Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent North Dade Security, Ltd., has held a Class "s" security guard agency license. At all times material hereto, Respondent Rollins Donald has held a Class "K" firearms instructor license. At all times material hereto, Respondent Linda Donald has held a Class "K" firearms instructor license. At all times material hereto, Linda and Rollins Donald have been the principal owners, corporate officers, and directors of Respondent North Dade Security, Ltd., and as such are responsible for the control and operation of the agency. There is no licensed manager for the agency. At all times material hereto, Raymond Curtis Foxwood was an employee of North Dade Security, Ltd. Foxwood has never been licensed as a firearms instructor. An applicant for a statewide gun permit, also known as a Class "G" armed guard license, must submit to Petitioner an application for such license. The application form contains a Certificate of Firearms Proficiency which verifies that the applicant has received the statutorily-required firearms training by a licensed firarms instructor prior to the filing of that application for licensure.- on October 7, 1985, Foxwood submitted to Petitioner on behalf of North Dade Security, Ltd., approximately 20 applications for licensure as unarmed and armed guards. Although Foxwood was advised at that time by one of Petitioner's employees that the applications could not be processed due to the absence of licensure fees and due to deficiencies in completeness, the applicants were sent by North Dade Security to Petitioner's office to pick up their temporary licenses on the morning of October 8. When questioned about their applications, some of the applicants advised Petitioner's employee that they had received no firearms training, although their applications certified that they had. After the applicants were refused temporary licenses by Petitioner, North Dade Security sent the applicants to a gun range where Foxwood administered some firearms training for approximately four hours. Neither Rollins Donald nor Linda Donald was present at that training session. As of October 1985, several other persons employed by North Dade Security as armed guards had received no firearms training in conjunction with that employment. Most of the Certificates of Firearms Proficiency a contained within the applications of those latter employees and of the October 7 applicants were signed by Rollins Donald and by Linda Donald. 11. The numerous applications submitted by North Dadee La Security, Ltd., on October 7, 1985 was occasioned by a large contract entered into by North Dade Security, Ltd. requiring the immediate employment of a large number of armed guards.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents North Dade Security, Ltd., Rollins Donald and Linda Donald guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed herein, and revoking the Class "B.' license of North Dade Security, Ltd., and further revoking the Class "K" firearms instructor licenses of Respondents Rollins Donald and Linda Donald. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of February, 1987, at Tallahassee' Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Plante, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Room LL-10 Tallahassee Florida 32399-0250 Jackie L. Gabe, Esquire Charles C. Mays, Esquire McCRARY & VALENTINE Executive Plaza 3050 Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 800, Miami, Florida 33137-4198 Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The testimony at the final hearing in this cause was preserved by tape recorder using cassette tapes rather than by use of the court reporter. At the conclusion of the final hearing, Respondents determined that they would provide a transcript of proceedings for use by the undersigned and would therefore have the cassette tapes of the final hearing transcribed. The parties were afforded thirty (30) days from the filing of that transcript in which to submit proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders. On June 23, 1986, a transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties hereto subsequently agreed that that transcript was incomplete, and a complete transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 22, 1986. Accordingly, the parties' proposed recommended orders became due to be filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings no later than October 22, 1986. Respondents filed their proposed recommended order on October 20, 1986. However, Petitioner did. not file its proposed recommended order until October 23, 1986. On October 24, 1986, Petitioner also filed what it considered to be an uncertified "corrected transcript. A series of correspondence and conference calls then ensued due to the Respondents' inability to accept the "corrected~ transcript, and the parties were afforded additional time in which to resolve their differences regarding the September 22, 1986 transcript, which was determined by the undersigned to be the official transcript of this proceeding. By correspondence from Petitioner's substituted attorney filed on February 2, 1987, Petitioner withdrew its "corrected" transcript and agreed to the use of the official transcript filed on September 22, 1986. Since Petitioner's proposed recommended order was filed late and no extension of time for the filing of that proposed recommended order was requested or granted, no rulings are made herein on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Although Respondents' proposed recommended order was timely filed, only Respondent's finding of fact numbered 1 has been adopted in this Recommended Order. The remainder of Respondents' proposed findings of fact have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitations of the testimony of each witness. ================================================================= FIRST DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA NORTH DADE SECURITY LTD. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES CORPORATION, LINDA H. TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND DONALD and ROLLINS DONALD, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. Appellants, CASE NO. 97-1350 DOAH CASE NO. 85-4192 Vs. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LICENSING, Appellee. / Opinion filed September 1, 1988. An appeal from an order of the Department of State. Michael J. Cherniga, of Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard, C Tallahassee, for appellants. R. Timothy Jansen, Assistant General Counsel, Department of State, Tallahassee, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judgee. This is an appeal from a final order of the Department of State (Department) approving and adopting the hearing officer's recommended order holding that the firearms instructor licenses of the individual appellants should be revoked and that the security agency license of the corporate appellant should be revoked. We reverse and remand. The appellants raise, inter alia, the following two questions: (1) Whether the Department's failure to accurately and completely preserve the testimony adduced at the final hearing constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law and a violation of appellants' due process rights, and (2) whether the Department's failure to preserve the testimony adduced at the final hearing has materially prejudiced the appellants' rights to judicial review of this cause. At the final hearing in this case the Department attempted to preserve the testimony presented by tape recorder using cassette tapes rather than by the use of a court reporter. The Department notified appellants prior to the final hearing that it intended to preserve the hearing testimony in this manner, and that appellants would be responsible for furnishing any transcript they might need for review of the hearing officer's findings. Appellants were advised they were free to either hire a court reporter to produce such transcript or that they could use the Department's tapes t make their own transcript. Appellants neither hired a court reporter nor objected to the Department's announcement that it would tape record the proceedings. Unfortunately, the tape recorder malfunctioned, and numerous substantial and material portions of the testimony taken at the hearing were not transcribable because they were not recorded at all, or because the tapes were inaudible or unintelligible. The final hearing was concluded February 18, 1986. At the conclusion of the hearing the appellants determined that they would provide a transcript of the proceedings for use by the parties and would have the cassette tapes of the final hearing transcribed. The parties were afforded 30 days from the filing of the transcript in which to submit proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders. On June 23,1986, a transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) but the parties subsequently agreed that the transcript was incomplete. An allegedly complete transcript was filed with DOAH on September 22, 1986, and the parties' proposed recommended orders were due to be filed no later than October 22, 1986. Appellants filed their proposed recommended order on October 20, 1986 and the Department filed its recommended order October 23, 1986 together with what it labeled a "corrected" transcript. The appellants refused to accept the "corrected" transcript and the parties were afforded additional time to resolve their differences regarding the September 22 transcript. Ultimately, the transcript filed September 22 was determined by the hearing officer to be the official transcript of the final hearing. On February 2, 1987, the Department withdrew its "corrected" transcript and agreed to use the transcript filed September 22, 1986. The hearing officer's recommended order was entered February 25, 1987, and the final order of the agency was entered September 23, 1987, more than one and one-half years after the date of the final hearing. Section 120.57(1)(b)6, Fla. Stat. (1985) provides in part: The agency shall accurately and completely preserve all testimony in the proceeding, and, on the request of any party, it shall make a full or partial transcript available at no more than actual cost. The statute requires agencies to accurately and completely preserve all testimony in §120.57(1) proceedings held before them, and this mandatory duty cannot be avoided or escaped by simply advising an opposing party that the agency proposes to preserve the testimony by tape recording and that the opposing party has the right to hire a court reporter. The appellants were entitled to rely upon the Department to accurately and completely preserve the testimony taken at the final hearing, yet review of the transcript herein reveals that the Department failed to perform its duty. There are numerous obvious omissions of substantial and material portions of the testimony received, and the answers to many of the questions posed are incomplete or inaudible. Because of the condition of the record the appellants are unable to obtain any meaningful review of the proceedings. Booker Creek Preservation. Inc. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 415 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) and Florida Department of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) are not applicable, as these cases involved a factual situation where the appellant failed to furnish a written transcript although one could have and should have been obtained by the appellant. In this case the appellants made every effort to obtain a complete and accurate written transcript of the testimony but were unable to do so through no fault of their own. As the parties were unable to agree on a statement of the evidence, the appellants are entitled to a hearing de novo. The order of the Department is vacated and the cause is remanded for a hearing de novo on the petition. SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ ., CONCUR.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent’s application for a Class G Firearms license should be approved and whether his existing Concealed Weapons license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the licensure and sale of weapons in the State of Florida. By letter dated November 5, 1998, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, notified Kenneth Dunning that his application for a Class “G” license had been denied. The grounds for the proposed denial are as follows: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6118(4), Florida Statutes, in that you were convicted of a felony and your civil rights, including the specific right to possess firearms, have not been restored by the State of Michigan. For information, please contact the state (sic) of Michigan. In 1960, Mr. Dunning was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, in the State of Michigan. On December 23, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Dunning, seeking to revoke his Concealed Weapons license, number W98-00504. As grounds for the proposed revocation, the Complaint states as follows: On or about June 17, 1960, in the State of Michigan, Respondent was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, and has not had the right to own or possess firearms restored in the State of Michigan. Respondent is ineligible for licensure pursuant to Sections 790.06(2)(d) and 790,23, Florida Statutes. There is no evidence that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights were lost as a result of his 1960 conviction. The evidence, including Mr. Dunning’s uncontradicted testimony and available documents, establishes that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights, if impacted at all by his 1960 conviction, have been restored without reservation. By Order dated May 23, 1997, from the Office of Executive Clemency, Mr. Dunning was granted a restoration of civil rights “except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm” by the Governor of the State of Florida with the concurrence of the requisite members of the State Cabinet. The Certificate of Restoration indicates it is valid “in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in the state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court. . . .” By Executive Order dated September 10, 1998, and signed by the Governor of the State of Florida, Mr. Dunning was granted “the right to own, possess or use firearms.” Department Exhibit numbered 1 is a letter dated September 28, 1998, from “Anthony P. Gledhill” who is identified as “Division Counsel, Detroit” for the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to John P. Booth, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The letter is a legal analysis of case law related to restoration of an individual’s civil rights after conviction. The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored. Department Exhibit numbered 2 is a letter dated September 24, 1998, to Mr. Dunhill from Mr. Booth. The letter identifies as the reason for FDLE’s nonapproval of Mr. Dunning's attempt to purchase a firearm under Section 790.065, Florida Statutes, “the determination by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that your civil rights have not been fully restored by Michigan. . . .” The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order granting the application of Kenneth Dunning for a Class “G” firearms license and dismissing the Administrative Complaint addressed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kenneth Dunning 806 Walker Drive Tampa, Florida 33613 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Lever 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto David L. Jordan was certified in firearms instruction (Stipulation by the parties). On July 20, 1990, while conducting a firearms training class for probation and parole officer candidates, Respondent, while demonstrating use of a shotgun, pointed a shotgun at a female student at close range and pulled the trigger. Respondent was attempting to demonstrate the intimidating nature of a shotgun to the students. Prior to pointing the shotgun at the student, Respondent had checked the magazine and chamber of the gun to insure the gun was unloaded and showed this check to most of the students in the class. He then, with his back to the female student, operated the slide on the pump shotgun by pulling the rack back and then forward, turned toward the student with the shotgun muzzle within a foot of the student's face and pulled the trigger. This incident was extremely disturbing to the student at whom the gun had been pointed and to most of the rest of the class as well. During the morning session of the firearms training class, the senior instructor in the class, Sergeant Oates, had pointed a revolver at members of the class, and both Respondent and Oates had allowed students to point revolvers at other students to practice squeezing the trigger while dry firing. It is a cardinal safety rule when handling firearms to never point a firearm at another person unless compatible with the right to use deadly force. (Exhibits 1 and 2) The Florida Firearms Training Manual (Exhibit 1) expresses the rule as "Never point a firearm at anyone unless compatible with deadly force departmental policy and Chapter 776, Florida Statutes." It is gross negligence for an instructor in firearms training to point a weapon at another person or allow students to point firearms at other persons. The training of the class which Respondent was instructing on July 20, 1990, was conducted with functional weapons.
Recommendation It is recommended that the certification of David L. Jordan as a firearms instructor be revoked. This recommendation is in accordance with Rule 11B- 20.0012(1), Florida Administrative Code. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael R. Ramage, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 David L. Jordan 6213 Watermark Drive Apartment 206 Riverview, FL 33659 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue At issue in Case No. 94-5463S is whether the Petitioner's application for a Class 'G' Statewide Firearm License should be granted or denied. At issue in Case No. 94-6872 is whether the Respondent's Class 'D' Security Officer License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Department.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 15, 1994, Jean-Baptiste submitted to the Department an application for a Class 'G' Statewide Firearm License pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Jean-Baptiste held Class 'D' Security Officer License Number D91-05252, issued by the Department pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On February 29, 1992, Jean-Baptiste was the driver of an automobile involved in a minor traffic accident in Homestead, Florida. The accident was investigated by Trooper Talton B. Dunn of the Florida Highway Patrol. When, in the course of his investigation, Trooper Dunn asked Jean- Baptiste for his driver's license, Jean-Baptiste replied that he did not have a license in his possession. Trooper Dunn asked his name, and Jean-Baptiste gave the name 'Joseph Jean Pierre.' Trooper Dunn was unable to obtain confirmation that a Florida driver's license had been issued to anyone by that name. Trooper Dunn then asked one of the small children who were passengers in the car driven by Jean-Baptiste if she knew the driver's name. The child, who identified herself as the driver's daughter, stated that his name was 'Jimmy Baptiste,' and Jean-Baptiste agreed that this was his name when asked by Trooper Dunn. Trooper Dunn was unable to obtain confirmation that a Florida driver's license had been issued to anyone by the name of 'Jimmy Baptiste.' When Trooper Dunn again asked for his name, Jean-Baptiste stated that his correct name was the first name he had given, 'Joseph Jean Pierre.' At some point in the discussion, Jean-Baptiste told Trooper Dunn that his license had been suspended. Trooper Dunn arrested Jean-Baptiste for, among other infractions, giving false information on an accident report and obstructing justice. Jean- Baptiste gave his correct name to the authorities at the jail when he was being fingerprinted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: In Case Number 94-5463S, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner lacks good moral character and granting his application for a Class 'G' Statewide Firearm License; and, In Case Number 94-6872, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondent lacks good moral character and dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March 1995. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact included in the Department's Proposed Recommended Orders submitted in Case Nos. 94-5463S and 94-6872 are virtually identical, differing only in paragraph one to reflect the different licenses at issue. The following are my specific rulings on these proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1 through 9: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance though not repeated verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Frantz Olivier The Causeway Professional Bldg. 777 Northeast 79 St., Causeway Suite 104 Miami, Florida 33138 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32300-0250 The Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact The Respondent filed a license application with the Division of Licensing, Department of State for a Class "D" Unarmed Guard License on January 27, 1983. The Division of Licensing did not approve or deny the license application of Carlos Hernan Garcia within the 90-day period from the date of receipt of the application and, accordingly, by operation of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, the Division issued to Respondent a Class "D" Unarmed Security Guard License which expires on May 14, 1983. But for the operation of the 90-day rule, the Division of Licensing would not have issued the Respondent an Unarmed Security Guard License. On July 17, 1983 the Division of Licensing issued an administrative complaint to revoke the license on grounds that the Respondent willfully misrepresented his criminal record in his application in violation of Section 495.319(1)(a), Florida Statutes, committed an assault and battery other than in self defense and committed criminal acts which directly relate to the business for which the license was sought in violation of Sections 493.319(1)(c) and (j), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1979, the Respondent (while intoxicated) struck a police officer who was investigating a traffic accident in which the Respondent was involved. The Respondent was convicted of assault and battery upon a police officer and received six months probation and adjudication was withheld. On August 5, 1980, the Respondent was responsible for a fire which occurred in the bathroom of a restaurant during business hours for which he was convicted of criminal mischief. On or about October 29, 1982, the Respondent was carrying a concealed firearm, a 25-caliber pistol, without a license or permit required by Sections 790.05 and 790.06, Florida Statutes (1981). Following an argument which took place outside an apartment house, the Respondent shot and injured another person with the pistol. No criminal charges were brought and there was no prosecution as a result of this incident. The Respondent, who reads and writes English, failed to complete question number 13 on his security guard application, pertaining to past criminal arrests and convictions, by omitting any reference to the assault and battery and criminal mischief convictions, since the Respondent knew that he could be denied a license for having committed such crimes, and knowing that the omission, if discovered, would be grounds for denial of his license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the Class "D" license of the Respondent Carlos Hernan Garcia. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/480-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15 day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: James V. Antista, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos Hernan Garcia 9380 West Flagler Street, #120 Miami, Florida 33130 George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary Gast, Director Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On or about January 31, 1990, the Petitioner, John P. Fletcher, applied for a Class "D" Unarmed Security Officer license. In Section 13 of the application, the Petitioner represented that he never had been arrested. In 1957, when the Petitioner was about 21 years old, he was arrested in West Union, West Virginia, with a brother and another man, and the three were charged with stealing gasoline from a filling station. The Petitioner denies that he stole the gasoline, saying that he and his brother did not know that the third man had not paid for the gasoline for the car they were riding in. The Petitioner's mother paid restitution, and the charges were dropped. In November, 1963, when the Petitioner was about 27 years old, he was arrested for, and adjudicated guilty of, contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In fact, he was teaching a minor to drive a car against the wishes of the minor's parents. He served 60 or 90 days in jail in Lakeland on the charges. Two years later, in August, 1965, while he was working for the Peninsula Lumber Company, the Petitioner was arrested for alleged aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was put in jail for seven to 14 days while awaiting trial. The charges arose out of an altercation with a fellow employee. The Petitioner was upset about his pending divorce, and the other man kept picking at him about it. Three times, the Petitioner asked the man to stop, but he persisted. At one point, the man came at him in a threatening manner with a hammer in his hand, and the Petitioner cut him with a knife. In court proceedings, the other man admitted the truth of the Petitioner's version of the altercation, and the judge dismissed the charges. In January, 1983, the Petitioner was visiting at the home of his elderly mother, who was living alone in East Hillsborough County. The Petitioner was told that a bad-mannered neighborhood youth was vandalizing his mother's property and generally terrorizing her. The Petitioner was very angry about this. During the visit, he went out to his truck and found a firecracker, with fuse burned but not ignited, that he believed had been placed there by the youth of whom his mother had spoken. He sought out the youth, about twenty-one years old, grabbed him, and was going to "put a whipping on him" but did not. Instead, he threatened to do so if the youth did not stop his bad behavior, particularly towards the Petitioner's mother. As a result, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with aggravated assault. The Petitioner was placed on a pretrial intervention program on March 11, 1983, and he successfully completed the program on September 11, 1983. The charges were dismissed. The evidence did not explain why the Petitioner represented in Section 13 of his application that he never had been arrested. Although he conceivably could have forgotten about the 1957 arrest, it is not likely that he forgot about the others, and it is found that the misrepresentation was intentional. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Petitioner had occasion to work as a licensed armed security guard for Foley Security and Detective Agency and for United Security Agency in Tampa. The Petitioner worked for each of them for about a year, until each went out of business. He also worked for Securex and later Bedway as an unarmed security officer from January 29, 1990, until he voluntarily quit pending the resolution of his license application. The Petitioner also has worked as a truck driver and has operated heavy equipment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order denying the application of the Petitioner, John P. Fletcher, for licensure as a Class "D" Unarmed Security Officer. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, as more specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated April 15, 1991.
Findings Of Fact On March 14, 1991, Respondent performed the services of a security guard at a Best Western Motel in Orange County, Florida, As such he was employed by the motel. While performing the services above noted Respondent carried a 9mm Berretta automatic pistol in a holster external to his clothes. While performing the above-noted services Respondent's firearm was unloaded and he had hollow point 9mm shells in his pocket. While performing the above-noted services Respondent held neither a Class D nor Class G license. Respondent was performing the services of security guard while substituting for a relative who was ill. Respondent was working solely for the motel and was not associated with any security guard agency. The motel manager had requested that Respondent carry a unloaded firearm because several crimes had been committed in the vicinity of the motel. Respondent believed that as an employee of the motel, as contrasted with being employed by a security guard agency, Respondent did not need a security guard license. Further, Respondent believed he had a Second Amendment U.S. Constitutional right to overtly carry the firearm in the holster outside his clothing. At the time of this hearing Respondent was unemployed.
