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DORIS STEPHENS vs TOM'S FOODS, 89-005818 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Perry, Florida Oct. 26, 1989 Number: 89-005818 Latest Update: Dec. 31, 1990

The Issue Whether respondent discriminated against petitioner, either on account of her age or on account of an alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes (1989), in terminating her employment?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Doris Stephens, a woman now approximately 56 years of age, began working for respondent Tom's Foods, Inc., on June 30, 1981, sweeping floors at its plant in Perry, Florida. After various intervening assignments, she ended up as a packer on the potato chip line. Packers remove packages of potato chip bags from a conveyor belt and deposit them in cardboard boxes, which they form by folding. As a packer on the potato chip line, her duties included keeping a record of how many boxes she packed in the course of the shift, and cleaning up at the end of the shift. Headquartered in Columbus, Georgia, respondent Tom's Foods, Inc., employed 15 or more people in Florida for a period in excess of 20 weeks this year and last. On March 6, 1989, respondent fired Ms. Stephens, who has arthritis, for "excessive absenteeism." By all accounts, she was a good employee for her almost eight years with respondent, whenever she was at work. Petitioner's arthritis has not interfered in any way with her ability to perform her work when she was well enough to be at work. Petitioner attributes the absences on account of which she was discharged to visits to the doctor in Gainesville who treated her for arthritis, to certain side effects of medicine she took for arthritis, and to visits to a doctor in Perry, on account of the side effects. Company Policy People who work for Tom's Foods, Inc. as packers are paid nothing when sickness keeps them away from work for periods of up to four days. Without regard to the length of their service, moreover, they are discharged if illness (among other causes) occasions too many absences. The company's written attendance policy provides: 5. Definitions: A period of absence counts from the day an employee stops work until the day he/she returns to work. (This could include one day or three days, but would still count as one period.) If the employee is going to be absent beyond the seventh (7th) day (eight days or more), he/she must request and be granted a Leave of Absence and must provide a doctor's release before returning to work. The six-month period in which an employee's attendance is measured dates from the current date back six months, dropping off the oldest date and adding the newest date. Classification of absences: In order to define "excessive absenteeism" and deal with it in a fair and consistent manner, absences will be classified as either chargeable or non-chargeable: Non-chargeable absences are certain specifically identified absences which will not be charged against an employee's overall attendance record for the purpose of determining excessive absenteeism. These are absences due to: Jury duty. A death in the immediate family which qualifies the employee for funeral leave pay. (Absences due to other family deaths require prior approval from the plant manager.) An on-the-job injury. An official and formally-granted leave of absence (see Policy Statement A-204, Leave of Absence). Chargeable absences are all other absences for any reason; these will be charged against the employe's attendance record and will be used to determine excessive absenteeism. Excessive tardiness/early departure Because of production requirements, employees are expected to be present and at their work stations at the beginning and the end of their shifts. Failure to comply with these requirements will be a basis for disciplinary action in accordance with the provisions of this policy. Definition of tardiness: Any employee not present in his/her department and ready for work on his/her job scheduled starting time is considered "late for work" or tardy. . . . 3. Excessive tardiness/early departure. Excessive tardiness/early departure will be cause for discipline of the employee and may ultimately result in discharge. Tardies or early departures of less than three (3) hours are non-chargeable if prior notice is given to and approval obtained from the supervisor. Prior notice for a late start should be given at the end of the employee's previous shift. Prior notice for an early departure should be given four (4) hours before the end of the shift. Three (3) separate tardies and/or early departures will be counted as one (1) chargeable absence and will be applied in conjunction with all other chargeable absences as outlined in Sections B and D of this policy statement. Excessive absenteeism Excessive absenteeism is defined as six (6) chargeable periods of absence - or a maximum of eighteen (18) days of absence for chargeable reasons - within any six-month period. Excessive absenteeism cannot be tolerated and any employee guilty of such will be discharged under the following procedures: A verbal warning will be issued upon the fourth (4th) period of absence within any six-month period. A written warning will be issued upon the fifth (5th) periods of absence within any six-month period. Termination will occur upon the sixth (6th) period of absence within any six-month period. Respondent's Exhibit No. 12. This version of respondent's policies has been in effect since August 1, 1987, although similar policies have obtained at all pertinent times. An absence of less than five days, although for medical reasons, counts as a chargeable period of absence, if it lasts three hours or longer. A shorter absence, even a few minutes' tardiness, counts as one-third of a period of absence. In the event of a medical disability lasting five or more days, an employee is eligible for a formal leave of absence; and, when an employee obtains such leave, his absence is not charged against him for purposes of the absenteeism policy. Three Minutes Late Ms. Stephens missed work on September 26 and 27, 1988, because she was ill; she attributed her illness to arthritis medication she took. She was absent on October 17, 1988, when she went to Gainesville to see the doctor who treats her for arthritis. She was absent three days running on December 16, 17 and 18, again on account of illness she claimed her arthritis medicine caused. On December 27, 1988, going to see a doctor, because she was ill, made her 2.5 hours late. She missed three hours' work on January 3, 1989, again on account of illness. The next day she was three minutes late to work. Because she did not obtain permission to miss work, either before she was too sick to work or before she was tardy, each incident counted as a third of a chargeable absence. In accordance with company policy, Don Cook, the supervisor who recorded petitioner's three-minute peccadillo on January 4, 1989, spoke to her two days later. He told her she had the equivalent of four periods of absence within less than a six-month period, and that "[t]wo additional chargeable POA before March 26, 1989, will warrant termination of employment." Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. The day Ms. Stephens returned from a two-day absence occasioned by her illness on February 13 and 14, 1989, she received a written warning that a single additional period of absence "before 3/27/89" would result in termination. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. A final absence, this one also attributed to illness, lasted three days, March 1, 2 and 3, 1989, and resulted in her discharge. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Betty Davis, who "may be in her 50s," (T.92) and who may or may not have arthritis, filled the vacancy petitioner's discharge created. Because Ms. Davis, who had been doing similar work on another shift, was "the most senior person with that job classification," (T.91) company policy gave her the choice of taking petitioner's place. Consistent Application In the last two years, respondent has fired a number of other employees for violating its absenteeism policy. At the time of petitioner's discharge, no employee with six periods of absence in six months' time had been retained. Subsequently, however, two employees who had been absent six times in six months were not discharged, because supervisors had neglected to give warnings required by company policy after earlier absences. Although respondent had recently agreed to modify its absenteeism policy to accommodate an employee whose child suffers a "more than likely fatal" (T.98) illness, it was not shown that this employee had been absent six times in a six-month period. On more than one occasion, petitioner denied having any handicap, when asked on company forms. At no time before her discharge did petitioner seek accommodation on account of her arthritis, T.84, 135.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR deny the petition for relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, Acting Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 William S. Myers, Esquire 3800 One Atlantic Center 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30309 Doris Stephens Route 4, Box 397 Perry, FL 32347

Florida Laws (2) 760.02760.10
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D`ANGELO A. SULLIVAN vs AUSSIE RESTAURANT MANAGEMENT/OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE, 04-002609 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 21, 2004 Number: 04-002609 Latest Update: Jun. 02, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice as a result of retaliation.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner D'Angelo A. Sullivan is a black male who worked for Respondent from January 14, 1999, until November 2002 as a blooming onion cook at Respondent's restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent Aussie Restaurant Management is a company that operates an Outback Steakhouse in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 people. In a letter dated September 6, 2002, Petitioner requested a paid vacation. Petitioner believed he was entitled to a paid vacation. He departed on vacation on September 23, 2002. Upon returning on September 30, 2002, he was told that he would not be paid during the time he was on vacation. Respondent has a policy that provides paid vacations to employees who have worked 32 hours per week for the six weeks prior to the time requested for a vacation. Petitioner averaged 30.20 hours per week for the six weeks prior to his request for a vacation. He was, therefore, not entitled to a paid vacation. On October 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a Complaint Form with the Escambia-Pensacola Human Relations Commission. In the "Nature of the Complaint" section the blocks "race" and "color" were checked. The "other" block was completed with the words "promotion, pay raise." In this complaint, Petitioner recited that he was not given paid leave, that his work schedule had been reduced, and that he had been given a $.25 per hour pay raise instead of the annual $.50 per hour pay raise that he had received in prior years. The complaint also asserted that only one black had been employed "out front" among the customers. In the complaint he alleged mistreatment by a manager identified as "Donnie." Petitioner suggested as a remedy, that Respondent cease discrimination, that Petitioner be given a pay raise, a paid vacation, and a W-4 tax form. He also suggested that he should be trained so that he could get a promotion. No evidence was offered demonstrating that Respondent was aware of the existence of the complaint. Petitioner testified that he was advised by the person who took his complaint to refrain from telling Respondent he had complained, and that he followed that advice. In November 2002, subsequent to an automobile accident, and upon the advice of the attorney representing Petitioner as plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit arising from the accident, Petitioner determined that he should not continue to work. This decision was based in part upon his belief that working might lessen his chances of prevailing in the ongoing lawsuit. In June 2003 Petitioner approached the manager of Respondent's restaurant, Nicholas Loizos, on at least four occasions and asked to be hired as a "take away" person in the "front of the house." Although his former position of blooming onion cook was offered to him, Petitioner insisted that he wanted the "take away" position. Mr. Loizos told Petitioner that in order to be a "take away" person, he would have to take the "Front-of-the House Selection Test." Petitioner was provided the opportunity to take this test. Petitioner did not avail himself of this opportunity. No evidence was adduced that would indicate that Respondent engaged in racial discrimination against Petitioner, or any of Respondent's employees. No evidence was adduced that would prove that Respondent was aware that Petitioner had filed a discrimination complaint. Because Respondent was unaware of the discrimination complaint, Respondent could not have engaged in retaliation against Petitioner.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 D'Angelo A. Sullivan 1006 West Hayes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Maria A. Santoro, Esquire George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.5730.20760.02760.10
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ROBERT G. HARRISON vs BEARD EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC., 94-000794 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lynn Haven, Florida Feb. 14, 1994 Number: 94-000794 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1995

The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68760.10760.22
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ALEJANDRO LORENZO vs MIAMI DADE COUNTY, 08-001433 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 21, 2008 Number: 08-001433 Latest Update: Nov. 25, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of employment discrimination against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Spain and is of Hispanic origin. At all material times, he has been employed by Respondent. Since 1992, he has been employed as a truck driver. At the time of the incident described below, Respondent was a Waste Truck Driver. His job was to drive a 66,000-pound truck in Miami to collect garbage from the utility customers. On February 28, 2006, Petitioner was operating his truck along Northwest 54th Street. This is a major east-west arterial through central Dade County. At the location of the incident, this busy road contains five lanes of traffic. Leaving a strip mall, from which he had just collected garbage, Petitioner drove the truck across this arterial, crossing double-yellow lines in the middle, in order to save time in driving to the next pick-up location. Petitioner was not at an intersection and knew that the double-yellow lines meant that his maneuver was illegal. Petitioner "explains" that he chose to do this maneuver at the urging of the Waste Collectors riding on the back of the truck and with the knowledge that other truck drivers had done it too. Unable to clear all of the lanes at one time, Petitioner was forced to stop the truck around the middle of the highway at an angle closer to perpendicular than parallel to the direction of the traffic flowing around him. A collision resulted when a passenger car tried to pass the garbage truck on the left at the same time that Petitioner moved his truck forward to try to complete his maneuver. After an investigation, Petitioner's supervisor, who is black, decided to demote him to Waste Collector, which resulted in a small decrease in pay, but presumably less-preferred tasks involving more direct contact with solid waste. The supervisor weighed Petitioner's substantial experience with Respondent as a driver against the facts that he could have prevented this accident, even though he did not receive a citation, and that he has had five other preventable accidents while driving Respondent's vehicles. Respondent had previously required Petitioner to take good-driving courses on three occasions due to avoidable accidents. He had also been given progressive discipline for his driving mishaps, culminating in an eight-day suspension for his last accident, which was in December 2004. Petitioner claimed to his supervisor that he had done nothing wrong, that he had not violated any rules, and that everyone drives like he did. The supervisor was unfavorably impressed by his failure to accept responsibility for the accident and his nonchalant attitude. The supervisor legitimately concluded that this attitude combined with Petitioner's driving history unreasonably raised the risk of additional accidents caused by Petitioner. Petitioner's attempt to show disparate treatment was unpersuasive. Either similar discipline was imposed for a similar number of similar offenses, supervising personnel were different, or the similarity of past offenses could not be determined. Petitioner's supervisor testified that she did not demote him because he is Hispanic, and this testimony is credited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Eric A. Rodriguez, Esquire Office of Dade County Attorney 111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128-1930 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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JACK W. SIMMONS vs. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 85-000740 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000740 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 1985

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned his career service employment position with the Department of Natural Resources and, therefore, whether the Department of Administration should issue a final order to that effect. The parties presented Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are dealt with in this Recommended Order and, additionally, are addressed in the Appendix attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

Findings Of Fact For approximately two years and ten months the Petitioner, Jack W. Simmons was employed by the Department of Natural Resources at the Maclay Gardens State Park in Tallahassee, Florida. On January 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1985, Simmons was scheduled to work at his position at Maclay Gardens. Simmons did not appear for work on those days and did not seek prior authorization to be absent from work on those days. Simmons did not notify the Department of Natural Resources of his absence or the reasons there for on those days. Jack Simmons had been absent in the past for various reasons including a severe back problem associated with severe back pain. Simmons was largely immobilized during the week of January 7, 1985 and was unable to report to work because of severe back pain. He was unable to stand erect and unable to walk without great difficulty. As established by Joyce Jones, his neighbor, he was able to very slowly and painfully go to the door to let her in his apartment while dressed in a housecoat. He lived on the second floor in an apartment at the top of approximately twenty stairs. He was unable to cook for himself or to dress himself to the extent that he could not put on shoes and rested primarily in a reclining chair. Mr. Simmons at the time in question did not have a telephone and testified that he felt the nearest telephone was approximately three quarters of a mile away. He did not inquire of any of his neighbors as to whether they had a telephone and could report the reason for his absence to his employer, however. His neighbor, Joyce Jones, who assisted in feeding him and caring for him during this week when he was suffering severe back pain, established that she had asked him on January 9th whether he wished her to call his employer to report his absence. He declined her offer, intimating that he would call his employer later himself. Neither Simmons nor anyone else ever called his employer to report his absence or the reasons for his absence. There is no doubt that Mr. Simmons was severely incapacitated on the day in question and required the assistance of Ms. Jones to clean his house, do his laundry, cook for him and purchase medicine for his Lack pain. On one occasion she observed him crawling on the floor in an effort to get back in his reclining chair and on another occasion she observed his inability to get out of the bathtub. There is no dispute concerning the immobilizing nature of Mr. Simmons' illness. Mr. Simmons did not have a telephone and, although his employer previously suggested that he get a telephone, his employer did not require that he do so, merely requiring that he inform them of any absences and the reason therefor. Mr. Simmons maintained that on January 9th, the third day of Mr. Simmons' unreported absence, he was on his way to a telephone to call his employer and report his absence and its reasons when Major Johnston, his employer and supervisor, stopped outside his home and verbally informed him he was fired. That testimony is belied by that of Major Johnston, however, who established that he went to Simmons' house January 11th, a Friday, and not January 9th, a Wednesday. Major Johnston's testimony is accepted over that of Mr. Simmons and Joyce Jones, neither of whom could remember with certainty whether it was January 9th or not when this episode purportedly occurred and because, throughout his testimony, Mr. Simmons candidly admitted he was not able to recall dates and times very well. Major Johnston's version of his whereabouts on January 9th was corroborated by his co-workers, who, together with Johnston, established that Johnston was at a meeting all day with his employers and supervisors on January 9th and only left that meeting during that entire work day to attend a lunch gathering with the same personnel. They immediately returned together from the restaurant to the remainder of the meeting. Indeed, Major Johnston established that he was at a park district manager's meeting all day on both January 9th and 10th, except for the lunch breaks when he lunched in the company of other co-workers who were also in attendance at the meeting, some of whom testified in corroboration of his testimony. Accordingly, Major Johnston's version of the events in question on January 9th and 11th, is accepted over that of Mr. Simmons and Ms. Jones. Major Johnston had intended to go on annual leave from his position on January 11th, but because he was directed by his superior to visit Simmons for the purpose of terminating him from employment, he worked that morning and only took annual leave on that afternoon. His testimony as to his whereabouts on January 9th was corroborated by C. W. Hartsfield, Chief of the Bureau of Park Management, by Joseph Knoll, Assistant Chief, and by James A. Cook, a former deputy director of park operations, all of whom were in Johnston's presence all that day. Joseph Knoll discussed Simmons' unauthorized absence situation with Major Johnston on January 9th and 10th and on January 10th instructed Major Johnston to wait until the next day, Friday, January 11th, and on that day go to Simmons' home to make sure he was not hospitalized before the Department of Natural Resources took any action against Mr. Simmons' employment status. Late on the morning of January 11th, Major Johnston reported to Joseph Knoll that he had visited Mr. Simmons that morning and had notified him of his termination from employment that morning, January 11th. Mr. Simmons was then removed from the payroll and other benefit entitlements effective at 5:00 P.M., January 9th, the third day of the unauthorized absence in question. In the face of the testimony of Major Johnston concerning the termination on January 11th, Mr. Simmons opined only that "I believe it was January the 9th", or words to that effect. His neighbor who cared for him during his illness, Joyce Jones, simply could not remember on what date Simmons told her he had been terminated. Major Johnston had earlier signed and delivered to Simmons a letter warning him that if he had one more unauthorized absence it could result in the loss of his job. During 1984 Mr. Simmons had received a written reprimand for unauthorized absence and tardiness and for similar infractions later in that year had received a three-day suspension from employment. It was at this point that Major Johnston signed and gave him the letter warning him that any more unauthorized absences could result in the loss of his employment. Simmons maintained that he was totally bedridden, without telephone and that he lived at the corner of Park and Franklin Streets in Tallahassee, approximately three-quarters of a mile from the nearest telephone. His own witness, however, his neighbor, Joyce Jones, established that she visited him and he was able to painfully and laboriously come to the door and let her in and tell her of his back problems. On those and succeeding days she cared for and cooked, fetched him medicine and the like and Simmons never asked her to call his employer on his behalf although she offered to call. Simmons had other neighbors, but never asked any of them to call for him to report his absence, either. Although Mr. Simmons was undisputedly gravely ill and unable to walk any distance to use a telephone, there is no doubt that he had an opportunity to report his absence and its reasons to his employer through neighbors, one of whom had even offered to do so, but he had declined that opportunity after being previously warned on two occasions about the importance of reporting his absence to his employer. The Petitioner was given written notice of Respondent's initial determination that he had abandoned his position for in excess of three days and notice of his right to a hearing to contest that determination, as shown by Respondent's Exhibit One, in evidence.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a final Order be entered by the Department of Administration finding that Jack W. Simmons abandoned his position of employment for three consecutive unauthorized days of absence, from January 7th through January 9, 1985, as envisioned by Rule 22A-7.10(2), Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer ~ Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkwav Tallahassee, Florida 323C1 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Been, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulvard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Richard L. Kopel, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paolo G. Annino, Esq. Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. 822 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kevin Crowley, Esq. General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32302 APPENDIX - CASE NO. 85-0740 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings or Fact: The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are in unnumbered paragraphs and We ruled upon by paragraphs in the sequence they appear in the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In large part the Proposed Findings of Fact consist of discussion of testimony and argument of counsel, but to the extent they assert Proposed Findings of Fact they are ruled upon as follows: Accepted.| Accepted in part but rejected inasmuch as this paragraph depicts that the nearest telephone was three-quarters of a mile away, which Proposed Finding is rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. Accepted to the extent that it depicts Simmons intent to contact his employer, but rejected insofar as it has already been found that Simmons failed to actually contact his employer. Accepted, but this paragraph of Proposed Findings is subordinate to and unnecessary to the Findings of Fact reached in the Recommended Order on the malarial issues presented and is not dispositive of the material issues of fact raised in this case. Accepted in that there is no dispute as to the severity of Jack Simmons' illness, but this Proposed Finding of Fact concerning the severe nature and immobilizing nature of his illness is subordinate to, and unnecessary to the Findings of Fact reached in the Recommended Order concerning Simmons' failure to take advantage of opportunities to notify his employer of the reasons for his absence and is therefore not dispositive of the material issues of fact presented in this proceeding. This Finding is rejected to the extent that it asserts that Simmons had no opportunity to contact his employer which Proposed Finding does not comport with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record, although it is true that it is undisputed that Simmons lacked a telephone and his neighbor, Joyce Jones, lacked a telephone. This Proposed Finding of Fact is rejected a., not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record in that it has been found that Simmons did not attempt to contact his employer, although it is true that his neighbor, Joyce Jones, offered to call his employer and at that time. Simmons rejected the offer stating that he intended to call the employer himself. He simply never did so when he had the opportunity. This Proposed Finding is accepted as in accordance with the competent, substantial credible evidence of record, but is subordinate to and immaterial to the Findings of Fact made disposing the material issues presented. The Department of Natural Resources did indeed not require him to obtain a telephone, but its procedure for reporting lateness or absence did envision the use of a telephone and his superiors were aware that he did not have a telephone, however, this Proposed Finding is subordinate to the Finding made to the effect that although Simmons had no telephone he did not avail himself of ample opportunity to use a neighbor's phone in his own apartment building or have Ms. Jones phone his employer for him, which she had offered to do and which he refused. This Finding is rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record in that the testimony and evidence of record in the above Findings of Fact made in the Recommended Order show that Simmons had the ability to contact his employer and failed to avail himself of it. This Proposed Finding is rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. This Proposed Finding of Fact is rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record to the extent that it indicates that Simmons was fired on January 9th instead of January 11th.I Accepted. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. This Finding is accepted to the extent that it depicts that Simmons was removed from all employee benefits including payroll effective 5:00 P.M. January 9, 1985, however that is subordinate to and not dispositive of the issue resolved in the Finding of Fact in the Recommended Order which establishes that based upon the competent, substantial, credible testimony and evidence of record, Simmons was indeed terminated by his employer on January 11, 1985, not January 9th. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence of record. Accepted to the extent that the Notice of Termination indicated that Simmons was on unauthorized leave from January 2nd through January 6, 1985. The Respondent has admitted that is an error, but is an immaterial error since the actual disputed dates in question begin Monday, January 7, 1985. The mere fact that the termination notice contained more depicted dates of unexcused absences than were admittedly the case is an immaterial error and this last Proposed Finding of Fact is subordinate to and immaterial to disposition of the material issues of fact presented. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. (It should be noted that the Respondent has not numbered all of its Proposed Findings of Fact paragraphs. The Hearing Officer in making 8 specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact of Respondent has numbered those paragraphs 1 through 8 in making these specific Rulings).

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs P.A.T. AUTO TRANSPORT, INC., 09-003486 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Perry, Florida Jun. 24, 2009 Number: 09-003486 Latest Update: Jun. 04, 2010

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent, P.A.T. Auto Transport, Inc., committed the violations alleged in the relevant Stop-Work Order and the Fourth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and, if so, what, if any, penalty is warranted.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida, charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Workers' Compensation coverage requirements embodied in Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2008), whereby Florida employers must secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage and benefits for their employees. See § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. The Respondent, P.A.T., is a corporation conducting a trucking business, headquartered in Pensacola, Florida. The Respondent's services include transporting motor vehicles using a fleet of some 61 highway tractors and associated auto transport trailers. Michelle Newcomer is an investigator employed by the Petitioner. Her duties include conducting inspections and investigations of businesses who may be workers' compensation employers, to determine if they are required to have workers' compensation coverage under Florida law, and the extent and compliance of that coverage. Ms. Newcomer conducted an inspection of the Respondent at 6732 Rambler Drive in Pensacola, Florida, on March 18, 2009. She determined that two companies, or businesses, operated at that address, the Respondent and MNT Enterprises (MNT). MNT had a workers' compensation policy covering its employees and was statutorily compliant. Ms. Newcomer also investigated the Respondent and learned that the principal stockholder, George Hedges, was exempt from coverage. She inquired about the status of the truck drivers working for the company and was told by Tracie Hedges that they were independent contractors. She was unable to witness any violations occurring at that time and concluded the investigation. Later, in April 2009, she received information that led her to believe that the Respondent's truck drivers were employees and not independent contractors. She had an opportunity to see a pay stub for a truck driver who had worked for the company who had been injured and had a workers' compensation issue. She noticed that the pay stub reflected that Federal Income Tax withholding had been deducted, along with various other deductions, such as Social Security and Medicare. She felt this might be indicative of an employee relationship, rather than the drivers being independent contractors. She returned to the Respondent's address later that month and issued a written Request for Production of Business Records to the Respondent and to an associated company called TK131. She issued a Stop-Work Order for the Respondent due to its purported failure to comply with workers' compensation coverage requirements for employees. The Respondent did provide the required business records. She reviewed the records provided to her and was able to ascertain that the Respondent employed more than four employees. Additionally, she learned that, although the Respondent, through a leasing arrangement for its office employees, had workers' compensation coverage for them, the 59 drivers and corporate officers did not appear to be covered by workers' compensation insurance. Thereafter, the Stop-Work Order was amended to include the purported failure to secure payment of workers' compensation coverage as required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. That resulted in a Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment. The Department also issued a Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment to DTS, LLC, which included the predecessor company, Darts Transport. The Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment issued to DTS was later revoked, however. The Department takes the position that the Respondent, P.A.T., paid its drivers through the entity known as "DTS", or directly with P.A.T. checks during the audit period, and that the number of drivers paid for their services was more than four employees and closer to 59 drivers for the 61 tractor-trailers owned by the Respondent. The Department does concede that a small number of the drivers were clearly owner-operators and no longer contends that they were employees. The Department thus contends that at no time pertinent hereto did the Respondent have a workers' compensation policy or an employee leasing arrangement in place by which workers' compensation coverage was provided for the drivers. The original Order of Penalty Assessment covered the period April 22, 2006, through April 22, 2009. The 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessments for those dates, which is at issue in this case, also included a $108,000 fine for the Respondent's working in violation of a Stop-Work Order. The total fine assessed and sought by the Petitioner is $1,564,707.91. The Department maintains that the drivers working for the company are employees and therefore should have been covered with workers' compensation insurance, but the Respondent disputes that claim, asserting that the drivers are independent contractors and therefore do not need to be covered by workers' compensation insurance. The Petitioner maintains that office workers employed by the Respondent were required to be covered by workers' compensation insurance as well. The Respondent maintains that these were covered through coverage obtained from an employee leasing company, through an employee leasing program. The Department also maintains that three employees, as corporate officers, were not properly qualified to be exempt. The Respondent maintains that the required Exemption Request forms were properly delivered to the Department and therefore it complied with the law in obtaining exemptions from workers' compensation coverage. Finally, the Department maintains that certain named individuals were employees of the Respondent and should have been covered by workers' compensation coverage or insurance, but the Respondent maintains that these employees, who essentially performed incidental, non-recurring tasks for the Respondent, were not employees and did not have to be covered by such insurance. Moreover, the Respondent claims that it has a contingent liability insurance policy in place which served as a policy of workers' compensation insurance and for this reason it is compliant also. The parties agree that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035 defines "payroll" as the basis for calculating a penalty. Payroll can include any of ten variations of payments from or through an employer to or on behalf of an employee. These include the payment of traditional wages and also bonuses, un-repaid loans to employees, expense reimbursements that are not documented on the employer's business records, payments binding an employer to a third party on behalf of an employee for services rendered by the employee, among others. Investigator Newcomer relied on Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(a) to define payroll for the office workers and truck drivers paid directly from the Respondent's account. The drivers were paid from the P.A.T. account from July 16, 2008, through April 22, 2009. Investigator Newcomer opined that the drivers' payroll prior to July 16, 2008, could not be included on the Penalty Worksheet based upon Rule 69L- 6.035(1)(a), but rather was based on Rule 69L-6.035(1)(i). Ms. Newcomer did not rely on Rule 69L.6.035(1)(b),(d),(e),(f),(h), or (j) to define P.A.T.'s payroll. The Department included payments to various child support enforcement agencies, made on behalf of drivers, on the Penalty Worksheet, by authority of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(c), defined as payments made to a third party on behalf of the employer for services rendered to the employer by the employee. The Department also included as payroll on the Penalty Worksheet loans made to drivers, maintaining that these have not been repaid and should be deemed as part of payroll under Rule 69L-6.035(1)(g). There is no proof that this is the case, however, because neither Ms. Newcomer nor Ms. Hedges offered any evidence to establish that there is proof that some or all of the loans remained unpaid. The Petitioner, through the testimony of Investigator Newcomer, takes the position that payments made by P.A.T. to Darts Transports or DTS,LLC are properly included on the Penalty Worksheet by authority of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L.- 6.035(1)(i). Those payments were made prior to July 16, 2008, before P.A.T. began making payments directly to drivers. The Rule provision in question, concerns payments made to an alleged non-compliant employer who has contracted with the customer, if the contract includes payment for labor and materials. If it is impossible to segregate the cost of materials from the employee payroll in such a contract, then under this Rule provision, 80 percent of the total contract price shall be presumed to be the employer's payroll, with regard to that customer and contract. The unrefuted evidence, however, establishes that the drivers in this situation were paid a flat 25 percent commission of the hauling fee charged by P.A.T., after deduction of the cost of fuel for the trucks. P.A.T.'s customers paid the fuel surcharge to P.A.T. There is no evidence that P.A.T. provided customers with any materials. Its business operation involves solely and simply the transportation of customer-owned vehicles. The Department also maintains that corporate officers Bradley Hedges and Gregory A. Hedges, as well as Teri Kimberly Forret, corporate officers of P.A.T., are non-exempt employees. It contends that under Rule 69L-6.035(2) their compensation constitutes "payroll," under the default formula in that Rule provision, for defining payroll to a corporate officer, if the ten factors under sub-section(1) of that Rule do not address the means of compensation received by those corporate officers. The quintessential question in this case, however, concerns whether the drivers are independent contractors or employees. If they are independent contractors, then there is no obligation on the part of the Respondent to ensure payment of workers' compensation benefits for them. This would mean that the Respondent cannot be adjudicated non-compliant by the Petitioner Department and payments to the drivers would not constitute payroll and would be stricken from the Penalty Worksheet calculation. Independent contractor status is defined in Section 440.02(15)(d)1.a.(I)-(VI) and b.(I)-(VII), Florida Statutes (2008). Under the former statutory provision, four of the six criteria must be met for independent contractor status to be established. Under the latter provision, any of the seven conditions named in that provision may be satisfied and independent contractor status thus established. With regard to the criteria in Section 440.02(15)(d)1.a.(I)-(VI), the preponderant weight of the evidence shows that some of the truck drivers are independent contractors with federal employer identification numbers and some are sole proprietors who are therefore not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under pertinent state or federal regulations. § 440.02(15)(d)1.a.(II), Fla. Stat. The evidence also shows, for purposes of Subsection(15)(d)1a.(V) of this statutory provision, that the drivers are permitted to work or perform work for other entities or companies needing their services, in addition to the Respondent, at the election of the driver. There is no showing that an employment application must be completed to perform such tasks for other unrelated entities. The drivers must use the unrelated company's truck for work assigned to them by such other companies or entities. They are not permitted to use P.A.T. trucks for non-P.A.T. transportation work (driving) they have agreed to perform. Moreover, all the drivers are compensated for completion of a task or set of tasks according to a flat 25 percent commission of the hauling charge imposed by P.A.T. There is no evidence that clearly shows a contractual agreement which expressly states that an employment relationship exists between the drivers and P.A.T. Even if the status and operations of the drivers referenced above does not meet four of the criteria listed in sub-subparagraph a. Subsection 440.02(d)1., they may still be presumed to be independent contractors and not employees, based upon a full consideration of the nature of their individual situation with regard to satisfying any of the conditions or criteria referenced in Section 440.02(15)(d)1.b.(I)-(VII). With regard to the first criteria under that provision, the drivers perform the services of driving for a specific amount of money in the form of a 25 percent commission. They control a substantial amount of the means of performing the services or work. The driver is asked to deliver vehicles from point A to point B for that commission. He gets paid that commission whether it takes one day or six days to accomplish the task. The driver determines the route to be driven. The driver, within the limits of the Department of Transportation rules, determines when to begin driving and when to pull over to sleep. The driver is free to decline to accept a hauling job. There is no detrimental action taken against a driver for declining to accept a given hauling job, unless it happens too frequently for satisfactory conduct of P.A.T.'s operations. The driver must provide the incidental tools and equipment, such as binding chains and maintenance tools to operate the truck and securely transport the load of vehicles he is required to transport. The driver is responsible for maintaining current driver's license qualifications and DOT physical examination requirements. The driver is responsible for paying for any necessary badges authorizing entry at maritime ports, a frequent occurrence in the transportation of foreign-manufactured vehicles. The Respondent, P.A.T., either owns or leases the trucks used by the drivers and pays for the insurance policies for the trucks. P.A.T. also pays for routine maintenance of the truck. If the driver causes damage of any sort to the truck, the driver must bear the financial responsibility for repair of the damage. The driver must also bear responsibility for any damage to the vehicles being transported on the trucks. It can thus be seen that both the Respondent and the drivers control a substantial portion, respectively, of the means of performing the services or work. Clearly, the unrefuted evidence shows that the drivers receive compensation for the work or services performed (driving services, incidental loading and unloading and protection responsibilities, with regard to the vehicular cargo), for a commission or per job basis and not on any other basis. Therefore criterion number IV, cited last above, is clearly met. Concerning criterion (II) under the last-referenced provision cited above, the drivers incur expenses for costs of their commercial driver's license, repair costs for any vehicle damage to the truck or to the vehicles which are being transported by the truck; any DOT fines incurred by the drivers; any badge expenses, as port entry and exit fees, must be borne by the drivers; lodging and meal expenses on the road during a haul must be borne by the drivers, without reimbursement. Concerning criterion (III), the driver is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or services that he or she agrees to perform, in the operational sense, in that the driver will not be paid if the delivery of the vehicles ordered to be transported is not satisfactorily accomplished. The privity of contract, however, for a given hauling job runs between the customer and P.A.T., the Respondent, who the customer actually contracts with to have the vehicles transported. The drivers, for purposes of criteria (V), (VI), (VII), of the last-referenced statutory provision, as established by the unrefuted testimony of Ms. Hedges, stand to realize a profit, or suffer a loss, in connection with performing the transportation driving services. They have continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations aside from the expense of owning or leasing the truck, insuring the truck, or the fuel expense which they do not bear. They do, however, have recurring or continuing business liabilities or obligations which have a direct effect on whether they realize any net gain from a commission on a given hauling job. The success or failure of their business, even as sole proprietors, depends on the relationship of their receipts, under their 25 percent commission arrangement, and their expenditures for each hauling job for which they earn that commission. Drivers often complain of losing money due to vehicle repair bills, fines, towing charges, etc. Additionally, as referenced above, although when transporting loads for P.A.T., the drivers must use P.A.T. owned or leased trucks, the drivers are free, under their arrangement, to engage in hauling for other companies or customers, if they are not currently engaged in the middle of a hauling job for P.A.T. They may do so for other companies using other trucks, so long as they do not engage in such transportation services for other entities with P.A.T.'s truck. This factual arrangement tends to also militate in favor of the drivers not being employees. Many of the drivers have the standard federal tax withholdings deducted from their commission payments, as well as, in some cases, court-ordered child support payments. While this might be deemed to militate in favor of an employer/employee relationship, the unrefuted testimony of Ms. Hedges establishes that this is a service that drivers have come to P.A.T.'s management and requested, because in view of their many hours and days spent on the road, and for other reasons, involving their business management abilities, it is an assistance to them to have the tax liabilities simply withheld from their commission payments. This helps to avoid personal difficulties involving arrearages to the Internal Revenue Service. Status of Non-Driver P.A.T. Workers and Corporate Officers Persuasive testimony offered by Tracie Hedges, established that Regina Davis, Robin Hand, Stanley Warren, William Bertelsen, Cecil Hannah, Chipley Atkinson, Kristene Viverios, Katherine Flores, Laura Dunn, Amber Taylor, Amy Murphy, and Ms. Hedges herself, are office workers of P.A.T. They are covered by a policy of workers' compensation insurance through AES Leasing, a worker leasing company. Apparently the Petitioner no longer disputes this. Ms. Hedges reviewed, in her testimony, the final Penalty Worksheet concerning the status of various named persons who the Petitioner contends were employees, not covered by workers' compensation coverage. Ms. Hedges established with persuasive testimony that Arthur Nicolas was not a P.A.T. employee, but did some improvements on the office building (i.e. in the nature of carpentry). Alex Sibbach and Witt Davis did not ever work as employees for P.A.T. They may have performed some yard work or sold some equipment to P.A.T., but were never employees. She also established that Richard Burrson and Robert Marra were dump truck drivers for a company by the name of MNT Enterprises and had never been P.A.T. employees. Bradley and Gregory A. Hedges and Kimberly Forret are officers of P.A.T., or were at times pertinent to this case. The Petitioner contends that they had not established an exemption from the requirement of being covered under a policy of workers' compensation insurance. This is because of the Petitioner's contention that no corporate officer exemption had been filed or made effective. Bradley Hedges and Gregory A. Hedges are children of owners Greg and Tracie Hedges. Kimberly Forret is Tracie Hedges' sister. Ms. Forret is an office worker at P.A.T. and both Bradley and Gregory A. Hedges work at P.A.T. on a part-time basis while attending school. Ms. Hedges completed exemption forms for all three of them and delivered them to Investigator Newcomer's office on Burgess Road in Pensacola, Florida. Investigator Newcomer took the position that the exemptions for these people had not been established or filed based on her examination of agency computer records. The computer program or site failed to establish to her that the three individuals in question had established exemptions. Exemption status is triggered by compliance with Section 440.05, Florida Statutes (2008).1/ Tracie Hedges established with persuasive testimony that the exemption applications for the named three officers had been hand-delivered to the Burgess Road office of the Department of Financial Services. Janice Evers is a staff worker at that office. She testified that her research could neither confirm nor deny that the exemption applications were delivered to her office, but acknowledges their receipt by the Department. It must be concluded that the applications were delivered to the office on Burgess Road but were never forwarded to the Tallahassee office by Ms. Newcomer's or Ms.' Evers staff. Investigator Newcomer's business address is 610 East Burgess Road in Pensacola, the location where Ms. Hedges testified that the exemption applications were delivered. When the Department made a Discovery Request for Production of the Business Records of the Respondent, it required that those records be produced at that same business address in Pensacola, Florida. It is thus "an office of the Department" for purposes of Section 440.05(c), Florida Statutes (2008). Ms. Hedges established that the exemption applications were delivered during the 2005 calendar year although she was unable to provide an exact date of delivery. Ms. Evers acknowledges that fact in her testimony. The Stop-Work Order at issue in this case by statute can only date back as early as April 22, 2006. Even if the applications were delivered on December 31, 2005, the three officers in question would be exempt from workers' compensation coverage requirements prior to April 22, 2006, when the time period, or audit period, related to the Stop-Work Order began. It is determined that at least by January 30, 2006, exemptions had been established, by delivery at least 30 days prior thereto, for Bradley Hedges, Gregory Hedges, and Terri Kimberly Forret. It is found that the exemptions were shown by persuasive evidence to have been delivered during the 2005 calendar year. Inasmuch as they were "received" by the Department in 2005, then they would have become effective, by operation of law, on or before January 30, 2006, well before the effective date of the Penalty Assessment of April 22, 2006.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, dismissing the Stop-Work Order and Fourth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57440.02440.05440.10440.107 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69L-6.035
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THERESA FOSTER vs. HANDLING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC., 87-003048 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003048 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1987

The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the following activities: (a) Discharging the Petitioner from her position of employment with Respondent because of Petitioner's race and (b) after discharging the Petitioner, continuing to seek applications for the position previously held by the Petitioner from similarly qualified or less qualified applicants. Subsequent to the filing of her petition for relief, the Petitioner filed a motion for default pursuant to Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, based upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the petition as required by the cited rule. By order dated September 21, 1987, the Respondent was given until October 5, 1987, within which to show cause as to why the relief requested in the motion for default should not be granted. The Respondent failed to respond to the order of September 21, 1987, and on October 7, 1987, an order was issued which included the following language: That pursuant to Rule 22T-9.008(5)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is hereby deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the petition. That at the final hearing in this case the material facts alleged in the petition will be taken as established without further proof, but both parties will be afforded an opportunity at the final hearing to offer evidence regarding any additional relevant facts. On the day scheduled for the hearing, the Petitioner and her attorney appeared at the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing, but there was no appearance on behalf of the Respondent. Approximately 45 minutes after the scheduled commencement time, the Hearing Officer called the Respondent's offices in Jacksonville and was advised by an employee of Respondent that the Respondent did not intend to have anyone attend the hearing. Shortly thereafter the hearing was convened and the Hearing Officer received evidence offered by the Petitioner. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the Petitioner, the Petitioner requested, and was granted, 15 days within which to file a proposed recommended order. Thereupon the record of the hearing was closed without any appearance having been made on behalf of the Respondent. On November 16, 1987, the Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specific rulings on all findings proposed by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order. Following the hearing, the Respondent was advised by letter of its right to file a proposed recommended order, but as of the date of this recommended order the Respondent has not filed any post-hearing document with the Hearing Officer.

Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1985, the Petitioner was referred by Job Finders of Florida, a private job placement service, to apply for a position with the Respondent, Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. The job the Petitioner applied for was Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner met all of the qualifications for the job of Secretary/Dispatcher. The Petitioner was interviewed by Mr. Jim Hart, the manager of the Ocala office of the Respondent. After interviewing the Petitioner, Mr. Hart decided, on the basis of her experience and references, that the Petitioner was the best qualified of several applicants. In this regard, it is noted that the Petitioner's prior employment had required the performance of duties substantially similar to those of the Secretary/Dispatcher position with Respondent. Thereafter, in the afternoon or evening of October 11, 1985, Mr. Hart telephoned the Petitioner, offered her the job, and advised her that she was to report to work on October 14, 1985. On October 14, 1985, the Petitioner reported to work at the Ocala office of the Respondent and immediately began performing the duties of Secretary/Dispatcher. During the work day on October 14, 1985, the Petitioner received a telephone call from Mrs. Lou Mohrman, the managing director of the Respondent. Mrs. Lou Mohrman welcomed the Petitioner to her position of employment and stated that she was pleased with the Petitioner's placement with the company. On October 15, 1985, Mr. L. D. Mohrman, president of Respondent, accompanied by Mrs. Lou Mohrman, managing director, visited the Ocala offices of the Respondent. After engaging in a boisterous conversation with Mr. Hart and visually ascertaining the Petitioner's race, Mrs. Mohrman summarily dismissed Petitioner without articulating a legitimate business reason for the termination. Within the next few days the Respondent listed the Secretary/Dispatcher position as vacant and continued to seek to fill the position with individuals with qualifications similar to or less than the qualifications of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a black female. She is a person within the meaning of Sections 760.02(5) and 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The dismissal of the Petitioner from her position of employment with the Respondent was motivated by the president and the managing director ascertaining the Petitioner's race. The dismissal of the Petitioner was motivated solely by her race. The Petitioner's starting salary at the Respondent company was $4.50 per hour for a 40-hour work week. After her termination, the Petitioner sought employment elsewhere and obtained another job in January of 1986, where she worked until November of 1986. In November of 1986 the Petitioner voluntarily left her job in order to finish school. When she began work in January of 1986 the Petitioner was making $3.80 per hour. When she quit in November of 1986 she was making $4.00 per hour.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment practice; Prohibiting the Respondent from terminating any employee on the basis of the employee's race; Requiring the Respondent to offer reinstatement to the Petitioner under the terms and conditions of employment to which she would be presently entitled if she had been continuously employed, including any raises to which she would have been entitled on the basis of longevity. Requiring the Respondent to pay back pay to the Petitioner from the date of termination until November of 1986 in an amount equal to the total amount the Petitioner would have earned as a Secretary/Dispatcher during that period, less any amounts actually earned during that period; and Requiring the Respondent to pay to the Petitioner her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3048 The following are my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance with exception of subordinate details not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6,7, and 8: Accepted Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12: Not included in findings of fact because they are subordinate procedural details. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Covered in prior findings. Paragraph 16: Accepted Paragraph 17: Covered in prior findings. Findings proposed by Respondent: (None) COPIES FURNISHED: Harry L. Lamb, Jr., Esq. Perry & Lamb, P.A. 312 W. First Street Suite 605 Sanford, Florida 32771 Mr. L. D. Mohrman, President Handling Systems Engineering, Inc. 3000 West 45th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Sherry B. Rice, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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JULIE WALLACE vs HEARTLAND PONTIAC, BUICK, CADILLAC, GMC TRUCK, INC., ET AL., 90-001137 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Feb. 23, 1990 Number: 90-001137 Latest Update: Jun. 18, 1990

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of marital status.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Julie Wallace. She was employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson from the last week of June, 1987, until September 12, 1988. Respondent is an automobile dealership, Heartland Pontiac-Buick- Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. Its corporate president at the time of Petitioner's employment termination was Nancy Cosgrove. Respondent hired Petitioner on June 18, 1987. Respondent's corporate president at that time was Steven Cosgrove, then husband to Nancy Cosgrove. Petitioner and her husband were married in July, 1987, shortly after she began her employment with Respondent. At the time, Petitioner's husband was also employed by Respondent as an automobile salesperson. The wedding ceremony took place at the Cosgrove home. Respondent does not have a work practice prohibiting nepotism and there are several examples of Respondent's employment of married couples, as well as employment of other multiple members of individual families. Petitioner fared well in Respondent's employment initially. She was recognized by the dealership as the "salesperson of the month" in August, 1987. She was awarded a trip to the "Indy 500" in May, 1988. In spite of Petitioner's productivity during the first year of her employment, Respondent lost a great amount of money for a period of approximately 14 months prior to terminationof Petitioner's employment. Respondent's financial losses resulted from insufficient sales overall in the dealership during that period of time. The separation and subsequent divorce of the Cosgroves coincided with Ms. Cosgrove's assumption of the presidency of Respondent. Ms. Cosgrove took over the dealership in order to prevent it from collapsing financially. For approximately two to four weeks prior to termination of Petitioner, sales records were abysmal for the entire sales force. Further, morale of the sales force was poor as the result of management changes and efforts to cut unnecessary expenses. In conjunction with management attempts to strengthen the dealership's dwindling finances, traditional assignment of demonstrator automobiles to salespeople were eliminated a few days prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment. The elimination of the demonstrator automobiles, coupled with the change in management from Mr. Cosgrove to Ms. Cosgrove, resulted in a verbal altercation between Petitioner's husband and Ms. Cosgrove on September 12, 1988. The upshot of that confrontation was the firing of Petitioner's husband by Ms. Cosgrove. A short time, perhaps an hour later, the sales manager employed by Ms. Cosgrove requested to see Petitioner. He asked Petitioner whether she might prefer to resign in theaftermath of her husband's termination. Petitioner said she did not wish to leave her employment. After Petitioner and Respondent's sales manager concluded their discussion, the sales manager returned later in the day and explained that Petitioner's employment was terminated in view of Petitioner's lack of production or automobile sales. Later, Respondent's sales manager provided Petitioner with a letter erroneously stating that Petitioner had been employed by Respondent for two years. The letter correctly stated that Petitioner was always in the top one third of the sales force in her performance, but did not elaborate on the extent to which performance of all members of the sales staff had plummeted prior to Petitioner's termination. At the time of Petitioner's employment termination, there was only one other salesperson, in addition to the sales manager, remaining on Respondent's sales staff. Through attrition and previous terminations, Ms. Cosgrove had virtually eliminated the sales force inherited from her ex-husband's management by the time of Petitioner's termination. The world of automotive salespersons is extremely competitive and pressurized. Individuals are constantly urged to produce or seek other employment. The fact of previous sales accomplishments provides salespersons no cushion for future periods of sale failures. As stated by Ms. Cosgrove, in a somewhat cold and dispassionate manner, at the final hearing, "you're either a hero or a zero." The discharge of sales personnel after a change of management and an extended period of financial non-profitability is not unusual in the automobile dealership business. Such a movement on the part of Ms. Cosgrove was also motivated by a desire to increase sales and improve morale with salespersons of her own choosing. Salespeople, such as Petitioner, working at Respondent's dealership are "at will" employees, possessing no employment contracts of a specified term, or conditions governing the termination of their employment. Sales employees at the dealership did have a payment plan or agreement with Respondent. The plan in effect during Petitioner's employment permitted her to draw a salary against commissions, provided she had accumulated commissions in-house and elected to utilize this draw procedure versus direct commission payment. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had no accumulations against which to draw a salary. The payment plan did not provide a set term of employment or address standards for employment termination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX It should be noted that both parties incorrectly filed their proposed findings with the Commission On Human Relations as opposed to the Division Of Administrative Hearings. Upon discovery of the error, the parties were permitted to have the proposed findings forwarded to the abovesigned by Commission personnel. Upon review of the proposed findings, it was noted that neither party's proposal is presented in the form of separately numbered paragraphs which would permit a referenced comment or ruling on each proposed finding. Each party's proposed findings have been reviewed and addressed to the extent possible by the foregoing findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Julie Wallace 1406 Chloe Terrace Sebring, FL 33870 E. Mark Breed III, Esq. 335 South Commerce Sebring, FL 33870 Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JAMELLA R. KING, 97-003734 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 11, 1997 Number: 97-003734 Latest Update: Apr. 02, 1998

The Issue Whether Respondent should have been suspended from her position with Petitioner as a school bus aide, and whether Respondent should be dismissed from her position.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, The School Board of Dade County (Board), was a duly constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida,1 pursuant to Article IX, Constitution of the State of Florida, and Section 230.03, Florida Statutes. Jamella R. King (King), was employed by the Board as a school bus aide from November 1989 until her suspension in July 1997. The position of school bus aide is governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Board. Since 1993, King's employment history has been characterized by excessive unauthorized absences, tardiness, and a continued disregard for administrative directives. In December 1993, King participated in a conference-for- the-record (CFR) because of her excessive unauthorized absences. Respondent was referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), a confidential, collectively bargained for benefit which assists employees who may be having problems that, while not associated with employment, may be interfering with their performance. King refused to attend the scheduled counseling sessions. In February 1994, King participated in another CFR to discuss her attendance problem. The seriousness of the situation was brought to King's attention, and she was directed to improve her attendance. King was again referred to EAP, but failed to avail herself of these services. On or about January 22, 1996, a Transportation Operations Procedures Reminder (Reminder) was given to King. The Reminder set forth the Board's attendance policies and advised King that she currently had four and a half days of unauthorized leave. On April 30, 1996, another Reminder was given to King, addressing her attendance deficiencies. At that time, King had accumulated the equivalent of at least ten days of unauthorized absences in the 1995/1996 school year. From August 28, 1995, to May 28, 1996, King accumulated the equivalent of 21 days of unauthorized absences. On or about June 10, 1996, a CFR was held with King to review her continued disregard of proper attendance practices. King was again referred to EAP and was advised that she must improve her attendance. King was warned that her failure to improve could result in termination of her employment. King refused to follow this directive and continued to accumulate unauthorized absences. In July 1996, King signed in for work, but failed to go to her assigned route. King was issued a letter of warning for failure to complete her assigned route. King's supervisor directed her to improve her attendance. King failed to improve her attendance. As of October 10, 1996, King had accumulated 36 days of unauthorized absences for the preceding 12 month period. On October 29, 1996, a CFR was held with King concerning her attendance problem. At the CFR King received a reasonable directive from her supervisor to improve her attendance. King failed to follow this directive. In January 1997, King was removed from her assigned placement and placed on sub-status by her supervisor because King had become unreliable at her work site due to her continued unauthorized absences. Sub-status refers to a pool of aides who substitute as needed. From January 4, 1996, to February 10, 1997, King accumulated the equivalent of 47.5 days of unauthorized absences. On February 10, 1997, a CFR was held with King regarding her attendance problems. King was again directed to improve her attendance. From March 4, 1996, to April 15, 1997, King had accumulated the equivalent of 44 days of unauthorized absences. On May 27, 1997, a CFR was held with King regarding her continued attendance problem. King's continual unauthorized absences adversely impacted her work site because her coworkers were compelled to perform King's job duties. King's unauthorized absences also adversely affected the quality of transportation being provided to the students who ride the buses to which bus aides are assigned. These students have special needs that require the presence of an aide who can properly attend to those needs. Without a bus aide, there is the potential that the bus driver will be interrupted and distracted by those students. Additionally, when different bus aides appear on the bus, these students may feel uncertain and nervous, which may also unnecessarily distract the bus driver. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between AFSCME and the Board provides: ARTICLE II -- RECOGNITION * * * Section 3. . . .It is understood and agreed that management possesses the sole right, duty, and responsibility for the operation of the schools and that all management rights repose in it, but that such rights must be exercised consistently with the other provisions of the agreement. These rights include, but are not limited to, the following: Discipline or discharge of any employee for just cause; . . . * * * ARTICLE V --DEFINITIONS * * * Section 27. Unauthorized Absence -- Any absence without pay which has not been requested by the employee and approved by the supervisor, in writing, at least five days in advance. Employees are required to notify the work location, prior to the beginning of the workday, when they are unable to report to work or intend to be absent. Absences of the employee, where notice of absence is made prior to the start of the workday, but are not covered by the employee having accumulated sick or personal leave, shall be charged as unauthorized absence and may result in disciplinary action in accordance with Article XI. Upon the employee reporting back to work, the employee shall be apprised of the unauthorized leave status; however, if the employee can demonstrate that there are extenuating circumstances (e.g., hospitalization or other unanticipated emergency), then consideration will be given to changing the status of leave. The work location supervisor has the authority to change an unauthorized leave; however, nothing herein precludes requested leave being determined to be unauthorized where the employee does not have available sick or sufficient personal leave. * * * ARTICLE XI -- DISCIPLINARY ACTION Section 4. Types of Separation Dissolution of the employment relation between a permanent unit member and the Board may occur in any of four distinct types of separation. * * * Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position -- An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. . . . Disciplinary -- The employee is separated by the employer for disciplinary cause arising from the employee's performance or non-performance of job responsibilities. Such action occurs at any necessary point in time. On July 23, 1997, the Board suspended King and initiated action to dismiss her from employment with the Dade County Public Schools.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining King's suspension without pay and dismissing her from her position with Petitioner as a school bus aide. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1998.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57447.209 Florida Administrative Code (1) 6B-4.009
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ARTHUR R. JONES vs PROGRESS RAIL SERVICES, INC., 96-002768 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Jun. 11, 1996 Number: 96-002768 Latest Update: Oct. 16, 1997

The Issue The issue is whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the petition for relief filed on April 19, 1996.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, petitioner, Arthur R. Jones, alleges that in October 1993, when he was fifty-four years of age, he was unlawfully terminated from his position as a welder with respondent, Progress Rail Services, Inc. (PRS), on account of his age. After conducting a preliminary investigation of the claim, the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. Petitioner then filed his petition for relief realleging the same disparate treatment. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of refurbishing railroad cars and is located in Green Cove Springs, Florida. Although there is no direct evidence as to the number of persons employed by PRS, through representation of its counsel in his opening statement, it can be inferred that PRS employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the year when the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or in the preceding calendar year. After taking a welding test, petitioner began employment with PRS in April 1992. Initially, he worked as a carpenter, but he was later transferred to a "weld out" position. The latter position involved physically demanding work and required petitioner and a co-worker, working as a team, to weld steel tops onto railroad car frames. During petitioner's tenure as a PRS employee, PRS had a progressive discipline policy which provided that an employee would receive a verbal warning, followed by a written warning, which was then followed by placement on probation. The fourth and final step was termination of employment. PRS's absenteeism and tardy policy was based on a point system. Employees received one point for tardy or early leave, and two points for absences. When the employee reached eight points, a verbal warning was given in accordance with the progressive discipline policy. A total of twelve points resulted in a written warning while sixteen points resulted in a period of probation. Eighteen points resulted in termination. On November 17, 1992, petitioner was given his first verbal warning regarding absenteeism. On March 24, 1993, petitioner again received a verbal warning for failing to report to work on time. On the March 24 disciplinary action form, petitioner was admonished by his supervisor to "come to work on time." On May 12, 1993, petitioner was given a written warning for absenteeism. On the disciplinary action form, the supervisor noted that petitioner "need(ed) to improve on come (sic) to work all work day." As of May 24, 1992, petitioner had accumulated seventeen points, and thus he was placed on probation for excessive absenteeism. His supervisor again warned him in writing "not (to) be late or absent," and if he was, "(i)t will result in your termination at (PRS)." All of the foregoing disciplinary actions were taken by supervisor O'Bryant. Sometime after May 24, 1992, petitioner began working under a new supervisor, Thomas M. Martin. On December 12, 1992, petitioner was given a verbal warning by Martin for "not wearing safety shoes." The warning was justified since petitioner was not wearing lace-up safety shoes as required by company policy. In May 1993, petitioner was transferred to a "weld-out" position under the supervision of Randy Cochran. On September 3, 1993, Cochran gave petitioner a written warning for "not doing (the) job assign(ed) to him!" Petitioner had been instructed to clean out a storage boxcar but was found reading a newspaper. He was advised in writing that he "need's (sic) to perform the job assign(ed) to him!" On October 1, 1993, petitioner was placed on probation for poor "work performance" due to not meeting established time standards for a particular job. Specifically, he was charged with "taking too long to do the work" by "spend(ing) 5.0 hours on (a job that) should have taken 2.0 hours to complete." He was told in writing to "(d)o (his) job within the time standards," or face possible "termination." After observing petitioner continually failing to meet established time standards during the next few days, on October 6, 1993, Cochran verbally warned petitioner that unless he "made the time standard" on the job he was working that morning, he would be terminated. When Cochran later observed petitioner "way behind" on his job, petitioner was terminated for poor "work performance." According to the disciplinary action form, petitioner was "not able to complete work within time standards." These time standards were uniformly applied to all welders regardless of age, and the dismissal was in conformity with PRS's progressive discipline policy. There is no credible evidence that PRS was motivated by discriminatory animus when it made this employment decision. Whether petitioner was replaced by another person, and if so, the age of that person, is not of record. When an employee leaves employment with PRS, an exit interview is conducted to identify any problems with employment policies and procedures, including management practices. Complaints made by the employee regarding unfair treatment, such as discrimination, are recorded on the exit interview form. When petitioner was discharged, an exit interview was conducted. During the interview, petitioner made no complaints regarding suspected age discrimination. Petitioner was not employed from the time of his discharge until November 16, 1994. On that date, he began collecting Social Security disability benefits. During the years 1991 through 1994, PRS discharged eighty-one employees. Of those, twenty-four were age forty or over. In 1995, respondent had one hundred fifty-seven employees, of which sixty-one were age forty or older. At hearing, petitioner contended that Randy Cochran, his supervisor from May 1993 until his termination, made discriminatory comments regarding his age. Specifically, petitioner contended that, on more than one occasion, Cochran called him an "old man" and threatened to fire him on account of his age. These allegations, however, are not deemed to be credible and are hereby rejected.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the the Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Arthur R. Jones Post Office Box 8 Satsuma, Florida 32189 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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