safety or well being of juveniles. A statement as to whether you have been involved in any other criminal offenses either prior to subsequent to the commission of the disqualifying offense. . . . Petitioner received this letter on or about June 5, 2001. Petitioner subsequently sent Respondent a form dated June 5, 2001, seeking a desk review of his request for an exemption from disqualification based on the fact that he had clear and convincing evidence to support a reasonable belief that he was of good moral character. Respondent received Petitioner's request on or about June 19, 2001. By letter dated June 13, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent as follows in pertinent part: Since the commission of the disqualifying offense in my middle school years, I have not been convicted or had adjudication withheld against me on any charges. This letter did not refer to Petitioner's arrests in 1999. By letter dated June 13, 2001, Petitioner provided Respondent with a detailed explanation of the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense. Petitioner did not reference his 1999 arrests in this letter. By letter dated June 13, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent as to his qualifications and desire to work with juveniles. Petitioner did not reference his 1999 arrests in this letter. At Petitioner's request, three professors at Bethune- Cookman College sent Respondent letters of reference for Petitioner. The Mayor of Daytona Beach and Petitioner's then current employer also wrote letters in support of Petitioner's application for employment with Respondent. At least one of the Bethune-Cookman College professors was aware of Petitioner's criminal history, including his arrests in 1999. At some point in time, Petitioner provided Respondent with certified copies of the 1990 Order and Order Terminating Supervision relating to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner also furnished Respondent with copies of the 1999 Announcement of No Information relating the robbery charge and the 1999 Notice of Completion of Pretrial Intervention and Nolle Prosequi relating to the grand theft charge. Additionally, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the police report relating to the grand theft charge. Petitioner never provided Respondent with a written statement explaining his arrests in 1999. By memorandum dated June 20, 2001, Respondent's staff requested Respondent's Inspector General to review Petitioner's background screening file and indicate whether Petitioner's request for an exemption was granted or denied. The Inspector General denied Petitioner an exemption. By letter dated June 21, 2001, Respondent advised Petitioner that his request for exemption from employment disqualification was denied. Petitioner was 25 years old at the time of the hearing. He is currently working as a licensed security guard.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Shawnee S. Lawrence, Esquire 1010 West 4th Street Rivera Beach, Florida 33404 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's request for an exemption pursuant to chapter 435, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Approximately ten years ago, Atkinson was charged with attempted armed robbery of a book store. Atkinson offered the following facts relating to the attempted robbery: (1) she decided to rob a book store in Georgia, (2) she secured an unloaded BB gun, (3) she entered the store, (4) she changed her mind when she encountered verbal resistance from the store clerk, (5) she ran from the store, (6) she was apprehended a few blocks from the book store, and (7) she was arrested for armed robbery. Atkinson pled no contest to a lower charge of attempted theft by taking and was sentenced to four years unsupervised probation. Other than the attempted theft by taking, Atkinson has no criminal record. Atkinson operates a small daycare center from her home in Lynn Haven, Bay County, Florida. Because she intended to expand the facility, Atkinson filed the requisite applications with the Department. Subsequently, Atkinson's criminal record was revealed. As a result of her criminal record, Atkinson was advised that she was ineligible to hold a position caring for children. The Department notified Atkinson of her right to request an exemption. Subsequently, Atkinson appeared before the Department's exemption review board, and she spoke on her own behalf. Atkinson offered neither witnesses nor exhibits at the hearing. According to the Christiane LeClair, the Department's District Screening Coordinator, Atkinson appeared to minimize the seriousness of the offense, and she did not voice true remorse for her actions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the screening committee recommended denial of her exemption request. Atkinson contested the Department's decision denying her exemption. The contest resulted in this chapter 120 hearing before the undersigned administrative law judge. Unlike her appearance before the screening committee, at the administrative hearing Atkinson brought six witnesses and introduced a composite exhibit. The witnesses came from varying occupational backgrounds and varying educational levels and all shared similar positive impressions of Atkinson. For example, James Douglas Williams, a senior foster care counselor for the Department of Children and Family Services in Bay County, testified that Atkinson had cared for his children, that she was trustworthy, and that she was more than competent to care for children. Mr. Williams was aware of Atkinson's criminal past. He stated that her criminal past did not give him a negative impression of Atkinson, and he reasoned that the crime was a youthful indiscretion for which she has adequately paid her debt to society. Mr. Luther W. McDonald, Jr. also testified on behalf of Atkinson. Mr. McDonald is a thirty-seven year veteran of the Bay County School District, and he has lived next door to Atkinson for the past three years. Based on Mr. McDonald's personal observations, he feels that Atkinson is well able to provide care for children. Mr. McDonald also was aware of Atkinson's criminal conviction, and like Mr. Williams, he feels that it was an isolated event that occurred over ten years ago which should not now have a negative effect on her ability to serve as a child care provider. A series of satisfied parents also testified on Atkinson's behalf. Each parent testified that Atkinson had cared for their respective children and that she provided a warm, caring, and nurturing environment. They also testified that they were aware of her criminal history and that it had no impact on their decision to enroll their children in Atkinson's care.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order GRANTING Atkinson's request for exemption. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1996.
The Issue Whether the Agency’s intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner is a 37-year-old female residing in Jacksonville, Florida. She desires to work as a Medicaid waiver provider, an independent solo provider of community-based services to the Agency’s clients with developmental disabilities. On October 12, 2009, the Agency granted Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment for an offense of grand theft committed on December 28, 2001. Between 2004 and 2009, Petitioner was a service provider for Agency clients both in a group home setting and as a solo provider of community-based services. On July 14, 2011, the Florida Department of Children and Families issued Petitioner a notice that she was ineligible for continued employment in a position of special trust working with children or the developmentally disabled based on a felony offense of aggravated assault committed on December 30, 2010. The Disqualifying Offense On December 30, 2010, Petitioner was driving by her boyfriend’s home and noticed a vehicle backing out of his driveway. Petitioner knew the vehicle belonged to another woman, Ms. Stevens. Petitioner called her boyfriend on his cellular phone, confirmed he was in the car, and began conversing with him. Petitioner and her boyfriend engaged in a series of calls with each other over the next few minutes while she followed Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner wanted the driver of the car to pull off the road so she could talk to her boyfriend in person. Petitioner pulled her vehicle alongside Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. The situation escalated. The vehicles were traveling on a parallel path on a two-lane road in a residential subdivision. In her anger, Petitioner threw an open soda can through the rear window of Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Finally, Petitioner’s vehicle struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles pulled off the road. Petitioner’s boyfriend exited the vehicle, but Ms. Stevens took off and returned with a law enforcement officer. The police report notes approximately $700 in damage to the two vehicles. During the entire incident, Petitioner’s two minor children were back seat passengers in Petitioner’s vehicle. Following an investigation, the police determined Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of criminal mischief and reckless driving. Petitioner served two days in jail. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to both charges, adjudication was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on 12 months’ probation, ordered to complete 75 hours of community service, attend anger management training, and pay fines and fees amounting to $1,068. Petitioner attended a one-day anger management class through the Salvation Army in 2011. Petitioner was released from probation on May 3, 2012. Employment Following the Disqualifying Offense Petitioner worked as an executive housekeeper for a Hilton Garden Inn in Jacksonville from June 2012 to November 2013. Petitioner worked briefly as a manager at a Subway restaurant between March and October 2014. In November 2014, Petitioner began employment as a manager at a Burger King restaurant in Jacksonville, where she remained employed on the date of hearing. Subsequent Criminal History Petitioner has had no disqualifying offense since the 2011 aggravated battery offense. Petitioner was cited for three traffic infractions between 2011 and 2013. One of the infractions was a criminal charge of driving without a valid driver’s license. The other two citations were for speeding and failing to yield the right- of-way. Petitioner’s Exemption Request Petitioner’s exemption package was slim. In addition to the exemption questionnaire, in which she provided little information regarding herself, Petitioner submitted a one-page narrative letter and two very brief character reference letters. On the questionnaire, Petitioner reported no damage to any persons or property from the disqualifying offense. Further, Petitioner reported no stressors in her life at the time of the offense. As to her current stressors, Petitioner reported none, and listed her family, church, and herself as her current support system. Petitioner reported no counseling other than the one- day anger management class completed in 2011. Petitioner listed no educational achievements or training. As for accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner wrote, “I feel very remorse [sic] for my actions and I take full responsibility for them.” One of the character reference letters was from a co- worker (perhaps even someone under her supervision) and did not identify the name of the employer or dates she worked with Petitioner. The letter described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to do her best” as well as “proficient in all cores of her profession.” The author further described Petitioner as a Christian who is very involved with her church and youth ministry, and who is considered a good and loving mother. The author of the second character reference letter did not identify her relationship to Petitioner, but indicated that she had known Petitioner for six years. She described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to the community as a youth leader and big sister to the children of her church.” Further, she wrote, “[Petitioner] is a compassionate and loving person, but above all she is a Christian who loves her children and her church.” In her personal statement, Petitioner described the events surrounding the disqualifying offense as follows: I was involved with a young man at the time of this incidence [sic]. What happen [sic] on that day was this young man had been calling my phone all day and we passed each other on the street in the same neighborhood and I followed him. We both at this time kept calling each others [sic] phone back to back. After a few blocks both cars came to a stop. Neither of us got out of the car. Each of us pulled off the same time and our cars bumped each other. After a few more blocks we stopped again. He got out of the car from the passenger side. I then realize [sic] that he was not the driver. A few minutes later the car came back. An off duty police officer with JSO wrote me a ticket for reckless driving, operating a vehicle with no insurance and criminal mischief. Mean while [sic] two more officers with JSO arrived on the scene and one of the officers decided to arrest me and charged me with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (with no intent to kill). Petitioner offered nothing else related to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner’s narrative does not reveal an understanding of the seriousness of her offense or offer any explanation for her behavior. Nor does the narrative back up her statements on the questionnaire that she feels remorse and has accepted responsibility for her actions. In formulating its decision to deny Petitioner’s request for exemption, the Agency considered the following factors to be significant: Petitioner’s disqualifying offense occurred just a year after having been granted an exemption from a prior disqualifying offense of grand theft. The offense demonstrated a lack of good judgement and decisionmaking. Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner’s children were in the car at the time of the incident. Petitioner was 32 years old at the time of the incident. Petitioner reported no life stressors at the time of the disqualifying offense and no significant changes in her life subsequently. Petitioner was not forthcoming in her application about the damage to the vehicles incurred during the incident. Petitioner’s driving record raises a concern with her ability to safely transport Agency clients. The Agency also considered that Petitioner’s character references were not from past or current employers, that they revealed very little about the relationship between the author and Petitioner, and that they did not acknowledge the disqualifying offense or offer any indication of changes in Petitioner’s life. Final Hearing Petitioner’s attitude at hearing was defensive. Petitioner took issue with the description of events surrounding the disqualifying offense noted in the police report. Petitioner particularly stressed that the vehicles were stopped, rather than traveling down the one-lane road side by side, when she threw the soda can into Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner denied that she intentionally struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle, but rather insisted that the vehicles “bumped” as they were both pulling off the road at the same time. Petitioner offered no witnesses on her behalf. Petitioner introduced one additional character reference letter from Reverend Charles G. Skinner, Pastor, Twin Springs Missionary Baptist Church. Pastor Skinner stated that he had pastored Petitioner for 10 years and had witnessed “spiritual maturity” in her life. In the letter, Pastor Skinner described Petitioner as an active member of the church, a devout Christian and mother “with an humbling nature exhibiting a thirst for erudition.” Petitioner did not demonstrate her humble nature at the hearing. Petitioner was defensive, argumentative, and spent her time pointing out “inaccuracies” in the police report. Petitioner has no understanding of the seriousness of her offense, and was “baffled” that the charge included a reference to a deadly weapon when she had no weapon at the time. Petitioner downplayed the event, testifying that the whole incident took maybe 8 to 10 minutes, and that the vehicles were traveling slowly, perhaps 15 to 20 miles per hour. Petitioner acknowledged that her children were in the vehicle at the time of the incident, but insisted they were not in danger and that she would never do anything to put her children in danger. Throughout the hearing, Petitioner emphasized she had no idea Ms. Stevens was driving the vehicle in which her boyfriend was riding, until the vehicles pulled off the roadway. Apparently Petitioner believed that the facts were more favorable to her if it was only her boyfriend she was trying to run off the road, rather than her boyfriend and “the other woman.” Petitioner failed to appreciate that no matter who was driving the vehicle, Petitioner’s actions put them at risk.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent should take final action to deny Petitioner's application for a real estate sales associate license on the grounds set forth in Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny.
Findings Of Fact The "Key for License Denials," attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference as the Key to the Commission's Findings of Fact in this case. Pursuant to the Key for License Denials, the Commission finds the following facts in this case, to wit: 2,4,5
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order announcing its intention to continue to process Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate rather than denying the application on the grounds stated in its December 28, 2011, Notice of Intent to Deny. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2012.
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent properly terminated Petitioner from his employment as a deputy sheriff for alleged insubordination in violation of Chapter 89-404, Section 8, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 8, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act) and Respondent's General Order Section 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.17(a), and, if not, whether Respondent should reinstate Petitioner to his former position with back pay, benefits, and seniority.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida. Respondent is responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent employed Petitioner as a deputy sheriff, and Petitioner was subject to relevant rules and regulations identified in the record as General Orders and Rules. Sometime in July 2004, Ms. Caroline Hart, a private citizen, communicated to Petitioner that she had previously been the subject of inappropriate sexual misconduct from Deputy Sheriff Gerald Akins when Deputy Akins responded to a call from Ms. Hart within the city of Dunedin, Florida. Ms. Hart knew Petitioner from a previous relationship. Petitioner was uncertain of the procedure he should follow, and sought advice from Corporal James Cooper, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Corporal Cooper was the acting sergeant for their squad. No sergeant was scheduled to be on duty that night when the squad was to begin its shift. Petitioner telephoned Corporal Cooper and reported the accusations by Ms. Hart. Corporal Cooper assured Petitioner that Petitioner had followed the correct procedure and that Corporal Cooper would report the information to Sergeant Michael Rogers, the shift commander for the shift that included their squad and that of Sergeant Rogers. During the conversation between Corporal Cooper and Petitioner, Corporal Cooper stated that Petitioner should not discuss the matter with Deputy Akins. Petitioner subsequently telephoned Deputy Akins and told him about the accusations by Ms. Hart. Respondent alleges that when Petitioner communicated with Deputy Akins Petitioner committed insubordination by "refusing to obey a lawful order" from Corporal Cooper within the meaning of General Order Section 3-1.1, Subsection 5.17(a)(the rule). Petitioner asserts that the statement by Corporal Cooper was advice, rather than an order, and that Petitioner did not commit insubordination. The factual issue presented is whether Corporal Cooper ordered Petitioner not to speak to Deputy Akins. A finding of insubordination requires a preponderance of evidence to show that Corporal Cooper intended to issue an order, that the express words used by Corporal Cooper clearly stated an order, that Petitioner understood the statement to be an order, and that Petitioner intentionally refused to follow an order. Relevant rules do not define terms such as an "order" or "refusing an order" and do not distinguish an "order" or an "instruction" from "advice." The trier of fact defines relevant terms based on the plain and ordinary meaning of relevant terms as they are defined in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., at 25, 1238, and 1469 (Boston 2000), and as explained in relevant testimony during the hearing. As the Chief Deputy explained during his testimony: The terminology that we use is a lawful order. I'm not certain that there is a specific definition within the policies. My understanding of the . . . the term order . . . in the context of our rules and regulations is basically the definition that I guess you would refer to in a dictionary in terms of when an order is given. Transcript (TR) at 220. Corporal Cooper clearly intended to order Petitioner to refrain from talking to Deputy Akins. Corporal Cooper assumed in his own mind there was a possibility for either a criminal or internal investigation, or both. Consistent with standard operating procedures in either type of investigation, Corporal Cooper intended to preserve the opportunity for investigators to "blind side" Deputy Akins by not giving him a head's up before questioning him. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Corporal Cooper ever articulated the disputed order. The words used by Corporal Cooper to articulate the alleged order are not in evidence. Corporal Cooper does not recall what he said to Petitioner. The words used to communicate an order are essential to the existence of an order and to an understanding in the mind of a recipient, such as Petitioner, that he is receiving an order. As the Chief Deputy explained during his testimony: Obviously you need to be clear as to what words were used at the time when Corporal Cooper spoke with Deputy Collinsworth as it related to any communication with Deputy Akins. TR at 221-222. Corporal Cooper does not recall the exact words he used to communicate with Petitioner. Petitioner understood Corporal Cooper to advise Petitioner not to contact Deputy Akins. Corporal Cooper and Petitioner were the only parties to their conversation. The exact words used by Corporal Cooper, if they were in evidence, must also be interpreted in the context of the conversation with Petitioner. In response to a question from the trier of fact concerning the distinction between an order and advice, the Chief Deputy explained: And I think that the best way to describe that is in the context of . . . the words used. . . . [T]here would be some question as to the specific verbiage that was used and putting that into context as you made your decision. TR at 221-222. The conversation between Corporal Cooper and Petitioner arose in the context of Petitioner soliciting advice from Corporal Cooper. Corporal Cooper gave Petitioner advice in the same conversation in which he intended to "instruct" Petitioner to refrain from talking with Deputy Akins. However, Corporal Cooper did not verbally distinguish the advice from the instruction or clearly segue from advice to an order. Conflict testimony from Corporal Cooper during direct and cross examination elucidates the ambiguous context of the conversation with Petitioner. During direct examination by counsel for Respondent, Corporal Cooper testified that he gave Petitioner an instruction in response to Petitioner's request for advice: Deputy Collinsworth had called. He was upset. He stated he needed some advice. Q. Did you give Mr. Collinsworth some advice regarding his dealings with Ms. Hart? A. Yes. I told him not to talk with her any further, ignore her phone calls and not to have any personal contact with her. Q. And what did you tell Mr. Collinsworth about the allegations that Ms. Hart had made pertaining to Deputy Akins? A. Well . . . I told him that he started at the right spot and that I was going to have to get with Sergeant Rogers, because he was our shift commander at the time, and present the information to him and see where it goes from there. Q. And did you give . . . Deputy Collinsworth any other instructions about how he should deal with this information? A. I did tell him not to contact Akins, so I wanted to get a word for word from Akins. I didn't want him to have a head's up. (emphasis supplied) TR at 53-55. On cross-examination, Corporal Cooper did not recall the exact words he used to communicate with Petitioner and cast the conversation with Petitioner in a different light. In relevant part, Corporal Cooper testified: Q. And Shane was off duty to the best of your knowledge? A. Yes. Q. 'Cause he worked with you on the same shift, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And you gave advice to Deputy Collinsworth about this whole situation, didn't you? A. Yes. Q. And some of your advice was to terminate all the phone calls with Ms. Hart and all the communication and all that, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And that wasn't an order, was it? A. No. Q. Now when you were testifying on direct you mentioned that you went into the conversation about what to do with Akins, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Did you preface anything in between the conversation about Hart and now talking about Akins, did you preface it with anything such as, well, now this is an order? Did you make any suggestion that you were changing from advice to an order? A. Not in that manner, no. Q. And as a matter of fact you don't remember what you said verbatim, is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. As a matter of fact you could have said I don't think you should call him. Could you have said that? A. Yes. Q. And that wouldn't be an order, would it? A. No. Q. And you could have also said I don't think it's a good idea to call him. Could you have said that? A. Yes. Q. And if you did indeed say that, that wouldn't be an order, would it? A. No. Q. And you could have also said, no, I wouldn't. Why get him upset? You could have said that, couldn't you? A. Yes. Q. And had you said that, that wouldn't be an order, would it? A. No. Q. Deputy Collinsworth has never disobeyed your orders in the past, is that correct? A. Correct. (emphasis supplied) TR at 69-71. Petitioner's understanding that Corporal Cooper advised, rather than ordered, Petitioner not to talk to Deputy Akins was corroborated by Deputy Akins. At a time more proximate to the incident, Petitioner asked Deputy Akins not to tell anyone about their conversation because Corporal Cooper had "advised" Petitioner not to discuss the matter with Deputy Akins. In relevant part, Deputy Akins testified: Q. Did Deputy Collinsworth tell you whether you should expect a call from Corporal Cooper? A. No, he did not. Q. Do you recall how this conversation concluded with Deputy Collinsworth? A. He stated that if anyone asked if we had spoken, to say no, we had not. Q. And did you ask him why he was asking you to do that? A. Yes. Q. And what did he say in response to that? A. Because he was advised by Corporal Cooper not to talk to me. . . . I don't remember verbatim word by word how the conversation went, but . . . I'm absolutely positive of the context of the conversation and how it was said. (emphasis supplied) TR at 112 and 116-117. It is undisputed that advice is not an order. Advice is a recommendation or suggestion. An order is a command or instruction given by a superior to a subordinate to act or to refrain from an act. The words used by Corporal Cooper and the context of the conversation with Petitioner did not create an understanding in the mind of Petitioner that he had received an order not to contact Deputy Akins. Petitioner lacked the requisite intent to refuse to follow an order. Respondent urges that Petitioner should have understood he was receiving an order from Corporal Cooper. As the Chief Deputy explained during his testimony: But I would also tell you that Corporal Cooper and Deputy Collinsworth were both aware of the fact that an allegation is made, that there is potential for an administrative investigation, and in the context of their discussion if Corporal Cooper was clear that there was the possibility of an administrative investigation, then at that point by general order there is no discussion with the principal. (emphasis supplied) TR at 222. Corporal Cooper was not clear that there was the possibility of an administrative investigation. Corporal Cooper advised Petitioner that he had started at the right place and that Corporal Cooper would report to the shift commander and see where it goes from there. Even if Corporal Cooper clearly stated that an administrative investigation were possible, Respondent did not terminate Petitioner from his employment on the alleged ground that Petitioner violated Respondent's written policy. The synopsis of the charge against Petitioner states: You were ordered by Corporal Cooper not to call or speak to Deputy Akins regarding an allegation concerning him. You disregarded this order and then you told Deputy Akins not to tell Corporal Cooper that you called him concerning the allegation. (emphasis supplied) Inter-Office Memorandum dated May 13, 2005. The expression, "see where it goes from there" is not synonymous with an administrative investigation. The matter could have been resolved through informal investigation by a front line supervisor. As Sergeant Rogers explained during cross-examination by counsel for Respondent: Q. If Akins was making improper comments to a member of the public, particularly someone that was a victim of a crime that he was involved in investigating, that would be improper? A. Yes, sir. Q. That would be subject to an investigation? A. Depends on what type of investigation you mean. Whether it would be a formal investigation or one done by a front line supervisor. That was my intent, I was going to have a front line supervisor look into it. TR at 247. Sergeant Rogers did not request an administrative investigation. When Corporal Cooper reported the allegations against Deputy Akins to Sergeant Rogers, the shift commander told Corporal Cooper to refer the matter to a sergeant identified in the record as either Sergeant Hubbard or Marshall (Sergeant Marshall). Sergeant Marshall was the shift commander for the squad or squads assigned to the city of Dunedin, Florida, the situs of the alleged violation. Sergeant Rogers ordered Corporal Cooper to refer the matter to Sergeant Marshall for investigation the next day. Sergeant Rogers received the report from Corporal Cooper at about 4:00 a.m. Ms. Hart was "extremely drunk," according to the information available to Sergeant Rogers, when Ms. Hart made the allegations against Deputy Akins. As Sergeant Rogers explained during cross-examination by counsel for Respondent: [T]he woman was extremely drunk. Why would I call her back at four or five in the morning when she's probably passed out? Let her sober up and let another supervisor talk to her later. TR at 248. Respondent did not undertake an administrative investigation of the allegations by Ms. Hart against Deputy Akins until months later when Respondent discovered those allegations during the administrative investigation of Petitioner that led to this proceeding. The investigation of the allegations by Ms. Hart exonerated Deputy Akins. Even if the words used by Corporal Cooper to communicate his intended order to Petitioner were in evidence, the disclosure by Petitioner to Deputy Akins of the allegations by Ms. Hart did not defeat the purpose of the alleged order from Corporal Cooper. As the Chief Deputy explained during his testimony: Q. Did the basis for exonerating Deputy Akins, if you know, have any relationship with the potential harm created by the disclosure of the allegations by petitioner to Deputy Akins? A. [I]n fact I don't believe it would have changed the final outcome. It [exoneration] probably still would have been followed . . . . The primary concern was the [lack of] veracity of the [alleged] victim. TR at 226-227. The refusal of Petitioner to follow the advice of Corporal Cooper arguably may have been disrespectful. The refusal arguably may have been made contemptuous by the efforts of Petitioner to conceal his conversation with Deputy Akins. However, disrespectful and contemptuous disregard of advice is not insubordination. Corporal Cooper did not treat the disclosure by Petitioner to Deputy Akins as insubordination. Respondent's written policies require Corporal Cooper to report insubordination to his superior. Corporal Cooper neither reported the alleged insubordination to Sergeant Rogers nor filed a written report of insubordination. Corporal Cooper explained, in substance, that he routinely does not write up subordinates because he needs to maintain a working relationship with his deputies. Corporal Cooper thinks he may have filed a verbal report with the shift commander but, again, does not recall the exact words in his verbal report. The shift commander does not recall such a report. When Deputy Akins informed Corporal Cooper that Petitioner had disclosed the allegations by Ms. Hart earlier that evening, Corporal Cooper did not respond in a manner consistent with a perception that Petitioner had committed insubordination. As Deputy Akins explained during direct examination by counsel for Respondent: Q. And what did Corporal Cooper tell you in that conversation? A. He asked me if I had spoken with Deputy Collinsworth and I advised him yes. Q. Did he say anything in response to that? A. He stated he had a feeling that Collinsworth might have called me. TR at 113. Corporal Cooper had no reason to believe that Petitioner "might" commit insubordination. Petitioner had never disobeyed orders from Corporal Cooper in the past.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner not guilty of insubordination, rescinding the termination of employment, and reinstating Petitioner to his former position of employment with back pay, benefits, and seniority. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Jolly & Peterson, P.A. 2145 Delta Boulevard, Suite 200 Post Office Box 37400 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Aaron C. French, Esquire 4600 North Habana Avenue, Suite 17 Tampa, Florida 33614 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756
The Issue Whether Respondent should take final action to deny Petitioner's application for a real estate sales associate license on the ground that Petitioner was found guilty, in the State of Georgia, of the crime of theft by taking.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On June 12, 2006, Petitioner was working as a clerk at a UPS store in Cherokee County, Georgia, when he "gave in to temptation" (as he described it at hearing) and stole $500.00 in cash from an envelope given to him by a customer for shipment to the customer's former wife in Kansas. When the customer's former wife received an empty envelope, she notified the customer, who, in turn, called the police. On June 16, 2006, the police went to the UPS store to investigate the matter. When questioned by the police during their visit to the store, Respondent admitted to stealing the $500.00. He was thereupon placed under arrest and, thereafter, criminally charged. On October 16, 2007, in Cherokee County, Georgia, State Court, Petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor crime of theft by taking and sentenced to 12 months' probation. Among the conditions of his probation was that he provide "proof of repay[ment]" of the $500.00 he had stolen. Petitioner has not been arrested again, and he has returned to its rightful owner the $500.00 he had stolen and has otherwise completed his probation. The record evidence, however, does not reveal how long ago Petitioner's probation was completed; nor, more importantly, does it shed any light on what Respondent has done with his life (other than completing his probation and not getting arrested) since the theft which led to his being placed on probation, or what his present reputation is for honesty, trustworthiness, and fair dealing. The record evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that there is reason to believe that, notwithstanding his commission of the aforementioned theft, it is not likely he would act dishonestly or in any other manner endangering the public were he to be granted the real estate sales associate license he seeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin Vaughn, Jr. 931 Village Boulevard, Apartment 905-203 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Special Counsel Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Roger P. Enzor, Chair, Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment in a position involving direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons and, thus, whether the intended action to deny an exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency Action Petitioner seeks an exemption from disqualification to allow her to serve as a direct care service provider for One Mainstream, a direct services provider for developmentally disabled clients. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust, and charged with serving and protecting children or adults with developmental disabilities. Vulnerable populations served by APD include individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down’s syndrome. Some of APD’s clients are incapable of expressing their needs, or unable to express whether something is wrong. As part of the application process for employment as a direct services provider with One Mainstream, Petitioner was subject to a routine pre-employment background screening pursuant to section 435.04. The screening revealed the existence of two disqualifying criminal incidents (resulting in three charged offenses) in Petitioner’s past. The offenses were described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations as follows: In April 1998, Petitioner committed her first disqualifying offense, Domestic Violence Battery, a first degree misdemeanor. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Subsequently, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the offense and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner was approximately thirty-four years old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to pay various court costs/fines. In January 2002, Petitioner contemporaneously committed her second and third disqualifying offenses, two counts of Domestic Violence Battery, first degree misdemeanors. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Petitioner contends there was no physical violence involved in these offenses. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses and was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner was approximately thirty-seven and nine months old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to serve thirty days in the county jail and pay various court costs/fines. As a result of the background screening results, Respondent determined that Petitioner was disqualified from further employment in a position of special trust with children or the developmentally disabled. On February 16, 2015, Petitioner filed her Request for Exemption. All such requests are made to the Department of Children and Families, which conducts the initial background investigation. The file was assigned to Beatriz Blanco, DCF’s central region background screening coordinator. By July 10, 2015, the request for exemption had been assigned to Respondent. Daniella Jones, APD’s state office exemption background screening coordinator, requested additional information regarding Petitioner’s drug counseling and anger management courses. The record is not clear as to which items contained in Respondent’s Exemption Review file, if any, were submitted in response to Ms. Jones’ request. Among the items submitted by Petitioner in support of her Request for Exemption were a completed employment history record; information related to her having obtained a certified nursing assistant license; and six letters of recommendation. The Exemption Review file also included Petitioner’s written explanation of the disqualifying offenses and subsequent non- disqualifying incident1/; and copies of law enforcement, prosecution, and court documents related to the disqualifying offenses, a subsequent non-disqualifying incident, and three prior non-disqualifying incidents. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each request for information. Among the factors identified by Mr. Lewis as bases for the recommendation of denial of the exemption by staff was the perception that Petitioner’s answers to questions about her past conduct were “immature,” that she did not take responsibility for some of the past incidents, and that she did not show sufficient remorse for those incidents. The exemption request was ultimately provided by APD staff to the director of APD, who entered the notice of denial on August 27, 2015. Petitioner’s Background Petitioner grew up in a tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. Her parents were hard drinkers, and she was raised in an environment in which the use of alcohol was accepted. By the time she was 17 years of age, Petitioner was a drinker and a “brawler.” Over the years, Petitioner’s issues with alcohol led her into drunken choices that resulted in the brushes with law enforcement and the criminal justice system described herein. Petitioner readily acknowledged that she had been an alcoholic during the times when she committed the disqualifying offenses. The Disqualifying Offenses 1998 Disqualifying Offense On or about April 18, 1998, Petitioner was told by a friend that her husband was staying with a girlfriend at an apartment in a nearby town. Petitioner “had some drinks” and went to the apartment to confront her husband. She burst in on the husband and his girlfriend unannounced and became embroiled in a brawl. The police were called. By the time the police officer arrived, Petitioner was gone. The police report,2/ which was based on the statements of the husband and his girlfriend, indicated that Petitioner threw a conch shell at the husband, striking him in the head, whereupon she left the apartment, returning to throw a boot at the husband which missed and broke a clock. Since Petitioner was not on the scene, and based on Petitioner’s testimony described herein, an inference is drawn that the husband and girlfriend painted as exculpatory a picture as possible, omitting anything that could cast any blame on the husband for the incident. Petitioner testified that the altercation was not nearly as one-sided as portrayed in the hearsay police report, with the husband holding her down and choking her at one point. She denied throwing the conch shell, but admitted throwing the boot and breaking the clock. Although the evidence suggests that Petitioner may indeed have thrown the shell, the evidence also supports that the husband was more than a passive victim. Petitioner was arrested for “domestic violence (simple).” She pled nolo contendere to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was ordered to pay $620 in court costs. 2002 Disqualifying Offense On or about January 23, 2002, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with her boyfriend, in which her sister was involved. Petitioner was, according to the police report, “intoxicated and [ ] belligerent.” Petitioner had earlier received an inheritance from her mother, which she used to buy a house in Tampa, Florida. Her boyfriend moved in with her. The money soon ran out. Nonetheless, the boyfriend would not get a job, would not contribute to expenses, and would not move out. Petitioner and the boyfriend got into an altercation when she tried to evict him, during which Petitioner hit him with a frozen porterhouse steak. Petitioner indicated that she selected that as her weapon of choice, since he was eating all of her steaks but not paying for them. Petitioner was unclear as to the involvement of her sister, Geraldine Dreviak née Schubert, who also lived in Petitioner’s house, but denied that her sister was injured during the fracas. Petitioner introduced a letter from Ms. Dreviak in which Ms. Dreviak confirmed the boyfriend’s indolence, described her participation in requests that he leave, and substantiated Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Dreviak was not injured. No objection was raised as to the authenticity of the letter, though it was noted that the letter was hearsay. The letter was admitted, and is used in this proceeding “for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.” § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Ms. Dreviak suffered no physical injury in the altercation between Petitioner and her boyfriend. As a result of the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for “simple battery.” She pled guilty to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served, and assessed $678 in court costs and liens. Petitioner completed or was lawfully released from all nonmonetary sanctions imposed by the courts, and all fees and costs related to the two disqualifying offenses were paid. Other Non-Disqualifying Offenses Properly Considered Offense In September 2002, Petitioner was arrested in New York with several other persons for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, a misdemeanor. The controlled substance was cocaine. Petitioner contended she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. She testified that she just wanted to be done with the incident, and failed to appreciate the effect it would have in her later life. Petitioner was sentenced to time served and her license was suspended for six months. The incident was not only a singular and isolated event of its kind, but was Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement. Improperly Considered Offenses As set forth in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations, Petitioner was involved in the following non-disqualifying offenses: In September 1983, Petitioner committed the offense of Disorderly Conduct. Petitioner was convicted for this offense and adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately nineteen years and five months old at the time of this offense. In October 1988, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property. Petitioner contends she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately twenty-four years and six months old at the time of this offense. In December 1994, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Mischief with Reckless Property Damage. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately thirty years and eight months old at the time of this offense. Respondent considered it to be significant that Petitioner was unable to provide information regarding non- disqualifying incidents3/ despite the fact that she had no control over New York City’s records retention policy. Mr. Lewis noted that it would have been to the benefit of Petitioner to have provided records of those non-disqualifying offenses since, without those records, Respondent could not fully review that information. In denying the exemption, Respondent considered the information in totality, including the non-disqualifying offenses committed from 1983 through 1994. Petitioner’s failure to provide a “detailed explanation” of those offenses was a factor in Respondent’s decision. Section 435.07(3)(b) plainly provides that: The agency may consider as part of its deliberations of the employee’s rehabilitation the fact that the employee has, subsequent to the conviction for the disqualifying offense for which the exemption is being sought, been arrested for or convicted of another crime, even if that crime is not a disqualifying offense. (emphasis added). Considering evidence of non-disqualifying crimes committed prior to the disqualifying offenses exceeded the powers and duties granted by the Legislature. Thus, Respondent’s consideration of non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the conviction for the disqualifying offenses was error. Evidence of Rehabilitation Petitioner’s last disqualifying offense occurred on January 23, 2002. Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement of any kind occurred in September 2002. Petitioner has no arrests or involvement with law enforcement of any kind since then. At some point, the passage of time itself is evidence of rehabilitation. While by no means dispositive, the passage of almost 14 years since the last disqualifying offense is substantial evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Petitioner showed contrition and remorse for the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner has been married since 2008 to a man that she describes as supportive. Thus, the stresses of the abusive relationships that led to her disqualifying offenses have been alleviated. Petitioner initially provided letters from six persons who were acquainted with Petitioner, two of whom testified at the final hearing. The letters were sincere, left the impression that they were written by persons with knowledge of Petitioner’s present character, and were consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of witnesses at the hearing. When Petitioner filed her Request for Administrative Hearing, she provided letters of support from four additional persons who knew Petitioner, one of whom testified at the final hearing. As with the previous letters, the letters were sincere, and fully consistent with the witness testimony taken during the hearing. Petitioner has been licensed as a certified nursing assistant, though the date of her licensure was not specified. She has not been able to practice under her license due to the issues that are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around, and is not the same person that she was when she was a drinker. Petitioner’s Work History The Employment History Record form that is part of the Request for Exemption requests “employment history for the last three years.” Petitioner provided an employment history that indicated employment from May 11, 2011, to the date of the filing of the Request for Exemption. During that period, Petitioner was employed to perform custodial duties at the First Baptist Church of Weeki Wachee Acres, and worked as a cook for functions held at the church. Her work ethic and performance was, and is, exemplary. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner has attended to the needs of Billy Bowling on a volunteer basis for the past five or six years. Mr. Bowling, who is 49 years of age, is significantly developmentally disabled. At the hearing, he displayed obvious affection for Petitioner. Mr. Bowling’s mother, Patsy Bowling Anderson, testified that, at one time, the family employed a licensed direct service provider who was unacceptably rude, and upset Mr. Bowling. Since then, Petitioner is the only person outside of her family that Mrs. Anderson allows to care for Mr. Bowling. Mrs. Anderson testified that she had complete trust that Petitioner would do nothing that would result in harm to her son. Her testimony was substantiated by that of Major Anderson. The testimony of the Bowling/Anderson family was credible and compelling, and is accepted as convincing evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. In addition to her care for Billy Bowling, Major Anderson and Mrs. Anderson testified that Petitioner, on her own time and without compensation, provides care and assistance to elderly neighbors, and to children at their church, all without incident. Their testimony is credited, and is accepted as further evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Additional Clear and Convincing Evidence of Rehabilitation Mr. Lewis testified that when disqualifying offenses involve violence, Respondent looks for evidence of anger management counseling. The information provided to the APD director suggested that Petitioner had undergone no anger management courses that would mitigate the possibility of a recurrence of the incidents that occurred in 1998 and 2002. The lack of such evidence was, in this case, a significant factor in the recommendation of denial to the director. Although the evidence of counseling in the Exemption Review file was spotty, the evidence adduced at hearing from Petitioner and Mrs. Anderson was convincing that Petitioner is an active, and successful, participant in Alcoholics Anonymous. Petitioner acts as a sponsor for others and on occasion, has taken it on herself to conduct meetings when group leaders have failed to appear. She has been sober for more than ten years. Since both of Petitioner’s disqualifying offenses were largely fueled by alcohol, ongoing participation in Alcoholics Anonymous is a more appropriate and effective means of rehabilitation than a class in “anger management.” Petitioner has been fortunate to find herself in what, by all accounts, is an embracing and supportive community. The individuals testifying on her behalf expressed their firm conviction that Petitioner had turned her life around, with Mrs. Anderson, who has known Petitioner for 14 years, characterizing the change as “remarkable.” None of the witnesses could identify any reason to suggest that Petitioner would not be able to provide capable and safe services to children and developmentally disabled persons. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner meets the objective criteria for an exemption from disqualification established in section 435.07(1). When the decision was made to deny the exemption, it appears that APD staff provided the director with information as to non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the disqualifying offenses. It is not known how, or whether, that impermissible information may have colored the director’s decision. Nonetheless, an evaluation of Petitioner’s suitability for an exemption should be made without consideration of those earlier events. The credible testimony and evidence in this case established, clearly and convincingly, that Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses, and that she currently presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by Respondent if she is allowed to be employed as a direct service provider. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of the hearing testimony, particularly those regarding her lack of “anger management” classes and her lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities approving Petitioner, Catherine Schubert Rivera’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2015.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration’s (Agency) intended decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is required to conduct certain background screenings for employees who provide specific types of services within health care facilities licensed under chapters 400, 408, and 429, Florida Statutes. § 408.809, Fla. Stat. Petitioner seeks employment in a position providing such services to residents of a health care facility licensed by Respondent, and, as such, is required to participate in Respondent’s background screening process pursuant to section 408.809, Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted to the required background screening, which revealed that in 2006, Petitioner was adjudicated delinquent for the felony offense of Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon, in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes, in Franklin County, Florida, Case No. 06000033CJAXMX. In 2010, Petitioner was charged with Child Abuse and Child Neglect, but pleaded guilty to Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, in Duval County Circuit Court, Case No. 162010CF002633AXXXMA, in violation of section 827.04, Florida Statutes. The two above-referenced criminal convictions render Petitioner disqualified and ineligible to provide the listed services in a health care facility licensed by Respondent unless Petitioner receives an exemption from Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes. In addition, Petitioner’s background check revealed that she was arrested in 2014 for Battery, although the charge was dismissed, and Petitioner pleaded no contest to Disorderly Conduct, in Gulf County Court, Case No. 14-100MM. Petitioner was also arrested in 2014 for two (2) counts of Aggravated Battery with a Deadly Weapon, but those charges were dismissed. However, Petitioner pled no contest to the offense of Affray, in Gulf County Court, Case No. 14-179-CF. Petitioner initially submitted an application for exemption to the Agency in accordance with sections 408.809 and 435.07, on or about April 21, 2017, and participated in a telephonic hearing conducted by Respondent on June 13, 2017. Respondent’s witness, Sherry Ledbetter, the operations and management consultant manager for the Background Screening Unit, testified that she attended the telephonic hearing on June 13, 2017. Following the telephonic hearing, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request for an exemption by letter dated June 19, 2017, and Petitioner subsequently requested an administrative hearing. At the administrative hearing, Sherry Ledbetter testified that, in making the decision to deny the exemption request, Respondent considered Petitioner’s entire case file, including all submissions received from Petitioner, as well as her explanations of her past offenses. Ms. Ledbetter also testified that the instant denial was separate from, and did not impact, any exemption that Petitioner may receive for her Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) license through the Florida Department of Health. As explained by Ms. Ledbetter, once there is a disqualifying offense or conviction, Respondent is legally authorized to consider all subsequent arrests or convictions, even if those arrests or convictions are not disqualifying offenses. Indeed, Respondent considered Petitioner’s subsequent arrests and convictions during the review of Petitioner’s application for exemption. Ms. Ledbetter testified that Respondent also considered the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s most recent arrests, even though the charges were not disqualifying under the law. She further testified that the recency of those 2014 incidents was a large factor in Respondent’s decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption. Ms. Ledbetter noted that some of Petitioner’s statements conflict with the police reports and other documentation in Petitioner’s exemption file, particularly with respect to the 2010 Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor conviction. Petitioner’s child, who was four months old at the time, was discovered to have a broken leg and a broken arm. At the telephonic hearing, Petitioner was unable to explain what happened and blamed the injuries on the babysitter, although no proof was presented that the babysitter was charged with a crime related to this incident. When determining to deny the exemption request, the Agency was aware of the fact that Petitioner had taken court- ordered anger management courses in 2006, and again in 2014. In summary, Ms. Ledbetter testified that, based on Petitioner’s entire file and her responses during the teleconferences, Petitioner had not satisfied her burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, her rehabilitation subsequent to her disqualifying offenses. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and explained how her past does not define her today, and that she is a changed person. She explained that she has grown up a lot, and has learned to love herself. She also stated that she has learned how to be honest with herself, and to take responsibility for her actions. Petitioner explained that in 2015, her mother had lung cancer and was in hospice. She acknowledged that this experience with her mother was the pivotal moment in her life that changed her. Petitioner professed that she wants nothing more than to help people, and would do so if granted the exemption. Specifically, Petitioner would like to return to her work helping elderly adults. Petitioner called as a character witness her friend since high school, Sheila Long, who testified that Petitioner has grown up a lot, is a good mother, and is trying to be a better person. Petitioner successfully completed a CNA course in March 2017. Included with Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification were several letters of reference, all lauding Petitioner’s good character and geniality. Three of those letters attested to her successful employment in recent years, including two from representatives of the Eisenhower Center, a rehabilitation facility where Petitioner worked as a CNA until her disqualification. A third, from the assistant manager at the Walmart where Petitioner had been employed, praised Petitioner’s pleasant and courteous demeanor, and her honesty in revealing her criminal background. Although Petitioner appeared genuinely remorseful for her criminal convictions and has clearly made an effort to turn her life around, due to the recency of some of the offenses, it cannot be concluded that she is rehabilitated and should not be disqualified from employment. Petitioner has thus failed to meet her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that she should be granted an exemption from disqualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Lindsay Worsham Granger, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Mail Stop 7 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Nicole Henry 1609 Chatham Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Justin Senior, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Stefan Grow, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
