The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating and reestablishment of his small business pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2009),1/ as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.007, which, in turn, incorporates by reference the provisions of 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 24, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs (effective October 1, 2006),2/ and the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual 9.3.15, and, if Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, the amount owed to him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the undersigned found the following facts: The Department is the state agency that has responsibility for paying certain relocation and reestablishment expenses of businesses that have been displaced because of a public transportation project. See § 421.55, Fla. Stat. Sometime in 1999 to 2000, Mr. Carey purchased eight rental units in Hillsborough County, Florida, as an investment property. Mr. Carey managed the rental property and testified that he would advertise vacancies through "word of mouth." The record shows that these rental units were rented weekly and included written and verbal leases. In 2005, the Department informed Mr. Carey that his rental property would be subject of an eminent domain taking and informed Mr. Carey about the law authorizing the Department to pay certain expenses in relocating and reestablishing a small business. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Carey filled out a Business Survey Questionnaire for the Department, stating his desire to relocate his rental business. The Department acquired Mr. Carey's property on April 18, 2009. By mid July 2009, Mr. Carey contacted Mr. Nappi to determine whether or not he was still eligible to receive relocation and reestablishment reimbursement for his small business. Mr. Nappi determined that Mr. Carey remained eligible to apply for reimbursement and informed him of that fact. On August 28, 2009, Mr. Carey purchased a replacement property located at 19002 Apian Way, Lutz, Florida, for $300,000.00. The replacement property contained a house that had been the homestead property of the prior owner. Mr. Carey credibly testified that the purpose of purchasing this replacement property was "to get back into the rental business" and that he advertised the replacement property for rent by "word of mouth." Receipts introduced into evidence show that Mr. Carey began making repairs and purchasing materials as early as the first week in September. Mr. Carey testified, on cross-examination, that he could not remember the exact date when he listed the replacement property for sale, or the exact date when he entered into a contract for the sale of the replacement property. Mr. Carey testified that he would speculate that the contract for sale of the replacement property occurred in early October 2009. On October 15, 2009, Mr. Nappi went to the replacement property with Mr. Carey to review the work that Mr. Carey had already begun on the replacement property and to discuss the expenses eligible for reimbursement. In reviewing Mr. Carey's claimed expenses, Mr. Nappi found that the following expenses would be eligible for reimbursement: (1) the drywall work detailed in Exhibit A; (2) $561.00 worth of the receipts of materials purchased from Home Depot; and (3) the painting expenses detailed in Exhibit C. Mr. Nappi also testified that in reviewing the claimed expenses that Mr. Carey would be eligible for reimbursement of a portion of the replacement property's ad valorem taxes. According to Mr. Nappi, Mr. Carey would have been eligible to receive the difference of the amount of the property taxes between the acquired property and the replacement property in the amount of $849.56. The only expenses that Mr. Nappi identified as not being reasonable were for hauling away yard waste contained in Exhibit D. According to Mr. Nappi, the Department questioned the amount of the charges and determined that an appropriate amount would be $1,200.00 as opposed to the $2,450.00 sought by Mr. Carey. Consequently, the majority of the expenses claimed by Mr. Carey were eligible items for reimbursement. On November 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Carey a letter denying his eligibility to receive reimbursement for expenses in relocating and reestablishing his small rental business. The Department denied Mr. Carey's eligibility because the updated TRIM notice for the property tax, that Mr. Carey provided the Department, showed the replacement property was homestead property. Because the replacement property was homestead, the Department reasoned that Mr. Carey had not reestablished a small business. Mr. Carey informed Mr. Nappi that the replacement property was not homestead property and that the TRIM notice was wrong. In response, on November 9, 2009, Mr. Nappi wrote the Hillsborough County Tax Collector to determine whether or not Mr. Carey's replacement property was homestead property. On November 23, 2009, while the Department waited for a response from the Hillsborough County Tax Collector, Mr. Carey closed on the sale of the replacement property for $332,500.00. Mr. Carey did not inform the Department that the replacement property had been sold. In February 2010, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector informed the Department that the replacement property was not homestead. Also, the Department learned for the first time that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property. After learning that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property, Mr. Nappi contacted his supervisor Elbert Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Nappi informed Mr. Johnson that "it did not appear that the reestablishment status of the landlord had been in fact established[,]" and the claim would be denied. Mr. Nappi testified the Department attempted to determine whether or not Mr. Carey had reestablished his rental business by examining Mr. Carey's efforts to rent the replacement property. Mr. Nappi directed a right-of-way specialist for the Department to contact realtors, who were associated with the property, to determine if Mr. Carey had listed the property for rent; to contact the local newspaper to learn if the property had been advertised for rent; and to conduct an internet search of the property. According to Mr. Nappi, the realtor indicated that she was not aware of whether or not Mr. Carey listed the property for rent and learned nothing from the newspaper or internet search. Mr. Nappi admitted that the Department did not contact Mr. Carey to ask him about his efforts to rent the property. The Department did not contact Mr. Carey or ask him to provide any information about his efforts to rent the property. Consequently, the Department did not have before it any information concerning Mr. Carey's efforts as to "word of mouth" advertising of the property. Mr. Knight, the state administrator of Relocation Assistance, testified that asking Mr. Carey about his efforts to rent the property would have been helpful information to have in considering the reimbursement. However, Mr. Knight acknowledged that Mr. Carey's selling of the home prior to determination of whether or not he was entitled to reimbursement made the issue moot. In the Department's estimation, Mr. Carey had simply "flipped a house" and had not reestablished his business. On March 25, 2010, the Department informed Mr. Carey that it was denying his application for reimbursement because he was not eligible because he had not reestablished his small rental business at the replacement property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Mr. Carey's application for reimbursement of reestablishment expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondents have violated Florida's Fair Housing Act by refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner because of her mental disability and familial status. If so, whether Petitioner should be granted the relief she has requested.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a single parent. She has three sons, aged 10, 12, and 14. At all times material to the instant case, her sons have lived with her in the same household. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from phobias and from anxiety and panic attacks. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has received social security disability benefits from the federal government based upon her mental disability. Summer Lakes is a rental apartment community in Oakland Park, Florida. Petitioner lived in an apartment at Summer Lakes with her three sons from June of 1994 to January of 1995. During the period of her tenancy, Petitioner experienced financial problems. As a result, she had difficulty making her rent payments. In January of 1995, she was evicted from her Summer Lakes apartment for nonpayment of rent. Following her eviction, she and her sons lived with her mother in her mother's house (where Petitioner and her sons still live). Petitioner's financial situation improved following her eviction. By August 12, 1996, she had been able to save a substantial sum of money. On or about that date (August 12, 1996), Petitioner returned to Summer Lakes to inquire about again renting an apartment in the community. Flags outside the rental office indicated that apartments were available for rent. Upon entering the rental office, Petitioner was greeted by Vicki Atkinson (now Keating), Summer Lakes' manager. Summer Lakes had had another manager when Petitioner had lived there previously. Petitioner filled out an application to lease an apartment in the community and handed it to Ms. Atkinson. She also presented to Ms. Atkinson various documents in an effort to show that she would be financially able to make the required rent payments. Among these documents were bank statements which reflected that Petitioner had approximately $25,000 in the bank. Petitioner, in addition, showed Ms. Atkinson paperwork Petitioner had received from the federal government regarding her social security disability benefits. The paperwork indicated that Petitioner had been awarded these benefits (monthly payments of $910.00) based upon the finding that she had a mental disability. Immediately after reviewing the paperwork, Ms. Atkinson told Petitioner, "We don't want your kind here." Petitioner pleaded with Ms. Atkinson to let her rent an apartment in the Summer Lakes community. She even offered to have someone co-sign her lease. Ms. Atkinson was unmoved. Claiming that Petitioner's income was insufficient, she refused to rent an apartment to Petitioner. Her refusal was actually based upon her desire not to rent to a person with a mental disability. In refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner, Ms. Atkinson was acting on behalf of the owner of Summer Lakes, Pittco Summer Lakes Associates, Ltd. (Pittco). Pittco no longer owns Summer Lakes and Ms. Atkinson no longer is its manager. Pittco sold Summer Lakes to SummerLake Oakland Park, Ltd., on or some time before July 1, 1998.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that, although Ms. Atkinson and Pittco committed a "discriminatory housing practice" by refusing to rent an apartment to Petitioner because of Petitioner's mental disability and familial status, the Commission is without authority to grant the relief Petitioner has requested. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her national origin or ethnicity in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Fabiola Heiblum ("Heiblum") is a Hispanic woman who, at all times relevant to this action, has owned Unit No. 5C in the Carlton Bay Condominium, which is located in North Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased her unit in 2004 and has resided there continuously since some time in 2005. Respondent Carlton Bay Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") is the entity responsible for operating and managing the condominium property in which Heiblum's unit is located. In March 2008, the Association's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a special assessment, to be levied against all unit owners, the proceeds of which would be used to pay insurance premiums. Each owner was required to pay his share of the special assessment in full on April 1, 2008, or, alternatively, in three equal monthly installments, due on the first of April, May, and June 2008, respectively. Heiblum's share of this special assessment was $912.81. At or around the same time, the Board also enacted a procedure for collecting assessments, including the special insurance assessment. According to this procedure, owners would have a grace period of 15 days within which to make a required payment. After that period, a delinquent owner would be notified, in writing, that the failure to pay his balance due within 15 days after the date of the notice would result in referral of the matter to an attorney for collection. The attorney, in that event, would file a Claim of Lien and send a demand letter threatening to initiate a foreclosure proceeding if the outstanding balance (together with costs and attorney's fees) was not paid within 30 days after receipt of the demand. This collection procedure applied to all unit owners. Heiblum did not make any payment toward the special assessment on April 1, 2008. She made no payment on May 1, 2008, either. (Heiblum concedes her obligation to pay the special assessment and does not contend that the Association failed to give proper notice regarding her default.) The Association accordingly asked its attorney to file a Claim of Lien against Unit No. 5C and take the legal steps necessary to collect the unpaid debt. By letter dated May 8, 2008, the Association's attorney notified Heiblum that a Claim of Lien against her property had been recorded in the public records; further, demand was made that she pay $1402.81 (the original debt of $912.81 plus costs and attorney's fees) to avoid foreclosure. On or around May 10, 2008, Heiblum gave the Association a check in the amount of $500, which the Association returned, under cover of a letter dated May 16, 2008, because its attorney was now in charge of collecting the overdue debt. Heiblum eventually paid the special assessment in full, together with costs and attorney's fees, thereby obviating the need for a foreclosure suit. Heiblum believes that the Association prosecuted its claims for unpaid special assessments more aggressively against Hispanics such as herself than persons of other national origins or ethnicities, for which owners the Association allegedly showed greater forbearance. Specifically, she believes that the Association did not retain its attorney to undertake collection efforts against non-Hispanic unit owners, sparing them the costs and fees that she was compelled to pay. There is, however, no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited discriminatory act vis-à-vis Heiblum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Heiblum no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner committed the violations alleged in the citations he received on February 6, 1997. If so, what amount, if any, should he be fined.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner owned and operated two apartment buildings located (adjacent to each other) at 732 and 740 Joe Louis Avenue in Pahokee, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the 732 Apartments and the 740 Apartments, respectively). Each building contained ten apartments used to house migrant farmworkers and members of their families, including their children. Among Petitioner's tenants was Speedy Martin. Petitioner paid Martin to help him maintain the buildings and grounds. Michael Menor is a Sanitation and Safety Specialist with the Department. He is assigned to the Department's Belle Glade office. In his capacity as a Sanitation and Safety Specialist, he inspects migrant farmworker housing to ascertain whether there is compliance with applicable statutory and rule requirements. Menor conducted inspections of the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 14, 1997. The inspections revealed the existence of violations at both locations. Following his inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 1997. Before leaving, he handed these inspection reports to one of Petitioner's tenants, Marlo Camble. Approximately a week later, Camble provided the reports to Speedy Martin, who, in turn, notified Petitioner of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. # 5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. 4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Exposed wires [hanging from two] public lighting . . . fixtures [on] west side of b[ui]lding. Exposed wires in meter room. Empty out storage area and repair door under stairs. Repair wall on side of storage area. Repair public lighting on 2nd floor. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Note: Smoke detectors missing [from] Apt. #8. Fire extinguisher missing [from] Apt. #2. All fire extinguishers require reinspection and retag. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 14, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 and #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of building. Repair heater [in] Apt. #4. Repair broken windows [in] Apt. #4. (2 windows broken). Remove or repair screen door [on] Apt. #3. Repair public lighting. Repair screen [in] Apt. #1. Exposed electrical wires [in] front of Apt. #1. Repair door frame and screen in meter room. Clean room. Provide cover for electrical wires in meter room. Repair overhang [on] corner of b[ui]ld[ing's] west side. Remove wooden poles [on] south side of building. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of building. Repair public lighting [on] 2nd floor. Replace missing screen [in] Apt. #7. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Exposed wire [on] west side of Apt. #6. Repair storage door under stairs and clean storage room. Note: All fire extinguishers require retag and reinspection. Replace fire extinguisher and smoke detector [in] Apt. #2. Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments on January 31, 1997, to conduct follow-up inspections.1 The follow- up inspections revealed that, although Petitioner had remedied some of the problems that Menor had discovered during his January 14, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections), most of the violations found during these earlier inspections had not been corrected. Following his January 31, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 4, 1997. Menor, on February 3, 1997, "faxed" Petitioner copies of the inspection reports. He also spoke with Petitioner and advised him of the contents of the reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair cracks in building, south side. Replace 11 bathroom screens missing from building. Broken window [in] Apt. #5 and two broken windows [in] Apt. #4. Repair or replace covers for water meters. Clean out garbage, litter and debris [from] east side of building. Replace missing screens [in] Apt[s]. #1 [and] 2. Provide or repair heat [in] Apt. #2. Repair door to storage area under stairs. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #9. Repair or replace stove [in] Apt. #2. Provide effective extermination of rodents. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the January 31, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace missing screens in Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Repair leak on overhang, [in] front of Apt[s]. #4 [and] #5. Clean out garbage, litter and debris from east side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair 2 heaters [in] Apt. #4. Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side. Repair broken window [in] Apt. #3 [on] south side of building. Repair wall [on] south side of building. Provide covers for water meters. Replace 2 missing bathroom screens [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair public lighting [on] south side of b[ui]ld[ing]. Repair broken window (2)[in] Apt. #6. Repair storage door und[er] stairs. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 4, 1997. The inspections revealed that none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his January 31, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied, with the exception of the violation resulting from the broken heater in Apartment number 2 in the 732 Apartments, which had been repaired since the January 31, 1997, inspections. (One of the heaters in Apartment number 9 in the 732 Apartments, however, was now in disrepair.) Although Petitioner had taken steps to address some of these continuing violations, his efforts, as Menor's February 4, 1997, inspections revealed, were inadequate to correct the targeted problems. Petitioner had ordered meter covers from the City of Pahokee, but he had not yet received them nor had he placed any temporary coverings over the uncovered meters. He had attempted to repair the cracks in the building on the south side of the 732 Apartments; the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 732 Apartments; the overhang in front of Apartment numbers 4 and 5 in the 740 Apartments; the overhang on the west side of the 740 Apartments; the wall on the south side of the 740 Apartments; and the door to the storage area under the stairs in the 740 Apartments; but the repairs he had made had not been done properly. He had put rat poison under the buildings and given tenants rat traps in an effort to alleviate the rodent infestation problem at the 732 and 740 Apartments; however, he had not gone to the expense of hiring a professional exterminator to deal with the problem, even though it should have been apparent to him that the services of an exterminator were needed to effectively eliminate the rat population at the two locations. Following the February 4, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the 732 and 740 Apartments at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 6, 1997. Menor spoke with Petitioner and advised Petitioner of the contents of the inspection reports and what Petitioner needed to do to remedy the violations noted in the reports. Menor returned to inspect the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 6, 1997. Upon his arrival, Menor met Petitioner, who had also just arrived on the scene. In Petitioner's car were screens and light bulbs that Petitioner intended to install in the apartments and public areas that needed them. Notwithstanding Petitioner's intentions, none of the violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had yet been remedied. Inasmuch as the deadline that Menor had given Petitioner to correct these violations had passed, Menor issued Petitioner two citations, one for the continuing violations at the 732 Apartments and the other for the continuing violations at the 740 Apartments. Each citation directed Petitioner "to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00," but provided that Petitioner could "have the amount of the fine . . . reduced or waived completely by demonstrating good faith in correcting the violations or by presenting 'before and after' evidence to the Palm Beach County Public Health Unit within 48 hours of the time of the issuance of th[e] citation." Menor told Petitioner that he would be back to the apartments on Monday, February 10, 1997, to see if the violations had been corrected and if a reduction or waiver of the fines was warranted. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and advised him that he needed an extra day to bring the 732 and 740 Apartments into compliance. Menor responded by telling Petitioner that he would postpone his inspections of the apartments until the following day. The following day, February 11, 1997, Menor paid a return visit to the 732 and 740 Apartments to conduct post- citation inspections. Some of the continuing violations that Menor had discovered during his February 4, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had still not yet been remedied. These unremedied violations created conditions that posed a serious threat to the health and safety of the tenants. Following his February 11, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections and which gave notice that these violations needed to be corrected by 8:00 a.m. on February 17, 1997. Menor provided Petitioner, who was present during the inspections, copies of the inspection reports. The inspection report describing the condition of the 732 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Replace covers for water meters. . . . Repair door to storage area. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Repair cracks in building, south side. Screens missing from bathroom window[s]. The inspection report describing the condition of the 740 Apartments and grounds at the time of the February 11, 1997, inspection contained the following "comments and instructions": Repair overhang [on] corner of building['s] west side./Repair storage door. Provide covers for water meters. Repair 2 broken windows [in] Apt. #6. Provide effective extermination of rodents. Menor next inspected the 732 and 740 Apartments on February 17, 1997. The inspections revealed that at neither location had Petitioner yet "provide[d] covers for water meters" or "provide[d] effective extermination of rodents," although he had corrected the other violations Menor had discovered during his February 11, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections). Following his February 17, 1997, inspections, Menor prepared inspection reports which accurately described the violations that existed at the two locations at the time of the inspections. Copies of these inspection reports were "faxed" to Petitioner on February 18, 1997. On February 24, 1997, Menor received a complaint from a tenant living in Apartment number 4 in the 740 Apartments that there were "rats in [her] refrigerator." Later that day, Menor went to the 740 Apartments to investigate the complaint. His investigation revealed evidence that rats had entered the complainant's refrigerator through a hole. Menor spoke with Petitioner following his investigation and emphasized the importance of Petitioner providing his tenants with effective "pest control." Two days later, on February 26, 1997, Petitioner telephoned Menor and told Menor that he (Petitioner) had made arrangements for a "pest control" company, Glades Pest Control, to provide extermination services at the 732 and 740 Apartments, but that it would not be until March 4, 1997, that such services would be rendered. On April 18, 1997, Menor returned to the 732 and 740 Apartments to ascertain whether the continuing violations that he had discovered during his February 17, 1997, inspections (and had noted in his reports of those inspections) had been remedied. The inspections revealed that these violations had been corrected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the February 6, 1997, citations and fining him a total of $1,000.00 ($500.00 per citation) for these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1997.
The Issue Whether the comparable replacement dwellings used by the Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA) in the computation of the replacement housing payment offered to Petitioner were sufficient under the requirements of Title 49 C.F.R., Part 24, as adopted under the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual (Right of Way Manual), and whether Petitioner's property had water access which could be considered a compensable major exterior attribute of Petitioner's residential dwelling.
Findings Of Fact The JTA is a state-chartered authority which is responsible for providing mass transit and building roads and bridges in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner is a commercial fisherman who owned two parcels of land in the eastern part of Jacksonville. He fished the local waters utilizing a boat which he owned. The two parcels of land owned by Petitioner were taken by the JTA under threat of condemnation. The JTA required this land so that it could be used in connection with a road construction project known as the Wonderwood Connector. The two parcels of land were situated adjacent to and on the south side of an unimproved public right-of-way known as Wonderwood Drive. The two parcels of land were internally identified by the JTA as Parcels 400 and 404. Only Parcel 404 is the subject of this case. Parcel 404 had an appraised value of $32,300.00 which the JTA offered to Petitioner for the fee simple title, and which Petitioner accepted. In addition to the value of the fee simple property, Petitioner was also eligible under the applicable statutes and guidelines to an RHP. Petitioner was eligible for a RHP because the cost of comparable replacement housing was in excess of the fair market value of $32,300.00 for Parcel 404. Respondent offered Petitioner an RHP of $35,600.00, which was based on an analysis of three comparable replacement dwellings in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title 49, C.F.R, Part 24, as adopted by the Right of Way Manual. The JTA uses the Right of Way Manual in its acquisition programs for road, bridge, and highway construction. The comparable replacement dwellings used for computing the RHP were single family houses located 6.5 miles, 7.4 miles, and 6.4 miles from Parcel 404. They were functionally equivalent to Petitioner's displacement dwelling. Additionally, the comparable replacement dwellings used performed the same function, and provide a comparable or better style of living, as the displacement dwelling. The comparable replacement dwellings were reasonably accessible to Petitioner's place of employment. In other words, they were reasonably located near saltwater. Parcel 404 was not adjacent to any body of water. The title to Parcel 404 did reserve to the owner the right to use a platted easement for pedestrian access to Greenfield Creek, which was a saltwater creek. This easement was located south of Wonderwood Drive. This easement was not, by its terms, available for commercial uses and in fact was not used by Petitioner. North of Parcel 404, and slightly to the east, across Wonderwood Drive, Petitioner, prior to his difficulties with the JTA, maintained a floating dock on Greenfield Creek at which he moored his commercial fishing boat. Access to the dock was located on a right-of-way owned by the City of Jacksonville. It was convenient for Petitioner to walk across the road, embark on his boat, and go about his business as a fisherman. Petitioner believed that he had a right to ingress the area of the floating dock and believed he should have been compensated for the loss of this convenience as part of his RHP. The comparable properties used to determine the RHP were not so convenient to saltwater and, had Petitioner lived on any of the properties, he would have found it necessary to pull his boat on a trailer to a public launching ramp in order to conduct his fishing business. Because Petitioner had no right, title, or legal interest in the floating dock or the ground beneath it, the use of the area could not be considered to be a major exterior attribute of Parcel 404. There was no legal connection between Parcel 404 and the city's right-of-way on the saltwater creek, which Petitioner had used for his fishing business.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued denying Petitioner's claim for additional compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Thomas Route 1, Box 223T Nahunta, Georgia 31553 David Cohen, Esquire John C. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire Edwards & Cohen, P.A. 200 North Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jan Partin (Partin), during all times relevant to this proceeding, was the administrative assistant to the executive director of the Winter Haven Housing Authority, in Winter Haven, Florida. In that capacity she exercised responsible administrative, supervisory and technical management functions in assisting the executive director. In the absence of the executive director, she was totally responsible for the operation of the housing authority. Oswald and Leah Carrerou, husband and wife, owned rental property in Winter Haven, and in 1989 and 1990 were landlords in the housing authority's Section 8 program, a program funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide rental assistance to eligible tenants. The Carrerous were the second landlords brought into the authority's program, and in late 1989, early 1990, had more tenants than other landlords in the program. As Section 8 landlords, the Carrerous received monthly checks from the housing authority. In January and February 1990, those checks were $3,512.00 and $3,810.00, respectively, representing approximately sixty percent of the Carrerou's total rental income at that time. The Carrerou's primary staff contact with the housing authority with regard to the Section 8 Program was Jan Partin. This included contacts regarding tenants, leases, landlord/housing authority contracts, and rental payments. As it was a new program, the contacts were frequent, several times a week, by telephone and in person at the housing authority office. As executive director, Ash Ahmad was the formal administrator of the Section 8 Program. Ahmad trained Partin and another staff person in the program and Partin's contacts with the Carrerous were part of her routine functions. The Carrerou's perception that she had some control over their continued participation and receipt of rents was reasonable, even if not technically nor legally correct. In early 1990, Partin called Oswald Carrerou and asked if he would consider making a loan to a person who was very important to the housing authority, a witness in a federal case involving a tenant. Partin said the person needed money to pay his lawyer in a child custody dispute. Carrerou was concerned about the appearance and legitimacy of the transaction. He was not in the business of making personal loans, except in the context of his buying and selling real estate, in which cases the loans were secured by a mortgage. When he asked about collateral, Partin said something about a CD coming due and that he would be paid off then. Partin suggested that a note would be prepared, but did not say who would sign the note. Reluctantly, and with the concern that he had little choice, given his financial circumstances and reliance on the Section 8 rents, Carrerou agreed to the loan. Timothy Keaton was the person who was to receive the loan. Keaton met Partin in 1988 when his girlfriend, April Marshall, was living in a Winter Haven Housing Authority housing project. Keaton lived with Marshall off and on without being included in the lease; the couple had two children together. Keaton and Partin developed a close personal relationship and they began dating; Partin loaned and gave him money. Partin became involved in a custody dispute regarding the Keaton/Marshall children, a case which also involved the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Partin urged Keaton to hire a lawyer to get custody away from Marshall and she recommended a lawyer to him. This was the lawyer to whom the loan money was to be paid. At the same time that the custody dispute was pending, the housing authority was sued in federal court by Keaton's sometime girlfriend, Marshall, and other plaintiffs who were contesting their evictions. Partin was the legal liaison for the housing authority and worked closely with Sylvia Ibanez, the attorney for the housing authority in the Marshall lawsuit and other litigation. Keaton agreed to testify against Marshall and on behalf of the housing authority in the federal case. He gave a deposition attended by Partin, Attorney Ibanez and Marshall's attorney. This was around the same time that Partin sought the loan to pay Keaton's lawyer. Keaton and another man appeared at Carrerou's office with a note signed by Keaton's mother, Oreatha K. Ogletree, dated February 16, 1990. The note stated that she would be responsible for the loan of $1200 to her son, and that she would make the payment in March 1990, when her CD matured. After assuring himself that the lawyer was indeed representing Keaton, and that Oreatha K. Ogletree was Timothy Keaton's mother, Oswald Carrerou gave Keaton a check for $1200 payable to Robert Doyel, the attorney. The check is dated February 16, 1990. Carrerou had never met nor seen Keaton before that day. Because of cash flow problems, Carrerou borrowed the $1200 from his wife's VISA credit card account at 18 percent interest in order to make the loan to Keaton. Keaton did not sign the note, although there was a space on the note for his signature and social security number. Moreover, instead of taking the check to the lawyer's office that afternoon as was arranged, he tore it into three pieces. He did not want to be responsible for the money and did not want his mother to be responsible either. Sometime later, but before the end of February 1990, Partin called Leah Carrerou and told her that the Keaton children had spilled something on the check or had torn it, and that another check was needed immediately. Keaton had an appointment with the lawyer that afternoon and the lawyer would not see him without the check. Partin said she would send someone over to pick it up, and someone from the Housing Authority did come to get the check from Mrs. Carrerou. Later, Mrs. Carrerou realized her check was written on the wrong account and, after speaking to the lawyer's secretary for approval, she mailed a substitute check for $1200, dated February 28, 1990, to Robert Doyel. The Carrerous were never repaid their $1200. After the end of thirty days, Leah Carrerou called Partin, who assured that she would get her money. After about five or six subsequent similar calls, the Carrerous sued Oreatha Ogletree on the note. A final judgement in favor of Oswald Carrerou was entered on July 9, 1990, by Polk County Judge, Harvey A. Kornstein. Later, Oswald Carrerou filed a satisfaction of that judgement when he learned that Timothy Keaton had torn up his original check to avoid binding himself or his mother. Keaton believed that Jan Partin had come up with the money for the lawyer. Keaton did not know that Partin had obtained another check from the Carrerous. The federal case was eventually settled without the need for Keaton to testify at a trial. Meanwhile, Keaton got back together with April Marshall and appeared at the custody hearing on her side. Commonly, and within the Housing Authority's function of providing services to tenants or other members of the public, housing authority staff make referrals to other social services agencies or resources. The referral of Timothy Keaton to a landlord in a housing authority program was not within the scope of that appropriate function. The greater weight of evidence established that it was Partin's romantic relationship with Keaton, rather than any eleemosynary impulse that motivated her misguided efforts on his behalf.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that Jan Partin violated section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending restitution in the amount of $1200 and a civil penalty of $5000. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Claire D. Dryfuss, Esquire Acting Advocate Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert H. Grizzard, II, Esquire Post Office Box 992 Lakeland, Florida 33802-0992 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Charles D. and Winnie R. Rice owned and occupied a three bedroom, one bath, frame dwelling located on U.S. 29 in Century, Florida, consisting of 1,283 total square feet. This dwelling had no carport or garage. The Department of Transportation needed a right-of-way where their dwelling was located for a highway construction project. Mr. Rice first became aware of the Department's need for his property in 1977. Acquisition of the right-of-way in Mr. Rice's area commenced around 1980. Replacement housing is part of the Relocation Assistance Program administered by the Department of Transportation for persons displaced by the acquisition of real property for the construction of highway projects. The purpose of the Replacement Housing Program is to provide people with comparable replacement housing when they are displaced because of any type of federally funded project. Comparable replacement housing is that which is substantially equal to the housing occupied prior to acquisition. When persons who are displaced buy an established home on the market, any extra features in the existing home that were not in the old one are not considered in determining eligibility payments. When the choice is to build a new structure instead of buying an existing house, the Replacement Housing Program permits the Department to participate only in the cost of a structure of comparable size and similar features to the house being replaced. Cmparable housing in the local market is examined in order to determine what is available for sale in the area. The first comparable housing for sale in the area in this case was priced in the amount of $42,000, and this was selected as the first comparable figure for compensation purposes. A household survey was made of the Rice dwelling on February 4, 1982, to determine the number of rooms, area of living space, age and type of construction, so as to establish the level of eligibility in the Department's Relocation Assistance Program. On July 20, 1982, the Rice dwelling was inspected in order to confirm the information in the February household survey. The inspector measured the rooms and talked with Mr. Rice about the Relocation Program, but there was no discussion about monetary amounts. A Statement of Eligibility was prepared based on the first comparable housing amount of $42,000 which had been selected. This first comparable amount was used in the preparation of the Statement of Eligibility, wherein the approved appraisal for acquisition of the Rice's original dwelling ($19,240) was subtracted from the first comparable amount of $42,000, leaving a balance of $22,760. This figure was shown on the Statement of Eligibility as the maximum amount payable. (Exhibit 4) The Department's first contract with Mr. and Mrs. Rice when money was discussed was on August 19, 1982. The amount of the approved appraisal for the Rice property was discussed, as were subjects such as moving costs, replacement housing, and the Statement of Eligibility showing a maximum amount of $22,760. In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Rice were given a copy of the Department's publication called Your Relocation, which Mr. Rice read. He became familiar with the statement on page 5 about comparable replacement housing. The Rices were instructed to contact the Department before they signed any contract for construction. Mr. and Mrs. Rice signed a contract with Barney E. Seymour on September 29, 1982, to construct for them a three bedroom, two bath, brick veneer residence on their property, consisting of 1,731 square feet for $43,600. Article 4 of the agreement indicated the Department of Transportation was to pay $22,760 upon completion of the construction. However, the Department was not a party to this contract, did not review it, approve it, or indicate concurrence. No representative from the Department was present when the contract was executed. Mr. and Mrs. Rice relied on the contractor to provide copies of the contract and the construction plans to the Department, and he delivered a copy of the contract and a set of the plans to the Department's office. However, the builder had no receipt or acknowledgment to show the date delivery was made. Sometime during the first part of October, 1982, a representative of the Department discussed with the builder on the telephone the matter of the amount of money the Department would pay to the Rices, but during this conversation, there was no discussion about the size of the dwelling or the type of the construction. During the first part of November, 1982, the Department was provided with a copy of the contract between the Rices and the builder, and the plans for the dwelling. A review of these plans disclosed to the Department that there were 448 square feet of additional floor space in the replacement dwelling, and an additional bathroom, that were not in the acquired dwelling. A revised Statement of Eligibility was computed on November 16, 1982, based on the square foot cost of the replacement dwelling. The amount of $400, shown as an estimate from a plumbing supplier in the plans, was subtracted from the contract price of $43,600, for the extra bathroom, leaving an amount of $43,200. This was divided by the 1,731 square footage of the new house, amounting to a cost per square foot of $24.96. This square foot cost was multiplied by the additional 443 square feet, to establish an additional cost of $11,182.08. This amount was subtracted from the contract price less the extra bathroom ($43,200) resulting in an amount of $32,017.92 allotted for the replacement dwelling. Additional allowable costs of $1,473.50 for a replacement lot and $312 for landscaping were added to $32,017.92, increasing this amount to $33,803.42. Deducting the amount of the approved appraisal of the old Rice residence ($19,240) from $33,803.42 resulted in an adjusted entitlement of $14,563.42 for replacement housing. The Rices executed the necessary documents, and they were paid this adjusted amount of eligibility. Mr. Rice contends that he was due the full amount of $22,760 (the difference between the first comparable housing figure set at $42,000, and the approved appraisal figure of $19,240), and that after his payment of $14,563.42 he is still entitled to receive an additional $8,196.58.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter its Order that the proper amount for replacement housing benefits payable to Charles D. Rice and Winnie R. Rice is $14,563.42, and disallowing their claim for an additional amount of $8,196.58. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary B. Lane, Esquire Post Office Box 12331 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents violated section 70-176, Pinellas County Code of Ordinances (Code), as alleged in Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint (Complaint).
Findings Of Fact This case concerns an allegation that Petitioner, an African-American female, was the victim of housing discrimination in two respects. First, after complaining that her bathroom was not timely repaired by her landlord, Petitioner reported the problem to the City of St. Petersburg (City). When the manager came to repair the bathroom, Petitioner alleges he told her he "would throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Second, Petitioner alleges she was told by the manager to move her car that was parked "for a few days" on the property, yet white tenants were allowed to keep a truck with "no tags and flat tires" on the premises for more than a year. Because no evidence was presented on the second issue, only the first allegation will be addressed. By way of background, from August 2012 until she was evicted in October 2015, Petitioner resided in an apartment complex at 3865 9th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The complex is owned by Holly Berry Gifts, Inc., whose president is Holly Bonk. The complex is managed by Mike Prusinski. Bonk and Prusinski are employed full-time in other jobs, but devote attention to apartment matters when required. Bonk has a practice of leasing units to whoever is qualified, regardless of their race. She was drawn into this affair because of the alleged comments of her manager. It is fair to assume that Bonk has delegated responsibility to Prusinski to deal with maintenance issues and to evict tenants. Pursuant to a one-year Residential Lease executed by Petitioner in July 2012, she was required to pay $500.00 rent each month, due no later than the fifth day of the month. If rent was paid after the fifth day, a $60.00 late charge was imposed. After the lease expired on July 31, 2013, Petitioner continued renting her apartment on a month-to-month basis, but all terms and conditions in the original lease still applied, including the same monthly rent and late payment provisions. Prior to 2015, Petitioner was periodically late in paying her rent. For the months of February, March, July, and August 2015, she was either late paying her rent, or she did not pay the full amount. No rent was paid for September 2015. Despite Petitioner being in arrears throughout her tenancy, Prusinski "worked with" her because of her financial constraints, and according to Petitioner, he never demanded she pay the late charge. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner sent a text message to Bonk complaining that her upstairs neighbor (a female) was playing loud music and was noisy, which interfered with Petitioner's enjoyment of her apartment. When the neighbor came to Petitioner's apartment to discuss the complaint, Petitioner opened the door and "maced" the neighbor in the face. The neighbor filed a complaint with the police. Petitioner was arrested and charged with battery. In 2016, a jury convicted her of battery, and she was sentenced to 15 days in jail and placed on probation for 11 months. According to Prusinski, the macing incident was the final straw that led him to begin the eviction process. Besides the macing incident, Prusinski explained that Petitioner "harassed" the air-conditioning crew that serviced the complex to the point they refused to provide further service unless they received a $45.00 surcharge for each visit. He described Petitioner as being "hostile" towards him throughout her tenancy, and he noted it reached the point where she would not answer the door half of the time when he knocked. On August 14, 2015, a Fifteen Day Notice to Vacate the premises was personally served on Petitioner informing her that she must vacate the premises by August 31, 2015. An Eviction Notice was then obtained from the court. Before it was served on Petitioner, she changed the door locks, padlocked the circuit breaker box to her apartment, and moved out without notice to Respondents. Each of these actions violated the terms of her lease. Petitioner says she did this because she was "scared" that "Mike was coming over to throw her out," and a friend told her it was okay to change the locks. Prusinski was forced to call a locksmith to access the empty apartment and use bolt cutters on the padlock to restore electricity. In all, Petitioner still owes $1,933.00 for past due rent, late charges, court costs, locksmith charges, and the cost of a bolt cutter. There is no evidence that the eviction process was motivated by racial bias. The record shows that Prusinski has evicted four black tenants and eight white tenants for failing to pay their rent. Although Petitioner was upset that she had to relocate to new housing, she agrees there was justification for her eviction. A month after her eviction, Petitioner filed her Complaint. Petitioner says the Complaint was filed only to address issues other than her eviction. Against this backdrop, the only allegation that requires resolution is an assertion by Petitioner that Prusinski directed a racial slur towards her when he was repairing her bathroom.2/ Due to a leak in the upstairs bathroom, Petitioner's bathroom developed multiple problems, which required repairs to the walls and ceiling and professional mold remediation. Although these problems were eventually resolved, they were not resolved as quickly as Petitioner desired. Therefore, she reported the problem to the City. The City inspected her unit in early April 2015, determined that repairs were needed, and relayed its findings to Prusinski. After receiving the City's report, Prusinski came to the apartment to repair the bathroom. Petitioner says an argument over the repairs ensued, and he told her he would "throw her black ass out of here for calling the city on them." Except for Petitioner's testimony, there is no other credible evidence to corroborate this statement. Notably, even though the incident occurred in early April 2015, Petitioner never reported it to Bonk (Prusinski's boss), she did not mention the incident at the eviction hearing, and she waited until after she was evicted to raise the issue with the County. Prusinski denies making any racial comments to Petitioner and attributes her allegation to the hostile relationship between the two and her eviction in September 2015. Having considered the record as a whole, Prusinski's testimony is accepted as being the most credible on this issue. Ironically, Petitioner sometimes used the term "black ass" when referring to herself in text messages sent to Bonk, and during the hearing, she sometimes referred to herself as a "black ass."
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of replacement housing payment that the Petitioners should receive as a result of their being displaced by a highway construction project. The parties agree that Petitioners are entitled to benefits, but disagree as to the appropriate amount.
Findings Of Fact In 1979, Petitioners owned and lived on property located in Hillsborough County, Florida. The property included slightly more than two acres of land and a one-story frame dwelling. The dwelling contained three bedrooms, a living-dining room, a kitchen, and two open porches. Petitioners' property was condemned by the Florida Department of Transportation in order to obtain right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. The value of the land and dwelling structure was $60,950, and Petitioners were awarded this amount through a Final Judgment entered in a condemnation proceeding. The value of the Petitioners' dwelling structure was approximately $33,794, and the value of their property was approximately $27,206. The fact that these amounts do not coincide with the condemnation award is not material. Department of Transportation personnel located a comparable piece of property that included a dwelling structure. This dwelling structure was slightly larger and included some amenities that the Petitioners' condemned dwelling structure did not include. The structure was on three acres of land, more than the land included in the condemned parcel. The selling price of this comparable property and structure was $70,500. Petitioners decided against purchasing the comparable property and structure located by the Department. Instead, Petitioners decided to purchase property located near to Live Oak, Florida, and to build a new dwelling structure on the property. The parcel that Petitioners purchased is 41 acres in size and includes frontage on the Suwannee River. The Petitioner Mrs. Fred Anderson has contracted to construct a dwelling structure on a portion of the purchased property. The price of the dwelling is $35,000. The structure which Mrs. Anderson has contracted to build contains some amenities beyond those that were included in the condemned dwelling structure. Nonetheless, the Department has conceded that the structure, now under construction, is comparable to the condemned structure. The Department has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to receive the difference between the value placed on the condemned structure and the cost of building the new, comparable structure as a part of their replacement housing payment. This amounts to $1,206 ($35,000 minus $33,794) In making a determination as to the amount of replacement housing payment that Petitioners are entitled to receive in connection with their property acquisition, the Department determined to place a value on three acres of the 41-acre tract that Petitioners purchased. Three acres were chosen because the comparable property located by the Department included three acres. The Department's personnel concluded that the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure site had a value of $8,597 per acre. The total value of the three-acre homesite was thus placed at $25,791. This amount is less than the $27,206 that was determined to be the fair value of the Petitioners' condemned land. The Department's personnel therefore concluded that Petitioners were entitled to no relocation assistance benefits for the property acquisition since they had received more money in the condemnation proceeding than the value of the three-acre homesite. In determining a fair value to be placed on the property purchased by Petitioners near Live Oak, it is not appropriate to consider the price of the entire 41-acre tract. The 41-acre tract cannot fairly be compared to the condemned tract that was less than three acres in size. Petitioners should receive compensation only for a comparable tract. Petitioners paid a total of $58,000 for the 41-acre tract. It would not be appropriate to place a value on the three acres surrounding the Petitioners' dwelling under construction by simply dividing 41 into the total purchase price. The three acres surrounding the homesite includes river frontage. It is the most valuable portion of the 41-acre tract. While the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure under construction include amenities that the Petitioners' condemned land did not include, it is fairly comparable. The fair value of the three acres is $10,782 per acre, or a total of $32,346. It thus cost the Petitioners more than the amount they received for their condemned land ($27,206) to obtain a comparable homesite. The Department's calculations which led to a value of $8,597 per acre were erroneous. During the course of negotiations between the Petitioner Mrs. Anderson and personnel of the Department of Transportation, Mrs. Anderson came to an understanding that she would receive $9,550 (the difference between the price of the comparable property located by the Department and the Petitioners' condemned property) in replacement housing payments. She relied on this understanding in contracting to have a dwelling structure constructed on her newly acquired property. The new dwelling structure has not been completed because Mrs. Anderson was relying upon receipt of the replacement housing payments to pay for construction. While it is clear that Mrs. Anderson had this understanding, it does not appear that the Department misrepresented any facts so as to lead her to that conclusion. Communications forwarded by the Department to Petitioners advised them that the maximum benefits they could receive would be determined by subtracting the value of their property as determined in a condemnation proceeding from the cost of comparable property. Petitioners concede that that amount is $9,550. The Department's communications clearly indicated that if Petitioners decided to purchase other property or to build a new dwelling structure, other compensation formulas would be utilized, but that the maximum possible benefit would remain $9,550. While Mrs. Anderson's new dwelling structure was being constructed, she had difficulty contacting the Department's officials, who were located in Tampa and Bartow. The difficulty in communication was in part the fault of Mrs. Anderson and in part the fault of the Department's officials. Mrs. Anderson went to a Department office near Live Oak and discussed the matter. The Live Oak officials, of course, had no knowledge of the details of the matter, but helped to communicate with officials in Tampa and Bartow. During these discussions, the officials in Live Oak assumed that Mrs. Anderson was entitled to receive the amount that she related to them ($9,550). No representations were made to her, however, that would properly lead her to a conclusion that she was entitled to receive that amount. The contractor who was building Mrs. Anderson's dwelling structure also contacted Department personnel. He, too, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550. Based on that understanding, he engaged in construction activities that Mrs. Anderson could not afford. While it is apparent that the contractor reached this understanding, it does not appear that anyone at the Department directly represented to him that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550 in replacement housing payments.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents have discriminated against Petitioners based on Petitioners' national origin.
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene was a loan officer employed by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. The office where Ms. Greene worked was located inside CenterState Bank, N.A., located at 6930 Gall Boulevard in Zephyrhills, Florida. The office is separate from CenterState Banks, Inc. There is signage on a glass wall of her office stating, "CenterState Home Loans, LLC." Ms. Greene is paid by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. She is paid by commission. Thus, there is no incentive not to complete loan applications. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is a separate corporation from CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. Both CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. are interest holders in CenterState Home Loans, LLC, but are not the managing members of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation is the managing member of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. As the managing member, Platinum Home Mortgage manages the quality control and integrity of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is not authorized to do Federal Housing Association (FHA) loans. Any FHA loans originated by CenterState Home Loans, LLC, are assigned to Platinum Home Mortgage. On August 28, 2009, Petitioners, Mr. Velez's mother, and Petitioners' young daughter came to Ms. Greene's office to discuss the possibility of obtaining a loan through CenterState Home Loans, LLC, and a loan through the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. The purpose of the Pasco County Home Buyers Program is to aid qualified home buyers in purchasing their primary residences. Initially, Petitioners were interesting in applying for an FHA loan. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Velez had telephoned Ms. Greene and asked what types of information would need to be submitted. Ms. Greene stated that he would need W-2 forms, paystubs, bank statements, and anything that showed proof of any assets or debts. Petitioners brought some of the documentation to the meeting. At the meeting, Petitioners supplied information to Ms. Greene, who typed the information into her computer using loan software entitled "Loan Soft." The information was placed on a Uniform Residential Application, which is called a Form 1003. No property was identified on the Form 1003 because Petitioners did not have a sales contract for a specific piece of property. They indicated that the property they wanted to purchase would be approximately $140,000. Mr. Velez told Ms. Greene that he was anticipating a 50 percent loan from Pasco County Home Buyers Program, which would leave approximately $70,000 to be financed plus closing costs. When Ms. Greene input the information into the computer program, it automatically calculated the approximate closing costs. The interest used to do the calculations was based on the interest rate on August 28, 2009, and was not a guaranteed rate. With Petitioners' permission, Ms. Greene pulled a credit report on each of them during the meeting on August 28, 2009. The credit report showed that there were some debts in collection and that there was an outstanding judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Additionally, based on CenterState Home Loan, LLC, guidelines, the credit scores did not qualify Petitioners for a second mortgage, which included a Pasco County Home Buyers Program loan. On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene needed additional asset information from the Petitioners and requested that they provide her with information concerning checking, savings, or money market accounts for at least a two-month period. Mr. Velez did present a bank statement at the meeting, which showed a current balance of less than $200. Ms. Greene told Petitioners that the debts in collection and the outstanding judgment needed to be resolved. Additionally, Ms. Guerrero was an authorized signer on some of her mother's credit cards, and a statement would have to be provided that Ms. Guerrero was not responsible for the debts associated with those credit cards. The software program that Ms. Greene used automatically completes a page in the application titled, "Pre- Approval Cover Sheet and Check List." The program put "completed" by a number of items which had not been completed, such as the Form 1003 and current asset statements. Petitioners had supplied some pay stubs and some bank statements at the August 28, 2009, meeting. The Form 1003 did not indicate that Petitioners had been pre-approved for a loan. The meeting ran near to the time CenterState Home Loans, LLC, was closing and could not be completed before closing time. Ms. Greene printed out a copy of the Form 1003, with the information that had been completed, and gave it to Petitioners. Petitioners were to complete, sign, and return the Form 1003 to Ms. Greene. Additionally, Petitioners were to provide evidence that the debts had been paid and the judgment satisfied, along with evidence of current assets. Because the application was not completed and additional information was needed, Ms. Greene could not fully analyze the application. Sometime after the August 28, 2009, meeting, Ms. Greene reviewed the information that had been supplied to her by Petitioners and discussed the information with Mr. Velez on the telephone. Mr. Velez wanted to schedule a meeting to discuss the application. She advised him that, based on the credit scores and the limited funds in his bank account, he could not qualify for a loan with a second lien by the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. Thus, there would be no need to meet. Mr. Velez told her that he wanted to continue with the process. Petitioners set about paying off the debts in collection and satisfying the judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Mr. Velez had received a disability settlement and placed some money in a bank account. Petitioners did not supply updated information to Ms. Greene. Sometime in October or November 2009, Mr. Velez called Ms. Greene and requested that she send a realtor a pre-approval letter. Ms. Greene replied that she could not do that because she did not have the supporting documents to be able to give a pre-approval letter. Mr. Velez became very angry and demanded the documents he had previously provided at the August 28, 2009, meeting. Ms. Greene had only copies of the documents that he provided, but she placed them in an envelope and left them for Mr. Velez to pick up. Petitioners stated in Form 1003 that their ethnicity was Hispanic or Latino. Mr. Velez stated at the final hearing: My basis for my racial discrimination was the fact that she [Ms. Greene] denied us the opportunity to turn in updated information when stated that she would allow us to do so. Ms. Greene never stated that she would not take additional information because Petitioners were Hispanic. She has processed loans for other Hispanics which involved the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, and she has closed loans for other minorities. Ms. Greene never discussed Petitioners national origin with them. She did not base any decision regarding their loan application on their national origin. After Petitioners were advised by Ms. Greene that they would not qualify for a loan involving the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, they applied for loans at two other lending institutions and were turned down on the basis of too many inquiries or insufficient credit scores. They finally received a loan from Manhattan Mortgage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2010.
