The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), properly denied Petitioner's Application for Qualification to perform work on DOT contracts which exceed $250,000.00 pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Morse Diesel Civil, LLC ("Morse Diesel"), is a new company created to perform heavy civil construction, in particular large road and bridge projects. Morse Diesel is owned 80 percent by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., and 20 percent by KPG, Inc. Morse Diesel Civil, Inc., is owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. KPG, Inc., is owned by Richard Kelly ("Kelly") and Jack Palmer ("Palmer"). Together, Kelly and Palmer have over 50 years' experience in heavy civil construction. On October 8, 1998, Morse Diesel filed an application for qualification with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") to perform all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. Since the company was new and had not yet performed any work, the letters of recommendation provided in the application related to Morse Diesel International, Inc. ("MDI"). MDI is a large commercial construction management company owned by AMEC Holdings, Inc. Through DOT requests for additional information, Morse Diesel learned that DOT was interested in the experience of its principals and recommendations regarding their work. The work experience of Kelly, Palmer, John Zito, and Grant Ralston was provided to DOT in response to those requests. Under Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, DOT thoroughly evaluated Morse Diesel and awarded it an Ability Score of 75 out of 100. DOT found that Morse Diesel had the necessary organization and management, adequate equipment, and a satisfactory work performance record which included an evaluation of the quality of completed work, any history of payment of liquidated damages, untimely completion of projects for which liquidated damages were not paid, cooperative attitude, contract litigations, claims, and defaults. Their score of 75 also included an evaluation of their integrity and responsibility. To date, Morse Diesel's ability score remains unchanged and in effect. On January 11, 1999, Morse Diesel was granted a Certificate of Qualification to perform all classes of work requested except major bridges and provided a maximum capacity rating of $200,000,000; that is, the total aggregate dollar amount of uncompleted work a contractor may have in progress at any time. Thereafter, Morse Diesel applied for a revised Certificate of Qualification to include major bridge classifications. DOT requested and was supplied additional information regarding the work experience of Kelly, Palmer, Zito and Ralston. DOT served a Notice of Intent to Deny the application for additional classes of work and Morse Diesel filed a request for a Section 120.57, administrative hearing. That case was dismissed as moot when Morse Diesel did not renew its Certificate of Qualification. On February 2, 2000, Morse Diesel applied for a Certificate of Qualification for all classes of road and bridge work except for bascule bridge rehabilitation. DOT denied its application on March 3, 2000. The decision to deny an application for Qualification is a very serious matter and each application is thoroughly evaluated by DOT. Less than one percent of all applications are denied. The decision to deny the February 2, 2000, application of Morse Diesel was made by the DOT pre-qualification engineer, Lewis Harper. The Notice of Intent to Deny the Application ("Notice of Intent") was written by Mr. Harper and Brian McGrail of the legal staff and identified the factual bases for the denial of the application and all the statutory and rule criteria utilized in the review of the application. Summary of Allegations The grounds for denial identified by DOT in the written Notice of Intent are: (a) a record of contract litigation, claims, uncooperative attitude, untimely completion of projects without payment of liquidated damages, and defaults by the management of Morse Diesel (Kelly and Palmer) when they worked for S. J. Groves and Sons, Inc., and Balfour Beatty Construction, Inc., on major bridge projects in Alabama, West Virginia, and Florida; (b) S. J. Groves was defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge Project by the State of Alabama; (c) Kelly and Palmer had substantial supervisory and management responsibilities for the Cochrane Bridge project and contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department; (d) The answer to Question 19-2 of the application regarding Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the Cochrane Bridge project does not accurately reflect their role and is considered false, deceptive or fraudulent; (e) Kelly and Palmer had responsibility for prosecuting work and making decisions for filing claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge project in the State of West Virginia and there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims; (f) Kelly and Palmer were litigious and claims-oriented when they were associated with Balfour Beatty in Florida; (g) MDI is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Norm Fornella is an officer is both companies and MDI was not listed in the application as an affiliate; (h) Morse Diesel did not advise DOT of the default of MDI; and (i) KPG is an affiliate of Morse Diesel because Kelly is an officer in both companies and KPG was not listed in the application as an affiliate. The application was not denied due to a lack of adequate experience or equipment. Although Morse Diesel listed the same affiliates in its 1998 application as it did in its 2000 application, the 1998 application was partially granted and the failure to list affiliates was not a ground for denial of the request for additional classes. Allegations (a)-(d): Record of Contract Litigation, Claims, Uncooperative Attitude, Untimely Completion of Projects and Defaults by Management of Morse Diesel The right to submit a claim is a valuable right of the contractor. If a contractor contends he/she is due additional time and money, it is common for him/her to pursue his/her claims rights. If the liability for unforeseen circumstances falls on the owner, the contractor typically pursues claims based upon the increased cost associated with the extra time and expense occasioned by the unforeseen circumstances. Kelly and Palmer have been involved in very difficult, highly technical jobs throughout their careers. It is common for these projects to involve a number of problems and related change items. Industry-wide, complex projects often involve change item costs ranging between 12 percent and 20 percent of the contract price. The Cochrane Bridge Project; Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement; and Application Question 19-2 Construction on the Cochrane Bridge was begun in 1985. Kelly was an executive vice president of S. J. Groves at the time and was also responsible for 30 or 40 other projects. At the same time, Palmer was a vice president of operations for S. J. Groves responsible for 10 to 12 projects. The project manager for the Cochrane Bridge project reported to Palmer and Palmer visited the project every two weeks, mainly to solve problems. The Cochrane Bridge was one of the first cable-stayed bridges built in the United States. It was designed by an Italian design firm and could not be built in accordance with the method of construction proposed by the designer. Moreover, each time there was a design problem, the Italian design firm had to be consulted, which took a great deal of time and caused delays. The Cochrane Bridge was designed to withstand a certain maximum load after construction was completed. The bridge, however, was undergoing greater stress while it was under construction. Consequently, disagreement ensued over the sequence of erection, whose responsibility it was to develop the erection sequencing, whether additional strengthening was needed during construction and, if so, who would pay for it. While these issues were addressed, S. J. Groves stopped work on the project. The State of Alabama requested Groves to work on other areas of the project during the down-time, but Mr. Groves refused for economic reasons. Alabama threatened to default Groves if they did not return to work. Kelly and Palmer attended several high-level company meetings where the issue of whether to continue the project was discussed by Franklin Groves, the owner of S. J. Groves, as well as the company's president and general counsel. Although Kelly and Palmer recommended that S. J. Groves remain on the project, their recommendation was overruled and a default was entered by the State of Alabama. Kelly and Palmer left S. J. Groves within 6 months of the default and formed their own company, RNE, in 1989. There is no reliable evidence that they "contributed substantially to the difficulties experienced by the Alabama Road Department" as charged in the Notice of Intent to Deny. S. J. Groves pursued litigation against the Alabama road department regarding the default and a settlement was reached. The contractor chosen to take over the job after the Groves default, filed claims of approximately $10,000,000 to $12,000,000, and also wound-up in litigation with the State of Alabama. There were thirty to forty vice presidents of S. J. Groves. Neither Kelly nor Palmer understood that they served as a corporate officer of S. J. Groves until after Morse Diesel had filed the 1998 application and were shown corporate forms filed with the Secretary of State. In response to Question 19-2 in the application, Morse Diesel stated: "Richard Kelly and Jack Palmer were denominated vice presidents of S. J. Groves, which defaulted on a job in Alabama in 1989. S. J. Groves had a number of people denominated as Vice Presidents and neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Palmer was at the level of management responsible for the decision to abandon the Cochrane Bridge Project. Both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Palmer recommended against abandoning the project and were overruled. They then left the company." There is no evidence which contradicts this finding. Allegation (e): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in the Wierton- Stubenville Project DOT presented no evidence to support its charge in the Notice of Intent that Kelly and Palmer were responsible for making the decision to file claims on the Wierton-Stubenville Bridge in the State of West Virginia and that there were substantial delays and disputes over settlement of claims. The only direct evidence is that Kelly was not involved in the preparation of claims or claims settlement on the Wierton- Stubenville project. The record is silent as to Palmer's involvement, if any. Allegation (f): Kelly's and Palmer's Involvement in Litigation and Claims at Balfour Beatty Kelly and Palmer were involved in Balfour Beatty's initial foray into the heavy civil construction business in Florida. In the early 1990's, Kelly met with DOT on Balfour Beatty's application for qualification to bid. At that time, DOT was on notice and inquired about Kelly's and Palmer's involvement in the S. J. Grove's default in Alabama. The Cochrane Bridge project was discussed in detail during a meeting held at DOT headquarters in Tallahassee. After being qualified, Balfour Beatty bid $82,000,000 on a large I-95 project in Broward County and was the successful low bidder by $1,000,000. In the beginning of the project Kelly and Palmer acquired staff and equipment, wrote purchase orders for materials, and supervised the project. On December 31, 1991, Dan White was hired as the project manager and Palmer visited the site every couple of weeks until problems on the project escalated. As the project manager, Dan White was in charge of the job and was responsible for the filing of claims. There were right-of-way problems and contaminated soil which delayed the project from the beginning. An initial design problem resulted from the project having been designed by two different design firms operating from different types of surveys. Consequently, the road was not aligned at the same elevation to match existing structures. These elevation problems shut down the project for months. None of the design, right-of-way, or soil contamination problems was the fault of Balfour Beatty. Nonetheless, DOT rejected all change items and required Balfour Beatty to file claims. A lawyer for DOT eventually became involved in the project in an attempt to settle the disputes which resulted in the preparation of Supplemental Agreement Number 73. SA-73 settled the claims up to that date, set new dates for project completion and paid money for completion by those dates. SA-73 was entered into based upon DOT's assurance that a constructibility review had been completed to make sure that the remainder of the project could be constructed in accordance with the existing plans and there would be no further design problems. However, the constructibility review was not complete and new design problems occurred immediately. The design of the parking lots was changed as they were being built. Core holes, used to determine the depth and density of the pavement had not been drilled. This caused more delays and claims. Balfour Beatty filed a lawsuit against DOT, Morrison Knudsen, the CEI on the project, and DOT personnel on site. The case was settled against DOT and its personnel for $4,750,000 and a jury awarded $4,300,000 against Morrison Knudsen. Balfour Beatty remains qualified to bid on DOT projects and was awarded a contract to build the Fuller Warren Bridge in Jacksonville. Kelly and Palmer, as consultants to Balfour Beatty, participated in preparing the bid for the Fuller Warren Bridge and that project is currently staffed with many of the same personnel who worked on the Broward County I-95 project, including the project manager, Dan White. The Broward County I-95 project was awarded on a bid of $82,000,000. DOT paid Balfour Beatty $97,000,000. The completion of the I-95 project was one to two years late and resulted in over 100 claims being filed. The Fuller Warren Bridge project was awarded on a bid of $81,000,000 and has cost to date approximately $94,000,000 to $96,000,000. None of the problems on the I-95 project were caused by Kelly or Palmer. Neither Kelly nor Palmer was involved in the preparation of the lawsuit or its settlement. ALLEGATION (g): Statements in the Application on Affiliations According to DOT's application, "The term 'affiliate' means a predecessor or successor of a contractor under the same, or substantially the same, control or a group of business entities which are connected or associated so that one entity controls or has the power to control each of the other business entities. The term 'affiliate' includes the officers, directors, executives, shareholders active in management, employees and agents of the affiliate. The ownership by one business entity of a controlling interest in another business or a pooling of equipment or income among business entities shall be prima facie evidence that one business entity is an affiliate of another." In its application for bid qualification, Morse Diesel listed Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. as its affiliates. Morse Diesel did not identify either MDI or KPG as "affiliated companies" in response to question number 8 in the application. The application was prepared under the direction of Morse Diesel's President, Mitchell Becker who has a master's degree in civil engineering and a law degree. Based upon his interpretation of the definition, he determined in good faith that MDI and KPG were correctly omitted from the response to question 8 because neither met the criteria for "affiliate" as defined in the application. The answer to question 8 is the same in both the 1998 application and the 2000 application and DOT did not request additional information in the 1998 application related to the response nor did it list the failure to name MDI and KPG as affiliates as a ground for denial of the additional classes of work in 1999. There was a notation on page 2 of 19 in the 1998 application referring to MDI as a "sister company." The question requested letters of recommendation. Morse Diesel was a newly formed company, and did not have recommendations for projects it had completed. Instead, it supplied the recommendations of MDI. It became apparent to Morse Diesel through subsequent requests for additional information that DOT was interested in recommendations about the principals and management of Morse Diesel, not MDI. Consequently, when filing its 2000 application, Morse Diesel did not supply MDI letters of recommendation and instead provided recommendations on previous work completed by Morse Diesel personnel while associated with other companies. The only entities that are predecessor entities or have any control over Morse Diesel are Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. and AMEC Holding, Inc. KPG is not a predecessor or successor of Morse Diesel and has no ability to control it with 20 percent ownership. Similarly, MDI is not a predecessor or successor entity and has no controlling interest in Morse Diesel. There was no intent to hide the nature of Morse Diesel's relationship with MDI or KPG. The fact that Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both Morse Diesel and MDI is clearly stated in their résumés in the application. It is DOT's policy to deny application for misrepresentation only when it is intentional. Morse Diesel listed MDI as an affiliate in its Virginia application because the definition of "affiliate" in that application was broader and appeared to encompass MDI. Footnote 3 on page 7 of the audited financial statements refers to a transfer of funds from MDI to Morse Diesel. Mr. Becker, as president of Morse Diesel testified that the footnote in the financial statement attached to the application was a mistake. MDI has never advanced money to Morse Diesel. The advances made to Morse Diesel were made by Morse Diesel Civil, Inc. Mr. Becker as president of Morse Diesel is aware of the financial condition of the company and reviews the financial statements each month. There is no pooling of equipment or income between Morse Diesel and MDI. Allegation (h): Notice of the MDI Default Question 19-2 on page 16 of 23 of the application asks whether "any officer or partner of your organization has ever been an officer, partner or owner of some other organization that has failed to complete a construction contract?" In response to that question, Morse Diesel explained in the application that Kelly and Palmer had been associated with S. J. Groves when it defaulted on the Cochrane Bridge project in Alabama, but otherwise answered the question "no." Although Mr. Becker and Mr. Fornella are officers of both MDI and Morse Diesel, the application did not reveal the default of MDI on a project in St. Louis because the company is contesting the default and has not as yet failed to complete that construction contract; it is in litigation. There is no credible evidence that Morse Diesel or Mr. Becker intentionally omitted any information from the 2000 application. Allegation (i): See Findings for Allegation (g). Morse Diesel has demonstrated that it is competent and has experience to prosecute the work requested in the application. DOT has allowed at least one other applicant to amend its application to identify related companies as affiliates after DOT has denied certification on that basis. The résumés in the application and evidence presented at hearing reflect the work experience of the management of Morse Diesel and indicate extensive experience in heavy civil construction, including highly complex projects. The management of Morse Diesel has experience constructing all the types of road and bridges for which qualification is sought. Morse Diesel has been qualified in New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, Pennsylvania qualified Morse Diesel on the condition that Mr.Palmer remain associated with Morse Diesel and involved in any project awarded there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Morse Diesel be permitted to supply DOT with corrections to the unintentional inaccuracies in its application and be pre-qualified in the classifications for which it applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Brian A. Crumbaker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents engaged in the unlicensed practice of contracting, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, licensing and monitoring general contractors. The Department headquarters are in Tallahassee, Florida. Part and parcel of the Department's duties is the sanctioning of persons who practice general contracting without a license. Morin is an individual living in Orlando, Florida. At all times relevant hereto, Morin was the registered agent and managing member of the LLC. As of the date of the final hearing, the LLC was no longer an active entity in Florida. No other members of the now-inactive LLC appeared at the final hearing. The Administrative Complaint filed by the Department makes the following allegations: Morin was not registered or certified to engage in the practice of contracting. The LLC was not registered or certified to engage in the practice of contracting. Respondents contracted with Scott Ghivizzani to construct a deck and boat dock in Lake County, Florida. Ghivizzani made a down payment to Respondent, but the deck and boat dock were never constructed. The down payment was never returned to Ghivizzani.1 The LLC is essentially a subsidiary of an entity also known as Barefoot Docks, but which operates in the state of Georgia. The Georgia entity advertises itself as a company which will construct, among other things, floating docks. At some point in time, the Georgia entity decided to create a limited liability company in Florida to handle its sales in this state. Morin, the company's primary salesman in Florida, became registered agent of the Florida entity, known and previously identified as Barefoot Docks of Florida, LLC. Morin resides in Florida and became a salesman for the LLC's products (primarily floating docks) in this state. Ghivizzani had contacted the LLC's representatives in Georgia concerning a floating dock. The Georgia representatives had referred Ghivizzani to Morin as their Florida contact. Thereafter, Ghivizzani dealt solely with Morin concerning the purchase. Ghivizzani ultimately signed a contract on June 14, 2005. The contract is entitled "Barefoot Docks Contract" and is signed by Ghivizzani. The total price of the contract was $49,500, with a deposit of $29,350 paid at the time of signing. The contract sets forth a general list of the component parts of the dock. Included in the contract was a provision in Section 5 saying, "All appropriate permitting will be handled by Barefoot Docks and no construction will begin until all permits are in effect. Owner will be charged all local and state permitting fees at final billing." The tone of the contract is a sufficient basis for Ghivizzani to believe that (1) there would be construction involved; and (2) Barefoot Docks was a licensed contractor. The contract did not, however, distinguish between the Georgia and Florida entities. The contract is not signed by the LLC or the Georgia entity. Morin does not dispute the general allegations in the Administrative Complaint except that the subject contract was between the LLC and Ghivizzani, i.e., that Morin was not individually bound by the contract. Further, Morin claims he was the agent of the LLC but did not individually contract with Ghivizzani. Also, Morin maintains that the LLC, of which he was a partial owner, merely sold Ghivizzani a prefabricated dock "kit" and agreed to assemble it for Ghivizzani, i.e., that it was not construction per se. The normal turnaround time for the LLC to put together a dock kit was about one month from the date it was ordered. In fact, another project completed by the LLC just across the lake from the Ghivizzani project took only about a month. The Ghivizzani project took six to eight months just to obtain a permit from the St. John's Water Management District. By the time this permit was issued, the LLC had essentially stopped doing business. The requisite city and/or county permits for this project were never obtained. The floating dock project necessarily required some electrical components. The electrical wiring component was not part of the original contract, but could be done at an additional cost to the owner. In that case, the LLC would have contacted an electrician to do the work. Ghivizzani's down payment was deposited by Morin into the LLC operating account. Morin at that time had access to the account as a member of the LLC and used a portion of the down payment to order component parts for the dock structure and to seek the necessary permits. Morin estimates that $9,000 to $10,000 of the deposit was used, leaving $19,000 to $20,000 of the deposit available. At some point in time, Ghivizzani decided to terminate the contract and asked Morin to return his deposit. Morin contacted the LLC's other members (who were both in Georgia) and was told that they would attempt to take money from another pending project in order to repay Ghivizzani. Morin attempted for several months to obtain the deposit as promised. After months of efforts by Morin to obtain Ghivizzani's down payment, the Georgia partners stopped returning Morin's calls. Morin realized at some point that the business had closed; at that time, there was no money in the LLC's bank accounts. None of the deposit was ever repaid to Ghivizzani. The materials and component parts of his dock were allegedly being held in the Georgia warehouse, but nothing was ever delivered to Ghivizzani. Ghivizzani had also paid the LLC to demolish an existing dock on the site. That work was done and paid for separately from the new dock purchase. Neither Morin nor the LLC has ever been licensed in the State of Florida to perform general contracting or electrical contracting.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation finding that Respondent, Barefoot Docks of Florida, LLC, is guilty of the unlicensed practice of contracting. Inasmuch as the LLC is no longer active, imposition of a fine or other sanctions against it would be meaningless. However, its principals (Jim Peterson and Dennis Shaw) should be denied certification should they ever apply in this state. As for Respondent, Chad Morin, the mitigating facts support an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered residential contractor, having been issued license number RR 0032366. On March 29, 1979, Respondent, doing business as Bert Kinast Construction Co., entered into a contract with Gary and Harriet Nelson to construct a residence for the sum of $65,122. On April 15, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed as of that date for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. Respondent signed the affidavit for the express purpose of obtaining a draw payment for construction performed and, as a result of the affidavit, did receive a draw payment of $9,765.30. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, Panama Machinery & Supply Co. was owed $193.98 for material furnished to Respondent for the construction of the Nelson residence. On June 4, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed as of that date for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. Respondent signed the affidavit for the purpose of receiving a draw payment for construction performed and, as a result of the affidavit, did receive a draw payment of $22,792.70. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, he owed Panama Machinery & Supply Co. $1,249.94. During August, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit stating that all bills for materials and labor performed for the construction of the Nelson residence had been paid. At the time Respondent signed the affidavit, certain materialman and subcontractors who furnished labor and material for the Nelson construction project were not paid, to wit: Panama Machinery & Supply Co., Coastal Insulation, West Florida Natural Gas Company, Culligan Water Services, Inc., Dixie Window Co. and Rachel's Lighting & Home Accessories. Respondent violated Section 1115.7 of the 1979 Edition of the Standard Building Code by not providing adequate head room in the stairwell at the Nelson residence. On or about August 3, 1979, Respondent entered into a contract with John C. and Barbara L. McHaffie to construct a residence for the sum of $105,475. On or about October 11, 1979, Respondent endorsed an instrument, specifically a check, acknowledging that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the McHaffie residence had been paid in full. Respondent endorsed the check to obtain payment for construction he had performed to that date. At the time Respondent signed the check containing that acknowledgment, certain material-men and subcontractors were unpaid, to wit: Buckley's Plumbing, Moore Concrete Products, William Smith and Panama Machinery & Supply Co. On or about November 20, 1979, Respondent endorsed an instrument, specifically a check, acknowledging that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the McHaffie residence had been paid in full. Also on November 20, 1979, Respondent signed an affidavit entitled "Partial Release of Lien on Progress Payment," stating that all bills for labor and materials furnished for the construction of the McHaffie residence were paid in full. Respondent endorsed the check and signed the affidavit in order to obtain a construction draw and did, as a result, obtain the construction draw for labor and materials used in the construction of the McHaffie residence. At the time that Respondent endorsed the check and signed the affidavit, certain materialmen and subcontractors were not paid, to wit: Parker Heating & Cooling, Culligan Water Services, Inc. , Moore Concrete Products, Overhead Door Company of Panama City, Inc., Coastal Insulation, Panama Machinery & Supply Co., G & H Building Materials and William Smith. Respondent received $50,937.50 which was to be used by Respondent to pay for materials and/or labor provided by various materialmen and/or subcontractors for the construction of the McHaffie residence. Certain materialmen and/or subcontractors were not paid from the monies received by Respondent for that purpose, to wit: Parker Heating & Cooling, Culligan Water Services, Inc., Buckley's Plumbing, Moore Concrete Products, Overhead Door Company of Panama City, Inc., Coastal Insulation, Hodges Lumber, Panama Machinery & Supply Co., G & H Building Materials and William Smith. On August 17, 1979, Respondent obtained permit number 5260 from Bay County, Florida, to perform the McHaffie construction. Respondent represented on the application for the above-referenced permit that his estimate of the building costs for the McHaffie residence was $57,250. Since the contract for the McHaffie residence was for $105,475, the price of the building permit would have been nearly $160 more since Bay County charges $3 permit cost per every $1,000 construction cost. During his construction of the McHaffie residence, Respondent violated Sections 1603 and 1706.8(1) of the 1979 Edition of the Standard Building Code in that the concrete floor in some areas was less than three and a half inches thick and caulking or flashing was not installed around the sliding glass doors. On or about November 25, 1981, Respondent was convicted of passing a worthless check, in violation of Section 832.05, Florida Statutes. Respondent's worthless check was given by Respondent to West Building Materials on or about March 25, 1981, as payment for building materials.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding the Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint, suspending Respondent's license as a registered residential contractor; for a period of three years, imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000 and placing Respondent on probation for three years upon reinstatement of his license, with the terms and conditions thereof to be set by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire J. K. Linnan, Executive Director 547 North Monroe Street, Construction Industry Licensing Suite 204 Board Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Mr. Berthold Kinast 1244 Airport Road Panama City, Florida 32401 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues presented in this hearing concern the request by Ortega Island, Inc. to be granted permission, by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, to construct a bridge across the Stockton Canal in Duval County, Florida. The permit review is under the general authority of Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and associated rules.
Findings Of Fact In July, 1980, Ortega Island, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Respondent, filed an application with the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, which would allow it to construct a bridge giving access from a mainland area to an adjacent spoil island known as Ortega Island. The spoil island was created in 1959. This proposed project is found in Duval County Florida. The island is approximately 42 acres in size and is adjacent to the Ortega River in an area roughly two and a half miles from the confluence of the Ortega and St. Johns Rivers. The body of water to be spanned by the proposed bridge is known as the Stockton Canal, a man-made canal. That canal is connected at its north and south ends to the Ortega River. The State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, which will now be referred to as the Department, reviewed the initial application of July, 1980, and a revision of May, 1981. The review was conducted by the Northeast District Office of the Department. A further modification was offered through a revised construction plan which dates from May, 1982. Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 4 is constituted of the initial applications related to the project design and certain comments made by the Department of Environmental Regulation. Respondent has sought the approval of its permit application based upon the belief that the project involves dredging below the mean high water line and filling above the mean high water line of waters of the state. Consequently, Department approval has been sought pursuant to those Sections 253.123 and 403.087, Florida Statutes, and the related provisions in Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. In the initial permit application of July, 1980, the applicant had proposed to construct a 20-foot concrete span, eight feet high, which was to be connected to the mainland and Ortega Island by the placement of fill material, thereby building causeways which extended approximately 55 feet into the canal from each end of the shore. This would have entailed the placement of 3,000 cubic yards of fill waterward of the mean high water line and reduced the canal width to 20 feet at the area of the bridge site. The Department did not look with favor upon the elimination of marine habitat by the construction of causeways and the attendant adverse impacts in the hydrographic regime in the Stockton Canal. This is shown in the Department's remarks found in Respondents' Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. To address those concerns, the Respondent employed Dr. Barry Benedict, an expert in the field of hydrographic engineering, who conducted hydrographic studies of the Stockton Canal. These studies are found as part of Respondents' Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. In summary, Dr. Benedict recommended that the bridge span be no less than 48 feet. Pamela Sperling, the hydrographic expert of the Department, reviewed these materials and concurred that a minimum span length of 48 feet would be necessary. This is reflected in a memorandum offered by Ms. Sperling, which is Respondents' Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence. The May, 1981, revision of the project calling for 52 foot bridge span is the result of the Benedict study and the remarks of Sperling. That proposal would allow for 39 foot causeways on each end of the bridge and 2,000 cubic yards of fill material waterward of the mean high water line. Notwithstanding the acceptance of the hydrographic improvements related to the new provision, the Department still was concerned about adverse impacts to marine habitat which would occur with the placement of fill on related biological resources. Likewise, the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, National Marine Fisheries Service, United States Department of Interior, and United States Environmental protection Agency had expressed concern about this destruction. Those comments are found in Respondents' Exhibit Nos. 13 through 16 respectively, as admitted into evidence. In the face of these reservations, the May, 1982, revision was made, which would allow a total span of the waterway, eliminating causeways and fill material below the mean high water line. Following the May, 1982, revision, the Department issued its notice of intent to grant the permit. Notification was made on September 10, 1982, a copy of which may be found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 17 admitted into evidence. The permit application appraisal by the Department was conducted by Tim Deuerling, who is an Environmental Specialist who assesses dredge and fill permit applications. Mr. Deuerling additionally has expertise in the field of biology and water quality analysis related to dredge and fill activities. His appraisal of the project is based upon several visits to the site, and his impressions of the site are outlined in a report of October 30, 1980. A copy is found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. On April 1, 1983, a further revision was offered to the permit application. The initial aspect of that revision concerned stormwater disposal for a concrete bridge. The remaining aspect of the revision was the suggestion that a timber bridge be considered as an alternative structure. The April 1, 1983, revision formed the basis of the consideration of the project by way of final hearing. The Petitioners protested consideration of the April, 1983, revision contending that the revision was not appropriately reviewed by the agency, in that it constituted a substantial revision in the application process and was not the application which the agency had accepted in indicating its proposal to grant the permit in September, 1982. The hearing was allowed to go forward over the objection of the opponents to the permit, it having been determined by the Hearing Officer that the revisions of April, 1983, were not so remarkable that they would require a new permit application or further agency study and review prior to the formulation of proposed agency action in deciding to grant or deny the permit request. Further, it was determined that the April, 1983, revision could be considered without the necessity of additional notification of the issues to be considered in the hearing, there being an adequate opportunity for the applicant to develop the record in favor of those modifications and to allow the Department, Petitioners, and Intervenor to form the needed record response. In the dispute as considered at the final hearing, the petitioners and Intervenor contended that the project should not be allowed because it fails to comply with requisite provisions of 253 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the associated rules related to those statutes. In addition to the protest which has been made by those individuals having party status in this instance, there have been other written statements in opposition which may be found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 18 admitted into evidence, a composite exhibit. Those objections by Petitioners and Intervenor are more specifically detailed and discussed in further sections of this Recommended Order. Under the April 1, 1983, proposal, the concrete bridge is composed of a system of hollow cord deck members supported by concrete piles. There are six pile bents and four of those are within the waterway. The spacing between the piles is 24 feet minimum horizontal clearance, with the bottom of the bridge deck being eight feet above the water at the lowest clearance point. The bridge span is 130 feet, to allow the bridge construction to be completed without the placement of fill below the line of mean high water on either end of the bridge. The bridge approaches under the new proposal are constituted of asphaltic concrete roadways supported by fill material and that fill material is separated from the waterway by the use of sheet pilings. Water drainage from the deck surface of the concrete bridge would flow through a collection system, which is part of the bridge structure. The water, which is released from the bridge surface on the mainland side, would be transported to a stilling and percolation basin also serving a residential area of approximately 42 acres. The water from the 42 acres now flows through a grass swale before entering the canal. The project design would accommodate the 42 acre flow and the .35 acres from the bridge. The water from the 42 acre plot and the bridge project flows into the Stockton Canal after receiving some water treatment in the transport process. The volume of the percolation basin is 620 cubic feet. The establishment of this percolation basin will not adversely affect the adjacent properties in the 42 acre tract by prohibiting the flow patterns from that property or sufficiently change the quality of stormwater treatment from the adjacent property to cause adverse impacts on receiving waters in the Stockton Canal. Runoff from the bridge to the island side of the proposed concrete structure would flow through a swale system for treatment before entering the Stockton Canal. The treatment afforded all runoff is by surface flow and vertical percolation. The alternative bridge structure, i.e., the wooden bridge, would span the Stockton Canal and not require filling either waterward or landward of the mean high water line. Unlike the concrete bridge, the deck surface is pervious. Consequently, water may be introduced directly into the canal from the deck surface. The stormwater runoff on the bridge approach on the mainland side would be collected and discharged through the existing grass swale and from there, into the canal. Drainage from the bridge surface and approach on the island side would be through a swale system and from there into the canal. The Stockton Canal is constituted of Class III waters within the meaning of Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the Respondent is required to give reasonable assurances that the project would not violate water quality criteria or standards related to Class III waters. In this instance, construction and utilization of the concrete bridge, with its attendant approaches, would not degrade the water below those standards, that is to say, the necessary reasonable assurances have been given that the short and long-term effects of the project will not result in violations of Class III water quality standards. The latest concrete modification allows for the removal and treatment of the stormwater effluent which flows from the bridge surface and approaches. No fill is to be placed in the waters of the state below the mean high water line. (The mean high water line was established in the course of the hearing through the testimony and the evidence presented.) Fill will be contained by sheet pile. Turbidity screens will be used while the construction is underway to confine turbidity problems in the placement of the bridge pilings. Siltation barriers are to be employed while removing the existing root overhang on the island side of the bridge to avoid the deposition of those materials in the waters of the state. The timber bridge allows for water to flow directly from the surface into the canal but the contaminants introduced into the canal would not exceed standards. According to Harvey C. Gray, Jr., State of Florida, Department of Transportation, an expert in chemical water quality analysis, the expected constituents from the stormwater runoff from the bridge decks either directly or indirectly introduced into the canal would not violate water quality criteria parameters. Nor would leaching from the wooden bridge pilings present a violation of water quality criteria. These opinions are accepted. A study mentioned by Harvey Gray has established that the contaminants from the deck surface are usually contained in the first half inch of rainfall and the treatment arrangements for stormwater runoff are designed to accommodate that first half inch. The source of pollution on the deck is vehicular traffic and vehicular fallout. Moreover the transport of the stormwater over the land surface attenuates the concentration of pollutants. Don Clay Bayley is Chief of the Environmental Services Division, City of Jacksonville. Testimony given by the witness Bayley, who has some experience in testing for leaching of contaminants from wood pilings, pointed out the toxicity of those materials. He acknowledges, however, that treatment substances can be used which are not toxic. The applicant should use these substances if the timber bridge is employed. Bayley alluded to studies done by the Department of Transportation for the Buckman Bridge, which is a bridge serving Interstate 95, related to the fact that violations of lead, zinc, and copper standards of water quality have been found in that area. These observations did not take into account an acceptable mixing zone where the contaminants are to be introduced into the St. Johns River under the bridge. More importantly, the Buckman Bridge is very different in terms of the amount of vehicle traffic, in that there are an extremely high number of vehicles using that bridge, as contrasted with the limited use of the subject bridge. Therefore, Bayley's concerns are not well- founded. Otherwise, the timber bridge offers the same quality of protection as the concrete bridge and reasonable assurances have been given that the short and long-term affects of the project will not violate water quality standards for Class III waters. Nonetheless, the higher quality of water treatment would be received in the concrete bridge alternative. In support of the application, sufficient water quality sampling has been done to establish reasonable assurances that water quality standards shall not be exceeded. Moreover, nutrient loading is not expected as a result of the bridge construction. In addition, witnesses Deuerling, Tyler and Craft, employees of the Department and experts in water quality analysis, do not believe water quality criteria will be exceeded by this construction, and their opinion is accepted. In summary, the necessary reasonable assurances have been given that water quality criteria related to Class III waters, as found in Rule 17-3.121, Florida Administrative Code, will not be exceeded and that the project will not promote undue nutrient loading as contemplated by Rule 17-3.011(11), Florida Administrative Code. Peter Hallock, project engineer, established in his testimony that either alternative in the bridge design would not adversely affect drainage related to adjoining properties on the landside of the bridge. The concerns expressed by Dr. Arlynn Quinton White, Jr., Department of Biology and Marine Science, Jacksonville University, of the possibility of stormwater impacts, with particular emphasis on hydrocarbon concentrations, are not accepted. The runoff is not found to be violative of water quality standards in the receiving waters. These findings take into account the expected maximum number of average daily trips, 460. Given the number of average daily trips, the stormwater contaminants, which are untreated, would not violate DER water quality standards. The number of average daily trips on the proposed bridge is much less than the 4,000 trips over the study bridge referenced by the witness Gray and generally discussed before. That study did not show violations of the criteria for Class III waters, which is the classification for the Stockton Canal. The location of the study, while not in Duval County, dealt with sufficiently similar circumstances to allow the acceptance of those findings. Testimony was presented by Dr. Barry Benedict, author of the aforementioned hydrographic study. His testimony concerned an analysis of the flow patterns at present and following the installation of the bridge. The testimony was based upon results of the initial investigation or study, found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence and the update of April 18, 1983, found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. Dr. Benedict's analysis utilized a liberal estimate of the impact of the bridge on the canal system on the question of flow. His findings were to the effect that the bridge would cause minimal change in the flow velocity of the water and in sedimentation in the overall canal. He did not feel that the installation of the bridge would unduly hamper the flushing qualities in the canal or result in a flood hazard to adjacent properties. This was his opinion whether the concrete alternative or timber bridge were elected. Benedict felt that a maximum nine percent difference in flow would occur bringing the flushing time within the canal system from 3 hours and 30 minutes to approximately 3 hours and 45 minutes. This, in Benedict's mind, is not a substantial hydrographic alteration. In summary, Benedict felt that the installation of the bridge would have minimal impact in terms of hydrographics. Benedict's depiction of these matters is accepted as being correct. The Department of Environmental Regulation's hydrographic engineer and specialist in hydrodynamics and water quality analysis concurred with Dr. Benedict on the hydrographic effects of the installation of the bridge. Her concurrence is based upon a review of the Respondents' Exhibit No. 6. Ms. Sperling had also examined the site for the proposed bridge project and made independent calculations that the flow velocity would not be significantly influenced by the installation of the bridge. Ms. Sperling believes that a flushing time which is essentially one half tidal cycle or six hours is acceptable, and she believes that the flushing time in this project after the bridge installation will fall within three and a half to four hours. Sperling also indicated that she did not feel that the bridge project would have adverse effects on the water quality within the canal. The opinions of Sperling, as related herein, are accepted as factually correct. George Robert Register, III, who holds a bachelor's degree in biology and a master's degree in coastal and oceanographic engineering, gave testimony on the hydrographics within the Stockton Canal. Register's opinions were not based upon testing or calculations related to the project such as sediment analysis, studies of tides, or soil borings. He noted the gradual shallowing which has occurred within the canal over a period of years and expressed concern that the change in flow could result in a more rapid shallowing. He alluded to the observations of Frederick W. Brundick, III, a resident of the Stockton Canal, who has seen the shallowing occur over a 20-year period. Register also stated that he feels that the present situation in the Stockton Canal is similar in nature to a problem which occurred in another area of the Greater St. Johns River which is known as Mill Cove. In that instance, dramatic silting has taken place. Register contended that boat traffic helps to suspend the particles of soil and alleviate silting, an influence which will be diminished after bridge construction due to less traffic. Register indicated that the analysis of the hydrographics, which was done by Dr. Benedict, was insufficient and indicated that, in his opinion, a stability test should have been done related to the project area. The stability analysis pertains to whether the water system will continue in its present flow pattern or is on the brink of rapid shallowing. While the observations of Register and Brundick related to the shallowing of the canal system are accepted, Register's opinion that the present system will rapidly deteriorate into a more shallow configuration, as with the case with Mill Cove, is not accepted. Nor is Register's suggestion that a stability test was in order on this occasion found to be correct. The calculations by Dr. Benedict, confirmed by Sperling, are found to be the more accurate depiction of the effects of the installation of the bridge. The placement of the bridge is not expected to be an event which will imbalance the flow patterns in such a fashion that rapid siltation will occur. Based upon Department of Environmental Regulation reports, the types of sediments in the canal subject to water borne transportation are silty. They have low fall velocities, which would make them less likely to increase sedimentation in the canal system due to the installation of the bridge, when compared to other soil types. The sediment materials are very fine and not such that they would readily settle out due to minor reductions in the flow velocity, such as would occur with the construction of the bridge. Although the reduction in flow velocity within the canal system after the bridge build-out is not such that it would cause water quality violations or substantially impede the flow, there will be some increase in siltation. This change in sedimentation or siltation is recognized by the Respondent, in the person of its expert, Dr. Benedict. The fact of this increase in siltation would require channel maintenance within the canal, and no provision has been made in the application for channel maintenance. That maintenance is necessary to prohibit undue shallowing, especially at the location of the bridge. This siltation at the bridge will result based upon the placement of the pilings, which will slow the velocity of water, leading to attachment of marine organisms to the bridge pilings. Consequently, provision should be made for channel maintenance. Likewise, even though the Respondent hopes to eventually have a homeowner's association responsible for bridge maintenance, that issue of the development of the island was not considered in the course of this hearing, making it necessary for someone to maintain the constructed bridge and approaches prior to any future development. That provision had not been made and should be arranged for. Both the channel and bridge maintenance would be an appropriate responsibility for the applicant for permit. The necessity for the bridge and canal to be maintained by the applicant is not such that the Department, pursuant to Rule 17-4.11, Florida Administrative Code, should require proof of financial responsibility or posting of a bond. If the applicant is financially able to construct the bridge, it is determined that the applicant could be expected to be financially able to maintain the bridge and canal. Witnesses of the Petitioners, in particular, the witness Bayley, have expressed concern about the placement of fill material on Ortega Island, in that it is the belief of that witness that the placement of the fill would displace the muck layer which would then be forced into the canal. Witnesses White and Register supported Bayley's opinions reference the muck layer. There is, in fact, a muck underlay on the island, and the placement of the fill soil can be expected to force the transport of some of the muck underlayer. The amount of muck layer to be displaced is not certain; however, by placing the piling barrier at the edge of the canal the muck can be contained. The applicant has made provision for protection against the muck material where the pilings are proposed for installation. Nonetheless, it may be necessary to extend the length of pilings beyond the area of the bridge abutment and approach to the bridge on the island side, to contain this material, and the applicant should make any necessary modification to prohibit the introduction of the highly organic muck material which could cause problems with ph and dissolved oxygen content related to water quality standards. In summary, the applicant has given the necessary reasonable assurances that the muck material will not violate water quality standards in the water, subject to necessary adjustments in the piling design on the island side in the area of the bridge approaches to block the flow of the muck. On the related question of the overall stability of the island, the geomorphologic process evidence shows that the island is becoming more inundated with water. This is borne out by the observations of Mr. Brundick, a 20-year resident in the area of the island, and is more graphically described in the photographs which are Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. His finding is also supported by the observations of Dr. White to the effect that certain vegetational species seen on the island indicated that increased island area was under water. The placement of the bridge approach fill was not shown to be a critical contributor to this condition. Notwithstanding the island's long-term physical change, there was no indication that this condition, per se, when considered in the context of the building of the bridge and the approaches, indicates violation of the permitting statutes or rules of the Department of Environmental Regulation. The development or the construction of the bridge requires the dredging of material in waters of the state. Per Section 253.123, Florida Statutes and Sections 17-4.29, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent/Applicant needs to address the possible interference with conservation of fish, marine, and wildlife and other natural resources which the project may promote contrary to public interest. Respondent satisfactorily responds to those matters. The biological and ecological studies, which were done by the Department of Environmental Regulation, and reported in Respondents' Exhibits 8 and 9, indicate that the area in the Stockton Canal is not particularly productive in terms of its biological volume and diversity. There is very little litoral vegetation and submerged grasses are scarce. The most diverse area is in the proposed project site which formally was the location of a bridge. The remains of that bridge debris have promoted a more diversified biological community. To protect the species and habitat during and after construction, the applicant is using a full span bridge, which is in keeping with recommendations by various state and federal agencies. The testimony of the expert biologist Tim Deuerling of the Department of Environmental Regulation, was to the effect that the impacts of the project related to biological resources was minimal. Jeremy Craft, of the Department of Environmental Regulation, agrees with Deuerling and indicates that there will be no impact on the resources pertaining to fish, marine, and other natural resources. Moreover, both Deuerling and Craft felt that the placement of the bridge piling would grant an opportunity for increased biological diversity in the Stockton Canal. Jeremy Tyler also indicated that he was of the opinion that the bridge would not negatively impact fish, wildlife, and other natural resources premised upon the fact that no fill was being placed waterward of the mean high water line and no substantial changes in the hydrographics of the canal system. These opinions expressed by Deuerling, Craft, and Tyler are accepted as being correct. The installation of the bridge will not result in the destruction of oyster beds, clam beds, or marine productivity including destruction of marine habitats, grass flats suitable as nursery or feeding grounds for marine life, and establishment of marine soils which could be used for producing plant growth useful for nursing or feeding grounds for marine life or interfere with the natural shoreline processes to an extent that is contrary to the public interest within the meaning of Subsection 253.123(2)(d) Florida Statutes. It was additionally established that the placement of the canal will not interfere with the endangered West Indian Manatee, the area of the canal having insufficient vegetation for the manatee to feed on. Any manatee passing through the area of the canal will not be hindered by the bridge's placement. Additionally, there may be some benefit to the placement of the bridge in that it would tend to slow the boat traffic, decreasing the possibility of injury to the manatee by boat propellers. This was established by testimony of the witness Deuerling. In summary, no showing was made that the project will adversely impact fish, marine, and other natural resources in the area to the extent that it is contrary to the public interest. Benedict and Sperling have established, through their opinion testimony, that the installation of the bridge would not have an adverse impact on the shoaling conditions which are occurring at the north and south entrances to the canal. This testimony is correct. The shoaling conditions will occur with or without the construction of the bridge. Moreover, as established through Benedict's testimony, during a flood stage condition, such as a flood tide five feet above mean high water, the bridge would make no notable contribution, in that it would cause a backup of water only in the range of two to three inches. The bridge, when installed, will reduce boat traffic. Nonetheless, at present, boats are not a primary factor in reducing the amount of siltation in the canal and a further reduction in the contribution which those boats make to reduction of siltation is inconsequential. Any positive contribution by boat traffic in reducing siltation is offset by the negative impact of that traffic on water quality. On the subject of hydrographic changes to be brought about by the installation of the bridge, there will be no substantial alteration or impediment to the flow of water in the Stockton Canal to an extent that it is contrary to the public interest. As briefly alluded to before, there will be some impacts upon navigation in the canal; however, those impacts do not reach the level of becoming a hazard to navigation or a serious impediment to navigation contrary to the public interest. At present, approximately 20 boats may use the canal in a weekend according to the testimony of Fred Brundick. The canal already has a "no wake" zone and the placement of the bridge will not tend to interfere with the speed of boat traffic through the canal. If anything, the placement of the bridge may assist in slowing down boat traffic within the canal for those individuals who tend to disregard the "no wake" zone. The shoaling, which has been spoken to in a prior paragraph, is most severe in the north end where minimum controlling depths of 3.7 feet mean low tide may be found as contrasted with 4.4 feet mean low tide at the south end. Therefore, southern access into the canal is easier for those persons who have residences on the canal and other persons who use the canal, when their boats have deep drafts. Smaller boats will be able to enter the canal from the north and south if the bridge is constructed, in view of the fact that the bridge affords an eight foot clearance. Those boats which would not be able to gain entrance into the canal after the construction of the bridge would be boats which require more than 4.4 feet of draft and greater than eight feet of vertical clearance. H. J. Skelton, a resident of the landside of the north end of the canal, testified in the course of the hearing and indicated that the placement of the bridge would limit the type and size of boat that he might wish to purchase in the future. At present, he does not own a boat or dock at his residence. Witness Brundick also established that he would be precluded from bringing one of his boats to his home because of the placement of the bridge, except at extremely high tide events. That boat is one which is infrequently moored at his home. Raymond Perry Harris, who lives on the canal, has difficulty bringing his boat through the north end at low tide, and he would be unable to utilize the southern entrance at low tide due to the 14 foot clearance necessary for the boat to go under obstacles such as the bridge. He brings this boat to the dock at his home approximately three to four times a month. Although it has been demonstrated that there will be some hindrance to local residents and others due to the placement of the bridge, the only hazard presented by the placement of the bridge concerns boat operators who are not attentive and water-skiers. This latter category of canal users would be utilizing the canal contrary to the "no wake zone, even without the placement of the bridge. Thus, water-skiers and careless boat operators are not the categories of individuals who use the canal and by doing so should cause the rejection of this permit request. On balance, the proposed bridge is not a hazard or impediment to navigation and its restrictions to the utilization of the canal are not contrary to the public interest. The minimal restrictions on navigation are within acceptable limits. The project, in its design, will not require the placement of fill below the line of mean high water. Determination of the mean high water line was made by a registered surveyor and that determination may be found as Respondents' Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Consequently, no local approval was sought pursuant to Section 253.1245, Florida Statutes (1982). There is no extension to land by the process of the construction of this project. However, there is an area of overhanging vegetation with an underlying undulation/indentation, which by its design causes the vegetation to be slightly above the water at low tide and under water at high tide, with the indentation being configured in a fashion which places the line of mean high water further landward than depicted by the applicant. The locale of these features is at the construction site on the island side. This phenomenon has occurred due to the changes related to erosion. The indentation or cave eroded because of tidal influences and boat traffic, leaving the vegetation mass. The overhang material would be removed, and this process does not involve the extension of land from a point above the line of mean high water into waters of the state. A siltation barrier would be used while this overhang is being cleared, and the sheet piling would be installed at or above the mean high water line, and associated work related to the installation of the pile would be landward of the line of mean high water. The applicant's plans do not show that the piling barrier or bulkhead will follow the configuration of that phenomenon. At present, there is a straight line bulkhead. Nonetheless, the applicant could vary the configuration and prevent the placement of fill in the water. To accommodate this problem from an engineering point of view, the bridge can be lengthened to assure that the bridge spans the entire waterway at the point of the phenomenon and thereby prevent any placement of fill waterward of the line of mean highwater. In addition, the bulkhead can be placed so that it follows the configuration of the undulation. In summary, treatment of the overhang problem will not require the extension of land into waters of the state by the placement of fill below the mean high water line as described in Section 253.1245, Florida Statutes (1982) . Moreover, the removal of the material in the overhang and the placement of the bulkhead to approximate the configuration of the cave and expansion of the bridge span on the island side are not actions which would violate water quality standards of the Department or are contrary to public interest related to conservation of fish, marine wildlife, or other natural resources. Neither will this tend to adversely impact or substantially alter or impede the flow of navigable waters contrary to public interest nor present a navigational hazard or serious impediment to navigation contrary to public interest. There is some indication of concern on the topic of decreased property values for residents on the landside on the proposed bridge. Likewise, testimony was given concerning the opinion of one homeowner that additional traffic would be hazardous to persons living in the present neighborhood adjacent to the canal. Additionally Phillip Fred Baumgardner is a member of the general public and gave testimony to the effect that the installation of the bridge would prohibit certain commercial boats from being able to work the canal. Owen Ganzel, who fishes in the area, expressed concern that the bridge installation would cause a decline in fish population; however, he indicated that lately, the Ortega Island area has improved These concerns are not substantial enough to cause the rejection of this permit application based upon public-interest concerns.
Findings Of Fact DOT is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the construction and maintenance of roads designated as part of the State Highway System. Clark is a road and bridge construction company located in Dozier, Alabama, and certified to bid on DOT contracts. On January 23, 1991, Clark submitted its bid on DOT Project No. 61530- 3601 for the construction of two adjacent bridges (Holmes Creek Bridge and Holmes Creek Relief Bridge) located in Washington County, Florida. On April 4, 1991, DOT and Clark entered into a contract for this project. The construction on the project was to take 400 contract days. On December 8, 1991, DOT advised Clark of its intention to declare Clark delinquent for unsatisfactory progress on the project. The contract required Clark to submit a construction schedule for approval by DOT. Under its approved construction schedule, Clark anticipated that it would commence its pile driving activity on the tenth day of the contract. Clark also proposed beginning the superstructure 40 days after beginning the substructure. The contract provides in part as follows: 8-7.3.2 . . . The Department may grant an extension of contract time when a controlling item of work is delayed by factors not reasonably anticipated or foreseeable at the time of bid. Such extension of time may be allowed only for delays occurring during the contract time period or authorized extensions of the contract time period. * * * Delays in delivery of materials or competent equipment which affect progress on a controlling item of work will be considered as basis for granting a time extension if such delays are beyond the control of the Contractor or supplier. * * * 8-8.2 Regulations Governing Suspension for Delinquency: Under the relevant rule provisions, a contractor is delinquent when unsatisfactory work progress is being made under these conditions: * * * (3) The allowed contract time has not expired and the percentage of dollar value of completed work is 15 percentage points or more below the dollar value of work which should have been completed according to the approved working schedule for the project. After falling 15 percent behind, the delinquency continues until the percentage points of the dollar value of completed work is within five percentage points of the dollar value of work which should have been completed according to the approved working schedule for the project. The contract required Clark to procure pilings for the project from a certified prestressed concrete manufacturer. The concrete mix design used by the prestress manufacturer had to be approved by DOT before construction could begin. At the time Clark prepared its bid, there were no preapproved prestressed concrete manufacturers in Florida or Alabama in the reasonable vicinity of the project. In preparing its bid, Clark contacted Sherman International (Sherman), a prestressed concrete manufacturer with headquarters in Birmingham and a plant in Mobile, Alabama. Immediately upon being awarded the contract, Clark notified DOT that Sherman would be its prestress supplier. Sherman had experience in fabricating prestressed products for states other than Florida and therefore believed it would not have a problem meeting Florida's certification requirements. The certification process requires inspection and approval by DOT officials of the manufacturer's equipment, material suppliers, plant operations, concrete mix, etc. The certification process also involves the production and pouring of test batches which must be reviewed by DOT officials who note problems with the product and direct resolution of the problems. The certification process involves a minimum of 28 days to allow the test batches to cure. After Sherman went through two unsuccessful 28-day curing periods in its effort to meet DOT approval, it retained an expert more familiar with DOT procedures and requirements and was finally able to obtain DOT approval on July 10, 1991. DOT's district engineer recognized that Clark reasonably would have anticipated that Sherman would be approved without delay. Neither Sherman nor Clark had reason to anticipate the approval of Sherman would take an extended length of time. Due to the delays in the approval of Sherman, Clark was unable to begin pile driving until August 14, 1991, the 98th day of the contract. Under the contract, piling had to be driven to depth until it met a specified bearing capacity, but still maintained the necessary height above ground to support the superstructure. The work on the foundation began by driving test piles. Once the test piles were driven, DOT was responsible for determining the order lengths for the piling. The order lengths were supposed to be long enough so that the piles would reach bearing and also maintain the specified height, above ground. Immediately upon commencing pile driving, Clark ran into problems because the piles were not long enough to be driven to bearing. The piles which did not meet bearing had to be spliced and redriven until they reached bearing. The contract contemplated that as many as seven splices would be required, 2 on the relief bridge and 5 on the creek bridge. The contract therefore identified splicing as an item for which the bidders were required to submit a unit price. In fact, on the creek bridge, 43 of the 96 piles had to be spliced. DOT was responsible for determining the additional pile lengths for the splices and it took DOT at least a week to make the determination once it realized a splice was required. Sherman had to manufacture the splices piecemeal as the orders came in to do so. Once manufactured, the pile splice had to cure for seven days then be shipped to the contractor. The contractor then affixed the pile splice to the original piling by the use of dowels and epoxy which had to cure for 48 hours. Construction of the substructure consisted of driving the piles, splicing and pouring concrete caps on which the bridge superstructure would rest. Before construction of the superstructure (decks) of the bridge could begin, pile caps had to be constructed. It took anywhere from two weeks to two months between the time the parties discovered that a pile or group of piles would have to be spliced and the time the spliced pile could be redriven. The pilings are constructed in clusters known as bents. Every bent on this project required splicing and therefore, construction of every bent was delayed. Before Clark could begin construction of the superstructure, it was necessary to have a consecutive series of bents completed including the caps. Even though Clark anticipated that it would commence construction on the superstructure 40 days after beginning the substructure, Clark was unable to start on the superstructure until 92 days after it started the pile driving operations because of the delays caused by the excessive splicing. Clark expected to be able to begin the superstructure on one end of the bridge while it was working on the substructure at the other end. However, Clark's planned, efficient progress was impeded because of ongoing driving operations of spliced pilings. Clark could not pour the caps while pile driving was going on within 100 feet of the bent where caps were to be poured. Clark continued on with its pile driving while it ordered splices for the previous bents. As soon as Clark was able to pour caps it did so and as soon as there were a sufficient number of completed successive bents available, Clark began work on the superstructure. Clark requested time extensions due to the delays, but the requests were denied. Clark ultimately was delayed in the progress of its work due to the unanticipated pile splices which exceeded the estimated quantity by more than 800 percent. DOT granted Clark nine additional contract days as the result of a supplemental agreement which did not include any additional time for the delays due to the excessive splicing. At the time of the notice of delinquency, Clark requested a 45-day extension of time due to the splicing. By a letter dated December 4, 1991, the DOT project engineer acknowledged that Clark was entitled to some time extension due to the splicing, but DOT proposed only a 9-day extension. In fact, no such extension was ever granted. DOT determined Clark delinquent on day 210. According to the engineer's weekly summary, on day 210, the percentage of the dollar value of completed work was 39.5 percent and the total allowed number of contract days was 403. By DOT's own calculations, if Clark had been given the nine days proposed for the supplemental agreement and the nine days suggested in the project engineer's letter of December 4, 1991, the project would have only been delinquent by 17 percent. It is not necessary for the trier of fact herein to determine the exact number of days which should have been granted for the pile splicing. It is enough to find that the 9 days suggested by DOT are inadequate and that the appropriate figure, based on the engineer's progress notes and reports, is at least twice that. DOT's witnesses offered explanations of why Clark was entitled to no extension in contract days because of the pile splices. However, their suggestions was beyond the realm of credibility in light of the actual extent of work and time required. Credibility determinations being within the exclusive province of the Hearing Officer, it is determined that DOT's testimony regarding the reasons for DOT's refusal to extend the contract time to reflect the inordinate number of pile splices is simply not credible or entitled to any weight. Additionally, neither of the main DOT witnesses had adequate knowledge of this specific project. If DOT had granted Clark an adequate number of days extension for the pile splices, that number plus the additional 9 days would result in an adjusted number of contract days of over 430. If Clark were granted the appropriate number of additional contract days, the percentage of dollar value of completed work would be less than 15 percentage points below the dollar value of work to be completed according to the contractor's schedule. This is calculated as follows: 210/430=48.6 percent. (Actual work completed of 39.5 percent or uncompleted percent of total contract amount of 60.5 percent.) 60.5-48.6=11.9 percent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOT enter a Final Order determining that Clark is not delinquent and dismissing the delinquency determination against Clark Construction Co., Inc., on State Project No. 61530-3601. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1592 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Transportation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-5(1-5); 15(8); 18(8); 32(17); and 34(19). Proposed findings of fact 7-14, 19, 20, 22-31, 33, 35-37, and 40 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 6 is unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 16, 38, 39, and 42 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 17, 21, 41, and 43 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Clark Construction Co., Inc. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-6(9-13); 8-13(14-19); 14(6); 15(7);. 16-28(20-32); 30-33(33-36); 34(8); 35(37); 36-40(39-43); and 46(38). Proposed findings of fact 1, 29, 41, 42, and 45 are subordinate to the facts actualloy found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 47 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 43 and 44 are unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Reynold D. Meyer Genie L. Buckingham Assistant General Counsels Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Mary Piccard, Attorney at Law Cummings, Lawrence & Vezina, P.A. 1004 DeSoto Park Drive P.O. Box 589 Tallahassee, FL 32303-0589 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's operation of an overweight truck over the low-limit bridge involved herein is a violation and if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutes involving commercial carrier and truck vehicle weights on covered vehicles operated on the streets and highways of this state. It does so through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to conduct random safety and compliance inspections of commercial vehicles being operated in this state. The parties agree that on August 8, 1991, Respondent, P.J. Constructors, Inc. was prime contractor to the Petitioner, Department of Transportation for the removal and replacement of a highway bridge over the Florida Turnpike where it intersects with Hood Road in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. At the time in issue, Respondent was operating a 1981 MAC tractor trailer low boy on which it was transporting a piece of heavy construction equipment. At the time in issue, Officer Neff stopped the vehicle for crossing over this bridge which was clearly posted as having a maximum weight limit for tractor trailers of 15 tons, (30,000 pounds). Following standard Department weighing procedures measuring weight at each axle and combining those weights to arrive at a total, and using portable Department scales which are calibrated every 6 months for accuracy, Officer Neff determined the vehicle weight at 54,800 pounds. This was 24,800 pounds over the legal weight and resulted in a penalty assessment of $1,240.00 at 5 per pound of overweight. The approaches to this bridge were clearly marked at several locations with signs indicating the maximum weight permitted for this type vehicle was 15 tons. These signs were located at sites which were far enough away from the bridge to give a driver ample notice of the restrictions and ample opportunity to turn around or to take an alternate route over roads situated between the signs and the bridge. In addition to the signs, however, earlier the same day, as warnings were issued to users of the bridge who were going to a construction site on the other side, Respondent's driver was specifically told of the bridge's low limits and advised of an alternate route to avoid it. Admittedly, the alternate routes would be longer than the route over the bridge, but no evidence as presented by either party as to how much the difference was. Respondent's General Manager, Mr. McAllester, claims the signs were not in position on the two occasions he visited the site during the bid process in February or March, 1991. He cannot say that he knew where the signs might have been located (away from the site), but avers only that he did not see any. However, officer Neff specifically checked to see that the signs were in place before issuing the citation on August 8, 1991 and it is, therefore, found that the signs were properly in place on that date. Mr. McAllester also urges in the alternative, however, that even if the signs were in place, as contractor on the bridge replacement project, the terms of the bid specifications, which directs contractors from operating equipment in excess of the maximum weights set out by law, exempts the contractor where the existing road or bridge is to be removed as a part of the work included in the project. The bridge in issue here was removed and replaced as a part of the project on which Respondent was contractor and the current bridge has no limit. Mr. McAllester admits that when the instant citation was issued, Respondent had no special permit to cross the bridge with an excess load. Once the citation was issued, however, Respondent quickly retained an engineer to do a structural analysis of the bridge in issue. Based on that analysis, Respondent thereafter sought and obtained permission to cross the bridge with an overload provided all other traffic was stopped on Hood Road while the excessively laden vehicle was on the bridge so it would be the only vehicle thereon at the time, and provided that vehicle kept to the center of the road while on the bridge. Subsequent to the citation and before the permit was issued, Respondent did not operate any excessively laden vehicles on the bridge. Respondent admits that at the time the citation was issued, there was traffic operating both on the Turnpike and on Hood Road. Therefore, a potential danger to the public existed. Nonetheless, traffic was maintained on both roadways throughout the entire project without incident. None of the weight limits or a need to maintain weight standards was discussed at the pre-bid conference, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a civil fine in the amount of $1,240.00 against the Respondent. P.J. Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Foster McAllester Vice President and General Manager P.J. Constructors, Inc. 4100 S.W. 70th Court Miami, Florida 33155 Ben G.Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel ]Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent, the Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT"), acted contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules or policies, or the proposal specifications, in rejecting the proposal of Petitioner, Old Tampa Bay Enterprises, Inc. ("Old Tampa Bay"), to RFP-DOT-97/98-1003, Bridge Tending/Maintenance and Repair Services for Five Movable Bridges, Sarasota and Manatee Counties (the "RFP" or "RFP 1003"), and awarding the contract to Intervenor, General Electric Industrial Systems ("GE"). GE also raises the issue whether Old Tampa Bay lacks standing because it submitted a materially false or fraudulent proposal.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 10, 1998, FDOT issued RFP 1003, requesting proposals for a bridge-tending, maintenance and repair service contract for five movable bridges within Manatee and Sarasota Counties. The contract would run for a period of one year, with an option for two annual renewals. FDOT contemporaneously issued RFP 1004, for the performance of identical bridge tending, preventive maintenance and repair services on four other movable bridges in Sarasota County. The RFP required, among other things, that proposers must employ an experienced bridge tender supervisor and an experienced registered electrical engineer. The RFP required that the contractor must be licensed to perform electrical and mechanical work in the State of Florida, and that a copy of the license be submitted as part of the proposal package. RFP 1003, Section 1.7.5. (In this and some other sections of the RFP, FDOT employed the undefined term "Consultant" rather than the term "Contractor" or "Proposer" used through the bulk of the RFPs. Absent a clarifying explanation, it is assumed that all three terms are used interchangeably.) The RFP required the proposers to provide the names of "key personnel," a resume for each of these individuals, and a description of the functions and responsibilities of each key person relative to the task to be performed. The approximate percent of time to be devoted exclusively to this project was also to be provided. FDOT’s prior written approval was required for the removal and substitution of any of the key personnel proposed. "Key personnel" included project engineers, bridge superintendents, mechanics, and electricians. Under the heading "preventive maintenance," the RFP required the proposers to provide "sufficient and competent personnel to perform the inspection, troubleshooting and work for all bid item requirements." The electrician must be "a licensed electrician with experience in industrial maintenance and troubleshooting." RFP 1003, Exhibit A-3, Section 3.0. The RFPs incorporated by reference the "Bridge Operations and Maintenance Manual" (the "Bridge Manual"), an FDOT document establishing procedures for bridge operations and maintenance requirements statewide. The Bridge Manual set forth the following qualifications for electricians: All electricians working on movable bridges or electrical equipment on any bridge must hold at least a journeyman electrician’s license in at least one Florida county and have skills in industrial electrical work. Ability to read and understand blueprints and written instructions. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing. Ability to plan, organize and coordinate work assignments. Ability to install, alter, repair and maintain electrical systems, equipment and fixtures. Bridge Manual, pages 2-3. Another section of the Bridge Manual elaborated on the minimum qualifications for electricians as follows: All electricians working on movable bridges or electrical equipment on any bridge must hold at least a journeyman electrician’s license in at least one Florida county and have at least two years experience in industrial electrical work. Vocational/training in industrial electricity can substitute at the rate of 720 classroom hours for each year of the required experience. After employment, they should attend the Bridge Inspection school and Movable Bridge Inspection school. They should also receive continuing training on motor controls, National Electric Code and applicable safety training. They should be able to read blueprints, and written instructions, communicate effectively, be able to plan, organize, and coordinate work assignments, and have the ability to install, alter, repair and maintain electrical systems, equipment and fixtures. Bridge Manual, pages 2-17 through 2-18. The RFP awarded a maximum of 100 points to responsive proposals. A maximum of 60 points could be awarded for the technical proposals, which were scored by a three-member technical committee that included Hendrik Ooms, FDOT’s assistant maintenance engineer for District One. Each member of the committee scored the proposals independently. Their scores were then averaged to arrive at the final technical score. The RFP listed Richard Marino, the head of contracts for District One, as the project manager who should receive all technical questions from prospective proposers. Regardless of the formal designation, Mr. Ooms was in fact the project manager and the person capable of answering technical questions. The technical proposal scoring subsumed a maximum of 35 points for the "management plan," including 20 points for identified "key personnel." A maximum of 35 points could be awarded for the price proposal. The low price proposal received the maximum 35 points, with the remaining proposals scored according to the formula: (Low price/proposer’s price) x Price points = Proposer’s total points. The technical committee was not aware of the contents of the price proposals prior to scoring the technical proposals. Finally, proposers could obtain 5 preference points for Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) participation of at least 10 percent of the total dollar amount of the contract, or 2 preference points for DBE participation of between 5 and 10% of the total dollar amount. On or about May 11, 1998, three companies submitted proposals for RFP 1003 and 1004: GE; Old Tampa Bay; and C & S Building Maintenance Corporation. GE is the incumbent vendor for these contracts. Until this bid, Old Tampa Bay was a subcontractor to GE on these contracts. On May 22, 1998, FDOT posted the proposal tabulations indicating the intended awardees of the two contracts. Old Tampa Bay was the apparent awardee of the contract for RFP 1003, the contract at issue in this case, with a total score of 79.67 points. GE was the second high scorer, with 79.45 points. GE was the apparent awardee of the contract for RFP 1004. As to RFP 1003, the averaged technical score for Old Tampa Bay was 39.67 points. The averaged technical score for GE was 49 points. All three members of the technical committee awarded GE more points than Old Tampa Bay, though Mr. Ooms saw a greater difference between the two bids than did the other committee members, Richard Marino and Kenneth Clark. Mr. Marino awarded 56 points to GE and 52 points to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Clark awarded 53 points to GE and 47 points to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Ooms awarded 38 points to GE and 20 points to Old Tampa Bay. Despite the difference in the technical proposals, Old Tampa Bay was named the intended awardee for RFP 1003 on the strength of 35 points for its significantly lower price proposal ($539,915 per year, versus $621,340 per year for GE) and obtaining the full 5 points for DBE participation. GE was awarded 30.45 price points according to the RFP formula and obtained no DBE points. No formal protest having been received, FDOT moved forward to the next step in the award process. The agency sent substantially identical letters to Old Tampa Bay as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1003 and to GE as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1004. The letters, dated June 15, 1998, and signed by Felipe Alvarez, FDOT’s purchasing agent, informed the vendors that they had each proposed the same people as "key personnel" who would devote 100 percent of their time to the project. This situation "concerned" FDOT, as these persons obviously could not devote 100 percent of their time to RFP 1003 as employees of Old Tampa Bay and 100 percent of their time to RFP 1004 as employees of GE. The letters requested each of the vendors to clarify the employment of the following persons: Mr. W. Bruce Chapman, whom GE had identified as its bridge superintendent and Old Tampa Bay had identified as its project manager; Mr. Gary Berkley, whom GE had identified as its mechanic and Old Tampa Bay had identified as its primary mechanic; Kelly Green, whom both GE and Old Tampa Bay had identified as primary electrician; and John Vance, whom both GE and Old Tampa Bay had identified as supporting electrician. The letters concluded with the following statement: The Proposal Package stated that if awarded the Agreement, the Consultant is to provide the services of the key personnel proposed. Removal and substitution of any of the key personnel proposed will require the Department’s prior written approval. Please advise the Department if your firm plans to provide the same key personnel or will be providing an equivalent substitution; equivalent meaning as of [sic] the same caliber, experience, and expertise or better than the individual originally proposed. (Emphasis added.) As noted in FDOT’s letter, the Old Tampa Bay proposal listed Kelly Green and John Vance as electricians. Old Tampa Bay’s proposal emphasized that Vance and Green were the current electricians performing electrical maintenance and repairs on the bridges, with nine years combined experience on the District One contract. Old Tampa Bay's proposal emphasized the ease of transition to the new contract that FDOT would enjoy should it select Old Tampa Bay: There will be no transition pain from the existing prime contractor [GE] to [Old Tampa Bay] as ALL personnel currently serving are already on the [Old Tampa Bay] payroll and have been for several years. FDOT will have no new relationships to establish or unknowns with which to be concerned. (Emphasis in original.) Old Tampa Bay’s proposal emphasized in several places that Old Tampa Bay would provide the same electricians who were already working on the bridges. In describing its technical approach to the electrical systems, Old Tampa Bay emphasized that its electricians would require no orientation before commencing work: The electrical system is a critical link in the operation of the bridge. Its maintenance is crucial to reliable operation. [Old Tampa Bay's] comprehensive maintenance program is designed to meet and exceed contract requirements. The [Old Tampa Bay] electrician (Resume attached) is knowledgeable and experienced in the performance of this program. He has performed this service under other FDOT contracts. Old Tampa Bay's proposal emphasized the experience of its electricians with respect to the electro-mechanical control systems, stating that "All [Old Tampa Bay] service personnel including electricians have been trained to work on, maintain, and troubleshoot as required each intricate system." Old Tampa Bay emphasized the experience of Vance and Green, and stated that they had "never failed to correct any problems on this system on any of the bridges in this contract." Old Tampa Bay made similar representations in regard to equipment malfunctions and computerized control systems, emphasizing the quick, successful responses by and experience of its electricians. The evidence indicated that Old Tampa Bay knew, or should have known, at the time it submitted its proposal, that John Vance had no intention of working for Old Tampa Bay on these contracts. Old Tampa Bay included Mr. Vance’s name and license in its proposal without his consent. Mr. Vance never stated orally or in writing that he agreed to be included in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. Old Tampa Bay never asked Mr. Vance’s permission to include his name as a proposed supporting electrician. Old Tampa Bay never asked Mr. Vance’s permission to include a copy of his electrical contractor’s license in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. About two weeks prior to the proposal submission date, Old Tampa Bay's president, Donald Abernathy, asked Mr. Vance for a copy of his license, but did not tell him that Old Tampa Bay intended to include the license in its proposal. Rather, Mr. Abernathy told Mr. Vance that Old Tampa Bay needed the license for purposes related to insurance. Mr. Vance refused to provide Old Tampa Bay with a copy of his license. Old Tampa Bay obtained a copy of Mr. Vance’s license by making a public records request to Manatee County, and submitted that copy with its proposal. Mr. Bruce Chapman has served for nearly four years as a bridge tender supervisor, employed by Old Tampa Bay under a GE contract with the FDOT. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Chapman was still an Old Tampa Bay employee. Mr. Chapman assisted Mr. Abernathy in trying to obtain permission of various people to use their names in Old Tampa Bay's proposal. Mr. Chapman testified that he knew from conversations with Mr. Vance that Mr. Vance did not want to work for Old Tampa Bay on the new contract. Old Tampa Bay also knew at the time of proposal submission that it had obtained no assurances from Kelly Green that he would work for Old Tampa Bay on the contract for RFP 1003. As detailed below, Mr. Green ultimately signed a letter-of-intent to work for GE on the contract for RFP 1004. Mr. Abernathy contended that Old Tampa Bay was entitled to include Vance and Green in its proposal without permission because they were Old Tampa Bay employees. However, Mr. Abernathy also conceded that Vance and Green were at-will employees, and his prior attempt to secure their permission to use their names in the Old Tampa Bay proposal was a tacit admission that Old Tampa Bay had no control over them. Further, in the fall of 1997, Mr. Abernathy attempted to obtain the signatures of Mr. Vance and several other bridge employees to a non-compete agreement for the purpose of binding them to Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Vance refused to sign the agreement. Old Tampa Bay provided payroll services to Vance and Green during their work on the bridges under GE’s existing contract with the FDOT, but Old Tampa Bay never supervised the work of the bridge electricians, never provided Vance or Green with the tools, equipment or supplies they used in their work as bridge electricians, and never had any control over the day-to- day activities of any electricians on any FDOT contract. The electricians worked on a daily basis with GE’s project engineer, Douglas Blake. Mr. Blake had trained Mr. Vance on bridge electrical equipment when the latter commenced work on the bridges. The electricians looked to Mr. Blake for technical and substantive assistance in working on the bridges. Mr. Vance testified that he considered himself an employee of GE. Mr. Green did not testify at the hearing. On June 26, 1998, both Old Tampa Bay and GE submitted responses to the FDOT letter of June 15, 1998. In a letter signed by William Trainor, contract leader, GE set forth its staffing plan for RFP 1004. GE identified the following as "key personnel" proposed for the positions discussed in the FDOT letters: John Vance as bridge superintendent (replacing W. Bruce Chapman); Bruce Morris as mechanic (replacing Gary Berkley); Kelly Green as primary electrician; and John Vance as Supporting electrician. GE attached résumés for each of these personnel. GE indicated that it would utilize PRM, Inc. as a subcontractor to secure the required contract personnel for the contract under RFP 1004, and GE attached letters-of-intent for employment for each of the named key personnel. Each of these letters was signed either by the named employee or by the president of PRM, Inc. FDOT accepted GE’s response in full. The award of the contract for RFP 1004 to GE was not protested. In a letter dated June 26, 1998, signed by Donald R. Abernathy, president, Old Tampa Bay proposed the following key personnel: W. Bruce Chapman as project manager; Gary Berkley as mechanic; Charles Adam Kenney as bridge superintendent (not mentioned in the FDOT letter); and Kelly Green as primary electrician. Old Tampa Bay attached résumés for each of these personnel. The letter made no mention of a supporting electrician. Old Tampa Bay also attached agreements of the employees to serve in their respective positions. However, the signature line on Kelly Green’s statement of acceptance was left blank. Mr. Abernathy testified that he asked Mr. Green to sign the document indicating his acceptance of employment with Old Tampa Bay, but Mr. Green refused. Mr. Abernathy did not reveal this information to FDOT, continuing to maintain that he was within his rights as Mr. Green's employer to include his name in the proposal. FDOT knew from its review of the GE submission that Mr. Green had in fact signed a letter of intent for employment with PRM, Inc. to work on the GE contract. Mr. Alvarez, the FDOT purchasing agent, acted chiefly as a coordinator and as the person ensuring that the procedural requirements of competitive bidding laws were met by FDOT. He admittedly lacked the expertise to make decisions as to the technical aspects of the project. Thus, Mr. Alvarez forwarded the vendors’ responses to Mr. Ooms, the project manager, for his evaluation. Mr. Ooms is a professional engineer, and for the past five years has supervised the operations of all nine bridges covered by RFPs 1003 and 1004. In a memorandum to Mr. Alvarez, dated July 2, 1998, Mr.. Ooms reported his findings and conclusions regarding the vendors’ submissions. As noted above, he found the GE submission acceptable in its identification of PRM, Inc. as a subcontractor and its naming of Vance, Morris, and Green as intended key personnel. Mr. Ooms found acceptable the submission of Old Tampa Bay insofar as it named Chapman, Kenney, and Berkley as key personnel. However, Mr. Ooms noted that the Old Tampa Bay submission provided no documentation of Kelly Green’s commitment to work for Old Tampa Bay. Mr. Ooms also noted that the Old Tampa Bay submission made no mention of John Vance, who had been listed as support electrician in Old Tampa Bay’s original proposal, and listed no substitute who would take over those duties. Mr. Vance had also accepted an offer from PRM, Inc. to work on the GE contract. Thus, Mr. Ooms concluded that the proposed key personnel roster submitted by Old Tampa Bay was not acceptable. By letter to Donald R. Abernathy dated July 8, 1998, Mr. Alvarez conveyed to Old Tampa Bay the "discrepancies" found by FDOT in the Old Tampa Bay submission of June 26, 1998. While stating that FDOT accepted the proposal of Chapman, Kenney, and Berkley for their respective positions, Mr. Alvarez pointed out the problems noted by Mr. Ooms as to Green and Vance. The letter concluded that "the Department still requires that your firm provide, in writing, clarification as to the positions of Primary and Supporting Electricians," and required the response by July 13, 1998. Old Tampa Bay responded by letter to Mr. Alvarez from Mr. Abernathy dated July 10, 1998. The letter provided no explanation as to Mr. Green’s unsigned agreement or Old Tampa Bay's failure to mention Mr. Vance or otherwise address the position of supporting electrician. The letter stated no objection to any of the conclusions contained in FDOT’s letter of July 8, 1998. The letter took no issue with the standard described for "equivalent" electricians. Old Tampa Bay's letter stated that it had selected Mr. Gary McCormick as its primary electrician. The letter noted that Mr. McCormick was finishing a project but would be available for this contract no later than July 27, 1998. The letter stated that while Mr. McCormick was a "skilled and valuable electrical and hydraulic specialist," he had never been required to have an electrician’s license by any prior employer. The letter requested that FDOT waive the license requirement for 90 days, during which time Mr. McCormick would obtain the required license. The letter attached Mr. McCormick’s résumé, which indicated that he had been involved with the Stickney Point bridge from September 1997 until July 1998. The résumé provided no dates for any of his other employment since 1973. The résumé indicated that most of Mr. McCormick’s electrical experience involved repair and installation of elevators. Old Tampa Bay's submission made no attempt to relate Mr. McCormick’s elevator experience to the electrical specifications of the RFP. The letter further stated that Old Tampa Bay was "actively seeking" a supporting electrician, and that Mr. Abernathy would fill the position until the search was completed over the "next few weeks." The letter gave no further indication of the status of Old Tampa Bay's attempt to locate a support electrician. The letter attached the résumé of Mr. Abernathy. Mr. Alvarez forwarded Old Tampa Bay’s July 10, 1998, letter to Mr. Ooms for his review. By memorandum dated July 15, 1998, Mr. Ooms responded to Mr. Alvarez, concluding that the proposed key personnel roster of Mr. McCormick and Mr. Abernathy as primary and supporting electricians was not acceptable. Mr. Ooms’ memorandum first addressed Old Tampa Bay's original statements in its proposal as to Vance and Green, noting that Old Tampa Bay represented both electricians as follows, in his words (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): [Mr. Green] "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 4 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. His duties range from preventive maintenance to emergency repair" . . . "an intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Green has a Journeyman’s electricians license. * * * [Mr. Vance] has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 5 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. The maintenance he performs covers the entire bridge--the gates, lock motors, drive motors, variable frequency drives, programmable controllers, contactors, limit switches, control panels and resistors." "intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Vance has a [sic] Electrical Contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms contrasted Mr. Green’s qualifications with those of Mr. McCormick, whose résumé showed that he had less than one year’s experience with bridges, did not hold a journeyman electrician’s license, and thus was not "an equivalent substitution for Mr. Kelly Green." Mr. McCormick’s résumé listed his current employer as "Acutec Inc.," his position as "project electrical foreman," and stated that he was "currently finishing Stickney Point drawbridge rehabilitation project. In charge of electrical, PLC, and hydraulic systems installation, trouble-shooting, and start-up. Working closely with Gregg Martin of FDOT, Sarasota." Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. McCormick did not have the qualifications claimed in his résumé. He testified that Mr. McCormick was not in charge of electrical, PLC and hydraulic systems installation on the Stickney Point bridge. He testified that Mr. McCormick was strictly a "wire puller," with "no experience whatsoever to do this type of work." Mr. Ooms took issue with Mr. McCormick’s claim that he was "in charge" of the installation of the PLC, or programmable logic controls. Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. McCormick’s employer, Acutec, was involved with writing the PLC program, setting up the parameters, checking out the hydraulics, and performing the interfacing, but that Mr. McCormick was simply running wires from point-to-point pursuant to instructions from others. Mr. Ooms testified that he knew these facts from watching at first-hand the work being performed on the Stickney Point bridge. Mr. Ooms did not call Acutec to verify the statements in Mr. McCormick’s resume. Mr. Ooms stated that there was no need to call Acutec, as he was out on the bridge and could see for himself what Mr. McCormick was doing. PLCs, or programmable logic controls, are the means by which newer bridges are controlled by computer. The PLC sequences the computer program to constantly monitor the condition and operation of the bridge. The PLC technology is not unique to bridges. It is common in many manufacturing operations, and is in place on two of the five bridges covered by RFP 1003. The remaining three bridges have a manual relay control system. Old Tampa Bay did not dispute that PLC experience is necessary to perform the work as an electrician on this contract. Mr. Ooms noted that Mr. McCormick’s résumé claimed PLC experience, but that when the time came for the contractor to deliver the laptop computer with the PLC programs to run the renovated Stickney Point bridge, Mr. McCormick could not even run the program on the computer. Mr. Ooms testified that if one cannot run the computer program, one cannot do anything on a computer controlled bridge. Mr. Ooms’ testimony as to the qualifications of Mr. McCormick is credited. While Mr. Ooms might have confirmed his conclusions with Mr. McCormick’s employer, he cannot be found to have acted arbitrarily in relying on his own extensive observations of Mr. McCormick’s job performance. Old Tampa Bay offered no evidence to dispute the factual underpinnings of Mr. Ooms’ decision that Mr. McCormick was not an equivalent substitute for Kelly Green. Mr. Ooms’ July 15, 1998, memorandum also rejected Mr. Abernathy as the temporary supporting electrician. As quoted above, the memorandum noted Old Tampa Bay's representation that John Vance, the supporting electrician it originally proposed, has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past five years in Sarasota and Manatee counties, has intimate knowledge of these bridges, and has an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms noted that Mr. Abernathy does not have an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Ooms also took issue with Mr. Abernathy’s résumé statement that he has acted as a bridge inspector for the past eight years for Kisinger Campo and Associates, a company that FDOT hires to perform bridge inspections. Mr. Ooms wrote that in the five years that FDOT has let out the operations and maintenance contracts, he has never "seen or known of Mr. Abernathy visiting a Sarasota or Manatee county bridge or troubleshooting a bridge problem." He testified that Kisinger Campo could not have used Mr. Abernathy as a bridge inspector because he lacked the required engineer’s license or certification as a bridge inspector. Mr. Ooms admitted that Kisinger Campo does not always tell him who is performing the inspections. Mr. Ooms made no inquiries of Kisinger Campo to verify Mr. Abernathy’s résumé. Mr. Abernathy testified that he was in fact an electrical inspector for Kisinger Campo for eight years and that in 1997 he personally performed inspections on every bridge covered by RFP 1003, including the electrical, lighting, and PLC systems. Mr. Abernathy conceded that he does not have an electrical contractor’s license. Mr. Abernathy’s testimony is credited as to his experience as a bridge inspector. In the case of Mr. McCormick, Mr. Ooms reasonably relied on his own extensive observations. As to Mr. Abernathy, Mr. Ooms attempted to rely on what he did not observe. Mr. Ooms chose to assume, without knowledge or verification, that Mr. Abernathy’s résumé was false. This assumption was arbitrary, and cannot be credited. Mr. Ooms’ decision to reject Mr. Abernathy was nonetheless reasonable. Mr. Abernathy did not possess the requisite license, and admitted that his most recent experience in actually performing bridge electrical maintenance and repair was more than twenty years ago. By letter to Mr. Abernathy dated July 17, 1998, Mr. Alvarez conveyed FDOT’s rejection of Old Tampa Bay’s proposal pertaining to the electrician positions. The reason for rejection was stated as follows: As stated within the Request for Proposal Package, if you are proposing to substitute key personnel you must provide an equivalent substitution; equivalent meaning as of [sic] the same caliber, experience, expertise or better than the individual originally proposed. . . . Please understand, the Department is looking forward in [sic] entering into an Agreement with your firm, [sic] however, it cannot accept anything less than what was originally proposed. Mr. Alvarez’ letter enclosed Mr. Ooms’ memorandum of July 15, 1998, and offered Old Tampa Bay another opportunity to submit substitute electricians no later than July 27, 1998. By letter from Mr. Abernathy to Mr. Alvarez, dated July 27, 1998, Old Tampa Bay submitted a new list of proposed substitutes. The text of the letter stated, in full: We have selected Mr. Steven Manning, Master Electrician License Number 3994, Hillsborough County to be our primary electrician. Attached is his resume. We have selected Mr. Adrian Cook as the supporting electrician, Journeyman License Number JE776, Hillsborough County. We have selected Mr. Wayne Cano as an electrician’s helper. Hillsborough County licenses have full reciprocity with Manatee and Sarasota Counties. Résumés of all three proposed employees were attached, along with copies of the relevant licenses and certificates of completion of various professional training courses. Mr. Manning’s résumé contained sketchy descriptions of the kinds of electrical work he had performed, and gave no indication that he had any experience working with computers or PLCs. Mr. Manning’s résumé revealed no experience with moveable bridge maintenance or repair. Mr. Manning had no experience as an electrician on the FDOT bridges. Mr. Manning’s résumé indicated that his experience included industrial electrical experience intermittently during eight years of electrical work. The résumé indicated "industrial and commercial electrical work," "working in fuel terminals, working with motor controls," "remodeling tenant spaces," "working with new commercial," "working with commercial remodeling, and service work," "traveling around Florida and Georgia remodeling Pizza Huts," "residential and commercial sales, estimating jobs, job foreman, billing and scheduling, handling of permits," and "working with industrial and commercial, service work, remodeling and new construction." Old Tampa Bay's submission offered no specific information or explanation of how Mr. Manning’s varied experience related to the specifications for electrical maintenance and repair in the RFP. Old Tampa Bay had obtained Mr. Manning’s name by calling an electrical company, Southern Power and Controls, and asking for recommendations of personnel with qualifications and experience equivalent to Mr. Green’s. Southern Power and Controls is an industrial electrical firm specializing in industrial controls, motor controls, switch gears, limit switches, and PLCs. Old Tampa Bay would have paid a finder's fee to Southern Power & Controls for any employees who went to work for Old Tampa Bay on this contract. Old Tampa Bay provided Southern Power and Controls with the documentation it had submitted to FDOT regarding the qualifications and experience of Vance and Green. Robert Harwell, a registered electrical engineer and principal of Old Tampa Bay, had discussions with Southern Power and Controls as to the qualifications of the candidates it sought. No person from Southern Power and Controls appeared at the hearing to explain the process by which they selected Mr. Manning. No person from Old Tampa Bay ever interviewed Mr. Manning. Mr. Manning did not testify at the hearing. Old Tampa Bay proposed Adrian Cook as a supporting electrician. Mr. Cook’s résumé indicated that he was a licensed journeyman electrician, with four years’ experience as an electrician and two years as an apprentice. Mr. Cook’s résumé indicated two years of unspecified commercial and industrial work, but no moveable bridge experience. Old Tampa Bay obtained Mr. Cook’s name from Southern Power & Controls, asking for personnel with qualifications and experience equivalent to Mr. Green’s. No person from Southern Power & Controls appeared at the hearing to explain the rationale for choosing Mr. Cook. No person from Old Tampa Bay ever interviewed Mr. Cook. Mr. Cook did not testify at the hearing. Old Tampa Bay submitted Mr. Wayne Cano as an "electrician’s helper." Old Tampa Bay did not specify what function Mr. Cano would serve or what actions he would perform as an "electrician’s helper." Neither the RFP nor Old Tampa Bay's proposal contains any mention of an "electrician’s helper." Mr. Cano’s résumé did not indicate an electrician’s license. Old Tampa Bay did not state that it had any intention to require Mr. Cano to obtain an electrician’s license. Mr. Cano’s résumé did not indicate any moveable bridge experience or experience on other FDOT projects. Again, Mr. Alvarez forwarded the Old Tampa Bay letter and attachments to Mr. Ooms for his review. Mr. Ooms provided his response by memorandum dated August 6, 1998. Again, Mr. Ooms outlined the qualifications and experience of the electricians originally proposed, Kelly Green and John Vance, as set forth in Old Tampa Bay's own proposal. Mr. Ooms wrote as follows (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): Mr. Green’s experience were [sic] listed as follows. "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 4 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties. His duties range from preventive maintenance to emergency repair . . . an intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Green has a Journeyman’s electrician license. Mr. Vance’s experience were [sic] listed as follows. "has worked on FDOT movable bridge contracts for the past 5 years in Sarasota and Manatee counties." "The maintenance he performs covers the entire bridge-- the gates, lock motors, drive motors, variable frequency drives, programmable controllers, contactors, limit switches, control panels and resistors." "intimate knowledge on the operation of bridges so that during malfunction he can use the bypass functions to keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." Mr. Vance has a [sic] Electrical Contractor’s license. Mr. Green and Mr. Vance each have over four years of "on the Bridge" experience trouble shooting non functioning systems. They have worked on nine different bridges that were 30-40 years old with antique controll [sic] systems and on bridges recently rehabilitated with modern computer controlled systems. They have years of experience in reading and analyzing bridge ladder logic programs and trouble shooting problems and solutions. All these bridges were operational and any loss of service was quickly reported. An outage can easily block traffic for several miles in minutes generating calls from the sherrifs [sic] department. In addition, any breakdown in service has severe political consequences due to the Ringling bridge and Anna Maria Bridge replacement program. A problem on Ringling Bridge can cause a [sic] hour detour and missed flights. On page C-1 of the contract it states "The Contractor’s personnel that will perform the work required by this Section shall be trained and well experienced in start-up and maintenance of equipment . . . and will have headquarters within Sarasota/Manatee County" . . . On page A-3.2 is [sic] states "the Contractor shall initiate corrective action within fifteen (15) minutes following the malfunction." further down on Page C-1 of the contract "the Contractor agrees to provide men and equipment to a bridge sites [sic] within 30 minutes of notification of any emergency equipment failure". Mr. Ooms contrasted the experience and qualifications of the proposed substitutes as follows (punctuation and capitalization not corrected): Mr. Steven Manning experience [sic] in industrial electrical work does not start until 1997. It does not show any bridge related work. His training certificate in Electrical ladder Drawings" is for a one day 7 contact hours session. The "well experienced" requirement is not clearly indicated by his resume. Mr. Adrian Cook also does not show any bridge related work and the "well experienced". Mr. Wayne Cano has 11 years of industrial experience but no bridge experience or electricians license. In conclusion Old Tampa Bay enterprises needs to provide us with equivalent substitutions. Specifically licensed electricians with a minimum of four years experience in diverse bridge electrical configuration; with old relay logic operation, well experienced in PLC controllers from various manufactures [sic]; the ability to read and interpret ladder logic drawing; the ability to program plc’s. The Department’s inclusion of response time in the contract clearly indicates our desire for prompt and efficient emergency repair work. In other words the Department would like the equivalent of Mr. Green and Mr. Vance in the original proposal who’s [sic] experience will "keep bridge down time and repair time to a minimum." By letter to Mr. Abernathy dated August 13, 1998, Mr. Alvarez forwarded FDOT’s rejection of Old Tampa Bay’s proposed substitutes. The letter essentially reiterated the contents of the memorandum quoted above, and informed Old Tampa Bay that it would have one last opportunity to provide FDOT with equivalent or better substitutions for the electrical key personnel. Old Tampa Bay’s response would be due no later than August 24, 1998. Mr. Alvarez testified that as to this and his prior letters to Mr. Abernathy, he essentially acted as a conduit for the actual decision-maker, Mr. Ooms. Mr. Alvarez wrote the letters because he was the designated contact person in the FDOT contracts office, not because of any personal expertise or authority he possessed to deal with the issue of the qualifications of the proposed key personnel. By letter from Mr. Abernathy to Mr. Alvarez, dated August 21, 1998, Old Tampa Bay informed FDOT that "we are unable to locate electricians which meet or exceed the qualifications of those we proposed, i.e., Mr. Green and Mr. Vance. Please proceed as necessary." Old Tampa Bay’s letter did not take issue with any of the conclusions set forth in Mr. Alvarez’ letter of August 13, 1998. On August 24, 1998, FDOT posted a revised proposal tabulation finding Old Tampa Bay nonresponsive and listing GE as the intended awardee of the contract for RFP 1003. At the hearing, Mr. Ooms testified that he did not know Mr. Manning, Mr. Cook, or Mr. Cano, had no personal knowledge of their background or experience, and relied on their résumés in making his decision. Mr. Ooms felt that Mr. Manning, while a master electrician, lacked sufficient experience on PLCs and had no experience working on bridges. Mr. Ooms noted that the only indication of electrical ladder drawing or computer experience on Mr. Manning’s résumé was a seven-hour continuing education course in electrical ladder drawing. Mr. Ooms’ undisputed testimony was that a single seven-hour course was insufficient to provide the expertise needed to perform the duties required of an electrician on these bridges. Mr. Ooms admitted that John Vance and Kelly Green lacked PLC experience when they started working on the bridges, and were trained by FDOT. However, Mr. Ooms rejected Old Tampa Bay’s suggestion that Mr. Manning could be similarly trained on the job. Vance and Green were trained in connection with the installation of PLC equipment on the Cortez Bridge in 1996. Mr. Ooms testified that this training was simply a part of the rehabilitation of the bridge, and that PLC experience was not a prerequisite at the time Vance and Green were hired. Mr. Ooms further distinguished this situation by noting that the issue here is not simply qualifications, but equivalency. Mr. Ooms stated that because Old Tampa Bay’s winning proposal was based on the presence of Vance and Green, any substitutes for Vance and Green must not only meet the RFP specifications but must be equivalent to the experience of Vance and Green, which included PLC experience. Mr. Ooms testified that he rejected Adrian Cook for the same lack of PLC experience. Mr. Cook held the required journeyman electrician’s license, but his résumé gave no indication of PLC or troubleshooting experience. Mr. Ooms testified that he called Mr. Cook’s current employer, who vouched for him as a "good man," but provided no details as to his PLC experience. Mr. Ooms also admitted that he did not ask the employer about Mr. Cook’s PLC experience. As to Mr. Cano, Mr. Ooms testified that he appeared well qualified but lacked the required journeyman electrician’s license, and lacked bridge experience. Mr. Ooms was impressed by Mr. Cano’s PLC and ladder logic experience, and might have approved him but for the lack of the required license. Mr. Ooms acknowledged that Kelly Green did not have his journeyman electrician’s license when he started work on the bridges. Mr. Ooms testified that he was unaware of that fact at the time Mr. Green was hired. Douglas Blake, project engineer for GE, affirmed that in the five years GE has been performing bridge operations and maintenance, FDOT has never asked any electrician to produce a license. Mr. Blake testified that performance of an electrician’s job on these bridges does not require permitting, and that there is no license exposure to an electrician working these jobs. Mr. Blake’s opinion was that the license requirement is merely a contract tool FDOT can use to eliminate substandard bids. No witness for FDOT assented to Mr. Blake’s characterization of the license requirement. FDOT’s consistent position was that a prospective electrician must have at least a journeyman electrician’s license, as set forth in the RFP and the Bridge Manual. Mr. Blake testified that Manning, Cook, and Cano all appeared to be worthy candidates to be bridge electricians, insofar as their electrical technical qualifications appeared to compare favorably to those of Vance and Green. No evidence was presented that Mr. Ooms had any knowledge of Mr. Blake’s opinion at the time he made his decision, or that such knowledge would have altered that decision. Lane Tyus, a GE electrical engineer with experience on these bridges, likewise testified that the résumés of Manning, Cook, and Cano would pass his initial screening and that he would make a final decision in a face-to-face interview. No evidence was presented that Mr. Ooms had any knowledge of Mr. Tyus’ opinion at the time he made his decision, or that such knowledge would have altered that decision. At the hearing, Old Tampa Bay produced a list purporting to show 25 electricians whose hiring for bridge work was approved by FDOT for various districts during the period 1991 through 1998, despite the fact that none of the 25 had prior bridge experience. This list included Mr. Vance and Mr. Green in District One, where Mr. Ooms works. Mr. Ooms disclaimed knowledge as to the approval practices of other districts, which in any event have no relevance to this proceeding. Mr. Ooms again averred that this situation is different than that prevailing when Vance and Green were hired, because the substitutes here proffered by Old Tampa Bay must not only meet the RFP requirements but must be the equivalent of Vance and Green in experience and expertise. Mr. Abernathy testified that he believed the team of Manning, Cook and Cano was the equivalent of Vance and Green. He testified that any modern industrial electrician must have experience with PLCs, and will not necessarily spell-out that experience on his résumé. He testified that it was his "absolute firm belief" that no matter whose names he submitted to FDOT as substitute electricians, they would be rejected. Mr. Ooms testified that he neither favored GE nor disfavored Old Tampa Bay. He admitted having greater familiarity with GE’s personnel because they have been working on the bridges for the last five years. He testified that he considers it his professional obligation to work with whoever holds the contract. Aside from the obvious licensure deficiency for Mr. Cano, these proposed substitutes may well have been equivalent to Vance and Green. However, their equivalence could not be ascertained from Old Tampa Bay's submissions. Their résumés did not clearly establish their qualifications in areas that Old Tampa Bay knew or should have known were critical to FDOT. The agency made its expectations very clear to Old Tampa Bay as to what was expected of equivalent substitutes. Old Tampa Bay did nothing to expand upon the sketchy résumés of these persons, or to explicate the relationship between their experience and the work to be performed on the bridges. Mr. Ooms cannot be faulted for failing to consider information that the proposer did not provide. It is found that Mr. Ooms was not biased in rejecting Manning, Cook, and Cano. Old Tampa Bay argues that the disparity in the scoring of the technical proposals between Mr. Ooms and the other two evaluators demonstrates his bias in favor of GE. However, as noted above, all three evaluators gave GE the highest marks for RFP 1003. In fact, the scores for GE’s proposal given by the other two evaluators were significantly higher than the score Mr. Ooms gave to GE’s proposal. The fact that Mr. Ooms found an 18-point disparity between the proposal of GE and the proposals of the other two bidders does not of itself indicate bias in favor of GE on his part, any more than the fact that his score for GE was 15 to 18 points lower than the GE scores by the other evaluators indicates a bias against GE. FDOT demonstrated no bias against Old Tampa Bay in this process, providing Old Tampa Bay repeated opportunities to provide satisfactory substitutes for Green and Vance. Old Tampa Bay attempted to show disparate treatment by introducing evidence showing that FDOT allowed GE to substitute Kelly Green for an electrician named Charles Cave in 1995, after award of the previous contract, despite the fact that Green at the time had no experience working on the bridges and did not obtain a journeyman electrician’s license until approximately two months after he commenced work. Assuming arguendo that FDOT’s actions in awarding this contract may be attacked by showing different agency behavior in prior contracts, the evidence adduced by Old Tampa Bay is insufficient because it gives no indication of the qualifications of Charles Cave, the electrician replaced by Mr. Green. There is no way to determine whether Mr. Green was or was not an equivalent substitute for Mr. Cave, and thus no way to establish disparate treatment by FDOT from one contract to the next. Old Tampa Bay further asserts that FDOT’s treatment of Mr. Green when he commenced work indicates that FDOT had the discretion to allow Mr. McCormick to obtain his journeyman electrician’s license after commencing work. Assuming arguendo that Old Tampa Bay’s assertion is correct, the facts establish that the lack of a license was a secondary concern in the rejection of Mr. McCormick. Mr. Ooms testified that his rejection of Mr. McCormick was primarily based on lack of bridge and PLC experience, and the overstatement of qualifications on Mr. McCormick’s résumé. Even if Mr. McCormick possessed the required license, Mr. Ooms would have properly rejected him. Old Tampa Bay challenged FDOT’s allowing GE to make changes in its management personnel after being awarded the contract for RFP 1003. The three upper-level managers in question were located in Atlanta, had nothing directly to do with the operation of the bridges, and were not "key personnel" as described in the RFP and Bridge Manual. GE informed FDOT of the change in a courtesy letter, dated October 20, 1998, more than five months after submission of the original proposals. The RFP did not require these remote persons to be identified by name at all, let alone require GE to freeze them in place as a condition of its contract. As noted above, the facts established that Old Tampa Bay included the name of John Vance in its proposal though it knew or should have known that Mr. Vance had no intention of working for Old Tampa Bay on this project. Old Tampa Bay attempted to demonstrate that GE did substantially the same thing when it included the name of Mr. Lane Tyus in its proposal as its registered electrical engineer. Mr. Tyus indeed testified that he did not know that GE had included his name in the proposal at the time it was submitted, and was not made aware of his inclusion until some time after Old Tampa Bay filed its protest. However, Mr. Tyus also testified that he knew his résumé was kept on file by GE precisely for inclusion in proposals. Further, he testified that he has been involved with the contract for these bridges since 1992, that he was not surprised at his inclusion, and that he was prepared to undertake the tasks described in the GE proposal. Thus, there is no comparison between Mr. Tyus’ situation with GE and that of Mr. Vance with Old Tampa Bay. Finally, Old Tampa Bay attempted to demonstrate bias in the fact that FDOT allowed GE to submit John Vance's name as bridge superintendent for RFP 1004, despite his lack of experience in that position. However, Mr. Ooms testified that Mr. Vance was in fact more than qualified for the position, in that the training requirements set forth in the Bridge Manual for electricians such as Mr. Vance include all the requirements for bridge superintendents as well as electrical courses.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the protest filed by Old Tampa Bay Enterprises, Inc. and awarding the contract for RFP-DOT-97/98- 1003, Bridge Tending/Maintenance and Repair Services for Five Movable Bridges, Sarasota and Manatee Counties, to General Electric Industrial Systems. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan Sjostrom, Esquire Steel, Hector & Davis LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Office oif the General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert A. Rush, Esquire Robert A. Rush, P.A. 726 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue At issue is whether an order recommending denial of the subject permits and variance should be rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing statement of the case and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order reversing Monroe County's decision to issue the subject permits and variance. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29 day of January 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of January 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation’s (“Department” or DOT”), notice of intent to award a contract to Intervenor, Archer Western De-Moya, Joint Venture (“AWD”), for a transportation project involving the design and reconstruction of federal and state roadways in Miami, Florida (“the Project”), is contrary to governing statutes, DOT’s rules, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the award is contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Project, Parties & Participants Respondent, DOT, is the state agency authorized by section 334.30, Florida Statutes, to issue requests for proposals to solicit competitive bids for private-public (“P3”) partnership projects. The Project was located in District VI of the Department. Greg Schiess is the manager of the Strategic Initiatives Office for DOT. Mr. Schiess oversaw the Project and was the agency representative for DOT at the final hearing. Nadine Chinapoo was DOT’s procurement officer who oversaw the RFP process for the Project. The RFP had strict rules of contact between bidders and any DOT employee or officer. The Department designated Ms. Chinapoo as the “single contact and source of information” for the RFP. The Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (“MDX”) is a state agency created in 1994, authorized by Miami-Dade County, and funded through toll revenues. MDX has regional oversight of five expressways in Miami-Dade County, including State Road 836 (“SR 836”). On February 6, 2017, DOT issued the “Design-Build Request for Proposal for SR 836/I-395 from West of I-95 to MacArthur Causeway Bridge and I-95 Pavement Reconstruction and I-95 Southbound to SR 836 Westbound and SR-836 from West of NW 17th Avenue to Midtown Interchange (SR-836/I-395/I-95)” (“RFP”). The Department developed the RFP pursuant to section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which allows DOT to enter into a P3 to finance, design and build transportation construction and facilities. No one timely filed an objection to any of the RFP specifications. The RFP involves two contracts: (1) the DOT contract for federal interstates 95 (“I-95”) and 395 (“I-395”), and a portion of SR 836 leading to and from MacArthur Causeway Bridge; and (2) the MDX contract which involves another portion of SR 836 from Northwest 17th Avenue to the Midtown Exchange at I-95. A key component of the RFP was the replacement for “Bridge No. 8/9” of I-395, which would run east to west (“Signature Bridge”). According to the RFP, the Signature Bridge would take traffic over a portion of downtown Miami to and from the MacArthur Causeway. Ultimately, the winning bidder or design-build firm (“DB Firm”) would provide preliminary designs, coordinate design services with the Department to finalize the engineering and construction plans, and perform construction of the finalized designs. It would also need to self-finance the design and construction of the Project, because payment would be made by DOT into an escrow account and then disbursed to the selected DB Firm on periodic intervals. This form of payment was referred to as “gap financing.” BCC is a private civil engineering firm based in Florida specializing in roadway projects. The Department engaged BCC to advise and draft concept plans and portions of the RFP related to roadway design, roadway geometrics and temporary traffic control (also known as maintenance of traffic (“MOT”)). Staff from BCC also represented the Department in meetings with bidders as allowed by the RFP.4/ The Project Selection Committee (“PSC”) was made up of three members: Javier Rodriguez, Executive Director of MDX; Gerry O’Reilly, Secretary of DOT for District IV; and Dat Huynh, District Planning and Environmental Administrator of DOT for District VI. The PSC selected the Best Value Proposer (“BVP”) based on scores given for the bidders’ Technical Proposals, contract time, price proposals, and a passing grade for the bidder’s financial health. The PSC also met publicly at various times during the RFP process. The Technical Review Committee (“TRC”) was the group in the RFP process responsible for reviewing and scoring the Technical Proposal. The TRC was made up of four DOT engineers and one MDX engineer. The Technical Proposal was made up two volumes. Volume 1 was worth a total of 60 points and included criteria such as construction methods, MOT plans, and innovation. Volume 2 was worth up to 30 points, and addressed aesthetic criteria such as streetscapes, lighting and enhancements. The Aesthetic Review Committee (“ARC”) was the group assigned to review and pass acceptable Signature Bridge options. The ARC also was responsible for reviewing and scoring Volume 2 of the Technical Proposals from each bidder. There were originally five members: four non-DOT representatives from the local community; and Brian Blanchard, the DOT assistant secretary. Mr. Blanchard withdrew from the ARC prior to the scoring of Volume 2, when his duties at DOT increased after the DOT Secretary resigned. Each bidder could submit three bridge designs or options. The ARC members gave a “pass” or “fail” grade to each Signature Bridge option submitted. These pass/fail grades determined which proposals moved to the next phase of the RFP involving the technical aspects of the entire proposal. Although the ARC members also ranked each of the bidders’ options, these rankings were for “informational purposes only.” Leon Corbett, the Department’s finance manager for the RFP, was responsible for overseeing the final phase of the RFP process of evaluating the financial fitness of the intended DB Firm. Mr. Corbett was experienced in evaluating financial proposals submitted in response to requests for proposals, and specifically had experience in evaluating bidders for proposals involving P3s. Mr. Corbett and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. Petitioner, FAM, is a joint venture organized specifically to submit a response to the RFP. The corporate members of FAM are Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (“FEI”), Astaldi Construction Corporation and Munilla Construction Management, LLC (“MCM”). All three members of FAM are civil construction contractors that were prequalified by DOT to submit bids to the RFP. Hope Grumbles, FEI’s director of sales and infrastructure, served as the corporate representative for FAM at the hearing. AWD was also organized to submit a response to the RFP. AWD is composed of Archer Western Contractors, LLC (“Archer”), and the de Moya Group, Inc. (“de Moya”), both DOT- prequalified contractors. Ultimately, DOT issued a notice of intent that AWD had been chosen as the winning proposer or DB Firm. Kevin McGlinchey, the vice-president over Florida and the Caribbean for Archer, served as the corporate representative for AWD at the hearing. History and Groundwork for Project and RFP Planning for improvements to I-395 and the bridge to the MacArthur Causeway began in the early 1990s, but did not result in any renovations. Research on the project began again in 2004 with the beginning of a project development and environmental study (“PD&E”) and culminated in 2010 with the issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement and the Record of Decision.5/ The purpose of the PD&E study was to produce a recommendation for final designs and construction. Separate PD&E studies were done for the I-395 and SR 836 projects. The original PD&E premise was simply to replace the bridge on I-395, but that project did not move forward because of concerns that the bridge and the construction itself may have negative impacts on the area underneath and adjacent to the bridge, including Overtown, a historic black neighborhood located adjacent to I-395. At some point after the release of the PD&E studies, DOT created a Project Advisory Group which met numerous times until 2013. The Project Advisory Group consisted of representatives of numerous stakeholders in the road improvements, including governmental agencies and civic organizations from the local area. Meanwhile in 2010 and early 2011, BCC, on behalf of the Department, began developing the RFP language. Although it was not involved in the original I-395 PD&E, BCC reevaluated the PD&E for factors, such as environmental and socioeconomic impacts, traffic issues, and right-of-way requirements. These changes were incorporated in the concept plans and procurement language for the final advertisement requesting proposals for the Project. In 2013, a lawsuit filed against DOT in Miami-Dade County sought equitable relief relating to any bridge renovations by DOT. As a result, DOT agreed that any renovation or improvements by DOT to the I-395 interchange would include a “Signature Bridge” as part of the Project. In furtherance of this goal and to allow local input regarding the visual impact of the bridge on the area, DOT created an Aesthetic Steering Committee to review alternatives for the “Signature Bridge” and recommend a specific bridge design to DOT. Despite meeting numerous times, however, this committee was unable to reach consensus on any one specific design. The committee disbanded, but the concept of the committee’s role was incorporated in the RFP process in the form of the ARC. During this time, MDX also had plans to reconstruct portions of SR 836. DOT and MDX agreed to conduct the SR 836 renovations and the bridge replacement as part of the same project for convenience and to save resources. As a result, DOT partnered with MDX to conduct a multi-phased and comprehensive reconstruction project that would address the traffic and aesthetic concerns of the local citizens. The project would include three major components: (1) a “Signature Bridge”; (2) SR 836 renovations; and (3) I-395 renovations. Also as a result of the public’s concerns related to the visual impact of the Project to the surrounding areas, the Department developed an Aesthetic Manual (found at Joint Exhibit 3) for the Project. This manual focused on the Signature Bridge and area underneath the bridge. As explained in the Aesthetic Manual: [T]he signature bridge will be the crown jewel of the Project. The purpose of this structure is two-fold: to provide Downtown Miami with a contemporary infrastructure icon, and to improve the quality of the space below 1-395 by relieving it of obstructing piers and columns. . . . Irrespective of the ultimate design, the Signature bridge shall still adhere to [certain] constraints: [The] Signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure. The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Concept Plans To provide bidders with an established set of design objectives (i.e., an idea of what it was looking for in the final product), DOT created concept plans that identified the project’s physical boundaries, the scope of the interstate reconstruction and proposed layouts. The RFP concept plans were developed and approved as part of the PD&E studies that were conducted for the I-395 and SR 836 projects prior to the issuance of the RFP. It is clear from the RFP itself and the testimony at the hearing that changes to the concept plans were anticipated and encouraged. A bidder’s improvements to the basic requirements and layouts to the concept plans could garner more points in the final bid score. The RFP described the purpose of concept plans. The Concept Plans have been developed to illustrate the work required for the Total Project. The Design-Build Firm may make use of the design in the Concept Plans as a starting point for the design. However, the Design-Build Firm is not limited to only the work identified in the Concept Plans but must stay within the constraints of the Department Commitments and the requirements of the RFP. Anthony Jorges, a civil engineer and the BCC consultant working with the Department on the roadway design, geometrics and MOT requirements of the RFP, gave clear and convincing testimony. He testified the concept plans were to serve as a launching pad for the proposals. [The concept plans are] essentially a starting point for the design-build teams. [I]t really is a conceptual level, about a 30 percent level design, but it gives the teams a point to start. It by no means is final or unmodifiable. It’s just a starting point . . . a baseline to start off with. No one timely filed any protest of the concept plans. RFP Timing and Process The procurement process took place over a year, from the date of advertisement to the selection of the DB Firm. The RFP process was broken down into four phases. Phase I: Short Listing Phase II: Aesthetic Signature Bridge Submission Pass/Fail Phase III: Technical Proposal Submissions and Scoring Phase IV: Price Proposal and Financial Proposal Submittals Although addressed in detail below, in summary, prequalified bidders were first required to submit a letter of response with specific preliminary information about the bidder. DOT then created a shortlist of bidders based on review of these letters. Each shortlisted entity was then given the opportunity to submit Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals. Each bidder that had a passing Aesthetic Bridge submission was permitted to submit a Technical Proposal and Financial Proposal. After the Technical Proposals were scored, the scores were announced along with each bidder’s price proposal and proposed contract time. After getting a pass grade on its financial proposal from the Department, the PSC selected the BVP. Phase I In Phase I, each proposer was to provide DOT a “Letter of Response” with general information, such as the proposer’s past projects and résumés of designated key staff positions. Specific to this protest, bidders were to designate a bridge architect and engineer of record for the Signature Bridge. Each timely Letter of Response submitted to the Department was to be evaluated on specific criteria by the PSC. DOT would then post a shortlist of bidders authorized to submit proposals. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted a Letter of Response and the PSC selected both for the shortlist, thereby advancing both to the second phase of the RFP process. Phase II Each proposer that was shortlisted provided a draft submittal of its Signature Bridge design or design options. These drafts were vetted by DOT through meetings that allowed the proposers and the Department to discuss any questions or concerns either had about the draft proposals. No members of PSC, TRC or ARC attended these “vetting” meetings; the meetings were solely intended to provide feedback and answer questions between DOT staff and the proposers. After the “vetting” meetings, each shortlisted proposer submitted up to three final Signature Bridge options to the ARC. Each ARC member then gave each option a “pass” or “fail” grade. If a proposer submitted more than one option, the ARC members ranked that proposer’s options by preference. These grades and rankings were provided to the PSC for review. To move to the third phase, a proposer must have received at least one “pass” rating. The RFP specifically provided the ARC’s rankings of individual options “are purely for informational purposes only, and will have no direct impact on the Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal.” On August 19, 2016, DOT issued the “Aesthetic Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail Posting Notice” indicating that the PSC had reviewed the ARC’s rankings. As allowed by the RFP, the PSC determined that the bidders that received three out of five passes would move on. AWD’s Signature Bridge proposal was a fountain-like design with multiple arches sprouting from a unified point. FAM’s Signature Bridge design consisted of two cabled structures that were similar, but inverted. Each had an arm with a rotating disk extending into the air. Ultimately, the PSC approved these submissions from FAM and AWD to proceed to the third phase of the RFP process. Phase III Whereas Phase II focused on the Signature Bridge, Phase III involved the Technical Proposals from the bidders. Each Technical Proposal was made up of a Technical Volume (Volume 1) and Aesthetic Volume (Volume 2). The TRC members reviewed and scored both volumes; the ARC members only scored Volume 2. According to the RFP, the technical scores were based on an “adjectival scoring system” that required each of the TRC and ARC members to review the volume or volumes of the proposals he or she was assigned and give each section an “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” These descriptive ratings were later converted to a numerical value and announced at the public meeting held on April 24, 2017, to open the contract time and price proposals. Ms. Chinapoo provided the Technical Proposals, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling all the scores to the PSC for review prior to the April 24 public meeting. Unlike the other bidder’s proposals, AWD’s Technical Proposal included a viaduct made up of two by-pass lanes in each direction on an elevated freeway along the center of the existing SR 836. The viaduct had construction and safety advantages over traditional “parallel lane” formats and would eliminate interaction between I-95 traffic and special event traffic in downtown Miami. Because this was a novel concept not addressed in the RFP or concept plans, AWD was required to get DOT’s approval before submitting the preliminary designs. After the TRC and ARC members reviewed the Technical Proposals, AWD received a 53.980 out of 60 points on Volume I and 24.389 out of 30 points on Volume II; FAM received 50.180 points for Volume I and 28.656 on Volume II. ATC Process Bidders were allowed to obtain permission to deviate from the concept plans and RFP requirements in certain aspects. The RFP outlined a process for approving requests for an Alternative Technical Concept (“ATC”), which included any deviation from a component of the technical requirements, or any proposed material or technology not addressed in the RFP. The RFP schedule anticipated that bidders would submit their ATC requests after Phase I and, if approved, incorporate them in the Technical Proposals submitted in Phase III. The purpose of the ATC process was to allow “innovation, flexibility, time and cost savings on the design and construction of Design-Build Projects while still meeting the Department Commitments.” The ATC process included one-on-one discussion meetings between the Department (or its representatives from BCC) with bidders “to describe proposed changes to supplied basic configurations, Project scope, design criteria, and/or construction criteria.” The purpose of these one-on-one ATC meetings was to discuss the ATC proposals, answer questions that the Department may have related to the requested deviations, review other relevant information, and establish whether the ATC proposal met the requirements for approval when possible. Representatives from the bidders and/or their engineers or designers, and DOT staff were involved as needed to provide feedback on the ATC. None of the TRC, ARC, and PSC members attended ATC meetings or participated in the ATC process. An ATC was deemed worthy of approval if the concept suggested was equal to or better than the existing requirements of the RFP, as determined by the Departments. ATC requests, which reduced scope, quality, performance or reliability, would be rejected. The Department retained discretion to approve or deny an ATC without a need to state justification. Once approved, an ATC was treated one of two ways: with an addendum to the RFP so all proposers were aware of the deviation; or (2) without an addendum so only the proposer that submitted the ATC would be permitted to utilize the approved ATC in its design. Not all concept plans or RFP requirements were modifiable; some could not be changed through an ATC. Specific to these proceedings, the RFP had “specific ATC restrictions” (or what the parties referred to as “nonmodifiables”) on the following requirements: Minimum basic number of lanes [for I-395 and I-95] as shown in Attachment A-33. All Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL). Minimum basic number of lanes [for SR 836] as shown in Attachment MDXA-02. Minimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes [for MDX]. Preliminary Plans and Confirmation Letter During Phase III, each remaining bidder was required to submit a technical proposal in which the bidder provided design concepts with preliminary plans. The RFP did not seek proposals of final designs that were ready for construction. Rather, as explicitly stated, the actual preparation of final plans and designs was to be part of the contract work being solicited, and would be performed after contract execution. As was clear from the RFP and testimony at the hearing, the goal of the procurement was not for the award recipient to provide final signed and sealed plans. Instead, it would provide plans as deliverables in the contract, submitted to DOT engineers for review, comment, and approval. More precisely, the RFP and contract required the winning bidder to submit--during contract performance--60- percent plans (plans that are 60-percent complete) for DOT comment and approval, followed by 90-percent plans for further DOT review. Only after the 90-percent plans were finalized, were they to be signed, sealed, and submitted to DOT for construction. In other words, the final design plans were to be developed by the DB Firm’s designers in collaboration with DOT’s (and MDX) staff as part of contract performance and deliverables--not as part of the procurement itself. Because of the unique fluid nature of the proposal drawings, the RFP provided that DOT may waive minor irregularities in proposals as follows: Waiver of Irregularities The Department may waive minor informalities or irregularities in Proposals received where such is merely a matter of form and not substance, and the correction or waiver of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers. Minor irregularities are defined as those that will not have an adverse effect on the Department’s interest and will not affect the price of the Proposals by giving a Proposer an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Proposers. Any design submittals that are part of a Proposal shall be deemed preliminary only. Preliminary design submittals may vary from the requirements of the Design and Construction Criteria. The Department, at their discretion, may elect to consider those variations in awarding points to the Proposal rather than rejecting the entire Proposal. In no event will any such elections by the Department be deemed to be a waiving of the Design and Construction Criteria. Because the proposal plans were merely preliminary, DOT required each bidder to submit a “Written Confirmation Letter” (“Compliance Letter”) stating that regardless of the preliminary plan, if chosen as the DB Firm, it would comply with and be bound by all requirements in the contract documents during contract performance. The winning bidder was required to fully comply with the Design and Construction Criteria and other RFP requirements for the price bid, regardless of the preliminary designs or if the proposal was based on a variation. AWD and FAM each submitted Compliance Letters. Phase IV and Selection of AWD as BVP In Phase IV, FAM, AWD, and two other bidders submitted their price proposal and total project calendar days. During the public meeting on April 24, 2017, price proposals from each proposer were opened. The price proposals also included each proposer’s total estimated contract time. Based on the formula set forth in the RFP, each proposal received a score for its price proposal. The members of the PSC were not involved in evaluating the price proposals or the contract time. Instead, the prices and contract times were evaluated by DOT staff, who were to alert the PSC members to issues with a proposer’s price or contract time. The record established DOT staff were not concerned and did not alert the PSC members to any issues. Both AWD and FAM received a score of 4.99 points for their price proposals. AWD proposed a total contract time of 1,460 days; FAM proposed a total contract time of 1,825 days. The RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Using this formula, AWD received 5.00 out of 5 points; and FAM received 4.00 points. The total scores were then noticed by the Department. The next step in this phase was for the Department to evaluate the financial fitness of the intended award. The Department’s finance manager for the RFP, Leon Corbett, and DOT staff evaluated the financial proposal of the highest scorer on a pass/fail basis. As noticed in the RFP, the financial review portion for this RFP was to occur after the April 24 public meeting announcing the technical scores and price proposals. The RFP states that the “PSC shall select the BVP for the Total Project.” It also states that “[t]he Proposer with a responsive Proposal will be evaluated by the PSC for award of the I-395 Agreements as the Best Value Proposer as set forth in this RFP.” Finally, the RFP provides as follows: The PSC will review the evaluations of the Technical Proposal and the scores for the Proposed Contract Time and Scored Price Proposal for each Proposer and make a final determination of the highest score. The PSC has the right to correct any errors in the evaluation and selection process that may have been made. The Department is not obligated to award the I-395 Agreements and the PSC may decide to reject all Proposals. If the PSC decides not to reject all Proposals, the I-395 Agreements will be awarded to the Proposer determined by the PSC to be the Best Value Proposer. Before the scheduled PSC meeting on May 12, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo provided each PSC member with the technical proposals submitted by the vendors, the individual scores of the evaluators, and a spreadsheet compiling the scores. On May 12, 2017, the PSC met to consider the scores, as well as DOT staff’s evaluation of the AWD financial proposal. The PSC unanimously determined that AWD was the “Best Value Proposer” based on the highest technical score, the best value proposer and the best contract time. One PSC member, Mr. Rodriguez, testified that before the May 12 meeting he spent about 12 hours reviewing the material before making the final decision as to which bidder would be BVP. He also testified that he considered AWD the BVP because “they had the best score, after they were scored, they had a compliant price, and they had the best time.” Mr. Rodriguez indicated he would have asked any questions at the meeting had he seen anything unusual, untoward, or problematic about the scoring of the proposals. Mr. Rodriguez noted there was one anomaly in the technical scores of one ARC member who preferred the FAM’s proposal. Whereas the other members of the ARC gave AWD scores of 26.2, 24.6, and 17.80 out of 30 points for Volume 2, John Richard gave AWD a score of 7.20 points; while awarding FAM a nearly perfect score of 29.300. Mr. Richard awarded the other two proposals (not FAM or AWD) 9.00 and 2.5 points. Mr. Rodriguez considered, but was not concerned about Mr. Richard’s individual scores because Mr. Rodriguez felt the scores were based on “aesthetics” and just “an opinion” about which proposal Mr. Richard thought offered the prettier bridge. There is no evidence establishing the PSC failed in its responsibilities or did not follow the RFP process in selecting the BVP as described in the RFP. After the PSC determined the intended award, the Federal Highway Administration was required to concur, the DB Firm was required to submit final financial documents, and the parties would then execute the contracts. DOT’s Scoring In the Amended Protest, FAM asserts the bid award should be rejected because the Department used the wrong methodology for assigning the technical scores for Volume 2. DOT took all of the reviewers’ scores, added them together and divided them by the number of reviewers. FAM claims that correct methodology would be to take the ARC members’ individual scores and average them to one score (x); take the TRC members’ individual scores and average them to another score (y); and then average x and y to arrive at a technical score for Volume 2. Although the RFP was specific as to what criteria the ARC and TRC members were to use in grading the technical proposals, and how those grades were converted to numbers, it was silent as to how the individual reviewers’ scores would be combined to come up with one score for Volume 2. As explained previously, all members from the TRC and the ARC used an “adjectival scoring system” that required individual evaluators to rate portions of the proposals as “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” Consistent with the RFP, non-reviewers (Mr. Schiess and a DOT in-house attorney) assigned numerical equivalents to the adjectival scores. These individual numerical conversions were delivered to Ms. Chinapoo, who kept them secure until the scores of all proposers were presented in a spreadsheet during a public meeting on April 24, 2017. As established by the evidence at the hearing, typically in DOT procurements there are technical reviewers scoring the technical part of proposals. In that situation all of the reviewers’ scores are averaged (i.e., added all together and divided by the total number of reviewers). Unlike other procurements that are based only on technical components and price, this RFP involved an additional component relating to aesthetics. Therefore, in this RFP process there were two separate scoring committees, ARC and TRC, each starting out with five members each. Mr. Rodriguez testified the method used by DOT-– calculating the final score by adding up the scores from the individual reviewers and then dividing it by the number of reviewers--was common practice. Theoretically, under this typical method, for the Aesthetic volume of the Technical Proposals, DOT would have added the scores from each of the ten committee members and divided by ten to reach the technical score. During the course of the procurement, however, one of the members, Brian Blanchard (the sole DOT representative on the ARC) resigned from the committee, and was not replaced. The RFP is silent as to how the absence of a committee member should be treated. DOT addressed the reduction in ARC membership by notifying the proposers that Mr. Blanchard was no longer on the ARC; and explaining the “scoring of your Technical Volume 1 will be done by the five-member Technical Review Committee (TRC), who will also score your Aesthetic Volume 2, along with the four remaining members of the ARC.” It did not clarify how the individual scores would be used to arrive at a total score. As reflected in Joint Exhibit 46, DOT converted the adjectival description provided by each ARC and TRC member and then calculated the scores of each of the reviewers to reach a total sum, which was then divided by the number of reviewers for each volume of the technical proposal. The language in DOT’s notice announcing Mr. Blanchard’s departure from the ARC is ambiguous. The fact, however, that the Department did not provide a formula (as it did for scoring the price proposal or contract time scores) and that it mentioned the “members,” and not the committees, supports the use of the typical averaging methodology, averaging scores of all nine evaluators. As Mr. Schiess testified, this is the way an evaluator’s scores would be treated in any other procurement. Q.: Do you know who made the decision on how to average those numbers? A.: The decision to average the scores has been something the Department has been doing. That’s just common practice. Q.: And what is the common practice? A.: To average the scores of the evaluators. Q.: Just take a straight average, add up all the evaluators and divide the scores by the number of evaluators? A.: Correct. Similarly, the testimony of the PSC members established this was common practice. Mr. Rodriquez testified that he has served on numerous DOT project selection committees over the years and that scores of evaluators are typically averaged. Dat Huynh, another PSC member, described the process as “regular averaging” as “just combining the number and dividing by the number of people that were in participation.” The testimony established any contrary method would need to have been clearly spelled out in the RFP. At the May 12 public hearing, FAM’s representatives raised the issue of the scoring and claimed it defeated the public’s role in the process. The evidence, however, established the public did have a key role in the selection of the Signature Bridge. The ARC’s role was to provide public input. In addition to scoring Volume 2, the ARC evaluated the Signature Bridge design proposals on a Pass/Fail basis and served as the “gate-keeper” keeping any designs it did not approve from moving further in the process.6/ John Morris, president of the third-place proposer, also indicated at the May 12 public meeting that based on his experience the process was not unusual: My team came in third in that process. And I’m not really here representing my joint venture team. I’m really more here as someone who has done a great deal of work with the Department of Transportation and bid on a lot of design-build projects over the last 20 years, and as far as I’m concerned, the DOT followed the process that they laid out in the RFP. Additionally, a plain reading of the RFP indicates it was the weight of the individual ARC members, not the ARC as a whole, that was valued. For example under the section titled “Aesthetic Signature Bridge Proposals Pass/Fail,” the RFP stated in relevant part: Each ARC member will independently pass or fail each option submitted. Each ARC member will also rank the options provided by a Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer against the other options provided by the same Proposer. * * * Although the ARC members will rank the different options . . . these rankings are purely for information purposes only, and will have no direct impact on Pass/Fail decision or on the evaluation of the Proposer’s Technical Proposal. * * * [T]he PSC will recalculate the options based on “passing” being lowered to three (3) out of five (5) passes from the ARC members. (RFP at 20)(emphasis added). There is also support for using individual scores in the RFP section titled “Final Selection Process,” which provides that at the public meeting where the price proposals are opened, “the Department will announce the adjectival scores for each member of the TRC and ARC, by category, for each Proposer.” (emphasis added). This interpretation makes sense given that the previous form of the ARC, the Aesthetic Steering Committee, could not come up with a consensus regarding a style or appearance for the Signature Bridge. Moreover, given that it was the DOT’s representative and not a public member that resigned, it cannot be said that the method used by DOT undermined the public’s participation in the process. There is no evidence that the method put forth by FAM is supported by the RFP, any rules or by any industry or departmental precedent; nor is there evidence that the ARC and TRC were to contribute to the scoring process equally. There is no evidence that the averaging methodology used by DOT is contrary to any statute or rule. The Department’s deriving the total score for Volume 2 by averaging all the evaluator’s scores was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. AWD’s Contract Time As stated previously, the RFP provided the formula for scoring the proposed contract times as: 5 x (a/b), where a = lowest number of calendar days proposed by any bidder; and b = number of calendar days proposed by that bidder. Additionally, the RFP noted: “The Proposed Contract Time should incorporate and set forth an aggressive but realistic time frame for the required completion of the Total Project.” According to the RFP, any time more than 1,825 days would be nonresponsive. AWD’s Proposed Contract Time was 1,460 days; FAM’s Proposed Contract Time was the maximum provided by the RFP-– 1,825 days. This comes out to be a 365-day or a one-year difference. As a result, using the formula in the RFP, AWD achieved a score of 5.0 out of 5 points for its contract time, and FAM achieved a score of 4.0 points. FAM challenges AWD’s contract time, claiming it was not realistic. FAM argues the 1,460 days proposed by AWD was unrealistic and insinuates this number was done solely to manipulate the scoring. AWD counters, not only was it realistic, it was aggressive, as requested by the RFP. There is no evidence of collusion or that AWD knew the individual technical scores before it came up with its proposal or that there was any kind of unethical or improper conduct relating to the contract time. Rather there was competent and convincing evidence that AWD’s shorter time proposal was realistic given its resources and experience. Kevin McGlinchey, who was involved in developing AWD’s contract time, testified the calculation of AWD’s contract time was an on-going process and was not finalized until a short time before the price and time submission was due. The evidence established AWD’s joint members had previous experience with DOT and P3/design-build projects. In addition, AWD was a very large contractor in the state with access to adequate local labor. Archer employs 1,300 workers in the area; de Moya employees up to 300 workers in the area. For example, depending on equipment availability AWD could have five eight-hour shifts, five ten-hour shifts, or six eight-hour shifts; or AWD could increase the number of crews working each shift. This access to labor afforded AWD the ability to increase its crews and shifts, thereby reducing the length of total work time. AWD also reduced its contract time over the procurement process by changes in its construction plan that allowed it to overlap construction phases and work on more than one segment of the Project concurrently, instead of running consecutively as originally anticipated when it submitted preliminary design documents and MOT plans. Mr. Schiess testified that he and a DOT bridge expert reviewed AWD’s Proposed Contract Time to determine whether it was realistic. This review was conducted between the time the scores were publicly released on April 24, 2017, and the PSC meeting on May 12, 2017. Mr. Schiess testified “based on our experience in Florida and other projects [with] these contractors [Archer and de Moya], that [1,460 days] was not an unrealistic time.” Because there was competent evidence AWD had the resources and a plan to complete the Project in the 1,460 days, its contract time proposal was aggressive, realistic, and responsive to the RFP. AWD’s Financial Proposal FAM also challenges the “Pass” grade DOT awarded AWD on its Financial Proposal. It argues (1) DOT failed in not reviewing FAM’s financial proposal; (2) AWD’s original financial proposal was non-responsive; and (3) DOT improperly allowed AWD to supplement information to its original financial proposal. Section VI, M., of the RFP addresses the financial requirements of the RFP and the documentation that must be provided by bidders. The financial evaluation is a two-step process with an initial Financial Proposal to be submitted on the due date for the price proposals. After the PSC chose a BVP, Mr. Corbett and his staff was also responsible for reviewing a final letter of commitment or credit provided by the DB Firm, which was due 15 days following the Department’s posting of its Intent to Award. Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted the initial financial review for this procurement after the public meeting, announcing the technical scores, price proposals and contract times. The Department was to give the highest scoring bidder either a pass/fail grade, which was relayed to the PSC to make its final decision. During this period, the RFP specifically allowed Mr. Corbett to obtain additional financial information. It states: The Department’s evaluation of a Financial Proposal is solely for the benefit of the Department and not for the benefit of the Design-Build Firm, any entity related thereto, the public or any member thereof, nor create for any third party rights. . . . The Departments evaluation of each Financial Proposal will be on a pass/fail basis. Analysis of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal by the Department will include, but not be limited to the following: * * * d. Review of the Lender Letter(s) of Commitment or Demonstration of Line(s) of Credit to determine if it meets the financing needs established in the Project Financial Plan. * * * The Department reserves the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its obligations to complete the financial due diligence. (RFP at 70.) As an initial matter, although Mr. Corbett did not conduct a concurrent pass/fail review of the financial proposal submitted by FAM (or the other bidders who made it to Phase IV), nothing in the RFP required the Department to review and assess the financial proposals of all the bidders. FAM asserts by failing to have its financial proposal evaluated, the PSC was deprived of the option of awarding the contract to FAM. However, if the PSC had opted not to award the contract to AWD despite its status as the highest scoring bidder, nothing in the RFP would have precluded the Department from initiating a pass/fail review of the FAM financial proposal at that point to assess FAM’s financial viability for the contract award. The Department did not err in evaluating only the highest scoring bidder, AWD. Regarding AWD’s responsiveness to the financial requirements of the RFP, AWD timely submitted its financial proposal to DOT on August 24, 2017, which included a preliminary letter of commitment (“PLOC”) from BankUnited. According to the RFP, the PLOC was required to contain the following information at a minimum: The lender was interested in providing financial support for the project; The lender had reviewed the financial requirements of the RFP; The amount of financial support the Lender intended to provide (no minimum amount was required by the RFP); Any special conditions to the PLOC. After AWD was ranked as the highest scoring bidder, Mr. Corbett and his staff conducted DOT’s initial review of AWD’s financial proposal. There is no dispute that DOT had the right to request any additional information or pursue other actions required to meet its duty of due diligence. The evidence established the original financial proposal met the minimum requirements of the RFP, but DOT requested additional assurances and clarification regarding its PLOC, which AWD provided. As Mr. Corbett explained, AWD’s Financial Proposal was responsive to the RFP requirements, but he had questions relating to the PLOC. Q.: And so this determination of responsiveness was made after you had the original financial proposal, Archer Western- de Moya, the first supplemental proposal and a second supplemental proposal that we just went over, correct? A.: So I mean, there is responsiveness and there is pass/fail, and I think that’s where we have to explore a little bit more. The letter states responsive, meaning it meets the minimum requirements. And then there is the pass/fail, which I don’t know why I didn’t address pass/fail, why I didn’t say it’s a pass in the letter. But the pass came at that point, too, yes. * * * So my answer is it wasn’t an additional proposal, it was--the original proposal was what was evaluated for responsiveness. We asked for additional assurances to make sure they were headed towards a path of getting the resources necessary to finance the project. So the determination was made after receiving all that information. It is evident on the face of the BankUnited PLOC that it is responsive, as it complies with the following minimum RFP requirements. BankUnited confirmed “its interest in providing financing” for the project. BankUnited stated it “has taken careful consideration to review and understand the financial elements of the Project.” BankUnited specified it was “prepared to provide a credit facility up to” $125 million; and the $125 million credit facility consists of $75 million from BankUnited and another $50 million from other participating banks. It is this reference to “other participating banks” that triggered Mr. Corbett to request further information. Attached to the PLOC was a term sheet from BankUnited that sets forth the conditions for its $125 million credit facility. Although FAM contends that the BankUnited PLOC is nonresponsive because BankUnited is only committing to provide $75 million of the $125 million credit to AWD, the evidence at the hearing established BankUnited was proposing to provide a single credit facility totaling $125 million, some of which BankUnited may obtain through group or a “pool” of lenders. The financial proposal was that BankUnited would be the lead arranger of multiple banks participating in the “lending pool.” Nothing in the RFP prohibited this type of “pool,” and the testimony at the hearing established DOT has accepted this kind of loan structure in the past. Where a single credit facility in the form of a loan pool is being proposed, there is nothing in the RFP that precluded BankUnited, as the lead arranger, from submitting the PLOC on behalf of all of the lenders that are or would be participating in the credit facility. Regardless, even if BankUnited’s PLOC is treated as offering a credit facility in the amount of $75 million rather than the full $125 million, this does not render the AWD financial proposal nonresponsive since the RFP merely requires that the PLOC state the “amount the Lender intends to lend,” and does not require what amount that should be. The RFP only states that the commitments “should meet the required amount [of gap financing] identified in the Project Financial Plan.” Obviously, the goal was to ensure the winning bidder had the ability to secure preliminary commitments equaling the amount it may have to put forward for completion of the Project because DOT would be making period payments, but not until after the DB Firm had incurred the expenses. Given BankUnited’s PLOC meets the minimum requirements of the RFP, AWD’s financial proposal was responsive. Moreover, the RFP allowed DOT to look beyond the bare minimum requirements of the RFP to obtain a higher level of assurance before finalizing a “passing” grade. Mr. Corbett also wanted the information in anticipation of questions that the PSC members may have. Specifically, the evidence established that on April 25, 2017, Ms. Chinapoo’s requested AWD to provide additional information regarding the proposed pooling loan being offered by BankUnited. In particular, Mr. Corbett sought “additional assurances” that BankUnited would be able to obtain the balance of the “pool” financing from other participating banks. On April 27, 2017, AWD responded to DOT’s request for additional assurances. In this response, AWD reaffirmed that BankUnited was committed to provide the Final Letter of Commitment that was required under DOT’s RFP. Because AWD’s compliance with the request for information was provided prior to the agency’s announcement that it intended to award the contract to AWD, these additional documents did not violate section 120.57(3)(f). On April 28, 2017, AWD also confirmed to DOT that it had taken steps toward finalizing the $125 million pooling credit facility described in the BankUnited PLOC. AWD also provided another PLOC from Private Bank indicating Private Bank also had an interest in participating in the BankUnited credit facility. Private Bank’s PLOC proposed that it would participate in BankUnited’s credit facility (rather than offering its own credit facility) and that its proposed $50 million loan to the $125 million pool would be the same as the conditions set forth in BankUnited’s term sheet. AWD’s April 28 response also advised that it was continuing to explore the possibility of having BankUnited provide a credit facility for the entire $125 million in gap financing needed. The details regarding this alternative credit facility were described in a letter from BankUnited that was attached to AWD’s April 28 response. Mr. Corbett admitted he considered the additional information received from AWD before announcing his final decision to “pass” the AWD financial proposal; and this information solidified his decision to give AWD a passing grade. Although hypothetically it is possible that had AWD provided different information, Mr. Corbett would have not been assured and may have reached a different result, this is not evidence of an error. Rather it is the essence of conducting “due diligence.” It is also true the additional information BankUnited provided included information that was not contained in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Based on this, FAM argues that the April 27 and April 28 responses constitute modified or amended financial proposals that were submitted after the RFP’s financial proposal deadline in violation of section 120.57(3)(f). However, FAM’s position must be rejected for several reasons. First, the RFP expressly authorized DOT “to request any additional information or pursue other actions” in furtherance of its financial due diligence. This clearly is broad authority that does not limit DOT’s inquiry to information that merely clarifies the financial proposal. Having failed to challenge this “due diligence” language in the RFP provision within the time permitted by section 120.57(3)(b), FAM has waived any objection to DOT’s use of this provision. Further, in both its April 27 and 28 responses, AWD reaffirmed that it was prepared to move forward with the BankUnited credit facility proposed in AWD’s April 24 financial proposal. Although AWD’s April 28 response included information from Private Bank, this information did not propose a new or different credit structure, it simply provided additional information regarding the pool structure expressed originally by BankUnited. Because the BankUnited credit facility indicates that there would be other lenders participating in its credit facility, the identification of Private Bank is consistent with, rather than amending or modifying, the financing plan presented in AWD’s financial proposal. Again, the purpose of the Financial Proposal and PLOC was not to obtain a final commitment from the DB Firm to a particular financing arrangement with a particular lender. Instead, the RFP only required the proposer to present its “preliminary” or possible financing plans so that DOT could evaluate the likelihood that the final award would go to a proposer that had the financial resources necessary to finish the project on time. Only after the contract was awarded would AWD be required to present DOT with its final financing plan in the form of a final letter of commitment. Nothing in the RFP required that this final financing plan be identical to the preliminary financing plan that was presented in AWD’s initial Financial Proposal. As such, the Department’s request for and consideration of the information from AWD regarding the BankUnited PLOC and the pooling credit structure did not violate section 120.54(3)(f), and was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition or arbitrary and capricious. FAM also argues the Preliminary Term Sheet (“PTS”) attached to the BankUnited PLOC conflicts with the RFP, which specifies the circumstances under which money paid under the proposed contract may be assigned to a lender as security for a loan. The RFP provision at issue, referred to by the parties as the “Assignment Clause,” states in relevant part, as follows: Reimbursement shall be made to the Design- Build Firm by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account [“PSEA”] using a unique vendor number sequence. The Design-Build Firm may, with the express written consent of the Surety(ies) and the Lender(s) Financier(s), sell assign or pledge any monies paid into the Project Specific Escrow Account by the Department in favor of third parties and including but not limited to the Design-Build Firm’s Surety(ies) and Lender(s)/Financier(s); however, any such sale, assignment or pledge must only attach to payments made by the Department after such funds have been paid by warrant mailed to the Project Specific Escrow Account, and no sale, assignment or pledge of any receivable from the Department is authorized nor will be permitted by the Department. (RFP at 63)(emphasis added). AWD submitted with its Financial Proposal the BankUnited PLOC, which had an attachment with the following relevant language: Seller [AWD] proposes to sell the right of certain future [DOT] payments . . . to one or more Purchasers in order to finance the Project. As established by Mr. Corbett and Department e-mails, the intent of the Assignment Clause was to make “each [contract] payment payable to the vendor/contractor executing the agreement.” In this regard, the RFP treats the deposit of funds into the PSEA as payment to the contractor. The assignment is permitted under the RFP’s Assignment Clause if AWD’s assignment of a contract payment to a lender does not divert DOT’s payments away from the PSEA to BankUnited. In other words, there is no violation if the funds continue to be deposited into the PSEA. If, however, the assignment gives BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are mailed to the escrow account, it violates the RFP’s Assignment Clause. There is no dispute that the BankUnited PTS purports to assign certain rights held by AWD to the BankUnited as collateral for the proposed credit facility. The terminology used to describe the assignment is non-specific and creates ambiguity as to what the particular right is that is being assigned or sold. For instance, there is language in the PTS indicating that AWD is selling or assigning its “right to payment from DOT” without describing what that right is. In order to know what “right to payment” is being assigned, it has to be determined what right to payment AWD would actually have under its DOT contract since AWD cannot sell or assign contract rights that it does not have. See Cole v. Angora Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As established by the RFP and testimony at the hearing, AWD will have no right under the DOT contract to receive payments directly from DOT; rather, payments from DOT will first be deposited into the PSEA, which will then be available for disbursement to the DB Firm. Because AWD will have no right to direct payment from DOT (as opposed to indirectly through disbursement from the PSEA), AWD cannot assign or sell a right to direct payments from DOT to any lender, including BankUnited. Stated differently, the only “right to payment” that AWD can assign is its right to payment from the PSEA. Moreover, the plain meaning of the PTS establishes AWD does not intend to assign or sell to BankUnited the right to receive payments from DOT before the payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The PTS states as follows: The Seller [AWD] shall establish a project specific escrow account (the “Project Specific Escrow Account”) with the Escrow Agent. All payments payable by DOT under the Department Contract will be deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. (emphasis added). Consistent with this directive, the PTS requires the parties, including BankUnited, to execute the “DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form” as part of their financing transaction. As established by the Department’s exhibits, the purpose of DOT Project Specific Escrow Account Form, which must be signed by both the bidder and lender (or in this case AWD and BankUnited), is to “irrevocably” request, authorize and direct DOT “to process, issue and transmit any and all future payments otherwise payable directly to [the DB Firm] to now be processed, issued and transmitted using DB Firm’s Project Specific Escrow Account . . . in lieu of DB Firm’s regular vendor account. . . .” This irrevocable request to DOT would be made in the name of AWD as the DB Firm contracting with DOT. As the lender, BankUnited’s signature on the form would indicate its consent and agreement “to be so bound by the entirety of the terms of [AWD’s] Request for Specific Escrow Account ” In other words, by signing this form, BankUnited will be agreeing to be bound by AWD’s irrevocable request to have all DOT payments deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. This means that, in accordance with the RFP’s Assignment Clause, BankUnited will be irrevocably agreeing not to receive payments from DOT before payments are deposited into the Project Specific Escrow Account. The arrangement between AWD and BankUnited does not violate the Assignment Clause and is, therefore, responsive. AWD’s Technical Proposal FAM challenges a number of aspects of AWD’s technical plan as being non-responsive to the RFP. Specifically, it claims AWD’s proposal violates the non-modifiable requirements for the number of lanes on certain portions of the Project and the lane width requirements. Basic/Continuous Lane Requirements for I-395 (Attachment A-33) As described earlier, AWD made substantial changes to the RFP’s concept plans for I-395 and SR 836 by proposing a two- tiered road formation made up of a two-lane viaduct on an upper level and a collector road system on the lower level. In order to pursue this design, AWD submitted an ATC proposal which was eventually approved as “ATC 12C”. The proposed viaduct would have two continuous lanes in each direction between the two major highway systems, SR 836 and I-395, without being impeded by local SR 836 traffic. The local traffic would be carried on a lower roadway or Collector- Distributor (“CD”) road underneath the viaduct. This lower CD road would also have one continuous lane in each direction, for a total of three continuous lanes in each direction. DOT determined that the viaduct concept and changes were an improvement over the RFP concept plan. As explained by Anthony Jorges, a traffic roadway engineer for BCC: First with the viaduct, by separating the traffic, it provides you unimpeded access to and from Miami Beach to the east, so it improves the emergency evacuation and improves access for emergency services. This addresses the event traffic issue that I brought up earlier. While you have events that may cause backups on the lower level for local traffic, we do have a separate level for the mainline that’s going to carry through. So you have those two lanes on top free at all times. So that was a significant advantage that we were looking at. And in addition to that, there is also the additional lane on the westbound to northbound--I am sorry, the eastbound to northbound movement, and that is taking it from the one lane that was in the RFP concept to the two lanes that Archer Western de Moya provided. That provides significant improvements to the operations of the mainline. It also provides safety benefits because now traffic that was queuing up on this ramp back on to the mainline is separated. Whatever traffic queues up here is separate from the mainline, and you won’t have the possibility for the speed differential, which contributes significantly to accidents. FAM contends that DOT erred in approving a technical proposal ATC 12C, because the number of continuous basic lanes on the highway was a non-modifiable requirement of the RFP. According to the testimony at the hearing and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (“AASHTO Manual”), highway lanes can be grouped into two categories: basic lanes and auxiliary lanes.7/ A basic lane is essentially one that is designated and maintained over a significant length of a route, irrespective of changes in traffic volume and lane balance needs. The parties also referred to a “basic lane” as a “continuous” lane-–one that allows traffic to move over a “significant length of route” without having to change lanes. An auxiliary lane is essentially all lanes other than the basic lanes. It is defined as “the portion of the roadway adjoining the through lanes for speed change, turning, storage for turning, weaving, truck climbing and other purposes that supplement through-traffic movement.” As part of the 2010 I-395 PD&E, DOT found that I-395 lacks sufficient capacity “for system linkage” with SR 836 and other roadways due, in part, to the fact that it has only one continuous lane in each direction while the linking roadways have three. One continuous lane on I-395 was inadequate to provide the necessary access or linkage to the other road systems. Initially, the Federal Highway Authority (“FHWA”) approved a plan to address I-395’s deficiencies which added one additional continuous lane in each direction. On June 15, 2015, however, the FHWA approved the Final Re-Evaluation (completed by BCC) for the I-395 PD&E. This version included a design change allowing “three (3) continuous lanes in each direction to match 836 on the west and MacArthur Causeway on the east.” (emphasis added). DOT noted that this design change was supported by AASHTO design principles, including the basic lane concept. A concept plan for the I-395 project, which included the three continuous lanes and later became the RFP concept plan, was attached to the Final Re-Evaluation. Section VI of the Final Re-Evaluation addressed DOT’s commitments for the I-395 project, including commitment number 14: “[m]aintain and enhance continuity between SR 836/I-95 facility on the west and the MacArthur Causeway on the east.” DOT concluded on page 18 of the Final Re-evaluation that the addition of the third continuous lane on I-395 was necessary to support this commitment, stating: STATUS: [ ] Design Changes No. 1 and No. 7 describe the need to add an additional lane in each direction and widen a portion of the westbound MacArthur Causeway Bridge in order to accommodate the changes to the ingress and egress points of the Port of Miami Tunnel. These changes allow the I-395 project to be compatible with both roadways to the east and west and provide system continuity. DOT also noted that the I-395 project would be constructed concurrently with the SR 836 project, which was the subject of a separate PD&E that was completed in 2011. The SR 836 PD&E Study noted on page 6: More specific improvements potentially involve the provision of a minimum of six continuous (i.e., 3 directional) mainline lanes and the provision of parallel collector distributor facilities to separate the system to system traffic from the local to system traffic. This language establishes MDX also intended that there be three continuous lanes in each direction as proposed by DOT for the I-395 project. In short, DOT’s intent was to have three continuous lanes that would extend from the western boundary of SR 836 to the eastern boundary of I-395. This would allow a driver in any of these lanes to travel from one end of the project to the other without having to change lanes. As a result of the re-evaluation of the PD&E, BCC developed the language for the RFP that related to continuous lane requirements also found in Attachment A08. This language states, in relevant part: The Department has prepared a set of Reference Documents, which include Concept Plans. These plans convey an established set of design objectives to which the Design-Build Firm is required to accomplish in [the I-395] component of the project. The Department’s design objectives include: * * * Provide 3 continuous through lanes to the I-395 Mainline in the Eastbound and Westbound direction. The RFP also provided “[t]he Design-Build Firm shall not modify the following requirements with an ATC Proposal . . . Minimum basic number of lanes shown in Attachment A-33.” Mr. Jorge’s testimony was that the purpose of this language was to be consistent with the objective to provide three continuous lanes in each direction on I-395 to and from the Signature Bridge. The reason the word “minimum” was included in there was we wanted to make sure that we were getting at least three lanes in each direction, and that is the intent behind having the word “minimum.” We did understand that there would be a possibility for changes. But we wanted to make sure that we had at least three lanes in each direction. Attachment A-33 is titled, “I-395 Lane Schematic” and includes information relating to the number of “basic lanes,” “auxiliary lanes,” and the “direction of lanes” at various points of entry via connector roads and ramps onto I-395. For the Signature Bridge, Attachment A-33 has a footnote that states, “The Signature Bridge Shall Accommodate a Minimum of Four 12’ Lanes in Each Direction[.]” The plain reading of Attachment A-33 in the context of the RFP is that the three continuous or basic lane requirements applied to the roadways, but that the Signature Bridge was required to have four continuous lanes. On its face, Attachment A-33 is a schematic drawing that shows all of the lanes in the RFP concept plan for I-395. Although four of the lanes depicted in Attachment A-33 are identified as auxiliary lanes, the rest are identified as basic lanes. However, absent is any indication of some “minimum” number of basic lanes that must be maintained and that cannot be altered through the ATC process, except at one location, which is at the Signature Bridge. For that specific location, Attachment A-33 states that there must be a “minimum of four 12’ lanes in each direction.” (emphasis added). The fact that a minimum is specified at one location on Attachment A-33, but not others, is an indication that DOT did not intend to establish a minimum for other locations on the schematic. Indeed, if DOT had intended for all basic lanes depicted at each location to be the minimum number of lanes for that location, then there would have been no point to including a specific note to express that the number of lanes at the Signature Bridge location was a minimum of four lanes. Mr. Jorges confirmed that this language requiring four lanes in each direction in Attachment A-33 applied only to the Signature Bridge. Q.: And what is the minimum number of basic lanes that there need to be at that [the Signature Bridge] location? A.: Four. Q.: And is a minimum number of basic lanes indicated on attachment A-33 at any other location? A.: No, it’s not. Q.: Can you explain how indicating a minimum number of lanes at the signature bridge is consistent with the PD&E? A.: The PD&E called for three lanes in each direction of I-395, so at the signature bridge, you have 16 a situation where you have the three lanes from I-395 plus the one lane from the eastbound connector, and that’s how we arrived at the four. Like I mentioned before, it was beyond the minimum three that we were expecting, and that’s why we felt it was necessary to identify minimum for that specific location. * * * Q.: Do you have a view or an opinion as to whether or not it would make sense to have a minimum basic number of lanes at every location that’s depicted on A-33? A.: Well, if every lane there was designated as a minimum requirement, there would be no room for any sort of modification or changes by the team, so it essentially eliminates any possibility for innovation and really negates the design- build process. Q.: Can you explain whether or not that would be consistent or inconsistent with the objective of the RFP? A.: It’s--the attachment is consistent with the objectives. One of the key objectives was to have three lanes in each direction. And there is other objectives stated, but they are not specific as to the number of lanes. Although Petitioner’s roadway engineer offered its own interpretation of the Attachment A-33 and the RFP language regarding continuous lanes, Mr. Jorges’ testimony was more reliable and convincing. Mr. Jorges was familiar with the history of “continuous lane” requirements and the reasons for including that requirement in the RFP. He and others from BCC were involved in drafting the concept plans and the RFP language that included the “three continuous-lane” requirement in the RFP. In reality, while the RFP stated the proposals were to “adhere to the number of lanes” in the concept plans, each bidder also had the option of pursuing an ATC that would allow it to deviate from this requirement. The purpose of the ATC process was to encourage the proposers to offer innovative solutions or an approach that was equal to or better than the RFP concept plans or other requirements in the RFP. The viaduct design offered by AWD was found to be “equal to or better” to the concept plan and thus meets the standard for issuing an ATC because (1) AWD’s ATC proposal does not preclude DOT from “meeting the Department Commitments,” which are defined to include the ones “listed in the PD&E, FEIS/ORS and any Reevaluations attached” and (2) AWD’s ATC proposal did not violate the Specific ATC Restrictions set forth in the RFP. Attachment A-33 plainly states there must be a minimum number of basic lanes at the Signature Bridge location only. FAM’s argument that every basic lane identified on Attachment A-33 should be treated as a “minimum” continuous lane that cannot be modified is rejected. The Department did not violate the RFP by issuing ATC 12C, and AWD’s proposal with this ATC is responsive to the RFP. Basic Lane Requirements for SR 836 (Attachment MDXA-02) FAM also challenges the number of lanes proposed by AWD for the MDX’s portion of SR 836 of the Project, which are established by attachment MDXA-02. Specifically, FAM argues AWD’s plan is “one basic lane short of the four basic lanes required by the RFP from Northwest 10th Avenue going eastbound through to I-395.” (FAM’s PRO, p. 16 at para. 45) The issue to be determined is whether the RFP and MDXA-02 requires four continuous lanes for this portion of the Project. Unlike Attachment A-33, Attachment MDXA-02 is not a schematic of all the lanes on the SR 836 concept plan. Instead, Attachment MDX-A02 contains only “typical sections” or a view of a cross-section (not a linear) of the roadway at a particular location. It is not possible to determine from only a cross- section view of a segment of the roadway whether any of the lanes are continuous over a significant length of SR 836. Thus, Attachment MDX-A02 does not reveal which lanes on SR 836 are basic or continuous. Although Mike Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, testified it was “possible” by reference to the typical sections “to determine what the basic lane requirements are for State Road 836 even if they are not identified as basic lanes on those typical sheets,” he did not rely on (or even refer to) Attachment MDX-A02. Instead, he relied on the RFP concept plan and the industry definition of “basic lane.” The RFP’s SR 836 concept plan referenced by Mr. Madison does identify which lanes are continuous. Again, the concept plans were to serve as reference documents for proposers to build off of and improve. The SR 836 concept plan serves as “general information only,” except as “specifically set forth in the body of” the RFP. Regardless, both parties offered evidence that AWD’s SR 836 proposal includes three basic or continuous lanes. Mr. Jorges’ testimony established the SR 836 concept plan has three basic lanes on the mainline and no basic lanes on the adjacent collector ramp. Instead, the fourth lane that FAM claims was necessary and non-modifiable was actually an auxiliary lane, not a basic lane. The evidence established the “fourth lane” in question is a CD road. Although a CD road can be a continuous lane, here it was not. In the concept plan, the CD road merely collects traffic from Northwest 12th Avenue, which it then distributes to I-395 without providing any access to or from SR 836. Because the CD road on the concept plan does not serve traffic that originates from SR 836, the concept plan’s CD road does not serve the function of a continuous or basic lane for SR 836. Further, the alleged “fourth lane” on the RFP concept plan’s CD road is not continuous and, thus, cannot be considered a “basic” lane. Mr. Madison admitted the concept plan’s CD road does not originate at the western boundary of the SR 836 project. Instead, the concept plan’s CD road originates at Northwest 12th Avenue, nearly halfway between the Project’s western and eastern boundaries. Thus, traffic cannot navigate the length of the SR 836 project on this fourth lane without changing lanes as required by the PD&E. Hypothetically, as explained by Mr. Jorges, a driver would not have access to a continuous lane on the concept plan’s CD road; on the concept plan, a driver entering the CD road via the northbound Northwest 12th Avenue entrance cannot reach the interchange and I-395 without shifting to another lane. After the interchange, this same driver would be forced to shift to another lane again to reach the MacArthur Causeway. By contrast, a driver accessing AWD’s CD road at the western boundary of SR 836 would be able to reach the MacArthur Causeway with no lane changes. Finally, as noted above, the Final Re-Evaluation for the I-395 PD&E proposed the addition of a third continuous lane to I-395 so that I-395 would have “three continuous lanes to match 836 on the west.” (emphasis added). The goal of the I-395 project was therefore symmetry in the number of basic lanes to improve linkage between the I-395 and SR 836 systems. The RFP required three basic or continuous lanes for the MDX portion of SR 836. AWD’s proposal was responsive to this basic lane requirement. Minimum Lane Width Requirements FAM next contends AWD’s proposal is non-responsive because it reduces the lane width for the lane and ramps for the SR 836/I-95 interchange. There is no dispute AWD’s lanes were reduced by an ATC from 12 feet to 11 feet at the ramp in question, but at issue is whether the ramp is in the I-95 portion of the Project, which is modifiable (i.e., not subject to the ATC restrictions); or is in the MDX portion of the Project, which is non-modifiable. The RFP states that “services performed by the Design-Build Firm shall be in compliance with” DOT’s Plans Preparation Manual (“PPM”). (RFP at 77.) Included in the PPM is a 12-foot lane-width requirement. For that portion of the roadwork within the scope of the MDX project, the RFP states that the winning bidder “shall not modify” through the ATC process the “[m]inimum widths of mainline lanes and ramp lanes.” (RFP at 84.) However, pursuant to Addendum 11, this ATC restriction was removed from the RFP for roadwork that is part of DOT’s I-395 project. In ATC 12C, AWD indicated it would be reducing the lane width of the SR 836 west-north connector from 12 feet to 11 feet starting at the physical gore. A “gore” is the area where a ramp joins the mainline or where two streams of traffic converge. Although there was testimony about a “theoretical gore” as opposed to a “physical gore,” engineers use the physical gore to mark the point where the ramp ends and the highway begins. In this case, AWD, through ATC 12C, sought to narrow the width of the traffic lanes at the point where the northbound ramp physically joins and transitions onto I-95. According to FAM’s roadway engineer, this reduction in the lane width is necessary because this ramp connects eastbound SR 836, which has 12-foot lanes, with northbound I-95, which has 11-foot lanes. The evidence establishes the portion of the connector road at issue is not part of the MDX project because it is owned and maintained by DOT, not MDX. This is confirmed by the fact that DOT owns the Northwest 17th Street Bridge (Bridge ID 870369), which is on the connector road to the south of the lane-width reduction area. DOT’s ownership of the lane-width reduction area is also consistent with DOT’s I-395/I-95 maintenance map, which shows that DOT (and not MDX) maintains this part of the roadway. FAM does not rely on the jurisdictional or maintenance maps, but rather relies on two documents in AWD’s ATC 12C application in which AWD referred to “836” as the applicable “State Road Number” and “MDX” as the “Approving Agency” for the proposed lane-width reduction. FAM also noted that AWD used station markers referring to SR 836 to identify the lane-width reduction area. However, as confirmed by the attachments to the RFP, including the DOT maintenance maps and DOT’s bridge inspection report, AWD was mistaken that MDX owned this segment of the roadway. This does not make DOT’s granting of the ATC erroneous. Moreover, FAM offered no document prepared by either DOT or MDX, including the RFP itself, which established MDX’s jurisdiction over this portion of the roadway. Here, the lane-width reduction occurs north of the physical gore, which is the point where the lanes originating from the ramp become physically connected to the lanes on the existing highway, I-95, via pavement that lies between the converging lanes. For safety purposes, according to the AASHTO Manual, once a roadway becomes physically connected to the highway, it is good engineering practice to design the roadway to match the criteria for the highway (e.g., 11-foot lanes) rather than to continue using the ramp criteria (e.g., 12-foot lanes). Even FAM’s roadway engineer acknowledged that, at some point before reaching I-95, the lanes joining I-95 from the connector road must transition from 12 feet to 11 feet to match the I-95 lanes, and that good engineering practice requires that this transition be done gradually rather than “suddenly.” He conceded that the lane-width transition proposed by AWD was reasonable, but disagreed whether the ramp ended at the physical or theoretical gore point. Q.: Right. You agree with me that at some point the lanes that are coming in to I-95 have to transition from 12 to 11 to match? A.: They would have to at some point. Q.: You can’t just go from 12 and all of a sudden have an 11-foot lane, right, that’s bad engineering practice? A.: Yes. Q.: As a matter of fact, the PPM won’t let you do it that way and AASHTO, too, you’ve got to have a transition? A.: Correct. Q.: Okay. So we are not questioning the reasonableness of having a transition? A.: Reasonableness, no. Q.: Okay. So I think to figure out the disconnect again, do you think the ramp doesn’t end at the gore? A.: No, it ends north of the gore, the other side of the gore point. Q.: But you just said there are two points. A.: Theoretical gore points. Q.: You believe the ramp ends at the theoretical gore point? A.: Yes. At the same time, FAM offered no evidence to show that it would still be possible to comply with the gradual transition requirement in the PPM and AASHTO if the lane reduction were delayed until after the theoretical gore when there is no longer any pavement separating the 12-foot lanes from the connector road and the existing 11-foot I-95 lanes. Because MDX neither owns nor maintains that part of the roadway where the lane is narrowed to 11 feet, this road segment is not within MDX’s portion of the Project or jurisdiction. Because the portion of AWD’s proposed lane narrowing for the ramp to I-95 was in the Department’s I-95 jurisdiction, it was modifiable. Therefore, AWD’s ATC proposal with the lane-width reduction was responsive and also a reasonably safe way to transition traffic to I-95. FAM’s Proposal Prior to and at the hearing, AWD argued FAM’s proposal was non-responsive to the RFP and to DOT’s regulations in a number of ways: (1) FAM’s engineer of record, FIGG-WGI, was a joint venture and, as such, could not work on the Project; FAM’s bridge architect, Linda Figg, was not qualified to serve in that capacity; (3) FAM’s Financial Proposal lacked the requisite audited financial statements; and (4) FAM’s technical proposal was inconsistent with the RFP requirements. FIGG-WGI, Inc. First, AWD claims FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI as an engineer of record violates Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 75.003(2), which states as follows: (2) The Department shall not recognize joint ventures for purposes of qualifying consultants to work for the Department. Each individual or firm will be annually qualified based upon individual or firm capability. FAM designated in its Letter of Response both “FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc.,” and “Wantman Group, Inc.” as two subcontractors as part of the FAM team. Later, however, FAM designated FIGG-WGI as FAM’s “Lead Design Firm.” Prior to submitting its Letter of Response, David Wantman asked DOT what information a design joint venture needed to submit to receive DOT approval to participate in this procurement. Carla Perry, a DOT procurement manager, was responsible for the prequalification process for this RFP. She informed FIGG-WGI engineering joint ventures “are not recognized” and that WGI would need to be designated as the engineering firm instead of the joint venture. She suggested the following: The foreign firm could sub to the Construction JV (or to Wantman), but the Engineering JV you referenced below would not be recognized for purposes of fulfilling the technical qualification in the engineering work types, and would be found non-responsive. . . . FAM’s position at final hearing and in its PRO was that FIGG–WGI was not a “legal joint venture.” This position is contrary to the evidence in FAM’s technical proposal noting FIGG–WGI was “organized as a fully integrated, single-purpose entity, which is the engineering firm of record” and the testimony at the hearing establishing FIGG-WGI was formed for legal reasons to insulate its members (Figg Engineering and Wantman) from third-party liability on large construction projects. FIGG-WGI is a joint venture and its participation in the Project, had FAM been chosen, would have violated DOT’s rules regarding what type of business structures can work on DOT projects. The violation, however, was curable. The RFP allows changes in designated key personnel and “teaming arrangements” subject to the Department’s approval. Approval of changes would be based on “whether or not the proposed substitutions in Partner/Teaming Arrangements are comparable to the Partner/Teaming Arrangements identified in the Letter of Response and/or Technical Proposal.” Here, the evidence establishes that the members of the joint venture are both individually prequalified to do work for DOT. In reality, their employees are the same employees of the joint venture which would have been working on the Project had FAM been chosen as the BVP. Moreover, the testimony at the hearing established that if FAM was chosen, both Figg Bridge Engineers, Inc., and Wantman Group, Inc., would have individually contracted with FAM in whatever corporate form would have been required by DOT. The RFP “Waiver or Irregularities” also provides FDOT may waive irregularities in proposals “where such is merely a matter of form and not of substance, and the correction . . . of which is not prejudicial to other Proposers.” Here, AWD failed to sufficiently establish how it suffered (either potentially or actually) from FAM’s designation of FIGG-WGI, LLC. Nor was there any evidence of how AWD would have been prejudiced if FAM was allowed to substitute the individual members of the joint venture, if FAM had been chosen to be the BVP. Any error in designating FIGG-WFI, LLC, as its lead designer and engineer of record was a curable minor irregularity that would not have made FAM’s proposal non-responsive. Linda Figg Second, AWD makes the same arguments regarding Linda Figg’s designation as “Bridge Architect” as it did in its pre- hearing motions as to why FAM’s proposal was non-responsive: the RFP required bidders to designate a bridge architect; and Linda Figg, the person designated by FAM, is not an architect. FAM designated Ms. Figg in its Letter of Response as its “Lead Bridge Architect.” Ms. Figg is not licensed as an architect with the State of Florida under chapter 481, Florida Statutes, (Architecture, Interior Design, and Landscape Architecture) nor is she licensed in any other state. The RFP is silent as to the qualifications of a bridge architect. Nothing in the RFP indicates the designated bridge architect must be registered or licensed; nor does it require the designated bridge architect to meet specific educational or other qualifications. No evidence was provided at the hearing as to how the Department defined “bridge architect.” In fact, FDOT did not join with AWD in this argument. Nor was there evidence at the hearing establishing the industry standard for defining a “bridge architect.” Merriam-Webster defines “architect” as “a person who designs buildings and advises in their construction.” Architect, Merriam-Webster Online (2017), https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/architect (accessed on February 23, 2017). Ms. Figg meets this definition of “architect.” Moreover, Figg Engineering is prequalified by DOT and has available professional staff (other than Ms. Figg) who are licensed architects and/or professional engineers. As such, FAM’s designation of Ms. Figg as its Lead Bridge Engineer did not make its proposal non-responsive. FAM’s Bridge Design – Load AWD also asserts FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violates the RFP’s non-modifiable requirement that “[a]ll Signature Bridge components shall be part of the structural system that carries bridge Dead Load (DL) and Live Load (LL).” “Dead load” is the actual weight of the bridge structure; “live load” is the added weight of the traffic traveling on the bridge. As explained at the hearing, “components” are the necessary parts of the bridge: superstructure (what cars drive on); substructure (pylons or columns); and foundation (what the pylons and columns are set on). In contrast, railings are safety devices and considered “appurtenances” as opposed to “components.” FAM’s bridge design contained two rotating disks, each on top of an extended arm. Bridge components that do not serve a purpose or carry any weight were not allowed by the RFP, and bidders could not obtain an ATC to change this requirement. FAM’s own bridge engineer, Denny Pate, testified that nonstructural parts of the bridge were prohibited by the RFP. Q.: Can you give the judge an example of a nonstructural bridge component that would be noncompliant under the RFP? A.: The RFP requirement, obviously, is--in my opinion, is saying: We don’t want fake bridge components. For example, there is a project development over here just west of Port St. Joe on the coast there called WindMark. And as part of their entrance to their development, they have a very standard short-span girder bridge, but they have put up steel, fake steel trusses along the sides that basically add interest to the bridge, make it visually more unique, but they don’t do anything. They are not structural. Mr. Pate went on to testify that the rings on the tops of FAM’s proposed bridges do not carry any live load. They were not necessary and could be removed without any effect on the bridge’s structural integrity.8/ This was consistent with the testimony of John Corven, AWD’s bridge engineering expert. Mr. Corven explained the loads in FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal picked up by the cables into the pylon did not find their way into the single arm with a rotating disc and, thus, the arm and disc would not be part of the load-carrying capability of the bridge. The inclusion of non-load bearing components was more than a minor irregularity. One could imagine a scenario where an aesthetic design may compromise safety concerns. More importantly, failure to adhere to the restriction requiring only load-carrying components had the potential of prejudicing other bidders who complied with this requirement from coming up with more eye-pleasing bridge designs. Mr. Corven testified: Q.: As an engineer, what would be the impact if that restriction were lifted in terms of the work you are doing from an engineering standpoint, meaning if you no longer had to worry about dead and live load components, how does that impact how you go about designing a structure? A.: Well, I think it would free the engineer to more artistic and aesthetic expressions for elements that might capture a visual appeal but not be functional structurally. Although the rotating ring may have been aesthetically and architecturally interesting, it was prohibited by the RFP. As such, FAM’s Signature Bridge design with the arm and rings was non-responsive. Twin Structures AWD also asserted FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal violated the RFP’s prohibition against “twin structures” found in the Aesthetic Manual for the RFP which states: The signature bridge shall be two fully independent bridges that are made to look like one form (e.g. twin basket handle bridges void of a visually unifying element will not be allowed). This structural autonomy is necessary because the EB and WB structures will be constructed sequentially, yet the stakeholders have insisted upon the appearance of one aesthetic entity. Elsewhere the RFP notes, the bridge proposals must adhere to the following minimum requirements: “No twin structures.” The common sense meaning of “twin structures” is two bridges that are identical or exact duplicates. Simply looking at the design, FAM’s proposal’s eastbound and westbound structures are not identical, but rather inversely similar. Moreover, as established by Mr. Pate’s unrefuted testimony, there were a number of “non-twinning” aspects of FAM’s Signature Bridge proposal. The westbound bridge runs straight, whereas the eastbound bridge contains a horizontal curve. The towers are mirrored so that the features are not in the same direction. The features on the two structures are staggered. There are a different number of spans in the overall length of the structures. The overall structures are different lengths: Bridge 8 (eastbound) has a signature bridge length of 980 feet and 1,432 feet of overall length between the spans; and Bridge 9 (westbound) has 977 feet for the Signature Bridge and 1,207 feet in overall length. FAM’s proposed Signature Bridge design did not contain twin structures prohibited by the RFP requirements. Constant Girder Depth AWD also challenges FAM’s Signature Bridge as being non-responsive to the Aesthetic Manual’s requirement “the signature bridge shall have a constant depth superstructure.” The language of the RFP does not include this reference, but does require “[g]irder depth on each side of the expansion joints shall be the same, i.e., no steps allowed.” As explained at the hearing “girder depth” is “basically what your eye sees as the distance from the top to the bottom of the roadway surface.” Both AWD’s and FAM’s bridge engineering experts testified the girder depth on each side of the expansion joint was the same in FAM’s Signature Bridge design and complied with the RFP language requiring equal girder depth on each side of the expansion joint. FAM’s Signature Bridge was responsive to the RFP’s girder depth requirement. MOT Plan Next, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are non-responsive because (1) the plans do not illustrate pedestrian access; (2) the plans do not have the requisite number of traffic lanes; and (3) the plans contain two reverse curves without a tangent. The RFP requires the following: The Construction Phasing/Sequencing Plan shall provide information regarding Traffic management for Total Project . . . [and] shall include a narrative describing the means by which the Design Build Firm will move vehicular, bicycle and pedestrian traffic along the Project Limits. The evidence established FAM provided a narrative description of pedestrian access in its technical proposal and submitted MOT plans that allow for the same level of pedestrian access as exists in the present condition. As such, FAM met the pedestrian access requirements of the RFP, and its MOT was responsive to the pedestrian access requirements. AWD next contends that the RFP requires that three lanes of traffic be maintained during all MOT phases because that is what exists in the present condition. However, DOT clarified in writing during the Q&A phase that proposers need only provide the same number of lanes shown in the RFP concept plans during MOT. The evidence at the hearing established FAM provides the same number of traffic lanes shown in the Concept Plans, and as such its MOT plans are responsive to this requirement. Finally, AWD contends FAM’s MOT plans are deficient because one of the ramps (Ramp D1) contains two reverse curves without a tangent. A tangent is the straightaway leading a driver in a certain direction when he or she comes around the curve. Although the testimony surrounding the curves in the MOT plan was highly technical, Mr. Madison, FAM’s roadway engineer, convincingly explained that the two reverse curves in FAM’s MOT are not super-elevated or abnormally cross-sloped. A cross-slope is the pitch of the roadway from one side to the other; a normal cross-slope is two percent. The testimony at trial established FAM’s MOT plan contains two curves that are two percent in one direction at all times and meet industry safety standards. Thus, they do not require a tangent. Regardless, even if the curves required a tangent, there was no evidence that failure to include this tangent put other bidders at a disadvantage. Finally, if Ramp D1 required a tangent, the plans AWD complains about are preliminary in nature. During the Q&A phase, DOT notified FAM that its Ramp D1 design needed a tangent between two curves or otherwise needed to be redesigned to meet the standards. FAM agreed to do so. Because this was a “modifiable” aspect of the MOT, had the PSC selected FAM as BVP, adjustments and corrections to Ramp D1 could be achieved per FAM’s commitment to comply with the RFP in its Confirmation Letter. FAM’s MOT plans were responsive to the RFP, and any need for an adjustment to include a tangent could have been provided in the final plans as allowed and anticipated by the RFP. Audited Financial Statements AWD argues FAM’s Financial Proposal was non- responsive because it did not contain audited financial statements from one of the members of its joint venture. The winning bidder was required to self-finance portions of its work as it would not receive full payment from DOT until after it had incurred costs for design and construction. This type of structure is often referred to as “gap financing.” The RFP required each bidder to submit a Financial Proposal “so the Department can be assured that the Design-Build Firm has sufficient financial resources to construct the Department Project within the allotted Contract Time, based on the Cash Availability Schedule.” To satisfy itself that the entity who would ultimately design and build the Project was able to finance the labor and construction costs, the Department required each bidder to provide a financial proposal that contained, among other things, audited financial statements. The RFP required the following in the Financial Proposals: The minimum required documents the Design- Build Firm must submit to the Department as part of the Design-Build Firm’s Financial Proposal shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: . . . Financial Statements of members of the Design-Build Firm or any partners of the joint venture that make-up [sic] the Design-Build Firm that will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Department Project or directly provides financial support related to the Department Project. Lenders that are not members of the Design-Build Firm or partners of the joint venture that make up the Design-Build Firm are not required to provide Financial Statements. Financial Statements shall include: For the most recent two (2) fiscal years in which audited Financial Statements are available, audited Financial Statements prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Required Financial Statements shall include: Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report); Balance Sheet; Income Statement; Statement of Retained Earnings or Changes in Stockholders Equity; Statement of Cash Flows; and Notes to Financial Statements. * * * If audited Financial Statements are unavailable for the most recently completed fiscal year, unaudited Financial Statements, prepared in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, shall be provided for such fiscal year. An affirmative statement shall be provided indicating that the Financial Statements for the most recently completed fiscal year are still being audited. These unaudited Financial Statements shall be certified as true, correct and complete by the Chief Financial Officer or treasurer of the entity. Requirements for unaudited Financial Statements are the same as for audited Financial Statements, except an Opinion Letter (Auditor’s Report) is not required. (RFP at 67–68.) As described in the RFP, the RFP required a joint- venture bidder to submit the audited financial statements of each of its members in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); if a partner of a joint-venture member would provide financial support for the project, that partner’s audited financial statements were required to be submitted as well. There is no dispute FAM did not and could not include any audited financial statements for one of its members, FEI, because FEI is not audited. There is also no dispute that FEI will be responsible for the repayment of financial support related to the Project or would directly provide financial support related to the Project. FAM did not qualify for the alternative included in the RFP for providing audited financial statements when such statements are unavailable for the most recent fiscal year. Moreover, it was clear from the testimony put on by FAM that such audited statements could not have been provided in a timely matter, even if the Department had allowed FAM to supplement its financial proposal. Brian Smith, the assistant corporate controller for Fluor Corporation, testified if FAM had been selected BVP and the Department had requested the audited financial statements for FEI, it could not have provided them until well after the May 18, 2017, date set forth in the RFP for selecting the BVP. Q.: Had you been asked by DOT for an FEI audited financial statement for 2016 back in April of 2017, what is the soonest that FEI could have provided that information to DOT? A.: An audit of this nature would generally take four to six weeks, on an expedited basis, probably four weeks. FAM counters it provided equivalent information and thus there was no effective harm. The RFP, however, specifically requires audited financial statements, not the information in those statements. This seems especially prudent given the size of the Project and when, as in this case, the bid was awarded as a public–private transportation facility under section 334.30, Florida Statutes, which emphasizes the financial health of bidders. Moreover, the failure to submit audited financial statements has been found to render a proposal non-responsive when such statements are required by an RFP. See Jani-King Gulf Coast Region v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., Case No. 16-2762BID, RO at 23 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 26, 2016) (explaining the importance of audited financial statements, noting they “provide a much higher level of assurance as to the validity of the financial information presented,” than unaudited statements). Nor can FAM satisfy the requirement for audited statements from FEI simply by submitting such statements from FEI parent corporation. See Consultec, Inc., d/b/a Gen. Am. Consultec, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Admin., Case No. 91-5950BID, RO at 29 (Fla. DOAH Nov. 25, 1992) (finding submission of financial information from parent company failed to satisfy RFP requirement to provide audited financial statements and thus proposal was non-responsive). As explained in Consultec, FAM would have had an advantage had it not been required to provide such statements. Succinctly, . . . its failure to comply with the audited financial statement requirement of the RFP gave it an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders since by submitting the balance sheet of its parent company, as opposed to its own financial statements, HCPP effectively precluded any assessment of its own financial soundness. Id. As such, FAM’s failure to include the audited financial statements of FEI renders its Financial Proposal non- responsive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner Fluor-Astaldi-MCM, Joint Venture’s Amended Formal Written Protest, and affirming Respondent Florida Department of Transportation’s Notice of Intent to award to Intervenor Archer Western-de Moya, Joint Venture. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2018.
