The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Florida Commission on Human Relations fails to send a copy of the Charge of Discrimination to Respondent within five days of the complaint being filed, as required by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition of Manuel Pedraza in DOAH Case No. 02-0238, and FCHR Case No. 99-1636, for failure to timely file his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan K. W. Erlenbach, Esquire Erlenbach Law Offices, P.A. 2532 Garden Street Titusville, Florida 32796 Toby Lev, Esquire Egan, Lev, & Siwica, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue May Petitioner proceed to a hearing on the merits of her charge of employment discrimination or does the untimeliness of her Petition for Relief bar her claim?
Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), alleging that Respondent Department of State had discriminated against her because of her race (Black) when it had discharged her on October 1, 1996. The Commission concluded its investigation into the matter, and on January 31, 2000, the Commission issued its "Determination: No Cause." A "Notice of Determination: No Cause" was mailed by the Commission to Petitioner on January 31, 2000. It contained the following statements: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2000.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on his race in violation of Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fabian L. Dixon, is an African-American male. At all times relevant to this Petition, Petitioner was employed by the Florida Department of Children and Families as a Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Specialist–Forensic Corrections at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. Petitioner was aware of Florida State Hospital’s strict policies regarding Falsification of Records or Statements; Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations or Policies and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee. Petitioner was also aware that violations of such policies could result in dismissal of the employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. 4. On June 22, 2001, at 8:32 a.m. and 8:33 a.m., Unit 21 received two faxed copies of Inter Agency Leave Transfer forms from Petitioner, each donating twenty-four hours of sick leave for a total of forty-eight hours and both purportedly signed by Norman Torres. Mr. Torres subsequently discovered that over twenty-four hours had been deducted from his sick leave balance, and discovered that forty-seven hours had been used by Fabian L. Dixon. Mr. Torres then informed his timekeeper that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. In reviewing the sick leave donation forms it appeared the date was changed on one of the forms, then the two forms were faxed to Unit 21. Written statements from Mr. Torres indicated that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. Because of the serious nature of the violation, and given Petitioner's past history of discipline, Respondent terminated Petitioner on September 21, 2001. The employment decision was not based on Petitioner's race and was consistent with Respondent’s disciplinary policy. On October 1, 2001, AFSCME elected to file a grievance on behalf of Petitioner under the provisions of the Master Contract between the State and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The grievance was initially reviewed by the Department of Children and Family Services and it was determined that there was cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. The grievance was then appealed to Step 3 of the grievance procedure, which provided for review of agency action by the Department of Management Services. The issue determined at Step 3 was whether the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner. Review of the Department’s actions revealed that the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner and that the penalty imposed was within the range for each charged violation. The grievance and relief requested was denied. On December 4, 2001, a “Request for Arbitration” was filed by AFSCME on behalf of Petitioner and a hearing was scheduled for June 2, 2003. On May 20, 2003, AFSCME filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Arbitration. In response to the notice, the hearing was cancelled and an Order Closing the File of the Department of Management Services was issued on May 20, 2003. At hearing, Petitioner admitted that he altered the Inter Agency Leave Transfer Form, but contended that the hospital did not terminate other white employees for similar offenses. However, Petitioner failed to present any independent testimony to corroborate this claim and made absolutely no showing that there was any relationship between his race and his termination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850)488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Fabian L. Dixon 4634 Century Road Greenwood, Florida 32443 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Florida State Hospital Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a black female, was hired by Respondent on May 2, 1978. Petitioner was employed as a psychiatric aide until June 12, 1981. From June 13, 1981 until Petitioner's dismissal by Respondent on October 17, 1985, her primary duties consisted of working with severely mentally ill patients as a Human Services Worker II at Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was a permanent employee of Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor at the time of the incident was Dan Gibbs, a black male. On September 2, 1985, Petitioner volunteered to work a consecutive eight (8) hour shift from 11:00 p.m. on September 2, 1985 until 7:00 a.m. on September 3, 1925. Petitioner's primary duty was to observe A. G., a suicidal patient, on a one-on-one procedure throughout the entire shift. The one-on-one procedure requires the observer to remain within arms reach of the assigned patient at all times without interruption. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 3, 1985, Emma Jordan, a white female registered nurse and Geri Knowles, a white female security officer, found the Petitioner asleep in the T.V. Room of Ward Nine (9) with her feet propped up on a chair, a pillow behind her back and a cover over her. Petitioner's co- worker, Freddy Jones, a probationary employee, was also found sleeping and was subsequently terminated by Respondent for sleeping on the job. Two patients, including A. G., were also asleep. A. G., the patient assigned to Petitioner for a one-on-one procedure, was no less than ten (10) feet from Petitioner. Ten (10) feet is more than arms length. There was sufficient light from the nurses' station and the television for Jordan and Knowles to determine that Petitioner was asleep. Jordan and Knowles observed Petitioner sleeping for about two (2) minutes before she was awakened by Jordan. After Petitioner was awakened, Jordan, whose duties included caring for patients on Ward Nine (9), questioned Petitioner about who was responsible for carrying out the one-on- one procedure and was informed by Petitioner that both she and Freddy Jones took turns. When Jordan attempted to explain the safety violation, Petitioner responded with "you ain't my supervisor, mother fucker." From this point, the exchange between Petitioner and Jordan escalated with Petitioner using more obscenities and making actual physical contact with Jordan. Additionally, Petitioner encouraged Jordan to "Fight like a woman, mother fucker." Both Dan Gibbs and Freddy Jones had to intercede and physically restrain Petitioner on two (2) occasions. Petitioner had previously been suspended for three (3) days in August, 1982 for sleeping while on duty. Prior to this incident, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's personnel policy concerning disciplinary action for sleeping on the job. Respondent's disciplinary rule provides for a "written reprimand or up to thirty days suspension or dismissal" for sleeping on the job. With each subsequent occurrence of the same violation, the rule imposes a more severe discipline. A predetermination hearing was held by Respondent on September 26, 1985 and Petitioner was subsequently discharged by Respondent on October 17, 1985 for sleeping on the job and malicious use of profane language. The evidence in the record does not reflect a similar instance where an employee (black or white) had been accused and disciplined for sleeping on the job while observing a patient on a one-on-one basis and exhibiting conduct such as the Petitioner exhibited in this instance. Respondent's hospital had, prior to September 3, 1985, suspended both black and white employees for sleeping on duty and subsequent to this incident dismissed a white male employee for sleeping on duty while assigned to a one-on- one supervision of a patient. There was no evidence to support Petitioner's contention that her termination was "retaliation" by Respondent because she had successfully challenged an earlier termination by Respondent for abandonment of position. The evidence clearly established that Respondent reinstated Petitioner after receiving additional information from Petitioner without the matter going to hearing. The evidence clearly establishes that Petitioner was discharged because she was found sleeping on the job while assigned to a suicidal patient on a one-on-one basis and for use of malicious profane language. The evidence clearly establishes that Respondent's actions were not inconsistent with previous disciplinary actions taken against other employees, both black and white, with similar offenses. There was insufficient evidence to show that Respondent's actions taken in discharging Petitioner were motivated by impermissible racial consideration.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Joann Postell has failed to establish that she was discharged due to her race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), and that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 12th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2391 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.(a)(b) That Petitioner was employed by Respondent and terminated for sleeping on the job is adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 13. The balance of the introductory sentence is rejected as not being a finding of fact but that Petitioner's argument that her dismissal was discriminatory. Rejected as not stating a fact but only why Petitioner denied being asleep. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. 2. Rejected as being argument rather than a finding of fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 5. Adopted in Finding of Facts 4 and 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1a. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David A. West, Esquire Legal Counsel Northeast Florida State Hospital Macclenny, Florida 32063 Carl G. Swanson, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, (“the Agency”) regarding certificate of need ("CON") application number 10158 filed by North Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. (“NFRMC”). 1. NFRMC filed a CON application which sought the establishment of a 24-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit within its hospital located in Alachua County, Florida, Service District 3. The Agency denied NFRMC’s CON application 10158. ; 1 Filed November 4, 2013 11:10 AM Division of Administrative Hearings 2. NFRMC filed a petition for formal hearing challenging the Agency’s denial of CON application number 10158. 3. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. d/b/a Shands Rehab Hospital, filed a petition for formal hearing in support of the Agency’s denial of NFRMC’s CON application 10158. 4. NFERMC has since voluntarily dismissed its petition for formal hearing. 5. Based upon the voluntary dismissal, the Division of Administrative Hearings entered an Order Closing Files and Relinquishing Jurisdiction in the above styled matter. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 6. The denial of NFRMC’s CON application 10158 is UPHELD. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida on this DD day of Octet. 2013. cbc Peele Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration _NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review. which shall be instituted by filing the original notice of appeal with the agency clerk of AHCA, and a copy along with the filing fee prescribed by law with the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been furnished by U.S. Mail or electronic mail to the persons named below on this f "__ day of Nove~ hes _, 2013. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Cler| Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 412-3630 Janice Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) James McLemore, Supervisor Certificate of Need Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Elizabeth W. McArthur Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Counsel for NFRMC (U.S. Mail) Lorraine M. Novak, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration {Electronic Mail), F. Philip Blank, Esquire Blank & Meehan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Strect Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Counsel for Shands Rehab Hospital (U.S. Mail) we
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should reimburse Petitioner for the attorneys' fees and costs Petitioner expended in its successful defense of Respondent's Stop-Work Order.
Findings Of Fact Hernandez, Inc., was a contractor based in the Jacksonville, Florida area, and was in the business of installing dry wall, among other construction-related activities. Its principal owner, Jorge Hernandez, founded the company in 1981. The Department of Financial Services is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Workers' Compensation Law. This duty is delegated to the Division of Workers' Compensation. The Division is a state agency. It is not a nominal party. On February 5, 2004, Hernandez, Inc., was engaged in installing drywall in the Bennett Federal Building in Jacksonville, Florida, using its own personnel, who were leased from Matrix, Inc., an employee leasing company, and two subcontractors, GIO & Sons (GIO), of Norfolk, Virginia, and U&M Contractors, Inc., (U&M), of Charlotte, North Carolina. The leased employees were properly covered by workers' compensation insurance provided by the lessor. Prior to contracting with GIO and U&M, Hernandez, Inc., asked for and received ACORD certificates of insurance, which on their face indicated that the subcontractors had both liability coverage and workers' compensation coverage. It is the practice of Hernandez, Inc., to ensure that certificates of insurance are provided by subcontractors. The office staff of Hernandez, Inc., at all times prior to going out of business, tracked the certificates and ensured that they were kept current. Hernandez, Inc. had relied on hundreds of these ACORD certificates in the past. During times pertinent, neither GIO or U&M maintained workers' compensation insurance on their employees that complied with the requirements of Section 440.38(7), Florida Statutes. On February 5, 2004, Katina Johnson, an investigator with the Division's Jacksonville office, made a routine visit to the Bennett Federal Building with another investigator. She observed personnel from Hernandez, Inc., and its subcontractors GIO and U&M, installing dry wall. She also determined that Hernandez, Inc., had a contract to install dry wall as a subcontractor participating in the construction of the Mayport Naval Station BEQ. U&M worked at both the Bennett Federal Building site and the Mayport BEQ site as a subcontractor of Hernandez, Inc. Ms. Johnson discovered that neither U&M nor GIO had workers' compensation coverage for its employers. Ms. Johnson asked for and received the certificates of insurance that Hernandez, Inc., had obtained from GIO and U&M, which facially suggested that Hernandez, Inc., had determined that its subcontractors had appropriate coverage. Nevertheless, she issued a SWO on February 26, 2004, to Hernandez, Inc., as well as GIO, and U&M. By the SWO, Hernandez, Inc., was charged with failure to ensure that workers' compensation meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, was in place for GIO and U&M. She also issued an Order of Penalty Assessment that eventually became an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004. The SWO stated, in bold print, that Hernandez, Inc., was, "Ordered to Stop Work and Cease All Business Operations in the State." Hernandez, Inc., was, at the time, also engaged in construction at the new Jacksonville Library and at the Carlington Apartments, both of which were located in Florida. By the terms of the SWO, Hernandez was required to stop work in those sites also. The Division had no evidence that might cause it to believe that Hernandez, Inc., was operating in violation of the law at those sites. The SWO contained with it a Notice of Rights advising that a formal or informal administrative hearing might be had and required that a petition for a hearing be filed within 21 days of receipt of the SWO, if a hearing was desired. Hernandez, Inc., was not informed that it had the right to an immediate hearing. Hernandez, Inc., timely filed a petition demanding a formal hearing. In an effort to get back to work, Hernandez, Inc., entered into an agreement with the Division, whereby it paid a partial penalty of $46,694.03, but admitted no liability. The formal hearing did not take place until August 16, 2005. Ms. Johnson had the power to issue a stop-work order. She did not have to get approval from a neutral magistrate or from the Division. Because she was a recent employee of the Division, she conferred with her supervisor Robert Lambert before taking action, and he approved her action in writing. In February 2004, it was the policy of the Division to issue SWO's for all work sites even though it concluded that a violation had occurred in only the site or sites visited. The Division policy did not require an investigation into all worksites as a prerequisite to shutting down all worksites. The policy requiring a contractor to cease work at all worksites was not adopted as a rule. In February 2004, the Division asserted that compliance with Section 440.10(1)(c), Florida Statutes, required a general contractor to look beyond an ACORD certificate of insurance to determine if subcontractors had complied with the requirement to maintain the required workers' compensation coverage ". . . under a Florida endorsement using Florida rates and rules pursuant to payroll reporting that accurately reflects the work performed in this state by such employees." This policy was not adopted as a rule and was subsequently abandoned. The Division, in implementing this policy, asserted that a general contractor must actually review the policy of a subcontractor presenting an ACORD certificate and determine if it was in effect and if it complied with Florida law. This policy was not adopted as a rule and the policy was subsequently abandoned. The Division further asserted that the employees of the subcontractor of a general contractor were to be viewed as if they were employees of the general contractor, when contemplating workers' compensation coverage. This policy was not adopted as a rule. Ms. Johnson acted in conformance with the Division's policies in effect at the time the SWO was issued. The net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,821,599, on December 31, 2003. Hernandez, Inc., was struggling financially in February 2004, but was on the way to recovery until the SWO was issued. On November 30, 2004, the net worth of Hernandez, Inc., was a negative $1,161,865, and this figure included the sum of $978,000 that Mr. Hernandez put into the business. Accordingly, Hernandez, Inc., was a small business party for purposes of Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, during times pertinent. The SWO, which terminated work at all Hernandez work sites, torpedoed any chance the company had to continue in business. Mr. Hernandez mortgaged his house, which he subsequently lost to creditors, in an effort to keep Hernandez, Inc., in business. All of his efforts failed. The failure was a direct result of the actions of the Division. The Division's interpretations of the law that precipitated their policies, and thus the failure of the business, were both wrong and unreasonable. Subsequent to the hearing and Recommended Order in Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation v. Hernandez, Inc., Case No. 04-1174 (DOAH October 3, 2005), the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order styled, In the Matter of: Hernandez, Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 75492-05-WC (Florida Department of Financial Services, January 25, 2006). The Final Order noted that the contractor, Hernandez, Inc., complied with the extant law when it, ". . . demanded and received proof of insurance. . . . " The Final Order also noted that there was no authority produced by the Division that would permit the imposition of a fine on Hernandez, Inc. The Final Order further recited that there was no statutory duty on the part of a contractor to ensure (emphasis supplied) that its subcontractors had secured workers' compensation coverage for its employees. It noted that, ". . . without some formal delineation of the specific obligations of a contractor in ascertaining proof of insurance from a subcontractor, the Department cannot impose a penalty upon the facts presented in the instant case." The Division was ordered to rescind the SWO issued February 26, 2004, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004, and was further ordered to repay the amount of $46,694.03, which had been paid to persuade the Division to abate the SWO. The action was initiated by the Division, which is a state agency. At the time the SWO was initiated, there was no reasonable basis in law and fact to do so. The actions of the Division were not "substantially justified." Hernandez, Inc., prevailed in the hearing because the Chief Financial Officer entered a Final Order in its favor and the Order has not been reversed on appeal and the time for seeking judicial review of the Final Order has expired. Hernandez, Inc., is, therefore, a "prevailing small business party." Hernandez, Inc., paid its law firm, Holbrook, Akel, Cold, Stiefel & Ray, P.A., $51,815.50 in attorneys' fees, and paid $8,837.00 in costs, in its successful defense of the Division's actions.
