The Issue The issue in this matter concerns the amount of monetary sanctions that the Agency for Health Care Administration may impose on Respondent pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) based on the overpayment of Medicaid reimbursements made to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is designated as the single state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, otherwise known as the Medicaid program. See § 409.902(1), Fla. Stat. AHCA is responsible for administering and overseeing the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. See § 409.913, Fla. Stat. AHCA's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (“MPI”) is the unit within AHCA that oversees the activities of Florida Medicaid providers and recipients. MPI ensures that providers abide by Medicaid laws, policies, and rules. MPI is responsible for conducting audits, investigations, and reviews to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, or neglect in the Medicaid program. See §409.913, Fla. Stat. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Respondent had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA, Medicaid Provider No. 0742236-00. The Medicaid provider agreement is a voluntary contract between AHCA and the provider. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to the duly-enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into rule, which were in effect during the audit period. Pursuant to its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of the Medicaid program, MPI conducted an audit of Respondent's paid claims for Medicaid reimbursement for the period from April 1, 2011, through October 31, 2013. The audit’s purpose was to verify that claims AHCA paid to Respondent under the Medicaid program did not exceed the amount authorized by Medicaid laws, policies, and applicable rules. As a result of the audit, AHCA determined that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $177,717.69 for services that, in whole or in part, were not covered under the Medicaid program. AHCA also sought to impose sanctions upon Respondent consisting of an administrative fine of $34,192.30,2/ as well as investigative, legal, and expert witness costs of $1,127.66. Respondent is a dentist specializing in pediatric dentistry. He has practiced for over 43 years. He maintains offices in both Clearwater and Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent’s dental practice serves almost exclusively developmentally disabled children. Many of his patients suffer from severe behavioral, emotional, mental, physical, or social handicaps or other medical issues. Respondent’s practice is primarily based on referrals of special needs patients who other pediatric and general dentists send to him for treatment. Approximately, 95 percent of Respondent’s patients are Medicaid recipients. At the final hearing, AHCA presented the testimony of Robi Olmstead, an AHCA administrator with MPI. Ms. Olmstead's responsibilities include overseeing MPI investigations and supervising AHCA staff’s performance of Medicaid audits. With over 10 years of experience in her position, Ms. Olmstead is very familiar with and knowledgeable about how MPI conducts Medicaid audits. Specifically related to this matter, Ms. Olmstead, in her official capacity with AHCA, signed the FAR that MPI presented to Respondent on April 8, 2015. Ms. Olmstead described MPI’s Medicaid audit of Respondent’s Medicaid claims.3/ Using AHCA's data support system, MPI investigators accessed the complete universe of Respondent’s Medicaid claims. MPI selected the period from April 1, 2011, through October 31, 2013, as the audit period. MPI calculated the amount of overpayment based on its review of a random sample of 35 recipients for whom Respondent submitted 507 claims during the audit period. AHCA then contacted Respondent and requested that he submit documents to substantiate his Medicaid claims for the 35 recipients. In response to AHCA’s request for documents, Respondent provided his records of service and billing for each of the 507 claims for the 35 recipients. AHCA, upon receiving Respondent’s records, forwarded them for a peer review. The peer reviewer evaluated the records and prepared worksheets reflecting a determination regarding the nature of the dental services rendered for each claim, and whether such claim was eligible for payment under the Medicaid program. Based on the peer reviewer’s determination, MPI calculated that Respondent had been overpaid for all claims he presented within the audit period by a total of $177,717.69. After determining that Respondent had been overpaid, AHCA prepared and sent to Respondent a Preliminary Audit Report (“PAR”), dated February 12, 2015. The PAR notified Respondent that the audit revealed that he had been overpaid by $177,717.69. On April 8, 2015, AHCA issued the FAR. The FAR served as AHCA’s final determination that Medicaid had overpaid Respondent. The FAR set forth the following bases for AHCA’s determination that Respondent was overpaid: Documentation Supported a Lower Level of Service (“LL”): The peer review of Respondent’s records revealed that the documentation Respondent submitted for payment did not support level of service for some claims. These claims may involve an established patient that Respondent coded as a new patient (which is billed at a higher level). AHCA believed that Respondent should have used a different code for the service he provided. AHCA considered the Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these services in excess of the appropriate amount an overpayment.4/ No Documentation (“No Doc”): Respondent’s records revealed that some medical services for which Respondent billed and received payment were incomplete or lacked sufficient documentation. AHCA considered the Medicaid payments for these services an overpayment.5/ Not Medically Necessary (“NMN”): The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that the documentation did not support the medical necessity of some of the claims Respondent presented for payment. (Respondent explained that this category of claims related to occlusal x-rays he obtained from dental patients for whom he also had taken panorex x-rays. The peer review considered these charges duplicative.) Therefore, AHCA considered the Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these claims an overpayment.6/ Erroneous Coding (“EC”): The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that some services rendered were erroneously coded on the submitted claim. These services documented one activity, but another billing code was identified. Consequently, AHCA considered Medicaid payments made to Respondent for claims in excess of the appropriate service an overpayment.7/ Behavioral Management (“BM”) Services Not Reimbursable: The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that Respondent did not adequately explain his claims for BM services. Respondent should not have requested payment for BM without explaining why BM was used or the specific type of BM techniques utilized for treatment. Furthermore, the peer review determined that Respondent should not have included BM in his claim if he also billed for either sedation or analgesia on the same date of service. AHCA considered Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these BM claims an overpayment.8/ The FAR also notified Respondent that AHCA had calculated and was seeking to assess a fine of $35,543.54 (since lowered to $34,192.30). Ms. Olmstead explained that, in accordance with section 409.913(15), (16), and (17) and rule 59G- 9.070, AHCA must apply sanctions for violations of federal and state laws, including Medicaid policy. AHCA determined to sanction Respondent in the form of an administrative fine. After determining that Respondent had been overpaid for Medicaid claims, AHCA prepared a Documentation Worksheet for Imposing Administrative Sanctions (“Worksheet”). The Worksheet was signed on April 7, 2015, by an AHCA investigator. Ms. Olmstead also signed the Worksheet after she reviewed and approved the form. The Worksheet specified how AHCA calculated the fine it sought to impose on Respondent for the Medicaid claims violations listed above. As noted on the Worksheet, AHCA found a total of 58 claims violated Medicaid laws, policies, and rules. The specific number of claims in violation were: lower level of service 38; no documentation, 9; not medically necessary, 8; error in coding, 2; and behavior management/illegal documentation, 1. The Worksheet also contained a section that read: Confirm that you have considered the following via checking the box: I have considered the serious & extent of the violation. I have considered whether there is evidence that the violation is continuing after written notice. I have considered whether the violation impacted the quality of medical care provided to Medicaid recipients. I have considered whether the licensing agency in any state in which the provider operates or has operated has taken any action against the provider. If the sanction to be imposed is suspension or termination, I have considered whether the sanction will impact access by recipients to Medicaid services. The AHCA investigator placed a checkmark by each consideration. AHCA did not use any additional forms or methods to document its consideration of these factors. AHCA did not provide the Worksheet to Respondent with the FAR. The Worksheet is an internal AHCA document the investigator and administrator use to calculate the amount of a fine. However, AHCA did include in the FAR the final monetary sanction which AHCA calculated on the Worksheet ($35,543.54). Ms. Olmstead stated that AHCA considered Respondent’s failure to comply with Medicaid laws a “first offense.” Pursuant to rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), AHCA shall impose a $1,000 fine per claim found to be in violation for a first offense. Accordingly, based on the 58 claims reviewed for the audit, AHCA calculated a fine of $58,000.00. Thereafter, rule 59G-9.070(4)(a) instructs AHCA to limit the monetary sanction for a “first offense” violation of Medicaid laws under rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) to twenty percent of the amount of the overpayment. Thus, AHCA reduced the amount of the fine it seeks to impose on Respondent to $34,192.30. Finally, Ms. Olmstead testified that the FAR cited to several documents that AHCA distributes to guide and inform providers of the types of services that the Medicaid program covers and how to correctly bill Medicaid for these services. The documents applicable to this matter are: the 2007 Florida Medicaid Dental Services Coverages and Limitations Handbook; the 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook; the 2011 Florida Medicaid Dental Services Coverages and Limitations Handbook; and the 2012 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent testified that this Medicaid audit was the first he has experienced. Prior to this matter, he has never been fined or sanctioned for any violations of the Medicaid program. Respondent also emphasized that this Medicaid audit did not show that he ever rendered sub-quality dental care to any of his patients. Respondent acknowledged that he currently receives the Medicaid Handbooks electronically. Respondent conceded that he is bound to adhere to the Medicaid guidelines in the Handbooks. Respondent offered the following explanations for the claims he submitted which resulted in the overpayments: Not Medically Necessary: Respondent understood that AHCA determined that his claims for occlusal x-rays were considered duplicative. Respondent explained that the occlusal x-rays reveal tooth decay and disease that panorex x-rays do not. Furthermore, Respondent’s use of the occlusal x-rays did not result in any harm to his patients. On the contrary, Respondent expressed that these x-rays only enhanced the services and treatment he provided to his patients. Behavioral Management (“BM”) Services: The BM fee compensates the provider for the effort and time it takes to prepare a patient for dental treatment or control the patient during treatment. In many cases, if Respondent cannot employ BM techniques, he cannot render effective dental treatment. Respondent charges approximately $35 for BM services. Insufficient Records: Respondent stated that the medical notes and records that his office maintains meet or exceed Florida standards. However, certain of his records apparently did not comply with Medicaid program requirements. Respondent further asserted that AHCA never alleged that he sought payment for services he never delivered or were not completed. Sabrina Blake is the office manager for Respondent’s dental practice. As part of her responsibilities, she handles billing practice inquiries. Regarding AHCA’s claim of insufficient records to support the BM charges, Ms. Blake explained that Respondent marked “BM” on the patients’ records to indicate that a behavior management technique was used. The error was that Respondent did not write out exactly what behavior management technique was used during the treatment. Medicaid rules required additional information or documentation. Therefore, while Respondent’s practice did not provide the requisite notation to support a Medicaid payment for BM charges, Respondent did actually provide the service claimed. Respondent stated that AHCA never provided him the opportunity to correct any alleged violations or billing errors. Respondent claims that none of the disallowed charges or medical services were submitted to intentionally obtain an unauthorized payment from the Medicaid program. AHCA did not produce evidence to contradict Respondent’s assertion. Prior to the final hearing, the parties entered into an agreement wherein Respondent agreed to repay to AHCA the full amount of the overpayment Respondent received from the Medicaid program.9/ Based on the overpayment, AHCA seeks to impose on Respondent an administrative fine of $34,192.30. Accordingly, the primary issue for the undersigned to consider is whether AHCA is authorized under the applicable law to impose on Respondent an administrative sanction in the form of a fine as a result of his violation of Medicaid laws, rules, or policy. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, AHCA proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to comply with provisions of the Medicaid laws.10/ As detailed below, section 409.913 and rule 59G-9.070 authorize AHCA to impose a fine on Respondent in the amount of $34,192.30 based on his violations of the Medicaid program. Consequently, a fine of $34,192.30 should be assessed against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA issue a final order imposing an administrative fine of $34,192.30 for Respondent’s first offense of violating provisions of Medicaid provider publications adopted by AHCA rules, Florida or federal laws or regulations governing the Medicaid program, or the provider’s Medicaid agreement with AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), out of her settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Alia Juarez ("Alia") was born on September 12, 2016. A few hours after birth, Alia was found, in the arms of a relative in her mother's hospital room, to be unresponsive and not breathing. She was resuscitated, but suffered catastrophic brain damage as a result of lack of oxygen. Due to the catastrophic and permanent brain damage, Alia is unable to ambulate, communicate, toilet, eat or care for herself in any manner. She is completely dependent on others for every aspect of her daily life. Alia's medical care related to the injury was paid by Medicaid and Medicaid provided $168,054.34 in benefits. Accordingly, Alia's entire claim for past medical expenses was in the amount of $168,054.34. Alia's parents and natural guardians, Sandra Perez Luna and Jose Luis Juarez, brought a medical malpractice claim against the medical providers responsible for Alia's care ("Defendants") to recover all of Alia's damages associated with her injuries, as well as their own damages associated with their daughter's injuries. The medical malpractice claim against the Defendants was settled for a lump sum unallocated settlement of $925,000. Due to Alia being a minor, court approval of the settlement was required and the court approved the settlement by Order of November 26, 2018. As a condition of Alia's eligibility for Medicaid, Alia assigned to AHCA her right to recover from liable third-parties medical expenses paid by Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) and § 409.910(6)(b), Fla. Stat. During the pendency of Alia's medical malpractice claim, AHCA was notified of the claim. AHCA did not "institute, intervene in, or join in" the medical malpractice action to enforce its rights as provided in section 409.910(11), or participate in any aspect of Alia's medical malpractice claim against the Defendants. Instead, AHCA asserted a $168,054.34 Medicaid lien against Alia's cause of action and settlement of that action. Application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to Alia's $925,000 settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $168,054.34 Medicaid lien. Petitioner presented the testimony of Alfred R. Bell, Jr., Esquire, a Florida attorney with 22 years' experience in personal injury law, including medical malpractice. Mr. Bell is board-certified in Civil Trial by the Florida Bar. He represented Alia and her family in the medical malpractice action. As a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured clients. He also stays abreast of jury verdicts in his area by reviewing jury verdict reporters and discussing cases with other trial attorneys. He was accepted as an expert in valuation of damages without objection. Mr. Bell explained the seriousness of Alia's injuries, stating that within a few hours of being born, Alia went from a healthy baby to a child who will never have a normal life. Mr. Bell testified that Alia is unable to swallow and requires suction every five to 15 minutes and will be dependent on others for her care for the remainder of her life. "I can't think of much worse to have happened to a child than the damages that she suffered," said Mr. Bell. The damages of Alia's parents are similarly catastrophic. Mr. Bell testified that he had reviewed life care plans and economist reports in cases involving similar injuries to children and the present value of Alia's future needs would approach $20 million. Further, her lost ability to earn money in the future would have a present value of $1.7 million. Mr. Bell testified that to these economic damages, the value of Alia's noneconomic damages would be added. Mr. Bell outlined that the "worst damage in my opinion that she sustained isn't an economic damage, it's the damage to the person because that's something that you can't give them back what's been taken away." Mr. Bell testified that Alia's noneconomic damages would have a similar significant value. Based on his training and experience, including the review of jury verdicts in comparable cases, Mr. Bell opined that the damages recoverable in Alia's case had a conservative value of $20 million. Petitioner also presented the testimony of R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, a Tallahassee trial attorney with more than 40 years' experience. His practice is dedicated to plaintiff's personal injury, as well as medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical products liability. He has handled cases involving catastrophic brain injury to children and handles jury trials. He routinely makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties. He was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages without objection. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Barrett opined that Alia's damages are conservatively valued in excess of $20 million. He testified that Alia's economic damages alone would have a value of $20 million and then, her noneconomic damages would also have a value of $20 million alone. In regard to the noneconomic damages, Mr. Barrett testified that the jury verdicts in cases comparable to that of Alia's case support his valuation of Alia's damages--noting that the average noneconomic award alone in those comparable verdicts was $19.4 million. Both experts testified that using $20 million as the value of all damages, Alia only recovered 4.63 percent of the value of her damages. Accordingly, they opined that it would be reasonable, rational, and conservative to allocate 4.63 percent of the settlement, or $7,780.92, to past medical expenses paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program. AHCA did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, propose a different valuation of the damages, or contest the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses. In short, Petitioner's evidence was unrebutted. The testimony from Mr. Bell and Mr. Barrett is compelling and persuasive. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that $7,780.92 of the settlement represents reimbursement for past medical expenses.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments, and, if so, what is the aggregate amount of the overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Doctor's Office, was a Florida corporation approved by the Agency to provide group Medicaid services. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was owned entirely by non-physicians who employed salaried physicians to provide Medicaid services. Petitioner, at all times relevant to this matter, offered physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 371236P-00. Petitioner, pursuant to the specific terms in the contract with the Agency, agreed to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program, and Federal laws and regulations. Petitioner, pursuant to its contract with the Agency, agreed to only seek reimbursement from the Medicaid program for services that were "medically necessary" and "Medicaid compensable." The Audit In mid-1996, the Agency, pursuant to its statutory responsibility, advised Petitioner that it intended to audit Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims for the alleged medical services it provided between July 1, 1994 and June 30, 1996. In September 1996, the Agency conducted an initial audit site visit, and randomly selected 61 patient files for review. The complete patient files, provided by Petitioner, were reviewed by Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse consultant and Agency employee, as well as Dr. Solenberger, a physician consultant and Agency employee. In accordance with its procedure, the Agency determined that Petitioner had submitted a total of 580 claims for reimbursement relating to the 61 patient files and had received full payment from the Medicaid program for each claim. On March 3, 1997, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR), and advised Petitioner that it had over-billed Medicaid and received an overpayment from the program. Shortly thereafter, the Agency auditors, Dr. Solenberger and Ms. Dewey, met with Frank Colavecchio, Petitioner's Corporate Representative, and discussed the Medicaid violations alleged in the review. During the meeting, the Agency requested Mr. Colavecchio to instruct Petitioner's staff physicians to review their records and provide a written rebuttal to the Agency's initial determinations. Within days, and prior to any further action, the Agency placed the audit on indefinite hold. The Agency decided to delay the audit until certain proposed legislation relating to peer review and the integrity of the Medicaid reimbursement program was enacted. Two years later, Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, was enacted during the 1999 legislative session and became law. Shortly thereafter, in 1999, the Agency hired Dr. Larry Deeb, a board-certified, practicing pediatrician, to perform a peer review of Petitioner's practices and procedures. Dr. Deeb has performed similar medical records reviews for the Medicaid program since 1981 and possesses a thorough understanding of CPT coding and the EPSDT requirements. Dr. Deeb received the medical files provided by Petitioner, and reviewed each patient file in the random sample, including the medical services and Medicaid-related claim records. On November 11, 1999, Dr. Deeb completed his peer review of 564 of the 580 claims provided in the random sample and forwarded his findings to the Agency. Dr. Deeb advised the Agency that 16 reimbursement claims involved adult patients and he therefore did not review them. Utilizing Dr. Deebs findings, the Agency employed appropriate and valid auditing and statistical methods, and calculated the total Medicaid overpayment that Petitioner received during the two year audit period. On July 17, 2000, approximately four years after the original audit notification, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The Agency advised Petitioner that, based upon its review of the random sample of 61 patients for whom Petitioner submitted 580 claims for payment between 1994 and 1996, Petitioner received $875,261.03 in total overpayment from the Medicaid program during the audit period. Petitioner denied the overpayment and requested a formal administrative hearing. Following the initial commencement of the final hearing in this matter in December 2001, Dr. Deeb, again, reviewed the disputed claims and modified his opinion relating to 6 claims. Thereafter, the Agency recalculated the alleged overpayment and demanded Petitioner to pay $870,748.31. The Allegations The Agency alleges that specific claims submitted by Petitioner, which were paid by the Medicaid program, fail to comply with specific Medicaid requirements and therefore must be reimbursed. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has required providers to meet the Medicaid program's policies and procedures as set forth in federal, state, and local law. To qualify for payment, it is the provider's duty to ensure that all claims "[a]re provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with . . . state . . . law." Section 409.913(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Medicaid manuals are available to all Providers. Petitioner, as a condition of providing Medicaid services pursuant to the Medicaid program, is bound by the requirements and restrictions specified in the manuals, and under the contract, is required to reimburse the Medicaid program for any paid claims found to be in violation of Medicaid policies and procedures. The evidence presented at hearing established that Petitioner frequently violated various Medicaid policies and procedures. First, Petitioner repeatedly failed to comply with Section 10.9 of the Medicaid Physician's Provider Handbook, (MPPH), and Sections 409.905(9), 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp. 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes, which require all medical services to be rendered by, or supervised by a physician, and attested to by the physician's signature. Medical records reflecting services for paid claims must be physician signature certified and dated, or the services are not defined as physician's services. In addition, Petitioner routinely failed to correctly document the provision of certain physician's assistant (P.A.) Medicaid services that require the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath. See Chapter 1 of the Physician Assistant Coverage and Limitations Handbook, March 1995, and Appendix D (Glossary) in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (HCFA-1500). In addition, Petitioner failed to comply with Medicaid regulations that require an approved physician to be present in the facility when certain P.A. services are delivered and to attest to it by signature within twenty-four hours of service. See Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, and Sections 409.905, and 409.913 (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996 Supp.), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented at hearing also demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly violated specific record keeping requirements located in Section 10.9 of the MPPH, Sections 10.6 and 11.5 of the Medicaid EPSDT Provider Handbook (EPSDT), and Sections 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Agency demonstrated that Petitioner occasionally failed to document support for the necessity of certain services or simply billed for services that were not medically necessary. As indicated, Medicaid policy limits a physician to bill only for services that are medically necessary and defines the circumstances and varying levels of care authorized. In fact, Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, provides in part: The physician services program pays for services performed by a licensed physician or osteopath within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by state law . . . . The services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness on an eligible Medicaid recipient. Delivery of all services in this handbook must be done by or under the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath . . . at any place of service . . . . Each service type listed has special policy requirements that apply specifically to it. These must be adhered to for payment. The manual further provides clear guidelines defining authorized services for reimbursement which Petitioner apparently overlooked. For example, the manual defines the four types of medical history exams that Medicaid providers may conduct, the nature of the problems presented, and the appropriate and authorized tests. The manual also identifies the varying degrees of medical decision-making complexity related to Medicaid services and provides instructions relating to the method of selecting the correct evaluation and management code for billing. Petitioner consistently violated coding restrictions. Moreover, the Medicaid policy manual also outlines the specific procedures and billing requirements necessary for seeking payment for medical services including the early periodic screening for diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services. Chapter 10 and 11 of the MPPH specifically state that services that do not include all listed components of the EPSDT are not defined as an EPSDT, and upon audit, the Agency re-calculated Petitioner's medical services at the appropriate procedure code. Stipulation Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that certain paid claims were correctly determined by the Agency to be overpayments. Specifically, the parties agreed that portions of samples 1, 3, 14, 21, 28, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, and 56 could not be claimed for reimbursement since lab services which are part of an office visit reimbursement and/or lab service fees performed by an independent outside lab are not permitted. In addition, the parties agreed that specific portions of samples 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 35, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, and 55 could not be claimed since Modifier 26 billing, the professional component, is only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital and Petitioner's services were rendered in an office. Pediatric Sample With regard to the random sample of pediatric files, upon careful review, the evidence presented at hearing sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was overpaid the following amounts on the following paid claims for the following reasons: The prolonged physician's services billed to Medicaid were not documented as having been provided or medically necessary. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 1 1/18/1996 99354 $ 36.64 1 5/14/1996 99354 $ 36.64 13 9/25/1995 99354 $ 36.64 19 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 21 12/18/1995 99354 $ 36.64 28 3/06/1995 99354 $ 36.64 42 6/04/1996 99354 $ 36.64 43 12/19/1994 99354 $ 36.64 47 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 47 10/17/1995 99354 $ 36.64 51 4/05/1995 99354 $ 36.64 53 11/02/1995 99354 $ 36.64 56 5/01/1996 99354 $ 36.64 The level of care billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care provided was at the 99213 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 1 9/14/1995 $ 34.14 1 1/18/1996 $ 34.14 1 5/14/1996 $ 34.14 33 9/28/1994 $ 20.00 47 10/17/1995 $ 34.14 The level of care billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99214 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 5/31/1995 $ 21.69 The level of care billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 25 7/27/1994 $ 2.00 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99203 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 35 5/11/1995 $ 37.96 51 12/08/1994 $ 15.00 55 11/21/1995 $ 37.96 58 9/22/1995 $ 37.96 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 43 12/11/1994 ($ 3.00) credit The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the medical services provided and documentation supported an EPSDT visit. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 2/06/1995 $ 16.53 The required components of the EPSDT were not documented as being performed at the office visit that had been claimed and paid as an EPSDT and therefore, the difference between the EPSDT payment received and the value of the procedure code for the documented level of office visit that occurred (i.e., 99214, 99213, 99212, 99211, or 99203), is deemed an overpayment. Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 1 7/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 3 6/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 5 3/03/1995 99203 $ 21.43 6 7/07/1994 99213 $ 5.00 10 8/17/1995 99212 $ 43.82 12 1/31/1996 99204 $ 0.00 14 5/31/1995 99213 $ 39.82 18 10/04/1994 99213 $ 5.00 18 1/29/1996 99214 $ 27.37 20 8/25/1994 99213 $ 5.00 21 12/11/1995 99214 $ 27.37 29 8/17/1994 99212 $ 9.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 29 9/06/1995 99213 $ 39.82 40 7/25/1994 99203 $ 0.00 41 5/06/1996 99214 $ 27.37 46 9/19/1994 99213 $ 5.00 46 10/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 47 11/02/1994 99213 $ 5.00 51 9/07/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 7/10/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 1/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 59 5/02/1996 99203 $ 43.39 Adult Samples At hearing, Petitioner disputed all of the Agency's findings relating to patients over the age of 21 and objected to Dr. Deeb, a pediatrician, performing any review of their files. While Dr. Deeb is not the appropriate peer to review adult patient files, the following adult claims did not require substantive peer review and resulted in overpayment due to the stated reason: There were not any medical records in existence to indicate that any medical services were performed. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/20/1995 99215 $ 53.00 2 7/11/1995 99215 $ 59.14 2 8/09/1995 99215 $ 57.14 2 9/07/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 10/11/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 1/02/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 3/22/1996 73560/Rad.Ex. $ 16.36 2 4/01/1996 99215 $ 57.14 2 4/05/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 4/23/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/16/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/19/1996 99215 $ 57.14 16 5/14/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 16 5/14/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/14/1996 99215 $ 57.14 23 7/28/1994 99213 $ 23.00 23 5/09/1995 72069/26 Rad.Ex. $ 6.98 23 5/09/1995 72069/Rad.Ex. $ 17.45 23 10/20/1995 99213 $ 23.00 34 4/24/1996 99214 $ 35.45 57 11/17/1995 99215 $ 59.14 60 4/10/1996 99215 $ 57.14 61 5/22/1995 99213 $ 23.00 The medical records failed to contain the required physician's signature and date authenticating the fact that the services billed were performed by either P.A. Olsen or P.A. Avidon under physician supervision. The services provided by the non-physician employee were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Cluster Number Date of Service Proc. Code Pd./ P. Code Allowed Overpayment 2 6/30/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 2 7/20/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 7/28/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 9/05/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 8 4/17/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 17 3/27/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 23 5/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 23 6/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 34 4/23/1996 99205/99203 $ 35.96 The medical records failed to contain the required physician signature authenticating the fact that the services were provided by a physician. The services provided were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Procedure Code Cluster Number Date of Service Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 6/14/1995 99215/99211 $ 45.14 16 5/15/1996 99215/99211 $ 45.14 61 5/05/1995 99205/99204 $ 14.53 The provider improperly sought payment for lab services that were part of the office visit reimbursement and/or lab services performed by an independent outside lab. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 3/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 2 4/03/1996 UA $ 3.00 15 2/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.50 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 The provider improperly sought payment for Modifier 26 billings (professional component) which are only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/17/1995 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 2 6/14/1995 Radiologic exam $ 7.20 8 4/17/1995 Tympanometry $ 9.00 16 5/13/1996 Radiologic exam $ 5.45 16 5/15/1996 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 In addition to the policy and procedural violations, Petitioner, in egregious violation of the Medicaid program, admittedly submitted Medicaid claims for the services of specialist physicians (such as an allergist, OB/GYN, podiatrist, psychologists, and ophthalmologists) not within its Provider group, collected Medicaid funds based on those claims, and reimbursed the respective specialist. While Petitioner's corporate representative, Mr. Colavecchio, was admittedly responsible for the coding and billing of the Medicaid services submitted for reimbursement, he was minimally aware of the Medicaid policy requirements and possessed limited working knowledge of CPT coding and EPSDT billing. In addition, Petitioner's employees, Dr. Keith Wintermeyer and Dr. Marcia Malcolm, were only moderately familiar with the CPT coding and EPSDT component requirements. They provided little input to Petitioner regarding CPT coding and the sufficiency of certain physician's services relating to EPSDT billing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency re-calculate the overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact, and include only those identified violations in the cluster samples of the adult patient files, and issue a Final Order requiring Petitioner to reimburse, within 60 days, the Agency for the Medicaid overpayments plus any interest that may accrue after entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Felker-Little, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Charles D. Jamieson, Esquire Ward, Damon & Posner, P.A. 4420 Beacon Circle West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent, Florida Hospital Orlando (Respondent or FHO), was overpaid by Medicaid for care provided to the patient, L.D., in the amount of $52,606.04, as alleged by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or AHCA); or, whether, as Respondent maintains, such care was medically necessary and supported by the record presented in this cause. Petitioner also maintains an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 is warranted in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the Medicaid Program in Florida. Petitioner, through MPI, audited FHO for the dates of service from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2008 (the audit period). At all times material to the audit period, FHO was enrolled as a Medicaid provider, governed by a Medicaid provider agreement, and subject to all pertinent Medicaid rules and regulations related to the provision of Medicaid services to Medicaid recipients/patients. Respondent's Medicaid Provider No. was 0010129001. All services provided to Medicaid patients are billed and identified by patient name, date of service, and provider. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of patients are redacted in MPI proceedings. Although this case began with a number of patients being identified as part of the audit dispute, only one patient, L.D., and the services provided to her remain at issue. Before a Medicaid provider is authorized to bill Medicaid for medical services rendered to a patient, several checks are considered. First, the patient must be Medicaid-eligible. There is no dispute that L.D. was Medicaid-eligible. Second, before an inpatient stay is reimbursable, a Medicaid provider must seek prior authorization. To do so, at all times material to this case, AHCA enlisted the assistance of, and contracted with, KePro South (KePro) to perform utilization management for inpatient hospital services for Medicaid recipients. This meant the Medicaid provider contacted KePro by email through a system known as "I-Exchange." In this case, FHO followed the protocol and requested prior approval for patient L.D. KePro approved the inpatient stay for L.D. All patient records for L.D. have been revisited in the course of this case and have been thoroughly debated by doctors for both parties. In summary, AHCA's expert, Dr. Walter, opined that the records for L.D. do not support the "medical necessity" for the extended inpatient stay that was provided for her care. In contrast, Dr. Busowski, opined that L.D. required the inpatient stay based upon the medical conditions she and her babies presented. The events leading up to the instant dispute, set in chronological context, are as follows: FHO provided medical services to a patient, L.D.; those services were billed to and paid by Medicaid; AHCA conducted its audit of FHO for the audit period prior to August 12, 2008; on that date, AHCA issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR); the PAR claimed a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $359,107.65 (overpaid claims for the full audit period); in response, FHO set about to furnish additional documentation to support its Medicaid billings; such documentation was reviewed by Petitioner and its medical consultants before the Final Audit Report (FAR) was entered; then, the FAR reduced the amount claimed as overpayment, gave Respondent the opportunity to challenge the FAR, and forwarded the case to DOAH. Respondent continued to provide additional information to AHCA throughout the pre-hearing and post-hearing times. Subsequent to discovery in this case, AHCA considered information from FHO and, ultimately, the overpayment claim was reduced to $52,606.04 as noted above. Prior to entering the FAR, Petitioner did not have the benefit of testimony from Dr. Busowski or Dr. Fuentes. Additionally, Dr. Walter, AHCA's consultant, did not have the benefit of reviewing the records from Dr. Busowski's point of reference. It is undisputed that FHO billed Medicaid and was paid $52,606.04 for patient L.D. Dr. Busowski is a board-certified physician whose specialty is OB/GYN and whose subspecialty is Maternal Fetal Medicine, also described as "perinatologist" in this record. L.D. presented to a clinic staffed by Dr. Busowski and his former associate, Dr. Fuentes. Both doctors have privileges at FHO and took turns monitoring patients admitted to the hospital. In examining L.D., it was discovered that her cervix had shrunk from 2.6 to 1.2 centimeters. As L.D. was pregnant with twins, the patient was admitted to FHO as a "high risk" pregnancy. Simply stated, the medical concern for L.D. was that she would deliver her children prematurely and, thereby, cause additional medical issues for herself, as well as her babies. L.D. was only 26 weeks, two days along at the time, and it would be very difficult for the twins to be delivered at that time. Further, L.D. had had two prior deliveries by C-section, so it was anticipated that her twins would also be delivered in that fashion. Finally, the twins were locked with one in a breached position so that if the children had prematurely delivered vaginally, other complications would have been likely. L.D. remained at FHO until she was discharged at 35 weeks, six days. During her stay at FHO, doctors were able to monitor contractions, make sure her C-section scar did not dehisce, and chart the growth, well-being, and viability of the children. Some patients, such as L.D., may be monitored in a home setting with "take home" equipment. That device is not covered by Medicaid and was, therefore, not an option for L.D. It may have provided a less expensive treatment option had it been available to L.D. and had her home environment been suitable for its use. It is unknown whether L.D. and her home environment would have been conducive to the home monitoring some patients can use. Another consideration in keeping L.D. hospitalized was the well-being of the unborn twins. Medical costs for premature babies are higher than full-term children. Had L.D. delivered prematurely, there would have been three Medicaid patients with serious medical needs rather than one. Dr. Busowski candidly admitted that all considerations in keeping L.D. hospitalized were not listed in the patient's chart. As a specialist, Dr. Busowski did not think it was necessary to have certain facts documented. It is not Dr. Busowski's policy to keep any mother hospitalized unnecessarily. It was not Dr. Busowski's practice to write "a whole bunch because nothing has changed." L.D.'s chart contained daily notes from an attending OB/GYN or resident, but orders were not written for medication unless it changed or was new. For example, if an order for prenatal vitamins were written, it would naturally continue throughout the patient's stay without additional orders. In this case, L.D. was on the medication Procardia. It was used to stop pre-term contractions. When L.D. was discharged and the babies were not in danger, presumably, Procardia was not necessary. Until she was stabilized during her hospitalization, it was necessary. Thus, the length of stay ultimately is the issue of this proceeding. Not that L.D. was admitted inappropriately or without medical basis, but that she was kept as an inpatient longer than medically necessary. Since L.D. was admitted at 26 weeks, two days and discharged at 35 weeks, six days, the question then essentially is: When in the interim should she have been discharged because her continued inpatient care was not necessary? Arguably she could have taken the medication to stop contractions at home, monitored herself somehow, and rushed to the emergency room (ER) if delivery was imminent. Delivery of the twins short of a prescribed gestation period would have placed the children at risk. Who would have borne the medical responsibility for pre-term twins born under ER conditions when it was avoidable and was, in fact, avoided in this case? Medicaid has a "pay and chase" policy of paying Medicaid claims as submitted by providers. Audits performed by the Agency then, after-the-fact, reconcile the amounts paid to providers with the amounts that were payable under the Medicaid guidelines and pertinent rules. The Medicaid provider agreement executed between the parties governs the contractual relationship between FHO and AHCA. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement, together with the pertinent laws or regulations, control the billing and reimbursement of the claim that remains at issue. The amount, if any, that was overpaid related solely to the period of inpatient treatment that L.D. received from week 27 of her pregnancy until her discharge. Dr. Walter conceded perhaps a week would be required to stabilize the patient under her presenting conditions. The provider agreement pertinent to this case was voluntarily entered into by the parties. Any Medicaid provider whose billing is not in compliance with the Medicaid billing policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. Petitioner administers the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to its authority, AHCA conducts audits to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. The audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. Audits are to ensure that the provider bill and receive payment in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. Respondent does not dispute Petitioner's authority to perform audits. Respondent does, however, dispute that a recoupment is appropriate, because FHO sought and was given prior approval for the inpatient stay for L.D. through the KePro system. If the inpatient length of stay was medically necessary for L.D., Petitioner does not dispute the amount billed as accurately reflecting the services provided to L.D. during that stay. There is no question that L.D. stayed in the hospital for the length of stay noted in the record. Based upon the weight of the persuasive evidence in this case, it is determined that L.D.'s length of stay until week 35 of her pregnancy was medically appropriate and necessary to protect the medical health and well-being of L.D. and her unborn children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the case, with each party bearing its own costs and expenses of the litigation. Further, to the extent that Petitioner may have already sought recoupment against Respondent for the alleged overpayment, it is recommended that those funds be credited back to FHO. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Arnold, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. Post Office Drawer 14079 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), is entitled to recoup from Respondent, JRM Pharmacy, Inc., d/b/a Super Drugs Pharmacy (“JRM”), $156,657.05 as Medicaid overpayments; and whether investigative, legal, expert witness costs, and fines should be imposed against JRM.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the designated state agency responsible for administering the Medicaid Program in Florida. At all times material to this case, JRM has been a licensed pharmacy and authorized Medicaid provider pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. The Medicaid Provider Agreement is a voluntary contract between AHCA and JRM. JRM’s Medicaid provider number is 102451500. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, JRM is subject to the duly-enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, Medicaid provider publications, and the Medicaid Provider Agreement between it and AHCA. At all times during the audit period, JRM was required to follow the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drugs, Services, Coverage, Limitations, and Reimbursement Handbook (“Prescribed Drugs Services Handbook”). This case involves a Medicaid audit by AHCA of JRM as to dates of service from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010 (“audit period”). AHCA’s Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (“MPI”), pursuant to its statutory authority, conducted an audit of JRM of paid Medicaid claims for medical goods and services to Medicaid recipients which occurred during the period from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2010. The audit included a comparison of the amount of prescription medications billed to Medicaid by JRM during the audit period with the units of the corresponding medications JRM purchased from licensed wholesalers. The audit concluded that JRM was overpaid a total of $156,657.05 for various prescription medications it billed to AHCA and received payment from AHCA. The claims which make up the overpayment alleged by AHCA of $156,657.05 were filed and paid by AHCA prior to the institution of this matter. JRM does not dispute that it was overpaid $43,890.02 for various prescription medications, and JRM concedes that AHCA is entitled to recover this amount as an overpayment. However, JRM disputes the remaining balance of AHCA’s alleged overpayment of $112,767.03, which AHCA attributes to an overpayment to JRM for the brand named prescription drug Prevacid 30 mg Capsule DR (“Prevacid”). The audit involved a review of JRM’s purchases of Prevacid from McKesson, and Lansoprazole from Bellco, the authorized wholesalers, during the audit period. The audit established that JRM billed to AHCA and received payment from AHCA for more Prevacid than JRM had available during the audit period to dispense to Medicaid recipients. Specifically, the persuasive evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates JRM was overpaid $112,767.03 for Prevacid. When a Medicaid pharmacy provider submits a claim to Medicaid for payment, Medicaid identifies the prescription drug on the claim by the National Drug Code (“NDC”). The generic form of Prevacid is Lansoprazole. Prevacid and Lansoprazole have different NDC numbers. JRM was required to submit the entire 11-digit NDC number for the actual product dispensed on the claim. During the audit period, JRM billed to Medicaid and was paid by Medicaid for “NDC: 00300304613 PREVACID 30 MG CAPSULE DR, NDC: 00300304619 PREVACID 30 MG CAPSULE DR, AND NDC: 64664004613 PREVACID DR 30 MG CAPSULE.” The persuasive evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that JRM billed Medicaid and was paid by Medicaid for 31,650 Prevacid capsules. However, JRM only purchased 10,907 units of Prevacid, leaving a shortage of 20,744 capsules of Prevacid and an overpayment of $112,767.03. Thus, JRM received payment from Medicaid for $112,767.03 for Prevacid that JRM did not purchase and did not dispense to Medicaid recipients. There is a significant cost difference between the brand name Prevacid and generic Lansoprazole, with the brand name Prevacid being billed at a much higher rate than the generic Lansoprazole. JRM purchased a large amount of Lansoprazole from Bellco during the audit period, but billed and received payment from Medicaid for Prevacid. Only prescription drugs that are on the Florida Medicaid Preferred Drug List are allowed to be paid for by Medicaid. During the audit period, generic Lansoprazole was not on AHCA’s preferred drug list. However, Prevacid was on AHCA’s preferred drug list. JRM often dispensed Lansoprazole and billed and received payment from Medicaid for dispensing Prevacid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order of recoupment of a Medicaid overpayment from JRM in the amount of $156,657.05; impose a fine of $5,000.00; and remand this matter to the undersigned for a determination of the amount of investigative, legal, and expert witness costs, should a final order be entered by AHCA indicating that AHCA ultimately prevailed, and if there is any dispute as to the amount of such costs following the issuance of the final order by AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2015.
The Issue The issues are 1) whether Dr. Veloso's eligibility to participate in the Florida Medicaid program as a provider of physician services should be terminated, due to his guilty plea to a charge of Medicaid fraud in the Circuit Court for the 15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida and 2) whether a stay of the termination should be granted pending disposition of Dr. Veloso's appeal.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Dr. Veloso was a provider of medical services to persons who qualify for the Medicaid program and received reimbursement from Medicaid funds for his services. The Department is designated to administer the provision of Medicaid funds in Florida. Dr. Veloso is a licensed physician and a licensed pharmacist who practices in South Florida and whose patients are primarily Medicaid eligible. Dr. Veloso does not necessarily maintain a regular office practice. In addition to treating patients at his offices in West Palm Beach and Miami, he sees them at their homes, at the pharmacy or wherever is most convenient to the patients. As a provider of services to Medicaid eligible patients, Dr. Veloso is charged with the responsibility of being familiar with the rules and law relating to the Medicaid program. On November 4 1987, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Office of the Auditor General received a call alleging that Dr. Veloso was making a copy of a Medicaid card when he filled a prescription. Dr. Veloso was employed at the caller's pharmacy as a part-time pharmacist. An investigation of Dr. Veloso's medicaid billing practice ensued. The investigation revealed that Dr. Veloso was billing for office visits on Miami Medicaid residents although his practice of record was located in West Palm Beach. The investigators interviewed sixteen households for whom Medicaid billings had been submitted by Dr. Veloso. The interviews resulted in the taking of sworn statements of six of the patients from the sample households who denied that they had received the treatment for which Dr. Veloso had filed reimbursement. None of the six patients was present or testified at the hearing. In his testimony, however, Dr. Veloso, countered the denials of each of the six patients. He described the treatment he had given each of the six and produced the patients' medical records to verify his statements. As to why the patients allegedly made the contradictory statements, Dr. Veloso asserted that they were quite possibly intimidated by the investigator since the patients did not have complete command of the English language and the investigator presented herself with an official badge for identification prior to the interview. Dr. Veloso also stated that if any mistakes had been made, they were only clerical. He explained that his wife prepared most of his billings at their home, and although he admitted that he was responsible for her actions, he represented that mistakes, if any, were inadvertently made. At the hearing, the investigator testified that it was her conclusion that Dr. Veloso did knowingly file false claims for services. Although the files for the six patients were received into evidence and each corroborates that he did in fact treat the patients, the actual disputed billings were not offered at the hearing. A comparison between the treatment given to the patients and the alleged fraudulent billings cannot be made. Given the demeanor of the witnesses, the competent substantial evidence received at the hearing and the lack of corroboration of the affidavits of the six patients, Dr. Veloso's testimony is deemed credible. Criminal proceedings were brought against Dr. Veloso. Dr. Veloso asserted that on the advice of his attorney, he entered his plea on October 2, 1989. The choice of plea on the judgment and sentencing form filed in this case is indicated by checking one of the three blocks on the form. The first block precedes the following statement, "Been tried and found guilty of the following crime(s)." The second block is followed by, "Entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)," and the final choice is a block notated by "Entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)." The block checked in Dr. Veloso's case is the second block. Above the "X" in the block is a handwritten statement, "Alford Plea." Dr. Veloso argued that it was not his intent to enter a plea which would be an admission of culpability. He entered his plea as merely a matter of convenience and on the representation of his counsel that the plea would result in punishment similar to a misdemeanor traffic offense. Dr. Veloso, further, testified that his plea was on appeal. Except for Dr. Veloso's statements and the official court documents, no additional competent substantial evidence was presented at the instant hearing concerning the circumstances present at the time of Dr. Veloso's plea. However, the judgment and sentencing form dated October 2, 1989 clearly indicates that he entered a plea of guilty to and was adjudicated guilty of a lesser included offense of medicaid fraud under Paragraph 409.325(5)(b), Florida Statutes. His sentence was stayed, and on October 6, 1989, an Order was issued in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County withholding adjudication for the offense and placing Dr. Veloso on probation for one year and requiring that restitution be paid to the Department of $492.00 plus costs. Although Dr. Veloso is a well intended physician, he was, in fact, found guilty of Medicaid fraud, based on a plea of guilty and is subject to termination from further participation in the Medicaid program under existent law, if the Department chooses to exercise its discretion to sanction him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order dismissing the charges against Dr. Veloso and not imposing the sanction permitted pursuant to Paragraph 409.236(11)(a), Florida Statutes, based on the exercise of its discretion. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28 day of June, 1990. JANE C HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1990.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or Agency), is entitled to a Medicaid reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the authority and responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of this authority, the Petitioner is required to recover Medicaid overpayments when appropriate. See § 409.913, Fla. Stat. (2006). At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a licensed physician and a Medicaid provider subject to the provisions of Chapter 409. As a Medicaid provider, the Respondent was authorized to provide services to eligible patients but was obligated to comply with the Medicaid Provider Agreement in doing so. The Medicaid Program contemplates that authorized providers will provide services to eligible patients, bill the program and be paid according to the Medicaid standards. All Medicaid providers must practice within the guidelines of the Physicians Coverage and Limitations Handbook and applicable law. Providers may be audited so that it can be verified the process was appropriately followed. In this case, the Respondent was audited. According to the audit findings, the Respondent received payment for services that he did not perform. Dr. Eiber (a physician not part of the Respondent’s practice group) reviewed and signed off on x-ray studies and reports for which the Respondent billed and was paid by Medicaid. Dr. Eiber is a Medicaid provider but he is not affiliated with the Respondent or the Respondent’s group. In order for the Respondent to bill and receive payment for Dr. Eiber’s work, the latter physician would have to be listed and identified within the group in which the Respondent practiced. The Respondent was responsible for all billings for which he received payments. In connection with billing, the Respondent was required to maintain and retain all Medicaid- related invoices or claims for the audit period. In this regard, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook specifies that when a radiological study is performed in an office setting, either the physician billing the maximum fee must have performed or indirectly supervised the performance and interpreted the study; or if a group practice, a member of the group must perform all components of the services. That procedure was not followed. When the Agency disallows a paid Medicaid claim, it must seek to recover the overpayment from the Medicaid provider who received payment on the claim. This is the basis of the “pay and chase” methodology used in the Medicaid program. The claims are paid, subject to audit, and recovery is sought when the claim is disallowed. Based on the audit findings in this cause, the Agency seeks $32,935.96 as an overpayment of Medicaid claims paid to the Respondent. The Petitioner also seeks an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00. The Respondent was given the results of the audit and afforded an opportunity to respond and provide additional information to the Agency to show that the amounts billed were correct. The Respondent has presented no supplemental information to corroborate the correctness of the claims at issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order sustaining the Final Audit Report and finding an overpayment against the Respondent in the amount of $32,9935.96. The Final Order should also impose an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig A. Brand, Esquire Law Offices of Craig A. Brand, P.A. Grove Forest Plaza 2937 Southwest 27th Avenue, Suite 101 Miami, Florida 33133 Willis Melvin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Conclusions This cause came before the Agency for Health Care Administration for issuance of a Final Order. 1. On April 8, 2013, the Agency sent a letter to the Petitioner notifying the Petitioner that it owed an overpayment in the amount of $63,378.06 to the Agency based upon an adjustment in the Petitioner’s overpayment rates (Exhibit A). On April 23, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Hearing and the Agency Clerk referred the Petition for Formal Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. On May 16, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based upon a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction filed by the parties. On May 23, 2014, the Agency rescinded the overpayment letter (Exhibit B). The Agency’s rescission of the overpayment letter has rendered this matter moot. Filed August 14, 2014 9:31 AM Division of Administrative Hearings OA / CLERK P 33u Based on the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: Respondent’s right to a hearing in this matter has been rendered moot and the Agency’s May 11, 2013 overpayment letter is rescinded. The parties shall govern themselves accordingly. DONE AND ORDERED this > day of Avow ot , 2014 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, AND A COPY ALONG WITH THE FILING FEE PRESCRIBED BY LAW WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been furnished by U.S. or interoffice mail to the persons named below on this Ut day of ZL Lisas OC, 2014. RICHARD J. SHOOP, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 9850) 412-3630 COPIES FURNISHED TO: Douglas Lomonico Assistant General Counsel George N. Meros, Jr. GrayRobinson, P.A. Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3189 Medicaid Program Integrity Office of the Inspector General Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Division of Medical Quality Assurance Department of Health
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), out of her settlement proceeds as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact On April 21, 2011, Ms. Puzanskas gave birth to her son. After birth, Ms. Puzanskas began experiencing symptoms of nervousness, panic attacks, and being overwhelmed. On June 21, 2011, she called her doctor's office and described her symptoms to her midwife. Her midwife concluded that Ms. Puzanskas was depressed or experiencing "baby blues." Based on this telephonic diagnosis, the midwife arranged for a prescription of the anti-depressant psychotropic drug, Zoloft, to be called into Ms. Puzanskas' pharmacy. The next day after taking the Zoloft, Ms. Puzanskas again called her doctor's office with complaints that the Zoloft was causing her to feel strange and jittery. Ms. Puzanskas was instructed to continue taking the medication. On June 24, 2011, Ms. Puzanskas began suffering from severe depression and hallucinations. That same day, she went into her back yard and doused herself with gasoline and set herself on fire. She suffered third-degree full thickness burns over 30 percent of her body requiring multiple skin grafts, with scarring over 60 percent of her body from all burns and grafts. Ms. Puzanskas' medical care for the injuries was paid by Medicaid, which provided $54,171.70 in benefits associated with her injuries. This amount constituted her entire claim for past medical expenses. As a condition of her eligibility for Medicaid, Ms. Puzanskas assigned to the Agency her right to recover from liable third-party medical expenses paid by Medicaid. Ms. Puzanskas brought a medical malpractice action against the medical staff responsible for her care to recover all of her damages associated with her injuries. During the pendency of the lawsuit, the Agency was notified of the action. Although it did not dispute the ultimate settlement received by Petitioner or otherwise participate in any aspect of the litigation, the Agency asserted a $54,171.70 Medicaid lien against Ms. Puzanskas' cause of action and settlement of the action. In preparation for the trial, Petitioner's counsel used mock jury panels to evaluate their trial strategies, value of damages, and the likelihood of a defense verdict. Mock jurors split. Some would have returned a verdict for the defense, finding no liability, while others would have returned a verdict for Ms. Puzanskas and given her some limited damages. Still others would have given her a very high amount of damages. See Pet'r Ex. 9. Eleven mock jurors provided verdicts from approximately $16,554,000 down to approximately $554,000. The remaining six jurors would have returned zero-dollar verdicts. The average award in the 17 verdicts was $3,741,000. Nine of the 11 jurors who produced a verdict for Petitioner included approximately $54,000 in their verdict, and then added amounts ranging from $500,000 to $16,500,000. The $54,000 is representative of Petitioner's rounded hospital bills. The insurance policy covering the incident had limits of $250,000 and the medical providers had no collectable assets. After the first day of trial, the medical providers offered $500,000 to settle the case, and this was accepted. However, this amount did not fully compensate Petitioner for her injuries. Mr. Moore, an experienced trial attorney who represented Petitioner, testified that based on his training and experience, Petitioner's damages had a value in excess of $3,700,000. However, using a conservative number for purposes of this case, he valued her damages at $3,000,000. Thus, the $500,000 settlement represented a recovery of 16.6 percent of the value of her damages, and a similar percentage for past medical expenses. Therefore, he testified that an allocation of $8,992.50, or 16.6 percent of $54,171.70, would be a reasonable and conservative portion of the settlement for past medical expenses. Based on his training and experience and review of the medical records and file, Mr. Barrett, a trial attorney, valued Petitioner's damages between three and five million dollars. He also opined that $3,000,000 would be a very conservative figure. Using the same allocation method advocated by trial counsel, Mr. Barrett applied a 16.6 percent ratio to the Medicaid expenses, and concluded that an allocation of $8,992.50 of the settlement to past medical expenses is reasonable, rational, and appropriate. This testimony was not rebutted by the Agency, and the Agency did not present any evidence proposing a differing valuation of damages or contest the methodology used to calculate the $8,992.50 allocation to past medical expenses. The testimony from Mr. Moore and Mr. Barrett is compelling and persuasive. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that $8,992.50 of the settlement represents reimbursement for past medical expenses.