The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).
Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025
The Issue Whether the intended decision of Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Respondent/Florida Housing) to fund the application of West River Phase 2, LP (West River/Intervenor), based on the scoring of its application, is contrary to Respondent’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited liability corporation based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Intervenor is a Florida limited partnership based in Tampa, Florida, in the business of providing affordable housing. Respondent is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These tax credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. These credits are then normally sold by developers for cash to raise capital for their projects. This has the effect of reducing the amount that the developer would have to borrow otherwise. Because the total debt is lower, a tax credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the tax credits. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150, while a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. The demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. Florida Housing allocates housing tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation as authorized by section 420.507(48). Housing tax credits are made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as indicated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA at issue here is 2016-113, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties. The RFA was issued on October 28, 2016, a modification to the RFA was issued on November 10, 2016, and responses were due December 30, 2016. A challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of the RFA by parties not associated with the instant case, but that challenge was ultimately unsuccessful. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated $14,669,052 of housing tax credits to qualified applicants to provide affordable housing developments. A review committee made up of Florida Housing staff reviews and scores each application. These scores are presented in a public meeting and the committee ultimately makes a recommendation as to which projects should be funded. This recommendation is presented to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (Board) for final agency action. On May 5, 2017, Petitioner and all other participants in RFA 2016-113 received notice that the Board had determined which applications were eligible for consideration for funding and that certain applications were selected for awards of tax credits, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Such notice was provided by the posting of two spreadsheets, one listing the “eligible” and “ineligible” applications and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to seven developments, including Intervenor. Petitioner’s application was deemed eligible and scored the maximum number of points, but it was not selected for funding due to having a higher lottery number than Intervenor. If Intervenor’s application had been deemed ineligible, Petitioner’s would have been selected for funding. In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges that Intervenor’s application is ineligible for two reasons. First, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to include all “principals” for its designated developer entity as required by the RFA. Next, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor failed to provide sufficient documentation to establish that its designated developer entity, and specifically the identified “principal” of the developer entity, had the requisite developer experience required by the RFA. Disclosure of the Principals of the Developer The RFA at section Four (A)(3)(d) requires the disclosure of information as follows: Principals Disclosure for the Applicant and for each Developer. The Application must include a properly completed Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Form Rev. 08- 16) (“Principals Disclosure Form”) that was uploaded as outlined in Section Three above. The Principals Disclosure form must identify the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) as of the Application Deadline and must include, for each applicable organizational structure, ONLY the types of Principals required by subsection 67-48.002(93), F.A.C. A Principals Disclosure Form that includes, for any organizational structure, any type of entity that is not specifically included in the Rule definition of Principals, will not be accepted by the Corporation to meet the Mandatory requirement to provide the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form. The term “principal” is defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(93)(b) with respect to a developer, and provides as follows when the developer entity is a limited liability company: A limited liability company, at the first principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company, and, with respect to any manager or member of the Developer limited liability company that is: A corporation, at the second principal disclosure level, any officer, director or shareholder of the corporation, A limited partnership, at the second principal disclosure level, any general partner or limited partner of the limited partnership, or A limited liability company, at the second principal disclosure level, any manager or member of the limited liability company. Florida Housing offers a pre-approval of the principals disclosure form to all potential applicants. The pre-approval process verifies that the disclosure form has been completed properly as to form. However, its purpose is not to determine the accuracy of the information provided by the applicant. Intervenor utilized the pre-approval process and its principal disclosure forms were pre-approved. In response to this RFA and rule requirement, Intervenor identified WRDG Boulevard, LLC, as its developer. On the principal disclosure form included within its application, Intervenor further identified Banc of America Community Development Corporation (BOACDC) as the “managing member” and the Housing Authority of the City of Tampa as “member” of WRDG Boulevard, LLC. The principal disclosure form submitted by Intervenor for its developer entity lists approximately 62 individuals that are principals of BOACDC and identifies them as officers, directors, and shareholders. However, two officers who met the definition of principal were omitted from Intervenor’s principals disclosure form for the developer entity. The evidence establishes that the annual report filed by BOACDC with the Florida Secretary of State’s office on March 31, 2016, lists four officers and directors for BOACDC. The listed officers and directors include Mr. Jason Pritchard as senior vice president and Mr. Nathan Barth as secretary. Neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on the principals disclosure form submitted to Florida Housing by Intervenor. Intervenor concedes that the principals disclosure form is missing these two principals, but asserts that neither Mr. Barth nor Mr. Pritchard had actual authority to bind BOACDC or had any direct involvement with the proposed project. Intervenor further points out that neither Mr. Pritchard nor Mr. Barth is listed on Respondent’s past due report dated April 5, 2017, which was the most recently published past due report prior to the RFA review committee meeting on April 25, 2017. Intervenor also asserts that there is no specific language in the RFA that prohibits waiving this admitted deviation. Accordingly, Intervenor alleges that the failure to include these two principals should be waived as a minor irregularity. The RFA requires that principals be listed and does not include qualifiers or exemptions to these requirements in instances where the omitted principal is either not on the latest arrears list or does not have the authority to bind the designated entity. Mr. Reecy testified that while Respondent has waived other failures to submit certain information, it did so only when the missing information could be found elsewhere in the application. In the present case, there is no other place in the application where a list of the principals of the developer could be found. The evidence establishes that the accurate and complete disclosure of principals is important in the RFA process for several reasons. First, Respondent uses the disclosure of principals to determine if any individuals associated with a proposed development are in arrears or indebted to Florida Housing in connection with other developments previously funded by Florida Housing. A Florida Housing staff member, during the review process, checks each principal listed for arrearages and reports back to the review committee accordingly. Second, Respondent uses the information to determine if any principal associated with a proposed development is ineligible to participate in any Florida Housing program due to prior illegal acts or misconduct. Mr. Reecy testified as to several recent instances where individuals have been subject to “timeouts” due to misrepresentations made to Florida Housing. Mr. Reecy credibly testified that Florida Housing must know who it is dealing with for each applicant and developer entity, and that to not know this information would harm the basic structure of the RFA application process, which resultantly would adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing and the public. Developer Experience Chart Section Four, 4(a)(3) of the RFA provides, in part, as follows: General Development experience (5 Points): To be eligible to be awarded 5 points for General Development Experience, the Prior General Development Experience chart must meet the requirements of (a) below. At least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of the Developer entity, or if more than one Developer entity, at least one Principal, which must be a natural person, of at least one of the Developer entities, must meet the General Development Experience requirements in (i) and (ii) below. General Development Experience: A Principal, which must be a natural person, of each experienced Developer entity must have, since January 1, 1996, completed at least three (3) affordable rental housing developments, at least one (1) of which was a Housing Credit development completed since January 1, 2006. If the experience of a natural person Principal for a Developer entity listed in this Application was acquired from a previous affordable housing Developer entity, the natural person Principal must have also been a Principal of that previous Developer entity as the term Principal was defined by the Corporation at that time. Prior General Development Experience Chart: The Applicant must provide, as Attachment 4 to Exhibit A, a prior experience chart for each natural person Principal intending to meet the minimum general development experience reflecting the required information for the three (3) completed affordable rental housing developments, one (1) of which must be a Housing Credit development. The RFA requires that at least one principal of the designated developer entity have completed at least three affordable rental housing developments since January 1996. If the designated principal is using experience from a previous developer entity, the named principal must have been a principal of that entity as the term principal “was defined by the Corporation at that time.” Intervenor submitted a general development experience chart as part of its application in accordance with the RFA. This chart listed Eileen M. Pope as its principal with the required developer experience, and specified three developments for which Ms. Pope was identified as a principal of the developer. Based upon this chart, Intervenor was awarded five points by the scoring review committee. One of these developments was First Ward Place Phase I, which was listed as being completed in 1998. In 1998, Ms. Pope was employed as a regional property manager for the Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). She was not an officer, director, or shareholder of the CHA. The RFA in this case requires an applicant to state the name of each developer, including all co-developers. It is thus relatively easy for applications submitted to Florida Housing in 2017 to determine whether or not a particular entity is considered a “co-developer” of a project. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to make this determination with respect to developers of projects located in North Carolina in 1998. There is no evidence directly identifying CHA as a “co-developer” of First Ward Place Phase I. However, Ms. Pope identified it as such, and there is evidence in the record that the CHA was in partnership with NationsBank Community Development Corporation (NBCDC), and that NBCDC was the developer of the project. The available evidence does not demonstrate that the CHA should not be considered a co-developer of First Ward Place Phase I. Whether Ms. Pope should be considered a principal of a co-developer, however, is another matter. The evidence is uncontroverted that she was employed by the CHA as a regional property manager. The CHA was governed by a board of directors along with several officers (president, CEO, CFO), any of whom would have been considered a principal of the CHA. Ms. Pope was not a director, officer, or shareholder of the CHA; for the First Ward Place Phase I project, she “worked on the development team middle-to-back-end piece.” She considered herself a member of the “senior management” of the CHA and part of the “development team.” She testified that the CHA was, to some extent, a regulatory agency, and that part of her job was to oversee compliance issues and to track how certain funds were being spent. She testified that it was her understanding that a “principal” was “a person in authority” and, thus, she considered herself to be a “principal.” However, she also testified that she did not claim to be a principal: I disagree with your first part of the comment in that you said that I said I was a principal of the housing authority. I didn’t say I was a principal. I said there were no principals, and I was asked if I viewed myself as a principal, and I said I don’t understand what the definition of the principal would be, that a principal is somebody in authority. So, if you’re asking me that, yes, I would have viewed myself as a principal. I never claimed to be a principal of the housing authority. (Jt. Ex. 8, pg. 53) Mr. Reecy testified that Ms. Pope was “an employee, but not a principal in any way that Florida Housing has ever defined principal in any regard.” Mr. Reecy also testified that Florida Housing had never considered a person other than an officer, director, shareholder, or managing member to be a principal of either an applicant or a developer. In fact, Mr. Reecy compared Ms. Pope’s position with the CHA to his own position with Florida Housing, in that both had a high level of responsibility, and both were integral to the operation of the entity, but that neither could be considered a principal. As noted above, the RFA requires that in order to gain points for developer experience, the natural person principal must have also been a principal of that previous developer entity as the term principal was defined by the Florida Housing “at that time.” There is no dispute that Respondent’s rules in effect in 1998 did not explicitly define a principal of a developer. Both Florida Administrative Code Rules 9I-48.002(69) and 67-48.002(77) defined “principal” to include only officers, directors, shareholders or general partners, but these rules specifically applied only to applicants. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that it has been Respondent’s position and practice that a principal did not include all employees of an applicant or developer, even those in positions of authority, but instead, included only the officers, directors, shareholders, or general partners of an applicant or developer. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Pope had some degree of experience. As Mr. Reecy indicated, however, simply having experience is only part of the equation; Ms. Pope must also have been a principal. There is no evidence establishing that Ms. Pope was an officer, director, or shareholder of either NBCDC or the CHA in conjunction with the First Ward Place Phase I development. It is, therefore, found that Ms. Pope was not a principal of either entity, and the award to Intervenor of five points for its developer experience was clearly erroneous.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued finding that Florida Housing’s initial scoring decision regarding the West River application was erroneous, concluding that the West River application is ineligible for funding, and awarding funding to Blue Broadway. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2017.
The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).
Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact By letter dated May 31, 1979 Respondent notified Petitioner that it was acquiring part of the property on which Petitioner's office was located and that it would be necessary for him to relocate. At the time Petitioner worked as a real estate appraiser in the office of the Pickens Agency owned by Philip Pickens. Pickens provided work space, telephones, secretary, data bank and supplies. The data bank contained data on real property throughout Florida and was invaluable to the appraisers in getting comparables to use for appraising like property. Due to the acquisition of additional property for the U.S. 90 right-of- way, it was necessary to move the two-story building in which Petitioner's office was located. This required moving out of this building into different quarters. In the building Petitioner's office, located on the second floor, comprised approximately 800 square feet in which he had desk, telephone and work space. The data bank was also located on the second floor. Philip Pickens owned another building in the Immediate vicinity into which Petitioner moved. The data bank was left in the original building which was jacked up in preparation for its move. Thee data bank remained available for use albeit less convenient for those using it. Petitioner had less space in the one-story building into which the Pickens Agency moved and Petitioner's office was located near the back door through which clients visited the Pickens Agency. He shared a telephone with another appraiser and had a smaller desk and less work space. He also experienced interruptions from visitors entering the office through the back door which opened into Petitioner's office space. During the two years immediately preceding the relocation of the office, Petitioner's appraisal work was performed exclusively for DOT. Part of this work was assigned him by the Pickens Agency and in some cases he was contacted directly by DOT for the appraisal . When employed directly by DOT, Petitioner received 50 percent of the appraisal fee and the Pickens Agency received 50 percent. When assigned work by the Pickens Agency, Petitioner received 45 percent of the appraisal fee. During the five months following Petitioner's move into the new quarters his income dropped substantially from what it had been before the relocation. Petitioner filed application for relocation benefits as soon as he moved his office and before any change in income occurred. Normally, there is a lag of three to six months between tile Line the appraisal work is done and payment is received. Petitioner's income during the first nine months of 1980 (January - October) we $10,622.97. For similar periods in 1979, 1978, and 1977 his income was $29,750, $26,382.50 and $22.252.50, respectively. Petitioner testified that he believes the loss of income was due to his inability to turn out as much work in the more restricted space and less privacy in the one-story building than he had before the move. Petitioner moved some 30 yards from his original location kept the same mailing address and the same telephone number. During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, the Lake City District of DOT had fewer relocation claims than in comparable periods of the two previous years. Relocation claims are related to appraisals which would indicate fewer appraisals were ordered by DOT in Lake City in 1979-80 than in the two previous years. During the period in question, most of Petitioner's work for DOT was generated by the Bartow office. This would require most of Petitioner's appraisal time out of Lake City with the use of the office primarily for the preparation of his appraisal report. No evidence was submitted to show the effect, if any, on the Pickens Agency's business resulting from the move or the business done by the other appraisers who also moved. During the period 1977-1980 the Pickens Agency employed between two and five appraisers and at the time of the relocation employed two appraisers, one of whom was petitioner. (Tr. p. 31). The number of appraisers employed varied with the volume of business coming into the agency. The appraisal work done by the Pickens Agency was statewide and not concentrated in the vicinity of Lake City.
The Issue Whether the Appellant has been paid relocation assistance benefits in accordance with the law and applicable regulations.
Findings Of Fact The Appellant, Mr. Alfred J. Harris, lived in a one bedroom mobile home on property identified as Parcel No. 145 on Interstate 95. The area on which Mr. Harris and his wife and daughter lived was needed for the Interstate Highway and Mr. Harris became eligible for relocation assistance funds. Relocation assistance eligibility was found to be Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($11,150.00) which was based on the difference between a comparable home and location and the land of Mr. Harris. The eligibility mistakenly did not include the mobile home on Mr. Harris' land. A comparable mobile home and lot was found for Mr. Harris and his family in the general area where he lived which could have been purchased for Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($26,500.00) in relocation benefits as well as receiving payment of Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($15,350.00) for his land. It was not learned until after the computation for relocation assistance was made and paid that Mr. Harris and his wife had living with them a daughter. The fact that the mobile home was a one bedroom home and three people were living there removed the home from the condition of decent, safe and sanitary housing for the occupants therein. Had the computation been made for relocation assistance with the knowledge that the mobile home in which the Appellant lived did not meet the conditions for decent, safe and sanitary housing, the relocation assistance benefits would have been Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($9,250.00) which is less Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00), the amount for which Mr. Harris sold his mobile home. Mr. Harris was paid Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) more than he would have been entitled to had the Appellee, the Florida Department of Transportation, not made an error with respect to the mobile home which Mr. Harris later sold by transfer upon the buyer assuming the payments of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00). Mr. Harris and his family decided to buy a conventional type home for the sum of Twenty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($26,200.00) rather than the comparable mobile home and land found by the Appellee for the Appellant which was valued at Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($26,500.00) . Mr. Harris then refunded Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to the Appellee from the Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($11,150.00) he had received in relocation assistance. The problem of the overpayment by the Appellee to the Appellant was reviewed by the federal government which refused to absorb the relocation benefits overpaid to Mr. Harris in the amount of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) but he Appellee, Florida Department of Transportation, agreed that inasmuch as it had made the error and overpaid the Appellant Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00), it would absorb the mistake and not collect the amount from the Appellant. The Appellant, Mr. Harris, had misunderstood the error of Appellee and the amount of overpayments and was under the mistaken belief that the Department of Transportation, Appellee, owed him additional relocation assistance monies. Thus, he filed a Complaint on February 18, 1976.
Recommendation Dismiss the appeal inasmuch as the Appellee owes no monies to the Appellant. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Alfred J. Harris 509 Tumbling Kling Road Fort Pierce, Florida Mr. Joseph A. Alfes, Chief Bureau of Right of Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's proposed amendment to the Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP), specifically paragraph 16 of the proposed 2012 QAP allowing Respondent to allocate certain tax credits by means of Request for Proposals (RFPs), adopted by and incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(94), constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Allapattah Housing Partners, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company whose address is 1172 South Dixie Highway, Suite 500 Coral Gables, Florida 33146. Petitioner Tower Road Gardens, Ltd., is a limited partnership whose address is 5709 NW 158 Street, Miami Lakes, Florida 33014. Petitioner City River Apartments, Ltd., is a limited partnership whose address is 1666 Kennedy Causeway, Ste. 505, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Respondent is a public corporation created by section 420.504, Florida Statutes, to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Respondent's statutory authority and mandates appear in Part V of chapter 420, Florida Statutes. See §§ 420.501 through 420.55, Fla. Stat. Respondent is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of nine individuals appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. Respondent's address is 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. In the July 1, 2011, Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW), Volume 37, No. 26, pages 1831 through 1872, Respondent gave notice of the proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-48 and to forms and instructions that make up the Universal Cycle Application Package, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.004(1)(a). The July 1, 2011, Notice of Proposed Rule indicated that a public hearing would be held at Respondent's office in Tallahassee, Florida, on Tuesday, July 26, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. The Amended Petition was filed within ten days of the final public hearing and, thus, is timely pursuant to section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes. Under federal law memorialized in Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code), each state is given an amount of federal Low-Income Rental Housing Tax Credits (Housing Credits) based upon its population. In 2011, each state is entitled to $2.15 per capita of Housing Credits. Florida is entitled to receive approximately $40,422,817.00 in 2011 Housing Credits. These Housing Credits are then allocated to specific qualifying housing projects and can be utilized by project investors each year for a ten-year period. Accordingly, the 2011 Florida Housing Credits entitlement will represent a total value of $404,228,170.00 ($40,422,817.00 each year for ten years) in Housing Credits. Developers typically sell the tax credits to investors to generate equity investments in such projects. For example, an equity "price" of 90 cents for each dollar of the 2011 allocation of Housing Credits would generate approximately $360 million in investor equity for the statewide allocation. More than seven million seven hundred thousand dollars ($7,700,000.00) of 2011 Housing Credits remain unallocated by Respondent. The amount of Housing Credits available for 2012 will not be known until the Internal Revenue Service publishes its state population estimates in early 2012. As in 2011, the amount will be the product of Florida's population multiplied by $2.15. Section 42 of the Code requires that each state designate a "housing credit agency" which is responsible for the proper allocation and distribution of Housing Credits in compliance with the criteria and guidelines of section 42. Respondent's rules incorporate section 42 of the Code at Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(71). Respondent is designated as Florida's housing credit agency by section 420.5099, Florida Statutes, and, as such, is responsible for the allocation and distribution of Housing Credits. Respondent administers various federal and state affordable housing programs, including the Housing Credit Program, pursuant to section 420.5099 and chapter 67-48. Respondent's rulemaking authority to implement this process is set forth in section 420.507(12), Florida Statutes. Under federal law, Respondent must distribute Low- Income Rental Housing Tax Credits to applicants pursuant to a specific QAP. IRC § 42(m)(l)(A)v. The QAP must contain certain criteria mandated by federal law, referred to as "Selection Criteria." IRC § 42(m)(l)(B). The Code further provides that a state's federal Housing Credit award will be deemed to be zero if its QAP fails to include a complete plan setting forth (a) selection criteria, (b) preferences for lowest income, longest terms and development in qualified census tracts, and (c) procedures for monitoring and reporting a project's non- compliance. IRC § 42(m)(l)(A). Respondent's QAP must be approved by its Board of Directors and by the Governor and must be adopted as a rule. IRC § 42(m)(A)(i); § 120.56. Typically, each year, Respondent embarks on a public rule-making process to adopt the applicable rule and QAP which control the complex and critical processes for evaluation, review, notice, opportunity to be heard, and, ultimately, ranking and approval of developments to receive allocations of Housing Credits for that year. Because the demand for allocation of Housing Credits exceeds that which is available under the Housing Credit Program, applicants of qualified affordable housing developments must compete for this funding. Applicants apply for funding, under various affordable housing programs, through Respondent's Universal Cycle application process, which is set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.002 through -21.00351 and 67-48.001 through -48.005. Applicants for tax credits provide information as required by the forms and instructions of the Universal Cycle Application Package, which is adopted by and incorporated into rule 67-48.004(1)(a). To assess the relative merits of proposed developments, Respondent has established a competitive application process known as the Universal Cycle. Fla. Admin. Code Chapter 67-48. Respondent scores and competitively ranks the applications to determine which applications will be allocated Housing Credits. Respondent's scoring and evaluation process for Housing Credit applications is set forth in rule 67-48.004. Under these rules, the applications are evaluated and scored based upon factors contained in the Universal Cycle Application Package and Respondent's adopted rules. Respondent then issues preliminary scores to all applicants. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 48.004(3). Following release of the preliminary scores, competitors can alert Respondent of alleged scoring errors in other applications by filing a written Notice of Possible Scoring Error (NOPSE) within a specified time frame. Respondent reviews the NOPSE and notifies the affected applicant of its decision by issuing a NOPSE scoring summary. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-48.004(4). Applicants then have an opportunity to submit "additional documentation, revised pages and such other information as the Applicant deems appropriate ('cures') to address the issues" raised by preliminary or NOPSE scoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-21.003 and 67-48.004(6). In other words, within parameters established by the rules, applicants may cure certain errors and omissions in their applications pointed out during preliminary scoring or raised by a competitor during the NOPSE process. After affected applicants submit their "cure" documentation, competitors can file a Notice of Alleged Deficiency (NOAD) challenging the sufficiency of an applicant's cure. Respondent considers the challenged cure materials and reviews the NOADs, then issues final scores for all the applications. Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-48.004(9). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.005 establishes a procedure through which an applicant can challenge the final scoring of its application. The Notice of Rights that accompanies an applicant's final score advises an adversely affected applicant of its right to appeal Respondent's scoring decision in a proceeding conducted under chapter 120. Ultimately, Respondent ranks each application and allocates available Housing Credits based on such rankings. The last time the QAP in the State of Florida was promulgated and adopted as a rule was in 2009, which allocated 2009 Housing Credits. During 2010, there were no new amendments to Respondent's rules or the QAP. At the end of 2010, Respondent drafted a 2011 QAP, which was signed by the Governor, but never adopted as a rule. The draft 2011 QAP allocated Housing Credits in accordance with a Universal Application Cycle, but Respondent did not adopt the QAP as a rule pursuant to chapter 120.56. The 2011 Cycle did not take place. On June 26, 2011, Respondent's Board authorized publication of proposed rule amendments to chapter 67-48. The proposed rule amendments adopt and incorporate the 2012 QAP by reference at proposed rule 67-48.002(94). Proposed rule 67-48.002(94) provides: "QAP" or "Qualified Allocation Plan" means, with respect to the HC Program, the 2012 Qualified Allocation Plan which is adopted and incorporated herein by reference, effective upon approval by the Governor of the state of Florida, pursuant to Section 42(m)(1)(B) of the IRC and sets forth the selection criteria and the preferences of the Corporation for Developments which will receive Housing Credits. The QAP is available on the Corporation's Website under the 2011 Universal Application link labeled Related References and Links or by contacting the Housing Credit Program at 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329. The 2012 QAP proposed rule purports to govern the process and allocation for both 2011 and 2012 Housing Credits. The only mention in the 2012 QAP proposed rule of the allocation of 2011 Housing Credits is contained in Paragraph 16 of the 2012 QAP proposed rule, which states in its entirety: "Any available 2011 Housing Credit Allocation Authority may be awarded by the FHFC [Respondent's] Board by means of Request for Proposals based on criteria approved by the FHFC [Respondent's] Board." Petitioners challenge proposed rule 67-48.002(94) (which incorporates by reference the 2012 QAP proposed rule) and those portions of the 2012 QAP proposed rule which purport to govern the allocation of 2011 Housing Credits. It is undisputed that Petitioners have standing to initiate and participate in this rule challenge proceeding. § 120.56(1)(a).
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
Findings Of Fact On March 21, 1979, the Department of Transportation began negotiations to acquire real property in Dade County, Florida, for a right-of-way in connection with the expansion of I-95. In October of 1979, representatives of DOT found the Petitioner's trailer on land located on the right-of way. This trailer was not being used as a residence, but was used for storage of feed for horses being raised by the Petitioner. The Petitioner claimed to be occupying the property pursuant to a lease from the owner. The representatives of DOT advised the Petitioner that he must move the trailer off the property, but that he could file a claim for relocation benefits. Subsequently, the Petitioner presented DOT with a claim for the expenses of moving the trailer off the subject property. The Petitioner also submitted a lease dated May 1, 1979, from Henry Milander to the Petitioner, leasing the subject property for a term of two years, in support of his claim to be in lawful possession. This lease, however, was not executed by Henry Milander, but by Michael Manin, whose signature was neither witnessed nor notarized. The Petitioner subsequently submitted a power of attorney executed by Henry Milander to Michael Manin, dated approximately three years prior to the date of the Petitioner's lease. This power of attorney was witnessed, but was not notarized. Neither the lease nor the power of attorney had been recorded on the public records of Dade County. The DOT representatives conducted a title search, and found that the record owner of the subject property was Ruth Milander Tabrah, as trustee of a trust established by Henry Milander in 1955. This trust had not been terminated, and was in existence during the time periods relevant to this proceeding. Thereupon, the DOT advised the Petitioner that his claim for relocation benefits had been disallowed because his occupancy of the subject property was "inconsistent with the rights of the true owner". The Petitioner's request for a formal administrative hearing challenges the determination of DOT that he is not eligible for relocation benefits.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of Richard E. Kimball for relocation assistance payments be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Kimball 18930 S.W. 312 Street Homestead, Florida 33030 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of replacement housing payment that the Petitioners should receive as a result of their being displaced by a highway construction project. The parties agree that Petitioners are entitled to benefits, but disagree as to the appropriate amount.
Findings Of Fact In 1979, Petitioners owned and lived on property located in Hillsborough County, Florida. The property included slightly more than two acres of land and a one-story frame dwelling. The dwelling contained three bedrooms, a living-dining room, a kitchen, and two open porches. Petitioners' property was condemned by the Florida Department of Transportation in order to obtain right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. The value of the land and dwelling structure was $60,950, and Petitioners were awarded this amount through a Final Judgment entered in a condemnation proceeding. The value of the Petitioners' dwelling structure was approximately $33,794, and the value of their property was approximately $27,206. The fact that these amounts do not coincide with the condemnation award is not material. Department of Transportation personnel located a comparable piece of property that included a dwelling structure. This dwelling structure was slightly larger and included some amenities that the Petitioners' condemned dwelling structure did not include. The structure was on three acres of land, more than the land included in the condemned parcel. The selling price of this comparable property and structure was $70,500. Petitioners decided against purchasing the comparable property and structure located by the Department. Instead, Petitioners decided to purchase property located near to Live Oak, Florida, and to build a new dwelling structure on the property. The parcel that Petitioners purchased is 41 acres in size and includes frontage on the Suwannee River. The Petitioner Mrs. Fred Anderson has contracted to construct a dwelling structure on a portion of the purchased property. The price of the dwelling is $35,000. The structure which Mrs. Anderson has contracted to build contains some amenities beyond those that were included in the condemned dwelling structure. Nonetheless, the Department has conceded that the structure, now under construction, is comparable to the condemned structure. The Department has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to receive the difference between the value placed on the condemned structure and the cost of building the new, comparable structure as a part of their replacement housing payment. This amounts to $1,206 ($35,000 minus $33,794) In making a determination as to the amount of replacement housing payment that Petitioners are entitled to receive in connection with their property acquisition, the Department determined to place a value on three acres of the 41-acre tract that Petitioners purchased. Three acres were chosen because the comparable property located by the Department included three acres. The Department's personnel concluded that the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure site had a value of $8,597 per acre. The total value of the three-acre homesite was thus placed at $25,791. This amount is less than the $27,206 that was determined to be the fair value of the Petitioners' condemned land. The Department's personnel therefore concluded that Petitioners were entitled to no relocation assistance benefits for the property acquisition since they had received more money in the condemnation proceeding than the value of the three-acre homesite. In determining a fair value to be placed on the property purchased by Petitioners near Live Oak, it is not appropriate to consider the price of the entire 41-acre tract. The 41-acre tract cannot fairly be compared to the condemned tract that was less than three acres in size. Petitioners should receive compensation only for a comparable tract. Petitioners paid a total of $58,000 for the 41-acre tract. It would not be appropriate to place a value on the three acres surrounding the Petitioners' dwelling under construction by simply dividing 41 into the total purchase price. The three acres surrounding the homesite includes river frontage. It is the most valuable portion of the 41-acre tract. While the three acres surrounding the dwelling structure under construction include amenities that the Petitioners' condemned land did not include, it is fairly comparable. The fair value of the three acres is $10,782 per acre, or a total of $32,346. It thus cost the Petitioners more than the amount they received for their condemned land ($27,206) to obtain a comparable homesite. The Department's calculations which led to a value of $8,597 per acre were erroneous. During the course of negotiations between the Petitioner Mrs. Anderson and personnel of the Department of Transportation, Mrs. Anderson came to an understanding that she would receive $9,550 (the difference between the price of the comparable property located by the Department and the Petitioners' condemned property) in replacement housing payments. She relied on this understanding in contracting to have a dwelling structure constructed on her newly acquired property. The new dwelling structure has not been completed because Mrs. Anderson was relying upon receipt of the replacement housing payments to pay for construction. While it is clear that Mrs. Anderson had this understanding, it does not appear that the Department misrepresented any facts so as to lead her to that conclusion. Communications forwarded by the Department to Petitioners advised them that the maximum benefits they could receive would be determined by subtracting the value of their property as determined in a condemnation proceeding from the cost of comparable property. Petitioners concede that that amount is $9,550. The Department's communications clearly indicated that if Petitioners decided to purchase other property or to build a new dwelling structure, other compensation formulas would be utilized, but that the maximum possible benefit would remain $9,550. While Mrs. Anderson's new dwelling structure was being constructed, she had difficulty contacting the Department's officials, who were located in Tampa and Bartow. The difficulty in communication was in part the fault of Mrs. Anderson and in part the fault of the Department's officials. Mrs. Anderson went to a Department office near Live Oak and discussed the matter. The Live Oak officials, of course, had no knowledge of the details of the matter, but helped to communicate with officials in Tampa and Bartow. During these discussions, the officials in Live Oak assumed that Mrs. Anderson was entitled to receive the amount that she related to them ($9,550). No representations were made to her, however, that would properly lead her to a conclusion that she was entitled to receive that amount. The contractor who was building Mrs. Anderson's dwelling structure also contacted Department personnel. He, too, came to the conclusion that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550. Based on that understanding, he engaged in construction activities that Mrs. Anderson could not afford. While it is apparent that the contractor reached this understanding, it does not appear that anyone at the Department directly represented to him that Mrs. Anderson would be receiving $9,550 in replacement housing payments.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents have discriminated against Petitioners based on Petitioners' national origin.
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene was a loan officer employed by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. The office where Ms. Greene worked was located inside CenterState Bank, N.A., located at 6930 Gall Boulevard in Zephyrhills, Florida. The office is separate from CenterState Banks, Inc. There is signage on a glass wall of her office stating, "CenterState Home Loans, LLC." Ms. Greene is paid by CenterState Home Loans, LLC. She is paid by commission. Thus, there is no incentive not to complete loan applications. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is a separate corporation from CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. Both CenterState Banks, Inc., and CenterState Bank, N.A. are interest holders in CenterState Home Loans, LLC, but are not the managing members of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. Platinum Home Mortgage Corporation is the managing member of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. As the managing member, Platinum Home Mortgage manages the quality control and integrity of CenterState Home Loans, LLC. CenterState Home Loans, LLC, is not authorized to do Federal Housing Association (FHA) loans. Any FHA loans originated by CenterState Home Loans, LLC, are assigned to Platinum Home Mortgage. On August 28, 2009, Petitioners, Mr. Velez's mother, and Petitioners' young daughter came to Ms. Greene's office to discuss the possibility of obtaining a loan through CenterState Home Loans, LLC, and a loan through the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. The purpose of the Pasco County Home Buyers Program is to aid qualified home buyers in purchasing their primary residences. Initially, Petitioners were interesting in applying for an FHA loan. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Velez had telephoned Ms. Greene and asked what types of information would need to be submitted. Ms. Greene stated that he would need W-2 forms, paystubs, bank statements, and anything that showed proof of any assets or debts. Petitioners brought some of the documentation to the meeting. At the meeting, Petitioners supplied information to Ms. Greene, who typed the information into her computer using loan software entitled "Loan Soft." The information was placed on a Uniform Residential Application, which is called a Form 1003. No property was identified on the Form 1003 because Petitioners did not have a sales contract for a specific piece of property. They indicated that the property they wanted to purchase would be approximately $140,000. Mr. Velez told Ms. Greene that he was anticipating a 50 percent loan from Pasco County Home Buyers Program, which would leave approximately $70,000 to be financed plus closing costs. When Ms. Greene input the information into the computer program, it automatically calculated the approximate closing costs. The interest used to do the calculations was based on the interest rate on August 28, 2009, and was not a guaranteed rate. With Petitioners' permission, Ms. Greene pulled a credit report on each of them during the meeting on August 28, 2009. The credit report showed that there were some debts in collection and that there was an outstanding judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Additionally, based on CenterState Home Loan, LLC, guidelines, the credit scores did not qualify Petitioners for a second mortgage, which included a Pasco County Home Buyers Program loan. On August 28, 2009, Ms. Greene needed additional asset information from the Petitioners and requested that they provide her with information concerning checking, savings, or money market accounts for at least a two-month period. Mr. Velez did present a bank statement at the meeting, which showed a current balance of less than $200. Ms. Greene told Petitioners that the debts in collection and the outstanding judgment needed to be resolved. Additionally, Ms. Guerrero was an authorized signer on some of her mother's credit cards, and a statement would have to be provided that Ms. Guerrero was not responsible for the debts associated with those credit cards. The software program that Ms. Greene used automatically completes a page in the application titled, "Pre- Approval Cover Sheet and Check List." The program put "completed" by a number of items which had not been completed, such as the Form 1003 and current asset statements. Petitioners had supplied some pay stubs and some bank statements at the August 28, 2009, meeting. The Form 1003 did not indicate that Petitioners had been pre-approved for a loan. The meeting ran near to the time CenterState Home Loans, LLC, was closing and could not be completed before closing time. Ms. Greene printed out a copy of the Form 1003, with the information that had been completed, and gave it to Petitioners. Petitioners were to complete, sign, and return the Form 1003 to Ms. Greene. Additionally, Petitioners were to provide evidence that the debts had been paid and the judgment satisfied, along with evidence of current assets. Because the application was not completed and additional information was needed, Ms. Greene could not fully analyze the application. Sometime after the August 28, 2009, meeting, Ms. Greene reviewed the information that had been supplied to her by Petitioners and discussed the information with Mr. Velez on the telephone. Mr. Velez wanted to schedule a meeting to discuss the application. She advised him that, based on the credit scores and the limited funds in his bank account, he could not qualify for a loan with a second lien by the Pasco County Home Buyers Program. Thus, there would be no need to meet. Mr. Velez told her that he wanted to continue with the process. Petitioners set about paying off the debts in collection and satisfying the judgment against Ms. Guerrero. Mr. Velez had received a disability settlement and placed some money in a bank account. Petitioners did not supply updated information to Ms. Greene. Sometime in October or November 2009, Mr. Velez called Ms. Greene and requested that she send a realtor a pre-approval letter. Ms. Greene replied that she could not do that because she did not have the supporting documents to be able to give a pre-approval letter. Mr. Velez became very angry and demanded the documents he had previously provided at the August 28, 2009, meeting. Ms. Greene had only copies of the documents that he provided, but she placed them in an envelope and left them for Mr. Velez to pick up. Petitioners stated in Form 1003 that their ethnicity was Hispanic or Latino. Mr. Velez stated at the final hearing: My basis for my racial discrimination was the fact that she [Ms. Greene] denied us the opportunity to turn in updated information when stated that she would allow us to do so. Ms. Greene never stated that she would not take additional information because Petitioners were Hispanic. She has processed loans for other Hispanics which involved the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, and she has closed loans for other minorities. Ms. Greene never discussed Petitioners national origin with them. She did not base any decision regarding their loan application on their national origin. After Petitioners were advised by Ms. Greene that they would not qualify for a loan involving the Pasco County Home Buyers Program, they applied for loans at two other lending institutions and were turned down on the basis of too many inquiries or insufficient credit scores. They finally received a loan from Manhattan Mortgage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioners' Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2010.
