Findings Of Fact At all times material here to, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker under the laws of the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0044295. On or about June 4, 1981, Respondent, representing himself to Doris Colon as the duly appointed, qualified and acting broker for Alvin Katz if, and representing that Alvin Katzif was the owner of certain real property located at 636-638 Southwest Eighth Avenue, Miami, Florida, accepted from Colon a written offer to purchase said property. Colon's offer was accompanied by a deposit of $5,000, receipt of which was acknowledged by Respondent on or about June 6, 1981. That deposit was delivered to the Respondent, as broker, to be held by him in escrow under the terms of the Deposit Receipt. The vendor named in the Deposit Receipt Agreement Alvin Katzif, was unable to sell the property in accordance with the terms expressed in that Deposit Receipt Agreement. Therefore, the sale was never consummated. Approximately one month after signing the Deposit Receipt Agreement, Alvin Katzif advised Respondent that he did not hold title to the property and that there were numerous and diverse claims to the property. Respondent never placed Colon's $5,000 deposit in an escrow account but rather placed the deposit in a personal account. Colon, through counsel, made a demand for the $5,000 earnest money deposit. Respondent failed to provide Colon with an accounting or delivery of her deposit until such time as she obtained a civil judgment against him. At no time did Respondent request an escrow disbursement order or submit the matter to arbitration or seek interpleader. Respondent converted Colon's $5,000 earnest money deposit to his own use. On or about the same day that Colon gave Respondent her $5,000 deposit made payable to him, Respondent gave Colon a check for $10,000 made payable to her. The $10,000 paid to Colon was not a loan to her and had no relation to the Katzif/Colon transaction. Rather, the $10,000 was a deposit toward the purchase of a duplex owned by Colon in which Respondent was then living as a tenant and which he desired to purchase from Colon. That transaction was completed, and the closing took place on August 12, 1981. The closing statement reflects credit given to Respondent of $10,000 toward the purchase price of the duplex he bought from Colon. The duplex Colon sold to Respondent is located at 2931-41 Southwest Sixth Street, Miami, Florida. When Respondent gave Colon his $10,000 deposit toward the purchase price of the duplex which he bought from her, he took her to friends of his at Intercontinental Bank, where she opened an account. She then wrote the $5,000 check out of that account, which check was the deposit which accompanied her offer on the property she wished to purchase from Katzif. In other words, the only relationship between the $10,000 check given to Colon by Respondent and the $5,000 check given to Respondent by Colon is that the fact that Respondent gave Colon a $10,000 down payment on the duplex he was purchasing from her gave Colon the opportunity to make an offer on the Katzif property using $5,000 of the $10,000 as a deposit on the offer to Katzif.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker license number 0044295. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin I. Carlin, Esquire 3000 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 402 Miami, Florida 33137 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint issued August 13, 1990, Petitioner charged Respondent with violation of Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes and provisions of Rule Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code, due to Respondent's failure to correct five Class III deficiencies cited during a survey of Respondent's premises by Petitioner's representative on March 6, 1990. Respondent holds license number 0005512, issued by Petitioner or its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Respondent's representative requested an administrative hearing on August 28, 1990. By joint stipulation between Respondent's representative and Petitioner's counsel, bearing a date stamp of February 13, 1991, the parties resolved their differences. As a result, the pending administrative proceeding before Hearing Officer Robert Benton, a duly designated representative of the Division of Administrative Hearings, was concluded. Under provisions of the stipulation between the parties, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $937.50 through monthly payments to Petitioner of $156.25 for a period of six months beginning March 1, 1991. In the event of non-payment, Respondent agreed that it would be in default of a final order requiring payment of the entire fine amount. A final order incorporating the parties' stipulation was entered by Petitioner on March 16, 1991, directing the parties' compliance with the stipulation and its requirements that Respondent make the required monthly payments to prevent a default declaration. Respondent never made any payments, monthly or otherwise. On April 1, 1991, Respondent applied for a renewal of it's license to operate an adult congregate living facility. Thereafter the requested license renewal for the period of July 2, 1991 through July 1, 1993, was erroneously granted by Petitioner's representatives, contrary to the prohibition against such a renewal contained in Section 400.417(1), Florida States, and without regard to Respondent's noncompliance with Petitioner's final order of March 16, 1991. Respondent was informed by certified mail letter dated July 2, 1991, from Petitioner's counsel that no payment had been made pursuant to the parties's stipulation or the March 16, 1991, final order of Petitioner directing the parties' compliance with the terms of the stipulation. Respondent was requested to respond within 30 days. Respondent's representative received the letter on July 8, 1991. Petitioner's counsel, by certified mail, again notified Respondent on August 19, 1991, that no payment had been received and requested a response within seven days. Respondent's representative received the letter on August 21, 1991. On May 6, 1992, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint which forms the basis of this proceeding and declares that Petitioner is in default of the requirements of the parties' stipulation and subsequent final order. As requested relief, Petitioner seeks the revocation of Respondent's license in lieu of payment of the stipulated fine. Respondent's representative received the Administrative Complaint on May 8, 1992. At the final hearing, Respondent's representative and corporate officer, candidly admitted that it was his signature, on behalf of Respondent, on the original stipulation between the parties. He further stated that he never intended to pay anything toward retirement of the stipulated fine amount and that his execution of the stipulation was purely for the purpose of delay. He was motivated to seek delay in this manner because his wife was eight months pregnant and his brother was a political candidate for city commissioner at the time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent to satisfy the March 16, 1991 final order by payment of the $937.50 fine by a date certain or suffer the immediate revocation of license number 0005512 without further proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my ruling pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-11. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Mark K. Glaeser, Pro Se Collins Court 2924 SW 39th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32608 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency For Health Care Administration The Atrium, Ste. 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303
Findings Of Fact The petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, are husband and wife. They have been members of the Florida retirement System (FRS) since their transfer on January 1, 1979. Previously, the petitioners were members of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) Plan D. In order to transfer to FRS, they moved from TRS Plan D, to TRS Plan E, on December 31, 1978, and then into FRS on January 1, 1979. In transferring from TRS to FRS, a member is entitled to a refund of excess TRS contributions. In early 1979, Mr. Price received refund warrants totalling $16,060.61 which represented TRS contributions of $10,138.73 and accrued interest of $5,921.88. In early 1979, Mrs. Price received refund warrants totalling $17,515.03 which represented TRS contributions of $11,383.91 and accrued interest of $6,131.12. The petitioners failed to cash these refund warrants and to date have not negotiated them. In November, 1979, the petitioners visited the Division of Retirement and discussed the cashing of these warrants based on questions of taxation. This discussion was followed by a letter dated December 30, 1979, to A. J. McMullian III, State Retirement Director, in which the petitioners again discussed the taxation questions and advised the respondent that they had not cashed the warrants. They asked that new warrants be issued and that they be paid interest on the amount of the warrants for the period of time from the issuance to the cashing of the warrants. By letter dated January 25, 1980, Mr. McMullian advised the petitioners to cash the warrants and further told petitioners that interest could not be paid. In their petition for an administrative hearing, the petitioners alleged that they were under-refunded; however, at the hearing the parties stipulated that only two issues are presented for resolution: Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on their contributions from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, and Whether the petitioners are entitled to interest on the total amount of the uncashed warrants from the date of issuance to the present. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, Section 238.10, Florida Statutes, has consistently been construed as providing for the payment of interest on contributions based on a fiscal year. The fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30. On June 30 of each year, interest is calculated on the total accumulated contributions then on deposit. If no contributions are on deposit on June 30, no interest is credited for this fiscal year. Since the petitioners received refunds of excess accumulated contributions on December 31, 1978, no interest was paid for the 1978-79 fiscal year because no contributions were on deposit on June 30, 1979. At the time that refund warrants are issued, the funds backing the warrants are transferred from the retirement system trust fund to the Treasurer's Office and the Division earns no more interest on these funds. The petitioners contend that they were advised by Leon Burnett of the Division of Retirement not to cash the warrants in their possession pending the outcome of this case. Ruth Sansom testified that it is standard practice to advise members not to cash benefit warrants if the amount of the benefit is in question, but that refund warrants may be cashed and adjustments made in the future. In a separate case (Case No. 80-1029), Mr. Price is challenging the amount of his benefit warrants. However, at the hearing in this case the petitioners did not understand the difference between a refund warrant and a benefit warrant, although this subject was discussed at their November, 1979, meeting with Mr. Burnett, and Mr. Price had in his possession both refund warrants and benefit warrants which had not been cashed.
Recommendation BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, seeking interest on their contributions for the period of time from July 1, 1978, through December 31, 1978, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of the petitioners, Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price, for interest on the total amount of their uncashed warrants from the date of issuance, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-1779 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price and Elizabeth R. Price 1000 N.E. 96th Street Miami, Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Cedars Executive Center Suite 207C, Box 81 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether the Respondent's real estate license in Florida should be disciplined because the Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined because the Respondent failed to account and deliver funds in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Joyce A. Wolford is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0313643 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, t/a Blue Ribbon Realty, 1400 N. Semoran Boulevard, Orlando, Florida 32807. As To Counts I and II Diane Ortiz was employed by Respondent Joyce Wolford to perform various duties, including operating the computer and taking messages. During her employment with Respondent, Diane Ortiz completed a contract for sale and purchase of certain real property which was signed by Jane Evers as buyer. In conjunction with the Evers contract, Ortiz did receive an earnest money deposit in the form of a cashier's check for the sum of $1000 and made payable to Blue Ribbon Realty. The earnest money deposit check given by Evers was turned over to Respondent by Ortiz. The endorsement on the Evers deposit check was Blue Ribbon Realty. The sale was contingent on Evers' assumption of the existing mortgage. The mortgagee did not approve Evers, and the transaction did not close. Evers contacted Ortiz and Respondent on several occasions and demanded return of her $1,000 deposit. Evers met personally with Respondent and demanded return of the $1,000 deposit. Evers sent a written demand for the return of the deposit by certified mail to Respondent on August 9, 1989. Despite Evers repeated demands for return of the $1000 deposit, Respondent has not returned any money to Evers. Jane Evers filed a lawsuit against Respondent Joyce Wolford in the County Court for Orange County, Florida, for the sum of $1,000 and court costs. A Final Judgment in the civil lawsuit was rendered for Jane Evers against Joyce Wolford for $1,000 principal plus $73 in court costs on March 15, 1990. Respondent has not satisfied the Final Judgment awarded to Evers or any portion thereof. As To Counts III and IV Anthony Pellegrino did enter a contract to purchase certain real property known as Lakefront Motel near Clermont, Florida. Respondent Joyce Wolford did negotiate the contract. Pellegrino did give Respondent a $5,000 earnest money deposit in the form of a cashier's check to secure the contract for purchase of Lakefront Motel. The cashier's check given as a deposit by Pellegrino was endorsed to Blue Ribbon Realty account #0880510063. The Lakefront transaction did not close, and Pellegrino demanded that Respondent return the $5,000 earnest money deposit on several occasions. Respondent has not returned the $5,000 deposit or any portion thereof to Pellegrino. The $5,000 earnest money deposit for the Lakefront contract was transferred to a mortgage company for a transaction involving a condominium that Pellegrino sought to purchase. Said condominium transaction did not close. In neither case did Respondent request the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue an escrow disbursement order. On July 2, 1990, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order in the case of Department of Professional Regulation v. Joyce Wolford, finding Respondent guilty of failure to account and deliver a commission to a salesman and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine of $1000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of having violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1989), as charged in Counts I, II, III and IV of the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent's real estate license be suspended for two years, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000 and, upon completion of the suspension period, placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years with such conditions as the Commission may find just and reasonable. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,1,7,18,19,20,21,22,24 (in part), 25 Rejected as cumulative or irrelevant: 7,8,23,24 (in part) Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraph 1 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence: Paragraph 2,3 COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Raymond Bodiford, Esquire 47 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
The Issue This case is presented in the form of an Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent. The Administrative Complaint, in its general terms, accuses the Respondent of improperly refunding deposit money to prospective purchasers of real estate in the face of a conflicting demand on that deposit money made by the prospective seller. These actions purportedly violate Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Following the service of the Administrative Complaint discussed in the Issues statement to this Recommended Order, the Respondent indicated his disagreement with the matters set forth in that Administrative Complaint, to the extent of disputing allegations of fact contained in that document. In the face of this factual controversy, a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing was requested by the Respondent and the Petitioner forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration. Subsequently, a formal hearing was held on January 28, 1982. In the course of the hearing, Petitioner presented two (2) witnesses, Ernest Olinger and Patsy N. Baucant. The Petitioner also offered three (3) items of evidence which were received. Respondent testified and offered two (2) items of evidence which were admitted. The petitioning agency is an agency of State government which has, among other functions, the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen and the requirement to take disciplinary action when those brokers or salesmen are suspected of violating the regulatory provisions related to their right to operate as real estate salesmen and brokers. This duty on the part of the Petitioner forms the basis for the accusations placed against the Respondent. At all times pertinent to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed and continues to be licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued License No. 00085431 by the Board of Real Estate in the State of Florida. The address of record for the Respondent, which is on file with the petitioning agency is: c/o G. W. Stone, Inc., 1001 Fourth Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The Respondent maintains two offices, one at the 1001 Fourth Street North address and the other located at 14701 Gulf Boulevard, Madeira Beach, Florida. During the period in question by the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was a broker in charge of and operated from the office at Madeira Beach which is part of the corporate arrangement, G. W. Stone, Inc. Respondent was one of the member-brokers of G. W. Stone, Inc. Respondent's son, Robert D. Stone, was a broker in charge of and operated from the Fourth Street North office in the relevant period. On or about July 12, 1979, Ernest Olinger who was associated with G. W. Stone, Inc., in the position of real estate salesman, obtained a sales listing of a premises at 6823 Seventeenth Lane, North Meadow Lane, St. Petersburg, Florida, owned by one Patsy N. Baucant. At that time, Olinger was working out of the Fourth Street North office of the corporation. (Sometime between July 12, 1979, and October 9, 1979, Olinger was dismissed from this employment with that corporation and accepted a position with Bayfront Real Estate, Inc., in Pinellas County, Florida. Nonetheless, he continued to be associated with the Baucant listing.) On October 9, 1979, another salesman employed by G. W. Stone, Inc., negotiated and obtained a contract for purchase of the Baucant property by Val Etter and Rita Locke. The terms and conditions of that purchase may be found in the sales agreement and deposit receipt which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. This contract was signed by Etter and Locke and the seller, Baucant; with R. Holmes Campbell, the real estate salesman who negotiated and obtained the contract, witnessing the Etter, Locke and Baucant signatures and Olinger witnessing the signature by Baucant. Etter and Locke paid $1,000.00 for earnest money deposit on account in contemplation of the purchase. By the terms of the contract, the property conveyance was contingent upon transferring to the "purchaser" the existing mortgage at Sun Bank and Trust Company of St. Petersburg, Florida, at the prevailing assumption rate. In keeping with this provision of the contract, both Locke and Etter applied for the assumption of the mortgage. Etter was approved and Locke was disapproved on the loan application. A copy of the loan disapproval related to Locke may be found as an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Campbell then spoke to Olinger and advised Olinger that Locke and Etter had dissolved their living arrangement, which was an arrangement not based upon a formal marriage. Campbell also told Olinger that the closing of the property would have to be done in Etter's name, to the exclusion of Locke, and a closing date was established for November 30, 1979. Olinger went to the closing on the date scheduled and was the only individual in attendance. The property never was closed. Within a period of a few days following the scheduled date for closing, Baucant asked Olinger about the deposit money and was told that he did not handle those matters, in that it was not his function and that she should contact the Respondent. Baucant did in fact call the Respondent in the presence of Olinger. Baucant, in the course of that conversation, made known her desire to have the deposit money and asked what he intended doing with it. Stone's response was to the effect that at that time he, "did not know." Baucant called the Respondent a couple of days later and he indicated that he had given the money to Rita Locke. Stone had in fact returned the $1,000.00 earnest money deposit to Rita Locke by payment from the escrow account of G. W. Stone, Inc. This took place on December 7, 1979. A copy of that check may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. When confronted with his reasoning for disbursing this money, Respondent indicated to Baucant that Locke and Etter had a personal argument. The money had been disbursed to Locke following demands by Etter and Locke made to Campbell who in turn advised the Respondent of the demand for refund of the earnest money. From the facts presented, it is determined that Stone disbursed the earnest money deposit to Locke at a time when he knew that Baucant had a competing claim on that deposit money. In the course of the hearing, Respondent denied that he had any conversation with Baucant concerning the topic of requests for the earnest money deposit in question. He made this denial on the basis of his failure to recollect such conversations. He did indicate that he had a policy to return deposits to prospective purchasers in circumstances such as set forth in the contract. In Stone's estimation, based upon what he knew of the matters, he returned the money to Locke because she was entitled to receive it.
Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1978, the Respondents, C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation (hereafter Respondents or Chapman) through a registered real estate salesman in the employ of the Respondents, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Gerry and Ada Ball, as buyers or purchasers and Joseph Winston, as seller, for the sale of property located at 305 Ben Avon Drive, Tampa, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, the Respondents' salesman received a $1,000.00 deposit from the purchasers which was placed in the Respondents' trust account on May 5, 1978. Prior to the date of the scheduled closing, the purchasers inspected the property and requested the seller to make certain repairs and/or replacements to rectify defects which included wood borer damage, structural roof problems and an inoperable pool heater. The seller refused to make the repairs and/or replacements demanded and the offer was formally withdrawn by the purchasers on July 28, 1978, via letter to Chapman Realty requesting return of their $1,000.00 earnest money deposit. Prior to formal withdrawal of the offer, verbal demands were made by Mr. Hall upon Chapman Realty for the return of his deposit. The demand for repairs and/or replacements and withdrawal of the offer was predicated on a provision of the sales contract which provided: Buyers themselves, or at their expense may have property inspected to ensure that there are no structural, electrical or plumbing defects. If any are found, buyers have the right to withdraw their offer and have all of their earnest deposit refunded to them. Thereafter, Respondent Chapman disbursed the $1,000.00 as follows: $350.00 via check dated September 6, 1978, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell, an attorney-at-law in Florida. $500.00 via check dated January 9, 1979, made payable to purchasers Hall. $150.00 via check dated January 10, 1979, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell. Prior to any disbursal the Respondent Chapman discussed with Mr. Hall the possibility of placing the escrowed funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Respondent Chapman contacted his attorney, Robert Carbonell, regarding the conflicting demands of the parties. Mr. Carbonell was introduced to Mr. Hall by the Respondent over the telephone. The Respondent met with Mr. Carbonell on a regular basis since Mr. Carbonell was employed by the Respondent to handle real estate transactions involving Chapman Realty. Respondent was never authorized by the purchasers to pay a fee to Mr. Carbonell directly from the $1,000.00 deposit held in trust. The $500.00 was paid directly by the Respondent to Attorney Carbonell from the Chapman Realty escrow account without oral or written authorization of the seller or the purchasers and in the absence of a settlement agreement between the Hall's and Mr. Winston. Although Mr. Carbonell and the Respondent Chapman believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing Mr. Hall, neither Mr. Hall nor the seller, Mr. Winston, were under the same impression. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Winston believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing the Respondents rather than Mr. Hall. Such an impression was reasonable in light of Mr. Carbonell's regular employment by the Respondent, the absence of a written agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr. Carbonell coupled with the lack of discussion or agreement concerning fees and the potential conflicting positions which existed between the parties and the Respondents. If any fee were due to Attorney Carbonell for his efforts in securing the return of the $1,000.00 deposit, this was a matter between Mr. Carbonell and Mr. Hall. Neither Mr. Carbonell nor the Respondent Chapman discussed the amount of the fee with the Halls. Mr. Carbonell arrived at the amount he thought was reasonable, $500.00, and Respondent Chapman diverted such amount to Mr. Carbonell from the Respondent's escrow account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents', C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation licenses to practice real estate be suspended until restitution is made to Gerry and Ada A. Hall, as follows: $500.00 plus interest at 12 percent accrued since July 28, 1978, and Interest on $500.00 accrued at 12 percent for the period from July 28, 1973 until January 9, 1979. Respondents' licenses to be reinstated upon submission and acceptance by the Board of Real Estate of satisfactory evidence of payment. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Staff Attorney 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale W. Vash, Esquire DIXON, LAWSON & BROWN 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602
Findings Of Fact On November 19, 1981, the Florida Real Estate Commission, then Board of Real Estate, received the application of Kay M. Harvey, Petitioner, asking that she be licensed to practice real estate as a salesperson. A copy of that application form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following the review, and by correspondence dated February 19, 1982, the application for licensure was denied. A copy of that denial statement may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The basis for denial was as set forth in the Issues Statement to this Recommended Order, with the exception of the assertion that the answer to Question No. 6 was incomplete. That assertion was first offered at the final hearing in this cause. In keeping with the opportunity expressed in the letter of denial, Petitioner requested a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. The Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings was then requested to assign a Hearing Officer and the case was considered through the process of a formal hearing conducted on July 30, 1982. Petitioner is a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, residing at 2612 Sandra Lane. She has lived in Jacksonville for the period of her life. She is now twenty-nine (29) years old and is employed by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. She has held employment with that organization for ten and one half (10 1/2) years. During that time, she has held various clerical positions and at present is a rate clerk. In that capacity she calculates insurance premium rates and informs customers of their premium rates. Her position includes making decisions on the question of premium adjustment refunds for the benefit of customers. This responsibility includes a determination on the part of Petitioner on the subject of proper refund; however, Petitioner does not prepare the refund draft nor mail the refund check. Petitioner does not handle cash money in other facets of her employment. On the topic of the answer to Question No. 6, which is the focus of the dispute between the parties, when asked to describe her understanding of the instructions given to an applicant who was answering Question No. 6, she stated, "I feel that it is asking me whether I've ever been arrested, and if I have, what it was for, and whether I was on parole or not." On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was arrested for obtaining property by the issuance of a worthless check. The arrest occurred in Duval County, Florida, for an offense committed in that county. The amount of the check was two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), constituting a felony offense. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was placed on probation. The probation was successfully concluded on July 8, 1982, following restitution by Petitioner. This pertained to the circuit court case, Docket No. 81-5065CFR, Duval County, Florida. In connection with the offense involved with the issuance of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check, Petitioner purchased carpet from a merchant in Duval County, The Carpet Barn. When the check was processed, Petitioner was informed that she did not have sufficient funds to honor the check. This information was provided by an employee of the merchant. The check was then processed a second time and again Petitioner was informed that there was insufficient money in the account to allow the check to be negotiated. Petitioner was again told by the employee of The Carpet Barn that there were insufficient funds. Petitioner also received notice from her bank that there was insufficient money to honor the claim for a two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) payment. The check was not suitable on the first occasion due to the Petitioner's failure to deduct certain service charges from her bank account, which service charges had the effect of reducing the amount of available funds to be spent for other purposes. The check was not honored on a second occasion due the submittal of another check issued by the Petitioner, which had been outstanding, causing the reduction of available monies in the Petitioner's checking account, such that there were insufficient funds to honor the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($208.00) check when it was processed on the second occasion. In the face of the shortages, Petitioner was requested to provide money to balance the checking account and allow payment of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. This was not done. Petitioner then requested that she be given a month to place sufficient funds in the account to honor the claims by The Carpet Barn, and was granted that opportunity. Following the second submission for payment, an employee of The Carpet Barn contacted the personnel office where Petitioner worked and spoke with the Personnel Manager about the subject of the outstanding check. Petitioner was disturbed by this contact and called the employee of The Carpet Barn and entered into an argument on the subjects of the check and that employee's contact with Petitioner's employer. The employee of The Carpet Barn indicated that the matter would be turned over to the local State Attorney for prosecution. Petitioner then contacted The Carpet Barn to try to arrange for the payment of the check and was told that they expected total payment and no settlement was arrived at, in view of the fact that Petitioner was suggesting payment of a lesser amount. The Petitioner and the merchant being unable to resolve their differences, Petitioner was prosecuted. She retained the carpet she had purchased and an amount of two hundred sixty or seventy dollars ($260.00 or $270.00) in her checking account, which represented the difference between the initial cost of the carpet and the charges in her account which had been deducted, causing the disallowance of the payment of the full amount of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. At the time of the incident involving the check, Petitioner was making an annual salary of twelve to thirteen thousand dollars ($12,000.00-$13,000.00) and the merchant was repaid the amount of two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), in keeping with the terms of Respondent's probation. The repayment was made through installments over a period of eleven (11) months. The other conditions of probation related to maintenance of her position in employment with the State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and submission of periodic reports were compiled with. In 1975 or 1976, Petitioner, while married, wrote a check at a time when the bank upon which the funds were drawn did not believe that she had check writing privileges, in that the bank was not aware that a signature card had been executed by Petitioner, thereby entitling her to write checks on a joint account with her husband. Prior to being notified by Respondent that it wished to inquire about the event of 1975 or 1976, Petitioner did not feel that any crime had been committed or that any criminal law investigative record of the events involving this particular check existed. At hearing, Petitioner did acknowledge that she had been charged with the offense in 1975 or 1976, related to checks or worthless checks, in the sense that she received a court summons about the check. Petitioner, by her explanation, was taken "downtown" and signed papers and was fingerprinted. The signature card had in fact been signed and filed with the bank, but the bank, not being cognizant of that signature at the time the check was written, refused to accept it. On the date of court appearance, under summons, an official of the bank accompanied Petitioner to that proceeding and the matter was dismissed. If Petitioner were licensed, one Terry Baker, licensed broker in Florida, has indicated that he might employ Petitioner. Petitioner indicated that to guard against problems of the type which occurred with the check incidents, that she would be more careful in her calculations in protecting the interests of her clients as a real estate salesperson.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue An Administrative complaint dated April 13, 1999, alleges that Respondent Mr. Stevens violated several provisions of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, when he failed to return an earnest money deposit to a buyer after being directed to do so by the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The issues in this proceeding are whether Mr. Stevens committed the violation and if so what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Collie E. Stevens, has been licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker since 1986. Prior to that year he was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida. In 1996 Mr. Stevens represented the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in the sale of a home in Orange County, Florida. On October 1, 1996, Doris Wright executed an Offer to Purchase and Contract of Sale for the home. When she signed the contract Ms. Wright gave the broker, Mr. Stevens, a check for $675.00 as an earnest money deposit. Mr. Stevens deposited the check into his escrow account. Later, in October or November 1996, Ms. Wright withdrew her offer to purchase the property. The VA regional office provided a notice to Mr. Stevens dated November 20, 1996, directing him to return the earnest money deposit to Ms. Wright. Mr. Stevens never returned the money to Ms. Wright although she made several requests through his secretary and made several attempts to contact him directly. Mr. Stevens alleges that he is entitled to retain at least $250.00 of the $675.00 deposit because that was the mortgage company's fee for processing Ms. Wright's mortgage application. Mr. Stevens claims that Ms. Wright authorized him to pay that fee on her behalf when she was not in town; Ms. Wright does not dispute that claim. Mr. Stevens also argues that he should be entitled to the remainder of the deposit money because Ms. Wright cancelled a listing agreement for him to sell her house. Ms. Wright disputes this claim and Mr. Stevens did not produce any contract or document evidencing such an agreement. During the pendancy of his dispute with Ms. Wright over entitlement to the deposit Mr. Stevens never notified the Florida Real Estate Commission of the dispute nor did he submit the matter to arbitration, mediation, or any court. Mr. Stevens insists that he could have worked out his differences with Ms. Wright and that he was always willing to give her $425.00, left after deducting $250.00 for the processing fee from the $675.00 deposit. In 1996, in another case, Mr. Stevens was disciplined by the Florida Real Estate Commission for culpable negligence or breach of trust, failure to give notice of his representation of a party, failure to maintain trust funds in an escrow account, and failure to preserve and make available brokerage records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding that Collie E. Stevens is guilty of a violation of Sections 475.25(1)(d)1. and 475.25(1)(0), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend his license for two years and require him to complete a 7-hour escrow management course and a 60-hour post-licensure course, and that he pay the costs associated with this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 308N Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Collie E. Stevens Son Set Free Realty, Inc. 2294 North U.S. One Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
