The Issue Whether Hunter Lewis, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Angel Lewis and Jerry Lewis, are the parents and natural guardians of Hunter Lewis, a minor. Hunter was born a live infant on June 2, 2000, at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, a hospital located in Tallahassee, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Hunter's birth was Arthur S. Clements, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes.1 Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. The cause and timing, as well as the significance of Hunter's neurologic impairment To address the cause and timing of Hunter's neurologic impairment, as well as its significance, Petitioners offered selected medical records relating to Hunter's birth and subsequent development (Petitioners' Exhibit 1); the Verified Medical Opinion of Richard J. Inwood, M.D., a neonatologist (Petitioners' Exhibit 2); and the deposition of Donald C. Willis, M.D., an obstetrician (Petitioners' Exhibit 3). In turn, Respondent offered the deposition of Paul R. Carney, M.D., a pediatric neurologist (Respondent's Exhibit 1). As for the significance of Hunter's impairments, it was Dr. Carney's opinion, based on the results of his neurologic evaluation of November 21, 2002, that Hunter's assessment "indicates substantial cognitive and language impairment," but "very mild long tract neurological findings." Dr. Carney described Hunter's developmental delay as static, as opposed to progressive, and he ventured no opinion as to the cause or timing of Hunter's impairments. As for Dr. Inwood, he was of the opinion that: . . . Hunter Lewis [ ] was delivered by induced labor prior to 38 weeks and had immature lungs. Because of the immaturity of the lungs he suffered hypoxic insult and, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, sustained significant neurological injury. This injury would not have occurred had his delivery been delayed until he had demonstrated lung maturity. His problems are not congenital and did not occur during labor or delivery, but rather after delivery . . . . Notably, Dr. Inwood did not further address Hunter's neurologic injury or, stated otherwise, did not speak to whether in his opinion, Hunter suffered both cognitive and motor impairment and, if so, the significance of each. As for Dr. Willis, he was of the opinion that the medical records revealed no evidence of oxygen deprivation or other trauma associated with labor, delivery, or resuscitation immediately following Hunter's birth. Significantly, the medical records are consistent with the opinions of Doctors Inwood and Willis that the cause and timing of Hunter's impairment was not associated with labor, delivery, or resuscitation, and with the opinion of Dr. Carney that, while Hunter may demonstrate substantial cognitive delay, his motor impairment is mild. Given the record, it must be concluded that the proof demonstrated, more likely than not, that Hunter's impairments were not occasioned by an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in the hospital, and that he is not permanently and substantially physically impaired.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation filed December 2, 1993, petitioners and respondent stipulated as follows: That pursuant to Chapter 766.301- 766.316, Florida Statutes, a claim was filed on behalf of the above-styled infant against the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (the "Association") on behalf of Jasmin Soto, Violeta Rodriguez and Luis Soto (the "Petitioners") for benefits under Chapter 766.301-766.316 (F.S.) 1988. That a timely filed claim for benefits complying with the requirements of F.S. 766.305 was filed by the Petitioners and a timely denial was filed on behalf of the Association. That the infant, Jasmin Soto, was born at Baptist Hospital on September 29, 1990, and that the said hospital was a licensed Florida Hospital and the attending physician was a participating physician within the meaning of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. That the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this claim. That Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, states that "birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2500 grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post- delivery in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially, mentally and physically impaired. The parties agree that Jasmin Soto suffers from a right brachial plexus injury. That the parties stipulate to the authenticity of the medical records and/or medical reports of Michael Duchowny, M.D., who appears on behalf of the Respondents and Leon I. Charash, M.D., who appears on behalf of the Petitioner. While Dr. Charash has not been deposed, Dr. Duchowny has been deposed and his deposition is submitted as part of this Stipulation. The parties stipulate that there are no other pertinent medical facts to be considered by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties further Stipulate that if the parties were to proceed to a hearing on the merits no further proof would be offered and traditional burdens of proof would apply. Based upon this stipulation, the parties request the hearing officer to rule on Petitioner's claim based upon this Stipulation, the attached medical records and the deposition of Dr. Duchowny. The neurological examinations of Jasmin reveal that she suffered from a "mild" to "moderate" right Erb's palsy related directly to the right brachial plexus injury she received at birth. A brachial plexus injury, the cause of Erb's palsy, is not, however, a brain or spinal cord injury. Moreover, Jasmin's mental functioning is normal and not impaired due to any birth- related complications.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation filed November 12, 1993, petitioners and respondent stipulated as follows: COMES NOW, CHARLES PATRICK, ESQUIRE, Attorney for CLYDE RAY, JR., a minor, and LISA TAYLOR and CLYDE RAY SR., individually and as parents and natural guardians of CLYDE RAY, JR., and COMES NOW, MARK J. ZIENTZ, ESQUIRE, Attorney for FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, who hereby stipulate and agree as follows: That pursuant to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, a claim was filed on behalf of the above-styled infant against the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (the Association) on behalf of Clyde Ray, Jr., and Clyde Ray, Sr., and Lisa Taylor (the Petitioners) for benefits under Chapter 766, F.S. That a timely filed claim for benefits complying with the requirements of F.S. 766.305 was filed by Petitioners and a timely denial was filed on behalf of the Association. That the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this claim. That Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, requires an infant to suffer both a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment to fall within the definition of a "Birth-related neurological injury" making said infant eligible for coverage by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. The parties agree that the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., does not exhibit substantial physical impairment so as to fit within the strict definition of claims covered by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association under Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. That the infant, Clyde Ray, Jr., was born at Jackson Memorial Hospital on June 17, 1990, and that said hospital was a licensed Florida Hospital and the attending physicians were participating physicians within the meaning of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. WHEREFORE, based upon the above stipulated set of facts, it is respectfully requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings approve the stipulations as being consistent with the evidence in this cause and enter an order denying the claim against the Association on the basis that Clyde Ray, Jr., did not suffer a birth-related neurological injury as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes.
The Issue At issue is whether David Britt, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied.
Findings Of Fact Fundamental findings Petitioners, Sandra Britt nee Sandra Nap and Frank Britt, are the parents and natural guardians of David Britt, a minor. David was born a live infant on November 9, 1997, at Tampa General Hospital, a hospital located in Tampa, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physicians providing obstetrical services during David's birth included the attending physician, Catherine Lynch, M.D., an attending faculty physician with the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, as well as a number of resident physicians from the University of South Florida, College of Medicine. At the time, Dr. Lynch was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, and the resident physicians, supervised by Dr. Lynch, were deemed participating physicians under the provisions of Section 766.314(4)(a), Florida Statutes.2 Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." Sections 766.302(2) and 766.309(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Here, NICA has concluded that David suffered a "birth- related neurological injury" and, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, proposes to accept the claim as compensable under the Plan. NICA's conclusion is grossly consistent with the proof and, consequently, its proposal to accept the claim as compensable is approved. Notice of Plan participation While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners have responded to the healthcare providers' claim of Plan immunity by contending that the hospital and the attending physician3 failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether, as alleged by the healthcare providers, appropriate notice was given. O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, supra. As a prelude to resolving the notice issue, it is noted that Mrs. Britt received her prenatal and intrapartum care at the Genesis Clinic (an obstetric and gynecologic health care facility) and Tampa General Hospital (TGH), facilities owned and operated by the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority. Pertinent to this case, the proof demonstrates that TGH manages the clinic, and provides the necessary nursing and clerical workers; however, prenatal care and intrapartum care are provided, pursuant to an "affiliation agreement," by physicians (faculty and resident) associated with the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, who are employed by the Florida Board of Regents. Regarding her prenatal care, the proof demonstrates that Mrs. Britt's initial visit to the Genesis Clinic occurred on March 26, 1997.4 Typically, such a visit would include registration, financial consultation, a tour and orientation, and prenatal lab work. Here, as would be expected, Mrs. Britt initially presented to the front desk where she registered (signed in) and provided certain basic information about herself to complete a patient profile. Following completion of the patient profile, Mrs. Britt presented to the financial counselor, whose office was adjacent to the front desk and faced the patient waiting area. During the course of that meeting, the proof demonstrates that the financial counselor (Norma Kringel, currently known as Norma Kringel Tooley) reviewed Mrs. Britt's patient profile and, apparently satisfied that Mrs. Britt was Medicaid eligible, provided her with a packet (a plastic bag) containing various samples and child care information, as well as a Genesis Social Assessment form to complete. Following completion of that form, the financial consultant provided Mrs. Britt with a brochure prepared by NICA titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem," which contained a concise explanation of the patient's rights and limitations under the Plan. Notably, the brochure included the following language: You are eligible for this protection if your doctor is a participating physician in the Association. Membership means that your doctor has purchased this benefit for you in the event that your child should suffer a birth-related neurological injury, which qualifies under the law. Notwithstanding, while the consultant encouraged Mrs. Britt to read the brochure, she did not identify the physicians who would be providing Mrs. Britt's obstetrical care or advise her (as she easily could have) that the physicians who would be providing such care were participants in the Plan.5 The next step in the process presents the most problematic issues with regard to notice. According to the proof, at the conclusion of her meeting with the financial consultant, a new patient, such as Mrs. Britt, was directed to the patient waiting area, where she was to await the health education coordinator (Patricia Ogden, R.N.) for an orientation tour of the facility and classroom presentation. According to Nurse Ogden, it was her established procedure to collect the new patients in the waiting area, and then proceed with a tour of the facility, explaining the various services that were available, followed by a classroom session. During the course of the tour, it was Nurse Ogden's practice to explain to the patients that TGH provides prenatal care at the clinic in "affiliation" with the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, and that the physicians who would be providing obstetrical care were residents (M.D.s) now specializing in obstetrics and gynecology and that their services were under the direct supervision of an attending faculty physician. During the classroom session, it was Nurse Ogden's practice to, inter alia, hold up the "Peace of Mind" brochure to ensure that each new patient had one, explain that the affiliated group of physicians from the University of South Florida who would be providing their obstetric care were participants in the Plan, and advise the patients that if they had any questions regarding the Plan they should consult with their physicians. Following the classroom session, the new patients would then proceed to the final stage of their initial visit, prenatal lab work. From the routine practice established by the clinic for an initial visit by new patients, Intervenors suggest it is reasonable to infer that Mrs. Britt participated in the tour and classroom session, and was therefore informed as to the identity of her physicians (as a group) and that they were participants in the Plan. As additional proof that Mrs. Britt participated in the tour and classroom session, Intervenors point to the Progress Notes of Mrs. Britt's initial visit of March 26, 1997, which contains a check mark next to an item titled "Orientation tour and class session attended by patient," signed by Nurse Ogden. Notably, however, Nurse Ogden took no roll call or otherwise identified the patients who accompanied her on the tour or participated in the classroom session, and executed the Progress Notes confirming a patient's attendance on the tour and at the classroom session based solely on a list of new patients who had registered (signed in) at the reception desk that day. Consequently, the Progress Notes provide no independent or compelling proof, distinguishable from that which might be inferred from the clinic's routine practice, that Mrs. Britt attended the orientation tour and class session on March 26, 1997. Contrasted with the conclusion Intervenors would suggest be drawn from the Clinic's routine procedure for new patients, Mrs. Britt testified that she did not participate in an orientation tour and class session, and was never informed that the physicians who would provide her obstetrical care were participants in the Plan.6 As independent evidence that she did not follow the routine established for new patients, Petitioners point to the clinic's records, which reveal that she did not, as would be routine, present for prenatal lab work on March 26, 1997, but returned to the clinic on March 27, 1997, for that lab work. Given the proof, it cannot be resolved with any degree of confidence that, more likely than not, Mrs. Britt attended the orientation tour and classroom session. Consequently, since the tour and classroom session was the only occasion (apparent from the record) that patients were advised that their physicians were participants in the Plan, it must be resolved that the proof fails to support the conclusion that Mrs. Britt was ever provided notice that her physicians were participants in the Plan. While the proof failed to demonstrate that Mrs. Britt received notice on behalf of the participating physicians, it did demonstrate that TGH provided timely pre-delivery notice to Mrs. Britt, as envisioned by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes. In this regard, the proof demonstrated that on October 19, 1997, during the course of pre-registration at TGH, Mrs. Britt was again given a copy of the brochure (prepared by NICA) titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem," which, as previously noted, contained a concise explanation of the patients' rights and limitations under the Plan.
