The Issue Whether the Respondent, Mario Medero, discriminated against the Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, on the basis of her sex, female?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, is a female. The Respondent, Mario Medero, is a male. Dr. Medero is a physician. He practices medicine as a professional association. Dr. Medero is the chief executive officer and the supervisor or principal of the professional association. The professional association operates a medical office in Ocala, Florida. The medical practice performed by Dr. Medero consists primarily of treating individuals who have been injured on the job and who are covered by workers compensation insurance. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment. On August 20, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski was hired for employment by Dr. Medero's professional association as the front desk receptionist at Dr. Medero's office. At the time she was hired, Ms. Zbikowski was told that she would be considered for an accounts payable clerk position at the office. The position was held by Barbara Redding if Ms. Redding left the position. Ms. Zbikowski was told at the time of her employment that her consideration for the position of accounts payable clerk was dependent upon Ms. Redding actually leaving. Ms. Redding ultimately decided not to resign her position. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was hired as a bookkeeper or accounts payable clerk, or that she was not placed in the position she was hired to fill. Ms. Zbikowski's Performance. Ms. Zbikowski worked initially at the front desk. Her performance was considered inadequate by Marilyn Hartsel, the office manager and Ms. Zbikowski's immediate supervisor. Ms. Zbikowski was moved to other positions within the office. She worked for a while in medical records and for approximately one day in accounts payable with Ms. Redding. Ms. Zbikowski's performance in medical records and in accounts payable was also considered inadequate by Ms. Hartsel. Within three or four weeks after Ms. Zbikowski began her employment, Ms. Hartsel had decided to recommend that Ms. Zbikowski be terminated because of the inadequacy of her work. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment by Dr. Medero. At the time that Ms. Zbikowski was initially employed at Dr. Medero's office, Dr. Medero had caused the office to advertise for a housekeeper for his home. Ms. Zbikowski discussed the position with Dr. Medero. Dr. Medero agreed to employ Ms. Zbikowski as his housekeeper and Ms. Zbikowski agreed to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. Ms. Zbikowski agreed to clean Dr. Medero's house, run errands for him and the office, pick up his son from school and take his son to and from tennis lessons, meet Dr. Medero's former wife half way between Ocala and Tampa to pick up or to drop off Dr. Medero's daughter, who was in the custody of his former wife, and generally oversee his household. Although the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski performed services in her capacity as housekeeper for anyone other than Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski was paid for her services out of accounts of the professional association and Ms. Hartsel continued to be her immediate supervisor. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was forced in any way to accept employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. The evidence proved that she accepted the position voluntarily and without coercion. Ms. Zbikowski continued to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper until September 28, 1992. During her employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper, Dr. Medero was satisfied with Ms. Zbikowski's performance. Alleged Sexual Harassment. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero sexually harassed Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski testified about very few specific alleged incidents involving Dr. Medero and the evidence failed to substantiate those incidents. Ms. Zbikowski admitted that she had had no physical contact with Dr. Medero except for one occasion when she hugged him from advancing funds to her to pay for her son's day care and on another occasion when he gave her a physical examination after being in an automobile accident. The evidence failed to prove that either incident involved improper conduct by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski's testimony that Dr. Medero evidenced a "flirtatious manner" was not substantiated by competent substantial evidence of specific incidents. The most specific incident, and the incident which led to Ms. Zbikowski's termination from employment, took place on Thursday, September 24, 1992. At lunch on that day, Ms. Zbikowski and her four year old son were in Dr. Medero's back yard. Ms. Zbikowski was cleaning lawn furniture. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding came to Dr. Medero's house, waved at Ms. Zbikowski and went into Dr. Medero's bedroom. The curtains/blinds to the bedroom windows were closed soon after Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding went into the room. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, both of whom were not married at the time, were lovers. Ms. Zbikowski was aware of their relationship. At no time did Ms. Zbikowski see Dr. Medero or Ms. Redding in Dr. Medero's bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski believes that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding engaged in sexual intercourse while in the bedroom. This belief was not, however, substantiated by competent substantial evidence. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, who is not longer involved personally or in a working relationship with Dr. Medero, both testified that they did not engage in sexual intercourse. Ms. Zbikowski did not see them engage in intercourse. At best, Ms. Zbikowski's belief was based upon hearing "giggling" and "these little, um, sounds and things" from the bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski's Termination from Employment. On the afternoon of September 24, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski spoke with Ms. Hartsel and told her that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding had sexual intercourse in her presence and her son's presence. Ms. Zbikowski was very upset and Ms. Hartsel told her to take the afternoon off and report to the office the next morning. Ms. Zbikowski also made other allegations, which the evidence failed to substantiate, of incidents of sexual harassment by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski left a beeper and a garage door opener she had been provided by Dr. Medero at Dr. Medero's home and left. The next morning, Friday, September 25, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski reported to the office. She was told that she would be expected to the work at the office in the mornings and then work at Dr. Medero's home in the afternoons. Ms. Zbikowski left at lunch and did not return. Ms. Zbikowski informed Ms. Hartsel that she did not intend to return that day because she did not want to return to Dr. Medero's home. Ms. Hartsel told Ms. Zbikowski that she would discuss the matter with Dr. Medero. Ms. Hartsel did not, however, order Ms. Zbikowski to return to work that day or inform her that she was not authorized to stay home. After speaking to Ms. Hartsel by telephone that weekend and being told that Ms. Hartsel had not yet discussed the matter with Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski reported to work Monday, September 29, 1992. By the time that Ms. Zbikowski returned to the office on Monday, Dr. Medero had been informed of the allegations of sexual harassment she had made against him to Ms. Hartsel. Shortly after arriving at the office, Ms. Zbikowski was escorted to her automobile by Dr. Medero, Ms. Hartsel and a nurse and was told by Dr. Medero not to return. Ms. Zbikowski was, therefore, fired by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski was terminated because of the allegations she made concerning Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding and the other allegations of sexual harassment. Ms. Zbikowski was not terminated because she was not performing her duties as Dr. Medero's housekeeper in a satisfactory manner. Ms. Zbikowski's Subsequent Employment. Ms. Zbikowski was employed, and eventually terminated, by other physicians after her termination from employment by Dr. Medero. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero was involved in any manner in Ms. Zbikowski's subsequent terminations from employment. Ms. Zbikowski's Charge of Discrimination. Ms. Zbikowski filed a Charge of Discrimination against Dr. Medero with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Zbikowski alleged that she had been discriminated against based upon the following: I am a female. I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992 when I was discharged from my position of maid. During my employment I was subjected to sexual harassment by Dr. Mario Medero, and also I was subjected to different terms and conditions in my employment. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. On September 2, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Zbikowski filed a Petition for Relief, requesting a formal administrative hearing on October 19, 1993. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Ms. Zbikowski alleged, in part, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: . . . . The alleged fact memos are that Petitioner was hired for a "Bookkeeping" position but was never given the opportunity to work in this position as original Bookkeeper (Dr. Medero's girlfriend) decided not to leave her position, so Petitioner was given a less meaningful job as "Housekeeper" but was subjected to harassing sexual misconduct by Respondent. The relief is as follows: Petitioner has for 1 year been trying to maintain and seek employment in the Medical field, one which she has worked in for 13 years, but because of Dr. Medero's influence in the Medical field has made it very hard for Petitioner to continue in this field. Petitioner is seeking recovery for the discriminating position he placed her in while under his employment plus relief from the undue hardship which has been placed upon her because of his lies in this matter. . . . . . . . Ms. Zbikowski proved the following allegations contained in her Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief: "I am a female." "I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992, when I was discharged from my position of maid." "Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job." The remaining allegations contained in the Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief were not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any action of Dr. Medero was based upon Ms. Zbikowski's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not sexually harassed and she was not terminated because of her sex. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any policy or standard of Dr. Medero or his office had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was replaced by a male or that other female employees with comparable or lessor qualifications were retained. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was sexually harassed by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that Dr. Medero or his office discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black male. Respondent is a staffing company that contracts with third party employers. Over 80 percent of Respondent’s employees are Black. After Respondent matches a candidate with a job opening, the third-party employer interviews the candidate for employment. If the candidate is employed by the third party, the employee must abide by the third-party employer’s policies as well as the employment policies of Respondent. Petitioner was hired by Respondent some time in January 2008. Respondent requires all employees to notify Respondent of his or her absence prior to that employee’s scheduled report time for their employment. Respondent also requires that all employees report to work at their scheduled report time. Failure to either call in or show up for work is known as a ‘no call/no show’. The employment policies of Respondent reflect that a “no call/no show” is grounds for termination. Petitioner received a copy of Respondent’s employee handbook, which included the “no call/no show” provision. He was also aware of Respondent’s “no call/no show” policy. Around January 14, 2008, Respondent successfully matched Petitioner with a position at BR Williams Trucking Company (BR Williams). Like Respondent, BR Williams maintains a policy of termination when an employee fails to show up for work or does not call in prior to the start of the work day to report their absence. Petitioner’s scheduled report time for BR Williams was 7:00 a.m. On March 3, 2008, Petitioner contacted Respondent’s Regional Sales Manager, Diane Jarrett, to report that he had overheard a racial slur that a White employee, Harry Hingson, had made to another employee. Like Petitioner, Mr. Hingson had been placed at BR Williams by Respondent and was an employee of both Respondent and BR Williams. Ms. Jarrett sent Respondent’s Human Resources Assistant, Annis Herndon, to BR Williams to terminate Mr. Hingson for having made the racial slur. She met with Mr. Wilkinson, BR Williams’ manager. Mr. Hingson was terminated from BR Williams. Neither Ms. Jarrett nor Ms. Herndon disclosed that Petitioner had reported Mr. Hingson’s racial slur to her. After the termination, Mr. Wilkinson mentioned to a group of employees, including Petitioner, that he hated to fire Mr. Hingson because “everybody needs a job.” The evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Wilkinson said that “once he found out who did this, they will pay.” Petitioner felt that Mr. Wilkinson was talking to him or targeting him because Mr. Wilkinson looked him in the eyes during the meeting. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify at the hearing. As a consequence, there is no competent evidence regarding Mr. Wilkinson’s intent showing any look he may or may not have given Petitioner. On March 24, 2008, Petitioner worked his regular shift at BR Williams. On the evening of March 24, 2008, Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DUI) and was held in jail overnight. He was released two days later on March 26, 2008. On March 25, 2008, Petitioner was scheduled to begin his shift at 7 a.m. Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled because he was in jail. Petitioner also did not call Respondent to report his absence prior to the beginning of his shift or during the morning of March 25, 2008. Mr. Wilkinson called Respondent around 9:00 a.m. and reported that Petitioner was not at work and had not called in. He did not know where Petitioner was. Respondent could not locate Petitioner at his home. Mr. Wilkinson instructed Respondent that if he or Respondent did not hear from Petitioner before noon, Petitioner was terminated for not showing up at work and not calling in. About 1:00 p.m., after Petitioner was terminated by BR Williams, Petitioner called Respondent collect from jail. He was advised that he had been terminated from BR Williams. After speaking with Petitioner, Respondent called BR Williams to report that Petitioner had called in after noon and that she had told him that he had been terminated from BR Williams. Respondent did not tell Petitioner that he was terminated from Cardinal Staffing. BR Williams’ decision to terminate Petitioner was not based on his race or his complaint regarding Mr. Hingson’s racial slur. Indeed, there was no competent evidence to suggest that Petitioner was terminated from BR Williams for any reason other than he was in jail, and did not report to work as scheduled. Petitioner was not terminated from Cardinal Staffing. Petitioner left a message on Respondent’s answering machine on March 27 or March 28, 2008. Return calls by Respondent could not be left at the numbers that Respondent had for Petitioner. He did not contact Respondent again until August 2008, at which time there were no positions available for him. Importantly, Petitioner was not terminated from Respondent. As with all Respondent’s employees, Petitioner had the responsibility of calling Respondent as often as possible to check if other employment opportunities were available. If Petitioner had contacted Respondent to seek placement during April–June, 2008, and if a placement for which Petitioner was qualified had been available, Respondent would have sent him for an interview with the prospective employer. Indeed, it was Petitioner’s lack of action that caused him to miss any employment opportunities that may have been available to him during April – June, 2008. After August 2008, Petitioner did not contact Respondent to seek other employment opportunities. Petitioner identified two non-minority employees that were terminated from their third-party employer jobs and received new assignments with another of Respondent’s clients. The two employees were Jason Whibble and Sherita Cheshire. Neither of these employees was similarly situated to Petitioner. Mr. Whibble was terminated for having a felony conviction involving multiple traffic tickets. Ms. Cheshire was terminated because she could not perform her job duties. After termination, both employees called in on a daily or weekly basis to check to see if any job openings were available. In this case, Petitioner was terminated for a very different reason from BR Williams. Petitioner also did not frequently call Respondent to check for job openings that might be available to him. Indeed, Petitioner has not identified any similarly situated non-Black employee of Respondent’s who was terminated from an employment assignment on the basis of an employer’s “no call/no show” policy and was treated more favorably than Petitioner. The evidence was clear that Petitioner was not terminated from Cardinal Staffing and failed to maintain frequent contact with them. Clearly, Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter Jan Pietruszka, Esquire Shumaker Loop & Kendrick 101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2800 Tampa, Florida 33602 Melvin Lee Butler 40 Jack Scott Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Robert E. Larkin, III, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Caucasian male, was born on March 23, 1949. At the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue in this case, Petitioner was 52-53 years old. Petitioner was employed by Respondent since 1973. He was terminated effective August 15, 2001. Respondent, at all times material to this case, is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent, at all relevant times, is in the business of providing telephone services to individuals and businesses in south Florida and elsewhere. At all relevant times, Petitioner was employed as a Service Technician. Service Technicians are responsible to install and repair telephone equipment in response to customer requests. At all relevant times, Respondent employs individuals as Service Technicians who are older than Petitioner. Many other individuals employed as Service Technicians are over the age of 40 at all times relevant to this case. Beginning in 1997, Respondent began to evaluate its Service Technicians according to a system called "Integrated Technicians Performance Plan [ITP].” The purpose of ITP was to improve customer service by evaluating Service Technicians and the individuals who manage them, on a regional basis, in accordance with standardized performance measures. Service Technicians whose ITP evaluations revealed deficiencies, including Petitioner, were provided assistance pursuant to individualized Technician Development Plans (TDP) and given a reasonable period of time to improve. From the time ITP was implemented in 1997, Petitioner was at all relevant times on a TDP because of deficiencies in his job performance. Petitioner's job performance was consistently deficient from 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment. From 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment Petitioner was provided assistance to help him improve his performance. Despite the assistance provided, Petitioner failed to improve his job performance to minimum levels required of all Service Technicians and required by his TDP. By August 2001, supervisors responsible for the training, evaluation and supervision of Service Technicians had determined that Petitioner did not maintain his job performance at the minimum levels required of Service Technicians and did not fulfill the requirements of his TDP. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner could have been terminated earlier than he was. In consideration of the fact that Petitioner had been a long-time employee of the company, he was given more time to improve his performance than company policy required. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that age played any role in Petitioner's termination. Petitioner did not prove that after he was terminated, a younger worker replaced him. Similarly, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act, or that any disability played any role in his termination. Petitioner alleged his disabilities as “war wounds, tinnitus and hearing loss.” Petitioner never informed Respondent that he suffered from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Petitioner never informed Respondent that the disabilities alleged would in any way prevent him from performing his job as a Service Technician, or from satisfying the TDP developed to assist in ameliorating his performance deficiencies. Petitioner never informed Respondent that the alleged disabilities substantially impacted any major life function, or affected Petitioner’s ability to perform the essential functions of his Service Technician job. Respondent was not, at relevant times, on notice that Petitioner might suffer from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Respondent never perceived Petitioner to be disabled at times relevant to this case. During his employment as a Service Technician, Petitioner did not indicate a need for or make any request to Respondent for accommodations for any physical condition. Finally, Petitioner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for complaints he had filed in another forum. This allegation was not proved; rather, the evidence established that Petitioner never opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent discharged Petitioner solely on account of inadequate job performance as a Service Technician, and not on account of his age, disability, or in retaliation for complaints filed in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a payroll clerk with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Prior to November 1994, Petitioner was employed by Markings and Equipment Corporation, first as a receptionist, later as a payroll clerk for several years. She had a good working relationship with management and staff. In November 1994, Edward T. Quinn and two other investors purchased the assets of Markings and Equipment Co. and established a new corporation named Mill-it Striping, Inc., a Florida corporation. On November 7, 1994, Mill-It Striping began operations. Edward T. Quinn was named Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. Petitioner and one other person were retained as office staff. Other employees of the former owner were retained as field workers in their same positions. Petitioner and the other employees were retained on a 90-day probationary period. All employees were required to complete application forms for the new company. The organization of the company was revamped and operating policies were changed. Petitioner and Quinn became embroiled in disputes over policy and procedures on a nearly daily basis. Quinn's management style was gruff and unprofessional. Foul language was directed toward Petitioner's work by Quinn on a regular basis. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Quinn's derogatory remarks of a social nature were directed toward Petitioner. On December 5, 1994, Petitioner was terminated from her position as a payroll clerk. Quinn alleged that Petitioner was terminated because of her poor work performance and reporting to work late on more than one occasion while on probation. Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was replaced in her position by a Caucasian female. Respondent's company presently has been administratively dissolved, as of September 24, 1999. There is no evidence that the corporation is active, is a subsidiary to another company, or that it has any remaining assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Edward T. Quinn as former Vice President Mill-It Stripping, Inc. 107 Shore Drive Longwood, Florida 32779 Valerie A. Roberts Post Office Box 543 Maitland, Florida 32751 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by retaliating against Petitioner for filing a charge of discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jacques Pierre (Petitioner or Mr. Pierre) is black and his national origin is Haitian. He has worked in the United States for 24 years. On or about January 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of discrimination against his employer, Respondent, SSA Security, Inc., a/k/a Security Services of America, a California Corporation (Respondent or SSA). SSA, under a subcontract with a federal government contractor, Alutiiq-Mele, provided security services for a federal building in Miami. SSA continued to employ Petitioner as a security guard when it took over the contract from his previous employer, Superior Protection. Contractors and managers changed, in the past, but the security guards stayed the same. On August 10, 2006, and August 15, 2006, first Mr. Pierre, then a representative for SSA signed an agreement to settle the EEOC complaint. With a letter dated August 23, 2006, Mr. Pierre received a settlement check in the amount of $1,257.04, and he was advised to report any future unlawful harassment or discrimination charges by use of a "Harassment Hotline and [to] speak with your local area manager, Barry Hirsch [sic]." Captain Barry Hersch was Mr. Pierre's immediate supervisor. The agreement was approved, in principle, by Kent Jurney, Sr., an SSA corporate officer. The language of the agreement is, in relevant part, as follows: Removal of all Disciplinary Notices in File. Company agrees to remove all writings related to disciplinary actions taken against Employee from Employee's personnel file maintained by the Company. Employee understands that the removal of said documents does not prevent the Company from issuing disciplinary notices and/or taking disciplinary action against Employee as necessary in the future should Employee violate the Company's rules of [sic] policies. * * * 4. Confidentiality Clause. The Employee and the Company agree to the following confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement: (a) The parties represent and agree that they will keep the terms and amount of this agreement completely confidential. The parties will not hereafter disclose any information concerning this agreement to anyone, including but not limited to, any past, present or prospective employee of the Company or any prospective employer of the Employee. On August 25, 2006, the federal government changed the requirements in the contract. No longer would security guards be allowed to take breaks at the start or end of their shifts, but only during the middle. Mr. Pierre was made aware of the change. In violation of the requirement, on September 1, 2006, Mr. Pierre took his break at the end of his shift. The federal government contract also prohibited security guards from being on the work premises more than 30 minutes before or after their shifts. On August 28, 2006, Mr. Pierre returned to his work site and entered the building more than 30 minutes after his shift to retrieve keys and a telephone charger. Mr. Pierre also got into a loud and profane argument with another worker during his unauthorized return to the building. Mr. Pierre admitted he had an incident where he got into an argument with and "fired back" at a supervisor in 1995 or 1996. Beginning on or about July 10, 2006, Petitioner began to request, but initially was denied, leave. Mr. Pierre was feeling threatened and harassed by his supervisors and was suffering physically as a result. On a form dated August 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre said he was requesting leave from September 11 to September 25, with a return date of September 27, 2006. Spaces on the form to indicate whether it was approved or disapproved, and by whom are blank. As the reason for the request, Mr. Pierre indicated "stress related: as a result of retaliation.” This time, Captain Hersch, approved the request and Mr. Pierre went on vacation in September 2006. On September 5, 2006, as instructed by Mr. Jurney, another Miami supervisor, Bill Graham, issued a memorandum to Mr. Pierre requiring him to attend a mandatory meeting "about several important issues and notifying him of his "temporary removal from the schedule until this meeting has taken place." Copies of the memorandum were sent to Mr. Jurney and Captain Hersch. The evidence is insufficient to determine if other security guards who violated the same rules were subjected to the same consequences, or if discipline was uniformly applied. Mr. Pierre requested, either through his supervisor, Captain Hersch, or directly to Mr. Graham, that the attorney who handled his EEOC complaint and settlement agreement be allowed to attend the meeting with him. Mr. Jurney denied the request. Because he never attended a meeting, Mr. Pierre remained "off the schedule." For the remainder of 2006 and in early 2007, he was working part-time only at his second job with the State Department of Corrections. Mr. Pierre's income was reduced from $15 an hour ($17 minus $2 for insurance) for 40-hour weeks with SSA, plus $1,000 every two weeks from Corrections to only his Corrections pay. The evidence is insufficient to determine how long Mr. Pierre was, or if he still has, a lower income and what, if any, efforts he has taken to secure alternate employment to mitigate damages. SSA supposedly notified Mr. Pierre, in a memorandum dated September 22, 2006, that he was suspended without pay for two weeks for his rule violations and his failure to attend the mandatory meeting. The authenticity of the memorandum was questioned, and no witnesses testified to sponsor it or to explain why it was necessary, given the fact that Mr. Pierre was already "off the schedule." On October 3, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed a charge of retaliation with the Florida Commission on Human Relations which, on July 2, 2008, found that reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. In the fall of 2006, Mr. Pierre applied for a job with the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (Miami- Dade). It was his understanding that his background investigation had been successfully completed, but that SSA had not responded to a reference form. Mr. Pierre took the form to SSA. The form, dated October 4, 2006, was completed by Captain Hersch, who responded, in relevant part, as follows: Reason for termination (voluntary/fired)? NON APPLICABLE Describe the applicant's work performance. GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE Describe the applicant's attendance record. GOOD OVERALL Was the applicant ever disciplined for any reason? If YES, please explain. YES CONFIDENTIAL." Is applicant able to work well with others? YES Is applicant trustworthy? YES Describe applicant's work habits? KNOWS HIS JOB, AND DOES IT Is applicant eligible for re-employment? If NO, please explain why. STILL EMPLOYED There is no explanation why Captain Hersch mentioned the confidential agreement, but not the subsequent disciplinary actions that were the focus of concern to Mr. Jurney and Mr. Graham, which could have been disclosed without violating the agreement. Based on the earlier assurances from Miami-Dade, Mr. Pierre, having put "no" when asked about discipline of his job application, believes the contradictory response from SSA caused him not to get the job. He received a letter informing him, but without giving specific reasons, that he was not hired by Miami-Dade. He failed to prove the correctness of his belief. Mr. Pierre testified, but presented no supporting evidence, that he could have earned up to $120,000 a year with Miami-Dade. SSA received notice on the second anniversary of its contract, in October 2006, that the federal government contract would not be renewed. Some time in 2007, most likely in February, at Mr. Pierre's request, he met with Mr. Jurney. It was not until that meeting, Mr. Pierre remembered, that Mr. Jurney had someone remove pre-settlement discipline records from his personnel file. By that time, SSA no longer had a contract with the federal government and was transferring its personnel over to work for the next contractor, Alutiiq. Mr. Pierre asked to be transferred and Mr. Jurney testified that he contacted someone at Alutiiq and asked for Mr. Pierre to be interviewed, but the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that SSA attempted to transfer Mr. Pierre to Alutiiq, or what the routine procedures were for transferring security guards. When Mr. Pierre found out that the necessary paperwork was never sent from SSA to Alutiiq, he tried unsuccessfully for two or three weeks to contact SSA. It is reasonable to believe that SSA, while not allowing Mr. Pierre to work, would not help him transfer over to the next contractor. Mr. Pierre was not transferred and was not employed by Alutiiq. Mr. Jurney testified unconvincingly that he made non-federal contract job offers to Mr. Pierre and Mr. Pierre found the offers acceptable, “but he didn’t accept them.” It is inconceivable that Mr. Pierre, who has three children to support and a wife who works part-time, would have rejected any legitimate job offer at that time. Mr. Pierre and Mr. Jurney, a former highway patrol trooper and member of an advisory board for the Florida Highway Patrol, discussed Mr. Pierre’s desire to be a trooper. Mr. Jurney offered to assist him but that employment never materialized. As a corporate officer, Mr. Jurney was responsible for overseeing hundreds of contracts involving 1,500 employees. He was senior to Mr. Graham and Captain Hersch. Yet, once he authorized the EEOC settlement, he became directly involved in the decision-making concerning discipline and consequences for Mr. Pierre. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierre had ever come to his attention before he approved the settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order directing that Respondent cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $15.00 an hour for each normal 40-hour work week between September 5, 2006, and the date of the final order, offset by earnings from substitute employment, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald G. Polly, Esquire Hawkins & Parnell, LLP 4000 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3243 Jacques Pierre 19601 Northwest 12th Court Miami, Florida 33169 Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Human Rights Act by maintaining racially segregated restroom facilities, as alleged by Petitioner; and, if so, the affirmative relief which should be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the COMPANY operated a business establishment located at Pompano Beach, Florida. BOYKIN a black male, was employed by the COMPANY during a one-week period in 1978. During BOYKIN'S employment, the COMPANY maintained separate restroom facilities, segregated on the basis of race. (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S two restroom facilities were racially segregated by the use of signs affixed to the outside door of each restroom--one sign labeled "Colored," and the other, "White." (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restrooms was offensive to BOYKIN, and the other black employees. (Testimony of Boykin.) As of September 26, 1980, the offending signs by which the COMPANY racially segregated its restrooms were no longer affixed to the restroom doors. (Viewing by hearing officer, accompanied by parties.) The COMPANY presented no evidence controverting BOYKIN'S allegation that it maintained racially segregated restrooms during the time in question. Neither did it assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for maintaining segregated restroom facilities. BOYKIN presented no evidence to establish that the COMPANY employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1977 or 1978.
Conclusions Conclusions: Respondent company maintained racially segregated restrooms for Petitioner and its other employees. The signs, by which the restrooms were labeled, "Colored" and "White" were no longer affixed to the restrooms at the time of final hearing. However, Petitioner failed to prove an essential elements of his claim-- that Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Recommendation: That the Petitioner for Relief be DISMISSED. Background: On November 27, 1978, Petitioner Michael C. Boykin ("BOYKIN") filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations a complaint of unlawful discrimination against Respondent H. L. Westberry Paving and Trucking Company ("COMPANY"). The gravamen of BOYKIN'S complaint was that he was subjected to an unlawful condition of employment by virtue of the COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restroom facilities. After investigation, the Commission on Human Relations issued its determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the COMPANY had engaged in an unlawful employment practice, as alleged, in violation of the Human Rights Act, Sections 23.161, et seq., Florida Statutes. After an unsuccessful effort to effect voluntary conciliation of the dispute, the Commission issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation on June 11, 1980. Within the requisite 30-day period thereafter, BOYKIN filed a Petition for Relief from the alleged unlawful employment practice. Notwithstanding the COMPANY'S failure to file any pleading responding to BOYKIN'S Petition for Relief, or request a hearing thereon, the Commission forwarded it to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 10, 1980, for the assignment of a hearing officer. By Notice of Hearing, final hearing was thereafter set for September 26, 1980. At final hearing, counsel for the COMPANY represented that on September 25, 1980, he received a telephone call from an unidentified employee of the Commission purporting to cancel the hearing scheduled for September 26, 1980. As a result, he asserted his witness was not present at final hearing; he then proffered that, if present, his witness could testify that signs indicating "Colored" and "White" were not now affixed to the doors of the separate restrooms located on the COMPANY'S premises. In order to avoid continuing the hearing, the parties agreed that the undersigned hearing officer should determine whether or not the described signs were present by conducting a viewing of the COMPANY'S premises. In light of this viewing, the COMPANY declined to request a continuance, and indicted that it wished to present no further evidence. The COMPANY also moved to dismiss the Petition for Relief, claiming that the Commission lacked jurisdiction based on: (1) federal preemption of the area by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (2) failure of the Commission to complete its proceeding within 120 days from the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's deferral of this matter to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was offered, and received in support of the motion, after which the motion was denied. The only witness who testified at final hearing was BOYKIN. No other exhibits were offered by either party. The Florida Commission on Human Relations was not represented at final hearing; BOYKIN represented himself, in proper person, and without assistance by the Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended: That the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael C. Boykin 801 Powerline road, #161 Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Thomas P. Quinn, Esquire 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard Suite 605, International Building Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33404
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, or national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).1
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Bamawo is a black male from Nigeria. Mr. Bamawo began working for the Department at the Dade Correctional Institution ("DCI") as a correctional officer in March 1993. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Bamawo was a career service employee whose duties included the care, custody, and control of inmates of the institution. Mr. Bamawo normally worked the third shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. During most of the time Mr. Bamawo was employed at DCI, Captain Scott Pardue, as the third shift supervisor, directly supervised Mr. Bamawo. According to Mr. Bamawo, he and Captain Pardue did not "see eye-to-eye" even though Mr. Bamawo tried to get along with Captain Pardue. The first incident that Mr. Bamawo considers discriminatory occurred in 1995, when Captain Pardue formally disciplined Mr. Bamawo for writing graffiti.3 Mr. Bamawo denies that he wrote the graffiti, and he made a verbal complaint to a superior officer identified as "Colonel Thompson." Mr. Bamawo also asserts that, in 1995, an Anglo corrections officer was promoted to sergeant, and Mr. Bamawo was required to follow his orders. Mr. Bamawo asserted that he made many complaints to Captain Pardue about this sergeant but that Captain Pardue did nothing. Also in 1995, Captain Pardue made two remarks to Mr. Bamawo that Mr. Bamawo considered offensive: On one occasion, Captain Pardue apparently was looking at a picture of an African woman in a National Geographic magazine when he asked Mr. Bamawo if "you people live in houses or sleep in trees"; Mr. Bamawo believed Captain Pardue was making a derogatory comment about Mr. Bamawo's being a native of Africa. Another occasion was at Thanksgiving, when Mr. Bamawo brought a can of corn to a covered-dish lunch; Mr. Bamawo opened the can of corn and set it on the table with the other food, and Captain Pardue asked if this was the way people in Africa ate corn. These remarks caused Mr. Bamawo to be humiliated and embarrassed in front of his co-workers. Mr. Bamawo asserts that Captain Pardue refused to approve his requests for time off the job but would approve time off for Anglo officers. When Captain Pardue refused Mr. Bamawo's requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo asked other captains for approval, and, when they refused to approve his requests for time off, Mr. Bamawo called in sick. Mr. Bamawo recalls that, on one occasion, he was forced to miss an appointment because Captain Pardue ordered him to work overtime. According to Mr. Bamawo, Captain Pardue accused Mr. Bamawo of being a minute late on one occasion and penalized him, although Mr. Bamawo recalls that Captain Pardue did not penalize others for being late. It was Mr. Bamawo's perception while he worked at DCI that, countless times, Captain Pardue changed the work assignments of Anglo officers when they requested a change, but that Captain Pardue never changed Mr. Bamawo's work assignment when he requested a change. Mr. Bamawo believed that he was given the assignments that no one else wanted. On March 21, 2000, Mr. Bamawo was involved in an altercation with Sergeant Frankie Tindall. Mr. Bamawo called Sergeant Tindall "bitch" and threatened to "blow away" Sergeant Tindall when Sergeant Tindall questioned Mr. Bamawo about trash that littered his post.4 On April 23, 2000, Captain Pardue designated Correctional Officer Orol as third-shift supervisor in DCI's north annex "Yard One"; Mr. Bamawo was one of three other correctional officers assigned to Yard One at the time. As designated supervisor, Mr. Orol had the authority to assign tasks to the three other officers. Mr. Bamawo protested Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol because Mr. Orol had been out of the academy only six months; Mr. Bamawo felt that he should have been designated supervisor because he was the senior officer on the shift. Captain Pardue told Mr. Bamawo that he felt more confident with Mr. Orol in the position of supervisor. Mr. Bamawo told Captain Pardue that he was going to file a grievance. At some point during the daylight hours of the third shift on April 23, 2000, Mr. Orol told Mr. Bamawo to complete a check of the perimeter fence, which Mr. Bamawo considered a difficult job to do in the daylight because it was very hot work. Mr. Bamawo refused the order and told Mr. Orol that he would do the fence check when the sun went down. After a time, Mr. Orol called Mr. Bamawo on the radio and told him again to check the perimeter fence; Mr. Bamawo again refused, using a radio shorthand phrase meaning, "Do it yourself." Captain Pardue was monitoring the radio transmission and heard the exchange between Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol. Captain Pardue thought that Mr. Bamawo had responded to Mr. Orol in a "nasty" tone of voice, and, fearing that Mr. Bamawo and Mr. Orol might get into a confrontation, Captain Pardue radioed Mr. Bamawo and told him to come to the control room. Captain Pardue took Mr. Bamawo into a copy room and confronted him about his attitude toward Mr. Orol. Mr. Bamawo again complained about Captain Pardue's choice of Mr. Orol as supervisor rather than Mr. Bamawo. During the discussion, Mr. Bamawo became agitated, turned, and walked away from Captain Pardue. Captain Pardue called to him and told him to come back; Mr. Bamawo turned back and approached Captain Pardue with his fists clenched, called Captain Pardue "bitch," and said he would "bust" Captain Pardue.5 At this point, Captain Pardue, fearing for his safety, called Jeffrey Wainwright, who was the acting warden of DCI. After talking with Captain Pardue and Mr. Bamawo, Mr. Wainwright reassigned Mr. Bamawo to the women's facility across the street from DCI. Mr. Bamawo threatened to file a discrimination complaint if Mr. Wainwright did anything to him as a result of the incident with Captain Pardue. Mr. Bamawo was terminated from his employment with the Department on May 4, 2000. Mr. Bamawo appealed his termination to PERC, which found that the Department had just cause to terminate him based on the incidents of March 21 and April 23, 2000. Mr. Bamawo testified that, through the years, Captain Pardue made "countless" derogatory remarks about Mr. Bamawo's race and national origin. At first, according to Mr. Bamawo, he thought that Captain Pardue was joking, but that, eventually, he saw hate behind Captain Pardue's remarks.6 Mr. Bamawo also claims that Captain Pardue gave him bad work assignments; refused to give him days off; and used rookie officers like Mr. Orol to "agitate" him. Mr. Bamawo believes that he was terminated in retaliation for having threatened to file a grievance against Captain Pardue for unprofessional conduct because Captain Pardue designated Mr. Orol as the supervisor on April 23, 2000, and allowed him to give orders to more senior correctional officers. Other than his complaint to "Colonel Thompson" about the graffiti incident in 1995, Mr. Bamawo did not complain during the years he worked at DCI, either verbally or in writing, that Captain Pardue made racist remarks or derogatory remarks about his national origin or that Captain Pardue discriminated against him in any respect. Mr. Bamawo stayed in his job as a correctional officer at DCI because he liked the job, thought everyone was friendly, and liked working with the inmates. He had no problem with anyone on the job except Captain Pardue and Sergeant Tindall.7 Summary The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that his termination by the Department was motivated by discriminatory intent or retaliatory. Mr. Bamawo failed to present any evidence to support a finding that the Department has ever imposed a lesser penalty on anyone not a black or a person of African origin for having threatened a Department sergeant or captain with violence. Mr. Bamawo has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that his termination was retaliatory because he had not, at the time he was terminated, filed an employment discrimination complaint; rather, Mr. Bamawo had merely threatened Mr. Wainwright that he would file such a complaint if disciplinary action were taken against him for the April 23, 2000, incident involving Captain Pardue. The evidence presented by Mr. Bamawo is not sufficient to support a finding that he was subjected to continual harassment based on his race or national origin such that his ability to function as a correctional officer was impeded. Although Mr. Bamawo, as a black man of African origin, is a member of two protected classes, he did not present evidence sufficient to establish that he was treated differently from other correctional officers with respect to pay, assignments, time off, or any other aspect of his employment with the Department, and he did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that he was forced to endure an abusive and hostile work environment at DCI. The evidence submitted by Mr. Bamawo is sufficient to establish that, in 1995, Captain Pardue made a remark about Africans sleeping in trees and a remark about the manner in which Africans served canned corn, but, even though Mr. Bamawo was humiliated and embarrassed by these boorish remarks, these two isolated instances of derogatory comments based on race and national origin are not indicative of a pervasively hostile or abusive work environment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Oghenerhoro Bamawo. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Background From 2006 through May 3, 2010, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a classification officer at Glades C.I.1 At all times material to this proceeding, Robert Shannon served as the warden at Glades C.I. and was responsible for the daily operation of the facility. Petitioner's immediate superior, Everett McPherson, supervised Petitioner, several other classification officers, and three senior classification officers. Petitioner contends that during her term of employment with Respondent, one of the senior classification officers (Barry Carrigan) and another co-worker (Janet Smith) subjected her to a hostile work environment. In addition, Petitioner alleges that she was subjected to a variety of discrete acts of discrimination, which include: a search of her person in May 2009; a written reprimand in June 2009; a delayed transfer to the work camp facility located at Glades C.I.; a belated performance evaluation from her supervisor; delayed training opportunities; and a prohibition against bringing her bible into the facility. Beginning with Petitioner's hostile environment claim, each allegation is discussed separately below. Improper Comments / E-Mails On December 23, 2008, various Glades C.I. employees—— including Petitioner and Mr. Carrigan——attended a Christmas luncheon on the grounds of the facility. During the event, Mr. Carrigan remarked to the other attendees (but not to Petitioner in particular) that all African-Americans from the city of Pahokee look like "monkeys" and African "tribesmen." In addition, Mr. Carrigan opined, in essence, that women are inferior to men.2 Understandably offended, Petitioner reported the remarks the next day by filing an anonymous complaint with Warden Shannon. An investigation ensued, at the conclusion of which Warden Shannon suspended Mr. Carrigan for ten days.3 Subsequently, in May 2009, Petitioner discovered copies of two e-mails on the floor of her office, which were sent by a co-worker, Janet Smith (on Ms. Smith's work e-mail account), to another employee, Tricinia Washington. In the e-mails, Ms. Smith called Ms. Jackson "Blackee," and referred to Petitioner as a "monkey and idiot." Upset by the contents of the e-mails, Petitioner timely reported the contents of the e-mails to Warden Shannon. At the conclusion of an investigation into the matter, Ms. Smith was suspended for five days. Search of Petitioner On or about May 15, 2009, Mr. McPherson observed Petitioner exiting the prison facility carrying a bulky package that he thought was suspicious. In compliance with Respondent's entry and exit procedure, Mr. McPherson notified the prison control room with the expectation that a search of Petitioner's person would occur. A search of Petitioner was subsequently conducted, which yielded no contraband or other improper items.4 During the final hearing, Warden Shannon credibly testified that because of unique problems regarding contraband at Glades C.I., facility employees are subject to search upon exit from the facility. As such, Mr. McPherson committed no violation of policy by reporting what he observed Petitioner carrying as she left the facility. Reprimand On June 24, 2009, Warden Shannon disciplined Respondent by issuing a written reprimand. Warden Shannon credibly testified——and there is no evidence to the contrary—— that the reprimand was prompted by an incident in May 2009 in which Petitioner, in a loud and aggressive voice, called a co- worker "low down and dirty" in the presence of other employees. As a result of the written reprimand, Department of Corrections Procedure 605.011 rendered Petitioner ineligible for promotion for a six-month period. Accordingly, Petitioner could not apply for an assistant warden position during the summer of 2009 that she was interested in pursuing. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the reprimand was unwarranted or issued with the intent to deprive Petitioner of a promotional opportunity. In addition, there is no evidence that Warden Shannon issued the reprimand based upon a protected characteristic of Petitioner or in retaliation for five discrimination complaints Petitioner filed through Respondent's internal complaint procedure approximately one month before the reprimand.5 Late Performance Evaluation As indicated previously, Everett McPherson served as Petitioner's immediate supervisor during her term of employment. As a classification officer supervisor, Mr. McPherson was responsible for preparing annual performance evaluations of his subordinates, including Petitioner, by the end of each April. The evidence is undisputed that Mr. McPherson failed to timely complete Petitioner's evaluation, a copy of which was not provided to her until June 2009. While Mr. McPherson attempted during his final hearing testimony to attribute the delay to Petitioner, he was unable to recall on cross- examination if he had even completed a draft of Petitioner's evaluation by April 30, 2009. Accordingly, it is determined Mr. McPherson was responsible, at least in part, for the late completion of Petitioner's evaluation.6 Although Petitioner asserts that the belated performance evaluation deprived her of the opportunity to apply for an assistant warden position, the evidence refutes this contention. First, as discussed above, Petitioner's June 24, 2009, reprimand rendered her ineligible for promotion for six months. Further, even if Petitioner's reprimand did not temporarily disqualify her from seeking a promotion, Warden Shannon credibly testified that pursuant to Department of Corrections Procedure 605.011, Petitioner could have timely submitted a promotional packet once her evaluation was completed. Training Opportunities During the final hearing, Petitioner testified that she was unable to obtain re-training to conduct criminal background checks because Mr. McPherson refused to provide her with a computer "code" necessary to complete an on-line course. Petitioner further testified that she filed a grievance regarding the matter that resulted in the training being conducted within one month. Although the undersigned credits Petitioner's testimony as to particular claim, she adduced no evidence concerning when this event occurred, nor did she prove that the delay adversely affected her ability to complete her duties or impeded her ability to seek promotion. In addition, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Mr. McPherson was motivated by any unlawful animus. Transfer to Work Camp At some point during June 2008 or earlier, Petitioner requested a lateral transfer from the main unit at Glades C.I. to the facility's work camp. Petitioner was ultimately transferred to the work camp shortly before her termination in May 2009. Although Petitioner complains that she was not transferred to the work camp at an earlier date because of her gender, she adduced no evidence to support such an allegation. Further, Petitioner made no showing that the transfer to the work camp resulted in increased pay, benefits, or materially different responsibilities. Allegations of Religious Discrimination During all relevant times to this proceeding, Department of Corrections Procedure 602.016(4)(j)17 prohibited prison employees from bringing "recreational reading material (non-work related) such as books, magazines, newspapers, etc" into secure areas of corrections facilities. There is no dispute that "recreational reading material" encompasses religious texts and that the policy therefore barred Petitioner from brining her Gideon Bible into the facility. However, Petitioner has wholly failed to demonstrate that the policy is improper on its face or was applied differently to any other prison employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent, AAR Airlift Group, Inc. (Respondent), committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Gabriel C. Gaudio (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a male over 50 years of age. On or about May 9, 2009, a company located in North Carolina hired Petitioner to work as a Technical Publications Clerk. Petitioner was over 40 years of age at the time of his employment. Prior to March 2012, Petitioner relocated to Florida to continue employment with the company that then became known as AAR Airlift Group, Inc. Respondent does business in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida, and has over 15 employees, one of whom was Petitioner. At all times material to this matter, Respondent employed Steve Lane (Lane) and Melvin Zahn (Zahn) as supervisors with the company. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent had policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and any other reason prohibited by law. Any employee who believed discrimination had occurred was directed to report to the local Human Resources Department or to the Corporate Vice President of Human Resources. Respondent’s employees are considered “at will.” Respondent reserves the right to involuntarily terminate any employee for any reason or for no reason unless to do so would violate law. Petitioner maintains he was terminated in retaliation for a complaint he submitted because of his age, or because of his disability. All of the actions complained of occurred between March 2012 and June 2012 (when Petitioner was terminated). It is undisputed that Petitioner’s age would establish he is a member of a protected class. It is undisputed that Petitioner was terminated after he submitted a complaint against his co-workers. Although Petitioner asserted he is disabled, Petitioner presented no evidence to establish the nature of his disability or that Respondent required him to perform tasks contrary to his physical or mental limitations. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to accommodate any claimed limitation Petitioner might have had. In April 2012, Respondent issued a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) to Petitioner to outline areas of his job performance that needed improvement. It was anticipated that Petitioner would address the areas of concern and make improvement within 90 days. Upon receipt of the PIP Petitioner filed a claim of hostile work environment with the company’s human resources office. More specifically, Petitioner claimed two employees, Zahn , technical publications manager, and Rachel Grygier (Grygier), a technical publications librarian, had disparaged him regarding his age and disability. To address Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent initiated an internal investigation of the claim. As part of the investigation process, Respondent directed Petitioner not to disclose or discuss the accusations of his claim with anyone. Respondent sought to resolve the matter without having the allegations discussed among employees before individual statements could be taken. Contrary to the directive, Petitioner discussed his complaint against Zahn and Grygier with at least one other employee. That employee (Barnett) e-mailed support for Petitioner to JoAnne Paul (Paul), Respondent’s human resources compliance manager. When Paul confronted Petitioner as to whether he had discussed his complaint with Barnett, Petitioner falsely denied knowing Barnett. Paul took Petitioner’s failure to maintain confidentiality regarding his complaint to Lane, Respondent’s director of quality assurance and internal evaluations. Together, Paul and Lane decided to terminate Petitioner. The basis for the termination was two-fold: the failure to follow a directive not to discuss the complaint; and the lack of truthfulness when asked about knowing Barnett. Petitioner maintains that his termination was in retaliation for his complaint against Zahn and Grygier and that the company wanted him out. Petitioner presented no evidence that after his termination he was replaced with a younger employee. Even though Petitioner did not establish the nature of his disability, Petitioner presented no evidence that he was replaced by a non-disabled person or that his handicap caused Respondent to terminate him. Further, Petitioner did not establish that any area of concern noted in his PIP related to his disability. Neither Zahn or Grygier had anything to do with Petitioner’s termination. Finally, Petitioner failed to present credible evidence that filing a complaint against Zahn and Grygier was the genesis for his termination. Petitioner was a long-time employee with the company. He had started in North Carolina and moved to Melbourne with the company. Had Respondent wanted to terminate him for any reason it could have done so prior to the move or after the move. Petitioner’s claim that his complaint against Zahn and Grygier caused the termination is not supported by the weight of persuasive evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gabriel Gaudio 259 Abernathy Circle, Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Chelsie J. Flynn, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, based on her sex or in retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013).2/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was at all times relevant hereto an employee of the Florida Department of Elder Affairs. Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Respondent or Department), is the state agency responsible for administering human services programs for the elderly and for developing policy recommendations for long-term care. See § 430.03, Fla. Stat. (2015). Respondent operates a Comprehensive Assessment and Review for Long-Term Care (CARES) program to assess individuals for Medicaid long-term care services, whether in a nursing facility, in a private home, or in another community setting. The CARES program operates 19 offices statewide and one central office in Tallahassee. Medical assessments are conducted by CARES Assessors (CAs), and Senior CAs. CAs and Senior CAs are supervised by a Program Operations Administrator (POA) in each office, who reports to a Regional Program Supervisor (RPS). The RPS reports to the Deputy Bureau Chief in Tallahassee, who reports to the Bureau Chief; who, in turn, reports to the Division Director for Statewide and Community- Based Services. In January 2013, Petitioner began employment as a CA in Respondent’s Gainesville office. Petitioner began in a one-year probationary employment status. The record did not clearly establish how many individuals were employed in the Gainesville office with Petitioner. There was an office assistant, Rose Gonzalez; at least four other CAs, including Justin Keels; a registered nurse; and their supervisor, POA Sam Rutledge. Freadda Zeigler was the RPS for the region, which included the Gainesville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Daytona Beach offices. Ms. Zeigler commuted from her home in Broward County. In Tallahassee, Jay Hudson was the Deputy Bureau Chief, Paula James was the Bureau Chief, Carol Carr was the Deputy Division Director, and Marcy Hajdukiewicz was the Division Director. The Gainesville territory covered from Marion County north to the Florida/Georgia line, west to the Leon County line, and east to the Duval County line. CAs were assigned to particular locations within the office’s jurisdiction. CAs traveled to both health care facilities (e.g., nursing homes, assisted living facilities) and private homes to meet with and personally evaluate the needs of the client. Petitioner was primarily assigned to cover facilities in Jasper, Live Oak, Dowling Park, Mayo, and Lake City. Petitioner was in the field conducting evaluations two to three times per week. Her assignments required some long commutes, up to one and one-half hours to Jasper (just south of the Georgia line) and over an hour to Dowling Park and Live Oak. In February 2013, a senior CA position became open in Gainesville. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied and were interviewed for the position. Mr. Keels was selected for the position in March. As senior CA, Mr. Keels did not supervise other CAs in the Gainesville office, but was “put in charge” when Mr. Rutledge was out of the office. When Petitioner began her employment in Gainesville, she was told that a desk was being ordered for her. She was given a folding table to use in her workspace. Petitioner’s workspace was in an open area of the office. Other employees would pass through and occasionally gather in her workspace on breaks or on their way to lunch. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rutledge often came into the open area to interact with other employees around lunchtime to see if anyone wanted to “get food.” Sexual Harassment Claim4/ One day in late March 2013, Mr. Rutledge and Mr. Keels were in Petitioner’s workspace and began discussing a restaurant with the word “cooter” in its name. During this conversation, the two men stood on opposite sides of Petitioner’s worktable, where Petitioner was seated. One of the men asked Petitioner if she knew what the word “cooter” meant, and she responded that she did not. One of the men stated that it meant “vagina.” Petitioner testified that she was embarrassed, uncomfortable, and felt trapped at her worktable where the men stood on either side of her. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone at first. Petitioner testified that she was afraid that if she said anything, she would be fired. Petitioner’s ambivalence was due in no small part to the fact that Mr. Rutledge was her supervisor. Petitioner described another incident that occurred shortly before the “cooter” incident. Mr. Rutledge called Petitioner into his office and asked her to look at a picture on his computer screen. The picture was of a woman in a bikini. Mr. Rutledge said something to the effect of “that is what my ex-wife used to look like.” Petitioner was embarrassed and left Mr. Rutledge’s office. Respondent maintains a sexual harassment policy of which Petitioner was aware. The policy provides, in part, that “[a]ny employee who believes that he or she is the victim of sexual harassment . . . may make an oral or written complaint to the General Counsel or Director of Internal & External Affairs within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory action.” In April 2013, approximately a week after the “cooter” incident, Respondent’s Inspector General Taroub King began an investigation of Mr. Rutledge, prompted by an anonymous complaint. Among the allegations investigated were that Mr. Rutledge borrowed money from employees, encouraged employees to participate in an investment scheme (or schemes), and utilized employees to witness signatures and notarize documents of a personal nature. The complaint described Mr. Rutledge as maintaining no management structure, lacking basic documentation, and essentially performing no work of any kind. Petitioner was interviewed in connection with the investigation by Ms. King and another investigator from the Inspector General’s office on April 4, 2013. Petitioner was placed under oath and her interview was audio-recorded. Petitioner was questioned about the allegations in the complaint against Mr. Rutledge, and she fully cooperated with the investigators. At the end of the interview, Ms. King asked Petitioner if she had any other information to relay. At that point, Petitioner reported that inappropriate comments and banter of a sexual nature occurred in the office. Petitioner did not report any other details. Ms. King asked Petitioner for particular examples. In response, Petitioner shared the “cooter” incident and the “bikini” incident. All of the employees in the Gainesville office were interviewed by Ms. King. Mr. Keels was interviewed after Petitioner and was questioned about the “cooter” incident and office banter of a sexual nature. At the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that there was both frequent sexual banter and inappropriate conversations in the Gainesville office. She testified that the staff nurse once referred to a patient as having “balls the size of a bull.” She also reported that Mr. Rutledge made hand gestures indicating that Ms. Gonzalez was large-breasted. Petitioner did not share these details with Ms. King during her interview. As with the “bikini” incident, Petitioner was able to walk away from, or otherwise ignore, the comments and gestures of a sexual nature in the workplace. Upon her return to Tallahassee, Ms. King reported her investigative findings to members of Respondent’s Human Resources Department, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director of Internal and External Affairs. Petitioner testified that she sent Ms. King an email sometime after her interview asking whether more information was needed from Petitioner regarding her complaints of inappropriate sexual comments in the workplace. Ms. King denied that Petitioner sent any follow-up email of that nature. Ms. King did recall an email from Petitioner requesting public records. Respondent terminated Mr. Rutledge on April 8, 2013, four days after Petitioner was interviewed by Ms. King. The decision to terminate Mr. Rutledge was made by management in the Tallahassee office. Both Mr. Hudson, the Deputy Bureau Chief, and Ms. James, the Bureau Chief, traveled from Tallahassee to Gainesville to terminate Mr. Rutledge. Ms. Zeigler was likewise present at the Gainesville office for the termination of Mr. Rutledge. However, Ms. Zeigler claimed not to have been informed ahead of time about the termination. She said the appearance of Mr. Hudson and Ms. James at the Gainesville office on April 8, 2013, was a surprise to her. In early May 2013, a significant remodel of the Gainesville office was initiated. The remodel created confusion in the Gainesville office, with furniture being moved around, office files and equipment being boxed up, and the general mess associated with construction in the workplace. At some point, Petitioner lost track of an entire box of her files and later found them on the floor under a pile of chairs she assumed the painters had moved.5/ Alleged Acts of Retaliation Respondent named Mr. Keels as Acting POA, effective April 8, 2013. Ms. James testified, credibly, that Mr. Keels was named Acting POA because he was the senior CA in the office. Mr. Keels was questioned about the “cooter” incident during his interview by the Inspector General. Thus, there is sufficient evidence from which the undersigned can infer that Mr. Keels was aware Petitioner had reported the “cooter” incident to the Inspector General during the investigation of Mr. Rutledge. Petitioner complained that she was ostracized by other employees in Gainesville after Mr. Rutledge was terminated. Petitioner also complained that Mr. Keels treated her unfairly in his capacity as acting POA. First, Petitioner maintained that Mr. Keels increased her caseload, from about 27 to about 44 cases, which made her job very difficult given the lengthy commutes to her assigned facilities. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than her testimony, that her caseload substantially increased after Mr. Keels became acting POA. Petitioner complained to the Inspector General on April 4, 2013, that her caseload under Mr. Rutledge’s supervision was inordinately heavy. Petitioner also shared with the Inspector General that Mr. Keels, in his capacity as senior CA, was unfair in case distribution. Further, Petitioner testified that although her caseload was heavy in early May, it later declined. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Keels assigned Petitioner an inordinately heavy caseload following her complaints to the Inspector General and Mr. Keels’ temporary promotion to acting POA. Sometime after Mr. Keels became acting POA, he took away Petitioner’s worktable. According to Petitioner, Mr. Keels said he took the table for use in the conference room for “staffings,” a term that was not explained by any witness. Petitioner testified there were other tables available in the meeting room which could have been used for that purpose. For the next two months, Petitioner completed her in- office work at a window ledge. She placed her laptop and files on the ledge and utilized extra chairs for additional workspace. In June 2013, Petitioner was presented with a new desk. Petitioner’s Termination During Mr. Rutledge’s tenure as POA, the Bureau had rolled out significant changes to the CARES program. Those changes had not been implemented by Mr. Rutledge, much less communicated to the Gainesville staff. After Mr. Rutledge’s termination, CARES management began monitoring the Gainesville office very closely. During the next few months, Ms. Zeigler was more frequently present in the Gainesville office and was in almost constant contact with Mr. Hudson regarding the activities of the Gainesville office. However, Ms. Zeigler was unaware of any discussions Mr. Hudson may have had with the Bureau Chief or the Division Director. Shortly after Mr. Rutledge’s departure, Ms. Zeigler met with the Gainesville staff to explain new procedures. Among the procedures was a requirement to include on employees’ GroupWise calendars, an entry of every planned field visit. The CAs’ GroupWise calendars were accessible not only to their immediate supervising POA, but also to the RPS and higher-level managers. The calendar was an important management tool used by Respondent both to perform quality assurance checks and to monitor employee performance. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent the following email to the CAs in Gainesville: Good afternoon all, As mentioned in the past meeting in your office, it was requested that I be given access to your GroupWise calendars to help monitor accountability for field visits with Specialization. I would like to thank each of you for adhering to the request, and would like to ask each of you to add the following information to your calendars: First and Last name of client visiting Facility name where client will be visited Home address if visiting client in the home Purpose of visit Time of visit (include estimated travel time) * * * This information is needed for accountability purposes, and also used to check that assessments are being entered in CIRTS, per the attached CARES policy #PPH Update No2011_2, that is still currently in place. Effective immediately, I would like for each worker to add this information to their calendars prior to making a visit. You should also add any approved leave time that you will be taking as well. If your visit schedule changes, it needs to be noted on the calendar with the appropriate change. Please revisit this memo for a thorough understanding. On May 14, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent an email to Petitioner informing Petitioner that information on her calendar was incorrect. On May 31, 2013, Ms. Zeigler issued a formal counseling memorandum to Petitioner for failure to list her client visits on her GroupWise calendar as directed. The following excerpt is especially relevant: You were instructed to submit your plans for field visits [sic] travel at least one day in advance of the actual travel. A review of your calendar clearly showed that you either did not put any information on your calendar as required and/or you entered incorrect data, for the following dates: April 16, 2013, May 6, 2013, May 7, 2013, May 9, 2013, May 10, 2013, and again on May 14, 2013. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not deny that she failed to enter required information on her calendar. Instead, Petitioner offered a series of excuses, including system connectivity issues, her travel schedule, and confusion regarding a transition from GroupWise to the Outlook calendar system. With regard to connectivity, Petitioner explained that there were problems connecting to the Department’s computer system from remote locations and, occasionally, in the Gainesville office. Petitioner likewise testified that she would not return home until 6:00 p.m. or later on days she traveled to Jasper and other remote field locations. Petitioner complained that connectivity issues prevented her access to GroupWise from home, and thus, was unable to enter the visits scheduled for the following day. Petitioner testified that she complained to the information technology department in Tallahassee about connectivity issues and diligently tried to address these concerns. Petitioner introduced in evidence an email exchange between herself and Ms. Zeigler in which she complained about, and Ms. Zeigler resolved, an issue with Petitioner’s access to CIRTS – the Department’s online case input system. The email string is dated July 17, 2013, well after the date of Petitioner’s documented missing calendar entries. Further, the email relates to access to the case input system and is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim of issues with connectivity to the computer system in general. Finally, Petitioner explained that the Department changed from GroupWise to the Outlook system, and she was confused about whether to continue adding entries on her GroupWise calendar during that transition. In the May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum, Ms. Zeigler referred to the program’s transition from the GroupWise to the Outlook calendaring system, as follows: The Microsoft Outlook Email and Calendar program was installed on all computers in DOEA, migrating existing GroupWise information to the new Outlook program on May 28, 2013. Instruction videos and online documentation were made available to all DOEA employees to learn how to utilize the new program. You were instructed to give proxy access to the RPS via email from the acting Supervisor. It is evident that you were successful in accessing the Outlook Calendar, as you sent the RPS a request to share your calendar on May 30, 2013. On the same date, you left the office to go to the field at 12:55 p.m., and failed to update/place any information on your calendar before departing. The sign in sheet indicated that you were going to a nursing facility. This repeated failure to comply with procedures is unacceptable. As a result of this failure, your supervisor was unaware of what facility and/or client you were seeing and how long it would take time wise for the field visit. You effectively prohibited your supervisor from knowing your whereabouts and/or the client(s) to be seen. In light of the facts, Petitioner’s alleged confusion about whether to continue adding information to her GroupWise calendar is not credible. Petitioner did not send an Outlook calendar-sharing invite to Ms. Zeigler until May 30, 2013, well after her missing GroupWise calendar entries of April 16 and May 6, 7, 9, 10, and 14, 2013. Further, Petitioner failed to calendar her appointments the same day she sent Ms. Zeigler the calendar- sharing invitation, thus belying any excuse that she had connectivity issues, at least on that particular date. In an effort to minimize the significance of her failure to document her field visits on her calendar, Petitioner testified that she noted her field visits on a daily sign-in log physically maintained in the Gainesville office. Petitioner introduced a composite exhibit purporting to be copies of the daily sign-in logs from April, May, June, and July 2013. Even if the exhibit was reliable evidence of Petitioner’s whereabouts, the logs are irrelevant to the issue of whether Petitioner complied with the electronic calendaring requirement. No evidence was introduced to support a finding that the daily sign-in log was an acceptable alternative to Ms. Zeigler’s specific, clear, and repeated direction to all Gainesville employees to use their GroupWise, and later Outlook, calendars to note their planned field visits with required details. The evidence conflicted as to whether Ms. Zeigler’s May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum constituted discipline. Petitioner testified that the memorandum was a training tool. Ms. Zeigler testified alternately, and with hesitancy, that the memorandum was “almost like a verbal warning type of thing,” and “unofficially formal.” On cross-examination, Ms. Zeigler testified, “I don’t think that that would be a reason to fire somebody after one counseling memo. I mean that would be absurd.” Ms. James testified that the memorandum constituted a first-step disciplinary action. Ms. James explained that a counseling memorandum is preceded by a verbal warning from the supervisor. The Department’s disciplinary policy was not introduced in evidence. In light of Petitioner’s probationary employment status, the issue of whether the counseling memorandum constituted discipline is largely irrelevant. The counseling memorandum is evidence of poor job performance during Petitioner’s probationary employment period. At some point after Mr. Rutledge’s termination, the Department advertised for the open POA position. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied for the position. Mr. Hudson and Ms. Zeigler conducted interviews for the position. Petitioner was not responsive to Ms. Zeigler’s efforts to schedule Petitioner’s interview for the position. Eventually, Ms. Zeigler did interview Petitioner for the position. Ms. Zeigler also interviewed Mr. Keels. In June 2013, Ms. Zeigler prepared performance evaluations of the Gainesville staff. Ms. Zeigler had little knowledge of staff performance prior to Mr. Rutledge’s termination, as Ms. Zeigler was new to the region. Ms. Zeigler gave all the Gainesville employees ratings of “3,” satisfactory performance, across the board. In late July 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. Hajdukiewicz from the Tallahassee office came to the Gainesville office and personally terminated Mr. Keels. Ms. James did not directly make the decision to terminate Mr. Keels, but she agreed with the decision. Ms. James stated that Mr. Keels was terminated based on his actions after he became acting POA in Gainesville. Ms. James did not elaborate and neither counsel asked any follow-up question. On July 31, 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. James came to the Gainesville office from Tallahassee, met with Petitioner, and offered her a choice of resignation or termination. Petitioner chose termination. That same day, after leaving the office, Petitioner called the Department of Human Resources and requested to change her termination to resignation. The request was granted. Petitioner did not ask why she was being terminated or asked to resign. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. Carr nor Ms. James gave her a reason. Ms. Zeigler resigned from the Department in October 2013. The circumstances of Ms. Zeigler’s resignation were not introduced in evidence. In that regard, Ms. Zeigler testified as follows: I had a lot of questions with the State that probably should not come up here, but there are a lot of questionable things that were going on with the State at the time which led to my resignation. So I did not question it. I did not question [Petitioner’s] termination based off of my ability to run the office, because I almost felt like it was being run above me.[6/] Ms. Zeigler’s testimony was introduced in support of Petitioner’s claims. However, Ms. Zeigler had difficulty recalling events, including the timing of relevant events. Of note, Ms. Zeigler testified that she was the RPS for Gainesville about a year, meaning she would have begun in the position in October 2012. Later, she testified that Mr. Rutledge was terminated “not long after I was there [as RPS].” Her testimony was hesitant, hedging, and sometimes conflicting. Ms. Zeigler testified that she was in daily contact with Mr. Hudson about issues in the Gainesville office after Mr. Rutledge was terminated, but claimed to have had no advance notice of either Mr. Keels’ or Petitioner’s termination. As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Zeigler’s testimony to be both unreliable and unpersuasive. Ms. Zeigler’s counseling memorandum to Petitioner regarding calendaring is credible evidence of Petitioner’s job performance which cannot be discounted by Ms. Zeigler’s after-the-fact, and apparently biased, testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, did commit an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, and prohibiting the practice. However, under the specific facts of the case, the undersigned recommends no affirmative relief from the effects of the practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2015.
