Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeanette Dilligard, is licensed to operate the Dilligard Foster Home for children located at 1751 N.W. 76th Street in Miami, Florida. In the summer of 1985, W. T., age 11, L. I., age 9 and P. F., age 8, were placed in Ms. Dilligard's care by DHRS. While the children were in Ms. Dilligard's care, they were frequently and consistently given physical punishments and beatings. Each child would receive some form of physical punishment at least once a week. Ms. Dilligard used an electrical extension cord and a white belt when administering the beatings. The beatings would last about 5 minutes, sometimes leaving cuts and bruises on the children. The punishments were usually administered for fairly insignificant transgressions by the children. On one occasion, Ms. Dilligard had taken the children with her to a laundromat and L. I. accepted a piece of chewing gum from another person that was there. When Ms. Dilligard and the children returned home, L. I. was given a beating for "accepting food from a stranger." On another occasion, P. F. was eating sunflower seeds and left some of the empty shells on the floor. Ms. Dilligard administered a beating to P. F. for that offense. On yet another occasion, P. F. received a beating when she brought home a bad school report card. On November 19, 1985, W. T. lost a key to the house which he was given by Ms. Dilligard. Ms. Dilligard had previously told W. T. that if he lost the key, he could be given a beating. That evening, W. T. and his two sisters planned that they would run away from Ms. Dilligard's home the next day. On the morning of November 20, 1985, the three children ran away and went to their aunt's house. After the children left Ms. Dilligard's home, they were interviewed by the child protection team in Dade County and taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital for a medical examination. The physician's report indicated that both P. F. and L. I. had multiple bruises, scratches and abrasions on their legs and back which were non- accidental type injuries consistent with their allegations of physical beatings. Prior to receiving her license to operate a foster home, Ms. Dilligard was specifically advised, during a Foster Parent Training Program, of DHRS' policy that any form of physical punishment in the foster home setting was prohibited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Jeanette Dilligard's license to operate a family foster home be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of January, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1907 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in finding of fact 3. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent (None Submitted) COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Jeanette Dilligard 1751 Northwest 76th Street Miami, Florida 33147 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether denial of Respondent's re-licensure application as a Foster Care Home for the reasons stated in the Department's denial letter of October 30, 2000, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant facts are found: Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. Petitioner, a single male, previously employed with an abused children agency in Broward County, Florida, was granted a foster care parent license by the DCF's Foster Care Licensing unit effective August 10, 1999, through November 10, 1999. A second child specific foster home license for G.K. was issued to Petitioner, effective from March 3, 2000, through August 10, 2000. DCF takes the position that Petitioner is not eligible for re-licensure as a family foster home primarily because he exhibited "poor judgment" relative to a single medical treatment, taking the temperature of an eleven-year-old male foster child through his rectum during the month of August 2000. DCF further alleges that Petitioner has willfully violated specific statutes and rules relating to the conduct and maintenance of the foster home. Those alleged violations are specified in the licensure denial letter dated October 30, 2000, from the DCF to Petitioner. Nicara Daniels is a foster care licensing unit worker with the DCF since November 1999. Ms. Daniels had on-the-job- training and some Professional Development Center Training for new employees. In the licensing unit, Ms. Daniels had training in physical abuse, sexual abuse, drug abuse, and emotional abuse toward children. The DCF used Ms. Daniels to provide testimony regarding each violation as they appeared in the letter of denial. Herein below the allegations are chronologically addressed. Medication and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom. On or about July 31, 2000, a period when Petitioner was licensed, Ms. Daniels, Child Protection Investigator assigned Petitioner, made an unannounced visit to Petitioner's home during a period when Petitioner was medicating himself. During her walk through Petitioner's bedroom she entered his bathroom and saw Petitioner's medication for his diabetes on the bathroom shelf along with several bottles of cooking wines. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she observed the cooking wines in the bathroom. Along with bottles of medication she also observed the lock box in which Petitioner kept his medications and cooking wines when not in use. The door to Petitioner's bedroom and bathroom each had operative locks on them. Ms. Daniels knew that Petitioner took medication for his diabetic condition prior to this inspection and she acknowledged having no experience with the use of cooking wines. Rule 65C-13.011(14)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, requires all medication, poisonous chemicals, and cleaning materials to be in a locked place and inaccessible to children, and that alcoholic beverages should be stored out of the reach of small children; with the recommendation that these beverages be kept in a locked place. Ms. Daniels admitted that for the children, all of whom were 11 years or older, to have access to the medication or cooking wines, they must enter the bedroom, go into the bathroom and open the lock box. There is no evidence presented of any foster care child having access to Petitioner's bedroom, bathroom or the locked medicine box at any time. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's testimony that she knew Petitioner was on medication. Ms. Daniels, however, never questioned the children whether they entered or attempted to enter Petitioner's bedroom at any time when he was not present. I find the mere presence of medications and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom, absent other evidence, is not a violation of the cited rule. John Snider in Petitioner's Foster Care home. Ms. Daniels testified that during an early morning visit on an unspecified date in July of 2000, she observed a young man, John Snider, in Petitioner's home. After she advised Mr. Snider had to be screened, Petitioner followed the DCF's process and a screening application for Mr. Snider was submitted to the Department. The Department screened and cleared Mr. Snider and advised Petitioner and Mr. Snider by letter on August 21, 2000. Rule 65C-13.010(4)(g), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the foster care parent notify the department of the presence of such person. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires screening for "all persons that provide respite care in the . . . home on an overnight basis must be screened." Rule 65C-13.009(6)(a)5., Florida Administrative Code, requires a criminal records check for "all persons 18 years and older residing in the . . . home." Petitioner, during a telephone conversation with Ms. Daniels on July 31, 2000, informed her that Broward Juvenile Justice placed Mr. Snider in his home on July 27, 2000. It is Ms. Daniels' opinion that a four-day period between entry and notifying DCF is not reasonable notification. This "unreasonable" delay formed the basis for violation of the cited rule, notwithstanding the particular circumstances. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, which requires "all persons that provide respite care . . . must be screened.” I find Ms. Daniels' opinion that four days is not "reasonable" notification not based upon any protocol, policy or rule of the DCF. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the following. Petitioner informed Ms. Daniels by telephone that there were matters to discuss; however, the discussion took place four days later when Ms. Daniels was available. The Department of Juvenile Justice for Broward County placed Mr. Snider in Petitioner's home. After submitting an application, Mr. Snider was screened and cleared by the DCF. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find Mr. Snider's presence in Petitioner's home, under authority of the Broward County Juvenile Justice unit, and with telephonic notice to the DCF's licensing unit worker four days after entry into the home is not unreasonable, under the circumstances. Home Department's placing of T.J. in Petitioner's Foster Sometime during the first week of August 2000, Robert Mistretta, Department's child protection investigator and T.J.'s initial case worker, removed T.J. from his family and sought overnight foster care for him. Mr. Mistretta, aware of T.J.'s family situation, his medical, physical, emotional, and sexually abusive history sought a foster care home with those factors in mind. The Department's placement unit instructed him to take T.J. to Petitioner's home for an overnight stay. Mr. Mistretta took T.J. to Petitioner's home with the intention of an overnight stay and reassessment of the situation the following morning. After discussion with Petitioner of T.J.'s need for an overnight stay, Petitioner agreed. Mr. Mistretta chose not to provide Petitioner with information regarding T.J.'s medical, social, physical, emotional, or abusive family history. However, Mistretta gave Petitioner the DCF's emergency pager phone number [570-3081] for use during non-working hours and for emergencies should the need arise. Rectal Temperature Taking What had begun as an overnight stay resulted in a permanent placement and on or about August 6 or 7, 2000, T.J. became ill. His illness began during the day and continuing into the night. According to Petitioner, T.J. exhibited symptoms of a cold or flu, including fever, chills and headache. During the night, he was restless, tossing and turning in his sleep. Petitioner, having no medical history on T.J., became concerned about T.J.'s condition. He made several calls to the Department's emergency pager number [570-3081] provided him by Bob Mistretta, without success. Petitioner then attempted to contact Dr. Stuart Grant, a pediatrician, to no avail. Petitioner thereafter attempted to use his MAPP training first aid guide provided by the Department, but found those instructions unclear. Petitioner then sought information concerning fever and temperature taking from the internet. During the night while T.J. was asleep, Petitioner used a rectal thermometer to take T.J.'s temperature, causing him to awaken suddenly, somewhat startled. Petitioner talked with T.J., explained his concerns with his condition and the reason for taking T.J.'s temperature in that fashion. T.J. responded in a positive manner and went back to sleep. The following morning, Petitioner contacted Mistretta and explained what had happened with T.J. the night before. Mistretta took T.J. aside and privately inquired if he understood "good" touching from and "bad" touching. T.J. stated he understood the difference. When asked about Petitioner's manner of touching him while taking his temperature during the night, T.J. affirmed that Petitioner's touching was a "good" touch and not a "bad" touch. Mistretta, based upon his experience working with children who had suffered abuse, accepted T.J.'s response as true. Satisfied that no "bad" touching occurred during the rectal temperature taking process, Mistretta reported the incident to his supervisor, including his conclusion that nothing sexually or abusive had occurred and concluded his report in part as follows: "This case is closed with no indicators. There is no maltreatment that addressed a bad choice of judgment by a caretaker. There are licensing [unit] concerns regarding Mr. Marlowe's choice to use a rectal thermometer on an 11 year old child." (Emphasis Added) Mr. Mistretta testified that his understanding of the sequence of events the night T.J. was ill were: T.J. was running a high fever and had trouble falling asleep. Petitioner tried cold cloths to reduce the fever that, according to Petitioner's monitoring, was getting too high. Since T.J. was having trouble sleeping and once he did sleep, Petitioner thought a rectal thermometer would be best to try not to awaken him, Petitioner chose to use that form of temperature taking. T.J. reacted with a little bit of pain. Based on Petitioner's history of dealing with sexually abused kids, that reaction is not normal. When Petitioner talked with him about what happened, T.J. disclosed his history to Petitioner. In the process of making the decision as to the appropriate treatment, Petitioner consulted with a Johnson and Johnson book and several medical web sites. The documents from the medical web sites were subsequently provided by Petitioner. I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony credible regarding his conversation with Petitioner immediately after the T.J.'s incident. Following the above, Ms. Mistretta, in addition to his duty as T.J.'s caseworker, was also assigned by his supervisor to investigate a hotline abuse report. Mr. Mistretta investigated the alleged abuse narrative report and found no indication of maltreatment. He recommended the hotline abuse report be closed. Upon being presented with the hotline abuse report narrative with suggestions and allegations of sexual abuse, Mr. Mistretta testified: "The information generated in this narrative in the reporter page that has reporter information states that the CPI, Robert Mistretta, told reporter about allegations. So the source of this report is me. The reporters made their own clarifications, answered their own questions regarding some things instead of calling me back to clarity, talked amongst themselves, found out that they didn't like what happened, and some of the narrative is not true. It is blown out of the water, if you would. The narrative was started by a report. When Mr. Marlowe talked to me, I talked to somebody who talked to somebody, who talked to somebody. The next thing you know we have sexual abuse. The narrative is not true. I did not agree with the removal of T.J. (Emphasis Added) I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony on this issue to be consistent and credible. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the testimony of the DCF's other witnesses, none of whom had personal knowledge of the abuse report contents. However, Mr. Mistretta is the only witness with personal knowledge of events acquired in his positions as T.J.'s initial caseworker, his placement agent, the interviewer of T.J. and Petitioner, and the originator of the initial report. I have considered the fact that this incident occurred during the week of August 6-12, 2000. Petitioner's license expired on August 10, 2000. However, the DCF did not remove T.J. from Petitioner's home until September 6, 2000, almost a month later. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' testimony that during Petitioner's unlicensed period, DCF's placement unit continued to place children in Petitioner's home. I have also considered the deposition of Dr. Patricia Buck, M.D., pediatrician and Child Protection Team member for District 14 [Polk, Highland and Hardee counties], who was qualified as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse. After her review of documents provided by DCF and given the circumstances by DCF's counsel and Petitioner, Dr. Buck opined that use of a rectal thermometer would not have been her recommendation, had she been the care provider. According to Dr. Buck, anal temperature taking as a medical procedure is not abuse. Adding that the more medical history one has on a patient, the less likely a mistake in patient treatment. The evidence as a whole, including Mistretta's testimony and Dr. Buck's opinion, is persuasive as it relates to the issue of the circumstances and the "appropriateness" of the rectal temperature taking procedure. Accordingly, the testimony of Ms. Daniels, the licensing unit informs placement and other Department units of those parents who were licensed, parents who were not licensed or parents whose licenses had expired. She recalled attending the staffing meeting regarding the T.J. temperature incident and recalled informing staff that Petitioner was not a licensed foster care home after August 10, 2000. According to Ms. Daniels, placing children in a non-licensed home is not permissible. However, its her testimony that in this case, DCF's placement unit placed children in Petitioner's home during a period of time he was not licensed, and during the time T.J. was in Petitioner's home because of [DCF] "it being in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." In making this finding, I have considered both the DCF's need for foster care beds and its concern for the safety of foster care children. I have also considered the DCF's use of Petitioner's home when they were "in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." Screening of Ms. Scott Regarding the screening of Ms. Scott, Ms. Daniels testified Petitioner informed her that the screening application papers for Ms. Scott were submitted to the Department and had apparently come up missing. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she had no evidence to support her conclusion that Ms. Scott was a respite sitter for Petitioner's foster care children; that she had never checked with the DCF to ascertain whether or not Ms. Scott had been screened. Not inquiring whether Ms. Scott had been screened renders Ms. Daniels' testimony questionable. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's failure to provide the Department with Ms. Scott's application for screening not credible. Unwillingness to Provide Information on Mary Poe At some unspecified date, Ms. Daniels recalled she had a conversation with Petitioner regarding his next door neighbor, Ms. Poe, someone who would "check" on the foster children from time to time when Petitioner was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels did not recall if Ms. Poe entered Petitioner's home or gave the key to the children to enter in the home on days he was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels recalled only that, Petitioner's attitude regarding screening Ms. Poe was "uncooperative" and "defiant." During cross-examination Ms. Daniels could not recall the conversation with Petitioner when she was informed that Petitioner's condominium covenants required the manager to have a key to his apartment in case of emergencies. She did recall that Petitioner told her Ms. Poe was the mother of the condominium manager. Ms. Daniels recalled when she voiced concern with the situation Petitioner retrieved his key from Ms. Poe and returned it to the condominium manager for pick up by the children when they returned from school. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's unwillingness to provide information concerning Mary Poe evasive, inconsistent and not credible. In making the foregone finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's inability to recall facts, dates, times, places, regarding the matter to which she testified. I have considered the fact that Petitioner, when Ms. Daniels voiced concern, corrected the situation by removing the key from Ms. Poe's possession, thereby removing the need for screening by the Department. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' inability to recall facts regarding an incident the DCF considered an intentional refusal by Petitioner to "cooperate" and "communicate" with Department's staff. Confidentiality in Keeping a Life Book on Foster Care Children Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner informed her the foster care children had a computer life book (photo album) website. After being directed to the website by Petitioner and after viewing the website, Ms. Daniels concluded Petitioner had "released" the names and photos of the foster children on the websites. Without providing a rational basis, she testified that keeping required foster child life books in an electronic format is, in and of itself, inappropriate. She further testified that placing the names and photos on the web site violated DCF's rule of confidentiality. Rule 65C.010(1)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code, requires the foster care parent to maintain the children's records which ensures confidentiality for the child and the biological parents. Petitioner maintained that each child made an individual and personal decision to use the computers he made available in his home. To his knowledge each child placed his personal information, name, foster care status, photos, etc., on the web sites during chats and exchange of information with others users in various chat-room conversations. Ms. Daniels never inquired of the foster children whose names and status were found on the book of life web sites to ascertain whether they or Petitioner placed personal information on the web site. I find her testimony on this issue to be questionable, but reliable. In making the foregoing findings, I have considered Ms. Daniels' testimony and the absence of evidence in support thereof. I find Petitioner's testimony that he never divulged any confidential information on the web sites regarding foster children in his care credible, but not persuasive. As the custodial parent, Petitioner has the ultimate responsibility to maintain and protect the confidentiality of the children in his care and under his supervision. Permitting children of divulge personal/confidential and potentially endangering information on the web site is a breach of Petitioner's parental responsibility. Removal of G.K. from medication prescribed by a Doctor DCF alleged that Petitioner removed G.K. from prescribed medication in violation of Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)7.a, Florida Administrative Code, which imposes on the foster parent the responsibility for dispensing the medication as prescribed by the physician and recording the exact amount prescribed. In support of this allegation, the Department offered the testimony of Ms. Daniels. Ms. Daniels, by her admission, had no personal knowledge regarding G.K. and Petitioner's actions with G.K.'s medication. Her testimony was based upon what she had previously read in the file prepared by Stephanie Gardner, DCF's Representative and Petitioner's caseworker before the case reassignment to Ms. Daniels. When Ms. Daniels initially inquired of Petitioner about G.K.'s medication, he informed her that before he discontinued G.K.'s medication, he consulted with a nurse who in turn consulted with the prescribing doctor about the matter. Based on the response received from this consultation he discontinued G.K.'s psychotropic medication. Ms. Daniels based her conclusion of unauthorized discontinuance of medication on her conversations with Ray Mallette, a Department mental health counselor. In his letter to Petitioner, Mr. Mallette stated, in pertinent part: "To my knowledge, G.K. was not taking any psychotropic medication while under my care. Treatment was terminated in June of 1999, by mutual agreement, as no further care needed." Ms. Daniels testified that during her conversations with Mr. Mallette she recalled his stating that he did not authorize discontinuation of G.K.'s medication. Ms. Daniels could not state with any certainty if Mr. Mallette's use of the term "medication" included psychotropic medications or other medications. Petitioner provided Ms. Daniels the name of the Broward County physician with whom Petitioner had conferred through his nurse and who authorized taking G.K. off medication. There is no evidence that Ms. Daniels attempted to verify whether the medical persons provided by Petitioner had given instructions to take G.K. off psychotropic medications. I find Ms. Daniels' testimony on the issue of G.K.'s medication to be incomplete, confused and, not creditable. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Mr. Mallette's letter reflecting that he is not a medical doctor or dentist; therefore, he cannot prescribe nor discontinue a prescribed medication to a patient. I. Use of profanity and general unwillingness to work cooperatively with the Department Rule 65C-13.010(1)(c)1., Florida Administrative Code, requires foster care parents to "work" cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. In support of the above allegations, the DCF offered only the testimony of Ms. Daniels who stated: ". . . [A]lso during a conversation Mr. Marlowe used profanity. As far as [sic] concerned as just being uncooperative and maybe someone being uncooperative meaning there's something else behind it as far as, you know, not one to follow the rules that are set by the Department." I find the above testimony of Ms. Daniels to be vague and questionable. In making the foregoing finding, I have taken into consideration the fact that Ms. Daniels could not recall the date, time, place, words, or the circumstances of her conversation with Petitioner in which the alleged profanity was uttered. I have also taken into consideration the testimony of Ms. Stephanie Gardner, regarding Petitioner's uncooperativeness. Ms. Gardner, acknowledging that she did not know, did not remember nor did she recall; then went on to state: " . . . that at some unknown time and date, Petitioner stated, mentioned or indicated some information about a child or foster child that he had parented before. I don't know if it was Gary or one of the children that were actually at the Broward County at the Outreach Broward facility where he worked, but it was some information, and it was kind of alarming." I find the testimony of Ms. Daniels and the testimony of Ms. Gardner regarding the alleged profanity and regarding alleged uncooperativeness of Petitioner with the DCF questionable. Excluding the foregone evidence, other testimony regarding Petitioner and his conduct addressing matters that are related to those specific issues raised in DCF's denial letter of October 30, 2000, is neither material nor relevant to issues under consideration in this cause and disregarded.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioners, Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, for a family foster home license. 1/
Findings Of Fact Through series of circumstances, the Petitioners in this case--Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, husband and wife--came to know the children of a woman named N. M. 4/ Their priest told them about Nancy and her predicament. A serious drug and alcohol addict, and already the single mother of two boys (J. D., born December 30, 1977, and B. F., born January 7, 1983), each of whom had a different biological father, she was about to have another child by yet another man. The Petitioners were asked to help the family, and they agreed. Shortly after the third child--a girl, N. F., born November 4, 1988-- was released from the hospital, the mother asked the Petitioners to let the family live with them temporarily. Not long afterward, the mother slipped back to her way of abusing drugs and alcohol and left, leaving the children with the Petitioners. For some time, the Petitioners cared for the children without being licensed as a family foster home and without any financial assistance from HRS. Later, in approximately March, 1991, they became licensed as a family foster home for the specific and limited purpose of caring for the children of M. 5/ When it came to the children in their care, the Petitioners generally were very attentive to their needs for food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and they provided very well for the children, following up on all doctor appointments and the like. They were very conscientious in this regard. Generally, they got along well with the children, and the children tended to view them as if they were their real parents. As a result of their involvement with the family, the Petitioners came to know the children's maternal grandparents. While initially the Petitioners got along fairly well with the maternal grandparents, they had the opportunity to form opinions of them based on personal experience and stories related by the children and, later, by the fathers of the two boys. Essentially, the Petitioners thought the maternal grandparents were good grandparents, and they encouraged and cooperated in the maintenance of a relationship between the children and the maternal grandparents. At the same time, they did not perceive the maternal grandparents as a good option for permanent placement of the children. Besides the maternal grandparents' age and limited physical and emotional capabilities, and their lack of interest in being permanently responsible for the children on a full-time basis, the Petitioners also had a concern about what they understood to be the maternal grandfather's drinking habits. Instead, since reunification with the mother did not seem feasible to either the Petitioners or to HRS, the Petitioners felt the best option, at least for the boys, would be to investigate their reunification with their fathers. Along with HRS, the Petitioners were instrumental in locating the fathers of the boys and reestablishing contacts between them and their sons. Along with HRS, they actively encouraged and fostered the strengthening of the relationship between the boys and their fathers and worked with HRS to bring the men into a position to begin to care for their sons permanently on a full-time basis. When the Petitioners became licensed as a child-specific family foster home in approximately March, 1991, they agreed to work within the policies and procedures established by the Department and to accept supervision by a foster care counselor. There was no evidence that they were not supportive of the efforts outlined in the foster care agreement or plan. 6/ But problems between the Petitioners and the maternal grandparents developed between the time of the Petitioners' licensure and September, 1991. The problems got so bad that the HRS counselor assigned to the case had to conduct visitation in his office to ascertain who was causing the problems and how to best resolve them. The problems culminated in the maternal grandparents' ultimatum that they no longer could work with the Petitioners as foster parents and that they wanted the children placed with them, the grandparents. The problems worsened as HRS began to investigate the possibility of placing the children with the grandparents. 7/ The Petitioners were against this and attempted to use their positions as foster parents to thwart HRS efforts in that direction. A senior HRS counselor replaced the initial counselor in an effort to shepherd the grandparent placement, with its attendant visitations. But, although regular visitations by the grandparents was prearranged during the fall of 1991, 8/ the Petitioners consistently raised various obstacles to the grandparent visitations, requiring multiple interventions by the HRS senior counselor and others at HRS. Three times, despite HRS interventions, visitation had to be cancelled. The Petitioners' case was taking such an inordinate amount of time that the HRS senior counselor went to his supervisor for relief. The grandparents felt the need to go to court to have the court establish visitation over the Christmas holidays. A hearing had to be held on or about December 10, 1991, and the court granted the grandparents overnight visitation from December 25 through 30, 1991. On inquiring of the children on their return, the Petitioners believed the grandparents did not properly administer prescribed medications for two of the children and accused the grandparents of child abuse. HRS investigated and found that the grandparents had been in direct telephone communication with two of the children's doctors to resolve a discrepancy between two of their medication prescriptions and had followed the telephone instructions of the doctor in charge of the prescription. In connection with the problems with the grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a clear tendency to try to manipulate the foster care system to their advantage, even unintentionally to the detriment of the interests of the children, and sometimes, out of overzealousness, through use of untruths and half truths. On one occasion, in an attempt to persuade the first HRS counselor not to pursue placement of the children with the grandparents, they told the counselor that an HRS protective services worker had told them that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. In fact, it was the Petitioners who had alleged to the protective services worker that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. On another occasion, to avoid allowing the grandparents to pick up the children for visitation, the Petitioners cited a supposed statute or rule making it illegal for the grandparents to provide transportation for the children. 9/ Once the boy, B. F., lost a hospital pass for use to visit his grandparents because of problems raised by the Petitioners concerning the legality of the grandparents providing transportation for him. In addition to the problems with the maternal grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a certain tendency to take things into their own hands when closer contact and consultation with HRS would have been advisable. Once they made arrangements for one of the boys to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital without consulting with HRS and did not advise the counselor until shortly before admission. To attempt to justify their actions to the HRS counselor, the Petitioner told the counselor that the boy's family therapist strongly favored hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. In fact, the counselor later found that the family therapist only had said that it might become necessary at some point to hospitalize the boy. Once the Petitioner, Charles Wenz, used corporal punishment on one of the boys although he knew it was against HRS policy for operators of a family foster home to use corporal punishment. He explained that, due to the history of the Petitioners' relationship with these children, the Petitioners felt more like parents than foster parents and that he did not think it was appropriate in their case for the usual prohibition against corporal punishment to apply to them. Later, Mr. Wenz had another occasion to use a form of corporal punishment on the other boy. 10/ In January, 1992, the Petitioners applied to renew their "child- specific" license as a family foster home. On or about February 1, 1992, the court placed the children with the maternal grandparents, and the Petitioners converted their application to one for general licensure as a family foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), enter a final order granting the application of Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher for general licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1992.
The Issue The issue at the final hearing was whether the Petitioners met the statutory criteria for licensure as a children's foster home.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, were married in 1969 and have lived together continuously since that time. The Petitioners were previously licensed as foster home parents in the State of Florida and have had children placed in their home. During the summer of 1984, the Petitioners' became interested in adopting six (6) children, aged sixteen (16), fifteen (15), eleven (11), six (6), five (5), and four (4) years old. Because the parental rights of the natural mother had not been finally terminated, the Petitioners were advised by their case worker that they should apply for foster home care licensure. The case worker advised the Petitioners that if they were licensed for foster home care, they would be able to obtain custody of the children pending final termination of the parental rights of the natural mother. Thus, the Petitioners sought licensure to provide foster home care as a step toward ultimately adopting the six (6) children. By application dated November 1, 1984, the Petitioners, Paul and Patricia Burnette, applied for a license to provide foster-family care for children in accordance with the provisions of Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1983). The application provided for Ms. Burnette to indicate whether or not she had been convicted for anything other than a minor traffic violation. Ms. Burnette did not indicate "yes" or "no" on that portion of the form. On October 4, 1983 Patricia Burnette was convicted in the County Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Orange County, Florida of the offense of petit theft. Ms. Burnette was tried by jury and was represented by counsel. She was adjudicated guilty and placed on six (6) months unsupervised probation. Ms. Burnette was further ordered to pay a fine of $150, $15 victims compensation, $7.50 surcharge and $14 court costs within 30 days. She was sentenced to serve ten (10) days in the Orange County jail, suspended on the condition that she complete ten (10) days of alternative community service beginning October 15, 1983. Ms. Burnette was further ordered not to go onto the premises of Albertson's located at 2801 South Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida. Ms. Burnette was represented at trial by Leo A. Jackson, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Jackson informed Patricia Burnette that the judge had withheld adjudication. Mr. Jackson explained to Ms. Burnette that because the judge had withheld adjudication, she was not convicted of the crime. Based on the legal advice received from Mr. Jackson, Ms. Burnette believed that she had not been convicted of the offense of petit larceny. A medical history form was also included as a part of the application for licensure as a children's foster home. On the medical history form, Ms. Burnette responded "no" to the question of whether or not she had or had ever had any back pain. Prior to licensure as a children's foster home, the applicant's are required to be examined by a physician. The physician is required to complete a form entitled "Physicians Report on Adoption Applicants." As a part of completing the form, the physician requests information from the applicant concerning the applicants medical history or previous illnesses. Ms. Burnette was examined by Dr. Din On-Sun, D.O. on October 5, 1984. During the examination, Ms. Burnette did not indicate any prior back pain or any other problems related to her back. On November 10, 1978, Patricia Burnette was involved in an industrial accident and injured her back. Ms. Burnette was paid temporary total disability benefits for a period of 1,200 days and sustained a 3% permanent impairment as a result of the accident. As a result of her injury, Ms. Burnette was on crutches for two (2) years and was told that she would never walk again. Ms. Burnette occasionally still suffers from back pain and must take pain medication. Because of her back injury, Ms. Burnette did not·perform the community service which was ordered as a result of her conviction for petit theft in October 1983. From October 1983 through September 1984, Ms. Burnette continued to advise Ms. Sue Rash (the Alternative Service Coordinator responsible for arranging her community service) that she was unable to perform any community service because she was having considerable trouble with her back and needed back surgery but could not afford it. In September of 1984, MS. Rash arranged a special assignment for MS. Burnette to work approximately 2 hours per day at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory washing glassware and doing "light cleaning up." Ms. Burnette told MS. Rash that she wanted to talk to her doctor before she agreed to do any community service. On September 18, 1984, Ms. Burnette's physician advised Ms. Rash that he didn't think that Ms. Burnette could stand long enough to wash glassware and do clean-up work at the Sand Lake Treatment Plant Laboratory. On October 13, 1984, Ms. Rash sent a letter to the judge who had originally ordered Ms. Burnette to perform the community service. Ms. Rash explained to the judge that Ms. Burnette was still unable to perform her community service and recommended that a different sentence be considered for Ms. Burnette in lieu of community service. At that point, Ms. Rash closed Ms. Burnette's file.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioners' present application for licensure as a children's foster home be VOIDED; and, Petitioners be allowed to submit a new application so that their eligibility for licensure as a children's foster home may be evaluated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services based on full and truthful responses to the inquiries contained therein. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of April, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Whitney, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 N. Diane Holmes, Esquire 209 East Ridgewood Street Orlando, Florida 32803 William "Pete" Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Kathy Bergerson, held a family foster home license for her residence issued by the Children, Youth and Family Program Office of Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. As it relates to the license at issue, Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner in April 1987. In her home, Respondent was responsible for several developmentally disabled children and a developmentally disabled adult. Respondent's mother lives in an apartment adjoining the home and has access to the residence. Respondent's mother is a registered nurse. During the period since the licensure, the several incidents described in the following paragraphs occurred. Because the incidents involved Respondent or her home and the incidents were unexplained, Petitioner became concerned for the safety of the children in Respondent's care. The incidents at issue are as follows: Sometime during 1987 while one of the children was hospitalized, the child was discovered in what appeared to be a drug-induced sleep during a visit by Respondent. No harm to the child was demonstrated from the incident, and Respondent relayed the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Also, sometime in 1987, a housekeeper, provided by Metro-Dade County, allegedly assaulted Respondent's mother while attempting to steal toys and bed sheets from the home. No harm to the children was shown from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Then, early in 1988, Respondent received a delivery of medication which did not contain full amounts of the prescribed contents. The medication was delivered by a representative sent by Petitioner. No harm to the children was proven from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner. In July 1988, a report of the sexual abuse of the developmentally disabled adult living with Respondent was filed with Petitioner. The final disposition of the incident was not shown; however, neither Respondent nor Respondent's mother were classified as perpetrators of the alleged abuse. In September 1988, a child under Respondent's care, and custody was hospitalized after she became, untypically, lethargic and unresponsive when Respondent gave the child a dose of Panadol for her fever. Fearing that the child was allergic to the medicine, Respondent brought the bottle from which she had administered the medicine with them to the hospital, and reported her fear to the medical personnel at the hospital and to Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserted that the bottle of medicine was tested for its contents, the proof failed to demonstrate that a test was performed or the results of any such test. Respondent kept the medication for the children in a locked cabinet in her kitchen. Included in the drugs in the cabinet were Panadol, Valium and Benedryl. In addition to Respondent, Respondent's mother and nurses provided by Petitioner, on occasion, had access to the cabinet. While Petitioner contended that the Panadol given to the child was adulterated with Valium and Benedryl, the proof failed to indicate that the Panadol was altered, or that the child suffered from the ingestion of the medication. Petitioner asserted that it was unusual for a foster parent, such as Respondent, to have as many unexplained events reported within an almost two- year period. Therefore, based on the above incidents and what Petitioner perceived to be a pattern of unexplained incidents involving Respondent and her home, and after ordering a psychological evaluation of Respondent and her mother, Petitioner issued its notice of intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license on February 14, 1989. Petitioner alleged that Respondent was not capable of handling the stresses associated with maintaining a family foster home. At the hearing Respondent demonstrated a tendency to become overly excited; however, the proof failed to demonstrate that she is unable to handle the stresses of her life. Respondent is a caring person who has an obvious interest and concern for the children in her charge. She expressed deep concern over each of the incidents recited above and, in fact, reported the majority of the incidents to Petitioner. Although the incidents described above generate concern, was not shown that the safety of the clients was endangered by the incidents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: Recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order withdrawing its intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Park way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December 1989.
The Issue The issue is this case is whether revocation of Respondent's Foster Care license privilege for his past and present conduct, determined by the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter Agency) to be inappropriate, was proper under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. On or about November 5, 1999, the Agency, after Mr. Thibodeau's successful completion of the Agency's evaluation and qualifying procedures, determined Mr. Thibodeau to be of good moral character. At all times material to the application process, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained on each standard application form and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the foster care home application process. Based upon its determination, the Agency granted Provisional Certificate of License, No. 1999-110-002, for Substitute Family Home care privilege to Mr. Thibodeau. Thereafter, the Agency placed three minor children in Mr. Thibodeau's home: two teenaged brothers, David M. and Daniel M., and seven-year-old Steve. After an unspecified period of time together, bonding began to develop between the brothers, Daniel and David, and Mr. Thibodeau. As a result of a mutual agreement, Mr. Thibodeau submitted an adoption application to the Agency to become the adoptive parent of the brothers David M. and Daniel M. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained in the standard application forms and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the adoption application process. Ms. Georgia Alezras, trainer for the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes and Mr. Kelvin Birdsell, family therapist and continuity specialist, made a home-study visit to the Thibodeau residence at some time between early July and August 15, 2000. Mr. Birdsell testified that he confined his conversations to the brothers, David M. and Daniel M. during the visit. Mr. Birdsell further testified that his conversations with the brothers were separate and away from the presence and hearing of Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau, who conversed privately. On July 26, 2000, after Mr. Thibodeau submitted his adoption application, and after the home study visit by Ms. Alezras, the Agency received a confidential telephonic abuse report, Petitioner's exhibit number one.1 The abuse report contains an interpolation of the private conversation between Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau during the earlier home-study visit. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Family Counselor Supervisor, testified that Ms. Georgia Alezras reported her private conversation with Mr. Thibodeau to her Agency supervisors. The Agency's interpolation of the Alezras-Thibodeau conversation formed the factual allegations contained in the Agency's August 18, 2000, revocation letter. Sergeant Hagerty, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, testified that she and Sergeant O'Conner investigated the abuse allegations, consisting solely of the Agency's interpolation of Ms. Alezras' earlier and prior conversation with Mr. Thibodeau, by checking with authorities in Washington and checking with the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) with negative results. The removal of the children from Mr. Thibodeau's home was based upon a joint decision to be safe and take a preventative approach in this matter. Petitioner's exhibit number two, a composite of eight letters, contained a "Closing of Foster Home For Children" report form, with a "foster home closing date" of August 18, 2000, and the caseworker and supervisor's signature on the date of August 22, 2000. The report, under "reason for closing" heading, contains the following comments: [H]is license was revoked because he recently divulged information about his past, that, had we known these facts prior to licensing, would have disqualified him to act as a foster parent---namely, he stated that some years ago he left the state of Washington with an unrelated male child without parental or state permission and lived with him for years under false identification. Ms. Georgia Alezras did not testify. Mr. Thibodeau's testimony is the only evidence of the private conversation with Ms. Alezras. Mr. Thibodeau's recollection of his responses to Ms. Alezras' questions was: [I]n 1975 he moved to the State of Washington; in 1976-77 he met Daniel L.; in 1976-77 he left the State of Washington and moved with Daniel to Pennsylvania where Daniel enrolled in school using his Washington school records; Daniel's mother visited them in Pennsylvania and maintained contact by telephone; Daniel, at age nineteen returned to Washington. He used a friend's birth certificate to secure his Pennsylvania driver's license. His video business2 considerations were subsequently dismissed and he advised the Agency of his decision by letter to his caseworker. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Agency Representative, testified that one member of every MAPP team always asks a general, catchall question of every [foster care parent] applicant: "Is there anything else we need to know [about you], please tell us, [because] we will probably find out?" Ms. Olsen's candor and purpose comes into question on this point. She was not present during the Alezras-Thibodeau private conversation. Ms. Olsen does not know the identity of the team member who would have asked her catchall question nor does she know of a rule, guideline, or checklist requiring that specific question to be asked of every foster care license applicant, and there was no corroboration of her testimony. The Agency presented no evidence in support of its allegation that during the application process, its failure to inquire and Mr. Thibodeau's failure to disclose activities 20 years earlier in his life resulted from negligence or from the malicious intent of Mr. Thibodeau, and materially affect the health and safety of the minor children in his foster care. The Agency has failed to establish that Mr. Thibodeau left Washington with an unrelated minor child without parental consent and obtained false identification for the child. While it is true that Mr. Thibodeau "left Washington with an unrelated minor child," the Agency produced no evidence that his leaving was "without [minor child's] parental consent." Agency's investigators were unable to make contact with either the child or his mother. No investigation was made of the State of Washington's Motor Vehicle Department. No contact was made with the Pennsylvania authorities. Assuming argunendo, the Agency intended upon establishing this element by "an admission by Mr. Thibodeau"; they presented no evidence Mr. Thibodeau, in fact, uttered words to the effect of or acknowledged the comment "without parental consent." The undisputed evidence is Mr. Thibodeau's testimony that the minor child's mother not only approved of the child leaving Washington with him, but she also visited them in Pennsylvania and had telephone conversations with her child during his stay there. On this issue the Agency failed to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Thibodeau admitted his use of another's birth certificate to secure a Pennsylvania driver's license more than 20 years ago. Since that time, Mr. Thibodeau's conduct, foster care parenting skills, helping problem young boys, and good moral conduct has been, as testified by the several witnesses, exemplary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating to Stanley Thibodeau his foster care home license privilege. DONE AND ENTERED 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent Marie Smith has committed an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of children for whom she operated as a "medical foster care" parent or provider.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Marie Smith, was first licensed in 1992, as a foster care parent by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, since re-named the Department of Children and Family Services. In 1996 she became a qualified medical foster parent, authorized to keep children with special medical problems. The Respondent received special training to become a medical foster parent from Children's Medical Services, a unit of the Department of Health, which oversees the progress of children placed in medical foster care. Some of the training the Respondent received concerned a child, T.B. It involved the use of the medication Flovent, which is used to treat asthma and other bronchial conditions. Flovent is dispensed in a small aerosol container and is administered by use of an inhaler. The training which the Respondent received includes the manner in which the person administering Flovent can ascertain when the container is empty and no longer usable. In connection with the Respondent's training as a medical foster parent, Ms. Smith was also instructed in the importance of giving all medications as prescribed and in how to document administration of medications. Through training and practice she learned to execute forms provided by Children's Medical Services (CMS) called treatment records and medication records, in which were logged each dose of medication given. Although not connected with her training as a foster parent, she also received ninety hours in classroom instruction which resulted in her being certified as a pharmacy technician by the State of Florida. On July 29, 1996, the child D.P. was born. D.P. and his twin brother were placed in Ms. Smith's foster home in October 1996. D.P. lived with Ms. Smith continuously until he was removed from the home in March 1999. In July 1998, D.P. was diagnosed as having bronchiolitis, a chronic inflammation of the bronchial passages of the lungs, later identified as asthma. In order to treat this condition he was prescribed Flovent. The purpose of the medication was to reduce the frequency of exacerbations or "asthma attacks." The medication was not designed to alleviate attacks already in progress, but to prevent future attacks. The medication is only effective if given as prescribed over an extended period of time. If Flovent is not administered as prescribed over a period of time the patient may suffer an increased incidence of asthma. The failure to take preventive steps can result in long-term damage to the lungs according to Dr. Bailey. Ms. Smith filled the first prescription for Flovent at Smith's Pharmacy on July 9, 1998. Only one container of Flovent was dispensed on that occasion. A container of Flovent contains an advertised one hundred and twenty (120) metered actuations or "puffs." The literature inserted into every package contains a warning to the user to use the number of actuations, one hundred and twenty, indicated on the box because the correct amount of medicine in each puff cannot be guaranteed after that point. D.P.'s prescription required him to receive two puffs per day, once in the morning and once in the evening. Since the label on the container itself stated that there were only one hundred and twenty puffs per canister, the first container was due to be replaced after sixty days of use at two puffs per day. Notwithstanding this fact, the prescription was not refilled until October 16, 1998, or ninety-eight days after the first container was obtained. Thus, for a period of thirty- eight days, D.P. either received no dose at all, or potentially received an inadequate dose of medicine. An actual test of a full canister of Flovent was conducted at the hearing. That revealed that one could get approximately one hundred and fifty- seven puffs from a canister before it is empty. However, the literature which comes with the medication makes it clear that a user cannot depend on the adequacy of the dosage after one hundred and twenty puffs. Thus, even if Ms. Smith could have dispensed one hundred and sixty puffs from a canister, and if she maintained that she was administering two puffs per day, she would have run out of the medication after no more than eighty days. Ninety-eight days elapsed however, between the filling of the prescription and the first refill which was obtained in October 1998. Even under Ms. Smith's description of the dosing and administering of the medication, D.P. either had to have gone without his medication for some days or was receiving a less-than-standard amount in order for the medication to last as long as she maintained it did (i.e., possibly one puff per day). Ms. Smith maintained that she actually obtained two packages of Flovent from the pharmacy rather than one on October 16, 1998. The pharmacy records, however, show only one container being dispensed both in July and in October. Those records were made contemporaneously with the receipt and filling of the prescription. The pharmacist and pharmacy technician each double-check the work of the other. Thus if Ms. Smith had obtained double the amount of medication, both the pharmacist and the pharmacy technician would have had to make the same error at the same time, which is improbable. Moreover, there is no label on the extra box taped to the box dispensed on October 16, 1998. It is not the practice of the Smith Pharmacy to tape such boxes together or to label only one box. In any event, on October 16, 1998, Ms. Smith got the prescription refilled. On that day she picked up one container of Flovent. The prescription had not changed at that point so D.P. was still supposed to receive two puffs per day, so the container should have been replaced after sixty days. In view of the fact that Ms. Smith was keeping T.B., another child at the same time she provided foster care for D.P., and since T.B. also had a prescription for Flovent, it has not been established that Ms. Smith could have only gotten an extra Flovent box from the pharmacy, with the boxes containing the two canisters taped together and dispensed together on October 16, 1998. She could have simply used T.B.'s prescription box. The prescription obtained on October 16, 1998, was not re-filled again until March 10, 1999. A period of one hundred and forty-five days had thus passed before a new container was obtained. The test performed at hearing showed that as much as one hundred and fifty-six to one hundred and sixty puffs are contained in such a canister and therefore the medication might have lasted the one hundred and forty-five days. However, if the manufacturer's warning or instruction on the literature supplied with the canister is to be believed, after one hundred and twenty puffs had been dispensed (a sixty-day supply) then less medication might be dispensed with each puff thereafter. Since one hundred and forty-five days elapsed before a new prescription and container of medicine was obtained, D.P. may have failed to received one hundred and seventy doses of medicine over a period of five months. This could clearly have resulted in a worsening of D.P.'s condition. Moreover, Ms. Smith incorrectly documented the administration of the Flovent as though she were in fact giving the medication twice per day as prescribed. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 in evidence. The testimony of the witnesses employed with the CMS who oversee the care for children in medical foster care uniformly found that the Respondent provided good care and they never saw any evidence that medical care for the child D.P. was neglected. In fact, Dr. Samir Ebbeid, a pediatric cardiologist who treated the child from October 1996 through April of 1999, found that the Respondent uniformly complied with his instructions about care for the child and thought that the care of the child by the Respondent between the visits to his office was appropriate. In fact he found that the child improved while under the Respondent's care and that there was no reason to believe that the child's medical care under the care of Ms. Smith, the Respondent, was ever neglected. The child's asthmatic condition actually improved during the time he was under the Respondent's medical foster care.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services suspending the foster care license of Marie Smith for a period of ninety days, during which time she should undertake an approved course of instruction concerning the proper administration and record-keeping of administration of prescription drugs for children in her care. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Room 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Richard D. Ogburn, Esquire Post Office Box 923 Panama City, Florida 32402 Samuel C. Chavers, Acting Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) may revoke Respondent's family foster care license due to her continued contact with her husband after he was convicted of sexual molestation of their teen-aged daughter.
Findings Of Fact Lila and Charles Dean were licensed foster parents from 1986 through 1991, when they adopted their daughter who was then six years old. The couple subsequently had two natural daughters. In January 2001, the 16-year-old adopted daughter reported that Charles Dean had been sexually abusing her for approximately two years. Lila Dean immediately had Charles Dean move out of the family home. She has been consistently supportive of their daughter and went with her through the whole abuse and rehabilitation system. Charles Dean was convicted in 2001 of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and is a registered sex offender. Lila Dean has been separated from Charles Dean since January 2001, but she has not filed for divorce. On March 13, 2002, Lila Dean was relicensed by DCF as a family foster parent. George Payne, DCF Family Counselor III, testified that during the family foster home re-licensing process prior to March 13, 2002, Lila Dean admitted to him that she was seeing her husband away from the home once every two or three months to discuss child support, insurance, etc., and that he had no contact with the children. She also admitted that with the permission of his probation officer, Charles Dean had come to the home, while the children were at school, to make needed repairs. At Mr. Payne's urging, she promised to get someone else to make any future repairs. The licensing process took eleven months because of DCF's concerns about Mrs. Dean's contacts with her husband, but DCF licensed her individually on March 13, 2002, because of her previous excellent record as a foster parent in another district supervised by Mr. Payne from 1985 to 1989. On May 13, 2002, upon receiving an abuse report that Mrs. Dean had been having regular contacts with her husband; that Mrs. Dean had made comments in the community that Mr. Dean's sexual abuse was not that serious because the girl was his adopted, not his biological child; and that Mrs. Dean had spoken on Mr. Dean's behalf requesting that he be spared a prison sentence, DCF removed the two non-verbal, toddler, foster children who were then in Mrs. Dean's foster care and instituted a further abuse investigation. After the abuse report had been received regarding Mrs. Dean's 2002 contacts with her husband, she told Mr. Payne that she was not looking for a relationship with any other men because they might want a sexual relationship with her, but that sex was not an issue with her husband, so she felt comfortable with him. The abuse report, which related the couple's more frequent contacts, suggests the family is "working toward reconciliation," something Mrs. Dean has denied to Mr. Payne. The abuse report verifies the old abuse information as to the adopted daughter. It does not verify the tipster's allegation that Mrs. Dean does not view Mr. Dean's molestation of their adopted daughter as less serious than it would have been with a natural daughter. There is no direct testimony or otherwise reliable evidence on this issue, on the issue of whether or not she has spoken publicly on his behalf, or on the issue of whether or not a reconciliation is anticipated. There is no evidence that Charles Dean has been in the home since Lila Dean was relicensed. DCF sent a license revocation letter to Mrs. Dean after becoming aware of the increasing frequency of her contacts with her husband. The basis for revocation was given as: . . . pursuant to Section 409.175(8)(b)3. [now Section 409.175(9)(b)3] Florida Statutes, because your continued and repeated contacts with Charles Dean are inconsistent and incompatible with your role as a foster parent. It is not in the best interests of vulnerable foster children to be placed with a foster parent who considers it appropriate to have a relationship with a registered sex offender. [Clarification of statutory citation agreed-to and supplied]. Mr. Payne was unaware of any DCF rules Mrs. Dean broke by having contact with her husband. Mr. Payne has no indication that any children, natural or foster, were at greater risk post-licensing than pre- licensing due to Mr. And Mrs. Dean's increased contact. DCF cannot constantly monitor a foster parent to ensure that the children in her care are not placed at risk by her personal associations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating the family foster home license of Lila Dean and specifically limiting any appearance on the foster home premises by Charles Dean. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert Vest, Esquire 613 St. Johns Avenue Suite 212 Post Office Box 2525 Palatka, Florida 32177 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing licenses to operate foster homes for dependent children. Petitioner also prosecutes license discipline proceedings. Respondent is the maternal aunt of three female children, Deanna, Angelique, and Antoinette. Respondent is a retired teacher. She worked for the state of New York before she moved to Florida. She also receives Social Security payments. Prior to 1990, Respondent's three nieces lived with their biological parents in the state of New York. New York adjudicated the children dependent and assigned the children to the foster care of Respondent. The three nieces were approximately 5, 7, an 8 years old. New York paid Respondent $2,100 a month to provide foster care for the three children. New York pays a monthly board rate of $700 per child. Petitioner agreed to supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. On March 12, 1992, Petitioner and Respondent entered into an Agreement To Provide Foster Care For Dependent Children ("Foster Care Agreement"). Each Foster Care Agreement provided, in relevant part: We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s) . . . without the consent of a representative of the Department. * * * We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, . . . living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster care home as prescribed by the Department. * * * This child is placed in our home on a temporary basis and is at all times under the supervision and control of the Department. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. We will take no action to acquire legal custody or guardianship of the child. * * * The Department may remove the child from our home at any time but will, whenever possible, give us at least two weeks notice. Until May 2, 1995, Respondent provided foster care for her three nieces without incident. Respondent was a loving and caring foster parent while the children were young. The children regarded Respondent as their mother. On April 25, 1995, Petitioner increased Respondent's licensed capacity for the period May 2, 1995, through May 1, 1996, to five children. Petitioner assigned two Florida foster children to Respondent. Petitioner paid Respondent $592 a month to provide foster care for the two Florida children. Florida pays a monthly board rate of $296 for each child. Problems developed in the foster home due to overcrowding. Tiffany, one of the two Florida foster children, had an infant child. Tiffany did not maintain good hygiene for herself or her child. Tiffany neglected her child. The additional parenting responsibilities fell on Respondent. Petitioner reduced the overcrowding by removing the two Florida foster children. Petitioner removed Tiffany and her child on December 8, 1995, and removed the second foster care child as soon as the school year ended. Other problems persisted in the foster home separate and apart from the problem of overcrowding. The three nieces were growing up and were beginning to manifest problems from unresolved childhood issues. Each niece had unresolved issues that presented very difficult parenting problems. As the nieces grew older, Respondent did not have the parenting skills necessary to parent her three nieces. Deanna's unresolved issues are illustrative. Deanna weighed under four pounds at birth. The mother was a cocaine addict throughout the gestational period. There was some fetal distress related to withdrawal. Deanna was always irritable. She had a very low frustration tolerance. She had frequent tantrums in which she would throw, spit, and hit her siblings and Respondent. Deanna had been treated with various medications. They included Ritalin, Depakote, Dexedrine, and Clonidine. The other two nieces presented Respondent with similar parenting problems. They hit Respondent when they did not get their way, frequently lied, and stole items from home and school. The problems presented by the three nieces would have been difficult enough to deal with for the best of parents. However, Respondent practiced inappropriate parenting techniques. Respondent used excessive corporal punishment to discipline all of her foster children. She practiced humiliation tactics on her oldest niece. Respondent gave preferential treatment to the youngest niece. Respondent arbitrarily allowed the youngest niece to have privileges denied to the other nieces. Respondent routinely gave the youngest niece excessive amounts of money for nominal tasks. For example, Respondent paid the youngest niece $100 for two hours work around the house. Respondent manages her own money poorly. Her income is insufficient to cover her expenditures. She is evasive and vague about her finances. Respondent became depressed and withdrawn. She remained non-verbal with lengthy periods of silence. She stared at the wall. When counselors and case workers confronted Respondent regarding her depression, she became very angry and agitated. She retreated into denial and relied on adolescent responses to distance herself from those trying to help her and her nieces. Petitioner conducted a critical case review on June 28, 1996. Petitioner provided numerous intervention services for Respondent and her nieces from July through November, 1996. Petitioner provided counseling through The Harbor Mental Health Services ("Harbor"). Respondent and her three nieces attended group therapy at Harbor. In addition, each niece participated in individual counseling at Harbor. Petitioner provided an Intensive Crisis Counseling Program ("ICCP") for Respondent. ICCP is an intense in-home counseling program over six weeks. It is designed to prevent removal of foster children from the home. Petitioner extended the ICCP in Respondent's home for an additional six weeks. Petitioner provided psychological evaluations to determine if Respondent was suicidal or suffered from alcoholism. The evaluations found no evidence of either problem. Therapists attempted to assist the individual family members toward effective communication, establishing boundaries, reasonable consequences, and consistent discipline. The intervention services provided by Petitioner were unsuccessful. Respondent and her nieces persisted in their inappropriate behavior. Petitioner issued a provisional license to Respondent for the period August 2, 1996, through November 2, 1996. The license required weekly visits by a foster care counselor. Petitioner conducted a routine home visit on September 26, 1996. The situation had not improved. On October 4, 1996, Petitioner conducted another critical case review. At the critical case review, the foster care counselor learned from members of the ICCP team that Respondent planned to leave Florida to visit New York. On October 10, 1996, the foster care counselor telephoned Respondent. Respondent confirmed that she was leaving for New York on October 11, 1996. When the foster care counselor asked Respondent to provide the location of her three nieces and the identity of the respite caregiver during Respondent's absence, Respondent stated only that she was leaving the nieces with her mother. Respondent told the foster care counselor that if Petitioner wanted to see her nieces while Respondent was in New York, the foster care counselor should telephone Respondent's home and leave a message on Respondent's voice mail. Respondent's mother would check the messages each day and return the case worker's telephone call. Respondent's manner and tone were abrupt, cryptic, abrasive, and angry. The foster care counselor was unable to obtain any further information. Respondent terminated the telephone call. Respondent violated several requirements of each Foster Care Agreement. Respondent allowed the removal of each niece from her home by someone other than Petitioner's representatives. Respondent gave each foster child into the care or physical custody of another without the consent of Petitioner. Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with adequate notice of any change in the living arrangements or family composition of the foster children. Respondent's mother was not, and never has been, an authorized foster care parent or respite caregiver. Respondent did not consent to Respondent giving her nieces to the physical care and custody of Respondent's mother. Respondent did not give Petitioner the information needed for Petitioner to adequately supervise the foster children during Respondent's absence. Petitioner determined that it could no longer supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. Petitioner ascertained the location of the foster children. On October 17, 1996, Petitioner removed the nieces from the home of Respondent's mother. Petitioner returned the nieces to the appropriate authorities in New York. By letter dated, October 17, 1996, Petitioner notified Respondent of the action taken. The letter also notified Respondent that the foster care home was closed and that Respondent's license was being revoked.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating material provisions of the Foster Care Agreement for each of her three nieces, failing to effectively supervise and safeguard her foster home, and revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster care home for dependent children. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire District 13 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Patricia Genovese Qualified Representative 13140 Jessica Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Yvonne B. Butler, Esquire 6341 Gainsboro Avenue Spring Hill, Florida 34609
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be denied on the basis that the abuse registry examined during the re-licensure process disclosed a verified finding of abandonment of a child, recorded against the Petitioners as perpetrators, under authority of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners were licensed as a foster home and sometime in the latter part of 1999, their licensure came due for renewal. They were advised by a denial letter dated October 8, 1999, from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), that their home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. The initial agency decision to this effect was because the Petitioners, or at least Mr. Barnes, had an entry on the Department's abuse registry indicating a verified finding of abandonment against the Petitioners. The finding of abandonment involved the Petitioners' adopted son, D.B., being left at the office of the Department's foster care staff. Apparently the Barnes had had a great deal of trouble with D.B.'s behavior and had been unable to constructively discipline him and improve his behavior. This apparently made them very frustrated such that on March 26, 1999, Mr. Barnes called the Department regarding D.B., to inform the Department that they were simply unable to handle the child. Mr. Barnes talked to James Grant, supervisor of the foster care unit in the Department's Ocala office, and a witness for the Department in this case. Mr. Grant offered to provide assistance to the family to help resolve the issues between the Petitioners and their child. That offer of assistance was refused, however. Later that day, Mr. Barnes took D.B. to the Ocala offices of the Department's foster care unit and apparently left him sitting in the lobby of the building which houses the foster care staff. Mr. Barnes did not speak to Mr. Grant or anyone else in a responsible position before leaving the building and permanently abandoning the child. He only informed the receptionist that he was leaving the child. Because of the Petitioners' actions in leaving the child sitting in the lobby, a call was placed to the abuse hotline that same day. Joanne Hunter was assigned as the investigator of the abuse report. According to the final report of the investigation that was admitted into evidence, the case was closed with a verified indication of abandonment and neglect, the result of D.B. being abandoned in the Department's lobby. On March 27, 1999, a shelter hearing was held before a circuit judge and D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department due to the Petitioner's act of abandonment at the Department's office. Subsequently, the child was adjudicated dependent and placed in a long-term foster care placement. The child remained in that foster care placement at the time of the instant hearing. Certified copies of the judge's shelter order and the order of adjudication and disposition have been entered into evidence in this case. Prior to their adoption by the Petitioners, D.B. and his two siblings had been abused and neglected by their natural parents. They had, therefore, been placed in foster care by the Department. D.B.'s natural parents' parental rights had been terminated because of the uncorrected and continuing abuse and neglect of D.B. and his two siblings. The Petitioners had adopted D.B. and his two siblings. Children who have been abused and neglected or abandoned by their parents are especially vulnerable and require the greatest degree of stability in their home life that is possible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the re-licensure of the Petitioners as a licensed family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Billie and Willie Mae Barnes 15606 Southwest 27th Avenue Road Ocala, Florida 34473 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 43785 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
