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WENCESLAO LUGO PALERMO vs. KUPPENHEIMER MANUFACTORING, 88-005689 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005689 Latest Update: May 02, 1989

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from January, 1986, until March 7, 1988. Petitioner worked as a tailor and performed alterations at Respondent's store located in Altamonte Springs. In the latter half of 1987, Mr. Pease became the manager of the Altamonte Springs store and thus became Petitioner's supervisor. As had the prior manager, Mr. Pease and Petitioner worked out a schedule that did not require Petitioner to work in violation of his religious principles. However, relations between Petitioner and Mr. Pease were not good. Shortly after becoming manager, for independent business reasons, Mr. Pease decided to reduce the amount of fitting done in the store. The effect of this decision was to reduce the amount of work available for Petitioner. At about this time, Petitioner suffered an accident unrelated to employment. The accident resulted in an extended absence from work. Petitioner received his physician's approval to return to work on February 16, 1988, but failed to do so. Without prior notice, Petitioner showed up at the store on March 7, 1988, and informed Mr. Pease that Petitioner was ready to return to work. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the work schedule had already been arranged for the week. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the only days he could work were Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that he could not work Sundays due to his religious beliefs. Mr. Pease reiterated that no other time was available that week. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that Petitioner understood that he was being fired. Mr. Pease told him that he was not being fired; rather, he was quitting if he left Respondent's employment. Two days later, Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He never reported to work with Respondent again. Consistent with his Petition for Relief, Petitioner offered no evidence of discrimination due to national origin. Nothing in the record suggests the existence of any such discrimination. Petitioner has also failed to prove the existence of any religious discrimination. There is no evidence that Mr. Pease refused to try to accommodate Petitioner's religious beliefs with respect to work schedules after the weekend of March 12-13. The only evidence is that when Petitioner suddenly reported to work, the only days immediately available were the weekend days. The record does not even disclose whether Mr. Pease linked the two days, so as to prevent Petitioner from working the Saturday without working the Sunday. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Pease told Petitioner that if he failed to work the coming Sunday, he would lose his job. In sum, Petitioner has left it entirely to conjecture whether Mr. Pease would have failed to make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Pease was never presented with that opportunity. In addition, Petitioner has produced no evidence that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of the number of employees working for Respondent at the relevant time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5689 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance. 4-5. (first sentence) Adopted. 5. (second sentence) Rejected as irrelevant. 6-10. Adopted. s 11. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Weceslao Lugo Palermo 7505 Armstrong Road Lockhart, FL 32810 Richard D. Pease 590 West Highway 436 Altamonte Springs, FL 32714

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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ROSLYN PEARSON vs LAZYDAYS RV HOLDINGS CORP., 15-006118 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 28, 2015 Number: 15-006118 Latest Update: Mar. 17, 2016
Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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THERESA FOSTER vs. HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC., 87-003048 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003048 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1987

The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.

Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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ADRIAN RICO vs DILLARD'S, 17-001550 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 14, 2017 Number: 17-001550 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/

Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.02760.10760.50
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MARY S. RANDOLPH vs WALTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 14-003682 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Defuniak Springs, Florida Aug. 13, 2014 Number: 14-003682 Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2015

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, an African-American female, was employed by Respondent as a clerk coordinator in its Section 8 housing1/ department. As established during the final hearing, Petitioner's duties required her, among other things, to field inquiries concerning rental assistance, maintain records, receive applications, and, of particular importance here, conduct inspections of rental properties. As Petitioner was responsible for transporting herself to the inspection sites (at first in her personal automobile and, beginning in April 2012, in a county-issued vehicle), her written job description mandated that she hold a valid driver's license. Petitioner's term of employment, which began in 1990, proceeded largely without incident until September 19, 2013. On that occasion, Tom Baker——Petitioner's supervisor and the head of Respondent's Section 8 department——was engaged in discussions with the DeFuniak Springs Housing Authority concerning the development of a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies. At one point during the talks, DeFuniak Springs' housing director suggested that Mr. Baker confirm the status of his employees' driver's licenses. Finding the suggestion well taken, Mr. Baker immediately asked Brady Bearden, Respondent's loss control manager, to perform driver's license checks of the employees in the Section 8 department. Later in the day on September 19, Mr. Bearden informed Mr. Baker that Petitioner's license was not valid (due to her failure to maintain liability insurance), and that Petitioner's driving privilege had been continuously suspended since January 2, 2013——a period of more than eight months, during which Petitioner had operated a county-owned vehicle on numerous occasions. Although eager to address this issue with Petitioner, Mr. Baker was unable to do so until the morning of September 24, 2014, when Petitioner returned from a vacation. During the discussion that ensued, Petitioner erroneously insisted that she did, in fact, hold a valid driver's license. Upon being shown documentation that refuted her claim, Petitioner stated that she would clear up the matter with the clerk of court and return to work later in the day. Over the course of the next few hours, Petitioner obtained liability insurance and took the necessary steps to reinstate her driver's license. Later that afternoon, Petitioner returned to work and explained that she had trusted her daughter to secure automobile insurance for the both of them; that her daughter had failed to do so; and that she (Petitioner) had no knowledge of the suspension until Mr. Baker informed her as much. Predictably, this explanation did not sit well with Mr. Baker, who was troubled by Petitioner's acute lack of diligence in maintaining a valid driver's license——as noted above, a prerequisite of her position as a housing clerk coordinator. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Baker recommended to Respondent's human resources department that Petitioner's employment be terminated for violations of policies 31.4(A), 31.4(C), and 31.5(A), which provide: POLICY A. Any employee who loses the use of his/her driving privileges, whether knowingly or unknowingly, for any reason other than a temporary medical/disability condition, will be subject to disciplinary action, or transfer to another job classification, if available, for failing to meet the minimum qualifications of the job description. * * * C. Driving a County vehicle . . . without an appropriate valid driver's license . . . or failure to report the loss or use of a valid license, whether by suspension, revocation, or cancellation is subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination. POLICY A. Any employee who loses the use of his/her license shall report that fact to his/her immediate supervisor at the earliest possible time, and not later than the beginning of the next work shift. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action. (Emphasis added). During the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner offered no direct evidence in support of her claim of race discrimination. Instead, Petitioner attempted to prove her case circumstantially by identifying two supposed comparators, Kendalleigh Marse and Jerry Tuggle, both of whom, according to Petitioner, were not terminated by Respondent despite their commission of similar misconduct. This approach fails, for neither Ms. Marse nor Mr. Tuggle is a valid comparator for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. First, the undersigned is not persuaded that the driving privileges of the purported comparators were ever actually suspended.2/ Even assuming, however, that the record permits such a finding, it is evident that the suspensions were relatively brief, particularly when compared to Petitioner's.3/ Moreover, again assuming that the driving privileges of Ms. Marse and Mr. Tuggle were suspended for any period of time, there has been no showing that either employee ever operated a county-owned vehicle without a valid license. In any event, the record makes pellucid that, at the time of Petitioner's termination, no one in Respondent's employ was aware of any issues concerning the driver's licenses of Ms. Marse or Mr. Tuggle.4/ Even if the evidence were sufficient to raise an initial inference of impropriety, which it is not, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent's proffered reason for the firing——i.e., driving on a suspended license in a county-issued vehicle for more than eight months——is a mere pretext for race discrimination. On the contrary, the undersigned credits Mr. Baker's testimony that race placed no role whatsoever in Petitioner's termination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68318.15760.10760.11
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BRENDA LISSIMORE SIMMONS vs HAMILTON PRODUCTS, INC., 06-003719 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Oct. 02, 2006 Number: 06-003719 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 27, 2005.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who at all times material to this case was employed with Respondent as a production worker. Respondent, Hamilton Products, Inc., manufactures various animal related products such as horse tack and pet collars and is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Allegations of Race Discrimination Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination alleged discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation and reads in pertinent part: I believe that I have been discriminated against based on race, Black, which has resulted in discipline, unfair terms and conditions, and denial of promotion. Since 2003, I have noticed disparate treatment between White and Black employees. One example of this is that Black employees are rarely if ever promoted to management positions. Another example of this is that a Black coworker of mine, Deloise, would often harass me and when I complained to my supervisor Mrs. Robinson, she took the matter to Mrs. Lake. Mrs. Lake merely asked the woman to not do that again. This harassment continued and I repeatedly complained about it so that finally, I was moved to a different location. A similarly situated White female, Elaine, experienced similar treatment from Deloise but when she complained Deloise was stopped from repeating the behavior almost immediately. I was very upset about this obvious disparity that I contacted Mrs. Benfel and explained to her what was transpiring. She asked me to gather together my complaints and those of others which I did and submitted it to her in a letter. Almost immediately after I began to receive retaliation for my complaint. I was disciplined, verbally harassed and moved away from the other employees. Martha Robinson is a supervisor employed by Respondent for over 16 years. She was Petitioner's direct supervisor for some of the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. Ms. Robinson is a white female. A coworker, Delores,1/ who sat near Petitioner would tap her foot on a wooden box while working. Petitioner found this annoying and complained to Ms. Robinson. Ms. Robinson asked Delores to stop tapping her foot and had fleece put on the box. However, Delores continued to tap her foot. After three or four employees complained about Delores' foot tapping, Ms. Robinson took the box away from Delores and put it in Ms. Lake's office. Karen Benfield is the office manager for Respondent, where she has been employed for 19 years. Petitioner went to Ms. Benfield's office to complain about working conditions. Ms. Benfield described the complaints made by Petitioner as vague and broad-based, consisting of general assertions that employees were unhappy at work. Petitioner's complaints to Ms. Benfield did not include any allegation of racial discrimination about her or anyone else. Ms. Benfield asked Petitioner for specifics, to put her complaints on paper and she would make sure management saw it. She did not ask Petitioner to solicit comments from other employees and told Petitioner she could only speak for herself. Petitioner collected written complaints from her co- workers and delivered them to Ms. Benfield. Petitioner received a Warning Notice dated October 26, 2004, for disruptive influence on the workforce. It read as follows: The purpose of this warning is to make sure that you understand the structure of Hamilton Products and the parameters of acceptable behavior at work. Lately, you have brought a number of suggestions and grievances to the management of Hamilton Products on behalf of yourself and others. There is no single employee representative to management at Hamilton Products. You do not and may not speak on behalf of other employees. Every employee at Hamilton Products, including yourself, enjoys the right to share ideas, suggestions or grievances with management. Such communication is encouraged as long as it is made properly. There is a clear chain of command at Hamilton Products, and you must follow that chain of command when communicating with management. You must speak to your immediate supervisor or place a suggestion in the box provided for suggestions at the north end of the nylon department. It is not acceptable to go around the chain of command to a higher supervisor, as this disrupts the operations of Hamilton Products. In the future, you must follow the chain of command or use the suggestion box, and speak only for yourself. Failure to follow the procedure outlined herein will result in further disciplinary actions up to and including discharge. After the hurricanes of 2004, Petitioner's entire department was reprimanded by the plant manager for missing work. This was upsetting to Petitioner because Ms. Robinson had told these employees not to call in. She felt that Ms. Robinson should not have let him "talk trash" to the employees. There is no evidence that Petitioner or anyone else was singled out in any way by the plant manager regarding this incident. Petitioner believes that white employees were given opportunities for promotion and resulting raises. However, no employees on the production floor were promoted during the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. There is no competent evidence in the record to support Petitioner's claim that white employees received promotions and black employees did not. At some point, Petitioner was moved when the production department was reorganized. Petitioner was placed in the center of the plant, facing the rest of her department. She had no one on either side of her which resulted in her not being able to talk to coworkers while working.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2007.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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LATRICIA W. DUKES vs RUSHLAKE HOTELS U.S.A., INC., D/B/A DELTA HOTEL, 89-005595 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Oct. 13, 1989 Number: 89-005595 Latest Update: Mar. 16, 1990

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating in employment against Petitioner on the basis of her race.

Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, who is black, as an inspectress on April 11, 1988. An inspectress supervises the work of maids, who are responsible for cleaning the hotel rooms. On July 3, 1988, the housekeeper, Mr. Douglas Knight, who supervised Petitioner, informed her that, due to an excess of personnel, she was no longer needed as an inspectress. He offered her a position as a maid. The record does not reveal whether the change in duties would have resulted in less pay. Petitioner apparently declined the position. When she did so, Respondent terminated her. Although Respondent had received no warnings concerning unsatisfactory job performance, the work of the maids had clearly been unsatisfactory up to the time of her offered reassignment. The white woman who allegedly replaced Petitioner as an inspectress was Mrs. Triplett, who was married to the head maintenance manager of the hotel. Shortly after losing her job elsewhere, she was hired by Respondent around June 9, 1988, to replace the assistant housekeeper, who was on maternity leave until July 6, 1988. Mrs. Triplett was reassigned to the position of inspectress around June 18, 1988, and later promoted to housekeeper about two weeks after Petitioner's departure. Mr. Knight, who hired Mrs. Triplett, was friends with Mr. Triplett and later terminated for inefficiency in performing his work.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Latricia W. Dukes 4189 Tatum Street Orlando, FL 32811 Gale Brandy Ramada Main Gate Resort 2950 Reedy Creek Boulevard Kissimmee, FL 32741

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.06760.10
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TERRY DOSS vs EDEN CABARET, 21-001356 (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Apr. 20, 2021 Number: 21-001356 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent, Eden Cabaret (“Respondent” or “Eden Cabaret”), is liable to Petitioner, Terry Doss (“Petitioner”), for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 through 760.11, Florida Statutes (2019).1 1 Except as otherwise noted, all references to the Florida Statutes herein, are to the 2019 version, which was in effect when the actions complained of in Petitioner’s Complaint occurred.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male who currently resides at 12 Adkinson Drive in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner holds a certification in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (“HVAC”) repair and maintenance. The evidence is unclear whether Petitioner is a licensed HVAC contractor. Respondent is an entertainment club in Pensacola, Florida, owned by Timothy McEvoy. The evidence is insufficient to establish how many employees are employed by Respondent. Mr. McEvoy came to know Petitioner through Mr. McEvoy’s girlfriend, Rachel Johnson, in June 2019. At that time, Petitioner had full-time employment, but needed rental housing and was available for extra part-time work. Mr. McEvoy owned a rental home at 7490 Rolling Hills Road in Pensacola and informed Petitioner that he could rent a room from him there for $150.00 per week. The rental home was partially occupied by Mr. McEvoy’s cousin, Kent Leyonmark, but another room was available in the home. Mr. McEvoy took Petitioner to the Rolling Hills property and showed him around. Mr. McEvoy introduced Petitioner to Mr. Leyonmark, suggesting that Petitioner may rent a room there. The rental arrangement at Rolling Hills did not work out, however, because, as Mr. McEvoy testified, Mr. Leyonmark is a racist and would not allow Petitioner to move into the house.2 Feeling obliged to Petitioner, Mr. McEvoy suggested Petitioner could rent a room at the five-bedroom home he and Ms. Johnson were then renting. Sometime in early June 2019, Petitioner moved into Mr. McEvoy’s rental home, occupying a bedroom with a private bath. No formal rental agreement, written or otherwise, was ever reached. Mr. McEvoy then hired Petitioner to do some HVAC work for him. Petitioner performed a number of jobs for Mr. McEvoy at Marcone Supply, a commercial business located in a building owned by Mr. McEvoy. Petitioner worked on the AC duct system, installed an air return, and completed an insulation job. Petitioner further found an airflow problem at the front of the store and repaired a restriction causing the problem at Marcone Supply. Over the next few weeks, Petitioner performed work for Mr. McEvoy at Eden Cabaret, as well as other rental properties owned by Mr. McEvoy, and at his beach house on Pensacola Beach. No formal employment agreement was reached between the two men. Typically, Petitioner sent a text to Mr. McEvoy informing him that Petitioner was finished with his regular job and asking if Mr. McEvoy needed him for any work. After Petitioner informed Mr. McEvoy that he had worked approximately 20 hours, Mr. McEvoy told Petitioner, “It would be best if you 2 Mr. McEvoy’s testimony is entirely hearsay, but is not being used to prove that Mr. Leyonmark is a racist, and no finding is made in that regard, but is limited to show that, for whatever reason, Petitioner did not take a room at the Rolling Hills property. keep a sheet with start and stop time and [a] brief description of what you worked on by day.” When Petitioner had worked 37 hours, he texted Mr. McEvoy, “Didn’t know when you was [sic] going to pay me the hrs. I work [sic].” He also stated, “I also old [sic] y’all some rent.” Later, Petitioner sent a text asking Mr. McEvoy, “Did u need money for rent[?]” The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. McEvoy responded to that text message. Mr. McEvoy never paid Petitioner for the hours he worked. Petitioner never paid Mr. McEvoy any rent. In addition to staying at Mr. McEvoy’s home rent-free, Petitioner had the use of a car owned by Mr. McEvoy. Petitioner used the car to get to and from work—both his first job and the second part-time work he did for Mr. McEvoy. Mr. McEvoy testified that he allowed Petitioner to use the car because the rental house was not near a public bus route. At Petitioner’s prior residence he took the bus to work. Petitioner purchased gas for Mr. McEvoy’s car. Petitioner also inquired about buying the car from Mr. McEvoy. But, Petitioner never paid anything to Mr. McEvoy for using the car. In early July, Mr. McEvoy informed Petitioner that the house they were all living in had been put on the market for sale by the owner. Mr. McEvoy and Ms. Johnson, who was pregnant at the time, planned to move before the baby was born. In July, Mr. McEvoy informed Petitioner, “[W]e have committed to be out of here by the end of this month so you should plan accordingly.” Petitioner lived with Mr. McEvoy and Ms. Johnson for four to six weeks. During that time period, Petitioner worked a total of 73.5 hours on repairs and maintenance at several properties owned by Mr. McEvoy, including Eden Cabaret. When Petitioner requested, via text message, to be paid for the hours worked, Mr. McEvoy asked Petitioner to call him to discuss the issue. Mr. McEvoy did not contest the number of hours Petitioner worked, but wanted to discuss “where we stand for the work you did vs. the housing and transportation we provided.” The two men never discussed the issue face-to-face, and never came to an agreement in a series of text messages either. When asked by the undersigned how Mr. McEvoy’s failure to pay him was related to his claim of discrimination, Petitioner explained that he was the only black man that worked for Mr. McEvoy and that Mr. McEvoy paid all his other employees. Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of particular individuals employed by Respondent, what type of work they performed, or their rate of pay. Mr. McEvoy claims Petitioner was never Respondent’s employee. Rather, Mr. McEvoy testified that he engaged Petitioner, as he does many workers, as an independent contractor to work on any number of properties he owns.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commission issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Terry Doss, failed to prove that Respondent, Eden Cabaret was his employer, and dismiss Petition for Relief No. 2021-26984. protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position held: (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) other similarly-situated employees, who are not members of the protected group, were treated more favorably than Petitioner. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Petitioner met the first two elements: he is a member of a protected class; and is qualified to work in maintenance of HVAC systems. However, Petitioner is unable to prove the third element, that he suffered an adverse employment action. The evidence was persuasive, and is accepted, that Petitioner was compensated for the work he performed in the form of lodging and transportation, and not monetarily. Assuming, arguendo, Petitioner was subjected to an adverse employment action, he failed to prove the fourth element, that similarly-situated employees, who are not members of the protected class, were treated more favorably. For purposes of proving disparate treatment, a comparator must be similar to Petitioner in “all material respects.” See Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019). Similarity among comparators is required for the comparisons to be meaningful. Petitioner testified generally that other white employees were paid by Mr. McEvoy for their work. However, he did not introduce any specific comparators who were similarly- situated. Petitioner did not introduce evidence of the treatment of any non-black workers who had the use of rooms at Mr. McEvoy’s rental home or use of Mr. McEvoy’s personal vehicle. Petitioner failed to prove discrimination in compensation based on his race. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Timothy McEvoy Eden Cabaret 4001 North Davis Highway Pensacola, Florida 32503 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Terry Lynn Doss 12 Adkinson Drive Pensacola, Florida 32506 Timothy McEvoy Post Office Box 32562 Gulf Breeze, Florida 32562

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57760.01760.02760.10760.11 DOAH Case (1) 21-1356
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