Findings Of Fact Harper Close was born on June 5, 2017, at Bayfront Health Port Charlotte in Port Charlotte, Florida. Donald Willis, M.D., an obstetrician specializing in maternal-fetal medicine, was requested by NICA to review the medical records of Harper Close, and her mother, Danielle Angelo, and to opine whether an injury occurred in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period at Bayfront Health Port Charlotte due to oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. In a report dated December 30, 2017, Dr. Willis described his findings in pertinent part as follows: In summary: The prenatal course was essentially benign. The mother presented in labor at term. Vacuum delivery was done for fetal tachycardia and variable. FHR decelerations. The baby was not depressed at birth. Apgar scores were 7/9 without the need for resuscitation. Cord blood gas (venous) had a pH of 7.23, suggesting the baby was not hypoxic or acidotic during labor and delivery. The baby was stable enough to remain with the mother until about 30 minutes after birth. This would be consistent with no oxygen deprivation during the immediate post-delivery period. After the post- delivery period, respiratory distress developed and MAS was diagnosed. A complicated newborn hospital course followed. Fortunately, head ultrasound and MRI did not have findings suggestive of HIE or brain injury. There was no apparent obstetrical event that resulted in loss of oxygen or mechanical trauma to the baby’s brain or spinal cord during labor, delivery or the immediate post- delivery period. Respiratory distress due to meconium aspiration syndrome became apparent after the post-delivery and resulted in a complicated newborn hospital course. Attached to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Final Order is the affidavit of Dr. Willis, dated February 22, 2018. In his affidavit, Dr. Willis affirms the findings in his above-quoted report and maintains that his opinions are within a reasonable degree of medical probability. NICA also retained Michael S. Duchowny, M.D., a pediatric neurologist, to review Harper Close and Danielle Angelo’s medical records, conduct an Independent Medical Examination of Harper Close, and opine as to whether Harper Close suffers from a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment as a result of a birth-related neurological injury. Dr. Duchowny reviewed the medical records, obtained historical information from Robert Close and Danielle Angelo, and performed an evaluation on February 7, 2018. In a report authored after the neurological evaluation, Dr. Duchowny summarized his findings, in pertinent part, as follows: In SUMMARY, Harper’s neurological examination today reveals no specific focal or lateralized findings. She is developing on schedule. A review of medical records confirms history provided by the family. Harper had prominent respiratory failure and went into shock due to meconium aspiration syndrome. She was anuric for the first 2 days of life and treated aggressively for hypertension. Blood pressure was maintained on dopamine and dobutamine and she additionally received vasopressin and corticosteroid therapy. A head ultrasound on June 5 was within normal limits and an MRI scan of the brain performed on June 19, 2017 revealed a right posterior parietal cephalhematoma with a “cystic left basal ganglia.” Today’s evaluation does not reveal either of a substantial mental or motor impairment. Harper has done well following meconium aspiration syndrome and I believe that she will continue to develop normally. I am not recommending Harper for inclusion within the NICA program. Respondent’s Motion for Summary Final Order also relies upon the attached affidavit from Dr. Duchowny, dated February 20, 2018. In his affidavit, he affirms his findings contained in his report and opines, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that Harper Close has not sustained either a substantial mental or physical impairment, and opines that he believes she will continue to develop normally. A review of the file reveals that no contrary evidence was presented to dispute the findings and opinions of Dr. Willis and Dr. Duchowny. Their opinions are credited.
The Issue At issue is whether Christopher White-Maldonado, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary findings Petitioner, Susanna Maldonado, is the natural mother and guardian of Christopher White-Maldonado, a minor. Christopher was born a live infant on January 1, 2000, at Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Hospital, a hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Christopher's birth was Virgil Davila, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, the medical records and the results of a neurological examination by Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, and clinical neurophysiology, demonstrate, and Petitioner agrees, that Christopher does not suffer from a substantial mental or physical impairment, much less a permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment, as required for coverage under the Plan.1 (Respondent's Exhibits 1-7, Transcript page 10 and 11). Consequently, the claim is not compensable, and it is unnecessary to resolve whether Christopher's impairments resulted from brain injury caused by birth trauma (oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury), as advocated by Petitioner, or whether they are developmentally based, as advocated by Respondent.
The Issue Whether Isabelle Dianderas, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, whether the hospital and the participating physician gave the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to compensability Maribenny Dianderas and Arturo Dianderas are the natural parents and guardians of Isabelle Dianderas, a minor. Isabelle was born a live infant on October 8, 2002, at Florida Hospital, a hospital located in Orlando, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth was Natasha M. Knight, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Here, the proof is compelling, and uncontroverted, that Isabelle suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital that rendered her permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. (Joint Exhibits 1-4; Transcript, pages 125-145). Consequently, the record demonstrated that Isabelle suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" and, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The notice issue While the claim qualifies for coverage under the Plan, Petitioners would prefer to pursue their civil remedies, and avoid a claim of Plan immunity by the healthcare providers in a civil action. Therefore, Petitioners have averred, and requested a finding that, the hospital and the participating physician who delivered obstetrical services at Isabelle's birth, failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Plan. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)("[A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery.") Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied.1 The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, defines "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions[2] or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). The NICA brochure Responding to Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, NICA developed a brochure (as the "form" prescribed by the Plan), titled "Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem" (the NICA brochure), which contained an explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the Plan, and distributed the brochure to participating physicians and hospitals so they could furnish a copy of it to their obstetrical patients. (Joint Exhibit 5). Pertinent to this case, the NICA brochure applicable to Mrs. Dianderas' prenatal care and Isabelle's birth provided: The birth of a baby is an exciting and happy time. You have every reason to expect that the birth will be normal and that both mother and child will go home healthy and happy. Unfortunately, despite the skill and dedication of doctors and hospitals, complications during birth sometimes occur. Perhaps the worst complication is one which results in damage to the newborn's nervous system - called a "neurological injury." Such an injury may be catastrophic, physically, financially and emotionally. In an effort to deal with this serious problem, the Florida Legislature, in 1988, passed a law which created a Plan that offers an alternative to lengthy malpractice litigation processes brought about when a child suffers a qualifying neurological injury at birth. The law created the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA). EXCLUSIVE REMEDY The law provides that awards under the Plan are exclusive. This means that if an injury is covered by the Plan, the child and its family are not entitled to compensation through malpractice lawsuits. CRITERIA AND COVERAGE Birth-related neurological injuries have been defined as an injury to the spinal cord or brain of a live-born infant weighing at least 2500 grams at birth. In the case of multiple gestation, the live birth weight is 2000 grams for each infant. The injury must have been caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury, which occurred in the course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post delivery period in a hospital. Only hospital births are covered. The injury must have rendered the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. The legislation does not apply to genetic or congenital abnormalities. Only injuries to infants delivered by participating physicians, as defined in s. 766.302(7), Florida Statutes, are covered by the Plan. COMPENSATION Compensation may be provided for the following: Actual expenses for necessary and reasonable care, services, drugs, equipment, facilities and travel, excluding expenses that can be compensated by state or federal government or by private insurers. In addition, an award, not to exceed $100,000 to the infant's parents or guardians. Funeral expenses are authorized up to $1,500. Reasonable expenses for filing the claim, including attorney's fees. NICA is one of only two (2) such programs in the nation, and is devoted to managing a fund that provides compensation to parents whose child may suffer a qualifying birth-related neurological injury. The Plan takes the "No-Fault" approach for all parties involved. This means that no costly litigation is required and the parents of a child qualifying under the law who file a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings may have all actual expenses for medical and hospital care paid by the Plan. You are eligible for this protection if your doctor is a participating physician in the NICA Plan. If your doctor is a participating physician, that means that your doctor has purchased this benefit for you in the event that your child should suffer a birth-related neurological injury, which qualifies under the law. If your health care provider has provided you with a copy of this informational form, your health care provider is placing you on notice that one or more physician(s) at your health care provider participates in the NICA Plan. (Joint Exhibit 5). Here, Petitioners contend the brochure prepared by NICA was insufficient to satisfy the notice provision of the Plan (which requires that the form "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan"), because it failed to include an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. (Transcript, pages 11-13). However, neither Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997), the authority relied upon by Petitioners, nor the notice provision of the Plan, place such an obligation on NICA in the formulation of the brochure. In Galen, supra, the Court had for consideration the following question certified to be of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 766.316, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), REQUIRES THAT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS GIVE THEIR OBSTETRICAL PATIENTS PRE-DELIVERY NOTICE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PLAN AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE PROVIDERS' INVOKING NICA AS THE PATIENTS' EXCLUSIVE REMEDY? Id. at 308. In answer to the certified question, the Court held: . . . as a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery. Id. at 309. The Court reasoned, as follows: Section 766.316 provides in pertinent part: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients thereof as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth- related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. Without exception the district courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have read section 766.316 to require pre-delivery notice . . . . We agree with the district courts that the only logical reading of the statute is that before an obstetrical patient's remedy is limited by the NICA plan, the patient must be given pre-delivery notice of the health care provider's participation in the plan. Section 766.316 requires that obstetrical patients be given notice "as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries." That notice must "include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan." § 766.316. This language makes clear that the purpose of the notice is to give an obstetrical patient an opportunity to make an informed choice between using a health care provider participating in the NICA plan or using a provider who is not a participant and thereby preserving her civil remedies. Turner v. Hubrich, 656 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In order to effectuate this purpose a NICA participant must give a patient notice of the "no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries" a reasonable time prior to delivery, when practicable. Our construction of the statute is supported by its legislative history. Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan was proposed by the 1987 Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems. In its November 6, 1987 report, the Task Force recommended adoption of a no-fault compensation plan for birth-related neurological injuries similar to the then newly enacted Virginia plan (1987 Va. Acts Ch. 540). Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Medical Malpractice Recommendations 31 (Nov. 6, 1987)(hereinafter Task Force Report). However, the Task Force was concerned that the Virginia legislation did not contain a notice requirement and recommended that the Florida plan contain such a requirement. The Task Force believed that notice was necessary to ensure that the plan was fair to obstetrical patients1 and to shield the plan from constitutional challenge.2 The Task Force explained in its report: The Virginia statute does not require participating physicians and hospitals to give notice to obstetrical patients that they are participating in the limited no- fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. The Task Force recommends that health care providers who participate under this plan should be required to provide reasonable notice to patients of their participation. This notice requirement is justified on fairness grounds and arguably may be required in order to assure that the limited no fault alternative is constitutional. Task Force Report at 34 (emphasis added). Since Florida's NICA plan was the result of the Task Force's report, it is only logical to conclude that the plan's notice requirement was included in the Florida legislation as a result of this recommendation and therefore was intended to be a condition precedent to immunity under the plan. * * * Under our reading of the statute, in order to preserve their immune status, NICA participants who are in a position to notify their patients of their participation a reasonable time before delivery simply need to give the notice in a timely manner. In those cases where it is not practicable to notify the patient prior to delivery, pre- delivery notice will not be required. Whether a health care provider was in a position to give a patient pre-delivery notice of participation and whether notice was given a reasonable time before delivery will depend on the circumstances of each case and therefore must be determined on a case-by-case basis . . . . Accordingly, we answer the certified question as explained herein and approve the decision under review. Id. at 309-311. 1 The Task Force obviously believed that because not all health care providers are required to participate in the NICA plan, fairness requires that the patient be made aware that she has limited her common law remedies by choosing a participating provider. 2 The Task Force also must have recognized that failure to require notice would open the plan up to constitutional attack. For example, the Braniffs argue that if pre- delivery notice is not a condition precedent to immunity under the plan, patients will be deprived of their common law remedies without due process. However, because of our resolution of the notice issue, we need not reach the merit of this procedural due process challenge. Notably, the Court was not asked to resolve, and did not resolve, whether the obligation to provide a form that "include[d] a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan," required an explanation of the civil remedies a patient would forego if she chose a participating provider. Moreover, the unambiguous language the Legislature chose evidences no such intention. Rather, the Plan requires that the form "include a clear ['[f]ree from doubt or confusion']3 and concise ['[e]xpressing much in few words; succinct']4 explanation ['the process of making plain or comprehensible']5 of the patients' rights and limitations under the plan," and does not include an obligation to explain a patient's potential civil remedies at common law or otherwise. Rinella v. Abifaraj, 908 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("Where the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is unambiguous, we cannot construe the statute in a manner that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications."); Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 2001)(quoting Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999))("[I]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that Courts 'are not at liberty to add words to statutes that are not placed there by the Legislature.'"); Crutcher v. School Board of Broward County, 834 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)("When a court construes a statute, its goal is to ascertain legislative intent, and if the language of the statute under scrutiny is clear and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction beyond giving effect to the plain meaning of the statutory words."); American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)("Words of common usage should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense."). The brochure prepared by NICA satisfies the legislative mandate. Jackson v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D8676 (Fla. 5th DCA March 24, 2006)("The ALJ properly recognized that NICA developed a pamphlet titled 'Peace of Mind for an Unexpected Problem.' The pamphlet contains a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the NICA plan, as is required by the terms of the statute.")(petition for rehearing pending). Findings related to the participating physician and notice Mrs. Dianderas received her prenatal care at Loch Haven OB/GYN Group, Orlando, Florida, a group practice comprised of a number of physicians, including Natasha M. Knight, M.D., and dedicated to the practice of obstetrics and gynecology. At the time, Loch Haven, like Florida Hospital, was owned by Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.; however, patients, including Mrs. Dianderas, were not noticed, by signage or otherwise, of the relationship the business entities shared. On February 14, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas presented to Loch Haven for her initial visit. At the time, consistent with established practice for new obstetric patients, Mrs. Dianderas was given a copy of the NICA brochure, together with a Notice to Obstetric Patient (to acknowledge receipt of the NICA brochure). The Notice to Obstetric Patient provided, as follows: Notice to Obstetric Patient I have been furnished with information by the Loch Haven OB/GYN as prepared by the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association and have been advised that the physicians of the Loch Haven OB/GYN Group are participating members in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. This Plan provides that certain limited compensation is available in event certain birth-related neurological injuries may occur during labor, delivery or post-delivery resuscitation, irrespective of fault. For specifics on the Plan, I understand I can contact the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation association (NICA), Post office Box 14567, Tallahassee, Florida 32317-04567, (904) 488-8191 or 1- 800-3982129: I further acknowledge that I have received a copy of the form brochure prepared and furnished by the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association. Patient Signature Date Print Name Social Security Number D.O.B. Witness Date Mrs. Dianderas completed the form, by providing the requested information (name, social security number, and date of birth), and then signed and dated the form. Beverly Bailey, the medical assistant who saw Mrs. Dianderas on her initial visit, witnessed her signature. Here, Mrs. Dianderas acknowledges she signed the Notice to Obstetric Patient, but has no current recollection of having done so, and has no current recollection of whether she was or was not given a copy of the NICA brochure. (Transcript, pages 39-41 and 54-58). Moreover, Petitioners candidly concede, they can offer no proof to rebut the presumption that the notice provisions were met by the participating physician. (Transcript, pages 9, 55, 56, and 278). Consequently, since the NICA brochure complied with the requirements of Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, the participating physician satisfied the notice provisions of the Plan. However, notwithstanding the common ownership of Loch Haven and Florida Hospital by Adventist, they were separate business entities, and the notice by Loch Haven (on behalf of its physicians) did not satisfy Florida Hospital's obligation to give notice. § 766.316, Fla. Stat. ("Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician . . . shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries."); Board of Regents v. Athey, 694 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)("Under section 766.316 . . . notice on behalf of the hospital will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the participating physician(s) involved in the delivery " Conversely, it reasonably follows, notice on behalf of the participating physician will not by itself satisfy the notice requirement imposed on the hospital.) Findings related to the hospital and notice To support an inference that it complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, the hospital offered proof of the practice it followed to provide a copy of the NICA brochure and Notice to Obstetric Patient form (acknowledgment form)6 to each patient who presented to labor and delivery.7 See Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, Mrs. Dianderas presented to the labor and delivery on two occasions (September 29, 2002, and October 7, 2002), during which the hospital had an opportunity to provide notice, and during which the hospital claims it provided notice.8 With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' first admission, the proof demonstrates that at or about 7:25 p.m., Sunday, September 29, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with an estimated delivery date of October 14, 2002, and the fetus at 37+ weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, with complaints of contractions. At the time, the finance window was closed, as it had been since 11:00 p.m., Friday, and would be until 6:00 a.m., Monday, and Mrs. Dianderas was admitted to the triage unit by Cynthia Hall, R.N., the on-duty triage nurse. Notably, Nurse Hall, who was responsible for completing all paperwork associated with Mrs. Dianderas' admission, attended Mrs. Dianderas from 7:25 p.m., until her discharge (after it was resolved Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor) at 12:19 a.m., September 30, 2002, except for a brief period (between 9:17 p.m., and 10:20 p.m.) when Mrs. Dianderas was taken for an ultrasound. With regard to notice, Nurse Hall, who routinely works weekends, testified that it was her practice, during her initial evaluation in triage, to provide the patient a copy of the NICA brochure, as well as an acknowledgment form and Consent to Treatment form to complete and sign. According to Nurse Hall, the forms were routinely signed in her presence, were routinely witnessed by her, and she routinely made a photocopy of the acknowledgment form and placed it on the finance clerk's desk (that was adjacent to her desk), so finance could update their computer records on Monday to reflect that the NICA brochure had been given. The original documents, including the original acknowledgment form, were placed in the patient's chart. Here, Nurse Hall is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Nurse Hall. However, the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if Nurse Hall followed her routine practice, and she could offer no explanation for its absence. Also inexplicably, the finance records related to this visit (Intervenors' Exhibit 1A, pages 1 and 2), reveal that at 8:48 p.m. (20:48), September 29, 2002, a finance clerk identified as "RLCEE8" updated Mrs. Dianderas' record to reflect that a copy of the NICA brochure had been provided. Notably, according to Nurse Hall, who was in a position to know, the finance office (in which she would have placed a copy of the acknowledgment form) was not staffed at the time, and she could not explain those entries (which she did not and was not authorized to make). Moreover, at hearing, the hospital made no effort to identify "RLCEE8" or to otherwise explain how these entries occurred. Consequently, given such irregularities it cannot be inferred, with any sense of confidence, that the hospital or Nurse Hall's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' September 29, 2002, admission, or that she was provided a copy of the NICA brochure. With regard to Mrs. Dianderas' second admission, which ultimately led to Isabelle's birth, the proof demonstrates that at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas, with the fetus at 39 weeks' gestation, presented to labor and delivery, at Florida Hospital, on referral from her obstetrician for a nonstress test (NST), secondary to decreased fetal movement. At the time, the finance window was open, and Iris Miranda, a financial services representative was on duty. With regard to notice, Ms. Miranda testified (by publication of her deposition) regarding the routine she would have followed when Mrs. Dianderas presented to the finance window that afternoon. According to Ms. Miranda, that routine would have included giving Mrs. Dianderas a Consent for Treatment form to sign, as well as a copy of the NICA brochure and an acknowledgment form to sign and give to the nurse in labor and delivery. Here, Ms. Miranda is confident she followed her routine, and Mrs. Dianderas' chart does include a Consent to Treatment form signed by Mrs. Dianderas and witnessed by Ms. Miranda. Moreover, the finance department's records (Intervenors' Exhibit 1B, pages 1 and 2) include a computer entry at 2:03 p.m. (14:03), October 7, 2002, by Ms. Miranda (identified as "IVM76B") noting that a NICA brochure was provided. However, again the chart does not include a signed acknowledgment form, as it should if the hospital's routine was followed, and no compelling explanation for its absences was presented.9 Consequently, given the lack of a reasonable explanation for the irregularities that have been shown regarding the finance department's computer entries, as well as the absence of the acknowledgment form, it cannot be inferred with any sense of confidence that the hospital's routine was followed during Mrs. Dianderas' admission of October 7, 2002, or that Mrs. Dianderas was given a NICA brochure Finally, with regard to the hospital and the notice issue, it is noted that on presentation to Florida Hospital at 2:00 p.m., October 7, 2002, Mrs. Dianderas was not in labor, and insofar as the record reveals she was not thereafter in labor until sometime after her membranes were ruptured, at 4:55 p.m. More particularly, there was no "evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes" from 2:00 p.m., until 4:55 p.m., October 7, 2002. Moreover, there was no proof that, upon admission or until her membranes ruptured, "there [was] inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery" or "[t]hat a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus." Consequently, until 4:55 p.m., when her membranes were ruptured, Mrs. Dianderas did not have an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes, that would have excused the giving of notice. Moreover, there was no proof to support a conclusion that the giving of notice was not practicable. Jurisdiction
The Issue Whether Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). Whether the hospital and participating physician provided the patient notice, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), or whether notice was not required because the patient had an "emergency medical condition," as defined by Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005),1 or the giving of notice was not practicable.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Chontee Joyner and David Joyner are the natural parents of Brianna Renee Joyner, a minor. Brianna was born a live infant on February 16, 2006, at Lawnwood Regional Medical Center, a licensed hospital located in Fort Pierce, Florida, and her birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Obstetrical services were delivered at Brianna's birth by William B. King, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."2 Here, Petitioners and Intervenor took no position on whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury." In contrast, NICA was of the view that the record failed to support the conclusion that Brianna's impairments, admittedly substantial, were birth-related. Whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" To address whether Brianna suffered a "birth-related neurological injury," the parties offered a Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22), that included the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course, as well as those associated with Brianna's birth and subsequent development. The parties also offered the deposition testimony of Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine, and Raymond Fernandez, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics and neurology with special competence in child neurology, who offered opinions as to the likely etiology of Brianna's impairments. Dr. Fernandez examined Brianna on July 31, 2008, and obtained the following history from Mrs. Joyner: Labor was induced at 39 weeks gestation. Her cervix was 1 cm dilated. She was given Cytotec and Pitocin, and overall duration of labor was 31 hours. Epidural anesthesia was given at 24 hours of labor. Towards the end of the labor, contractions occurred one after the other and she pushed for 2 hours. Vacuum extraction was used, but she was stuck, and she was then extracted manually. Brianna was pale and she did not cry after birth. She was given to Mrs. Joyner for "1 second" and then taken to the nursery because of breathing problems. She was transferred to the NICU because of an apneic spell. Subsequent to discharge she was referred to several specialist[s]. She was found to have a small patent ductus arteriosus that was not felt to be significant. The neurosurgeons found no clinically significant spinal abnormalities. She required PE tubes and tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy because of recurrent ear infections and apneic spells. Hearing is normal. Genetics and neurology have not arrived at a specific diagnosis. She has been enrolled in a developmental therapy program through the Early Steps Program, and has improved slowly, but she remains delayed. Brianna sat straight without support at about 13 months of age. She ambulates by scooting in the sitting position, by pulling with her legs and balancing with her arms. She tries to pull up, but only if offered assistance and encouragement by holding her hands. She reaches for objects, manipulates toys but does not play with them meaningfully, although she likes noisy toys. She rarely puts food in her mouth (Cheerios sometimes). She babbles, but no words are spoken. She does not seem to understand spoken language, but does respond to visual cues. She lifts her arms when a shirt is about to be put on. She plays pat-a-cake, but not consistently. Eye contact is improving. She smiles and is loving with family members, and tends to be anxious in the presence of strangers. She bangs blocks together, but does not stack them. She does not engage in imaginative play. She likes to be read to, and helps turn pages. She watches her younger brother and follows him around the house, and laughs when he does funny things. Physical examination revealed the following: Recent weight was 27 pounds. Head circumference 47.25 cm (approximately 20th percentile). . . . Brianna was alert. She was anxious when approached, and comforted by her mother. She did not babble. No words were spoken. Eye contact was limited. She did not point. Mainly, she sat on her mother's lap and stared about the room and sometimes looked at me. There was no indication that she understood basic verbal requests. She did not point to body parts. She was not interested in toys, and pushed them away when offered. There were no specific dysmorphic features. She has 2 hyperpigmented macular-papular skin markings on her back. One is over the thoracic spine, and the other is to the right of midline. Pupils were equal and briskly reactive to light. Eye movement was full. She tracked visually, but eye contact was limited. Face was symmetric. She swallowed well. Low axial and proximal tone, but normal tone distally in extremities. No obvious weakness noted. She sat independently. She stood and took steps, but only with both hands held by her mother. There was no involuntary movement. Deep tendon reflexes 1+ throughout. Liver and spleen were not enlarged. Funduscopic examination was limited, only able to note normal red reflexes and unable to visualize optic nerves. She inconsistently turned toward sounds and when her name was called. Based on his evaluation of July 31, 2008, as well as his review of the medical records, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna was permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. However, with regard to etiology, Dr. Fernandez was of the opinion that Brianna's impairments were, more likely than not, caused by a genetic abnormality, as opposed to a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. In so concluding, Dr. Fernandez observed that the record did not provide evidence of an acute brain injury due to hypoxia or mechanical trauma during labor and delivery. Rather, he noted: There was mild shoulder dystocia but no evidence of upper extremity weakness. There was some medical instability after delivery but no evidence for an acute encephalopathy. Following a single fluid bolus she was then medically stable and began feeding well by the end of day 1. Hypotonia was noted initially and it has persisted without evolution or evidence of spasticity or involuntary movement. The initial brain CT scan [of February 20, 2006] showed no hemorrhage and later brain MRI [of May 18, 2006] was normal. Finally, Dr. Fernandez pointed to the report of Charles Williams, M.D., a geneticist associated with Shands Children's Hospital at the University of Florida, Division of Pediatric Genetics, where Brianna had been seen because of her developmental delay and austic-like features. That report, following chromosome analyses, identified a chromosome deletion, a genetic abnormality, that in Dr. Fernandez's opinion likely explains Brianna's global delay and physical findings. Dr. Willis reviewed the medical records associated with Mrs. Joyner's antepartal course; those associated with Mrs. Joyner's labor and delivery, including the fetal heart rate monitor strips; and those associated with Brianna's newborn course. Based on that evaluation, Dr. Willis was of the opinion that Brianna did not suffer a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or the immediate postdelivery period. In so concluding, Dr. Willis observed there was no significant fetal distress on the fetal heart monitor during labor; the baby's Apgar scores were normal (8 at one and five minutes); the baby did not require any significant resuscitation at birth (only suctioning and blow-by oxygen); and CT scan of the head on February 20, 2006, was negative, without evidence of hypoxic changes. When, as here, the medical condition is not readily observable, issues of causation are essentially medical questions, requiring expert medical evidence. See, e.g., Vero Beach Care Center v. Ricks, 476 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("[L]ay testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where the medical condition involved is not readily observable."); Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("The determination of the cause of a non-observable medical condition, such as a psychiatric illness, is essentially a medical question."); Wausau Insurance Company v. Tillman, 765 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("Because the medical conditions which the claimant alleged had resulted from the workplace incident were not readily observable, he was obligated to present expert medical evidence establishing that causal connection."). Here, the opinions of Doctors Fernandez and Willis were not controverted or shown to lack credibility. Consequently, it must be resolved that the cause of Brianna's impairments was most likely a developmentally based genetic abnormality, as opposed to a "birth-related neurological injury." See Thomas v. Salvation Army, 562 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)("In evaluating medical evidence, a judge of compensation claims may not reject uncontroverted medical testimony without a reasonable explanation."). The notice issue Apart from issues related to compensability, Petitioners have sought an opportunity to avoid a claim of Plan immunity in a civil action, by requesting a finding that the notice provisions of the Plan were not satisfied by the participating physician and the hospital. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat. See Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997)["A]s a condition precedent to invoking the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as a patient's exclusive remedy, health care providers must, when practicable, give their obstetrical patients notice of their participation in the plan a reasonable time prior to delivery."). Consequently, it is necessary to resolve whether the health care providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. § 766.309(1)(d), Fla. Stat.; Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Florida Division of Administrative Hearing, 948 So. 2d 705, 717 (Fla. 2007)("[W]hen the issue of whether notice was adequately provided pursuant to section 766.316 is raised in a NICA claim, we conclude that the ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether the health care provider complied with the requirements of section 766.316."). The notice provisions of the Plan At all times material hereto, Section 766.316, Florida Statutes (2005), prescribed the notice requirements of the Plan, as follows: Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician, other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice is not practicable. Section 395.002(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), defined "emergency medical condition" to mean: (b) With respect to a pregnant woman: That there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to delivery; That a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or fetus; or That there is evidence of the onset and persistence of uterine contractions or rupture of the membranes. The Plan does not define "practicable." However, "practicable" is a commonly understood word that, as defined by Webster's dictionary, means "capable of being done, effected, or performed; feasible." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1979). See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)("When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary."). Resolution of the notice issue When, as here, the Petitioners dispute that the healthcare providers complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, "the burden rest[s] on the health care providers to demonstrate, more likely than not, that the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied." Tabb v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 880 So. 2d 1253, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation and Stipulated Record (Exhibits 1-22) provide no such evidence. Consequently, it must be resolved that Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and William B. King, M.D., failed to establish they complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, or that any such failure was excused because the patient presented in an "emergency medical condition" or the giving of notice was otherwise "not practicable."3
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation of the parties, the following facts are found: Matthew Williams and Joy Williams (Petitioners) are the parents and natural guardians of Jesse Williams (Jesse), and are the “claimants” as defined by section 766.302(3). Jesse incurred a “birth-related neurological injury” as that term is defined in section 766.302(2), on or about December 26, 2018, which was the sole and proximate cause of Jesse’s injury. At birth, Jesse weighed 3,640 grams. Adrienne George, M.D., rendered obstetrical services in Jesse’s delivery, and, at all times material to this proceeding, was a “participating physician” as defined in section 766.302(7). TMH is a hospital located in Tallahassee, Florida, and is the hospital where Jesse was born. TMH is the “hospital” as that term is defined in section 766.302(6). Jesse died on March 28, 2019. Petitioners filed a petition pursuant to section 766.305, seeking compensation from NICA, and that petition is incorporated by reference in its entirety, including all attachments. Any reference made within this document to NICA encompasses, where appropriate, the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
The Issue Whether Christian Ross Morrill, Jr., a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). If so, the amount and manner of payment of an award to the parents, the reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the claim, including reasonable attorney's fees, and the amount owing for expenses previously incurred. Whether the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the willful and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth in Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., are the natural parents of Christian R. Morrill, Jr. (Christian), a deceased minor. Christian was born a live infant on June 21, 2007, at Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital, a licensed Florida hospital, located in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Christian died June 27, 2007. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's birth by Brooke Slaton, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. The participating physician (Dr. Slaton) and the hospital (Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital) complied with the notice provisions of the Plan. Petitioners and NICA have further stipulated, which stipulation Intervenor "does not oppose . . . and intends to offer no evidence to rebut," that Christian suffered a "birth- related neurological injury," as defined by Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, in that he suffered an injury to the brain or spinal cord caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital, which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for a single gestation . . . at birth caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, the parties' agreement that Christian suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" is consistent with the objective proof which demonstrates that Christian suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in the course of labor, delivery, and the immediate postdelivery period that, following withdrawal of life-support at day 6 after birth, resulted in death. Consequently, since obstetrical services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth, the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. The award Where, as here, it has been resolved that a claim is compensable, the administrative law judge is required to make a determination of how much compensation should be awarded. § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this case, Section 766.31(1), Florida Statutes, provides for an award of the following items: Actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable medical and hospital, habilitative and training, family residential or custodial care, professional residential, and custodial care and service, for medically necessary drugs, special equipment, and facilities, and for related travel. However, such expenses shall not include: Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is entitled to receive, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law. Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is contractually entitled to receive, from any prepaid health plan, health maintenance organization, or other private insuring entity. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which the infant is entitled to receive reimbursement, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which the infant is contractually entitled to receive reimbursement, pursuant to the provisions of any health or sickness insurance policy or other private insurance program. * * * 1. Periodic payments of an award to the parents or legal guardians of the infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury, which award shall not exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion of the administrative law judge, such award may be made in a lump sum. 2. Death benefit for the infant in an amount of $10,000. Reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of a claim under ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be subject to the approval and award of the administrative law judge. In determining an award for attorney's fees, the administrative law judge shall consider the following factors: The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. The time limitations imposed by the claimant or the circumstances. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services. In this case, Petitioners and NICA have agreed that, should Petitioners elect to accept benefits under the Plan, Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., as the parents of Christian, be awarded One hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b.)1., Florida Statutes, and a death benefit of Ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes, all to be paid in lump sum. The parties have further agreed to an award of Two thousand six hundred twenty-five dollars ($2,625.00) for attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the claim. Moreover, the parties have agreed no monies are owing for past expenses. Such agreement is reasonable, and it is approved.
