The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Caucasian male, was born on March 23, 1949. At the time of the alleged unlawful employment practice at issue in this case, Petitioner was 52-53 years old. Petitioner was employed by Respondent since 1973. He was terminated effective August 15, 2001. Respondent, at all times material to this case, is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent, at all relevant times, is in the business of providing telephone services to individuals and businesses in south Florida and elsewhere. At all relevant times, Petitioner was employed as a Service Technician. Service Technicians are responsible to install and repair telephone equipment in response to customer requests. At all relevant times, Respondent employs individuals as Service Technicians who are older than Petitioner. Many other individuals employed as Service Technicians are over the age of 40 at all times relevant to this case. Beginning in 1997, Respondent began to evaluate its Service Technicians according to a system called "Integrated Technicians Performance Plan [ITP].” The purpose of ITP was to improve customer service by evaluating Service Technicians and the individuals who manage them, on a regional basis, in accordance with standardized performance measures. Service Technicians whose ITP evaluations revealed deficiencies, including Petitioner, were provided assistance pursuant to individualized Technician Development Plans (TDP) and given a reasonable period of time to improve. From the time ITP was implemented in 1997, Petitioner was at all relevant times on a TDP because of deficiencies in his job performance. Petitioner's job performance was consistently deficient from 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment. From 1997 throughout the remainder of his employment Petitioner was provided assistance to help him improve his performance. Despite the assistance provided, Petitioner failed to improve his job performance to minimum levels required of all Service Technicians and required by his TDP. By August 2001, supervisors responsible for the training, evaluation and supervision of Service Technicians had determined that Petitioner did not maintain his job performance at the minimum levels required of Service Technicians and did not fulfill the requirements of his TDP. Accordingly, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner could have been terminated earlier than he was. In consideration of the fact that Petitioner had been a long-time employee of the company, he was given more time to improve his performance than company policy required. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that age played any role in Petitioner's termination. Petitioner did not prove that after he was terminated, a younger worker replaced him. Similarly, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence that he is disabled within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act, or that any disability played any role in his termination. Petitioner alleged his disabilities as “war wounds, tinnitus and hearing loss.” Petitioner never informed Respondent that he suffered from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Petitioner never informed Respondent that the disabilities alleged would in any way prevent him from performing his job as a Service Technician, or from satisfying the TDP developed to assist in ameliorating his performance deficiencies. Petitioner never informed Respondent that the alleged disabilities substantially impacted any major life function, or affected Petitioner’s ability to perform the essential functions of his Service Technician job. Respondent was not, at relevant times, on notice that Petitioner might suffer from any war wounds, tinnitus, hearing loss, or any other physical or mental impairment, disability, or handicap which might constitute a disability within the meaning of the Act. Respondent never perceived Petitioner to be disabled at times relevant to this case. During his employment as a Service Technician, Petitioner did not indicate a need for or make any request to Respondent for accommodations for any physical condition. Finally, Petitioner alleged that his termination was in retaliation for complaints he had filed in another forum. This allegation was not proved; rather, the evidence established that Petitioner never opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In sum, the evidence established that Respondent discharged Petitioner solely on account of inadequate job performance as a Service Technician, and not on account of his age, disability, or in retaliation for complaints filed in another forum.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on November 17, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Marchinko, was employed by the Witteman Company, Inc., from 1966 until April 2003. The Witteman Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Inc.") was a division of the Dover Corporation. While employed by Inc., Petitioner held the position of traffic manager. The most recent description of the duties of the position of traffic manager reads as follows: Responsible for, but not limited to, traffic managerial duties, coordinate and arrange for all product shipments, required documentation, customer interaction, and providing back-up support as required to others within the Company. Work with minimum supervision, produce quality, complete and accurate work and be an active and positive participant on teams and committees to which assigned. In February 2003, Cryogenic Industries made an asset purchase of Inc. and established Witteman, LLC (hereinafter LLC). LLC engineers and sells carbon dioxide, recovery, and production equipment to soft drink and brewing companies. Whereas Inc. had a maximum of 110 employees, LLC was established with only 17 employees, as many departments such as purchasing, traffic, and accounting were eliminated or "farmed out." At the time of the asset purchase, all employees of Inc. were terminated due to the sale of the assets of Inc. Petitioner was terminated from employment with Inc. effective April 8, 2003. She signed a Severance Agreement and Waiver and Release of Claims, releasing Inc. from all claims, including any related to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act. The position of traffic manager has not and does not exist at LLC. Petitioner was not hired by LLC. Petitioner has never been employed by LLC and, therefore, was not terminated by LLC. A few employees of Inc. were hired by LLC. Petitioner was not one of them. Cara Brammer is one of the employees of Inc. who was hired by LLC. Her position is Comptroller. Petitioner contends that regardless of Ms. Brammer's title, Ms. Brammer performs the same functions that Petitioner used to perform for Inc. Petitioner believes that Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC because she is younger than Petitioner. At the time Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC, she was approximately 39 years old and Petitioner was 55 years old. Ms. Brammer's duties as Comptroller include accounts payable, cost accounting, and general ledger work. According to Ms. Brammer, the traffic manager duties previously performed by Petitioner were separated between two of LLC's sister companies in California, which handle all of the major equipment, including manufacturing and shipping for LLC. William Geiger is General Manager of LLC. According to Mr. Geiger, the manufacturing of the product was shifted to two divisions located in California. The primary shipping of the company's product was also shifted to California. This is consistent with Ms. Brammer's testimony. According to Ms. Brammer, a small portion of the shipping duties that had initially been sent to California are now handled by LLC. She estimates that she spends only four to five hours a week on these traffic duties, that Mr. Geiger handles some of these duties, and that "quite a bit" of these traffic duties have been farmed out to a company called Freight Forwarder. LLC employs people in their thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties. There is no competent evidence that LLC used age as a criterion in its determination of who would and who would not be hired for the newly formed company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2004), popularly known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic female. Petitioner was employed by Respondent in records for almost 15 years prior to July 16, 2004, when she was terminated. Respondent is a municipal corporation located in Miami- Dade County, Florida, and an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent provides a variety of public services generally associated with cities of comparable size, including a full service police department. At all relevant times, Hispanics comprised approximately half of the police department's workforce. Many of these individuals were employed in supervisory capacities. Four Hispanics were supervisors in Petitioner's chain of command. In her position in records, Petitioner was responsible to timely and accurately process official police documents. Such processing included the completion of forms and transmittal documents and timely copying, filing and production of such documents to appropriate individuals and authorities (document processing). Failure to discharge any of the foregoing responsibilities is reasonably deemed by Respondent to be incompetence, and a firing offense(s). In her position in records, Petitioner was also responsible to comply with all directives of supervisors and to cooperate in internal affairs investigations. Cooperation in this context includes providing sworn statements and/or answering questions under oath as may be required by Respondent. Failure to comply with directives and to cooperate in internal affairs investigations are reasonably deemed by Respondent to be insubordination, and firing offenses. On April 29, 2004, a member of the public presented himself to records and requested a copy of an official police record to which he was entitled to access, specifically a traffic ticket. Records could not locate the document because it had not been properly processed by Petitioner, who was responsible for doing so. Having become aware of a problem with this particular document processing, Respondent thereupon took reasonable steps to determine whether this was an isolated error by Petitioner. In so doing, Respondent discovered and documented a high volume of document processing errors with respect to official police records for which Petitioner was responsible. In February 2004, one of Petitioner's supervisors – one who happened to be Hispanic -- issued a written directive (the February directive) to all records employees which required that they disclose, on a weekly basis, any "backlogs" of document processing work. In direct violation of the directive, Petitioner never disclosed existence of her backlog, which was, by April 29, 2004, extremely large. Now on notice of the backlog and deeply concerned about its potential effects on the police department and the public it serves, and pursuant to police department policy, an internal affairs investigation was initiated under the leadership of the same Hispanic supervisor. Over the course of the investigation, Respondent learned that the problem(s) revealed on April 29, 2004, were only the "tip of the iceberg." The internal affairs investigation uncovered “hundreds and hundreds” of additional document processing errors. Virtually all of the errors discovered involved official police records for which Petitioner was responsible. In the course of the internal affairs investigation, Petitioner was directed to give a sworn statement, and refused to do so, which refusal was deemed to constitute insubordination. Petitioner’s errors as documented in the internal investigation demonstrated incompetence. Her failure to comply with the February directive and to provide a sworn statement to internal affairs investigators constituted insubordination. At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, Petitioner was terminated for incompetence in the performance of her document processing responsibilities and for insubordination. Petitioner failed to discredit the factual underpinnings of Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment; neither did she establish any discriminatory basis upon which Respondent terminated her employment. Respondent replaced Petitioner with an Hispanic, who remained employed by Respondent through and including the time of the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter its final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Christina Quintero 4780 Northwest 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33126 David C. Miller, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt Sun Trust International Center, 28th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was unlawfully terminated from her position with Respondent because of her race (Caucasian), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter "FCRA"), Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant facts are determined: Respondent is a corporation, licensed to do business in Florida, that provides cleaning services to business clients; and is an employer, as that term is defined, under the FCRA. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent on January 1, 1997. Petitioner was hired as a restroom cleaner, and remained in that position until her termination from employment with Respondent on August 6, 1998. Throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors were: Cecilia Haimes ("Haimes"), a Caucasian female; Danna Hewett ("Hewett"), a Caucasian Female; and Carlos Ramirez ("Ramirez"), an Hispanic male. Additionally, throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was assigned to work at the Orange County Convention Center ("OCCC"). Hewett began her employment with Respondent as a restroom cleaner. Shortly thereafter, she was promoted by Ramirez to the position of lead restroom cleaner. Shortly after that, she was once again promoted by Ramirez, to the position of supervisor. As a supervisor, Hewett supervised Petitioner. Hewett became Petitioner's supervisor in or around August 1997. In her capacity as supervisor, Hewett was informed by other employees at OCCC that Petitioner was spreading rumors and gossiping about alleged affairs between certain employees and/or supervisors. Hewett and Ramirez discussed Petitioner's behavior, and they concluded that such behavior was extremely disruptive to the work environment. Specifically, such behavior by Petitioner affected employee morale and employees' respect for their supervisors. Based on these allegations, Ramirez contacted Ronald Jirik ("Jirik"), the Central Florida Regional Manager, to inform him of Petitioner's behavior. Upon meeting with Hewett and Ramirez, Jirik informed Ramirez to meet with Petitioner to try to get her to stop spreading such rumors. Ramirez met with Petitioner shortly thereafter. He attempted to resolve the problem and instructed her not to gossip or spread rumors. However, the problem persisted. Jirik contacted Ramirez to follow up on whether or not Ramirez was able to resolve the problem. Ramirez informed Jirik that he was unable to stop the rumors, and that he believed that Petitioner was continuing this improper behavior. Jirik then informed Ramirez that it would probably be best if Petitioner was transferred from the OCCC, and be given the option to transfer to another facility that was of equal distance from her home. Jirik is Caucasian. Jirik suggested that Petitioner be transferred to the Orlando Sentinel building due to the fact that, based on the information in Petitioner's personnel file, this location would have been of equal distance from her home. Additionally, such a transfer would not have changed any of the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including but not limited to, pay, benefits, responsibilities, or shifts. Based on the foregoing, Ramirez met with Petitioner and she was offered a transfer to the Orlando Sentinel building location. However, Petitioner refused to accept the transfer. Thereafter, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated on August 6, 1998. The evidence proved that Ramirez reprimanded Spanish- speaking and Caucasian employees in the same manner. Additionally, there was no credible evidence to show that Ramirez gave any form of favoritism to Spanish-speaking employees. Respondent's reason for terminating Petitioner was based on Respondent's perception that her conduct was disruptive to the work force. The allegation that Petitioner was terminated based on a discriminatory animus is unsubstantiated by the testimony and other evidence. There is no evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on her race (Caucasian).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Attas-Kaplan, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP 450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 800 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mary J. Hall 1821 Ernest Street Maitland, Florida 32794 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his age.
Findings Of Fact Currently, Petitioner is a retired, 68-year-old male. He retired from Respondent at the age of 66. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a truck driver. The position of truck driver, involves many long hours of driving (sometimes over 56 hours) various interstate and intrastate truck routes, along with some lifting and exposure to diesel fumes. Petitioner attributed a variety of illnesses and health problems to his work as a truck driver. Some of the illnesses and health problems are hypertension and heart blockage and failure, which resulted in the implantation of a pacemaker, carpal tunnel syndrome, polyneuropathy, muscular and autonomic system problems and pathological hyper-insomnia. Petitioner offered no evidence that any of these conditions resulted from his employment with Respondent. Prior to September 9 or 10, 2000, at the age of 64, Petitioner was hospitalized for heart problems. Around September 9 or 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the hospital. Upon his return to work, he gave his employer a physician’s note indicating that his work duties be limited to 40 hours a week. Petitioner met with Respondent’s transportation manager regarding whether less lengthy routes were available or whether his schedule or work duties could be adjusted. The employer did not have the ability to adjust the length of the routes, but added a second driver to ride and help with the driving on any route that Petitioner drove. Petitioner inquired about office work and was told that if he was interested in such work he needed to apply at the main office to see what was available. In part, because Petitioner liked driving and in part because the lesser number of hours involved in office work would cause Petitioner to earn less, Petitioner elected not to pursue and did not apply for such office work. No adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner, and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. At some point during this meeting, Petitioner alleges that the transportation manager said, “Why don’t you just retire.” Petitioner offered no specific context for this statement other than it was a general conversation about his health and closeness to retirement age relative to the adjustments that could be made to his driving duties. One isolated statement such as the one above does not demonstrate any intent to discriminate on Respondent’s part based on Petitioner’s age, especially since no adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. Around January 1, 2001, for medical reasons, Respondent approved a Leave of Absence with pay for Petitioner. In June or July, 2002, Petitioner filed his first workers compensation claim with Respondent. Petitioner’s claim was turned over to Respondent’s workers' compensation insurer, Kemper Insurance Company. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Kemper was under the direction or control of Respondent in any decisions Kemper made regarding paying or litigating Petitioner’s claim. In any event, Petitioner’s claim was contested. The main reason the claim was contested was that Kemper alleged that Petitioner’s “injuries” were not work-related. Over the years, Petitioner has amended his claim to include, among other health claims, the health problems listed above. Kemper has maintained its defense. During a mediation session on December 11, 2002, at which the employer was not present and in response to an inquiry regarding Kemper’s defense, Kemper’s representative stated that except for the carpal tunnel claim, all of Petitioner’s medical conditions were due to the natural aging process. Petitioner claims this statement demonstrates an intent on his employer’s part to discriminate against him based on his age. Such an isolated statement does not demonstrate such an intent especially since such conditions can be age related, there was no expert medical evidence demonstrating the cause of Petitioner’s health problems, the statement did not come from the employer, and there was no evidence that the insurer was under the direction or control of the employer regarding decisions to litigate or the factual basis for the defenses that the insurer would raise. The workers' compensation litigation continues to date. In the interim, Petitioner remained on a leave of absence with pay until January 1, 2003. He retired thereafter. There was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or that Petitioner suffered any adverse employment action based on his age. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Glynda Copeland Qualified Representative Tree of Life, Inc. Post Office Box 410 St. Augustine, Florida 32095-0410 Robert C. Johnson 560 Florida Club Boulevard, Suite 112 St. Augustine, Florida 32084
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by terminating her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act.
Findings Of Fact Lombardi started her employment as a judicial assistant with Dade County in 1971. Judge Mattie Belle Davis was the first judge who hired Petitioner. Judicial Assistants serve at the pleasure of the appointing Judge.1 Judge Bruce Levy hired Lombardi as his judicial assistant after Judge Davis retired. In December 2004, Judge Levy lost his re-election bid and Petitioner no longer had a full-time position as a judicial assistant with a judge. Lombardi started working in the temporary pool of judicial assistants. The position allowed Petitioner to retain her benefits while seeking a permanent judicial assistant position. While serving in the pool, Petitioner worked for Judge Leon Firtel from February 14, 2005, through February 28, 2006, before he let her go. Petitioner then worked for Judge Rosa Rodriguez from April 1, 2006, through May 23, 2007, until she let her go. Petitioner last worked for Dade County when she served as retired Judge Roger Silver's ("Silver") judicial assistant from September 1, 2007, until January 7, 2008. Lombardi was terminated in Silver's chambers with a bailiff and Ms. Suarez from Human Resources present. Silver informed the Petitioner her services were no longer needed and he was letting her go. Petitioner questioned why she was being terminated; however, Silver did not provide an explanation. Silver terminated Petitioner because he was not happy with her work performance. Silver testified that Petitioner had the following problems regarding her work: taking lunch breaks beyond the one hour he had discussed with her; numerous complaints from attorneys; selling Avon at the work place; not answering the phones and allowing calls to go to voicemail; and repeatedly setting unnecessary hearings on the docket. Prior to terminating Lombardi, Silver inquired with Human Resources about a replacement and was informed that he could not be assured that he would be able to get a temporary assistant to replace Lombardi due to the unavailability of funding. He still choose to terminate Petitioner because, "[he] felt having no one was better than what [he] had under the circumstances." Petitioner was not able to go back in the "temporary pool" of judicial assistants as she had in the past after Silver terminated her. In 2008, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit had a hiring freeze whereby the temporary pool was no longer funded. Human Resources eventually sent Elizabeth Gonzalez, whose date of birth is May 26, 1965, to Silver as a temporary judicial assistant. Silver had never met Gonzalez prior to her coming to work for him. There was no discussion of age when Silver requested a judicial assistant or when Gonzalez was assigned to him. Gonzalez served as Silver's temporary judicial assistant for a number of weeks and, when personnel advised him he could hire someone, including Gonzalez, Silver hired Gonzalez on or about March 10, 2008, because he was pleased with her work. Gonzalez worked with him until his retirement in December 2008. At the time when Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner was unaware of the exact age of her replacement. Petitioner's date of birth is May 18, 1948.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.