The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) Whether Petitioner, Deputy Michael Hughes, violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act by engaging in conduct unbecoming a public servant; and (2) Whether Petitioner violated Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, General Order 3-1.1.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: At all times pertinent to this case, Deputy Hughes was employed by the Sheriff's Office as a deputy sheriff. At the time of hearing, Deputy Hughes had over eighteen years' experience with the Sheriff's Office. On January 12, 2002, Deputy Hughes was working as a deputy sheriff and as a Field Training Officer in the Field Training Section of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. He was accompanied throughout his shift by a trainee, Deputy Mark Shorter. At approximately 2:55 a.m. on January 12, 2002, Deputies Hughes and Shorter responded to 5125 Betty Street in St. Petersburg to assist Deputies Michael Pulham and Vance Nussbaum, who were already on the scene of a traffic stop where the driver was suspected of having active warrants for his arrest. Deputies Hughes and Shorter had already responded to two calls at 5125 Betty Street, both involving complaints by neighbors that persons in the house were causing a public disturbance. After the traffic stop, the deputies noticed yet another disturbance occurring in the residence at 5125 Betty Street. The four deputies entered the residence. As the deputies walked in, one of the occupants, later identified as Donald Hillebrand, punched Deputy Hughes in the mouth with his closed fist. The deputies attempted to place Mr. Hillebrand under arrest for battery upon a law enforcement officer. A melee ensued between the four deputies and several occupants of the residence. Donald Hillebrand was subdued, handcuffed, and arrested. Two women who participated in the fight were also arrested. Mr. Hillebrand was then escorted to Deputy Hughes’ cruiser and placed in the rear seat, without the use of a seat belt. Two other arrestees, Lisa Ruthven and Barbara Metzler, were placed in the rear of the Pulham/Nussbaum cruiser for transport. Because several other people were coming out of the residence and the situation remained volatile, the deputies decided they would regroup at a more secure location a short distance from the Betty Street residence to complete their paperwork on the arrests. From the time he was placed in the back of the cruiser, Mr. Hillebrand spewed a stream of racial invective at Deputies Hughes and Shorter in the front. Mr. Hillebrand is white. Deputies Hughes and Shorter are black. Lt. John Bocchichio, the shift commander, met the four deputies at the secure location. He noted that Mr. Hillebrand was screaming "nigger this and nigger that" from the rear of Deputy Hughes' cruiser. While Deputies Hughes and Shorter completed their paperwork at the rear of their cruiser, Lt. Bocchichio opened the door of the cruiser, leaned into the car, and attempted to speak to Mr. Hillebrand in an effort to calm him. Mr. Hillebrand continued yelling and screaming, and eventually spit at Lt. Bocchichio, who gave up and closed the door of the cruiser. Lt. Bocchichio did not tell Deputy Hughes that Mr. Hillebrand spit at him, but he thought Deputy Hughes might have seen the spitting through the rear window of the cruiser. Alex Metzler, another participant in the brawl at the Betty Street residence, rode up to the secure location on a bicycle. He claimed he was merely riding to a store, but the deputies believed he was there to interfere with them. The deputies arrested him, handcuffed him, and placed him in the rear of Deputy Hughes' cruiser along with Mr. Hillebrand. Mr. Metzler was seated on the passenger's side, and Mr. Hillebrand was seated on the driver's side of the back seat. Both men were handcuffed with their hands behind their backs. The cruiser had a plexiglass shield behind the driver's side of the front seat, and a steel cage behind the passenger's side of the front seat. Deputies Hughes and Shorter, with Shorter driving the cruiser, commenced their travel to the Pinellas County Jail facility, located at 144th Avenue and 49th Street in Clearwater. Mr. Hillebrand continued his tirade at both Deputy Hughes and Shorter, calling them "niggers," inviting them to "suck his dick," and offering to perform various sex acts on their mothers. While the cruiser was traveling on 49th Street approaching 144th Avenue, Mr. Hillebrand leaned over to Mr. Metzler’s side of the police cruiser and spit through the steel cage into the face of Deputy Hughes. Deputy Hughes instructed Deputy Shorter to stop the vehicle. Deputy Shorter stopped the cruiser in the left-hand turn lane at the intersection of 49th Street and 144th Avenue, within sight of the jail. After the cruiser was stopped, Deputy Hughes exited the vehicle, walked around the rear of the vehicle and opened the rear driver’s side door. Mr. Hillebrand was lying on the back seat across Mr. Metzler. Deputy Hughes admitted that he was angry at being spat upon, but maintained that his purpose in stopping and exiting the vehicle was to prevent Mr. Hillebrand from spitting on him a second time by securing his seatbelt. Deputy Hughes reached into the back seat of the vehicle in an attempt to make Mr. Hillebrand sit up on his side of the seat. Mr. Hillebrand resisted. Deputy Hughes noted that Mr. Hillebrand was on top of the seat belt buckle and decided that he needed to remove Mr. Hillebrand from the vehicle. Mr. Hillebrand continued to resist, lying back on the seat and using his legs and feet to prevent his removal from the vehicle. Deputy Hughes leaned into the vehicle in order to grasp Mr. Hillebrand's shoulders to gain hold of him. At this point, Mr. Hillebrand agreed to cooperate. He sat up, turned to sit sideways in the vehicle and placed his feet on the ground outside of the vehicle. Mr. Hillebrand then stood up outside the cruiser. Deputy Hughes testified that he thought Mr. Hillebrand was attempting to head-butt him, though he admitted that Mr. Hillebrand's actions were also consistent with the moves that a handcuffed person would have to employ to exit a vehicle. In response to the perceived head-butt, Deputy Hughes struck Mr. Hillebrand in the chest with a forearm strike and followed with a knee strike to the abdomen. Deputy Hughes briefly pinned Mr. Hillebrand against the rear quarter panel of the cruiser, then returned him to the back seat and attempted to fasten Mr. Hillebrand with the seat belt. Deputy Hughes was unable to fasten the seat belt because the buckle had worked its way under the back seat. Deputy Hughes looped the shoulder harness portion of the seat belt over Mr. Hillebrand’s chest and tucked the end of it underneath the seat to give Mr. Hillebrand the impression that the seat belt was properly fastened. Deputy Hughes closed the rear door of the vehicle and returned to his own seat in the cruiser. Deputy Shorter resumed the drive to the Pinellas County Jail, which took no more than two minutes. Mr. Hillebrand was turned over to corrections officers without further incident and charged with two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer (one for punching Deputy Hughes and one for spitting on Deputy Hughes) and one count of resisting an officer with violence. Deputy Hughes admitted that he did not prepare a use of force report as to this incident. His arrest report detailed the brawl at the Betty Street residence, but made no mention of the subsequent stop after Mr. Hillebrand spit on him. After the incident, Mr. Hillebrand's mother filed a complaint alleging the physical abuse of Donald Hillebrand during the course of the arrest. The complaint triggered an investigation by the Inspections Bureau of the Sheriff's Office regarding the incidents leading to the arrest of Mr. Hillebrand and the use of force by Deputy Hughes and the other deputies involved. At the conclusion of the investigation, an Administrative Review Board reviewed the allegations and evidence compiled by the Inspections Bureau and determined that Deputy Hughes had violated the Pinellas County Civil Service Act and the rules, regulations and operating procedures of the Shriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board's memorandum, dated August 3, 2002, set forth the following specific violations: Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five Violation), 5.15 relating to the Custody of Arrestees/Prisoners, to-wit: Arrestees/Prisoners shall be kept secured and treated humanely and shall not be subjected to physical abuse. The use of physical force shall be restricted to circumstances specified by law when necessary to accomplish a police task. Synopsis: On January 12, 2002, you removed a secured prisoner from the rear of your cruiser while enroute [sic] to the jail and subjected him to physical force, which was not specified by law or necessary to accomplish a police task. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 3.20, relating to the Use of Force Reporting, to wit: Whenever a member either on or off duty, is required to use physical force against another person, the member shall immediately notify a supervisor of the action taken and complete the necessary documentation for review. Synopsis: On January 12, 2002, you used physical force against another person, but failed to complete the necessary Use of Force Report for review. The Administrative Review Board did not conclude that Deputy Hughes pulled Mr. Hillebrand out of the cruiser for the purpose of abusing him, or that Deputy Hughes used such force as would constitute a violation of state law or the United States Constitution. The Board unanimously concluded that the force utilized with regard to Mr. Hillebrand was unnecessary and served no legitimate law enforcement purpose, thereby violating General Order 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 5.15, relating to Custody of Arrestees/Prisoners. The Board found that Deputy Hughes' actions toward Mr. Hillebrand were inappropriate, given that his reason for stopping the car and commencing the chain of events that led to his use of force was to prevent Mr. Hillebrand from spitting on him again. The Board found that Deputy Hughes could have avoided being spit on without pulling Mr. Hillebrand out of the vehicle, and thus that there was no legitimate law enforcement purpose served by his use of force. The Board noted several factors to support its finding. Deputy Hughes stopped the cruiser less than two minutes from the jail, where corrections officers could have taken Mr. Hillebrand out of the cruiser without the use of force. Deputy Hughes could have found something in the cruiser, such as a rain slicker, to place over the cage behind him and block any further spit from the rear of the vehicle. Once the prisoner was secure and in custody, Deputy Hughes' primary duty was to transport him safely to jail without exposing the prisoner, the law enforcement officers, or the public to the risk of further injury. By stopping the vehicle and opening the rear of the caged and locked police cruiser, Deputy Hughes exposed himself, his partner, both prisoners, and possibly the general public to an unnecessary risk of injury. Deputy Hughes' actions created the situation that resulted in the need to use force on Mr. Hillebrand, and those actions were not necessary to accomplish the primary police task of transporting Mr. Hillebrand safely to the jail without further incident or injury. In short, the Board found that Deputy Hughes used appropriate force for the situation, but found that he violated regulations by allowing the situation to develop in the first place. Sheriff's Office General Order 10-2 provides guidelines for imposition of discipline by an Administrative Review Board, including a point system based on the number and severity of violations. The violations found against Deputy Hughes resulted in a cumulative point total of 65 points: 50 points for the violation of General Order 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 5.15, relating to Custody of Arrestees/Prisoners and 15 points for the violation of General Order 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 3.20, relating to use of force reporting. Sheriff's Office General Order 10-2 provides that the point total accumulated by Deputy Hughes allows for discipline ranging from a seven-day suspension to termination of employment. Deputy Hughes received the minimum seven-day suspension. Deputy Hughes appealed only the finding with regard to the violation of General Order 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 5.15, relating to Custody of Arrestees/Prisoners. Deputy Hughes did not contest the finding that he violated General Order 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 3.20, relating to use of force reporting. Deputy Hughes contended that he acted in self-defense to prevent Mr. Hillebrand from continuing to spit on him. This contention was illogical. By opening the rear of the vehicle and manhandling his prisoner, Deputy Hughes made it easier for Mr. Hillebrand to spit on him again. Further, the self-defense contention was beside the point, as the Sheriff's Office did not allege that Deputy Hughes had no right to protect himself. Rather, the Administrative Review Board found that Deputy Hughes chose the worst of several possible methods to prevent Mr. Hillebrand from spitting on him. The essential finding was that Deputy Hughes used poor judgment, not that he used excessive force. Deputy Hughes also contended that the Sheriff's Office was at fault for not equipping his cruiser with restraints designed to prevent prisoners from spitting. Whatever the value of such restraints, their absence did not prevent Deputy Hughes from improvising a protective device from the materials available in his cruiser. Finally, Deputy Hughes pointed to the fact that the Sheriff's office has no rule or regulation prohibiting a deputy from attempting to seat belt a prisoner in the rear of the vehicle to prevent him from spitting through the open portion of the cage. It defies reason to contend that the Sheriff's Office must develop a rule or regulation for every possible condition that may occur in the field, or that an experienced deputy may abandon common sense in the absence of a rule or regulation covering a situation in which he finds himself. The evidence presented at the hearing fully supported the findings of the Administrative Review Board and the penalty imposed upon Deputy Hughes for the violation of General Order 3- 1.1 (Level Five violation), 5.15, relating to Custody of Arrestees/Prisoners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a Final Order finding Michael E. Hughes guilty of violating the Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as set forth in the August 3, 2002, inter-office memorandum and upholding the suspension of Michael E. Hughes from his employment as a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office for a period of seven days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 1 Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Jean H. Kwall, General Counsel Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
The Issue Whether the conduct of Petitioner violated the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a constitutional officer for the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within Pinellas County, Florida. As a result, Respondent maintains and operates a correctional facility, commonly referred to as the Pinellas County Detention Center, or Pinellas County Jail. Petitioner is a detention deputy employed by Respondent at the Pinellas County Jail (Jail) and has been so employed for approximately fifteen years. Detention deputies are correctional officers and, as is the case with all detention deputies, Petitioner is responsible for the care, custody, and control of inmates incarcerated at the Jail. On May 10, 1997, while employed as a detention deputy by the Respondent, Petitioner was assigned to the B-Wing of the South Division working on the third shift. While on break that day, Petitioner went to the booking area of the Jail to meet his wife for lunch. Petitioner's wife, an employee of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, was working that same shift in the booking area. When Petitioner arrived in the booking area, in addition to his wife, also present were Detention Deputies Larry Potts, Lloyd Spain, Denise Borland and Detention Lieutenant Krista Rauch. Spain and Borland were processing an individual being booked into the Jail while Potts was assisting Rice’s wife. Lieutenant Rauch was located at the booking desk in a glassed area. On May 10, 1997, at the time the events in paragraph 3 were transpiring, Mathew Robinson was being booked into the Jail. After a portion of the booking process had been completed, Robinson was seated on a bench in the booking area awaiting a routine medical screening. During this process, Robinson became disruptive and began screaming and yelling. As a result thereof, Spain attempted to calm Robinson and de- escalate his disruptive behavior. When Robinson remained uncooperative, Spain, with the assistance of Potts, took physical control of Robinson and escorted him out of the booking area through a door commonly referred to as the “blue door.” Robinson was not shackled or handcuffed. Petitioner remained in the booking area. After Spain and Potts left the booking area with Robinson, Petitioner detected the shuffling of feet in the hallway area on the other side of the blue door and he proceeded through the door to investigate. Petitioner then observed Potts and Spain with Robinson who was in a half-squatted position with his knees bent. Following behind Potts, Spain, Robinson and Petitioner, was Detention Deputy Borland who had subsequently come through the blue door into the corridor in order to photograph the inmate. As Spain and Potts continued to escort Robinson down the hall, Petitioner followed behind them at a distance until they arrived at the vestibule area at the entrance to the C- Wing. At the entrance to C-Wing, there is a control booth that protrudes into the corridor area. During this entire escort process, Robinson remained unrestricted, other than his being held by Spain and Potts. At some point prior to the incident described in paragraph 10 below, Lieutenant Rauch left the booking area and entered the hallway through the blue door. When Spain and Potts arrived at the C-Wing entrance, the gate was already open. Robinson had escalated his level of resistance by screaming, yelling, fighting, and opposing efforts to walk him through the gate. Prior to the entry of Robinson and the detention deputies into the vestibule area of C-Wing, Robinson began trying to pull away from Spain and Potts and his feet were off the floor in an attempt to break the officers’ efforts to move him forward. However, Robinson did not throw punches, strike blows, or kick. During the escalation of resistance by Robinson, Spain did not lose physical control of Robinson, although he was pulled off balance. Robinson did break away from the hold being exercised by Potts for a few seconds. Neither Potts nor Spain fell to the ground. Neither Spain nor Potts requested the assistance of Petitioner nor were they aware of Petitioner’s presence. As the struggle continued, Petitioner intervened by kicking Robinson in the buttocks. Spain and Potts then took Robinson to the ground. Petitioner assisted in restraining Robinson and escorting him into C-1 Wing. Neither Petitioner nor other deputies have been trained to kick an inmate in the buttocks as a control technique. Kicking is generally used as a technique to impair or disable an inmate. At the time Petitioner kicked Robinson, he was not attempting to impair or disable Robinson. Deputies are taught to kick as a defensive maneuver when an inmate is approaching an officer. The kicking technique generally involves striking the inmate on the side of the leg in the calf area in order to effectuate a take down or redirect the inmate to the ground. The training provided to correctional officers in the use of kicking technique limits its use to circumstances requiring a counter- move to impede a subject’s movement toward an officer. At the time that Petitioner kicked Robinson, Robinson was not coming toward Petitioner. The kicking technique utilized by Petitioner lifting his leg, bringing it to hip level, thrusting the foot forward and kicking the inmate in the buttocks, is not an appropriate defensive tactic. This is not taught as a defensive tactic because it involves striking what is commonly called a “red zone.” Red zone areas include the head, neck and spine, and groin areas. A blow to red zone areas is appropriate only in a deadly force situation because such a blow may cause serious injury or death to the person struck. It is uncontested that the struggle Robinson engaged in with Spain and Potts did not create a situation where the use of deadly force would be appropriate. On May 10, 1997, shortly after the incident in question, Borland prepared an incident report in which she made no reference to Petitioner’s kicking Robinson. Borland was questioned about the incident by Corporal Powell of the Internal Affairs Division on May 28, 1997. During this inquiry, Borland made no reference to the kicking incident. Thereafter, Borland spoke to her supervisor, Lieutenant Rauch, and expressed her discomfort with preparing a report that would implicate Petitioner in misconduct. Lieutenant Rauch instructed Borland to prepare a report reflecting what Borland had observed. Borland complied with Lieutenant Rauch’s directive and, on May 30, 1997, prepared a memorandum. In the memorandum, directed to Corporal Powell, Borland indicated that on May 10, 1997, she had observed Petitioner kick Robinson. In June 1997, Borland told Deputy Corporal Marjeta Salliiotte that she did not want to write the May 30, 1997, memorandum. However, Borland stated that Lieutenant Rauch told her that both Borland and Rauch could get in trouble if Borland failed to write the memorandum. The Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office conducted an internal investigation regarding the incident of May 10, 1997. As part of that investigation, on June 23, 1997, the Chain-of- Command Board took a sworn statement from Petitioner. After giving his account of the events, Petitioner was asked questions regarding the incident by Corporal Powell and Sergeant R. Alphonso of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Inspection Bureau. Prior to the questioning, Corporal Powell instructed Petitioner “to answer questions directed to you during this interview truthfully and to the best of your knowledge.” While being questioned regarding the events of May 10, 1997, Petitioner admitted that he kicked Robinson in the buttocks and that this was observed by Lieutenant Rauch. However, from his point of view, the struggle that ensued between Robinson, Potts and Spain immediately prior to the kick could not have been observed by Lieutenant Rauch. From Lieutenant Raunch’s vantage point, as seen by Petitioner, her view of that struggle had to have been obstructed by the control room. Petitioner’s perception of where Lieutenant Rauch was at the time of the struggle is not inconsistent with that of other detention deputies in the immediate vicinity at that time. In response to questions during the proceeding of June 23, 1997, Petitioner was adamant in his denial that Lieutenant Rauch did not observe the struggle that Spain and Potts had with Inmate Robinson immediately before Robinson was kicked. Throughout his interrogation, Petitioner did not waver from this position, notwithstanding statements from Sergeant Alfonso that Lieutenant Rauch’s written statement gave “the inference that she saw that struggle.” Although Petitioner had responded when asked about the discrepancy in his statement and that of Lieutenant Rauch, Sergeant Alfonso continued to question Petitioner concerning whether the lieutenant observed the struggle. Among the questions asked by Sergeant Alfonso were: “Now, are you saying that [Lieutenant Rauch’s] being untruthful, that she’s lying about this?”; “And so what you’re telling us today is that Lieutenant Rauch is lying about seeing the incident?”; and “Your opinion is that Lieutenant Rauch is a liar?” In response to these questions, Petitioner answered in the affirmative. During the course of giving his sworn statement, Petitioner was asked whether he believed that Deputy Borland “lied in her statement against him.” Petitioner was also asked whether it was his “belief that Lieutenant Rauch put Deputy Borland up to that lie.” Petitioner answered both of these questions in the affirmative. At the time Petitioner responded to these questions, he believed that he was answering truthfully. There were two reasons that Petitioner believed that Borland’s second account of the incident was inaccurate and that Lieutenant Rauch told Borland what to put in the memorandum. First, Petitioner was aware that Borland’s May 10, 1997, incident report made no reference to the kicking incident and that Borland first mentioned the kicking incident in the memorandum dated May 30, 1997. Second, Petitioner based this belief on comments made to him by his wife. According to Petitioner’s wife, Borland had told another officer, Deputy Corporal Marjeta Salliiotte, that Lieutenant Rauch directed Borland to write the memorandum. Petitioner mistakenly concluded or interpreted this comment to mean that Lieutenant Rauch told Borland specifically what to include in the memorandum. After completing its investigation, the Administrative Inquiry Division (AID) presented its entire investigative file to the Chain-of-Command Board without conclusion or recommendation. The Chain-of-Command Board met and, after reviewing the materials provided by AID and giving Petitioner the opportunity to respond further, the complaint was sustained. Specifically, the violations determined by the Board to have occurred were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: conduct unbecoming a public servant; violations of the provisions of law or the rules and regulations and operating procedures of the Office of the Sheriff; Violation of rule and regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, C- 1, V, A, 021, relating to the custody arrestees/prisoners, a Level Five violation; Violation of rule and regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, C- 1, V, A, 024, relating to insubordination, use of profanity or insulting language towards a superior officer, a Level Five violation. Under the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Guidelines, a sustained finding of two Level Five violations is the basis for assigning 60 disciplinary points. As a result, Petitioner was assessed 60 disciplinary points. The Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office General Order B-15 identifies a disciplinary range for 60 points to be from a minimum penalty of a seven-day suspension to a maximum penalty of termination. In the instant case, Petitioner was assessed a ten-day suspension. The conduct engaged in by Petitioner in kicking inmate Robinson did not constitute a good correctional practice, and is not consistent with the training or conduct expected of correctional officers. The role of a correctional officer in an altercation is to engage in defensive maneuvers and to gain control of the inmate creating the disturbance. Although correctional officers are allowed to defend themselves, kicking an inmate in the buttocks serves no correctional purpose, does not constitute the proper use of defensive tactics and is not designed to maintain control of an inmate or a situation. Kicking an arrestee or inmate in the buttocks area is not appropriate absent a situation where great bodily harm is being threatened by the inmate. The conduct engaged in by Petitioner in responding to questions during the course of giving a sworn statement do not constitute insubordination. Respondent was required to answer all questions truthfully, that is the truth as he knew or perceived it to be. In the instant case, Petitioner's comments were not made voluntarily nor were they directed to Lieutenant Rauch. Instead, Petitioner's statements were made in response to questions from a member of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Inspection Bureau who was investigating the incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office enter a Final Order finding Petitioner guilty of the conduct alleged in Counts I and II of the charging document and suspending Petitioner, without pay, for eight (8) days from his employment as a detention deputy with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIED Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. LauBach Executive Director Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 3737 16th Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 B. Norris Rickey Senior Assistant County Attorney Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler and Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Jean H. Kwall, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 William Repper, Chairperson Pinellas County Sheriff's Civil Service Board Post Office Box 539 Clearwater, Florida 34617
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Darryl McGlamry, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. The Challenged Rule, Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. On January 23, 1991, the Respondent filed Rule 33ER91-1. This emergency rule was filed by the Respondent to alleviate problems created by a high increase in the number of close custody inmates caused by changes in the Respondent's rules during 1990. Pursuant to Section 120.54(9)(c), Florida Statutes, Rule 33ER91-1 was only effective for ninety (90) days. Therefore, Rule 33ER91-1 was due to expire on or about April 24, 1991. On April 23, 1991, the Respondent filed the Challenged Rule. The Challenged Rule is identical in its terms to Rule 33ER91-1. The Challenged Rule should have expired on July 22, 1991. The instant challenge was instituted on May 8, 1991, before the Challenged Rule expired. The amendments to Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, filed by the Respondent on July 1, 1991, do not repeal the effect of the Challenged Rule prior to July 1, 1991.
The Issue The matter presented here for consideration concerns the termination of the Petitioner, George Nelson, from his employment with the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, premised upon the purported authority set forth in Rule 22A-13.04, Florida Administrative Code, following the Petitioner's alleged decision to qualify as a candidate for office in the State of Florida, without first gaining permission of the appropriate authorities as set forth in Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22A-13, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Nelson, was a permanent status Career Service employee on July 14, 1980, working for the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. His specific employment was a firefighter. On the subject date, by correspondence directed to an official within the Division of Forestry, namely, Larry Wood, the petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to run for a School Board seat, District IV, in Wakulla County, Florida. A copy of that notification may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. As stated in the correspondence, Nelson had made an attempt to determine the necessary steps to gain the approval of his agency before taking the oath of candidacy for the aforementioned position. (This request was made following a conversation with the same Larry Wood held on July 10, 1980, on the subject of Nelson's candidacy. On July 10, a letter was sent addressed only to "Larry" and at Mr. Wood's instigation the subsequent letter of July 14, 1980, was dispatched referring to Wood as "Mr. Larry Wood", for appearance sake.) As set forth in the Nelson correspondence, the last date for qualifying for the School Board position was July 22, 1980, at 12:00 Noon. Prior to that date, the Petitioner's request to run was forwarded through the decision-making channels within the Division of Forestry. At the time Nelson dispatched his letter of July 14, 1980, there was some concern expressed by Wood to the effect that there might be some scheduling conflict between Nelson's primary employment duties as a forest ranger and his duties as a School Board Member; however, Wood indicated that the scheduling matter could probably be accommodated. Wood offered no guarantee to the petitioner that the request to run for office would be approved by the appropriate agency officials. On July 18, 1980, and again on July 21, 1980, officials with the Division of Forestry orally indicated to the petitioner that he would not be allowed to run for the School Board. In view of the fact that the last day for qualifying was July 22, 1980, the petitioner determined to offer his candidacy without the permission of his agency head, and on that date he took the loyalty oath for public office for the School Board, District IV, Wakulla County, Florida, as may be seen by a Joint Exhibit No. 4, which is a copy of the Loyalty Oath and the Oath of Candidacy and Statement of Candidacy. On July 23, 1980, Larry Wood, District Forester and supervisor to the Petitioner, contacted the petitioner to inquire why the petitioner had offered his candidacy without permission of the agency. The petitioner responded that he did so because he did not feel that there was any conflict between school board duties and that of forest ranger. Wood informed him that he would hear from the Division of Forestry on the subject. Following the conversation with Wood, on July 24, 1980, the petitioner received two items in response to his request. One of those items was dated July 21, 1980, from John M. Bethea, Director, Division of Forestry, addressed to Larry Wood, in which the subject of the Petitioner's candidacy was discussed and the indication given that it would not be approved due to scheduling problems and conflict and controversies "that are generated by any local governmental political body". The memorandum went on to say, "These controversies might affect the Forestry Division's ability to carry out the responsibilities with the very segments of the public." A copy of this memorandum may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The second item received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, was dated on that date, and addressed to George Nelson from Larry Wood, indicating a denial of the petitioner's request to run for public office. This correspondence may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence. After the Petitioner had received the memoranda discussed herein, there ensued a series of meetings between the Petitioner and various officials within the agency in which the agency tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in view of the fact that he had not gained their permission to run for the School Board. Throughout these discussions, the Petitioner continued to assert the conviction that unless some conflict of interest could be shown to him, he did not intend to withdraw as a candidate. In the discussions, the agency further stated that the choices open to the petitioner were ones of resignation from his position as Forest Ranger or withdrawal from the School Board race. They also stated that if he were caused to resign, there could be no rights to appeal beyond that point. In the course of the process, the Petitioner met with Director Bethea, who explained the Director's position on the Petitioner's right to run for office and reiterated his opposition, based upon his problems of scheduling to accommodate the needs of the Division of Forestry and the needs of the School Board of Wakulla County and also -he concern of possible conflicts and controversies arising out of the necessity for forest rangers to go on the property of the citizens of the several counties in the State of Florida and the fact that this might create a problem in view of the nature of the functions of a school board member. Although the Director generally held the philosophy that employees in positions such as the Petitioner's should not normally be allowed to run for local office, he did not absolutely foreclose the possibility that someone might persuade him to the contrary and thereby cause him to allow them to seek a local office. Each case would be reviewed on its own merits. The matter was also presented before representatives of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, who took the same position as had been taken by the other authorities within the Department, and again the Petitioner indicated that he would decline to withdraw as a candidate. Following the meeting with the Department officials, Wood made one other contact to ascertain if the petitioner had changed his mind about withdrawing his name as a candidate and the Petitioner indicated that he had not. Subsequent to that latter conversation with Wood, the petitioner was hand-delivered a letter dated August 12, 1980, which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 5. This letter informed the petitioner that he was deemed to have resigned his position as Forest Ranger effective August 15, 1980, and offered as a statement of authority Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes. That correspondence from Carl T. Dierking, Chief of Personnel Management and Employee Relations for the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, went on to say that in view of the Petitioner's decision to qualify as a candidate being made after the request to allow him to run had been initially denied by the Department and in keeping with Rule 22A-13.032, Florida Administrative Code, that the Petitioner could request an administrative hearing "toward obtaining an additional review of your situation." This request was to be forwarded through Robert Chastain, Esquire, General Counsel, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. After August 15, 1980, the petitioner was removed as a permanent party Career Service employee with the Respondent. On August 27, 1980, the Petitioner corresponded with Mr. Chastain through a letter which stated, "I would like to have an appeal of my dismissal of August 15, 1980, reason, not just cause." A copy of this petition letter may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. In turn Mr. Chastain contacted the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that a Hearing Officer be assigned and a hearing be set. A copy of that correspondence addressed to the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. Through that correspondence, Mr. Chastain expressed his opinion that Rule 22A-13.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides that an employee has the right to a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing. Subsequent to the case assignment herein, the Petitioner through his counsel has filed a rules challenge to the Rules 22A-13.04 and 22A-7.10(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which may be found in the Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 80-1925R. In addition, the Petitioner in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 80-2049R has attacked the Joint Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by contending that those aforementioned exhibits constitute invalid rules for reason that they were not duly promulgated. In fact, the Petitioner's duty assignment as a forest ranger would conflict at times with his function so School Board Member, in that some of the meetings of the School Board would be held at times when the Petitioner was actively on duty. In addition, the Petitioner is also on call and required to be available in his off-duty time should an emergency arise requiring his assistance as a forest ranger. The petitioner continued to work beyond August 15, 1980, and was eventually reinstated as a probationary employee with the Division of Forestry and holds the position of probationary forest ranger at this time.
The Issue Whether cause exists to suspend Respondent for 60 days without pay.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 47 below1/: Bob Gualtieri is the duly-appointed sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida. Sheriff Gualtieri is in command of the operations of the PCSO and is responsible for providing law enforcement and corrections services within Pinellas County, Florida. Sheriff Gualtieri is authorized to impose discipline in accordance with the Civil Service Act, upon PCSO members/employees who are found to have violated rules or regulations of the PCSO. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was employed by the PCSO as a Deputy Sheriff. As a Deputy Sheriff, Respondent was charged with the responsibility of complying with all applicable state laws and PCSO rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures. Respondent is familiar with the General Orders and standard operating procedures with respect to the PCSO generally, and in detention and corrections specifically. Respondent has been employed by the PCSO for approximately 24 years. Respondent has been employed as a deputy with the Detention and Corrections Bureau approximately nine years. [Lt.] Darrell Spiva is assigned to the Administrative Investigations Division of the PCSO. [Lt.] Spiva investigated concerns raised by Respondent's supervisors arising from a Christmas party that Respondent had for inmates who were under her supervision at the jail. In the Correction and Detention Bureau of the PCSO, Respondent's primary function is to ensure the care, custody and control of inmates. Respondent's specific responsibility is to supervise the inmates in the area of the jail where Respondent is assigned during a particular shift. As part of Respondent's job duties in her assignment as a deputy, Respondent is required to conduct well-being checks every 30 minutes, at a minimum, on each inmate in Respondent's assigned area. Respondent is required to document the completion of the well-being checks. Completion of the well-being checks is required to be documented in the official records of the PCSO using the jail's inmate management system. The inmate management software is commonly referred to as "JIMS." Respondent is familiar with a memorandum issued on April 11, 2011 (Memorandum), by Sheriff's Gualtieri's predecessor, Sheriff Coats, directed to all detention and corrections personnel regarding proper care, custody, and control of inmates. The subject line of the Memorandum reads, "automatic 30 day suspension without pay." The Memorandum was understood by Respondent to emphasize that in order to carry out the PCSO's legal and ethical responsibilities, it is imperative that deputies check on inmates. Deputies are to check on inmates in accordance with accreditation standards and requirements of the General Orders of the Sheriff. The Memorandum explained that there had been a pattern of violations by deputies not completing the required checks. The Memorandum indicated that deputies had not been completing the required well-being checks and then falsifying records to reflect they had completed the checks. According to the Memorandum, a new minimum penalty of 30-days unpaid suspension would be imposed for future violations. According to the Memorandum, the new minimum penalty was to be effective on April 11, 2011. On December 2, 2011, Respondent was assigned to supervise an area within the jail's central division designated "Pod 4C4." Pod 4C4 contained 16 cells on two levels around a common area on the lower level. During Respondent's shift, Pod 4C4 contained somewhere between 48 to 60 female inmates. The pod is designed to be managed by the direct supervision of a single deputy. The deputy is stationed at a work area within the pod. The work area is located in the front of the pod on the lower level. A person standing on the lower level of the pod cannot see into all the cells on the upper and lower level without moving up to the upper level and walking throughout the pod. There are certain recessed areas--vestibules, bathrooms, etc.--that are not entirely visible unless a deputy walks around the pod. It would not be a complete well-being check if Respondent did not go to the upper level of the pod. It takes somewhere under five minutes for a deputy, if not interrupted, to make the walk that constitutes a well-being check. On Respondent's overnight shift, which would have been from 6:00 p.m. on December 22, 2011, to 6:00 a.m. on December 23, 2011, Respondent made computer entries to indicate that she had performed well-being checks at certain times. JIMS records indicate that Respondent made well-being checks on the days in question at 1837 hours, 2054 hours, 2123, 2151, 2225, 2246, 0024, 0049, 0118, 0147 and 0218 hours. Pursuant to the Sheriff's General Orders the Administrative Review Board (ARB) met, reviewed the disciplinary file, questioned the Respondent, gave the Respondent an opportunity to make a statement and subsequently determined that based on the preponderance of the evidence, Respondent had violated the Sheriff's rules. General Order 10-2 covers disciplines and ranks certain offenses. General Order 10-2 ranks offenses from Level 1 to Level 5. Level 1 offenses are the least severe, and Level 5 offenses are the most severe. The General Orders set forth a procedure for assigning points for each sustained violation. According to the number of points, there is a corresponding table that indicates the range of punishment. The ranking of certain offenses, the procedure for assigning points for each sustained violation and the range of punishment are all set by the General Orders. The point total for the two sustained violations found by the ARB in Respondent's case is 60. The discipline range for a violation resulting in 60 disciplinary points is from a minimum of a seven-day suspension up to, and including, termination. Sheriff Gualtieri imposed a suspension of 30 days, or 240 hours, without pay against Respondent. The imposed suspension of 30 days, or 240 hours, without pay is the penalty provided for as a minimum in the Memorandum. Respondent did not make any correcting entries to document that well-being checks she intended to complete were never made. If Respondent made entries in the Sheriff's official records that well-being checks were performed and the well-being checks were not made, these recorded entries are false. Although the JIMS system indicated that Respondent made well-being checks at the times set forth in paragraph 34 above, video surveillance confirmed that Respondent did not actually make several of the well-being checks as indicated. Respondent admits that she logged each of the 11 entries into JIMS and that she failed to conduct well-being checks for the times entered at 2123, 2225, 0049, 0118, 0218 and 0244 hours. According to Respondent, the established practice in Pod 4C4 is to note in JIMS that a particular well-being check was done prior to actually conducting the check. Following this practice, Respondent should have conducted the well-being checks within a reasonable time after entering the times into JIMS; but she did not. Because Respondent failed to conduct the well-being checks as required, this failure resulted in the JIMS entries being false. Respondent asserts that she was distracted during the times in question because she was thinking about Christmas and her mom's 95th birthday. Respondent assertion of being distracted is not credible. If Respondent was able to repress her distracting thoughts long enough to make six entries in JIMS attesting to well-being checks that she intended to do, then she should have also been able to curb those same distracting thoughts long enough to actually conduct the required well-being checks. Respondent admits that there was no emergency or disturbance among the inmates that physically impeded here ability to complete the required checks, and in the absence of such circumstances, Respondent should have completed each of the checks. Respondent intentionally failed to conduct the well- being checks at issue, and she knowingly caused false entries to be made in the JIMS tracking system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Dolores Taylor, violated General Order 3-1.1, Rules and Regulations 5.4 and 5.14(c), and suspending Respondent for a period of 30 days (240 hours) without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2012.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the request for formal hearing filed by petitioner, Ronald McGahee. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of October 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Jayne C. Weintraub, Esquire 330 Biscayne Boulevard Penthouse Miami, Florida 33132 Donald Papy, Esquire 19 West Flagler Street Suite 802 Miami, Florida 33130 Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcment Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The Respondent whose Social Security Number is 356-48-9981 was certified as a law enforcement office by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on December 18, 1985 and was issued certificate number 12- 85-222-02. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer. On or about April 23, 1987 Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges of grand theft in the second degree, a violation Section 812.014, Florida Statutes and dealing in stolen property, a violation of Section 812.019, Florida Statutes. The Respondent was adjudged guilty of these offenses by the Circuit Court of Saint Lucie County, Florida on April 23, 1987.
Recommendation Having considered the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witness, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order revoking the law enforcement officer certification (No. 12-85-222-02) of Respondent, Carey A. Reddick. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Carey A. Reddick 15424 Loomis Harvey, IL 60426 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
