The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent has violated Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes; Subsection 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes; Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes; by being guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust; by allegedly failing to promptly deliver a deposit; by allegedly failing to maintain trust funds in a proper escrow account; by allegedly depositing or intermingling personal funds with trust funds or escrow funds; by operating as a broker without holding a valid, current license; and by failing to preserve and make available to the agency all books, records, and supporting documents and by allegedly failing to keep an accurate account of all trust-fund transactions.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practice of real estate brokers and salespersons licensed in the State of Florida. It has the duty to prosecute with Administrative Complaints any alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and related laws and rules, involved in the licensure and regulation of real estate brokers and salespersons. The Respondent, Richard Irwin Ray, is now and was, at all times pertinent to this case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He was issued license number 0423296, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to him was as a non-active broker, bearing an address of 10013 Calle de Celestino, Navarre, Florida 32566. The Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, was the licensed and qualifying broker for the now-defunct Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. for the period from October 31, 1985 to approximately November 6, 1989. The Respondent and Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. failed to renew their licenses on March 31, 1989, the expiration date. Instead, the licenses were renewed effective April 5, 1989; and the Respondent continued to do business as a real estate brokerage and broker for several months thereafter through and including the time in which the transaction at issue was entered into. On or about July 27, 1989, Richard Walker, a salesman working for the Respondent's brokerage firm, solicited and obtained an executed contract for the sale and purchase of certain real property owned by Myra Lee Philips, the seller, and Charles W. and Pamela S. Brannon, the proposed buyers. The buyers gave the salesman, Mr. Walker, a $500.00 earnest money deposit called for by the terms of the contract, which terms also provided that the earnest money deposit was to be held in escrow by Navarre Shores Realty, Inc., the Respondent's real estate brokerage firm. Mr. Walker maintains that he turned in the check or submitted it to the broker or to one of his representatives or to someone who was "running the office at the time". He does not recall to whom he actually tendered the check when he received it; however, he recalls making a copy of the check and then making a copy of the check and the front page of the contract, with the check copy overlaid on it, which was the procedure in the office required by the Respondent in order that he could keep a record of sales transactions. In addition to Mr. Walker, the salesman, having no recollection of who, if anyone, he might have given the check to with the Respondent's brokerage firm, the Respondent has no recollection of receiving the check, ever seeing the check nor the manner or means by which the check was handled, as, for instance, whether it was deposited in his firm's escrow account or not. Mr. Charles Brannon, the proposed buyer in the subject transaction, testified that he executed a $500.00 earnest money deposit check in accordance with the terms of the contract referenced above and that the $500.00 check did clear his bank account; that is, it was paid upon being tendered to his bank. The Respondent maintains that he does not know the location of any records he might have, if any, related to this transaction and the subject earnest money deposit check. During the time in question immediately following the transaction date of July 27, 1989 and the time in November of 1989 when the Respondent closed his real estate office, the Respondent apparently had some disagreements with salespersons, including Mr. Walker. During this time period, the Respondent and his secretary, Ms. Galfano, learned that some client and sales transactions files were removed from the Respondent's brokerage office by Mr. Walker and others. Apparently, Ms. Galfano was able to retrieve some of the files; however, the Respondent was unable to, or in any event, failed to provide the Department's investigator, Mr. Bratton, with any records related to the subject transaction, including the escrow account records, which might have revealed whether the earnest money deposit check was deposited in the Respondent's escrow account or not, although the Respondent did advise Mr. Bratton by telephone on two occasions that he was endeavoring to have the bank prepare his escrow account records. The escrow account had been closed by Emerald Coast State Bank because service charges had been applied to it which resulted in its having a negative balance. This may mean that no $500.00 earnest money deposit check had been deposited in that account, and the Respondent does not know what happened to the check once the Brannons executed it and presumably gave it to Mr. Walker. He does not feel that it was ever placed in his escrow account, nor that he ever had any possession of it because the account was closed for having a negative balance due to the debiting of monthly service charges. In any event, the Respondent did not obtain and provide to the Petitioner the escrow account records. The Respondent stated in his testimony that if the buyers, the Brannons, could provide their bank records and produce the cancelled check involved, that would show how the check was cashed and, therefore, whether it was processed through his escrow account. The cancelled check was not produced and admitted into evidence at the hearing. Mr. Brannon, one of the buyers, merely testified that the check had cleared his bank and had been debited from his account upon which the check was written. Check number 3642 in evidence is the $500.00 check drawn on the account of Richard I. or Maryanne Ray, which is the check by which the Respondent paid the seller, Ms. Philips, the earnest money deposit funds which she was due because the transaction failed to close. A receipt for that check was issued to the Respondent by witness, Richard Walker, the Respondent's former salesman. The receipt indicates that the funds in question were received from R. Ray Construction, a/k/a Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. Mr. Walker did not adequately explain why he issued a receipt to the Respondent for the check drawn on his personal account and represented it as being from R. Ray Construction, a/k/a Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. He merely testified that he went to Mr. Ray, who "...was operating out of his personal account with his construction company. I did it because that's what he was known as at the time. OK. I did it in good faith." Mr. Walker does not have any knowledge concerning where the earnest money deposit check from the buyer, the Brannons, was actually deposited, nor whether the Respondent ever received it. Ms. Galfano was the secretary for Navarre Shores Realty, Inc., the Respondent's firm, at the time of the transaction in question and thereafter. Ms. Galfano established that Mr. Walker took some files from the office which contained sales contracts when the Respondent closed the office. She went to his home on a Sunday and persuaded him to give her back the records and took them back to the office. Ms. Galfano opined that certain files had been removed from the office by Mr. Walker because Mr. Walker was in a dispute at the time with one of the sales associates in the office. Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. had been experiencing internal problems with the associates disputing among themselves. In fact, the Respondent lost several associates from his firm due to internal dissension, presumably about credit for clients and contracts. It was because of this that the Respondent decided to close his office. At the time of the transaction between the Philips and the Brannons, Navarre Shores Realty, Inc., through Mr. Walker, had the listing on the property. Prior to that time, the Philips' property had been listed with Mr. Lou Jakes, also a sales associate with Navarre Shores Realty, Inc. The seller, Ms. Philips, later turned the listing over to Mr. Walker because she was upset with Mr. Jakes over upkeep not being properly done on the beach house in question. She called the off ice concerning this and happened to talk to Richard Walker, who persuaded her to change the listing from Lou Jakes over to him. Thus, the subject listing and transaction caused a dispute between Mr. Jakes and Mr. Walker, and Mr. Jakes left the firm as, later, did Mr. Walker. One of them apparently removed the subject records from the brokerage office. Since the transaction in question and the internal dissension in his office involving Mr. Walker and the other associate, the Respondent has had difficulty conversing with Mr. Walker because they are not on good terms. In summary, the evidence establishes at most that Mr. Walker received the earnest money deposit check from the buyers, the Brannons. It was not established that the Respondent ever received or became aware of the delivery of the earnest money deposit check to Mr. Walker. It was not established that it was ever deposited in any of the Respondent's or his corporation's accounts. It was established that the Respondent, partly out of a desire to avoid accusation of any illegality by the Petitioner, voluntarily paid the $500.00 to the seller out of his personal account, although he does not know or has no recollection that the money was ever received by him nor deposited in any of his accounts. The earnest money deposit check was not produced and placed into evidence, which could have shown in whose bank and account the check might have been deposited. Mr. Brannon only testified that the $500.00 check cleared and was debited from his account. It was established that the Respondent either has no records of his escrow account transactions with regard to this real estate transaction or is unaware of their location. It was likewise established, however, that upon request by Mr. Bratton, Petitioner's investigator, for copies of those records, the Respondent did not produce them. The Respondent maintains that he had requested that his banks provide a copy of his account records; however, as of the time of the hearing, he had not provided those to Mr. Bratton. It was also established that the Respondent and his brokerage firm were duly licensed at the time the transaction in question occurred and that some months later, in November of 1989, he closed his office and ceased doing business. It was established that his licensure expired on March 31, 1989 and that there was a six-day lapse of his licensure, with it being renewed on April 5, 1989. In November of 1990, on approximately November 6th, the buyers, the seller, and the Respondent signed a release of deposit agreement whereby the Respondent was to disburse $500.00 to the seller with regard to the subject transaction. See Exhibit 2 in evidence. On or about April 18, 1991, the Respondent made and delivered check number 3642, in the amount of $500.00, drawn on his personal checking account number 1322650, maintained at First National Bank of Santa Rosa, Milton, Florida, payable to Myra Lee Philips, who had been the seller in the subject transaction. Thus, in excess of five months elapsed between the time the Respondent agreed to disburse the $500.00 to Ms. Philips and the time he actually paid Ms. Philips the $500.00.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, finding that the Respondent, Richard Irwin Ray, has violated Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, by failing to promptly deliver a deposit; finding that he is guilty of having failed to preserve and make available to the Petitioner all books, records and supporting documents concerning trust-fund transactions in violation of Rule 21V-14.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, as well as Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and that he be accorded the penalty for these violations of a written reprimand and a $250.00 fine. Concerning his violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and the consequent derivative violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by operating for six days without a license, it is recommended that due to this inadvertent, technical licensure lapse that no penalty be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 James Gillis, Esq. Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Richard Irwin Ray 10013 Calle de Celestino Navarre, FL 32566
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Richard L. Faircloth has held a real estate salesman's license, No. SL 0407933, issued by petitioner Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, authorizing him to work, since July 16, 1990, as a salesman for Discount Realty-Fla., Inc., a corporate broker in Alachua, Florida, whose "qualifying broker" is respondent's wife, Lise H. Faircloth. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On December 1, 1990, Alvin and Betty J. Wilson came to Mr. Faircloth's office in Alachua to sign a form deposit receipt and purchase and sale agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, by which they offered to purchase a house on Northwest 18th Terrace in Gainesville; and they gave Mr. Faircloth five hundred dollars in cash, as earnest money. Mr. Faircloth did not recall at hearing whether he put the money in his pocket at that point, but the money was never deposited in an escrow or trust account. After Mr. and Mrs. Wilson left, Mr. Faircloth communicated their offer by telephone to a representative of the house's owner. The offer was declined. When he telephoned the Wilsons with the news, he asked them to come back to his office. With their return later that day, a conversation lasting about an hour and a half began, at the end of which the Wilsons authorized respondent and his broker to retain the earnest money deposit for use in the event respondent located another house they decided to make an offer to purchase. For the same purpose, Mrs. Wilson later wrote respondent a check in the amount of $1,500, which was duly deposited in the broker's escrow account. Shortly thereafter, respondent drew a check on the escrow account in Mr. Wilson's favor in the amount of $200 (so he could pay an electric bill), but the bank refused to cash it. Funds in the escrow account were insufficient, because the Wilsons' $1,500 check had bounced. Mr. Faircloth also wrote a check the Wilsons used as a deposit when they rented a truck to move into a duplex they rented from him. The deposit check was ultimately returned to respondent, without being cashed. (When the Wilsons moved, respondent regained possession of the dog he had earlier given the Wilsons' son. He was never reimbursed $78 he expended for the care and feeding of this dog, after it had become the Wilsons' property.) The Wilsons paid $450 a month, in advance, while they rented the duplex, and nobody ever asked for a security deposit. When Mrs. Wilson received a check from Beneficial National Bank (who lent money against an anticipated tax refund) in the amount of $1,466, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, she endorsed it in favor of respondent or the broker and, as far as the evidence showed, this money was put in escrow (although $200 might have been deducted beforehand.) In any event, respondent transferred $200 to the Wilsons more or less contemporaneously. Altogether, the Wilsons entrusted respondent with $1,776 ($500 + $1466 - $200 = $1,766) for possible use as earnest money. After Mr. and Mrs. Wilson bought a house respondent had shown them in December of 1990, but through another broker's office, without availing themselves of Mr. Faircloth's assistance in closing the transaction, they asked him to return the money they had given him. He gave them a check signed by his wife, drawn on a Discount Realty-Fla., Inc. account in the amount of $1,316, on which was written "return of deposit less 450 00/100 security." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The check was dated April 17, 1991. At hearing, Mr. Faircloth testified that the $1,316 check to the Wilsons represented a $50 overpayment. He conceded that $450 had been improperly deducted from the moneys the Wilsons paid, as a claimed security deposit. But he contended that he and the Wilsons had agreed to a non- refundable, $500 "finder's fee" during their second visit on December 1, 1990. In fact, the Wilsons never agreed to any finder's fee, non-refundable or otherwise. At the time it was received, respondent and his wife gave two receipts for the Wilsons' $500. Each reflected that it was to be deposited as earnest money, and no subsequent writing indicated any different agreement between the parties. As late as April of 1991, respondent's conduct, notably delivery of the $1,316 check to the Wilsons, was inconsistent with the putative agreement about a finder's fee he testified to at hearing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. Copies furnished to: Janine Myrick, Esquire P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 33802 Richard L. Faircloth Post Office Box 1859 Alachua, FL 32615 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of August, 1992. Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints are correct and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Inge E. Hood ("Hood"), was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, license #0318539. The most recent license issued to Hood was as a broker c/o William Glass Realty, Inc., 2835 Bridge Street, Post Office Box 755, LaBelle, Florida 33935-9755. From approximately April 12, 1984 through January 10, 1991, Hood was a manager and qualifying broker for Florida Home Finders, Inc. ("FHF"), and acted as general manager for the FHF Port LaBelle office. FHF was a subsidiary of General Development Corporation ("GDC"), a developer of residential subdivisions. At the time Hood was the general manager of FHF's Port LaBelle office, FHF managed the rental program available to investment purchasers of GDC homes. The rental program provided such services as leasing, prospective tenant screening, rent collection, and maintenance of investor-owned housing. Such services were funded from escrow accounts to which the home owner would initially deposit funds and which would be supplemented by rental income. Prior to April 12, 1990, James R. Wells, was president of FHF and was the person to whom Hood reported. At some time in 1988, Juan and Beryl Soto purchased a GDC home at 4007 Sena Lane, LaBelle. The home was financed through a GDC program, GDC Financing Corporation1 . The Sotos did not occupy the home, and, pursuant to a property management agreement, it was placed in the FHF rental program, administered by Hood. The monthly rental income from the home was approximately half of the monthly mortgage payment amount. In late 1988, Hood was notified that the Soto home would likely revert to GDC through a foreclosure action, and that the Sotos were entitled to rental income prior to the foreclosure, after which rental income would accrue to GDC, to which the Soto property would revert. In 1989, the property reverted back to GDC ownership through foreclosure. FHF and Hood continued to manage the rental house for GDC. Approximately $5,394.19 in rental funds were due the Sotos for rental income on the home. A check for the amount was sent to the Sotos, but was returned to GDC.2 Upon return of the funds, the monies were deposited into the FHF property management escrow account. At some time in 1989, GDC sales went into decline. GDC's fiscal turmoil eventually culminated in the company filing for bankruptcy protection. Hood's compensation, which was based on a salary plus commission "override" agreement, likewise declined during this period. During late 1989 and early 1990, Hood desired to purchase a house at 4008 South Edgewater Circle, LaBelle, from owner Elizabeth Smith, who resided in Rosedale, New York. Prior to closing on the purchase, Hood rented the Smith house. While living in the Smith house which Hood was purchasing, Hood purchased replacement carpet, vinyl flooring, and blinds for the house at 4008 South Edgewater from Blocker's Furniture and Appliance Center in LaBelle. According to receipts, the expenditures at Blocker's totaled $3,683.01, including $2725.77 for carpet on 11/6/89, $799.99 for vertical blinds on 11/7/89, and $157.25 for vinyl flooring on 11/28/89. By checks numbered 017253 and 017254, both dated 3/19/90, payable to Blocker's Furniture and drawn on the "Florida Home Finders, Inc., Rental Receipts Escrow Account", Hood paid Blocker's $3,683.01 from the FHF rental escrow account. 14. By checks numbered 017261 (dated 3/26/90), 017609 (dated 5/5/90) and 017916 (dated 7/4/90), payable to Elizabeth Smith and drawn on the "Florida Home Finders, Inc., Rental Receipts Escrow Account", Hood paid $1,480 to Smith as rent for the house at 4008 South Edgewater. At the hearing, Hood testified that she was owed compensation from FHF which, due to GDC's financial problems, had not been forthcoming. Hood further testified that she was authorized by James Wells to withdraw funds from the FHF escrow account to cover her shortages. Hood suggested that the funds withdrawn from escrow were not actually escrowed funds, but were the funds supposedly rejected by, and therefore not owed to, the Sotos. The Petitioner's investigator interviewed Wells who admitted that he had expressed to Hood his concern over her financial condition, and that they had discussed her need for funds, but was unable to recall whether he had authorized Hood to remove funds from the escrow account without reference to his files, which he did not have at the time of the interview. The investigator did not further pursue the matter. Wells did not testify at the hearing. The evidence fails to support Hood's hearsay testimony regarding Wells' supposed authorization to remove funds from the rental escrow account. There is no evidence as to the amount of unpaid compensation to which Hood was allegedly entitled. There is no credible evidence that the Sotos had refused said funds or that the funds were no longer due to them. In March of 1990, Hood owned a house at 4083 South Edgewater Circle, LaBelle, which she desired to sell to Carolyn J. and Robert M. Ford. Hood arranged to rent the house to the Fords pending completion of the sale. By a rental agreement dated March 17, 1990, the Fords rented the Hood house located at 4083 South Edgewater Circle beginning on said date, with rental payments to begin on April 1, 1990. The rental agreement provided for a monthly payment of $475, of which $115 was to be credited towards the down payment until the sales transaction closed. By contract for sale and purchase dated March 17, 1990, the Fords agreed to purchase the 4083 South Edgewater Circle house. The Fords gave Hood a $500 earnest money deposit check, made payable to "Florida Home Finders" which was deposited into the FHF escrow account. The contract for sale provides that "[i]f Buyer fails to obtain the loan commitment and promptly notifies Seller in writing, or after diligent effort fails to meet the terms and conditions of the commitment or to waive Buyer's rights under this subparagraph within the time stated for obtaining the commitment, then either party may cancel the Contract and Buyer shall be refunded the deposit(s)." The Fords were unable to obtain financing for the home purchase by the date set for closing in the contract. However, the Fords continued to reside in Hood's property, and, based on the continuing lease agreement which provided for a portion of the rental payment to go towards the purchase of the house, apparently intended to obtain financing and close on the transaction. On April 12, 1990, James R. Wells was terminated as president of FHF. Wells was succeeded by Harold W. Fenno. By check #000337 dated October 8, 1990, drawn on the "Florida Home Finders Sales Escrow Account" and made payable to Hood, she withdrew $1,305.00 from the account. The funds include the $500 initial deposit and seven deposits of $115 as provided in the rental agreement. A notation on the check indicated that the funds were a "binder deposit due to Seller/Contract Null and Void" and that said monies are "to be applied if & when the contract does become active again" for the Fords purchase of the house at 4083 South Edgewater Circle. The evidence fails to establish that Hood was entitled to retain the Fords deposit funds. Mr. Fenno subsequently became aware of escrow account discrepancies related to Hood's withdrawals. On January 10, 1991, Hood's employment with FHF was terminated. There is no evidence that FHF has requested the Respondent to return or account for the escrow funds she withdrew. On February 8, 1991, the Fords, by cashier's check made payable personally to Hood, gave Hood $2,800. The monies were supposedly an additional deposit on the Hood home in which the Fords have lived since March, 1990. The Fords did not testify at the hearing. The sales transaction has never closed. In March or April of 1991, Hood became aware of the Petitioner's investigation into her withdrawal and retention of the Ford escrow deposit funds. By letter dated April 26, 1991, Hood notified the Fords to vacate the house at 4083 South Edgewater Circle by May 31, 1991. Hood's letter provided that the May rent was due to be paid not later than May 5, 1991. As of the date of the hearing (April 16, 1992) the Fords continue to live in the Hood house. There is no evidence that the Fords have requested refund or an accounting of any monies provided to Hood. The Fords have paid no rent since April, 1991. Hood is pursuing the eviction of the Ford's from the house. There is no credible evidence as to whether the Fords intend to close on the purchase of the property, to continue residing therein (with or without rental payment) or to vacate the house. The Respondent asserts that the Ford funds have been applied towards the unpaid rent. There has been no judgement rendered as to Hood's supposed entitlement to retain said funds. The evidence fails to establish that Hood is currently entitled to retain the Ford deposit funds.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order determining Inge E. Hood guilty of the violations set forth herein and revoking her license as a real estate broker. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1992. The transcript erroneously identifies the company as "GDV Financing Corporation". The Respondent asserted that the Sotos did not feel entitled to the funds so they returned them. Testimony as to the reason the check was returned by the Sotos is merely speculative, and is insufficient to support a finding of fact. APPENDIX CASES NO. 91-3146 and 91-6272 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of the evidence. The testimony of the president of FHF establishes that the Respondent was terminated by the company on January 10, 1991. 11. Second sentence is rejected, immaterial. Mr. Fenno was not president of FHF at the time the Respondent withdrew funds from the FHF escrow account. There has been no request to Respondent by FHF for return of or an accounting of said funds. Mr. Fenno testified that there was no written authorization for Respondent to remove the funds from the escrow account, but admitted he had not examined the files to see if such documentation exists. 13. Accepted as to the fact the Respondent has not refunded escrow funds to FHF. Rejected as to implication that there has been any written request from FHF for return of or an accounting of said funds, (Mr. Fenno admitted that there has been no request) or that Respondent has refused such request. 17. Statement that $1,305 withdrawal on October 10, 1990 from escrow account related to Ford purchase was "all without the prior knowledge and consent of the Fords or the Florida Home Finders, Inc." is rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, which fails to establish whether or not the withdrawal was approved by the Fords. 19. Rejected. The evidence fails to establish that the additional deposit funds were solicited by the Respondent. 21. Accepted as to the fact the Respondent has not refunded escrow funds to the Fords. Rejected as to implication that there has been any request from them for return of or an accounting of such funds, not supported by the evidence. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of the evidence. The records indicate that the Respondent's application for license as broker for Florida Home Finders, Inc. was filed on April 12, 1984. 6. Last sentence, rejected, irrelevant. The evidence fails to establish that GDC or FHF authorized Respondent to remove funds from escrow and convert said funds to personal use. 9-10. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 11. Rejected as to statement that Wells authorized Respondent to remove funds from escrow and convert said funds to personal use, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected as to statement, "This was done with the full consent of the Fords as rent." The Fords did not testify. If the statement refers to the lease agreement, the agreement is in evidence. If the reference is to the Respondent's removal of said funds from escrow, there is no credible evidence supporting the assertion. Rejected. The evidence fails to establish that the additional deposit funds were solicited by the Respondent 18. Last sentence rejected. There is no evidence that Hood is currently entitled to retain Ford deposit funds as setoff against unpaid rent. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Hurston North Tower 400 W. Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esq. Division of Legal Services Legal Section, Suite N-308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Kinley I. Engvalson, Esq. DUNCAN & ENGVALSON, P.A. Post Office Drawer 249 Fort Myers, FL 33902
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses described in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Raymond Mangicapra is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0326800. FUGI is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. It holds registration number 0245691. At all times material to the instant case prior to March 5, 1992, Mangicapra was the broker of record for FUGI. On March 5, 1992, he resigned as FUGI's broker of record and its president. Approximately five months later he returned to FUGI in the capacity of a licensed broker-salesman The Angulo Transaction On or about April 26 1991, Jose Angulo, his wife Martha Salazar Angulo, and their son Carlos Angulo, signed a written contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Angulo contract") to purchase from Lofts Development Corp. (hereinafter referred to as "LDC"), for $98,300.00, real property located in the Willow Wood subdivision in Palm Beach County upon which a residence was to be constructed. FUGI, through its then broker of record, Mangicapra, negotiated the sale for LDC. Mangicapra was also a part-owner of LDC and its qualifying agent. His partner was Vincent Ferri. Ferri, on behalf of LDC, signed the Angulo contract on May 2, 1991. Article II, Section C. of the Angulo contract provided, in part, as follows: Use of Mortgage Loan: Time to Make Application: Purchaser intends to pay for a portion of the Purchase Price by obtaining a permanent mortgage loan ("Mortgage Loan"). Purchaser agrees to make application(s) for such Mortgage Loan from a bona fide lending institution approved by Seller ("Mortgagee") in the amount of [$96,050.00], at applicable interest rates. Purchaser agrees to make application for such Mortgage Loan within five (5) days from execution of this Contract by Purchaser. Purchaser agrees to promptly execute all necessary documents, disclose all information within fourteen (14) days of request and pay all costs as and when requested of it by Mortgagee and/or Seller in conjunction with such application and take all other measures to aid in being approved for a Mortgage Loan, including the making of further applications for a Mortgage Loan. Failure to Obtain Mortgage Loan: Purchaser agrees that in the event Purchaser fails to qualify for such Mortgage Loan or fails to qualify for a Mortgage Loan sufficient in an amount to enable Purchaser to close after duly and promptly complying with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or Seller, Purchaser shall notify Seller of this fact, in writing, whereupon Seller may request that Purchaser make further applications for a Mortgage Loan. In the event that Purchaser fails to qualify for a Mortgage Loan with any Mortgagee after duly and promptly complying with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or the Seller, as provided above, then Seller shall, at its sole discretion, either (a) give a Mortgage Loan to Purchaser at applicable interest rates at the time such Mortgage Loan is closed for the Full Amount; or (b) transfer or otherwise assign a Mortgage Loan obtained by Seller at applicable interest rates at the time such Mortgage Loan is obtained for the Full Amount which Purchaser agrees to assume at closing in lieu of any other Mortgage Loan and for which Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for all loan closing costs, title insurance premiums and escrow balances existing at closing relative to such assumed Mortgage Loan; (c) in the instance where Purchaser is approved for a Mortgage Loan in an amount less than the Full Amount, unless otherwise prohibited by reason of government or lender regulations, take a purchase money second mortgage from Purchaser at applicable interest rates for a term not to exceed five (5) years and Purchaser shall pay all closing costs in connection with such purchase money second mortgage; or (d) return any monies paid hereunder less a sum for engineering and other expenses reasonably incurred in effecting and processing this Contract whereupon this Contract shall be terminated and the parties hereto shall be relieved of all further rights and obligations hereunder. Default by Purchaser: In the event Seller ascertains that Purchaser has failed to qualify for a Mortgage Loan due to Purchaser's failure to duly or promptly comply with all requests of the Mortgagee and/or Seller or due to failure on the part of Purchaser to supply accurate information, then any such event shall constitute default by Purchaser hereunder, entitling Seller to retain all sums paid hereunder as set forth in accordance with Article VI hereof. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article II to the contrary or notwithstanding a subsequent mortgage disapproval by a Mortgagee, Purchaser specifically agrees that once a mortgage approval is obtained by Purchaser from one Mortgagee, the deposit monies paid by the Purchaser to Seller shall no longer be refundable. . . . Article III, Section D. of the Angulo contract provided, in part, as follows: Subject to the following provisions of this Paragraph, the estimated date of completion for the residence shall be on or about 120 days from mtg approv. . . . . In the event said Residence shall not be completed two (2) years from the date of this Contract as aforesaid, Purchaser shall have the option to cancel this Contract by giving written notice to Seller ("Cancellation Notice") within 5 days after two (2) years from the date of this Contract ("Cancellation Period") and upon such cancellation Seller shall refund to Purchaser his deposit made hereunder. Upon such Refund, all parties to this Contract shall be fully discharged and relieved from the terms and obligations hereof. Liability of Seller is limited to the Refund and in no event shall Seller be liable to Purchaser for any damages which Purchaser may sustain. In the event Purchaser does not send the Cancellation Notice within the Cancellation Period, this Contract shall remain in full force and effect and Purchaser shall not have the right to cancel this Contract unless Seller is otherwise in default of this Contract. Seller shall not be obliged to make, provide or compensate for any accommodations to Purchaser as a result of delayed completion nor shall Seller be liable for any expenses or inconveniences to Purchaser which may directly or indirectly arise from delay of delivery of possession. Article VI, Section A. of the Angulo contract addressed the subject of "Purchaser's Default." It provided, in part, as follows: If Purchaser shall fail to cure such default within such seven (7) day period, Seller shall, and does hereby have the unrestricted option to (1) consider Purchaser in default under this Contract, (2) retain all sums paid to it, whether held in escrow or otherwise, hereunder as agreed upon and liqu[id]ated damages and in full settlement of any claim for damages, and (3) terminate all rights of Purchaser under this Contract. . . . Article VII of the Angulo contract addressed the subject of "Deposit Money." It provided as follows: Seller shall at its option have the right to use the deposit money for any purposes as it deems necessary. Article VIII, Section B. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: Purchaser represents and warrants that this sale of the Property pursuant to this Contract was made by Seller's personnel and Purchaser agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seller against any claims of real estate brokers for commissions relating to this sale. Article VIII, Section C. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: This Contract may not be assigned, sold or transferred by Purchaser without the prior written consent thereto by Seller, which consent may be withheld in Seller's sole discretion. There was no comparable provision in the contract restricting LDC's right to assign. Article VIII, Section E. of the Angulo contract provided as follows: This Contract shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, legal representatives, successors and, as permitted hereunder, assigns. Addendum E to the Angulo contract, which was signed by the Angulos on April 26, 1991, and by Ferri on May 2, 1991, provided, in part, as follows: The purchaser(s) of a one or two family residential dwelling unit has the right to have all deposit fund[s] (up to 10 percent of the purchase price) deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. This right may be waived in writing by the purchaser(s). Purchaser(s) hereby waive their right to have all deposit funds (up to 10 percent of purchase price) deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. . . . First Union Group, Inc., is the agent for the Seller(s) and will be paid for his services by the Seller(s). . . . The Angulos' initial deposit was a check, which they gave to Mangicapra, made out to FUGI in the amount of $500.00. In conjunction with making this payment, they signed a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, which provided, in part, as follows: It is specifically understood that this Earnest Money deposit is to be held in First Union Group, Inc's (hereinafter First Union Group) trust account. Upon acceptance of said reservation/contract between [the Angulos] (buyer) and Lofts Development Corp. (seller), and upon clearance of said deposit, buyer agrees that First Union Group may automatically transfer to seller said Earnest Money and said Earnest Money shall be treated as purchasers['] initial investment deposit. Purchaser agrees that once said reservation/contract between buyer and seller named above is accepted by seller, and there is in effect a purchase agreement, any and all future deposits due per said purchase agreement shall be made payable directly [to] seller. If any future deposits are inadvertently made payable to First Union Group, buyer hereby gives First Union Group the right and authorization to transfer said deposit money to seller. Any deviation to the above must be in writing from buyer at the time of the reservation/contract. . . . The "automatic transfer" of deposit monies from the real estate broker holding these monies to the seller/builder, like that authorized by this signed Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, was the accepted practice in the area. Mangicapra deposited the $500.00 check he had been given by the Angulos in FUGI's interest-bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank in Delray Beach, Florida. The deposit was noted on the Angulos's ledger card. Respondents did not have the written permission of all interested parties to place the Angulos' deposit monies in such an interest-bearing account. Respondents received three other earnest money deposits from the Angulos: a check, dated May 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $700.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "May 30 check"); a check, dated June 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $700.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "June 30 check"); and a check, dated July 30, 1991, payable to FUGI in the amount of $600.00 (hereinafter referred to as the "July 30 check"). The June 30 and July 30 checks were deposited in FUGI's interest- bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank and the deposits were noted on the Angulos' ledger card. The May 30 check, however, was inadvertently deposited in FUGI's general operating account at Capital Bank, instead of its escrow account, as a result of a bookkeeping error. On or about August 8, 1991, Respondents wrote a check (hereinafter referred to as "check #1395") transferring $4,800.00 from its Capital Bank escrow account to LDC. The $4,800.00 represented escrow funds being held by Respondents in connection with six different transactions. It included $1,800.00 of the $2,500.00 in earnest money deposits that Respondents had received from the Angulos. The transfer of this $1,800.00 to LDC was in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by the Angulos. Upon receiving check #1395, Ferri endorsed it back to FUGI to compensate FUGI for services it had provided LDC and for expenses FUGI had incurred in conjunction with the performance of these services. The endorsed check was deposited in FUGI's interest-bearing money market account at Capital Bank. On or about November 1, 1991, Donna Archer, who was then an employee of FUGI, sent a Verification of Escrow Deposit to Paragon Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "PMC"), from whom the Angulos were attempting to obtain a mortgage loan. Archer provided the following erroneous information in this Verification of Escrow Deposit: As Escrow Agent in the [Angulo] transaction, we are now holding the following amount in our escrow account for the above captioned transaction: $2,500.00------- total held in escrow. On or about December 26, 1991, PMC sent the Angulos the following letter advising them that their application for a mortgage loan had been conditionally approved: We are please[d] to inform you that your application for a FHA mortgage in the amount of 95,750.00 has been approved. The following items are contingencies on the loan and must be met prior to closing. Provide independent documentation of YTD income for Martha (i.e. copy of ledger signed by accountant of employer) Amendment of contract to reflect the following, contract to remain current through closing Hazard insurance policy for at least the loan amount Survey with flood certification [C]lear soil treatment guaranty Clear final inspection Proof of 10 year HOW warranty or 2/10 [h]ome buyers warranty At the time this conditional loan commitment was made, the master appraisal of the property was about to expire. Accordingly, an extension of the deadline was sought by PMC. By written agreement, dated April 26, 1992, and signed by Ferri and Jules Minker, the president of Contemporary Community Concepts Corp. (hereinafter referred to as "Contemporary"), LDC, which no longer wished to construct homes in the Willow Wood subdivision, assigned the Angulo contract to Contemporary: In consideration of the sum of $10.00 Ten Dollars lawful money of the United States, I, Vincent A. Ferri, President of Lofts Development Corporation, hereby assign without reservation or limitation and free of encumbrance, the purchase contract between Jose Antonio and Martha Salazar Angulo, his wife and Lofts Development Corporation, dated April 26, 1991 to Contemporary Community Concepts Corporation. The deposit monies indicated and due under the contract in the approximate amount of $1800.00 Eighteen Hundred Dollars, are not transferred by this agreement and remain with Lofts Development Corporation. In fact, the "deposit monies indicated and due under the contract," amounted to $2,500.00, although only $1,800.00 of that amount had been transferred to LDC. In May of 1992, upon attempting to contact Mangicapra to find out why LDC had not yet begun to work on their house, the Angulos discovered that FUGI had closed the office out of which it had been conducting its business. The Angulos brought the matter to the attention of Sharon Couglin of PMC. Couglin wrote a letter to an official at HUD to apprise the agency of the situation. A copy of the letter was sent to the Florida Real Estate Commission. Notwithstanding the Angulos' beliefs to the contrary, FUGI was still in business. It had simply moved to another location in Boynton Beach. (Mangicapra was not at this time, however, associated with FUGI in any way.) Minker contacted FUGI and the Angulos and advised them that the Angulo contract had been assigned to Contemporary. In his discussions with the Angulos, Minker told them that they would be given credit for the earnest money deposits that they had made. The Angulos, in turn, indicated that they wanted Contemporary to proceed with the construction of the house LDC had agreed to build for them. In accordance with the Angulos' stated desires, Contemporary proceeded with the construction of the house. As the house neared completion, the Angulos learned that the conditional mortgage loan commitment they had received was no longer valid because the master appraisal had expired. They thereupon tried to contact FUGI to explore their options. This time they were successful in their efforts to get in touch with a FUGI representative. They spoke with Denise Preziosi, who had replaced Mangicapra as FUGI's broker of record. The Angulos asked Preziosi if they could obtain a refund of their deposit monies in the event they decided that they did not want to go through with their purchase of the house. Preziosi indicated that she did not know the answer to the question and that, in any event, FUGI no longer held any of the Angulos' deposit monies. At the time she made this statement, Preziosi was under the mistaken impression that FUGI had transferred all of these monies to LDC. On or about November 25, 1992, Preziosi sent a letter to Minker, the body of which read, in part, as follows: I am in receipt of a copy of the "Agreement" between Contemporary Community Concepts Corporation and Lofts Development Corporation which Patti faxed to me yesterday. In reading this Agreement, I noticed that the amount stated as a credit to the Angulos is $1800 rather than the $2500 they did in fact pay to Lofts. I understand that you did not nor will not receive any money from Lofts but that you agreed to accept the assignment of the contract and would give them credit for their deposit. In this regard, please amend your records to reflect a credit of $2,500 as deposit monies rather than $1,800. The Angulos made their final color selections for the house in mid- December, 1992. Thereafter Minker obtained a certificate of occupancy for the house. Although Carlos Angulo, in Minker's office, signed a document prepared by Minker agreeing "to complete loan processing for a new loan and to close on [the house] when funds are made available as a result of this application, but not to exceed 60 days," 1/ when Carlos took this document home and presented it to his parents for their signature, they refused to sign it. The Angulos did not "complete loan processing for a new loan." The Angulos have not been refunded any of the $2,500.00 in earnest money deposits they have made, nor have they received any of the interest earned on these deposits. It has not been shown, however, that the Angulos are now, or were at any time previous hereto, entitled to such a refund under the provisions of their contract with LDC. The White-Hunt Transaction On or about May 3, 1990, Stacey White-Hunt signed a written contract (hereinafter referred to as the "White-Hunt contract") to purchase from LDC, for $97,000.00, real property located in the Delray Garden Estates subdivision in Palm Beach County upon which a residence was to be constructed. FUGI, through its then broker of record, Mangicapra, negotiated the sale for LDC. Ferri, on behalf of LDC, signed the White-Hunt contract on May 9, 1990. The White-Hunt contract contained provisions identical in all material respects to Article II, Section C., Article III, Section D., Article VI, Section A., Article VII, and Article VIII, Sections B., C. 2/ and E. of the Angulo contract, as well as Addendum E to the Angulo contract. (These contractual provisions are set out above.) White-Hunt's initial deposit was a check, which she gave to Mangicapra, made out to FUGI in the amount of $500.00. In conjunction with making this payment, she signed a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement, which was identical in all material respects to the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by the Angulos. Respondents received one other earnest money deposit from White-Hunt. It was a check payable to FUGI in the amount of $1,000.00. The $500.00 check and the $1,000.00 check were deposited in FUGI's interest-bearing money market escrow account at Capital Bank and the deposits were noted on White-Hunt's ledger card. Respondents did not have the written permission of all interested parties to place White-Hunt's deposit monies in such an interest-bearing account. On or about May 23, 1990, Respondents wrote a check transferring $6,500.00 from its Capital Bank escrow account to LDC. The $6,500.00 represented escrow funds being held by Respondents in connection with various transactions. It included the $1,500.00 in earnest money deposits that Respondents had received from White-Hunt. The transfer of this $1,500.00 to LDC was in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement signed by White-Hunt. White-Hunt sought, but failed to qualify for, a conventional mortgage loan. Thereafter she applied for an FHA mortgage loan. By notice dated October 10, 1991, she was advised that her application had been denied. On February 7, 1992, the law firm representing White-Hunt sent a letter to Respondents, the body of which read as follows: Please be advised that I have been retained by Stacey Hunt with regard to the above- referenced Contract in order to secure a return of her deposit. I have enclosed herein copies of the deposit checks made payable to ERA First Union Group in the total sum of $1,500.00 which were provided to you on April 17, 1990 and May 8, 1990. Since Ms. Hunt has failed to qualify for a mortgage, in accordance with Paragraph (b)(2) of the Contract, this letter shall serve as formal demand for a return of any and all deposits placed with your company and any and all interest accrued thereon. In the event I am not in receipt of a check payable to Ms. Hunt on or before February 14, 1992, I will presume that you have converted these funds and proceed to undertake . . . any and all efforts to have the funds returned including, without limitation, contacting the Florida Real Estate Commission. Preziosi, on behalf of FUGI, responded by letter to the law firm. The body of her letter read as follows: In response to your letter of even date enclosed please find a copy of a Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer which was signed on April 17, 1990 by Stacey Hunt. You will note that this agreement states that once a contract between buyer and seller is in effect, any deposit money given to First Union Group, Inc. will be transferred to the seller and treated as the initial investment deposit. Further, all future deposits are to be made payable to the seller. If an additional deposit was received by First Union Group, Inc., it too would be transferred to the seller. In this regard, be advised that on May 23, 1990, $1,500 that was being held by First Union Group, Inc. on behalf of Ms. Hunt was transferred to Lofts Development Corp. as per this agreement. Also enclosed is a copy of the check together with a copy of the escrow cards which represented all deposits transferred via this check. Respondents have not returned any deposit monies to White-Hunt; however, as Preziosi pointed out in her letter, well before White-Hunt had requested a refund from them, Respondents had transferred these monies to LDC in accordance with the Reservation Deposit/Contract Deposit Transfer Agreement White-Hunt had signed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Mangicapra guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, III, IV, V, and XV of the Amended Administrative Complaint to the extent indicated above, suspending Mangicapra's license for a period of 120 days and fining him $3,000.00 for having committed these violations, finding FUGI guilty of the violations alleged in Counts VI, VIII, IX, X, and XX of the Amended Administrative Complaint to the extent indicated above, suspending FUGI's registration for a period of 120 days and fining it $3,000.00 for having committed these violations, and dismissing the remaining allegations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of June, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1993.
The Issue An Administrative complaint dated April 13, 1999, alleges that Respondent Mr. Stevens violated several provisions of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, when he failed to return an earnest money deposit to a buyer after being directed to do so by the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The issues in this proceeding are whether Mr. Stevens committed the violation and if so what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Collie E. Stevens, has been licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker since 1986. Prior to that year he was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida. In 1996 Mr. Stevens represented the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in the sale of a home in Orange County, Florida. On October 1, 1996, Doris Wright executed an Offer to Purchase and Contract of Sale for the home. When she signed the contract Ms. Wright gave the broker, Mr. Stevens, a check for $675.00 as an earnest money deposit. Mr. Stevens deposited the check into his escrow account. Later, in October or November 1996, Ms. Wright withdrew her offer to purchase the property. The VA regional office provided a notice to Mr. Stevens dated November 20, 1996, directing him to return the earnest money deposit to Ms. Wright. Mr. Stevens never returned the money to Ms. Wright although she made several requests through his secretary and made several attempts to contact him directly. Mr. Stevens alleges that he is entitled to retain at least $250.00 of the $675.00 deposit because that was the mortgage company's fee for processing Ms. Wright's mortgage application. Mr. Stevens claims that Ms. Wright authorized him to pay that fee on her behalf when she was not in town; Ms. Wright does not dispute that claim. Mr. Stevens also argues that he should be entitled to the remainder of the deposit money because Ms. Wright cancelled a listing agreement for him to sell her house. Ms. Wright disputes this claim and Mr. Stevens did not produce any contract or document evidencing such an agreement. During the pendancy of his dispute with Ms. Wright over entitlement to the deposit Mr. Stevens never notified the Florida Real Estate Commission of the dispute nor did he submit the matter to arbitration, mediation, or any court. Mr. Stevens insists that he could have worked out his differences with Ms. Wright and that he was always willing to give her $425.00, left after deducting $250.00 for the processing fee from the $675.00 deposit. In 1996, in another case, Mr. Stevens was disciplined by the Florida Real Estate Commission for culpable negligence or breach of trust, failure to give notice of his representation of a party, failure to maintain trust funds in an escrow account, and failure to preserve and make available brokerage records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding that Collie E. Stevens is guilty of a violation of Sections 475.25(1)(d)1. and 475.25(1)(0), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend his license for two years and require him to complete a 7-hour escrow management course and a 60-hour post-licensure course, and that he pay the costs associated with this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 308N Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Collie E. Stevens Son Set Free Realty, Inc. 2294 North U.S. One Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(e), (k), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 61J2-14, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division), is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Lynda J. Lobsitz (Lobsitz), is and was at all material times to this proceeding licensed as a real estate broker in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, having been issued license number 0377747. Respondent, Jaclo, Inc. (Jaclo), is and was at all times material to this proceeding, a licensed real estate brokerage corporation, having been issued license number 0275422. During May 1997, the Division conducted an office inspection and escrow audit of Respondents' real estate office. On the day of the audit, Respondents maintained an escrow account for rental security deposits, which account had an adjusted trust liability of $85,300.89.1 The adjusted bank balance was $85,185.22, resulting in a shortage of $115.67. Respondents prepared bank reconciliation reports for January, February, March, and April 1997 for the rental security deposit account and for the rental escrow account. Attached to each of the reports was the monthly bank statement for the account and period covered in the bank reconciliation report. The bank statements identified the name of the bank, the name of the account, the account number, the account balances and dates. A list of outstanding checks, identifying the outstanding checks by date and number, was attached to each report. The dates used to reconcile the balances were not included in the bank reconciliation reports. For the January 1997 bank reconciliation report for the rental rents deposits account, there was a difference of $7,616.25. Respondents stated on the report that $7,630.00 was for a check which was returned for endorsement. The report further stated that $13.75 had not been located. For the February 1997 bank reconciliation report for the rental rents deposits account, there was a difference of $1,756.75. The report contained an explanation for the difference and the corrective action taken. For the March 1997 bank reconciliation report for the rental rents deposits account, there was a difference of $500 which was explained with the corrective action noted. For the bank reconciliation report for January 1997 for the rental security deposit and account, there was an overage of $531.33. The report stated that the amount had not been located. For the bank reconciliation for the rental security deposit and account for February, 1997, there was an overage of $2,234.33. The report explained that $1,700 was a bank error deposit; $3.00 was sales tax which was to be transferred to rents account; and the remaining $531.33 could not be located. For the bank reconciliation for the rental security deposit and account for March 1997, there was an overage of $31.33. The explanation and corrective action stated on the report was "Bank wire to incorrect account Mushlin will transfer from rents accounts. $531.33 have not located." For the bank reconciliation report dated April 1997 for the rental security account, there was an overage of $531.33 with the explanation of "Have not located difference."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, issuing a reprimand for the Respondents, requiring that Respondent Jaclo, Inc., pay an administrative fine of $100, and requiring that Respondent Lynda J. Lobsitz take a seven-hour broker management course. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1998.
The Issue Whether Respondent should increase its deposit pursuant to Section 624.411(3), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an insurance company domiciled in West Virginia which does business in several states, including Florida. Petitioner has been in existence for over 80 years and has conducted business in Florida for the past 30 or 40 years. Petitioner currently has approximately $540,000 on deposit in Florida, pursuant to Section 624.411(3), Florida Statutes. Florida has adopted the Uniform Insurer's Liquidation Act. Amounts held on deposit pursuant to Section 624.411, Florida Statutes, are held for the protection of all policyholders and creditors of the company who are located in a state which has adopted the Uniform Insurer's Liquidation Act. Petitioner has approximately $2,6000,000 on deposit in all states, of which approximately $1,300,000 is held for the protection of all policyholders. Amounts held on deposit in Florida can earn interest which is paid over to the Petitioner, and the deposits are held without cost to the Petitioner. Petitioner may at any time exchange the type of security or investment vehicle held on deposit as long as the market value of the replacement securities is equal to or exceeds the amount required to be on deposit. Amounts held on deposit, however, are not available to Petitioner for its operations and cannot be used to pay claims. Also, if the Petitioner wants to reduce the amount on deposit, it must receive approval from Respondent. For the calendar years ending 1983 through 1987, Petitioner's financial situation, as reflected in the financial reports filed with Respondent was as follows: YEAR CAPITAL & SURPLUS AND NET WORTH GAINS (LOSSES) FROM OPERATIONS 1983 $7.08 Million $1.51 Million 1984 7.43 2.30 1985 9.22 (0.63) 1986 8.13 (1.36) 1987 5.37 (3.22) Additionally, under the method of accounting used by the Respondent to evaluate the financial standing of insurance companies, Petitioner's Capital and Surplus and Net Worth would be lower than that reflected in the financial reports. Respondent's Review Procedures In determining the maximum amount of deposit which may be required under Section 624.411(3), Florida Statutes, Respondent uses a formula which allocates a portion of an insurance company's total obligations to Florida by multiplying the total obligations by a fraction the numerator of which is direct writings in Florida for the latest reporting period and the denominator of which is the total direct writings of the company for the same reporting period. Applying this formula to the financial data provided by Petitioner in its 1987 Annual statement or to the data in the March 31, 1988 Quarterly statement filed with the Respondent results in a determination that Respondent may require Petitioner to maintain the maximum deposit allowed by Section 624.411(3), Florida Statutes, if Respondent determines that good cause exists and that such an amount is warranted. In determining the amount of the deposit which should be required, Respondent looks at the following guidelines: (1) Solvency of the company, (2) Liquidity of the company, (3) Number of consumer complaints against the company, (4) Volume and concentration of Florida business conducted by the company, (5) history of regulatory compliance of the company, and (6) overall attitude of the company. Petitioner is solvent and liquid, under a strict interpretation of what these words mean, but both its solvency and liquidity have declined over the past year. Petitioner has taken steps which it believes will reverse the recent financial decline it has suffered. On the other hand, if Petitioner sustains the same loses it sustained last year, it may be insolvent by the end of this year.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order finding that Petitioner does not need to increase its deposit pursuant to Section 624.411(3), Florida Statutes, at this time. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding of Fact Number Ruling and RO Accepted. RO1 and 8. Accepted as part of the record in this proceeding, but not as a Finding of Fact. First two sentences accepted. RO3 and 4. Third sentence rejected as not a finding of fact. Accepted. RO2. 5.-6. Rejected as irrelevant. First two sentences accepted generally. RO14. Last sentence rejected as not a finding of fact. Accepted. See Conclusions of Law section of the RO. First sentence accepted generally. RO10-11, and Conclusions of Law section of RO. Rest of paragraph rejected as argument; but see Conclusions of Law Section of RO. Accepted generally. See Conclusions of Law section of RO. ,12.,13. Rejected as argument. Rejected as irrelevant and argument. Whether the company will increase its profits is as speculative as the department's assertion that the company will be insolvent. The fact that the company made a profit for the first quarter of 1988 is not supportive of the prior sentence. See financial data for the first quarter of 1987 and compare with data for all of 1987. ,16.,17. Rejected as irrelevant, argument, and not findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Ruling and RO of Fact Number Accepted generally. RO1. Rejected as not a finding of fact. Mr. Kummer, however, was accepted as an expert. Accepted. RO2. ,5.,6.,7. Accepted. RO4 and 6. 8.,9.,10.,11., Accepted. RO8. Accepted as set forth in RO9. The true net worth of the company cannot be conclusively established. Rejected as argument. Rejected as not a finding of fact. Accepted for proposition that net worth has declined. RO8. Cannot determine where 44 percent figure comes from. Accepted generally. RO14. Not a finding of fact. ,19. Accepted generally. RO10,11. Rejected as irrelevant. See ruling on Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 14. Rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Furlow, Esquire 800 Barnett Bank Building 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gabriel Mazzeo, Esquire Michael C. Goodwin, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32300-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32300-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Lee H. Davis, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued against him on August 16, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Division is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, regulating the practice of persons holding real estate brokers' and real estate salespersons' licenses in Florida. Section 20.165, and Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Lee H. Davis, is and was at all times relevant to this matter licensed as a real estate broker in Florida, issued License Number 0186063. The last license issued was as an involuntary inactive broker, c/o 815 New Waterford Drive, No. 204, Naples, Florida 34104. On or about August 24, 1995, Respondent executed a form 400.5 and submitted it to the Division to register as a salesperson with Sentry Realty and Property Management, Inc. ("Sentry"). At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent was registered with the Division as employed by Sentry. On or about September 7, 1995, Respondent facilitated a contract for sale and purchase (the "contract") between Robert Trindle as buyer and John Petracelli as seller/builder for property described as Hallandale Park, Plat Book 12, Page 37, Block 37, Lots 6,7,8, a/k/a approximately 2801 North East 214 Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. Mr. Trindle testified that he intended to purchase a townhouse to be built by Mr. Petracelli as part of a project to include 40 to 50 townhouses. The contract provided that a $3,900 deposit was to be held by "Lee H. Davis Escrow Agent." Mr. Trindle gave Respondent two checks totaling $3,900, as the earnest money deposit on the purchase price of $130,000. The first check, dated October 9, 1995, was for $1,000. The second check, dated November 3, 1995, was for $2,900. The checks were made out to "Lee H. Davis-- Escrow." Also noted on the checks was "Davena Group Inc.," which Mr. Trindle understood to be Respondent's real estate company. Each check was negotiated by Respondent within a week of its receipt. At the time of this transaction, Respondent's registered broker was John Brouillette of Sentry. Respondent did not place the escrow deposit with Mr. Brouillette, who testified that he knew nothing of the transaction at the time it occurred and never saw the contract. Respondent represented to Mr. Trindle that he would maintain the escrow deposit as broker during this transaction. Mr. Trindle did not give Respondent permission to transfer the escrow deposit to the builder/seller, Mr. Petracelli. Correspondence from Respondent indicated that he did turn the escrow deposit over to Mr. Petracelli, without informing Mr. Trindle. Mr. Petracelli never built the promised townhouses. Rather, he left the country, absconding with Mr. Trindle's escrow deposit along with monies provided by other purchasers and/or investors in the project. Mr. Trindle attempted to contact Respondent regarding the status of his escrow deposit, but was unable to reach him prior to the filing of his complaint with the Division. As of the date of the hearing, the earnest money deposit had not been returned to Mr. Trindle.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner finding that Respondent has violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1, 475.25(1)(e), 475.25(1)(k), and 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent, and that Respondent's real estate license be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sunia Y. Marsh, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308A Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Lee H. Davis 815 New Waterford Drive, No. 204 Naples, Florida 34104 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues posed for decision herein are whether or not the Respondent, Loretta Woloszyk, failed to account for or deliver a security deposit received by her, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and whether or not Respondent derivatively violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in that she is guilty of a breach of trust in a business transaction and, therefore, violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the following relevant facts are found. Loretta Woloszyk, Respondent herein, is presently registered with the Board of Real Estate as a broker/salesperson. On or about April 15, 1977, Respondent Woloszyk entered into a deposit receipt contract executed with John F. and Jeannine M. Chrest as purchasers of a house owned by Respondent Woloszyk located at 210 North G Street, Lake Worth, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of said deposit receipt contract, John E. Knowles signed as broker for receipt of a $300 cash deposit from the Chrests as purchasers. On or about April 22, 1977, the $300 deposit was placed in the escrow account of Sunshine Estates, Inc., the corporate broker by which the Respondent was employed. The deposit receipt contract was contingent upon the buyer qualifying for a Veterans Administration (VA) mortgage loan in the amount of $26,900. The relevant portion of the contract provided as follows: VA Appraisal: It is expressly agreed that, notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, the purchaser shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of earnest money or otherwise be obligated to complete the purchase of the property described herein, if the contract price or cost exceeds the reasonable value of the property established by the Veterans Administration. The purchaser shall, however, have the privilege and option of proceeding with the consummation of this contract without regard to the amount of the reasonable value established by the Veterans Administration. By letter dated May 25, 1977, the Chrests were notified that the subject property was appraised at $18,750, and thus was not acceptable under the minimum property appraisal standards of the Veterans Administration. With this notification, John Chrest went to the offices of Sunshine Estates, Inc., and demanded a return of his $300 earnest money deposit. John E. Knowles, as broker in receipt of the Chrests' $300 deposit, returned the $300 deposit check to Respondent Woloszyk, who deducted $200 from the Chrests' $300 deposit based on a separate rental transaction with the Chrests on the same subject property. During the hearing, John Chrest testified that he contacted Respondent for purchase of her residence situated in Lake Worth Farms. Mr. Chrest agreed during cross-examination that he initially contacted Respondent to "buy or rent Respondent's residence". He also testified that upon receipt of the VA appraisal at an amount below the agreed upon purchase price of $26,900, he agreed to pay to Respondent rent in the amount of $150 plus a $50 security deposit, which amount was deducted from the Chrests' security deposit. The FHA-VA deposit receipt contract contains a special condition entered by and between the parties (Woloszyk and the Chrests) indicating that "Buyer will pay rental of $225 per month until closing, beginning on or before May 1, 1977. Buyer will honor rental agreement for Kenneth Johnson, tenant, from April 1, 1977, to March 31, 1978, or $80 per month rent." Based thereon, and on John F. Chrest' s admission that be agreed to the rental fee which was deducted from his deposit received by Respondent Woloszyk, the administrative charges alleged are without basis. I shall so recommend.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMEND: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED in its entirety. RECOMMEND this 6th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1979 COPIES FURNISHED: John Namey, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ms. Loretta Woloszyk 733 Husiingbird Way, Apt. #3 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offense alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Carolee Harse, is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0493946. The last license issued was as a broker- salesperson with William S. Frank Associates, Inc., 120 U.S. Highway 1, Tequesta, Florida 33469. In August 1993 respondent showed a home to Mr. and Mrs. Jose Manzo that had been listed with the Multiple Listing Service by Jupiter By The Sea, a brokerage business in Jupiter, Florida. The house was owned by Mr. and Mrs. David Couch and Cynthia Nixon. Effective August 11, 1993, respondent obtained a contract between the Manzos, as buyers, and Couch/Nixon as sellers. Pursuant to the contract, the buyers' initial deposit of $200 was held in escrow by respondent's broker, William S. Frank Associates, Inc., and an additional escrow deposit of $3,000 was to be made by the buyer within five days of the effective date of the contract, to wit: by August 18, 1993. 1/ Following execution of the contract, the Manzos returned to their home in Mexico; however, they were scheduled to return on August 16, 1993, and arrangements were made for them to meet with respondent on August 17, 1993, to make the additional deposit. Unfortunately, Mrs. Manzo apparently required surgery while in Mexico, and Mr. Manzo did not return until the evening of August 17, 1993. Respondent spoke with Mr. Manzo by telephone the evening of August 17, 1993, and an appointment was made for him to meet with her broker, Mr. Frank, on August 18, 1993, to make the additional deposit. As respondent explained to Mr. Manzo, she would be out of town on August 18, and her broker would take care of the deposit. Indeed, respondent did have plans to be out of town on that date, and those plans had been made well prior to the subject contract. In this regard, the proof demonstrates that respondent and her husband had prior plans to attend a class reunion in Long Island, New York, and that they left Florida at 6:29 a.m., August 18, 1993, and did not return until late afternoon Sunday, August 22, 1993. Respondent advised the listing agent at Jupiter By The Sea that she would be out of town that week, and that Mr. Frank was scheduled to meet with Mr. Manzo on February 18 to receive the additional deposit. Upon her Sunday return, respondent telephoned Mr. Frank and learned that Mr. Manzo had not made the additional deposit. The next day, respondent spoke with the listing agent by telephone, and advised her that the additional deposit had not been made. 2/ Respondent also advised the agent that she would follow up with the Manzos and try to secure the additional deposit; however, such efforts to secure the additional deposit failed, and by August 25, 1993, it was evident that the Manzos would not proceed with the purchase. Although Respondent promptly advised the listing agent that the additional deposit had not been made, she did not personally undertake to notify the sellers. Rather, she assumed the listing agent would, in turn, notify that agent's client. Such assumption, given the circumstances, was reasonable. Standard of Practice 21-18 of the National Association of Realtors, received into evidence without objection, provides: All dealings concerning property exclusively listed, or with buyer/tenants who are exclusively represented shall be carried on with the client's agent, and not with the client, except with the consent of the client's agent. Petitioner offered no proof, either by rule or community standard, which would have placed a different obligation on respondent. Accordingly, there being no proof to the contrary, it is found that respondent's notification to the listing agent was appropriate, and she was under no obligation to also notify the sellers. Rather, that obligation rested with the listing agent. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which dismisses the amended administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of October 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October 1994.
