The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of charges set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with two violations of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and one violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background facts At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Rene A. Munecas, M.D., has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Munecas is board-certified in Obstetrics. As of the date of the events from which the charges in this case arise, Dr. Munecas had practiced obstetrics for approximately 45 years. Dr. Munecas has practiced obstetrics in the State of Florida since 1970. Dr. Munecas was born in Cuba, and he attended medical school in that country. He graduated from the Havana University, School of Medicine, in 1950. He then did a two-year internship in obstetrics at the University Hospital, Havana, Cuba, followed by a two-year residency in obstetrics at the same hospital. Dr. Munecas practiced obstetrics in Cuba until 1961, at which time he moved to the United States. In this country he did a one-year rotating internship at the Highland Park General Hospital, Highland Park, Michigan, followed by a two-residency in obstetrics/gynecology (OB/GYN) at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida. He completed his OB/GYN residency training at Orange Memorial Hospital in Orlando, Florida. Upon completion of his residency training in this country, he practiced in Michigan until 1970, when he moved to Florida. During the many years Dr. Munecas has practiced in Florida, there has been only one prior instance of disciplinary action concerning his practice of medicine. 1/ The prior disciplinary proceeding did not arise from any misconduct by Dr. Munecas, but from concerns as to whether he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness . . . or as a result of any mental or physical condition." 2/ By the time of the final hearing in the prior disciplinary proceeding, all of the medical experts were of the view that Dr. Munecas was able to practice with reasonable skill and safety so long as he continued to be monitored by his treating psychiatrist. The final order in that case (dated August 27, 1984) concluded as follows: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years during which time Respondent shall appear semi-annually before the Board and shall continue to be monitored by his treating psychiatrist, Dr. DeJesus who shall submit quarterly reports concerning Respondent to the Board during the two year probation period. No appearances by the treating psychiatrist, Dr. DeJesus, before the Board are required. Facts regarding patient A. B. There is very little evidence in the record of this proceeding concerning the quality or sufficiency of the written medical records kept by Dr. Munecas regarding his treatment of Patient A. B. 3/ There is no clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Munecas failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of patient A. B. Patient A. B., born July 4, 1965, was seen by Dr. Munecas on August 11, 1994, in the outpatient obstetrical clinic of Baptist Hospital of Miami. She was pregnant with twins. The hospital record indicates periodic visits to the clinic from August 11 through November 17, 1994. Her weight at the initial visit of August 11 was 210 pounds. She was 5 feet, 2 inches, tall. An outpatient ultrasound performed on November 3, 1994, indicated that both twins were in breech position. The results of that ultrasound were reported on November 4, 1994, and were known to Dr. Munecas prior to November 18, 1994, when another outpatient ultrasound was performed on patient A. B. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 19, 1994, patient A. B.'s membranes ruptured, and she was taken to the hospital. Dr. Munecas ordered an x-ray of the patient's abdomen for the purpose of ascertaining fetal position. An x-ray of A. B.'s abdomen was taken at about 8:15 a.m. For reasons not clear in the evidence in this case, a second x-ray of A. B.'s abdomen was taken about 10 minutes later. The two x-ray films did not provide any useful information about the position of either of the twins. A few minutes later, Dr. Munecas performed a pelvic examination of patient A. B., for the purpose of trying to determine the positions of the twins. On the basis of that examination Dr. Munecas was of the opinion that twin "A" was in a vertex position, and twin "B" was in a breech position. Later in the day, this opinion was shown to be incorrect. 4/ Dr. Munecas decided it was appropriate to deliver the twins vaginally, and began to take steps to implement that plan of treatment. Among other things, Dr. Munecas attempted to induce labor by administration of Pitocin, which induces labor by increasing uterine contractions. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 19, 1994, Dr. Munecas ordered a portable ultrasound examination of patient A. B.'s abdomen. 5/ The ultrasound examination was promptly performed, and by approximately 6:00 p.m. Dr. Munecas received the examination report. The report revealed that both twins were in a breech position. At some point after receiving the report of the ultrasound examination, Dr. Munecas changed his plan of treatment and decided that patient A. B. should be delivered by cesarean section. For reasons not clear from the record in this case, the cesarean section was not done until approximately 10:00 p.m. Twin "A" was delivered at 10:16 p.m., and twin "B" was delivered at 10:19 p.m. Both twins were healthy. Facts regarding current practice of obstetrics Ultrasound imaging is the procedure of choice for obtaining images to show fetal status. Ultrasound is superior to x-ray for such purposes for a number of reasons. Ultrasound produces fetal images that show more details than can be obtained by x-ray. The use of ultrasound also avoids certain potential fetal health risks that are associated with x-rays. Accordingly, except in the most unusual of circumstances, x-rays should not be used to obtain images of fetal status. Under the circumstances presented by patient A. B. on November 19, 1994, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have ordered an ultrasound. If for some reason an ultrasound was not available on the morning of November 19, 1994, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have relied on the results of the ultrasound that was performed on November 3, 1994. Pitocin is a drug that is commonly used by obstetricians to induce and enforce labor. The effect of Pitocin is to increase uterine contractions. Pitocin should only be used when it is desirable to induce labor. The obvious corollary is that Pitocin should never be administered to a patient in which vaginal delivery is contraindicated. Vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient A. B. because of risks to fetal safety inherent in a situation when twins are both in a breech position. Those risks can be avoided by cesarean section delivery. In circumstances like those presented by patient A. B., with both twins in a breech position, a reasonably prudent similar physician would find it unacceptable to attempt a vaginal delivery. The only acceptable course of treatment under such circumstances would be a cesarean section. 6/ Therefore, it was a departure from standards of care, skill, and treatment acceptable to a reasonably prudent similar physician for Dr. Munecas to attempt to induce labor by patient A. B. Facts regarding patient M. E. Patient M. E., born November 28, 1963, was seen by Dr. Munecas on May 2, 1995, in the outpatient obstetrical clinic of Baptist Hospital of Miami. The hospital record indicates periodic visits to the clinic from May 2 through June 21, 1995. The record also indicates that lab tests had been performed prior to May 2. Dr. Munecas' note for the visit of June 2 indicates his belief that the fetus may have had intrauterine growth retardation. The visits of June 14 and June 21 indicate increases in patient M. E.'s systolic and diastolic blood pressure, and increased protein in her urinalysis. Pre-eclampsia is a term used to describe a form of pregnancy-induced hypertension. Symptoms of pre-eclampsia include elevated blood pressure, presence of protein in the urine and/or the presence of swelling or edema of the hands and feet. A patient exhibiting symptoms of severe pre-eclampsia is at risk for three circumstances of extreme urgency. One is the possibility of a brain hemorrhage, which can be fatal. Second is the possibility of heart failure and pulmonary edema. Third is the possibility of liver hemorrhage, which can cause the liver to swell and burst. This third possibility manifests itself by right upper quadrant abdominal pain. In the early morning hours of June 22, 1995, patient M. E. awoke with severe right upper quadrant abdominal pain. When the pain continued, she called Dr. Munecas at home and described her pain to him. Dr. Munecas instructed her to go to the hospital. At approximately 4:50 a.m. on June 22, 1995, patient M. E. arrived at the hospital. Her blood pressure was taken in the supine position and read 196/111. Patient M. E. complained of continuous severe right upper quadrant abdominal pain. Dr. Munecas was called at home and advised of the patient's status. At that time, Dr. Munecas gave no orders, but indicated his desire for a perinatal consultation. At about 5:00 a.m., the hospital nursing staff called Dr. Lai. Dr. Lai gave no orders, but said that Dr. Munecas should call him at home. Hospital nursing staff called Dr. Munecas a second time at approximately 5:15 a.m. They requested his presence at the hospital to evaluate the patient. At about 6:00 a.m. on June 22, 1995, the hospital nursing staff again called Dr. Munecas and again requested his presence at the hospital. At this time the nursing staff also requested that Dr. Munecas prescribe medication to lower the patient's blood pressure. Dr. Munecas did not prescribe any medications for the patient. Instead, he ordered that an abdominal ultrasound be performed on the patient immediately to see if the patient had gallbladder problems. The ultrasound was promptly performed. It did not reveal any gallbladder problems. At approximately 6:05 a.m., a nurse manager called Dr. Munecas at home, and again requested his presence at the hospital. Dr. Munecas thereupon embarked for the hospital. He arrived at approximately 7:00 a.m. He promptly examined the patient and found her cervix to be dilated up to 2 centimeters. Dr. Munecas' impressions following the examination included "severe pre-eclampsia." Following the examination of patient M. E., Dr. Munecas performed an amniotomy on the patient. Amniotomy is a technique for the induction of labor. It is accomplished by manual rupture of the patient's membranes. An amniotomy should only be performed when it is desirable to induce labor. The obvious corollary is that an amniotomy should never be performed on a patient in which vaginal delivery is contraindicated. Vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient M. E. for two main reasons. First, following examination of patient M. E., it should have been obvious to any obstetrician that the patient was suffering from severe pre-eclampsia and that prompt action was necessary to minimize the risk of severe harm to the patient's health. Under the circumstances presented by patient M. E., on June 22, 1995, urgent delivery of the baby was the only acceptable course of patient treatment. Under the circumstances presented that day by patient M. E., there was no prospect for her to have an urgent vaginal delivery. A cesarean section was the only prospect for an urgent delivery of patient M. E. The second reason for which vaginal delivery was contraindicated for patient M. E., was the fact that the fetus appeared to have intrauterine growth retardation. Such a fetus is less able than a normal fetus to withstand the rigors of labor. Therefore, such a fetus is at greater risk for possible brain damage or death during vaginal delivery. Such risks are avoided by a cesarean section delivery. By inducing labor in patient M. E., Dr. Munecas exposed both patient M. E. and her fetus to unreasonable dangers which could be avoided by cesarean section delivery. A reasonably prudent similar physician faced with the circumstances presented by patient M. E. on June 22, 1995, would have gone to the hospital as quickly as possible following the first call from the hospital nursing staff describing the patient's status. Dr. Munecas' failure to do so was a departure from acceptable standards of treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician. A reasonably prudent similar physician faced with the circumstances presented by patient M. E. on June 22, 1995, in view of the obvious need for urgent relief of the severe pre- eclampsia, would have promptly made arrangements for a cesarean section delivery at the earliest possible time. Dr. Munecas' failure to do so was a departure from acceptable standards of treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician. Dr. Munecas appears to have voluntarily limited the scope of his medical practice since the incidents which gave rise to this proceeding. He limits his medical practice to gynecology and obstetrics in the office. He no longer performs major surgery or vaginal deliveries.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing Count Two of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint and as charged in two of the three paragraphs of Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing a penalty consisting of a permanent restriction on the scope of the Respondent's medical practice to the following extent: the Respondent is restricted from all hospital-based obstetrical practice and is barred from performing or assisting in the labor or delivery of any hospital obstetrical patient. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 050004170. Respondent practices in the field of general surgery, and at all times material to this action, Respondent was on staff as Chief of Surgery at the University Hospital, Holly Hill, Florida. The incident which gave rise to the charges herein arose on August 5, 1987 when Respondent inserted a chest tube into patient W.T.'s right chest wall so as to relieve a pneumothorax which had actually occurred in W.T.'s left lung. A pneumothorax is a pocket of air in the cavity surrounding the lung which causes the lung to contract upon itself. At all times material, Patient W.T. had a subcutaneous pacemaker on the left side of her chest. However, the evidence from all credible witnesses is consistent that pacemakers are routinely placed on either the right or left side and that there is no reasonable medical presumption that pacemakers are always placed in someone's left chest area. The subcutaneous pacemaker did not enter significantly into W.T.'s case management at University Hospital. It operated on "automatic" and since it did its job, none of the University Hospital physicians involved in W.T.'s care paid much attention to it. W.T. was admitted to University Hospital for treatment of a drug overdose on July 9, 1987. As a part of her treatment, an Ewald tube was inserted into her stomach by a physician other than the Respondent. Patient W.T. was discharged from the hospital on July 18, 1987 with a portion of the tube inadvertently left in her stomach and her esophagus. On July 21, 1987, W.T. was readmitted to University Hospital. She was suffering from septicemia and bilateral pneumonia. X-rays revealed that a portion of the tubing had not been removed. This tubing was removed by the Respondent via successful gastroesophagoscopy on July 23, 1987. At Respondent's order, W.T. was placed in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) following the removal of the tube. Dr. Desai was called in as a pulmonologist. When W.T. had been admitted to University Hospital on July 21, 1987, she already had been in a "guarded" condition. Despite successful removal of the Ewald tube, W.T.'s overall condition continued to deteriorate. Prior to the night of August 4, 1987, W.T. had developed adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) which involves a breakdown in the capillary barriers within the lung itself, resulting in a diffuse leakage of fluid throughout all of the air space of the patient's lung. Because of the patient's serious lung condition, Dr. Desai placed her on a volume respirator, and the respirator pressure (PEEP) was progressively increased during her admission until it was set at 20 PEEP at the time of the incident. Twenty PEEP is an unusually high level of respirator pressure which was necessary in this case because of the patient's severe lung problem. The volume respirator essentially breathed for the patient and involved a tube being secured in her mouth. Often, between her admission to the ICU and the date of the incident, W.T. had torn the respirator tube out of her mouth, so she had been continuously restrained and sedated to keep this from happening again. Each time W.T. had extubated herself she had been "blue coded," meaning she had suffered either cardiac arrest or shock. Whether or not W.T. weighed between 225 and 250 pounds or weighed 350- plus pounds cannot be determined with any reasonable degree of accuracy since there is equally credible evidence over the entire foregoing range of poundage. It is material, however, that by all accounts of all witnesses, W.T. was markedly and grossly obese to the extent that her size, shape, and weight contributed to her several health problems and rendered her a patient more difficult to diagnose, more difficult to x-ray, more difficult to move, and more difficult to nurse and medically attend than she would have been otherwise. The evidence as to whether W.T.'s obesity impeded medical personnel from correctly interpreting her breath sounds on August 5, 1987, the date of the incident, is divided, as is the evidence as to whether or not on that date W.T.'s pacemaker was visible to the naked eye, but upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole, it is found that on August 5, 1987, W.T.'s obesity, generally deteriorated condition, and left pneumothorax rendered the presence, volume, and location of breath in each lung subject to interpretation and "judgment call," and that unless one were specifically looking and feeling for a pacemaker, one would not necessarily have been able to detect the pacemaker in W.T.'s left chest due to the extraordinarily heavy pad of fat and the absence of scarring in that location. The foregoing finding of fact has been reached because with the exception of the complaining witness, Nurse Counihan, all factual witnesses either testified that they did not notice a pacemaker scar or they specifically noticed there was no scarring on W.T.'s chest. Also, with regard to breath sounds, both Mr. Starr and Respondent listened for W.T.'s breath sounds on the morning of the incident and within a very few minutes of each other. Mr. Starr described W.T.'s breath sounds when he entered her room as decreased on the right and absent on the left. His findings were consistent with a left pneumothorax but he never informed Respondent what he had found. Respondent arrived only a few minutes later and could not get any breath sounds from either side. Dr. O'Leary, accepted as an expert in pulmonology and the insertion of chest tubes, opined persuasively that one could not rely on breath sounds to locate which side the pneumothorax was on in the face of a recent x-ray. Also, the use of the respirator could have been misleading to either or both Mr. Starr or Respondent. X-rays taken of W.T.'s chest at least ten times between July 23, 1987 and July 31, 1987 clearly depict that the pacemaker was on the left side of W.T.'s chest. These x-rays were reviewed by Respondent with a radiologist the day before the events which are the focus of these charges took place. The radiology reports of W.T.'s chest x-rays dated July 25, 1987, July 28, 1987, and July 31, 1987 specifically mention the pacemaker but only the report dated July 28, 1987 states that the pacemaker overlies the left thorax. Respondent did not review any narrative reports when he and the radiologist were reviewing the actual x-rays together. There is no evidence that this procedure was outside the appropriate standard of care. Dr. Dworkin, expert in radiology and quality assurance and review, Dr. O'Leary, and Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's internal medicine expert, all testified that it is not below the professional standard of care for a treating physician to forget within a day after such an x-ray review which side a pacemaker is on unless the pacemaker enters significantly into his treatment of the patient, which in this case it did not. By the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, W.T. had become even more critically ill with multiple system failures, including a failure in the cardiopulmonary systems, a neurological deficit, and failure of her renal functions. The mortality rate of a patient suffering from ARDS, without considering the other conditions from which W.T. was suffering, exceeds 50%, and responsible medical retrospective estimates made at formal hearing of W.T.'s specific survival chances in the early morning hours of August 5, 1987 fall in the 10-50% range. During the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, the nurses on duty in ICU were having trouble maintaining W.T.'s blood pressure. They began telephoning Dr. Desai and Respondent at approximately 4:00 a.m. One of those doctors, most probably Dr. Desai, ordered a portable chest x-ray of W.T., which was accomplished at 6:30 a.m. by Josephine Christnagel, R.T., who is a registered x-ray technologist. At the time this x-ray was performed, W.T. was already in critical condition and could not speak or respond. W.T.'s condition was such that she probably was not salvageable when Respondent arrived on the scene at 7:00 a.m. on August 5, 1987. Unbeknownst to anyone at this point in time, the 6:30 a.m. x-ray had been inadvertently mislabeled by Ms. Christnagel so that the left side of the patient's chest appeared on the x-ray with a lead marker, "R" (for "right") , on it. This chest x-ray revealed that W.T. had a pneumothorax, and because it was mislabeled, the pneumothorax appeared to be on the right side. If a chest tube is properly inserted from the outside chest wall on the side of the pneumothorax, into the chest cavity, the air can be released and the lung can re-expand, delivering oxygen to the patient and raising blood pressure to normal. At all times material on August 4-5, 1987, the ranking ICU nurse on W.T.'s case was Carey Beninger ne' Counihan, R.N. The ICU nurses notified Dr. Desai by phone of the pneumothorax and he, in turn, notified Respondent. Because Respondent was more nearly ready to go to the hospital, Respondent rushed to the hospital to insert a chest tube into W.T., treatment which he and Dr. Desai, the attending pulmonologist, had agreed was the appropriate treatment for W.T.'s pneumothorax. For the reasons given infra with regard to the time the nurses' notes were compiled and Nurse Counihan's confusion over the x-ray itself, the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever told by Dr. Desai or by the nurses by phone that the pneumothorax was on W.T.'s left side (the correct side). Even if Respondent had been so informed by Dr. Desai, since Dr. Desai had never seen the x-ray, it still would have been appropriate for Respondent to rely on the x-ray itself once he got to the hospital, unless at the hospital, something or someone clearly alerted him to the fact that the pneumothorax was actually on the left side. At approximately 7:00 a.m., just prior to the arrival of Respondent, Dr. Michael Danzig, D.O., who was the day-shift emergency room doctor, and Wesley Starr, R.P.T., a respiratory therapist, arrived at ICU and entered W.T.'s room. At approximately the time they arrived, the night-shift emergency room doctor, Dr. Haas, left the room. By all accounts, there was a continuing "commotion," a "ruckus," or "an emergency situation" in progress with at least two nurses, including Nurse Counihan, and other personnel providing various therapies to W.T. who had no palpable blood pressure and was in shock. This atmosphere continued after Respondent arrived shortly thereafter, with the nurses' and Mr. Starr's attention directed to care of the patient. When Respondent arrived, Dr. Danzig became, essentially, an observer. Upon arrival at W.T.'s room, Respondent examined the 6:30 a.m. x-ray against a window with daylight showing through. The x-ray, as it was mismarked, showed a massive tension pneumothorax on W.T.'s right side and a pacemaker on the same side, the right. After review of the x-ray, Respondent examined W.T., including listening for breath sounds. He heard nothing significant from either lung. Dr. O'Leary's opinion that such a finding was not unusual and that Respondent could not rely on either his own examination of breath sounds or that of Mr. Starr (had he even known of Mr. Starr's hearing breath sounds on the right but not the left) at that point is persuasive. Under these circumstances, breath sounds would not have alerted Respondent to a mislabeled x-ray. Respondent relied on the mislabeled x-ray and began to prep the right side of the patient for the chest tube. As Respondent began to prep W.T.'s right side, a dispute arose between himself and Nurse Counihan. Having weighed and evaluated all the testimony and the documentary evidence and exhibits, having reconciled that evidence which can be reconciled, and having eliminated that evidence which is not credible, it is found that the most credible version of this dispute is that Nurse Counihan asked Respondent why he was prepping the right side if W.T. had a left pneumothorax, and Respondent replied, "No, it isn't. Look at the x-ray." To this, Nurse Counihan said, "Yes, it is. I'm sure of it," and pointed to the lung on the x-ray which did not show a pneumothorax (the side next to the nameplate and the side without either a pacemaker or a pneumothorax). Respondent said, "No, it isn't. Look at the damn x-ray!" Respondent then proceeded to intubate on the right side while referring frequently to the mislabeled x-ray. In making the foregoing finding, it is noted that there were significant differences between the testimony of Nurse Counihan and all other witnesses, both factual and expert. Nurse Counihan deposed/testified that both she and another nurse had pointed out to Respondent that the patient's pacemaker was on the patient's left side and so was the pneumothorax. The other three factual witnesses, Starr, Danzig, and Respondent, all testified that they have no recollection whatsoever of anyone mentioning a pacemaker. Even Wesley Starr, called by the Petitioner, and who was present in W.T.'s room at the head of the patient's bed throughout the time of these discussions, testified that, to the best of his recollection, no one mentioned a pacemaker and that he did not recall anyone except Nurse Counihan challenging the Respondent's prepping W.T.'s right side. Also, Dr. Danzig, who was present in the room during the argument, and who testified that he had placed over 200 chest tubes during the course of his medical residency training, testified that if Nurse Counihan had, indeed, mentioned a pacemaker, he would have intervened in order to assist Respondent in determining the correct side of the pneumothorax. Although Petitioner asserted that Dr. Danzig is not credible due to his friendship with Respondent, that argument is not persuasive both due to the remoteness and degree of the friendship and Dr. Danzig's insistence that if Respondent should say that Nurse Counihan pointed to the side of the x-ray showing the pacemaker, then Respondent would be wrong. Respondent apparently did not review W.T.'s records either before or after the dispute with Nurse Counihan. These records were either in her room or elsewhere in the ICU unit, but since, at that point, the nurses' notes had not been compiled from their scratch pads to the patient's chart since before 4:00 a.m., there was nothing in W.T.'s chart/records to alert Respondent that the x- ray was mislabeled or that the patient had a pneumothorax on the left side even if he had reviewed the record. Also, he would have had to go back to the July 31 x-ray or the July 28 radiology narrative before he could have discovered that the pacemaker was on the left. This would have been very time consuming. Also, Dr. Danzig, who actually had made a cursory review of the patient's records when he first arrived in the room, was not alerted by Nurse Counihan's words or her pointing to the x-ray to any reason to search the records for information about the pacemaker. In further assessing Nurse Counihan's testimony, the undersigned has weighed in her favor the consistency of her recent deposition testimony with her notes and the incident report which she completed within five hours after the intubation incident on August 5, 1987. However, weighing against her credibility with regard to her statements then and now that she told Respondent that the pacemaker was on W.T.'s left side is the fact that even her August 5, 1987 report and notes were prepared in the glow of a hindsight favorable to her position and that her deposition shows that she is confused about how a pneumothorax appears on an x-ray. Reconciling all the testimony one can, it is remotely possible that Nurse Counihan said, "It is a left pneumothorax," while pointing to the lung shown on the x-ray as not having a pneumothorax and which, due to the "R" marker on the other lung could be inferred to be the left lung. It is even remotely possible (although not probable or persuasive given the three other factual witnesses' testimony that she had never mentioned a pacemaker) that Nurse Counihan could have told the Respondent, "The pneumothorax is on the same side as the pacemaker," which also was consistent with the x-ray as mislabeled. However, upon the credible evidence as a whole, the only reasonable conclusion is that if Nurse Counihan did mention a pacemaker at the time of her dispute with Respondent, she was ineffective in clearly conveying to Respondent or to anyone else in the room that the pacemaker and the pneumothorax were on the patient's left side or that there was any reason to further search the records or the patient's body to resolve the dispute. It is uncontroverted that, prior to the insertion of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, absolutely no one, including Nurse Counihan, was aware that the x-ray was reversed, and that Ms. Counihan never informed the Respondent that the x-ray was reversed. Respondent's testimony is accepted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side (the side without the pneumothorax) he heard an immediate audible gush of air. That others in the room did not hear this rush of air is understandable due to the noise and confusion in the room, particularly the respirator sounds. Also, it is uncontroverted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, the patient's blood pressure, which had been zero, immediately rose into normal range. A dramatic and rapid reestablishment of the patient's blood pressure is the expected result of a proper placement of a chest tube with a tension pneumothorax. All health care personnel present seem to have regarded the blood pressure stabilization as proof that the Respondent had placed the chest tube on the correct side of the patient, because no one, including Nurse Counihan, thereafter protested that a misplacement had occurred. Release of pressure and a return in blood pressure is not normally associated with placement of a chest tube in the wrong side of a patient and there is no definitive medical explanation of why it occurred in this instance, despite Dr. O'Leary's speculation that the gush of air could have been a leak of air across the Mediastrum. After placement of the chest tube in the patient's right side, Respondent ordered an immediate repeat chest x-ray to be certain the tube was placed in the correct lung and was placed correctly. After the patient's blood pressure had been reestablished, Dr. Danzig left the intensive care unit because he believed that the pneumothorax had been relieved completely and because the patient was now stable. If W.T. had not been stable, Dr. Danzig would have remained in the room since he was the day- shift emergency room doctor and he did not know if any physicians other than Respondent and himself were even in the hospital yet. After securing the chest tube and dressing the chest, Respondent left the floor and went to the operating room (OR) to notify the OR staff that there would be a delay before he could begin previously scheduled surgery. Thereafter, on his way to check the new x-ray he had just ordered, Respondent met Ms. Christnagel, who was bringing it to him. Ms. Christnagel then informed Respondent that she had mislabeled the 6:30 a.m. preintubation x-ray. Respondent simultaneously reviewed the new, postintubation x-ray and discovered that he had placed the chest tube in the wrong side of W.T.'s chest. At approximately the same time, W.T.'s blood pressure again dropped and a "code blue" was called. Dr. Gloria Mikula, M.D., who happened to be in the ICU at the time W.T. coded, "ran the code" to attempt to reestablish the patient's blood pressure. Throughout the time in which Dr. Mikula was running the code on this patient, no one, including Nurse Counihan, said anything to the effect that W.T. may have had a chest tube placed in the wrong side. In fact, the nursing staff did not even inform Dr. Mikula that this patient had had a pneumothorax and chest tube insertion prior to the code being called. Such information would have been important from a medical standpoint because it would have allowed Dr. Mikula to act immediately to relieve the tension in the patient's chest. Immediately upon reviewing the repeat chest x-ray and upon hearing the announcement of the code blue at the same time, Respondent rushed back to W.T.'s room, placed a chest tube in the patient's left side, and the patient's blood pressure was again reestablished. However, some time later in her hospitalization, W.T. expired. Nurse Counihan's failure to say anything to Dr. Mikula about the pneumothorax is further indicative of her immediate satisfaction that Respondent's intubation on the right side had been acceptable and that it was only after he discovered his error through the new x-ray and correctly intubated W.T. on the left side that Nurse Counihan completed her notes and incident report describing his error for the chart. The notes were transposed from her scratch pad and memory at approximately noon, August 5, 1987. Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's expert in internal medicine, criticized Respondent's performance as below the professional standard of care because he felt that once Respondent was made aware in the patient's room by Nurse Counihan that the pneumothorax could be on the patient's left side, Respondent had an obligation to make further inquiry or investigation before inserting the chest tube in the patient's right side. In Dr. Rosin's opinion, Respondent's investigation could have taken several routes: review of earlier x-rays and the patient's record, further conversation with the nurse, further hands-on examination of the patient for signs of the pacemaker, and/or ordering a new x- ray. Although Dr. Rosin testified that Respondent should have ordered a repeat x-ray so as to resolve the dispute with Nurse Counihan before inserting the chest tube on W.T.'s right side, he also conceded that the only possible adverse effect of the decision Respondent made was the delay in relieving W.T.'s condition. The chest intubation involved is not a benign or casual procedure, but no actual harm occasioned by misplacement of the chest tube was demonstrated in this case, and the maximum amount of time which would have been saved, under Dr. Rosin's approach, would have been that short period of time it took for the Respondent to place the chest tube and dress the wound. Under the circumstances, if Respondent had delayed intubation, W.T. would probably have "coded blue" before the correctly labelled chest x-ray could have been performed anyway. In light of the confused state of the patient's breath sounds, obesity, and lack of scarring, the fact that no nurses' notes had been codified since before 4:00 a.m., Nurse Counihan's own confusion about the mismarked x-ray, and how far back in the patient's chart Respondent would have had to look before he would have been able to locate anything useful about the pacemaker, it is found that Respondent behaved reasonably in an emergency situation, and Dr. O'Leary's and Dr. Dworkin's expert opinions that he did not violate the professional standard of care in the first insertion of the chest tube are accepted. It is also found that the Respondent's procedure in ordering the new chest x-ray and leaving the room after the first intubation without further search of the records or further conversation in the room was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Physicians enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1991.
The Issue Should Respondent Patricia Dee G. Stehpenson's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined based on the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed herein?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0051453. The patient, a 73 year old female, presented to Respondent on July 11, 1991, with complaints of flashes of light over the past ten years which had increased over the past two years. The patient also complained of seeing halos around street lights at night. During this visit, Respondent diagnosed the patient as having 20/30 corrected vision in her right eye and 20/40 plus 2 corrected vision in her left eye, and that the patient had cataracts. However, Respondent did not recommend cataract surgery at this time. In January, 1992, the patient took the State of Florida driver's license test, including the eye test, and received her driver's license. However, the examiner notice that the patient was having trouble with the eye test and, although the examiner gave the patient her driver's license, the examiner suggested that the patient see an opthalmologist. At the time the patient received her driver's license in January, 1992, the patient was enjoying golf, bowling and driving. Although the patient did not immediately follow the driver's license examiner's advice concerning her eyes, the patient did visit with Respondent on May 8, 1992. At this visit, the patient advised the Respondent that the flashes and floaters had improved but that her vision was interfering with her golfing and driving. Again, Respondent did not recommend removal of the cataract. The patient's vision continued to interfere with her golfing and driving, notwithstanding the patient's testimony to the contrary which I do not find to be credible. The patient's next visit with Respondent was on October 16, 1992. At this visit, the patient advised Respondent that her vision had "lessened a lot" in the left eye. Visual acuity testing indicated corrected vision of 20/30 in the right eye and 20/40 plus 2 in the left eye. However, while the level of vision at which the patient was able to perceive letters (20/40 plus 2) did not change, the refraction (stronger glasses) required to achieve that level indicated more myopia, indicating that the cataract had progressed which supports the patient's complaint that her vision had "lessened a lot". Also at the October 16, 1992, visit, Respondent tested the patient's vision using brightness acuity testing (glare test) and measured the patient's vision as 20/70, with glare in the left eye. The glare test is a method whereby the doctor shines a light in the person's eye to determine the effect of glare on the person's vision. Although some ophthalmologists consider the glare test of no value, other ophthalmologists consider the glare test as another tool to assist the surgeon in making a decision concerning the necessity for cataract surgery. During the October 16, 1992, office visit, Respondent discussed with the patient: (a) the effect the cataract was having on the patient's activities (life-style); (b) the patient's complaint that her vision had lessened; (c) the results of the glare test showing the patient's vision as 20/70 with glare and; (d) other visual acuity testing; and (e)advised the patient that cataract surgery was indicated. Also, Respondent explained the cataract surgery procedures and discussed with the patient the risks and the benefits of the surgery. The patient had no reservations or objections to the surgery and consented to the surgery in hopes of improving her eyesight as well as her life- style. For a person with cataracts, a corrected vision of 20/40 or worse is the vision level where some cataract surgeons will recommend cataract surgery, while other cataract surgeons consider a corrected vision of 20/50 or worse, with or without glare, as the vision level where cataract surgery should be recommended. However, because the vision as determined by visual acuity testing (the ability of the person to perceive letters) does not always accurately reflect the person's quality of vision (the quality of perception on a day to day basis), neither vision level referred to above when considered alone can be used as a hard and fast rule to form a basis for cataract surgery. Since the quality of vision can only be described by the person with the cataract(s), the cataract surgeon must also determine, after consultation with the person, that the cataract(s) are interfering with the person's life-style. Therefore, a person with corrected vision of somewhat better than 20/40 or 20/70 with or without glare, may be a candidate for cataract surgery, provided the cataract is causing a reduction in the person's quality of vision beyond what is indicated by visual acuity testing and thereby interfering with the person's life-style. Furthermore, there are no written standards or guidelines which set a particular vision level for the cataract surgeon to follow when making a decision to recommend cataract surgery. The surgeon must take into consideration all factors and make a decision based on the surgeon's judgment as to what is best for that person. The patient's vision level and the interference the patient was experiencing with her life-style because of the cataracts in her left eye justified Respondent's decision to recommend and perform the cataract surgery on the patient, notwithstanding any of the testimony of Dr. Leslie Monroe to the contrary. On November 3, 1992, Respondent performed phacoemulsification (removal of cataract) with posterior chamber intracular lens implant (implantation of lens) on the patient's left eye. While the patient was in the holding area being prepared for surgery there were complications with the anesthesia. The anesthesiologist, Robert Dienes, M. D., first gave the patient a retrobulbar block which was repeated apparently due to Dr. Dienes' conclusion that the first retrobulbar block was ineffective. Apparently, Dr. Dienes also concluded that the second retrobulbar block was ineffective and gave the patient a superior lid peribulbar block. After giving the peribulbar block, Dr. Dienes noticed a dissecting subconjunctival hemorrhage and notified Respondent. Upon examining the patient's eye, Respondent found the globe (whole eye) to be soft with no active bleeding, indicating the eye was not full of blood and that there was no retina tear or rupture of the globe. Respondent also noticed that "the conjunctiva was real chemotic or it had blood behind it". Respondent also measured the patient's eye pressure with a Schiotz tonameter because there was no slit-lamp in the holding area. The patient's eye pressure was 5, with a 5.5 gram weight, which was normal. The patient's medical records do not reflect an indirect ophthalmoscopy being performed by Respondent on the patient's left eye between Respondent being advised of the dissecting subjunctival hemorrhage by Dr. Diemes and the Respondent performing surgery on the patient's left eye to remove the cataract and implant the lens. Furthermore, Respondent has no independent recollection of performing an indirect ophthalmoscopy during the above period of time before surgery. Respondent's normal practice under conditions and circumstances similar to those in this case has been to perform an indirect ophthalmoscopy during the above period of time before surgery. Therefore, it is assumed that Respondent performed an indirect ophthalmoscopy on the patient after being advised of the subconjunctival hemorrhage but before surgery, notwithstanding the fact that patient's medical records do not reflect such procedure being performed or the fact that Respondent has no independent recollection of performing such procedure during the above period of time. However, assuming arguendo that Respondent did not perform the indirect ophthalmoscopy before surgery, the Agency has failed to establish facts to show that under the conditions and circumstances of this case that such failure amounted to the failure of Respondent to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. After considering the conditions and circumstances surrounding the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized, Respondent made a decision that it was in the best interest of the patient to go forward with the removal of the cataract and implantation of the lens. The operation was completed without any further incident and there was a successful removal of the cataract and lens transplant. Respondent's decision to go forward with the surgery had no adverse effect on the subsequent treatment of the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized. In fact, the result of the treatment subsequent to the cataract surgery would have been the same even if Respondent had not gone forward with the surgery. Respondent, using a ophthalmoscope, was able to see the inside of the eye more clearly and assess the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized. While performing this indirect ophthalmoscopy, Respondent noted undulation of the vitreous with pigmented blood cells present and that the anesthesia needle had penetrated the globe. The patient was seen the next morning, November 3, 1992, by Respondent. After assessing the condition of the patient's left eye, Respondent referred the patient to Keye Wong, M. D., a retina specialist. Upon examining the patient's left eye on November 4, 1992, Dr. Wong noted vitreous hemorrhaging and retinal detachment. Dr. Wong performed an operation on the patient's left eye in an attempt to correct the damage and attach the retina. The patient's vision is not as good as it was before the operation, and still effects the patient's life-style. The patient has difficulty tolerating sunlight, which may or may not be a result of the complication experienced while the patient was being anesthetize. Respondent's action of going forward with the surgery after becoming aware of the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized did not cause, complicate, aggravate or result in any of the problems the patient has suffered postoperatively. Respondent did not fail to recognize, identify or treat properly the complications that arose before, during or after the surgery. The Agency has failed to establish facts to show that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances at anytime while Respondent was treating the patient, including both preoperative and postoperative treatment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed herein against Respondent Patricia Dee G. Stephenson, M. D. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1560 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner and the Department in this case. Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1-2 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 3 is adopted in Finding of Fact 3. The second and third sentence are not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 4 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 5, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 5 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 7, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 6 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 12, 13, and 14, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 8 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 21 and 22, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 9 is a restatement of Dr. Monroe's testimony and is not a finding of fact. However, see Findings of Fact 16 and 17. 8, Proposed findings of fact 10, 16, 17 and 19 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 15, 16, 10, 8 and 9. Proposed finding of fact 11 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 16, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Although proposed findings of fact 12, 13 and 15 are findings of fact, they are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. See Finding of Fact 9. Proposed finding of fact 14 is a restatement of Dr. Grabow's testimony and is not stated as a finding of fact, but see Finding of Fact 10. Dr. Grabow's testimony was 20/50 vision with or without glare which is different than just 20/50 vision. 11. Proposed findings of Fact 18 and 20 are not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 27 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 25. COPIES FURNISHED: Marm Harris, M. D., Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building Number Three 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Steve Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 William E. Partridge, Esquire Lutz, Webb, Partridge, BoBo, and Baitty One Sarasota Tower 2 North Tamiami Trail, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236
Findings Of Fact The applicants, MediVision of Miami, Inc., and MediVision of Northern Dade County, Inc., are wholly owned subsidiaries of MediVision Inc., which maintains its corporate offices in Boston, Massachusetts. MediVision, Inc., was incorporated in January, 1984, to promote the development of outpatient eye surgery, in part through the development and operation of outpatient eye surgery centers. MediVision of Miami, Inc., and MediVision of Northern Dade County, Inc., will each be responsible for the development and operation of the projects proposed in their respective applications. MediVision, Inc., was organized by several individuals in response to a study conducted by Bain and Company, a strategic consulting firms as part of a consulting engagement in which those persons were involved. The study disclosed several demographic and health care delivery trends which prompted MediVision management to pursue the development of outpatient eye surgery centers. Those trends are: an overall movement of all types of surgery from an impatient to an outpatient setting; the increase in the nation's elderly population, and the fact that the likelihood of a person developing cataracts increases dramatically with age; the technological improvements in the provision of cataract surgery; the growth in the number of cataract surgeries performed nationally; and, a change in the manner in which Medicare reimburses a facility for outpatient surgery performed upon Medicare recipients. Medicare, since 1982, has reimbursed licensed freestanding ambulatory surgical facilities at a flat rate for the provision of such surgery, with no cost to the patient. For the same surgical procedures performed in a hospital outpatient setting, Medicare will reimburse the facility its costs of providing the surgery; the patient is responsible to pay the Medicare deductible and 20 percent co-insurance. Various subsidiaries of MediVision Inc., presently operate eight outpatient eye surgery centers nationwide; two are located in Florida. Other MediVision subsidiaries are developing three additional centers in Florida, pursuant to certificates of need issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Both parties employed the same quantitative need methodology. The methodology employs the following steps: acquire data regarding number of impatient and outpatient surgical procedures performed by existing providers; using this data, calculate current overall surgical use rate and outpatient surgical use rate for county; using the projected population for the year in question and the current use rate, calculate projected number of surgeries; multiply total projected surgeries by 40 percent to establish total outpatient surgery pool for year in question; subtract from result of step 4, all outpatient surgical procedures projected to be performed in hospitals and operating freestanding ambulatory surgery centers; subtract financial break-evens of all certificate of need approved freestanding outpatient surgery centers from this pool; and, after subtractions the number of surgical procedures remaining are compared to the break-evens of certificate of need applicant at issue. If the pool is larger than break-evens the condition is satisfied. If the pool is smaller than break-evens the condition is not satisfied. The quantitative methodology provides a reasonable approach to the evaluation of need for ambulatory surgical facilities. The basic methodology has been employed by the Department since 1982; in December, 1985, the Department began to employ a "40 percent outpatient factor" in implementing the policy. Accordingly, looking toward the planning horizon of 1988, the methodology projects that 40 percent of all surgeries in Dade County will be performed on an outpatient basis. The 40 percent outpatient factor is reasonable for use in these proceedings. The prevailing literature suggests that 40 percent of all surgeries can be expected to be performed on an outpatient basis. Within Florida, many counties are already performing in excess of 30 percent of all surgeries on an outpatient basis. Trends in health care delivery and reimbursements including the growth in pre-paid health care organizations, such as health maintenance organizations; professional review organizations, which monitor the appropriateness of hospital admissions; and Medicare reimbursement incentives will contribute to an increase in the percentage of surgeries performed in an outpatient setting. While employing the same quantitative need methodology, the parties' health planning experts arrived at different conclusions as to whether the methodology projects need for the facilities at issue in these proceedings. The differences in outcome are attributable to two issues: (1) the calculation of a base-year use rate; and (2) the calculation of "break-evens" for previously approved, but non-operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. Each expert relied upon the same basic data source in calculating a base-year surgical use rate, employing data collected by HRS and reported in the most current State Agency Action Report prepared by the Department relative to Dade County. Such Action Report (CON Action No. 4095) lacked complete data regarding the total number of surgeries performed in Dade County during the base-year (1984-5), in that six of the thirty-three acute care hospitals in Dade County failed to report. Because it is necessary to have complete data in order to establish an accurate base-year surgical use rate, Mark Druash who was engaged to undertake a need analysis by the applicants, referred to earlier State Agency Action Reports to acquire surgical procedure data for the six hospitals which had failed to report. Such documents are reliable data sources upon which to base a need analysis. In calculating a county's surgical use rate, health planners take into consideration the total population within the county. Accordingly, the total number of surgeries provided within the county must also be considered. In that six Dade County hospitals failed to report data and HRS' health planner did not acquire data relative to those facilities, the surgeries performed at those hospitals were not included in his calculation of a surgical use rate. If the total population of a county is considered in calculating a surgical use rate, but something less than the total number of surgeries is considered, the calculation results in an artificially deflated use rate. As the base-year use rate drives all of the remaining calculations in the quantitative methodology, an error in the calculation of the use rate will be carried through the entire methodology. The ultimate effect of a deflated use rate is to project a smaller number of surgical procedures, as compared to a use rate calculated upon complete data. HRS calculated a base-year surgical use rate for Dade County of 78.2 surgeries/1000 population. MediVision calculated a base-year surgical use rate of 92.8/1000 population. The variance in the use rates is attributable solely to the fact that Druash acquired and employed in his calculations surgical procedure data from all Dade County hospitals previously relied upon by HRS; while HRS relied upon incomplete data. In that Druash's calculations are based on a complete data based the surgical use rate of 92.8/1000 population is found to be more accurate and reliable than the rate of 78.2/1000 population calculated by HRS from incomplete data. The parties differ in their calculation of "break- evens for previously approved, but not yet operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. The break-even calculation is an integral part of the quantitative need methodology. The purpose of subtracting from the available outpatient surgical pool the "break-evens" of approved, but not yet operational ambulatory surgical facilities is to assure that there exists need for the project proposed adequate to allow both such project and previously approved facilities to operate in a financially viable manner. The "break-even" approach is also intended to promote competition; rather than assuming that all of the procedures projected by a facility will be performed in such facility; the approach allocates to the facility only that number of procedures it needs to generate sufficient revenues to cover its expenses. Druash who participated in the development of the quantitative methodology during his tenure with HRS, testified that the "break-even" approach was selected because it would promote competition among providers by approving enough applicants so that they would be "hungry" for the residual surgeries projected by the methodology. The purpose of calculating a financial break-even is to ascertain at what point a project's cash flow will equal its expenditures. The generally accepted method for calculating a financial break-even requires that fixed costs be separated from variable costs. The concept of variable costs is the basis for the computation of a break-even. Fixed costs are those which remain constant regardless of the volume of business conducted by an entity; variable costs are those that change directly with volume. In the operation of an ambulatory surgical facility, virtually all expenses related to medical supplies are variable. If no patients are treated, no medical supplies are needed, and no expenses are incurred. If 100 patients are treated, 100 units of medical supplies are needed, with resultant expense. Certain expenses involved in the operation of an ambulatory surgical center are totally fixed, such as debt service and property taxes. All other expenses are variable to some degree e.g. salaries, utilities, and maintenance. Depreciation and amortization of property and equipment are not considered as expenses in a break-even analysis, as those items do not represent cash expenditures. As mere accounting recognitions of prior investment, depreciation and amortization should not be included in a calculation of a cash flow break-even. HRS' methodology for calculating financial break-evens for ambulatory surgical procedures treats all expenses as fixed, and includes amortization and depreciation among those expenses. By HRS' admissions the Department, "in lieu of attempting to determine what is fixed and what is variable . . . will use a somewhat more crude method". Where a financial break-even is calculated treating all costs as fixed, the resulting break-even number is artificially inflated. By the Department's reckoning, the effect of treating all expenses as fixed is to "add a cushion" to its approvals of prior applications. HRS' expert acknowledged, however, that differentiating between fixed and variable costs in performing a financial break-even analysis is the "preferred methods no question". Lovell Jones, a certified public accountant and expert in health care finance, performed revised break-even analyses for previously approved, but not yet operational, ambulatory surgical facilities. Jones first acquired expense and revenue data from the certificate of need applications submitted by previously approved applicants. Then, treating only medical supplies as variable expenses, and excluding amortization and depreciation from the list of fixed expenses, he calculated the actual financial break-even of each approved, but not yet operational, facility. Jones' analysis finds the collective break- even of all previously approved, but not yet operational, facilities to be 17,996 procedures, whereas the Department's "crude" analysis results in a collective break-even of 25,736. Jones' method of calculating break-even, which was agreed to be technically correct by both parties, is more accurate and reliable than the method employed by the Department. Using the agreed-upon quantitative methodology, the surgical use rate calculated by Druash, and the break-even numbers calculated by Jones, there is projected to exist in 1988 a pool of 5006 outpatient surgical procedures that could be provided by the applicants in these proceedings. Subtracting the break-even numbers of the two proposed facilities, there will exist a residual pool of greater than 3600 procedures. Accordingly, there exists a quantitative need for the two proposed facilities. Furthers the residual pool of greater than 3600 procedures represents an adequate "cushion" to satisfy the concerns of HRS that previously approved facilities be given the opportunity to operate in a financially viable manner. The proposed facilities will improve access to services for both Medicare and indigent patients. Medicare patients receiving surgery at the facilities will be treated free of cost, with the Medicare program having full responsibility for payment. All other patients will be treated at the facilities regardless of ability to pay. The proposed facilities will promote competition in that management intends the charges to commercial patients to be less than the prevailing charges in the community. Where an ambulatory surgical facility enters a market, hospital charges for similar services tend to decrease. The proposed facilities will promote cost containment, as it is more costly to render care in a hospital outpatient department than in a freestanding ambulatory surgical facility. Hospital outpatient departments, which are reimbursed by Medicare for their costs of providing services, do not have the same incentive to reduce costs as do freestanding ambulatory surgery facilities, which are reimbursed at a predetermined flat rate for the provision of services. Accordingly, Medicare has encouraged the use of freestanding ambulatory surgical facilities by incurring all responsibility for payments at no cost to Medicare recipients. The Department's sole concern regarding the financial feasibility of the proposed facilities arises out of its position that there exists no need for the facilities. Accordingly, the Department questions whether the facilities will enjoy utilization sufficient to generate the revenues necessary to their viable operation. In that need for the facilities has been found to exist, it follows that the facilities will be able to generate adequate numbers of surgeries to achieve break-even in their second years of operation. Several other factors indicate that the facilities will experience utilization sufficient to achieve break-even in their second years of operation: The marketing and community education activities proposed by the applicants will encourage utilization. In its existing surgical facility in Orlando, MediVision, Inc., has undertaken similar activities, which have resulted in substantial surgical referrals to the facility; There exists a residual pool of approximately 5,000,000 untreated cataracts nationally; Medicare reimbursement policies which allow Medicare recipients to receive treatment at licensed freestanding ambulatory surgical centers at no cost to the recipient will encourage utilization of the proposed facilities; The applicants' pricing structure, for both Medicare and commercial patients, will encourage utilization of the proposed facilities; and Two local ophthalmology group practices have expressed strong interest in performing surgery at the proposed facilities. Each group presently performs in excess of 1000 surgeries annually, which volume is greater than the break-even volume necessary to be achieved at each facility.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawn it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving the applications of Petitioners to establish and operate freestanding ophthalmic ambulatory surgical centers in Dade County, Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire The Perkins House, Suite 101 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
