The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her gender, age, and race as stated in the Petition for Relief, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following facts were established by clear and convincing evidence: Petitioner is a 49-year-old, African-American female. Petitioner was hired as a customer service representative at Respondent's Maitland, Florida, location on June 3, 2002. Petitioner received a copy of NuVox’ Employee Handbook, which addressed Respondent's anti-discrimination policies, as well as its policies regarding employee conduct, attendance, paid time off, and termination. Respondent provides voice and data communications services to businesses. On or about August 24, 2009, Petitioner was discharged from her employment with Respondent. Arleen Couvertier was Petitioner's supervisor between January 30, 2009, and May 2009. On February 20, 2009, Petitioner received a verbal warning for violating a policy regarding breaks, when she left for a break during a team meeting. Petitioner was informed that failure to comply with the expectations stated in the warning could result in further disciplinary action up to, and including, immediate termination. On April 8, 2009, Petitioner asked to have May 13, 2009, off as she had been subpoenaed to be in court. Petitioner was advised that she would not have enough paid time off to cover an absence on May 13, 2009, as she had already been approved for a three-day vacation at the end of May into early June, which would put her time off balance at an unacceptable negative 15 hours. Respondent suggested that Petitioner reduce her planned vacation by one day in May so the requested May 13, 2009, time off could be approved. Petitioner was reminded that if she kept her vacation hours, the May 13, 2009, court day would be an unplanned absence, which would result in an unpaid occurrence in accordance with Respondent's policies. Petitioner did not rearrange her vacation schedule and took May 13, 2009, off as an unapproved, unpaid absence, thus, earning an attendance occurrence. On May 11, 2009, Katylyn Weems became Petitioner’s supervisor. In May and June, Petitioner did not meet her performance goals. Petitioner's supervisor reviewed her performance statistics with Petitioner and suggested ways that she could improve. On July 30, 2009, Petitioner received a verbal warning from Ms. Weems, which was witnessed by her former supervisor, Ms. Couvertier, for an attitude problem that was borderline insubordinate, because Petitioner failed to acknowledge or respond to three different managers’ in-person, email, and instant message communications on July 29, 2009. Ms. Couvertier felt that Petitioner’s body language, her failure to answer a question asked from three feet away, and subsequent failure to turn away from her computer to answer the same question asked by Ms. Couvertier directly to Petitioner, was insubordination. On August 6, 2009, Petitioner was placed on a Final Written Warning for poor performance. In addition to her low work quality scores in May (45 percent) and June (54 percent), Petitioner scored equally as low in July (49 percent), compared to her goal of 85 percent through August. Petitioner was informed that she had to show significant performance improvement in 11 specific areas, including, but not limited to, continue to be on time at the start of the shift. Petitioner was told that she was expected to show immediate and sustained improvement in her performance and that failure to comply with the expectations in the final warning could result in further disciplinary action up to, and including, immediate termination. On August 10, 2009, Petitioner asked her supervisor to allow her to take Thursday, August 20, 2009, off from work. Ms. Weems denied her request, explaining that she had previously approved Petitioner’s request to take off Monday, August 24, 2009, and Wednesday, August 26, 2009, which was going to create a negative 13-hour balance and, therefore, she could not approve any greater negative time off balance. On August 20, 2009, Petitioner left a message for Ms. Weems that she would not be in that day because she had an appointment, which was later repeated by email. Petitioner did not appear for work on August 20, 2009. Ms. Weems sent an email to Petitioner informing her that she had earned a third unpaid occurrence for her August 20, 2009, absence without paid time off available, along with information about her two other occurrences. Ms. Weems also informed Petitioner that her day off on August 24, 2009, was no longer approved due to her lack of paid time off. On Friday, August 21, 2009, Petitioner called in to say she would not be in to work. Ms. Weems verbally informed Petitioner on the telephone that because she had taken unapproved time off on August 20 and 21, 2009, the approvals for time off on August 24 and 26, 2009, had both been rescinded and the days off would have to be rescheduled as she had no more available paid time off. Knowing that Petitioner had been subpoenaed to appear in court on August 26, 2009, Ms. Weems suggested that she try to come in on August 21, 2009, even arriving late, so that she would still have a paid time off day available to use on August 26, 2009. Petitioner said, “okay” before she ended the call, but did not come in to work at all on August 21, 2009. On August 24, 2009, Ms. Weems reminded Petitioner that her absence on August 20, 2009, was unapproved and that Petitioner had taken that day off anyway, as well as August 21, 2009. Ms Weems further reminded Petitioner that the August 20 and 21, 2009, absences had caused the approvals for time off on August 24 and 26, 2009, to be rescinded as Petitioner had no paid time off and could not have a further exception. In response, Petitioner emailed Ms. Weems, "I understand[,] but I will not be here on the 26th[.] I will be in court." As a result, on the same day, Petitioner was terminated due to insubordination related to her attendance and poor performance. The "insubordination" is related to Petitioner taking both August 20 and 21, 2009, off when she was told that she could not have August 20, 2009, as paid time off. Respondent presented evidence that credibly supports its assertion that its attendance policy was applied equitably without consideration of race, sex, or age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, NuVox, did not discriminate against Petitioner, Jacquelyn Brown, and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Johnny L. Torrence, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Hendrick Honda Daytona, on account of his race or his age in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct evidence of Petitioner’s age. However, Petitioner worked at the automobile dealership currently owned by Respondent since October 1987. During Petitioner’s questioning of Mr. Moreford, Petitioner indicated that the two had worked together at the dealership for virtually that entire period, beginning when they were 18 years of age, a statement with which Mr. Moreford appeared to agree. Thus, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Petitioner is more than 40 years of age. Respondent owns and operates an automobile dealership located in Daytona Beach, Florida, having purchased the dealership in September 2011. Respondent is part of a larger group of dealerships, with its corporate offices, including that of its human resources department, located in Charlotte, North Carolina. Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was initially employed by Respondent in October 1987. He worked as a detailer for some period, and more recently was employed as a lot attendant. His duties were generally to greet customers and take vehicle information, and move vehicles from place to place as needed by sales and maintenance personnel. On May 2, 2013, a customer brought his vehicle to Respondent for maintenance. The customer was a former employee of Respondent, and was known by Petitioner. The customer was initially met by an advisor other than Petitioner. The customer asked that his vehicle mileage be listed on the service ticket as 1,000 miles less than its actual mileage.2/ Recording a vehicle’s mileage as anything other than its actual mileage is contrary to Respondent’s policies. Thus, the request was refused. Petitioner was assigned to deliver the customer’s vehicle and paperwork to the service lane. After having his request to reduce the vehicle’s mileage on the service ticket refused, the customer asked Petitioner to do the same. Petitioner complied with the request, scratched through the correct mileage written on the service ticket, and wrote in the lower mileage requested by the customer. Upon delivery of the service ticket to the service lane manager, the scratched- through mileage was noticed. Petitioner was asked whether the mileage he had written on the ticket was correct, to which he replied in the affirmative. The vehicle’s mileage was subsequently confirmed as being 1,000 miles more than that written by Petitioner. Petitioner was called into a meeting by Respondent’s management to explain the situation. Petitioner explained that he only did what the customer wanted him to do -- a variant of “the customer is always right.” As a result of his action, Petitioner was given a written reprimand. Based on the testimony of Mr. Moreford, it was determined that the Employee Counseling Report was a business record as defined in section 90.802(6). In late September 2013, a customer brought her vehicle in to Respondent for two new tires. Her old tires were removed and taken to the dealership’s holding area, at which all used tires are marked for identification and collected for delivery to a used tire recycling facility. Respondent does not allow employees to take used tires from the holding area. After the customer’s new tires were mounted, the customer indicated that she wanted one of her old tires for use as a spare. An employee was sent to the holding area to retrieve one of the tires. Since the tires are marked, there would have been no mistaking them. After a search, the employee was unable to locate the used tires. Several employees, including Petitioner, were asked if they knew the whereabouts of the used tires. Petitioner admitted that his sister needed better tires on her car, and that he had given the customer’s used tires to her. Petitioner was instructed to retrieve the tires and return them so they could be provided to the customer. Petitioner left the premises to retrieve the tires. After having waited a reasonable period of time for Petitioner to return, Respondent was compelled to give the customer a new tire from its inventory for her to use as her spare. After the customer left, Petitioner returned to the dealership with two used tires that were not the ones removed from the customer’s vehicle. On or about October 2, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with the service lane manager, Mr. Sandrowicz, along with Dale Lockwood and Ralph Moreford. Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Moreford had worked at the dealership, under its current and prior owners, for most if not all of the years of Petitioner’s employment. During the meeting, the attendees discussed the incident with the tires, which was a violation of Respondent’s policies. Petitioner stated that a younger Caucasian employee, Brandon Swift, had done the same thing without repercussions. Nonetheless, Mr. Moreford advised Petitioner that he was terminated from employment as a result of the incident. On October 7, 2013, Petitioner was provided with a Separation Report describing the incident and its consequences. Based on the testimony of Mr. Moreford, it was determined that the Separation Report was a business record as defined in section 90.802(6). After the meeting was over, Mr. Swift was asked if he had taken any tires from the used tire holding area. Mr. Swift denied that he had done so. The used tire holding area was searched, and the tires alleged to have been taken by Mr. Swift were located. Petitioner speculated that Mr. Swift may have returned the allegedly purloined tires in time to avoid detection, though there was no support for that supposition. Thus, Mr. Swift is not a useful comparator of any dissimilar disciplinary action based on race or age. Mr. Moreford and Mr. Lockwood testified that Petitioner’s race and age had no bearing on the decision to terminate Petitioner. Rather, they testified credibly that the decision was based solely on the fact that Petitioner had violated company policy after having recently received a written warning for a different violation. Mr. Lockwood knew of no employee other than Petitioner having taken used tires. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially disparaging comments directed at himself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. Petitioner identified no instance of any ill-treatment directed at him due to his age. Petitioner identified two instances in addition to that involving Mr. Swift that he believed support his claim of discrimination. For some period of time, “J.D.” was Respondent’s service manager. Petitioner did not like the way J.D. talked to him. On one occasion, J.D. came to the back of the shop area and said all of the employees gathered there were “ignorant and stupid.” The group of employees included three African- Americans and one or two Caucasians. In Petitioner’s view, J.D. was generally unpleasant to everyone. Thus, Petitioner’s testimony supports a finding that J.D.’s disagreeable nature was visited equally on all subordinate employees regardless of race or age. As a second comparator, Petitioner alleged that Respondent’s African-American employees were charged for washing their cars at Respondent’s car wash, while Caucasian employees washed their cars, trucks, boats, and motorcycles free of charge. There was no corroborating evidence for Petitioner’s statement and, standing alone, it is insufficient to support a finding that such occurred. Furthermore, the allegation, even if proven, was not so similar to that forming the basis for the adverse employment action as to provide a useful comparison. Petitioner argued that “it wasn’t right the way they fired me.” He asserted that Respondent should have given him a written warning for the tire incident rather than firing him. While the act of taking two used tires that, but for the customer’s request to keep one as a spare, would have been destined for a recycling facility seems a relatively minor infraction, it was nonetheless a violation of Respondent’s policies. More to the point, regardless of the severity of the infraction and the perceived fairness of the sanction, Respondent’s decision to fire Petitioner was not based on racial animus or age bias. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race or age. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s decision to take two tires from Respondent’s used tire holding area in violation of Respondent’s policies, and his eventual return to the dealership with two tires that were not those taken. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American or were under the age of 40 were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Hendrick Honda Daytona, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Johnny L. Torrence, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00303. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on June 18, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was employed by Respondent from June 16, 2008, until her termination on December 10, 2008. Prior to that, Petitioner worked for the Welfare Transition Program which was taken over by Respondent. When she began her employment with Respondent, she was hired to be a customer service representative wherein she continued doing essentially the same job she was doing before Respondent took over. Respondent, Workforce Escarosa, Inc. (Workforce), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Workforce is one of 24 local workforce investment boards in Florida and is responsible for Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. Workforce oversees federal employment and training programs including the Workforce Investment Act, Welfare Transition Program, Disabled Veterans Program, Wagner Peyser Program, and other federal programs. Part of Workforce's responsibility is to train people for new jobs and careers, and to assist them in attaining economic self-sufficiency through employment. Maggie Thomas is the Assistant Director of Workforce's Welfare Transition Program and was Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Thomas hired Petitioner in June 2008 to be part of the "Core Team." The Core Team consisted of four persons: Julie Vick, Tesha Stallworth, Julia Lockhart, and Petitioner. The Core Team provided administrative support and was responsible for front desk operations. Often, 70 or 80 people were in the waiting area near the front desk. In July 2008, Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner following an incident that occurred when Ms. Thomas and Ms. Thomas' administrative assistant, Julie Vick, offered assistance to Petitioner regarding an overhead projector and screen. Ms. Thomas described Petitioner's response as "a real rude rebuff." Ms. Thomas also learned that there was tension between Petitioner and Ms. Vick. Ms. Thomas brought both Petitioner and Ms. Vick into her office emphasizing that staff needed to get along and that "staff should not treat staff in that abrupt rude manner." Later in July 2008, Ms. Thomas was approached by a career advisor who complained about Petitioner's demeanor with customers and staff. Ms. Thomas again counseled Petitioner regarding the importance of getting along with fellow staff members and treating customers with respect. Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner on a third occasion after receiving complaints from another career advisor, Tarae Donaldson, who is African-American. Ms. Donaldson requested that she not have to work with Petitioner on a project because of Petitioner's attitude and demeanor. Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner that Petitioner's attitude and demeanor in the workplace was affecting office morale, reminded Petitioner that this was the third time that Ms. Thomas had to counsel her about this, and advised Petitioner that she needed to take this matter seriously. In early November 2008, Petitioner had a confrontation with a co-worker, Julia Lockhart, who is white. Petitioner and Ms. Lockhart were co-workers and friends, who socialized after work and "hung out" together. That day, Ms. Lockhart was responsible for the front counter. A workforce client, Katrina Harmon, was working the front counter as part of the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP). Ms. Lockhart counseled Ms. Harmon about using "Mr.", "Mrs.", or "Ms." when addressing the Workforce clients rather than just calling out their last names. Ms. Lockhart described Ms. Harmon's actions toward the clients as unprofessional and that it "kind of reminded me of a drill sergeant." Ms. Harmon, who is African-American, later complained to Petitioner about Lockhart's counseling her. Petitioner and Ms. Lockhart then discussed the situation. Petitioner believes that Ms. Lockhart was upset with Ms. Johnson for siding with Ms. Harmon because Ms. Harmon is African-American. However, Petitioner acknowledged that this was her opinion based on her personal perception. Moreover, even if Ms. Lockhart was upset with Ms. Johnson, being upset with a co-worker does not establish racial discrimination. In early December 2008, another staff member, Tesha Stallworth, approached Ms. Thomas complaining about Petitioner's demeanor. Ms. Thomas learned more about the incident involving Ms. Harmon during this meeting with Ms. Stallworth. Ms. Thomas decided to transfer Ms. Harmon from the front desk to the Internet Café. About three weeks later, Ms. Thomas was called by Ms. Stallworth. During this call, Ms. Thomas learned that Ms. Stallworth threatened to quit because of Petitioner. During this three-week period, Ms. Thomas also heard complaints regarding Petitioner's office demeanor from Ms. Lockhart. Ms. Thomas considers Ms. Stallworth and Ms. Lockhart to be "very reliable employees." Ms. Thomas decided to have another counseling session with Petitioner. The fourth counseling session took place on December 8, 2008. Ms. Thomas felt that Petitioner's job was in jeopardy but wanted to give Petitioner one more chance. Additionally, Ms. Thomas found Petitioner's job performance to be otherwise good. Ms. Thomas described Petitioner as very defensive and that she did not take responsibility for any of her actions. Ms. Thomas presented Petitioner with a memorandum entitled, "Counseling on Unprofessional Behavior and Disrespect of other employees." Petitioner refused to sign the counseling memorandum. Following that meeting, Ms. Thomas went to Susan Nelms, Executive Director of Workforce. Ms. Thomas conveyed to Ms. Nelms her concerns, that she did not hold out any hope that the situation would be resolved, and that Petitioner was affecting morale. Ms. Nelms made the decision to terminate Petitioner. Ms. Thomas did not convey anything to Ms. Nelms that would indicate that there were any racial issues surrounding Petitioner's termination from employment. Ms. Thomas then went to Landrum to get advice on how to proceed. Ms. Thomas again met with Petitioner on December 10, 2008, and told her that her employment would be terminated. Ms. Thomas relates the following about the December 10 meeting: Q: And that's when the decision was made by Ms. Nelms to terminate Ms. Johnson? A: Yes. Q: And then was that then conveyed to Ms. Johnson? A: No. After December 8th, after Susan [Nelms] gave me the go ahead, I wanted a day to go to Landrum to make sure that I would do this in the proper manner. Q: So you got advice from Landrum? A: I did get advice from Landrum. Q: And then after that, did you meet with Ms. Johnson? A: I met with Ms. Johnson on December 10th. Q: All right. And conveyed that her position would be terminated? A: That is correct. And it is at that time, I'm positive about this, that she first brought up that it was a black/white issue against her. After she knew that she was being terminated and the reason I know-- I am absolutely positive about this, is because the day before when I visited Landrum, we were sitting there talking about the proper procedure and I remember asking-- I said, you know, what if she brings up that she thinks this is a black/white issue? I said, you know, how do I respond to that? I mean, she hasn't up to this point, but I asked and they just said, you should just say you don't want to go there. So after I handed her the termination, and she brought up that she thought it was a black and white issue against herself, that's when I said, I don't want to go there, because that's what I had been advised to say. Now, her memory on December 8th might have been that she brought up the black/white issue about Katrina [Harmon], but it was not about herself. I'm absolutely positive on that point. Ms. Thomas' testimony in that regard was credible and is accepted. That is, that Petitioner first mentioned to Ms. Thomas that the Lockhart/Harmon was a racial issue, somehow related to her, on December 10, 2008. On December 16, 2008, Petitioner wrote Ms. Nelms regarding her termination. The letter does not contain any allegation of race discrimination or that her termination was in retaliation for reporting race discrimination. On December 29, 2008, Petitioner spoke with Holly McLeod, a human resource manager with Landrum Professional Employer Service (Landrum). Petitioner did not complain to Ms. McLeod about any race discrimination or allege that her termination was in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination. On or about January 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Escambia-Pensacola Human Relations Commission concerning her termination from Workforce. The letter of complaint does not allege race discrimination or retaliation. Instead, the letter alleges that she was involved in a disagreement with a co-worker; that she became a victim on a "malicious vendetta" by this co-worker; that this co-worker manipulated and influenced another co-worker and their supervisor; and that the circumstances surrounding her termination were "irrational, irresponsible, and deceitful." At the time that letter was written, Petitioner believed that Ms. Thomas made the decision to fire her. Petitioner alleged in her Employment Complaint of Discrimination that she "became the subject of racial jokes and harassment by a co-worker, Ms. Julia Lockhart (white)." Petitioner's allegations in this regard are not precise in that she initially referenced four occasions of racial jokes but then characterized that as a "guesstimation." In her Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioner asserts that the number and frequency of the jokes are not known. There is testimony regarding the content of only one joke. Ms. Lockhart acknowledges that on one occasion, she told a joke when she and Ms. Johnson were outside smoking a cigarette together. Petitioner pointed out a black woman to Ms. Lockhart and commented that the woman had the biggest lips she had ever seen. In response, Ms. Lockhart then told a joke regarding African-Americans.1/ Petitioner laughed at the joke and did not indicate that she was offended. In response to a question as to whether she found the alleged jokes to be offensive, Petitioner replied, "I don't even remember what the jokes were, so how can I tell you if that they were offensive or not." Petitioner is not certain as to whether Ms. Lockhart meant to be offensive. The preponderance of the evidence suggests that Petitioner only stopped socializing with Ms. Lockhart after the incident involving Ms. Harmon, not because of any joke(s). Workforce has an open door policy for reporting discrimination. Petitioner received a copy of this policy, but did not complain to Workforce or Landrum about Ms. Lockhart's joke(s).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent Community Education Partners, d/b/a Emerald Bay Academy, engaged in an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner Adam Killick, and, if so, what relief should be granted to Petitioner, if any.
Findings Of Fact On October 3, 2005, the Commission filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings Petitioner's Petition for Relief. On that same date, an Initial Order was entered by the assigned Administrative Law Judge requesting certain information for the scheduling of the final hearing in this cause. Due to the parties' failure to comply with that Order, venue rights were deemed waived. On October 14, 2005, a Notice of Hearing was entered scheduling this cause for final hearing on December 19, 2005. An Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions was entered that same day requiring the parties to disclose to each other no later than seven days before the final hearing the names of their witnesses and further requiring them to exchange copies of their exhibits by that same deadline. That Order further provided that failure to timely disclose could result in exclusion of that evidence at the final hearing. On December 12 Respondent filed its Motion for Continuance of the final hearing. On December 13 Respondent filed correspondence advising that Petitioner had agreed to the continuance, that Petitioner would be out of the country the entire month of January 2006, and that Petitioner and Respondent had agreed to certain dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. One of those dates was February 17, 2006. On December 14, 2005, an Order Granting Continuance and Re-Scheduling Hearing was entered, scheduling this cause for final hearing on February 17, 2006, validating any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporating the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On January 26, 2006, Respondent filed its Agreed Motion for Leave to Present Testimony Telephonically, requesting that a witness who lives in New Mexico be allowed to testify telephonically at the final hearing on February 17, 2006. The Agreed Motion clearly set forth Petitioner's agreement to allow the telephonic testimony of that witness at the final hearing. On January 27, 2006, that Agreed Motion was granted, subject to Respondent making the necessary arrangements and subject to compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.213(5), which, inter alia, requires a notary public to be physically present with the witness to administer the oath. On February 3, 2006, Respondent filed its Notice of No Opposition advising that it did not oppose Petitioner's request for a continuance of the February 17, 2006, final hearing date. Petitioner's Motion for Continuance was filed on February 9, 2006. By Order Granting Continuance entered February 9, 2006, Petitioner's motion was granted, the final hearing scheduled for February 17, 2006, was cancelled, and the parties were afforded up to and including February 28, 2006, to advise the undersigned as to the status of this matter, as to the length of time required for the final hearing, and as to several mutually- agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing. That Order further provided that failure to timely comply would result in the conclusion that this matter had been amicably resolved and the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings would be closed. Neither party filed any document or pleading on or before February 28, 2006. On March 3, 2006, Petitioner filed his first Request for Discovery and sent a letter to the Clerk of the Division requesting subpoenas and indicating that he would accommodate a hearing date convenient to the undersigned and to Respondent. The letter also advised that after he had received all materials, he needed time to prepare. The letter did not provide dates for re-scheduling the final hearing in compliance with the February 9, 2006, Order. Subpoenas were issued to Petitioner pursuant to his request in that letter. The Order Re-Scheduling Hearing entered March 6, 2006, recited the provisions of the prior Order giving a deadline for providing mutually-agreeable dates for re-scheduling the final hearing and the failure of the parties to comply with that Order. It also recited that despite the earlier Order providing for the automatic closure of the Division's file if the parties failed to timely provide dates, since Petitioner had filed documents subsequent to the deadline, it was assumed that the case had not been amicably resolved. The Order re-scheduled the final hearing in this matter to be held on March 24, 2006, validated any served subpoenas for the new date, and incorporated the provisions of the first Notice of Hearing and the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. On March 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and a Motion for Rehearing. The Motion for Rehearing is confusing: it asks for reconsideration of his discovery request (no ruling had previously been requested or made); it complains about the December 2005 hearing date having been continued; it withdraws Petitioner's prior agreement to allow a witness to testify by telephone (which agreement had been subsequently ordered); it specifically states that Petitioner is not requesting another continuance but then speaks of requiring time to prepare that would extend well beyond the scheduled final hearing date. On March 16, 2006, Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Rehearing was filed, opposing the granting of Petitioner's pending motions. Petitioner's motions were heard telephonically on March 20, 2006. The manual he wanted produced, which Respondent agreed to give him, was ordered produced, but the remainder of Petitioner's requests were denied. An Order on Pending Motions was entered that same day to memorialize the rulings announced during the telephonic hearing. The Order specifically provided that Petitioner's request for a postponement of the final hearing was denied, a ruling made and discussed during the telephonic hearing. On March 17, 2006, Respondent filed its witness list, together with a cover letter advising that Respondent had provided Petitioner with its witness and exhibits lists in December. Petitioner has not filed any witness list in accordance with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions entered October 14, 2005. On March 22, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Subpoenas, together with a request that a hearing be held on the Motion that same day. A telephonic hearing was conducted on March 22, 2006, and an Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Quash Subpoenas was entered. During the course of that telephonic hearing, Petitioner indicated that he might not come to the hearing. In response to that statement, the undersigned explained to Petitioner that it was up to him whether he attended the hearing, dismissed his petition for relief, or withdrew his request for a hearing. The undersigned explained to the parties that the hearing would go forward as scheduled, that Petitioner had the burden of proof in this proceeding, and that not appearing or presenting evidence would prevent him from meeting his burden of proof. After normal business hours on March 22, 2006, and therefore on March 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Facsimile Letter to Judge Rigot. Although somewhat confusing, the Letter appears to re-argue points previously argued and memorialize Petitioner's understanding (and misunderstandings) of what transpired during the telephonic hearing on March 22, 2006. At 9:30 a.m., on March 24, 2006, Respondent's attorney and its witnesses were present for the scheduled final hearing. The undersigned waited for 35 minutes before opening the record and almost 10 minutes more before closing the record, with no appearance by Petitioner or anyone on his behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Adam Killick Post Office Box 18331 Panama City, Florida 32417 M. Brenk Johnson Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C. 1201 Elm Street, Suite 5400 Dallas, Texas 75270
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.
Findings Of Fact This Hearing Officer has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this hearing. Proper notice was given to all parties and all parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. An alleged violation of Chapter 479 was served on the Respondent, National Advertising Company, citing subject -- sign located on Interstate 95, 0.89 miles south of Bowden Road with copy "Valles" thereon by written notice dated September 2, 1976. The original part of the sign was erected within the city limits prior to 1970 and was not permitted by the Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation. The violation which is the subject of this hearing is that the sign has been added to by erecting forty feet of catwalk thereon and installing three lights. The monetary value was increased by approximately $1,084.00. The addition of catwalk and lights to the sign is not routine maintenance as defined in Section 479, Florida Statutes, and a permit was necessary for such additions to signs subsequent to January, 1971.
Recommendation Notify the Respondent that the subject sign will be removed if such is not removed within 30 days after entry of the final order. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. George E. Hollis National Advertising Company Post Office Box 23208 Tampa, Florida 33623 William Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida F. S. Whitesell, District Sign Coordinator Department of Transportation South Marian Street Lake City, Florida 32055
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on April 22, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent from August 2008 until his termination on or about January 9, 2009. Respondent, Arena Sports Café (Arena), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Arena is a restaurant/night club which offers the viewing of televised sporting events, and is generally known as a sports bar. Arena is adjacent to The Coliseum, another establishment with the same owners, Trisha Lawrence and Randy Berner. The owners are Caucasian. The Coliseum is an entertainment venue with live and recorded music, dancing, and stage acts. The Coliseum does not serve food, and does not have a kitchen. When hired in August 2008, Petitioner worked as a prep cook as part of the kitchen staff. He performed various duties including preparation of meals in the kitchen as well as preparing food for Respondent’s large salad bar. Petitioner holds a Food Handling Certificate and a Safe Serve Certificate, which he attained through a local college. Petitioner was paid $12.00 per hour, and generally worked a 40-hour work week. At the time Petitioner was hired, the Arena was brand new and very popular. When the Arena opened in August 2008, it featured lunch and dinner seven days per week. Weekends were particularly busy because college and pro football games were televised in the fall. However, the Arena saw a drop in demand for weekday lunches. During the fall of 2008, Anthony Cyr, a Caucasian, was employed by Arena as its general manager. Petitioner was already employed by Respondent when Mr. Cyr began employment there. According to Petitioner, Mr. Cyr used the word “nigger” (the "N" word) in the context of telling a joke on three occasions in October and November 2008. Mr. Cyr used this word in the presence of the kitchen staff, including Petitioner. Petitioner informed Mr. Cyr that this was offensive and objected. Mr. Cyr did not use the "N" word other than these three occasions, and did not use it again after Petitioner objected. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone, including the owners of Arena. As one of the owners of Arena, Ms. Lawrence would sometimes eat meals at Arena. At some point in January 2009, she voiced her displeasure to Mr. Cyr as to meals which she believed to have been prepared by Petitioner. She was never made aware of Petitioner’s allegations regarding the use of racial slurs by Mr. Cyr. According to Ms. Lawrence, she instructed Mr. Cyr to terminate Petitioner from employment because of his cooking abilities. Mr. Cyr informed Petitioner that his employment was terminated, and informed him that it was due to his job performance. Mr. Cyr also informed Petitioner that the decision to terminate Petitioner was Ms. Lawrence’s, not his. Mr. Cyr’s testimony regarding using the “N” word contradicts Petitioner’s testimony, and is somewhat inconsistent with Ms. Lawrence’s testimony regarding the reason Petitioner was fired. That is, Mr. Cyr denies using the “N” word in front of Petitioner. As for the reason he fired Petitioner, Mr. Cyr testified that it was due to a reduction in business following football season. There is no dispute, however, that Ms. Lawrence was the decisionmaker regarding the decision to fire Petitioner. Regarding the conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Cyr used the “N” word, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s testimony in this regard to be credible and more persuasive. That is, the undersigned finds that Mr. Cyr did use the “N” word in front of Petitioner in the workplace. As for the reason Petitioner was fired, Ms. Lawrence did acknowledge that business slowed down at Arena around the time she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner, and that the salad bar was phased out the month after Petitioner was terminated. However, she insists that she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner because of the quality of his cooking. In any event, there does not appear to be a dispute that Mr. Cyr told Petitioner that he was being fired due to job performance issues. At some time after Petitioner was terminated, Mr. Cyr was terminated from Arena because, in Ms. Lawrence’s words, he “was not that great.” When Petitioner was terminated, two Caucasian cooks remained employed at Arena. While Petitioner was not actually replaced, his duties were assumed by the remaining Caucasian staff. Since his termination, Petitioner has worked for approximately three weeks at another eating establishment. Otherwise, he has been unsuccessful finding employment despite his efforts. Respondent employs minorities and non-minorities in positions with both Arena and The Coliseum. The undersigned has reviewed the evidence of record, oral and written, as to the number of minority and non-minority employees and as to whether Respondent hired primarily non-minority persons in the better paying positions. The evidence of record is insufficient to support a finding that Respondent engaged in racially motivated hiring practices. There is no evidence that Petitioner complained to Ms. Lawrence or the other owner of Arena that he was being discriminated against on the basis of race. When he complained to Mr. Cyr, the offending remarks stopped. There was no competent evidence presented that Ms. Lawrence knew of the racial slur used by Mr. Cyr in the workplace in Petitioner’s presence. There is no evidence that Ms. Lawrence’s decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was related in any way to any racial remark used by Mr. Cyr.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Steven deLaroche, Esquire 1005 South Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent) committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination against Stephen G. Leslie (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) of 1992.
Findings Of Fact In 1986, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent as a "Safety Specialist." Beginning in 2001, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an "Outdoor Advertising Regional Inspector." As an outdoor advertising regional inspector, the Petitioner's responsibilities included patrolling state roads in his assigned counties to ascertain the status of permitted outdoor advertising signs and to remove signs that were illegally placed on state right-of-way. The Respondent's duties required extensive driving, which he did in a state-supplied vehicle. The Petitioner was based at the Respondent's Tampa headquarters, but was supervised by employees located in Tallahassee. In 2007, the Petitioner began to experience neurological health issues, but he continued to work and was able to perform the responsibilities of his employment. From September 2008 to June 2011, the Petitioner was supervised by Robert Jessee. In 2009, the Petitioner's health issues got worse. He began to take more sick leave, which the Respondent approved upon request of the Petitioner. The Respondent also provided equipment to accommodate the Petitioner's health issues, including a laptop computer and larger mirrors on the Petitioner's state vehicle. The Respondent also assigned another employee to ride with the Petitioner and to remove signs illegally placed on state right-of-way so that the Petitioner did not have to exit the vehicle. In 2010, the Petitioner was involved in two automobile accidents while driving the state vehicle. In January, he ran into a vehicle that was stopped for a school bus. In February, while transporting a group of other employees on I-75, the Respondent struck rode debris and the vehicle was damaged. In April 2010, the Petitioner's presence in the Tampa headquarters building was restricted for reasons that were unclear. Although the restrictions caused embarrassment to the Petitioner, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that such measures were related in any way to the Petitioner's disability. Following an investigation of the traffic incidents by the Respondent's inspector general, the Petitioner received a written reprimand dated August 18, 2010, and was directed to take the Respondent's online driving course. Beginning in June 2011 and through the remainder of the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent, the Petitioner was supervised by Michael Green. The Respondent collects statistical data to measure the productivity of persons employed as outdoor advertising regional inspectors. The Petitioner's productivity statistics were significantly lower than those of other inspectors, and he was behind in his assignments. Accordingly, Mr. Green rode along with the Petitioner for three consecutive days in September 2011 to observe the Petitioner's work. At the hearing, Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner arrived late to pick him up at his hotel on all three days. On one of those days, the Petitioner accomplished an employment- related task prior to picking up the supervisor. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner's driving made him feel unsafe during the observation. Mr. Green observed that the Petitioner accelerated and slowed the vehicle in an abrupt manner, and that he failed to use turn signals at appropriate times. Mr. Green also testified that the Petitioner was preoccupied as he drove by electronic devices, including a cell phone. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner appeared to have difficulty entering and exiting the vehicle, and with hearing certain noises in the vehicle, including the click of the turn signal. Mr. Green testified that he felt so unsafe that he asked the Petitioner to alter his driving practices while Mr. Green was in the vehicle. Mr. Green testified that during the observation ride, the Petitioner discussed his physical condition and admitted that medical appointments during the week made it difficult to maintain the routine work schedule. The Petitioner also advised Mr. Green that he was considering filing for disability retirement. After returning to the Tallahassee headquarters, Mr. Green prepared a memorandum dated September 19, 2011, to memorialize his observations about the Petitioner's job performance. Mr. Green's memorandum was directed to Juanice Hughes (deputy director of the Respondent's right-of-way office) and to the Respondent's outdoor advertising manager. In the memo, Mr. Green recommended that the Petitioner be required to provide medical verification of his continued ability to perform the responsibilities of his position. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 23, 2011, Ms. Hughes restated Mr. Green's observations and directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that the Petitioner was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. The letter specifically directed the Petitioner to provide medical information related to his ability to work his normal schedule, the existence of any work restrictions or required accommodations, and the impact of any medications prescribed for the Petitioner. The letter established a deadline of September 30, 2011, for the Petitioner's compliance with its requirements, and advised that he would not be permitted to resume his employment duties until the medical verification information was provided and any required accommodations were in place. The Petitioner apparently did not become aware of the letter until September 29, 2011. On that date, both Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes attempted to contact the Petitioner via his work cell phone and by email to advise him of the letter and to direct that he retrieve the letter from the district headquarters. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., contact was made with the Petitioner by calling his personal cell phone. At that time, the Petitioner was advised that he needed to return to the district headquarters to pick up the letter. He was further advised that he was being placed on leave until the requirements of the letter were met and that he needed to turn in his state vehicle when he arrived at the headquarters. The Petitioner advised Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes that he was attempting to obtain documentation required to file for disability retirement, and he asked for an extension of time during which to do so. His request for an extension was denied. The Petitioner, clearly unhappy with the circumstance, made a statement during the conversation that was considered by Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes to suggest that the Petitioner could cause damage to himself or to the state vehicle. The actual words spoken were disputed at the hearing, and the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have actually damaged the vehicle or himself. Nonetheless, it was clear after the conversation that the Petitioner was resistant to the Department's instructions. The Respondent immediately directed James Moulton, the director of Transportation Operations for the Tampa district, to check on the Petitioner's condition and to retrieve the vehicle assigned to the Petitioner. Mr. Moulton did so, accompanied by local law enforcement personnel, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 30, 2011, Ms. Hughes recounted the events of the day before and again directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that he was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. No deadline was set for the Petitioner's compliance, and he was advised that he could use leave for any absence related to obtaining the medical documentation. A few days later, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that he would be unable to obtain the requested medical verification and that he would be filing an application for medical disability retirement. In November 2011, the Petitioner filed the application accompanied by medical documentation establishing that the Petitioner had a "total and permanent disability," as defined by section 121.091(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/ His application was approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2013.