The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices; to wit: disparate treatment due to Petitioner's race (Hispanic) and/or retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic female. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a Registered Nurse, Nursing Supervisor, by Respondent. Respondent is a rehabilitative nursing facility in Gainesville, Florida, which qualifies as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Since the situations complained-of by Petitioner occurred, Petitioner has continued to be employed by Respondent with no breaks in service, no decreases in pay, no change in benefits, and no demotions in rank. At all times material, Respondent has employed Caucasians, Hispanics, African-Americans, and persons of Indian sub-continent descent. Petitioner signed on March 23, 2007, and on April 5, 2007, filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR. The Charge alleged that the Employer Respondent had perpetrated an unlawful employment practice upon Petitioner due to her race (Hispanic) and in retaliation. On July 25, 2007, FCHR entered and served a Determination: No Cause. On August 27, 2007, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief. However, her Petition for Relief only alleged discrimination on the basis of retaliation. The retaliation named was that "my evaluation would be done in a group because of a meeting with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Hawkins." There are no references whatsoever to race or national origin within the Petition for Relief. The Petition does not specifically allege pattern, or on-going discrimination. It does not specifically allege harassment or hostile work place. It suggests only that Petitioner feels that she does not get respect and is "attacked without evidence." Via her Petition, Petitioner seeks the remedy of ". . . that they [the employer] pay for all my therapies and medication and pay for the meetings I attended.” Early on September 5, 2006, Petitioner was standing in line to punch-in on her timecard at Respondent’s facility. Barbara Washington, an African-American CNA, was standing directly behind her. Petitioner shielded her social security number from Ms. Washington’s gaze. Later the same day, Petitioner was rolling a medicine cart down the hallway in Unit Two of Respondent's facility. Ms. Washington was taking a dinner break, seated in a position near the nursing station, which permitted her to view the patients assigned to her. Unfortunately, Ms. Washington's position did not permit Petitioner and the medicine cart to pass. Petitioner requested that Ms. Washington move, so as to let Petitioner and the medicine cart pass. Ms. Washington spoke sharply to Petitioner, either because Petitioner asked her to get out of the way of the medicine cart or for reasons of Ms. Washington's own related to the morning punch-in. During a later investigation by Director of Nursing (DON) Lisa Woods Streer, several versions of what Ms. Washington actually said were elicited. However, the best and most credible evidence on this particular point is Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Washington loudly used profanity (“the F word”) directly to Petitioner. There is, however, no evidence that, whatever the exchange entailed, any patient was disturbed, upset, or even aware of the exchange, and there is no evidence that the statements from Ms. Washington had anything to do with Petitioner’s Hispanic origin or any type of employer “retaliation.” At least three hours later on September 5, 2006, after Ms. Washington had gone off-shift and was standing outside the facility waiting for a ride home, Petitioner handed Ms. Washington a disciplinary form, known as “a counseling slip.” At that point, Ms. Washington refused to sign the counseling slip and, screaming loudly, denunciated Petitioner with additional profanity similar to her earlier verbal abuse. This language was overheard by Yadira Chavala, who was inside the building making out reports. Ms. Chavala stood up and looked out the window so as to determine who was yelling the profanity. Ms. Chavala considered the volume and content of Ms. Washington's comments to be unprofessional and unacceptable, but she did not take it upon herself to report the incident to the DON, who was not present in the facility at that time of the evening. Again, there is no evidence that Ms. Washington was attacking Petitioner’s ethnicity or acting on behalf of the employer in her screams at Petitioner. Petitioner, however, reported to the DON both incidents of loud profanity and insubordination from Ms. Washington towards Petitioner, via a copy of the counseling slip she had given to Ms. Washington and a note slipped under the DON’s door. DON Lisa Woods Streer, found these items when she came on duty the next morning, September 6, 2006. Pursuant to Respondent’s protocol, Ms. Streer asked Unit Director Karen Derrico to take written statements from staff, concerning the med-cart incident which had occasioned the counseling slip from Petitioner. The general tone of the feedback that Ms. Derrico got was that everyone in the facility had heard about the medicine cart incident, but there were no clear and reliable eye witnesses. Ms. Washington did not immediately own-up to her conduct and told DON Streer that Petitioner had made Ms. Washington feel like a thief by covering Petitioner’s social security number when they punched-in together the morning of September 5, 2006. The DON viewed this comment by Ms. Washington as a counter-accusation of some kind (possibly a complaint of discrimination) against Petitioner, and so the investigation continued. At some point, Ms. Chavala came forward to describe what she had heard from inside the building when Ms. Washington was cursing in the patio/parking area. Petitioner did not like the taking of statements and considered the process to be an attack on herself. She also did not like the fact that she was called in for a meeting on September 13, 2006, but was informed after she had arrived that the meeting had been put off to the next day. By September 13, 2006, the decision to discipline Ms. Washington had been made, because by that time Ms. Chavala had come forward concerning the second incident, but because the DON felt that Petitioner “had backed Ms. Washington into a corner” Petitioner required some counseling. Upset that a meeting was to take place the next day, Petitioner telephoned Mr. McKalvane of Respondent’s Human Resources Department in Pensacola, to complain about how the September 5, 2006, situation was being handled. Petitioner testified, without corroboration, that Mr. McKalvane told her that he could not talk to her before the next day’s meeting, but would attend the meeting by speaker phone. On Thursday, September 14, 2006, a two-hour meeting was held at the facility. DON Streer; Administrator George C. Hamilton; Unit Director Derrico; Ruthie Moore, the facility’s Staff Development Coordinator; and Petitioner were present. Streer, Hamilton, and Derrico are Caucasians. Moore is African- American. Mr. McKalvane's race/national origin is not of record, but he did not appear at the meeting, even by telephone. Petitioner felt betrayed because Mr. McKalvane did not attend the September 14, 2006, meeting by telephone. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, Ms. Moore suggested that if Petitioner had known that Ms. Washington was upset, it might have been wise for Petitioner to wait until the next day to hand Ms. Washington her counseling slip. Petitioner was offended by this comment because she believed her delay of three hours after the medicine cart incident before issuing the counseling slip had been sufficient. At the September 14, 2006, meeting, DON Streer suggested that Petitioner might want to get with Ms. Moore for some in-service instruction on how to be a better supervisor. Petitioner was offended by this suggestion, because Petitioner perceived no fault in her handling of Ms. Washington. At no time has Petitioner ever been required by the employer to take supervisory in-service training as a result of the September 5-14, 2006, events. In fact, Petitioner has not taken such training or any similar one-on-one training or in- servicing with the employer, and she has not been penalized for not doing so. As a result of Petitioner’s counseling slip concerning the September 5, 2006, incidents with Ms. Washington, Ms. Washington was suspended from work for one day without pay, but Petitioner was not disciplined in any way concerning Ms. Washington’s accusations. Petitioner suffered no discipline or loss in pay, position, or benefits as a result of the September 5, 2006, or September 14, 2006, events. Petitioner submitted that the employer’s punishment of Ms. Washington was somehow discriminatory against Petitioner because it took management nine days to come to the one-day suspension of the person that Petitioner wanted to be disciplined. However, the only comparator that Petitioner was able to offer was a situation which occurred a year later, in 2007. On that occasion, an oral confrontation occurred between an African-American female worker and a Caucasian female supervisor. There is no specific evidence concerning how similar the 2007 incident was to any of the September 5, 2007, incidents involving Ms. Washington and Petitioner. However, in the 2007 incident, the African-American female immediately admitted wrong-doing, and the very next day, the employer suspended her for one day without pay, just as the employer had suspended Ms. Washington for one day without pay in 2006, in response to Petitioner's counseling slip. Ms. Streer testified credibly that in 2007, the investigation and counseling period was shortened by the subordinate’s immediate admission of wrong-doing and lack of accusations against her reporting supervisor. Approximately September 20, 2006, Petitioner sent a 19- page, typewritten letter of complaint to Respondent’s corporate headquarters. The scope of this letter is not clear because it is not in evidence. Petitioner was supposed to be evaluated annually each September, but she did not receive her evaluation in September 2006. She reminded the DON in November 2006, that she had not yet been evaluated. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner received her annual evaluation which bears a date of October 5, 2006, signed on October 22, 2006, by Weekend Nursing Supervisor Sneha Rema, R.N. Supervisor, and signed-off on by DON Sterer on October 31, 2006.1/ Ms. Rema received no input for her 2006 evaluation from the DON or Administrator. By observation, Ms. Rema appears to be a member of one of the ethnic groups originating on the Indian sub-continent. She rated Petitioner as "exceptional" in categories "work quality," "work quantity/productivity," and "compliance & adherence to policies," and as "meets expectations" in categories "core values" and "leadership skills." Under the 2006, evaluation's heading, "Areas of Improvement, Developmental and/or Upcoming Objectives," Ms. Rema put this comment about Petitioner: May improve her leadership skills by attending seminars on interpersonal relationship and how to influence others to accomplish goals in constructive way and team building from a constructive point-of- view. Ms. Rema approaches evaluations with the belief that each employee has different levels of education and skills, should be encouraged to constantly improve, and can best improve if supervisors point out to the employee performance areas susceptible of improvement by the employee. This viewpoint was Ms. Rema’s sole motivation in making the foregoing comment. Ms. Rema views these types of comments as a way of pointing out goals, not failures. Contrariwise, Petitioner holds the personal belief that unless every single nurse received identical language on the foregoing part of his or her respective annual evaluation, regardless of that employee’s individual circumstances and regardless of who wrote the evaluation, then Petitioner has suffered a personal attack and discriminatory treatment by the employer. There is no evidence that the 2006, evaluation caused Petitioner any loss of pay, position, benefits, or hours. In fact, she received a raise. If the raise was delayed by one month, that information does not appear in the record. At some point between September 20, 2006, which was the date of Petitioner’s letter, and the end of November 2006, (the exact date is not of record), Mr. Ken Hawkins, a consultant of Respondent’s corporate personnel office in Tampa, journeyed to the facility and met with Petitioner to try to resolve her concerns. Mr. Hawkins race/national origin is not of record. The meeting was more acrimonious than harmonious and ended with Mr. Hawkins advising Petitioner that her concerns “were history” and he was not going to go over everything that had already been addressed. Petitioner was offended by Mr. Hawkins’ description of the events that concerned her as “history”; because she felt he yelled at her; and because she felt he had made her come to the facility for a live meeting when he could have just told her “no” over the phone. The two-hour September 14, 2006, counseling meeting and the brief meeting sometime after September 20, 2006, during which Mr. Hawkins told Petitioner he was not going to go over her concerns again are the meetings for which Petitioner feels Respondent employer should pay her. Sometime after her meeting with Mr. Hawkins, Petitioner filed a discrimination complaint with the City of Gainesville Office of Equal Opportunity. The date of this complaint is uncertain. However, it had to precede March 9, 2007, because on that date, in response to the city action, and in accord with Respondent’s Human Resources Office’s instructions, Administrator Hamilton wrote Petitioner and provided her with the Respondent’s 1-800 telephone number to report discrimination. Respondent has an anti-discrimination policy and also posts the 1-800 number in its facilities. Petitioner also filed an EEOC discrimination complaint, and the underlying discrimination complaint herein was filed with FCHR on April 5, 2007. Because her FCHR complaint was signed on March 23, 2007, the undersigned takes it that the EEOC complaint was filed at approximately that time. Petitioner has complained that, as a result of her September 20, 2006, letter to corporate headquarters, she was told, either by Ms. Streer or by Mr. Hawkins that she must be evaluated “in a group.” Her testimony on this issue as to who told her this vacillated, and the group rating was not confirmed by any other witness nor by the signatures on the 2006 and 2007 evaluations in evidence. Although Ms. Streer signs-off as the next level of management on evaluations, that action hardly constitutes "group rating." The evidence as a whole provides the overall sense that Petitioner has been, in the vernacular, “prickly” about what she perceives as situations of disparate treatment, none of which were supported by credible evidence in the instant case, and that as a result of Petitioner’s heightened sensitivity, none of Petitioner's on-site superiors want to expose themselves to old or new accusations by her, but the greater weight of the credible evidence is that in 2007, Theresa Volk, Unit Manager of Station One, supervised Petitioner for only two days per week, so Ms. Volk believed that Petitioner's supervisor for the remainder of the week should have input to Petitioner's 2007 evaluation. Ms. Volk’s name and that of Ms. Rema appear on the first page of Petitioner’s 2007 evaluation, but only Ms. Volk signed as her “evaluator” on October 9, 2007. In that 2007, evaluation, Ms. Volk rated Petitioner “exceptional” in “work quality” and “work quantity/productivity,” and “meets expectations" in “customer service,” “compliance & adherence to policies,” “core values,” and “leadership skills.” Under “areas for improvement,” she made a comment about wound care documentation intended for Petitioner’s improvement. After receiving her September 2007, evaluation, which had been signed by Ms. Volk on October 9, 2007, Petitioner suffered no loss in pay, position, or benefits, and, once again, received her annual raise. Petitioner testified that she got her 2007 raise “late” but did not quantify how late. Petitioner wrote Ms. Volk a letter treating Ms. Volk’s evaluation comment for improvement as a criticism related to a particular past incident, and was offended when Ms. Volk refused to stop the work she was doing to read Petitioner’s letter. Respondent has a policy which requires employees to request personal paid time-off 30 days in advance. Petitioner testified that under this system, she properly requested time off for October 20, 2007, and November 3, 2007, but that shortly before those dates, Ms. Streer told her she could have only one date or the other, but if Petitioner wanted to take off both days, Petitioner had to get a replacement for one day. While this much of Petitioner’s testimony is unrefuted, Petitioner was not persuasive that she ever got written approval of the dates, and she did not establish any connection between the denial of two days' leave and either her Hispanic heritage or as retaliation for her prior letter to corporate headquarters or as retaliation for any of her discrimination complaints in March or April 2007. Petitioner presented no evidence that she lost pay, position, promotion or benefits at any time, on the basis of retaliation or her Hispanic heritage. Petitioner testified that she had to go into therapy and pay for medications as a result of the stress that the foregoing incidents have caused her. She presented no corroborative medical testimony or evidence of any professional diagnosis and further presented no medical or pharmaceutical bills to establish any damages therefor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2012), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Nepton is a Hispanic man who worked as a collector for CCS from November, 2011, to February, 2012. CCS is a collection agency that employs approximately 80 collectors, who are divided into departments based on the different accounts they service. Mr. Nepton was originally hired to work under the supervision of Julio Castellon, and then was transferred to a unit supervised by Danielle Santilli. All of the work collectors perform is via telephone; persons who have outstanding bills are called in order to attempt collection of the debt. During his training in Ms. Santilli's department, he received most of his training from Ms. Santilli. According to Mr. Nepton, during these training sessions, Ms. Santilli made derogatory comments about Hispanic people. If the person being called was Hispanic, she would mention that Hispanic people were stupid, dumb, and never paid their bills. Mr. Nepton claims that the comments were made throughout his entire training, which lasted approximately one month. He claims that he reported his dislike of the derogatory comments to Ariel Castellon, a supervisor. Ms. Santilli testified, and denied ever making any derogatory or inappropriate remarks about Hispanics. Mr. Castellon also denied any knowledge of Ms. Santilli making any such remarks, and testified that Mr. Nepton never complained of any such comments while he worked at CCS. Lori French testified that in her capacity as the Human Resources Director, she never received any type of complaint regarding Ms. Santilli from any employee. The undersigned credits the testimony of the CCS employees, finding it consistent and credible in light of the scant evidence produced by Mr. Nepton. Mr. Nepton did not produce a single witness who could corroborate his testimony, despite the fact that the collectors worked in an open area, in close proximity to each other. The employee handbook instructed employees to report any workplace harassment of any type with the Human Resources Department. Mr. Nepton never filed such a complaint with the Human Resources Department. On February 1, 2012, Mr. Nepton received a call from a patient of a hospital inquiring as to whether the account was paid in full. Mr. Nepton requested the patient's date of birth, but the patient asked why that information was necessary. Mr. Nepton raised his voice and became argumentative with the patient. When Mr. Nepton was asked about the phone call by his supervisor, he became argumentative in the presence of the other collectors. On February 2, 2012, Mr. Nepton met with management regarding the incident on the previous day. He became agitated, raised his voice, and pointed his finger in the supervisor's face. Mr. Nepton, who was on probationary status, was discharged from his employment on that date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice and, if so, determination of the relief to which the Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Allison M. Huth, is an adult female person. At all times material to this proceeding the Petitioner has been a resident of the State of Florida. The Respondent, National Admark Corporation, is an advertising agency and publishing company. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was doing business from offices located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On the morning of June 12, 1998, a Mr. William Rufrano, who was at that time a boyfriend of the Petitioner, took the Petitioner with him to the Fort Lauderdale offices of the Respondent. At that time, Mr. Rufrano had some type of arrangement with the Respondent pursuant to which he worked in the field making sales calls in an effort to sell the Respondent's products.1 The Petitioner's reason for going with her boyfriend to the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, was to find out more about the company in order to decide whether she wanted to work for the company. Upon arriving at the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, Mr. Rufrano introduced the Petitioner to his "boss" and to several of the other people who worked in the Respondent's offices. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rufrano left the Respondent's offices and spent most of the rest of the day meeting prospective customers and making sales presentations outside of the Respondent's offices. The Petitioner remained at the Respondent's offices for most of the day. The Petitioner spent the day making calls to prospective customers. She attempted to have each of the prospective customers make an appointment for a salesperson to visit and make a sales presentation for the Respondent's products.2 The Petitioner never signed any paper work with the Respondent regarding any business relationship between herself and the Respondent. Specifically, she did not sign or submit an application for employment with the Respondent, she did not sign or enter into an employment contract with the Respondent, and she did not sign or enter into an independent contractor agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her hours of work would be or as to how many hours she would work each day, each week, or each month. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her compensation would be for making telephone calls.3 In sum: The Petitioner and the Respondent never entered into any agreement by means of which the Petitioner became either an employee or an independent contractor of the Respondent. During the course of her day at the Respondent's offices, the Petitioner had occasion to seek assistance from Mr. Anthony Tundo, who was the Respondent's Sales Manager, and was the person the Petitioner had been told to contact if she had any questions. Following the Petitioner's request for assistance, Mr. Tundo engaged in a number of inappropriate, unwanted, and ungentlemanly acts that caused the Petitioner to become very upset and uncomfortable. The worst of Mr. Tundo's acts that day are described as follows in the Petitioner's Exhibit 8, a letter signed by the Petitioner and her boyfriend a few days after the events on June 12, 1998: Mr. Tundo began stroking Allison's [Petitioner's] head very softly and used the excuse that he was trying to pick something out of her hair. Mr. Tundo trapped Allison against the coffee counter in the hallway. He then pressed himself, including his erection [,] against her body which was against the counter. He then proceeded to kiss her on her forehead and cheeks. When Allison was in Mr. Tundo's office, he told her to take a look at something he was doing. Not wanting to go behind the desk, Allison leaned over the front of the desk to look. As she did so, Mr. Tundo stared directly down Allison's blouse and commented[,] "what a nice pair of tits you have." Allison quickly stood up, and proceeded to walk around behind Mr. Tundo's desk figuring he couldn't look down her blouse. As she was leaning on his desk watching what he was doing, he began to stroke her fingers and hands. He then told her to turn around. Allison did so thinking there was a flaw or something wrong with her outfit. He then grabbed her firmly by the backs of her arms and positioned her[,] which made her feel extremely uncomfortable. After doing so, he uttered the word[,] "there." He then told Allison[,] "You have very, very nice legs," and "You have a very beautiful ass[,]" and proceeded to pat Allison on her rear end. When Allison was sitting on the couch in Mr. Tundo's office, she got up to go to the ladies' room. Mr. Tundo told her to sit back down. Presuming Mr. Tundo wanted to tell her some more things related to business, she sat back down. Mr. Tundo told her to "do that again." When Allison questioned what he meant, Mr. Tundo told her that he wanted her to uncross her legs (like she would have to do in order to stand up) again so he could see what it looks like inside her legs and up her skirt. Mr. Tundo was also moving his hands in an outward motion as he was telling her these things. After Allison left Mr. Tundo's office, he continued to follow her around the office building. As he was following her, he continually told her that she has "such a sexy walk," and "such a nice ass." He followed her into the conference room next to the coffee maker. He then proceeded to rub her shoulders, moaning softly and breathing heavy as he did so. He then told her that she seemed "tense." There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner. There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in any type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever been advised that Mr. Tundo had previously engaged in any conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever received any prior complaints that Mr. Tundo had engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner, or that he had engaged in any other type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Petition for Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2001.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of age and retaliating against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Meikle is an African-American male. At hearing, Mr. Meikle withdrew his claim of age discrimination. Mr. Meikle is only pursuing the claim of retaliation. Mr. Meikle was employed with the Radisson Hotel (Radisson), which was owned by Hotels Unlimited. Mr. Meikle’s supervisor at the Radisson was Harland McPhun, who was the Assistant General Manager. Mr. McPhun’s supervisor at the Radisson was Diane Gray, who was the General Manager. During his employment at the Radisson, Mr. Meikle was promoted from a cook to the Kitchen Director. He was very proud of being in the position of Kitchen Director. Mr. McPhun had not encountered any problems with Mr. Meikle being on time for work or being a “no-show” for work as scheduled. However, Mr. McPhun had encountered problems with Mr. Meikle in other areas, such as Mr. Meikle's providing his sister, who was employed at the front desk of the Radisson, with larger portions of food than the other employees; and being in places other than the kitchen area talking, i.e., at or near the front desk. Mr. McPhun gave Mr. Meikle verbal warnings, regarding the incidents, but never documented any of the verbal warnings. At some point in time, Hotels Unlimited decided to convert the Radisson to a Double Tree Hotel (Double Tree). The Double Tree’s structure required the position of a Food and Beverage Manager, who would supervise the food and beverage personnel, kitchen staff, and restaurant servers. Gerald Brown was hired as the Food and Beverage Manager in January 2008. Mr. Brown began his employment before the completion of the conversion from the Radisson to the Double Tree. On February 14, 2008, Mr. Brown held his first staff meeting with the entire staff over whom he had supervision. Mr. Meikle was late for the staff meeting. On February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a “Disciplinary Document” indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for being late at the meeting. Mr. Meikle admits that he was late for the meeting. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager (the date of the signature was not completed), and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. Additionally, on February 16, 2008, Mr. Brown issued another Disciplinary Document indicating that he was giving Mr. Meikle his first written warning for failing to follow rules and direction involving four different matters about which Mr. Brown had repeatedly counseled Mr. Meikle on several occasions, but were not being adhered to by Mr. Meikle. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle (the date of the signature was not completed), by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 16, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 18, 2008. On February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 23, 2008, a Saturday night. Mr. Meikle was scheduled to work, but he departed the kitchen and the hotel property without informing and obtaining permission from the manager. Hotels Unlimited’s policy required the informing of the manager in order for the manager to take appropriate steps to make adjustments to accommodate the absence. Mr. Meikle was entitled to a break, but he failed to notify the manager of his absence in accordance with the policy. The Disciplinary Document included a statement that “Disciplinary Action to be decided by the General Manager.” The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Meikle on February 26, 2008, by Mr. Brown, as the Manager, on February 25, 2008, and by Ms. Gray, as the General Manager, on February 26, 2008. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s absence from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, he was working an 18-hour shift, without anyone to relieve him, which meant that he was unable to take a break. He was exhausted and needed to take a break. Before Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle was working the 18-hour shift, and after Mr. Brown was hired, Mr. Meikle agreed to continue working the 18-hour shift. Mr. Brown did not wish to disrupt what was already in place, so he agreed to allow Mr. Meikle to keep the 18-hour shift. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Brown to maintain Mr. Meikle on the 18-hour shift, as Mr. Meikle requested. On that same day, February 25, 2008, Mr. Brown issued a Disciplinary Document for an incident that occurred on February 25, 2008. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, resulting in guests being disturbed. As Mr. Meikle had been absent from work on Saturday evening, February 23, 2008, Mr. Brown was inquiring of Mr. Meikle the reason for his (Mr. Meikle’s) absence. Further, during the conversation, Mr. Brown raised several other concerns. Mr. Meikle raised his voice and became very loud, which Mr. Brown determined was disturbing the guests. Mr. Brown requested Mr. Meikle to remove himself from the dining area. The Disciplinary Document was signed by Mr. Brown on February 26, 2008. Mr. Meikle refused to sign the Disciplinary Document where the employee’s signature is indicated; but, he (Mr. Meikle) noted on it, “Refuse to sign because I did what I was told,” and signed his name under the statement. Each Disciplinary Document indicated that Mr. Meikle’s termination was effective “2/29/08.” Mr. Brown did not indicate a date for termination on any Disciplinary Document and could offer no explanation as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such information. Furthermore, no testimony was presented as to why or how each Disciplinary Document contained such notation. Mr. Brown contacted Ms. Gray, recommending the termination of Mr. Meikle. Ms. Gray did not approve the recommendation; she wanted to continue to work with Mr. Meikle. On February 25, 2008, a letter, bearing the same date, from Mr. Meikle was faxed to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources. Among other things, Mr. Meikle notified Human Resources that he was working in a hostile work environment created by Mr. McPhun, providing examples of what he considered inappropriate action and conduct by Mr. McPhun; that Mr. McPhun “strongly dislike[s]” him “for whatever the reason”; that Mr. McPhun was taking food from the hotel and that he (Mr. Meikle) had reported it to the general manager; that all of his (Mr. Meikle’s) current problems at work stemmed from Mr. McPhun, providing examples of the problems that he (Mr. Meikle) had encountered2; that Mr. McPhun was the cause of all of his problems at work; that he (Mr. Meikle) had no one to ask for help; that Mr. McPhun was out to get him (Mr. Meikle) fired; that everyone was biased against him (Mr. Meikle) because of Mr. McPhun; and that a copy of the letter would be forwarded to the EEOC and the FCHR. Ms. Gray was notified by her superior that Human Resources had received a letter from Mr. Meikle, but she was not notified of the content of the letter nor did she receive or view a copy of the letter. Her superior told her to talk with Mr. Meikle and resolve the problem. Hotels Unlimited’s Employee Handbook, Employment Policies & Practices section, provides in pertinent part: Equal Employment * * * If you suspect discriminatory or harassing actions on the part of the Company or any other employee, you should immediately notify your General Manager or Corporate Department Head, as applicable, or, if you prefer, a Company Officer. Such notification will be held in confidence to the extent possible. Discriminatory behavior or action by any employee is cause for discharge. * * * Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment Policy Statement: Hotels Unlimited, Inc. is committed to a work environment in which all employees are treated with respect and dignity. It is the policy of Hotels Unlimited, Inc. to provide a work environment that is free from discrimination and harassment. Action, words or comments based on an individual’s sex, race, color, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law – either overt or subtle – are demeaning to another person and undermine the integrity of the employment relationship. . . . * * * Harassment on the basis of any other protected characteristic is also strictly prohibited. Such harassment is defined as verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility toward an individual because of his/her race, color religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, marital status, citizenship or any other characteristic protected by law, and that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance; or otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunity. * * * Administration of Policy: * * * It is unlawful to retaliate in any way against anyone who has complained about harassment. Any incident of retaliation should be reported in the same manner as an incident of harassment. Any employee who engages in such retaliation will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including discharge. All allegations of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation will be subject to prompt, thorough and confidential investigation. All investigations will be designed to protect the privacy of, and minimize suspicion toward, all parties involved. . . . The Employee Handbook provided protection against employment practices for statuses beyond those set forth by law.3 In the early morning hours of February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was awoken by a telephone call from a co-worker inquiring as to why he (Mr. Meikle) was not at work. Mr. Meikle informed his co-worker that he was off that day, but his co- worker advised that he (Mr. Meikle) was scheduled to work. Mr. Meikle telephoned Mr. Brown, who informed Mr. Meikle to be at work. Mr. Meikle reported to work, but failed to report for his shift as scheduled. Regarding Mr. Meikle’s failure to report to work on time for his scheduled shift, all work schedules for Food and Beverage, during Mr. Brown’s tenure, were typed and posted, one week in advance. The work week for Food and Beverage was Monday through Sunday. The posted work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, was prepared, typed, and posted by Mr. Brown and indicated that Mr. Meikle was required to work on Monday, February 25, 2008, and Tuesday, February 26, 2008; was not required to work on Wednesday, February 27, 2008, and Thursday, February 28, 2008; but, was required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008, specifically, from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Mr. Meikle reviewed a work schedule for the week of February 25, 2008, that was typed and hand-written. The work schedule indicated that it was prepared by Mr. McPhun and that he (Mr. Meikle) was not required to work on Friday, February 29, 2008. Based on that work schedule, Mr. Meikle did not believe that he had to report to work on February 29, 2008. However, Mr. Meikle was required to report to work on February 29, 2008, and work from 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. He failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled.4 No dispute exists that, at no time previously, had Mr. Meikle failed to report to work for his shift as scheduled. On February 29, 2008, Mr. Meikle was terminated for failing “to be at work on time for [his] schedule [sic] shift.” A Termination Report dated February 29, 2008, was signed by Mr. Brown, by Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray. Mr. Brown made the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle, and Ms. Gray agreed. Mr. McPhun did not participate with Mr. Brown and Ms. Gray in the determination to terminate the employment of Mr. Meikle. At the time of Mr. Meikle’s termination, Mr. Brown was not aware of Mr. Meikle’s letter to Hotels Unlimited’s Human Resources.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Hotels Unlimited/Double Tree did not retaliate against Marshall Meikle in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended and dismissing his petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner has been the victim of discrimination based upon his race and upon retaliation regarding his termination (lay-off) from employment with the Respondent and with regard to his allegation that he was denied overtime by the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a laborer and carpenter's helper for the Respondent, a construction company, at times pertinent to this case. The two construction projects involved in this proceeding are known as the Oceans Grande Project, a 20-story high rise condominium in Daytona Beach Shores and the Salida Del Sol project in Daytona Beach Shores. The first was commenced in construction in January 2004, and the Salida project in December 2004. They are still ongoing. Sometime in 2004 the Petitioner applied at the Respondent's Oceans Grande worksite asking for a wage rate of $14.00 per hour. He filled out an application and left and had no more contact with the Respondent employer for two or three months. He returned after that period of time and spoke with Grady Johnson, the project superintendent for the Respondent. He ultimately took a job at $12.00 per hour with the Respondent as a carpenter's helper/laborer. He was thus employed initially at the Oceans Grande project. The Petitioner was employed at that location from June 21, 2004 until early March 2005, when he was transferred to the Salida Del Sol project. Prior to that transfer, in November 2004, at the Oceans Grande site the Petitioner suffered an on- the-job injury. He was provided medical care by the Respondent, and had been placed on light duty by his physician. In early March 2005, the Oceans Grande project no longer had any light duty work available. It was the understanding of the superintendent, Grady Johnson, that at all times after November 15, 2004, the Petitioner had been on light duty status. He was aware of three specific letters that the company received from the physician. The latest one, advising that the Petitioner must remain on light duty, was received in March according to Mr. Johnson; however, rather than lay-off the Petitioner, the Respondent transferred the Petitioner to the Salida Del Sol project. That project was just getting underway at that time and light duty work was available. Two other employees were also transferred to that project. Thus, the Petitioner's employment at Salida Del Sol consisted of light duty work. Superintendent Getz of that project re-affirmed that the transfer to his project was because of a lack of a need for one such as the Petitioner on light duty at the Oceans Grande project, as well as the fact that his project at this time had light duty work. The transfer to the Salida Del Sol project occurred on March 7, 2005. At the time of the Petitioner's transfer to the Salida job site there were only two Yates employees, including the Petitioner, who were employed there, aside from supervisory personnel. On or about April 12, 2005, an employee of a subcontractor referred to the Petitioner with a racial slur, and made other unkind, argumentative comments toward him. The Petitioner made no mention of it initially, but on the very next day was working in that area and realized that one of the female employees was quite angry because of her awareness of the racially derogatory comment that the subcontractor's employee had made toward the Petitioner. This co-employee made a complaint about the matter to Rick Getz, the project superintendent at the Salida job. Mr. Getz immediately investigated the matter and confronted the employee of the subcontractor ("Dominick") and told him in no uncertain terms that such conduct was not to be tolerated on that job, regardless of whom he worked for. Subsequently Mr. Getz, along with the assistant project superintendent Rick Bilodeau, met with the subcontractor's employee, Dominick, as well as his employer and reiterated to both of them that this type of conduct would not be condoned and there would be no further incidents like this. There were no more complaints thereafter by the Petitioner or any other employee of the Respondent. In a conversation shortly after this meeting, Mr. Bilodeau informed the Petitioner that the matter had been resolved, at which point the Petitioner made a statement to the effect that he wanted to know the name and address of Dominick's employer because "my people like people with big mouths and lots of money." In any event, the Respondent's action remedied the situation and stopped any further racially derogatory incidents. The Petitioner has also complained of being denied overtime. This stems from Friday, April 29, 2005, when the Petitioner learned that the other two employees on his job site were going to work overtime the next day, Saturday. He claims he knew nothing about it and was not told by his employer and concluded therefore that he was denied overtime. The Respondent, however, offered preponderant evidence that there was overtime available on Saturday April 30, 2005, and that no effort had been made to exclude the Petitioner. Rather, overtime is voluntary and because of the small number of employees superintendent Getz had announced to all employees near the end of the workday on Friday that work was available for anyone who wanted to work on Saturday. It was Mr. Getz's impression that this had been made known to the Petitioner, but if the Petitioner had not heard the announcement at a gathering at the end of the day, it was not through any intentional effort by the Respondent to exclude him from an overtime opportunity. This was confirmed by Assistant Superintendent Billodeau in his testimony to the effect that it was customary on the job site on Friday to announce to everyone congregated in the afternoon whether they were going to work on Saturday or not. It was Billodeau's impression also that the Petitioner was present on that occasion. So all employees were told as a group that there was work to be done on Saturday. It is also true that numerous occasions had arisen on this and the Oceans Grande project in which the Petitioner was asked to work overtime but declined for various reasons, as the Petitioner himself has conceded. Finally, the Petitioner complains concerning his lay- off from the Oceans Grande project on May 6, 2005. In fact, efforts were made to avoid laying the Petitioner off, and to find him available work at the Salida project. Additional efforts were also made to contact the Petitioner for re-call purposes even after he was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. This belies any intention on the part of the Respondent to retaliate against the Petitioner for complaining about the racial comment incident by denying him overtime or laying him off. On May 2, 2005, the Salida Del Sol project had reached a stage in which there was very little work to do. The project was waiting for a work permit and for the installation of a tower crane. Therefore there was no work for a laborer, the Petitioner, or for the two carpenters, Felix Hernandez and Otillo Toledo. Rather than lay them off, however, Superintendent Getz called the project Superintendent, Mr. Johnson, at the Oceans Grande project to see if there was any work for the three employees. Mr. Johnson told him that he might have work for perhaps a week and therefore the Petitioner and the other two employees were transferred to the Oceans Grande project. Both Hernandez and Toledo were skilled carpenters, as opposed to the Petitioner, who was a laborer/carpenter's helper. When this transfer occurred it left only two traffic control employees, who were females, at the Salida job site, along with the tower crane operator. On May 6, 2005, the Petitioner was laid-off from the Oceans Grande project. There was simply no further work for a laborer at that job site so Mr. Mecker, the foreman, explained to the Petitioner why he was laid-off. He also told him that the company might soon have another project starting known as the Halifax Landing project and that he might have work available there. He told the Petitioner that he should remain in contact with the Oceans Grande project supervisory personnel in case a re-call came up because of additional work becoming available. The Respondent also noted in the Petitioner's personnel file at the time of this "reduction in force" that the Petitioner was "recommended for re-hire." Mr. Johnson also testified that as far as he was concerned the Petitioner was still eligible for re-hire and that he actually liked Julian Lawrence as a person and as an employee. It is undisputed, however, that the Petitioner never contacted the Respondent and never made any inquiry as to additional work. On occasion, Project Superintendent Johnson made efforts to call the Petitioner at the only phone number he had for him, regarding re-calling him for more work. This was probably three to four weeks after the lay-off. The fact that the Respondent noted on the personnel record at the time of his lay-off that the Petitioner was recommended for re-hire belies any indication that the Petitioner was being retaliated against by the Respondent. It also significant that the decision-maker with regard to the lay-off was Grady Johnson. The Petitioner maintains that he was laid-off in retaliation for complaining about the racial epithet incident involving "Dominick" at the Salida project. Mr. Johnson however, was totally unaware of that incident at the time he made the decision to lay the Petitioner off. Thus it was not possible that he did so as an act of retaliation. Indeed the Petitioner himself did not complain regarding the racial comment incident, but rather learned of it from the female employee who had made the complaint to the Respondent's management. Equally significant, no derogatory employment action was ever taken against the female employee who complained to the Respondent regarding the incident either. Project Superintendent Johnson established, based upon his 45 years experience in the construction industry, that it is important to understand how a construction project and company operates. There are different steps and different stages. During these different steps and stages of a project different employees are required and then become un-needed at a later stage of the project. Many times much of the work at various stages is performed by subcontractors. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that not only was Mr. Johnson unaware of the "Dominick" incident, but when asked if the lay-off of the Petitioner was in any degree an effort, to retaliate, Mr. Johnson was very adamant in denying that. He stated, "I've never done that in my life." Indeed, the testimony shows that on at least two occasions the Respondent sought to find available work for the Petitioner rather than lay him off. Mr. Johnson established that the Petitioner's employment record was marked as "eligible for re-hire" and the Respondent's attempts to reach the Petitioner after the lay-off was because the Respondent was actively trying to effect an arrangement so that the Petitioner would have work at different times with the Respondent. In Mr. Johnson's words, "We like Julian. Julian is good guy. There was no selection . . . we were trying to work it out where he could go to the other job, but that didn't work out."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julian J. Lawrence Post Office Box 263225 Daytona Beach, Florida 32126 Taylor B. Smith, Esquire The Kullman Firm Court Square Tower 200 6th Street North, Suite 505 Columbus, Mississippi 39703-0827 Jennifer Robbins Guckert, Esquire The Kullman Firm 1640 Lelia Drive, Suite 120 Jackson, Mississippi 39216
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on his national origin (Hispanic), by limiting, segregating, or classifying employees in a discriminatory fashion, or by retaliating against Petitioner for his opposition to unlawful employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent is a family owned company based in Winter Park that installs residential and commercial insulation and acoustical ceilings and tiles. The company is divided into two divisions. The Insulation Division is headed by William Aldrich. The Acoustic/Ceiling Division is headed by Dale Aldrich, Jr., who was Petitioner's ultimate supervisor. Subsequent references to "Mr. Aldrich" are to Dale Aldrich, Jr. Petitioner, a Hispanic male originally from the U.S. Virgin Islands, was hired by Respondent in February 2006 to work in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. He was hired as a tile installer, the entry-level position in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. A tile installer drops ceiling tiles into the gridwork installed by a ceiling mechanic. With experience, a tile installer may work his way up to ceiling mechanic. "Ceiling mechanic" is not a licensed position, and there is no formal progression through which an employee works his way up to this more skilled, higher paid position. Advancement depends on management's recognition that an employee's skills have advanced to the point at which he can be entrusted with the mechanic's duties. Three to four years' experience is generally required to advance from tile installer to ceiling mechanic. By all accounts, including those of the ceiling mechanics who supervised him at job sites and that of Mr. Aldrich, Petitioner was more than competent as to his actual job skills. During the approximately thirteen months he worked for Respondent, Petitioner received four pay raises. He was making $14.00 per hour at the time of his termination in August 2007. The evidence produced at the hearing demonstrated that Petitioner had problems controlling his temper on the job. He was generally negative and quick to take offense at perceived slights, especially when he inferred they were due to his national origin. During his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was involved in at least three altercations with fellow employees and/or general contractors for whom Respondent worked as a subcontractor. The earliest incident occurred in October 2006. Petitioner was working on a job site at which Respondent was a subcontractor for Harkins Development Corporation. Petitioner testified that a Harkins supervisor named Harley was "commanding" him to perform tasks on the job site. Petitioner was affronted, because he was not Harley's employee and because Harley, who was white, did not appear to be giving commands to the white employees of Respondent. After lunch, Harley feigned that he was about to throw a soft drink at Petitioner. In fact, the Wendy's cup in Harley's hand was empty, though a drop or two of condensation from the outside of the cup may have landed on Petitioner. In Petitioner's version of the story, Petitioner then stood up and asked Harley if he would enjoy being on the receiving end of such treatment. Petitioner then phoned Mr. Aldrich and asked to be sent to a different job site. Mr. Aldrich refused, and instead scolded Petitioner. Petitioner believed that Mr. Aldrich was retaliating for his complaint. Petitioner walked off the job site for the rest of the day, and worked at a different site the next day. Petitioner entered into evidence the written statement of his co-worker, Eddy Abud. Mr. Abud is Hispanic, with a national origin in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Abud witnessed the confrontation between Petitioner and Harley. Mr. Abud stated that Harley shook his cup and a "couple drops" of water splashed on Petitioner, who "went ballistic." Petitioner used obscenities against Harley and invited him to fight. Harley threw Petitioner off the job, an action with which Mr. Abud agreed. Petitioner entered into evidence the written statement of his co-worker, Robert "Pappy" Amey. Mr. Amey is white, and wrote that Petitioner "acted like a man all the time" except for the incident with Harley. Mr. Amey's statement reads as follows, in relevant part: Harley had a big drink cup and he turned around and flipped it, playing, nothing came out. Justo lit up [and] called him a mother fucker a dozen times. He said if I find you on the street, I'll kill you. I leaned to him and I said, "Justo, shut up." He did not, he cussed Harley out the door. It was Harley's job. This was unprofessional behavior by Justo. It was just horseplay and it was empty. No reason to act like that. Despite his overall respect for Petitioner, Mr. Amey stated that Petitioner should have been fired for his actions. Mr. Aldrich testified that Harley called him and told him that Petitioner had threatened him. Petitioner told Harley that he would not do anything on the job, but would "kick his ass" if he saw him away from the job. Mr. Aldrich stated that Harkins was one of Respondent's largest, longest-standing accounts, and that he knew Harley as a "stand up guy" who would have no reason to lie about such an incident. The second incident occurred later in the same month, on October 31, 2006. Petitioner was working for Respondent on a project at the University of Central Florida. A ceiling mechanic named Adam Sorkness was in charge of the project. Petitioner testified that Mr. Sorkness had already angered him in September 2006 by making racial jokes about black employees, and that Mr. Aldrich had separated Petitioner from Mr. Sorkness on subsequent jobs up to October 31, 2006. At first, there were no problems on the University of Central Florida job. Petitioner accepted his assignment from Mr. Sorkness. On this day, every man on the job was installing ceiling tile, which involved wearing stilts. According to Petitioner, two white employees arrived later in the morning and decided to work together, leaving Petitioner to work with Isaiah Fields, a black employee whom Petitioner alleged was the butt of Mr. Sorkness' earlier racial jokes. Petitioner became agitated because it appeared the two white employees were doing no work. Mr. Fields testified that he and Petitioner were working around a corner from Mr. Sorkness. They heard loud laughter from around the corner. Mr. Fields said that the laughter was not directed at him or Petitioner, but that it appeared to anger Petitioner, who said, "Wait a minute," and headed around the corner on his stilts. Mr. Fields stayed put and thus did not see the subsequent altercation. Petitioner approached Mr. Sorkness, who was also on stilts. Petitioner complained about the job assignments. Mr. Sorkness replied that everyone was doing the same job and that Petitioner could leave if he didn't like it. Petitioner became more incensed, calling Mr. Sorkness a "sorry white faggot." Petitioner took off his stilts, then confronted Mr. Sorkness at very close range. Mr. Sorkness pushed Petitioner away. Petitioner then charged Mr. Sorkness and they engaged in a brief fight. Ben Davis, a white ceiling mechanic who witnessed the altercation, called it a "scuffle."3 Mr. Aldrich investigated the matter and determined that Petitioner was the instigator of the fight. He suspended Petitioner for three days, and gave Mr. Sorkness a verbal warning. Mr. Aldrich issued a "written warning" to Petitioner cautioning him that he was subject to termination. Mr. Aldrich wrote the following comments: "Justo has been given 3 days off without pay. Normally an employee would be fired for this action. Justo has NO MORE chances. Next offense will result in immediate termination of employment with Energy Savings Systems." The document was signed by Mr. Aldrich and Petitioner.4 Petitioner claimed that Mr. Aldrich cut his hours in retaliation for the UCF incident, and it took several months for his hours to come back up to 40 per week. The time sheets submitted by Petitioner showed fluctuations in his work hours before and after the incident, which is consistent with Mr. Aldrich's testimony that he only cuts hours when work is slow for the company. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner's hours were reduced at times because he would refuse to take certain jobs, either because of their location or because Petitioner did not want to work with certain people, such as Mr. Sorkness. The third and final incident occurred on August 20, 2007. Petitioner was working on a job for which Respondent was a subcontractor to Alexander-Whitt Enterprises, a general contractor. Alexander-Whitt's superintendent on the job was Dan Alexander. Mr. Alexander asked Petitioner to clean up. Petitioner resented either the order itself or Mr. Alexander's method of delivering it, in light of a brief altercation between the two men on the job site three days earlier. Petitioner threatened to slap Mr. Alexander. Mr. Aldrich testified that he received several calls from Mr. Alexander complaining about Petitioner over the course of this job. Petitioner had an "attitude" about Mr. Alexander's instructing him on the job. Mr. Aldrich apologized. After Petitioner's threat, Mr. Alexander called yet again and told Mr. Aldrich that he wanted Petitioner off the job. After this call, Mr. Aldrich fired Petitioner. Aside from his own suspicions and resentments, Petitioner offered no evidence that his termination had anything to do with his national origin or was retaliation for his complaints about the company's discriminatory practices. In fact, Petitioner never made a formal complaint while he was employed by Respondent. His only "complaints" were to certain co-workers that he was being discriminated against because he was Hispanic. Andy Weatherby, a ceiling mechanic who at times was Petitioner's field superintendent, recalled Petitioner telling him that he felt disadvantaged on the job for being Hispanic, but that Petitioner described no specific incidents of discrimination. Julio Oliva, a junior ceiling mechanic with Respondent, is of Puerto Rican descent. Mr. Oliva testified that he saw no discrimination at the company. He worked often with Petitioner, whom he described as having a negative attitude. Mr. Oliva testified that it was difficult to merely pass the time in conversation with Petitioner, because Petitioner always had something negative to say. Edgar Mullenhoff, also Puerto Rican, has worked for Respondent since 1982 and is the field superintendent for the insulation side of the company. Mr. Mullenhoff described the company as "like a family" and stated that he never felt a victim of discrimination. Mr. Abud's written statement attests that he has had no problems working for Respondent, and that "we have great bosses." Petitioner noted what he termed a discriminatory pattern in the ethnic diversity of the Insulation Division versus the Acoustic/Ceiling Division. While conceding that most of Respondent's employees are Hispanic, Petitioner notes that the great majority of the Hispanics work in the lower paying, less skilled Insulation Division. Petitioner further argued that those few Hispanics hired in the Acoustic/Ceiling Division are given no opportunity to advance to the position of ceiling mechanic. William Aldrich, the head of the Insulation Division, testified that there is a much higher turnover in insulation, and that for the last four years or so the only applicants for the positions have been Hispanic. He credibly testified that he hires anyone who appears capable of doing the job. As to Petitioner's lack of advancement, it must be noted that he worked for Respondent for just a little over one year. Mr. Oliva testified that he has worked for Respondent for five and one-half years. He spent the first two years performing menial tasks and learning on the job. Mr. Oliva stated that Respondent's ceiling mechanics were helpful to him in learning the trade, and he felt no barriers due to his national origin. Mr. Sorkness testified that it took him between four and five years to become a mechanic. Mr. Davis testified that it took him between three and four years to work his way up to ceiling mechanic. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was terminated from his position with Respondent due to misconduct on the job. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Respondent has not discriminated against Petitioner or any other employee based on national origin.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Energy Savings Systems of Central Florida, Inc. did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Respondent based on race and/or subjected to a hostile work environment based on race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alphonso Williams, Jr., is an African- American male (Petitioner). Respondent, L. Pugh & Associates (Respondent), is a closely held company in the business of designing, constructing and maintaining fire safety equipment and systems. The company is owned by Larry Pugh and his wife Sharon Pugh. Andy Pugh, the brother of Larry Pugh, is employed by the company as a construction supervisor and spends most the day in the field away from the company’s shop and warehouse. Soni Sully is the company’s office manager and bookkeeper. In 1997, Petitioner was hired by Larry Pugh to run errands for him and to maintain the shop. Petitioner had learned of the job opening from Johnny James, an African-American employee of Respondent’s. Prior to being hired, the employee warned Petitioner about Andy Pugh. The employee intended to communicate that Andy Pugh was a hard, irascible person to work for who did not tolerate mistakes, did not cut anyone any slack, and did not speak in socially polite terms. At hearing, Andy Pugh was described as an ex-marine sergeant. The employee did not intend to communicate that Andy Pugh was a racist. However, Petitioner interpreted the employee’s remarks as such. Throughout this process, Petitioner’s allegations regarding Andy Pugh’s racial slurs towards him have grown initially from three incidents of Mr. Pugh calling Petitioner a "nigger" to, by the time of the hearing, daily racial disparagement. Other than Petitioner’s testimony, there was no evidence of such name calling or such racial disparagement being reported by Petitioner. Contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, there was no evidence from either Petitioner or Respondent that Soni Sully ever issued any racial slurs against Petitioner. Given the lack of corroborative evidence regarding racial slurs and their increasing frequency, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was subjected to such racial slurs while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner also charged that Andy Pugh would deliberately take the company vehicle assigned to him and assign it to someone on one of the construction crews Mr. Pugh supervised. However, the evidence demonstrated that none of the company’s fleet of vehicles were assigned to any one employee. The company’s vehicles were for use as needed by the company and could be assigned by Andy Pugh as he needed. This policy was explained to Petitioner many times. However, he never seemed to understand the explanation or accept it. Indeed, Petitioner continued to complain to Ms. Sully and Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. Petitioner’s constant complaints on the subject irritated Andy Pugh who did not always respond politely to Petitioner’s complaints. Petitioner received an hourly wage and mileage for the number of miles he drove. Initially, his hourly wage was $7.00. Over time, his hourly wage was increased to $8.50. By his choice, he received mileage even though he usually drove a company vehicle because it benefited him financially to claim mileage. No employee, including Petitioner, received both mileage and a vehicle allowance. At some point, Respondent instituted a company-wide policy limiting the amount of overtime an employee could work. Larry Pugh felt overtime billing was out-of-control and therefore created the policy. All employees, including Petitioner, were affected by the limitation. When Petitioner complained of the reduction the limitation of overtime caused in his pay, Petitioner was treated more beneficially than other employees and was permitted to work five hours of overtime per week. There was no evidence that Petitioner did not receive the mileage or the hourly pay he was entitled to receive. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was the only employee required to sign in and out. On June 7, 2001, Petitioner again complained to Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. At some point, words were exchanged between Andy Pugh and Petitioner. Petitioner alleged that Andy Pugh grabbed him by throat, called him a "nigger" and threatened to kill him. However, the details of this exchange are unclear due to the changing story of Petitioner about those details, the irreconcilable testimony and statements of Petitioner and Mr. Pugh, witnesses to the altercation and the surveillance tape of the premises during the altercation. Other than words being exchanged, there was insufficient evidence to show that this altercation was based on Petitioner’s race or occurred in the physical manner alleged by Petitioner. After talking with Sharon Pugh, Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Sheriff’s Department. The details of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Pugh are unclear. After an investigation, including interviewing witnesses and reviewing the surveillance tape, no arrest or criminal charges were filed against Andy Pugh. Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave until Larry Pugh, who was away, could investigate the incident. Upon his return, Larry Pugh looked into the matter and decided to terminate Petitioner mostly for filing criminal charges against his brother, but also, in part, for other more minor personality conflicts Petitioner had had in dealing with others while on company business. The evidence did not show that Larry Pugh’s reasons for terminating Petitioner were pretextual, retaliatory for Petitioner engaging in a protected activity or based on race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick J. Gant, Esquire Allbritton & Gant 322 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Michael J. Stebbins, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, P.L. 504 North Baylen Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Alphonso Williams, Jr. 2415 North "E" Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been subjected to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon alleged sexual harassment in the course of her employment and retaliation for her complaints concerning the alleged sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at times pertinent hereto. It is undisputed that that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that timeliness and jurisdictional requirements have been met. The Respondent obtained a contract with the United States Navy for a project to be performed at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It became the contractor for the project in approximately December of 1991. The contract, in pertinent part, provided that the Respondent would provide local cartage trucking services for the Navy on and in the environs of the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The project involved loading and transportation of aircraft parts and related supplies and equipment. The Petitioner was hired as a truck driver, delivering aircraft parts for the naval aviation depot (NADEP). During the course of that employment, there came a time when the Petitioner contended that she had been discriminated against because of her gender. The Petitioner contends that in a meeting in December of 1991, she was told by Terry Meyers, an employee of the Respondent and the Petitioner's supervisor, that she "didn't look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to look for another job. The meeting in which the statements were allegedly made was a meeting called by the Petitioner's supervisor and the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis, to address certain deficiencies in the Petitioner's performance. Another employee, Mr. Braughton, was also counseled at the meeting concerning his performance as a truck driver. His was the same type of employment position as that occupied by the Petitioner. Mr. Braughton is a white male. The Petitioner maintains that she informed a white male employee, Mike Morris, of the statements allegedly made at the meeting and that he immediately made a telephone call to Mr. Frank Moody, the president of the corporation, to put the president and the corporation on notice of sexual discrimination against the Petitioner. The Petitioner, however, was not present when Mr. Morris made that telephone call to Mr. Moody. Even had he made reference to alleged sexual discrimination in his telephone call to Mr. Moody, Mr. Morris only learned of the purported sexually-discriminatory statements from the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained that Mr. Morris informed her that he had heard the statements made while standing at the door of the room in which the meeting occurred and that Mr. Morris initiated the telephone call on his own volition to Mr. Moody, based upon hearing those statements. Mr. Morris, however, testified to the contrary, stating that the Petitioner approached him and claimed that she was on probation and was fearful of being laid off from employment and that the Petitioner told him of the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements and that he did not hear them himself. He further testified that the Petitioner instructed him to contact Mr. Moody concerning her fears about her job and the alleged discriminatory statements or she would contact "HRO and EEO and have the contract shut down". Mr. Morris, indeed, called Mr. Moody but never mentioned the statements alleged by the Petitioner to have been made to her by Mr. Meyers during the performance evaluation meeting. In fact, it has been demonstrated by Mr. Morris' testimony, which the Hearing Officer accepts as more credible, that the Petitioner never complained to Mr. Morris about a sexually-discriminatory statement or purported sexual discrimination. Mr. Morris, instead, spoke to Mr. Moody about problems he saw occurring in the operation in Pensacola which he attributed to the project manager, Mr. Danny Francis. He told Mr. Moody that Mr. Francis was allowing employees to leave work early without Mr.. Moody's knowledge and still crediting them with working a full day on such occasions which, in effect, cost the corporation additional salary monies which were unearned. The meeting in which the Petitioner was allegedly confronted with the statement that she did not look like a truck driver and had three weeks to look for another job was called and conducted by Mr. Francis and Mr. Meyers was present. It is undisputed that Mr. Moody terminated Mr. Francis shortly after the telephone conversation with Mr. Morris. He replaced Mr. Francis with the current project manager, John Jacobs. Mr. Moody testified that in a telephone conversation with the Petitioner that she never mentioned to him the alleged sexually-discriminatory statements referenced above. Instead, he was told by both Mr. Morris and the Petitioner that she was concerned that she might lose her job because of the results of the meeting with Mr. Francis, in which he told her that she needed to improve her job performance. In fact, the management of the Respondent perceived a genuine job performance problem involving the Petitioner's conduct of her job duties. This was disclosed in the testimony of both Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Morris, where it was revealed that the Petitioner had had a continuing problem performing her job correctly and that Mr. Morris and the management personnel had worked with her constantly during the course of her employment term with the Respondent, taking more time and personal attention with her than with other employees. This was done in order to repetitively explain her job duties and give her additional chances to improve her work performance, in comparison to the lesser degree of attention and remedial help that they accorded other employees. Prior to February 3, 1993, the Petitioner had been employed with the Respondent for over a year. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs established, however, that even though her probationary period had long since elapsed, he still considered the Petitioner to be, in effect, an employee in training because she was deficient in correctly accomplishing all of the duties of her job. She was slow in performing her job duties, including preventive maintenance inspections of her vehicle and in making the "pickups and deliveries" of freight she was required to transport on her truck in the performance of her duties. The counseling session concerning her work performance occurring in December of 1991, referenced above, was during her probationary period. The white male employee, Mr. Rick Braughton, who was also counseled about deficient work performance on that occasion, was informed that he might not remain employed past his probationary period unless his performance improved. The Respondent had a regular practice and procedure, as part of its truck safety and preventive maintenance program, that employees, who were drivers, were required to give a preventive maintenance and safety inspection of their vehicles each day prior to leaving the company facility or terminal to transport aviation parts or other freight. This was regarded as crucial to proper job performance by the employer because of the concern about safety of the drivers and avoidance of damage, and liability for damage, to the expensive equipment and parts which the Respondent was required by its contract to transport, such as expensive military aircraft parts and related equipment. Among these preventive maintenance inspection duties that driver/employees, such as the Petitioner, were required to perform daily was the requirement to check the air in the truck tires and "top off" the tires with the required air pressure, if necessary. 10 Mr. Jacobs established that there came a time when the Petitioner was noted to have failed on multiple occasions, in the same week, to check and air her tires. Finally, upon this deficiency coming to his attention again on February 3, 1993, Mr. Jacobs suspended the Petitioner for a day without pay, for failing to check and air her tires. The Petitioner claims that she was the only employee singled out for this treatment concerning failure to inspect and air her tires. The testimony of Mr. Jacobs is deemed more credible, having observed the candor and demeanor of all of the witnesses, and it is determined that the employer had a good-faith belief that the Petitioner was deficient in this regard and that the reprimand, consisting of the one-day suspension, was justified. It was not demonstrated that, even if the Petitioner's version of events is true and that other driver/employees were not disciplined for failure to air their tires, that such a circumstance occurred as a result of the employer's knowledge of other driver/employees failing to air their tires and arbitrarily choosing not to discipline them. In fact, it was not demonstrated by preponderant, non-self-serving evidence that other employees had not been disciplined for failure to air their tires. In fact, it was not shown, other than by the self-serving testimony of the Petitioner, that other employees had failed to air their tires when required. The other drivers are mostly male, but one is a female. There was no showing that she was treated any differently than the male drivers. In summary, it has been established that the employer accorded the reprimand to the Petitioner because of a good-faith belief that her performance had been deficient, on repeated occasions, in this respect. It is undisputed that prior to the date the Petitioner received the reprimand, consisting of one-day suspension without pay, that the Petitioner had a generally good attitude about her job insofar as management was able to observe. Even though management had had some concerns about her performance and the slow manner in which she was learning certain aspects of her job, with resulting deficient effects upon her performance, management forbore from using these concerns to reduce her performance rating. She received good evaluations of her performance, insofar as her personnel record is concerned, prior to the time she was suspended for one day on February 3, 1993. After the Petitioner received the suspension she developed a "bad attitude" insofar as her perception of management was concerned. She began to complain frequently about vehicle safety or purported concerns she had about the condition of her vehicle related to safety, particularly the truck brakes. Prior to her suspension, she had never complained in this regard. Management also perceived that she appeared to show down her work performance and management came to believe that it was an intentional delay of her work performance on an ongoing basis. Prior to receiving the reprimand, she was never known to complain to management concerning discrimination on account of her gender. She had never informed the project manager or any other supervisory personnel concerning her purported belief that employee Meyers was "following her". Only after she received the reprimand on February 3, 1993 did she elect to file a sexual discrimination charge with the Commission. Mr. Meyers had some supervisory authority over the Petitioner. His job duties also required that he drive his truck around the Naval Air Station and the immediate vicinity in the normal performance of his duties. This circumstance resulted in his being in close proximity to the Petitioner during the course of their respective work days. He contends that he was not purposely following her for the purpose of harassing her. The overall evidence of record reveals, however, that he, indeed, did follow or stop in her vicinity on a number of occasions to observe her work performance. This was not shown to be out of the ordinary scope of his supervisory duties, especially because of management's concern that the Petitioner was not progressing in the learning and performance of her job duties as well as other employees, including the other female driver. The project manager, Mr. Jacobs, felt that the Petitioner's attitude continued to decline after the February 3, 1993 reprimand. He felt that her attitude and performance reached its lowest level on the date she was observed to be loading "unauthorized equipment" (apparently a portion of a helicopter assembly weighing approximately 4,000 pounds) on the flatbed trailer of her assigned work truck. She was not authorized to load that equipment and apparently, according to her testimony, she did so in order to provide a substantial amount of weight on her trailer for the purpose of having her brakes inspected by the quality assurance official for the project. She went to an unauthorized area for approximately one hour to have this inspection performed without the approval of the Respondent's management. Further, it was not necessary, in order to evaluate the brakes on the vehicle for proper function and safety, to have the weight of the unauthorized load placed on the trailer. If, indeed, the brakes had been defective, it would have been entirely possible that the expensive aircraft parts she had placed on the trailer without authorization could have been substantially damaged, the truck or other property could have been damaged, and, indeed, the Petitioner or other persons could have been injured. Additionally, the Petitioner misrepresented the reason she was in the unauthorized area where she had her brakes inspected by Mr. Lett, the quality assurance officer. In this connection, because she had begun to complain repeatedly about the condition of her brakes and her vehicle (after her reprimand), the project manager, Mr. Jacobs, had had certain other employees come in on several occasions at approximately 6:00 a.m., before normal working hours, and before the Petitioner arrived on the job site, to inspect the Petitioner's truck for safety and appropriate preventive maintenance purposes. These employees were not informed that it was the Petitioner's truck they were inspecting at the time they were told to do the inspections. The Respondent was attempting to ascertain the true condition of the Petitioner's truck and determine whether her reports concerning safety problems, particularly with her brakes, were accurate or not. In fact, on the morning of the day when the unauthorized load was placed on the truck and the Petitioner had Mr. Lett perform the inspection of her brakes at the unauthorized area, one of the Petitioner's co-employees had inspected her brakes before she arrived to take custody of her truck that morning. He had determined that the brakes were operating properly. The Petitioner and Mr. Lett apparently felt that the brakes were deficient when they were inspected early in the afternoon of that day. The record does not reveal whether the brakes were deficient when Mr. Lett inspected them or that some change in the adjustment of the brakes or other problem had arisen since the employee inspected them early that morning and found them to be in proper operating order. Be that as it may, management was of the belief on that day and prior thereto that the Petitioner, although reporting brake deficiency problems, did not truly experience such brake deficiency problems with her truck. This belief was based upon management perceptions concerning the Petitioner's attitude after her reprimand and upon the independent, confidential inspections management had other employees do on the Petitioner's truck. Accordingly, whether its belief was accurate or not, management was of the good-faith belief, on the date she was observed loading unauthorized, expensive equipment onto the flatbed truck, in an unnecessary fashion, for the purpose of having her brakes inspected, while being absent from her work assignment for one hour in an unauthorized area, that it had performance-related reasons to terminate her, which it did. This decision was made against the background of the increasingly poor attitude displayed by the Petitioner since her reprimand and because of the continuing problems management had experienced with the Petitioner's job performance since her initial employment one and one- half years previously. Although the Petitioner testified that as early as December of 1991, the management of the Respondent had spoken with her regarding her work performance and she interpreted that meeting as an attack on her gender and not upon her poor work habits, this contention was not verified by any other testimony. Having observed the candor and demeanor of the Petitioner versus that of the other witnesses, it is determined that her testimony is less creditable because of its self-serving nature. Although the Petitioner testified that a comment was made that "she did not look like a truck driver" and that she had three weeks to find another job, this was not verified through testimony of any other witness. To the extent that any other witnesses testified concerning these statements being made in a belief that discrimination had been exhibited toward the Petitioner, the evidence reveals that this information only came to these people through self-serving reports by the Petitioner herself. Meyers directly contradicts that these statements were made to the Petitioner and he states that he never heard anyone tell her that she had three weeks to look for a job or that she "didn't look like a truck driver". The petitioner provided no testimony or evidence which could show how these alleged statements constituted "sexual discrimination" or how the statements related to her sexual discrimination claim. It was not shown that any member of management, with employment-decision authority, made or condoned such statements even if it had been established that they evidenced gender-based discrimination, which was not done. The Petitioner did not complain of sexual discrimination per se until after she had received a reprimand from management. Likewise, she began to repetitively claim that her equipment was unsafe after the reprimand. The Petitioner may have been overly sensitive to management's concern for safety inspections of her truck because of being reprimanded for safety violations and was afraid she would "get into trouble" with management if she did not constantly report feared safety problems. The fact was established, however, that management had a genuine, good-faith belief that it was being harassed by these repetitive, unsafe equipment reports by the Petitioner, given the then- prevailing atmosphere surrounding the Petitioner's employment, characterized by her less than satisfactory attitude, as perceived by management, and the fact that management's confidential inspections of her equipment did not reveal any safety problems of the type reported by the Petitioner. Finally, it is especially noteworthy that during this period of time when the Petitioner made the claim of sexual discrimination and retaliation based upon her claim, that the Respondent had in its employ, in an identical job position, a female truck driver who had had no unsatisfactory experience by management with her performance, was not subjected to investigative or disciplinary measures, and who is still satisfactorily employed with the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the petition herein in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1459 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact which are not in separately-numbered, discrete paragraphs. The paragraphs contain some proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and some which are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the same subject matter. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are intertwined with argument and discussions of the weight of the evidence or testimony. Because the paragraphs in the proposed findings of fact contain both findings of fact which the Hearing Officer accepts and which the Hearing Officer rejects, discrete, specific rulings thereon are not practicable. It suffices to say that all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are subordinate to, but have been considered and addressed in the findings of fact portion of this Recommended Order and have been in that fashion completely ruled upon. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The same considerations are true of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Some portions of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent consist of merely discussions and argument concerning the weight of the evidence and some are acceptable to the Hearing Officer based upon the Hearing Officer's determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony and evidence. Some are rejected as being unnecessary or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact made on the same subject matter. Here, again, this Recommended Order completely and adequately addresses the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, and the Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with those made by the Hearing Officer and to the extent they are inconsistent therewith, they are rejected as being not supported by preponderant evidence or as being immaterial, unnecessary, or subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry W. McCleary, Esquire 3 West Garden Street Suite 380 Pensacola, FL 32501 Donna Gardner, Esquire 213 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on September 12, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The events at issue concern Embarq's termination of Mr. Garcia's employment on September 13, 2010. At the time of his termination, Mr. Garcia was a 45-year-old male. His national origin is Puerto Rico, and he is of Hispanic descent. Further, Mr. Garcia suffered from migraine headaches, which were the result of a work-related injury. He had been an employee of Embarq, and its predecessor companies, since August 10, 1998. Before his termination, Mr. Garcia worked as a technician servicing business and residential customers. His base of operations was at the customer service center located in Winter Park, Florida, referred to by Embarq as the Winter Park "Railroad Avenue" Center. As a service technician, Mr. Garcia would receive his daily customer calls through a computer system that sent out work orders. Mr. Garcia would drive the Embarq vehicle to the customer's house or business to complete the service. The Embarq vehicle was equipped with a global positioning satellite (GPS) monitor tracking the vehicle's location, including the time the vehicle left and returned to the Embarq office. Finally, Mr. Garcia's work time was recorded by Embarq's computer system, named SAP, in which Mr. Garcia would enter a code indicating the tasks accomplished in customer service, the time when the task began and the time when he completed the task. As a service technician, Mr. Garcia was required to truthfully and accurately enter his time worked into the SAP system. Ms. Smith was Embarq's area operations manager for the Central Florida area, including the Winter Park center where Mr. Garcia worked. In the summer of 2010, Ms. Smith noted that some of the Embarq vehicles were returned to the customer service centers before the end of the work day at 4:30 p.m. Consequently, she asked the customer service center supervisors to examine all employee time records and determine whether or not a problem existed. Ms. Smith learned from Charles Clendenny (Mr. Clendenny), the acting manager for the Winter Park customer service center, that the examination showed some questionable activities. Based on Mr. Clendenny's report, Ms. Smith asked Ms. Trinder to conduct an independent review of all the employees at the Winter Park “Railroad Avenue” center. Ms. Trinder was Embarq's human relations business-partner, and part of her duties involved conducting employee investigations. Ms. Trinder examined the GPS documentation, the SAP time sheets, and the computer systems work force management assignments for all of the Winter Park “Railroad Avenue” employees. Her examination revealed questionable activities by four employees: Mr. Garcia, Scott Somner, James Shaunessy, and William Allison. The record showed that Mr. Somner is an African American and was approximately 48 years old at the time; that Mr. Shaunessy is a Caucasian, age in his sixties; and that Mr. Allison is an African American, age in his twenties. Of the four employees, only two were terminated, Mr. Garcia and Mr. Somner. Ms. Trinder and Ms. Smith credibly testified that during the interviews, they had learned that Mr. Shaunessy and Mr. Allison had received approval from their prior supervisor, Joe Venezia, to leave work early on the specific dates. Further, the data from the three computer systems confirmed Mr. Shaunessy's and Mr. Allison's explanations for leaving work early for the specific dates. Both Mr. Shaunessy and Mr. Allison were given training by Ms. Smith and Ms. Trinder concerning Embarq's work attendance polices. As to Mr. Garcia, Ms. Trinder's examination showed that Mr. Garcia had falsified his time records, and that he had unscheduled work absences. At the conclusion of the interview, Ms. Trinder typed a statement of Mr. Garcia's interview. The statement indicates that Mr. Garcia stated he did not know why he had entered that he had worked on two unscheduled work days, July 2, 2010, and July 14, 2010, and that he had mistakenly entered 4.75 hours as worked on an August 3, 2010, a date he actually took unscheduled time off. The result of these time entries was that Mr. Garcia was paid for work days on which he did not work, and that he avoided discipline for missing work. The Embarq employee handbook shows that employees are subject to discipline, if the employee misses work on a scheduled work day. The record shows that Mr. Garcia had previously been trained by his supervisor about the problem of missing work without providing the required 24-hour notice. On September 10, 2010, Ms. Smith sent a request to Ms. Susan Sarna, vice president/general manager, recommending that Mr. Garcia be terminated. Similarly, Ms. Trinder sent a recommendation to her supervisor recommending Mr. Garcia's termination. On September 13, 2010, Mr. Garcia was terminated as an Embarq employee. Mr. Garcia clearly testified that even though he had migraines that he had not requested any type of accommodation from his supervisors or from Embarq. Mr. Garcia did not bring forward any evidence, either direct or indirect, showing that Embarq's termination of his employment was the result of an unlawful employment practice. Mr. Garcia did not bring forward any evidence showing that Embarq's offered explanation that it terminated Mr. Garcia for attendance and time falsification was pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Petitioner failed to show that Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from January, 1986, until March 7, 1988. Petitioner worked as a tailor and performed alterations at Respondent's store located in Altamonte Springs. In the latter half of 1987, Mr. Pease became the manager of the Altamonte Springs store and thus became Petitioner's supervisor. As had the prior manager, Mr. Pease and Petitioner worked out a schedule that did not require Petitioner to work in violation of his religious principles. However, relations between Petitioner and Mr. Pease were not good. Shortly after becoming manager, for independent business reasons, Mr. Pease decided to reduce the amount of fitting done in the store. The effect of this decision was to reduce the amount of work available for Petitioner. At about this time, Petitioner suffered an accident unrelated to employment. The accident resulted in an extended absence from work. Petitioner received his physician's approval to return to work on February 16, 1988, but failed to do so. Without prior notice, Petitioner showed up at the store on March 7, 1988, and informed Mr. Pease that Petitioner was ready to return to work. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the work schedule had already been arranged for the week. Mr. Pease told Petitioner that the only days he could work were Saturday, March 12, and Sunday, March 13. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that he could not work Sundays due to his religious beliefs. Mr. Pease reiterated that no other time was available that week. Petitioner told Mr. Pease that Petitioner understood that he was being fired. Mr. Pease told him that he was not being fired; rather, he was quitting if he left Respondent's employment. Two days later, Petitioner filed for unemployment compensation benefits. He never reported to work with Respondent again. Consistent with his Petition for Relief, Petitioner offered no evidence of discrimination due to national origin. Nothing in the record suggests the existence of any such discrimination. Petitioner has also failed to prove the existence of any religious discrimination. There is no evidence that Mr. Pease refused to try to accommodate Petitioner's religious beliefs with respect to work schedules after the weekend of March 12-13. The only evidence is that when Petitioner suddenly reported to work, the only days immediately available were the weekend days. The record does not even disclose whether Mr. Pease linked the two days, so as to prevent Petitioner from working the Saturday without working the Sunday. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Mr. Pease told Petitioner that if he failed to work the coming Sunday, he would lose his job. In sum, Petitioner has left it entirely to conjecture whether Mr. Pease would have failed to make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of Petitioner. In fact, Mr. Pease was never presented with that opportunity. In addition, Petitioner has produced no evidence that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of the number of employees working for Respondent at the relevant time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5689 Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance. 4-5. (first sentence) Adopted. 5. (second sentence) Rejected as irrelevant. 6-10. Adopted. s 11. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Weceslao Lugo Palermo 7505 Armstrong Road Lockhart, FL 32810 Richard D. Pease 590 West Highway 436 Altamonte Springs, FL 32714
