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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs ANNE EVANS ETHERIDGE, 95-003964 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Aug. 09, 1995 Number: 95-003964 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1997

The Issue Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license. Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds. Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business. The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry. On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street. A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained. When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street. The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research. At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building. Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot". Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997. At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities. Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida. Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated: No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business. Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating: The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner. Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989. Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1. In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992. In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency. In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes. In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law. After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency. Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system. Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice. Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency. John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release. Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993. Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance. In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night. Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency. Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order. When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones. David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order. In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record. When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency. At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency. When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well. Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant. Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back". Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent. Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office. According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for 12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994. Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on. The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted. The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business. Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman. Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by. On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency. On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent. The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance. In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street. In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses. Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone. Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot. Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge. On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964. Judge Fay also ruled: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe- ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies. Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties. Petitioner's Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Findings: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker. Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166 Judy Groover, Esquire 24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 1341 Florida Laws (12) 120.57120.68648.44648.45648.46648.49648.52648.53648.57775.082775.08390.801
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs NOEL ANGEL RIVERA, 95-003032 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 19, 1995 Number: 95-003032 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1996

The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed violations as alleged in the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case the Respondent has been licensed as a limited surety agent. On April 10, 1995, Elsa De La Cruz went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who represented himself to be Respondent approached Ms. De La Cruz and asked her if he could help her. He specifically wanted to know if she was there to bail someone out and identified himself as a bail bondsman. The male also gave Ms. De La Cruz a business card bearing Respondent's name and business location. Ms. De La Cruz left the fifth floor of the courthouse and walked to the east wing which is commonly referred to as "the jail wing." The same male was also there and again approached Ms. De La Cruz. At this time he advised her that if the bond was set at $10,000, he would need $1,000 and collateral to help her. Ms. De La Cruz left the property and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit 2. Ms. De La Cruz did not initiate any of the contact between herself and the male who represented himself as Respondent. On April 11, 1995, Maggie Porto went to the criminal courthouse in Miami, Dade County, Florida, and waited on the fifth floor. A male who later identified himself as Respondent initiated contact with Ms. Porto and advised her that he was in business if she needed him. After a short while, Ms. Porto left the fifth floor and walked over to the east wing of the criminal center. Upon her arrival there, the same male handed Ms. Porto a business card. When Ms. Porto asked the male if he was the man identified on the card, the subject answered "yes." The business card represented Respondent's name. Later, Ms. Porto left the criminal center and returned to her office to complete the affidavit which is Petitioner's exhibit number 3. All contact between Ms. Porto and Respondent was initiated by the Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3032 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 2, the allegation as to the time of the incident is rejected as not supported by the record or hearsay. With regard to paragraph 3, the allegation as to when the business card was delivered to Ms. De La Cruz is rejected as contrary to the weight of the record. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 Northwest 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Noel A. Rivera 2200 Northwest 11th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Anthony Alvarez 350 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 201 Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Florida Laws (2) 648.44648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs LARRY LORENZO JONES, 06-000707PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 23, 2006 Number: 06-000707PL Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2007

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57648.442648.45648.49648.52648.571
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs CLARENCE LUTHER CEPHAS, SR., 03-000798PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Mar. 05, 2003 Number: 03-000798PL Latest Update: Nov. 02, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent violated provision of the Florida Insurance Code by employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business. Whether Respondent violated the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code by failing to report a change of address to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in this matter, Respondent Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., was licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. Pursuant to Florida law, Petitioner has jurisdiction over the bail bond licensure and appointments of Respondent. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on March 28, 1975, in case number 75-239 CF, of buying or receiving or aiding in concealment of stolen property, a felony. Records of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (Criminal Division), show that Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, pleaded guilty and was adjudicated guilty on October 22, 1975, in case number 75-2390 CF, of violation of drug abuse law, a felony. Records of the State of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) show that the conviction set forth in paragraph 4 above included convictions on March 28, 1975, and July 17, 1975, for parole violations. On or about March 7, 1980, the State of Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored the civil rights of Pamela Jean Coleman, relative to Coleman's criminal convictions in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 1975. Records of the FDLE show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, plead nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty, and convicted of retail theft in Polk County, Florida, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about November 25, 1991, Pamela Jean Coleman, a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman, in case number CF91-1923, pled nolo contendere, was adjudicated guilty and convicted of petit theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, which constituted a crime of moral turpitude. Records of the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, State of Florida, show that on or about December 16, 2002, an Amended Information was filed against Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, charging that between November 27, 2000, and January 25, 2002, in the County of Polk and State of Florida, having been convicted of or pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of any state, territory, or county, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, did participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of a bail bond agency or office thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in a closely held corporation which had an interest in a bail bond business contrary to Section 648.44, Florida Statutes. Further, the records of said court show that on or about January 31, 2002, Pamela Jean Coleman (a/k/a Deborah Lee Diehl, a/k/a Pamela Jean Jones, a/k/a Pamela Jones, a/k/a Pamela Coleman) in case number CFO2-00597A-XX, was tried, found guilty and adjudicated guilty of a violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, acting as a bail bondsman while being a convicted felon, a felony of the third degree, as charged in the aforesaid Amended Information. Said conviction is presently on appeal before the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. Respondent knew or should have known the foregoing information. Documents under Seal from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, pertaining to Clarence Luther Cephas, Sr., Bailbonds, Ltd., Inc., show that Pamela Jean Coleman filed original documents on behalf of Respondent's corporation and corresponded with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of the said corporation. She was listed as both the registered agent of the corporation and also a vice-president and director of the said corporation as set forth on a document filed over the signature of Respondent. Other filed documentation show Pamela Jean Coleman as the president, secretary, and as director of said corporation. These documents are accurate and valid. The original license application form, Florida Insurance Temporary License Application, under Section 11, Screening Question Information, contains the following language: "If you were adjudged guilty or convicted of a felony crime and your civil rights were lost, provide evidence that your civil rights have been restored." There is no evidence in the record that Coleman provided that information to Petitioner at the time the original application was filed or at any time subsequent to that period, and Coleman signed the application. Respondent gave a statement, under oath, before Luis Rivera, Special Investigator for Petitioner's predecessor (Department of Insurance), on November 27, 2000, wherein he stated: I have known Pamela Coleman/Jones for approximately four years and she has been affiliated with me for most of the time that I have been in the bail bond business. I had asked her if she had ever been convicted of a felony and she said that she had been convicted as a teenager. She had a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights from the Office of Executive Clemency that is dated March 7, 1980. I was under the impression that if her rights had been restored, that it would not be a problem with her working for me. I named Pamela as an officer in my corporation because I did not have any family that I could list as an officer except for my daughter, who is a deputy sheriff and could not be an office of the corporation. Respondent had a business address-of-record with Petitioner of B & B Bail Bonds, 580 North Broadway Avenue, Bartow, Florida 33830-3918, when in fact his business address was 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710. Respondent did not notify Petitioner of a change of address for his corporation as required by law. In November 2000 during an interview, Luis Rivera and another Special Investigator from his office advised Respondent that Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance) considered him to be in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes, notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights granted to Pamela Jean Coleman. Luis Rivera visited the home office of Respondent, on March 7 and 21, 2000, at 2095 East Georgia Street, Bartow, Florida 33830-6710, and knew of no other office location for that agent after that date. Constance Castro, a Special Investigator with the Tampa Office, Petitioner (then the Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, during September 2001, made an undercover visit to the bail bond office of Respondent, and pretended to be in need of a bail bond for a fictitious relative. She dealt directly with Pamela Jean Coleman who proceeded from the home living area of the house where Respondent was also located, to the office area of the home where Coleman conducted bail bond business with Castro. Special Agent Michael Kreis, Drug Enforcement Agency, in early 2001, had business with Cephas Bail Bonds. He went to the office thereof where he observed Pamela Jean Coleman sitting behind the desk. Coleman told him that she had posted bond the night before for the people he was asking about, and was very familiar with the street names of the people that were being sought. Coleman helped to arrange what was supposed to be a meeting between her and one of the suspects using the ruse that she needed the suspect to sign some bail bond paperwork. Kreis observed Respondent in the office but Coleman seemed to be in charge. Kreis observed her on the phone and dealing with people who came into the Cephas' bail bond office, and noted that by her actions and conduct, she was acting as a bail bond agent. On or about June 19, 2001, Noel Elizabeth "Nikki" Collier was working as a paralegal in her husband's law office when Pamela Jean Coleman visited their office with paperwork for one of their mutual clients to fill out. Coleman left her business card which read "Pamela J. Coleman, President, Clarence L. Cephas, Sr. Bail Bonds." Coleman was dressed in a black outfit with a badge attached to her belt. Coleman told her that if the mutual client did not sign the paperwork then the bail bonds would be revoked. When in the law office, Coleman identified herself as an agent for Clarence Cephas Bail Bonds. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8 was indeed a sworn statement made by him during a visit to Petitioner (then Department of Insurance), Bureau of Agent and Agency Investigations, at its offices in Tampa, Florida, in November 2000, and that he was indeed warned by Petitioner's personnel that he was in violation of Section 648.44(8), Florida Statutes. He was subsequently warned by the filing of an Administrative Complaint in June 2001, an Amended Administrative Complaint in December 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint in March 2003. Respondent acknowledged that Pamela Jean Coleman was indeed listed as an officer and as a registered agent as well as the filer of various corporation documents, regarding his corporation and on file with the Department of State, Division of Corporations, and that he did sign the paperwork indicating that she was a corporate officer. Respondent further acknowledged that Coleman did participate in his bail bond business and that he did make payments to her as an employee, which included filing of a W-2 Form indicating said payments. During the pendency of this action, the State of Florida, by and through Jerry Hill, State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Respondent for criminal violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes (2003), in the case styled State of Florida v Clarence Luther Cephas, Florida Tenth Circuit Court, Case Number CF02-00598A-XX (the "criminal case"). The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit conducted a jury trial in the criminal case. On December 17, 2003, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty," and the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit rendered a judgment of not guilty in the criminal case. The allegations contained in the criminal case were identical to the allegation contained in Count one of Petitioner's Second Amended Administrative Complaint. During the approximate period of time March 1997 to at least December 2001, Respondent did employ and/or did otherwise allow Pamela Jean Coleman to participate in the bail bond business. Respondent did fail to notify the Department of Financial Services of a change of address as required by law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of employing a convicted felon in the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.30, 348.44(8)(b), 648.45(2)(e) and (j), and 648.45(3)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes; Finding Respondent guilty of failing to report a change of address; and Revoking the bail bond agent license and eligibility for licensure of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Franklin, Esquire The Franklin & Carmichael Law Firm, P.A. 301 East Main Street Post Office Box 50 Bartow, Florida 33806 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (15) 120.569120.57624.303648.30648.34648.355648.421648.44648.45775.082775.083775.08490.20290.80390.902
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. ROBERT EUGENE RADNEY, 79-001632 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001632 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1979

Findings Of Fact The facts relevant to the charges here preferred are largely undisputed. In May 1978 Respondent's business address as reported by him to Petitioner was 2812 North 34th Street, Tampa, Florida. This address was visited by Petitioner's investigators on 23, 24, 25, and 30 May 1978. The building located at that address is owned and used by Scaglione Construction Company as its main office. There is no sign on the exterior of this building indicating a bail bondsman's office is located inside. While visiting the address, the investigators were advised that Respondent had no office there but Frank Puig did have a bail bond office in the building. Although there was some dispute regarding whether the investigators were shown Puig's office, or even allowed to go to the door of that office, whether they did or not is immaterial because Respondent readily admitted he had no files at this location and conducted no business therefrom. Again witnesses differed on whether there was a sign on the door of the office occupied by Puig. Whether there was a sign on that door reading "Frank Puig - Bail- bondsman" is irrelevant to the charge that Respondent had no sign designating his office. During the period in question, in fact, during most, if not all, of 1978, Respondent testified he was without power [of attorney] to write bonds. Exhibit 1 shows that three companies, Midland Insurance Company, Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, and Cotton Belt Insurance Company, Inc. all renewed Respondent's limited surety agency in October 1977 and all cancelled his limited surety agency 12-14-78. Respondent's testimony indicated that he was an agent only for Cotton Belt and that his power to write bonds had been withdrawn. According to Respondent's own testimony, he had no permanent office in which to keep his files and records and that these records were carried in his car and stored at his residence when not in his car. He was using Puig's telephone number as a place at which messages could be left for him. Respondent also testified that during 1978 he wrote no bonds and was only servicing existing accounts which preceded 1978.

Florida Laws (6) 11.111648.34648.36648.39648.43648.45
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs EMILIO GALLOR FAROY, 10-003185PL (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 11, 2010 Number: 10-003185PL Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JUANITA WILLIAMS, 07-005664PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida Dec. 12, 2007 Number: 07-005664PL Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs TAYRA A. PARKER, 13-000514 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Palatka, Florida Feb. 12, 2013 Number: 13-000514 Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs FREDERICK WENDELL JOHNSON, 02-002258PL (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 05, 2002 Number: 02-002258PL Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2024
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