The Issue Whether Respondents committed the unlawful housing discrimination practices alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner is a "unit owner" of a condominium located at 210-174th Street #310, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida. Said unit is located in the Winston Towers 600 Condominium ("Condominium"). Respondent, the Association, is a Florida non-profit corporation and the entity responsible for the operation of the Condominium. Respondent, Board of Directors, possesses the powers and duties necessary for the administration of the affairs of the Condominium. Pursuant to the Association By-Laws, the affairs of the Association are to be governed by a board of initially three, and not less than three, nor more than nine directors. Respondent, Jorge Nunez, was the President of the Association's Board of Directors at all times material to the Complaint. During his tenure, Mr. Nunez was also the chairman of the financial committee.4/ Respondent, Monica Zarante, possesses a Florida Community Association Manager ("CAM") license and at all times material was the Association's manager. Condominium Facilities and Services Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following facilities have been constructed in the Condominium, and form a part of the "common elements" of the Condominium and are to be used exclusively by the unit owners, their tenants, and guests: clubroom and entertainment areas (billiard room, library, men's and women's card rooms, meeting room and kitchen, bicycle room, and large screen television room); (b) main lobby; (c) mail room; (d) laundry room and vending machine room; (e) association office; (f) four elevators; (g) recreational facilities (tennis court, recreation pavilion, men and women's health clubs, party room, and sun deck); (h) L-shaped swimming pool; (i) jogging trail; (j) two shuffleboard courts; and (k) an irregularly-shaped reflecting pool. Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following are the delineated utilities and services available to the Condominium: electricity, telephone service, waste disposal, domestic water supply, sanitary sewage, storm drainage, and master antenna service. Association Committees As noted above, Petitioner's Complaint alleges that, "sometime in 2012 she was denied her right to participate on Association committees because of her race." Association By-Law 5.2 addresses committees and provides as follows: Committees. The Board of Directors may designate one or more committees which shall have the powers of the Board of Directors for the management of the affairs and business of the Association to the extent provided in the resolution designating such a committee. Any such committee shall consist of at least three members of the Association, at least one of whom shall be a Director. The committee or committees shall have such name or names as may be determined from time to time by the Board of Directors, and any such committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and report the same to the Board of Directors as required. The foregoing powers shall be exercised by the Board of Directors or its contractor, manager or employees, subject only to approval by Unit Owners when such is specifically required. Respondent Nunez credibly testified that the availability to participate on committees is open to all unit owners. If an owner wishes to be on a committee, he or she simply needs to communicate that desire to the particular committee chairperson. Mr. Nunez, at some point in time, was apparently the chairman of the financial committee. In Petitioner's direct examination of Respondent Nunez, the following exchange occurred: Q. Okay. Did you say, "You sit at this table with us, never?" A. Never. I can't say that. I can't say "never." I cannot reject anybody to belong to any committee. I can't. It's impossible. Q. Okay. A. I like you, I don't like you, you want to be on the committee, you have a right to be on the committee. Petitioner testified that she was denied access to the financial committee to which Mr. Nunez chaired. Petitioner failed, however, to present sufficient evidence for the undersigned to determine whether this alleged denial occurred during the time relevant to the allegations of Petitioner's Complaint. Even if relevant, outside of her bare assertion, which is not credited, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she was ever denied the right to participate on any Association committee. As a subset, Petitioner argues that she was denied "meaningful participation" on the committees, and thus, in condominium decision-making. In support of this contention, Petitioner references the testimony from Association Board Member Audrey Bekoff. In response to Petitioner's question of "why did the Petitioner point her finger at you?," Ms. Bekoff responded as follows: I haven't got the slightest idea. When you get angry, you pull your hair, you scream, you yell, you wipe the things off Monica's desk. You knock the things off. Everybody knows you on the Board. When you come into the meeting, everybody leaves. Petitioner contends that the "refusal to allow her to participate arose from Respondents' extreme dislike for her, and this extreme dislike was likely based, at least in part, on her race." Petitioner's contention, however, is belied by the record evidence. Indeed, audio recordings of various Association meetings provide multiple examples of Petitioner's robust participation in a variety of condominium issues. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner provided evidence to support the position that she is not well-liked, aside from her bald allegation, she failed to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in regards to Association committee participation. Association Records Petitioner claims she was denied access to the Association's financial records (in general) and records related to a particular condominium unit, Unit 2007, on the basis of her race. Petitioner alleges that the records requests were made on July 30, 2012, and November 1, 2012. Monica Zerante testified that the Association's protocol for requesting records from the Association included submitting a request in writing, and, thereafter, the Association provides a copy of the requested document or the requesting party may be given access to find the document. She further explained that the Association's policy is to charge 25 cents per copy; however, that charge is frequently waived. Mr. Nunez provided the further detail that once the Association receives a records request, the Association has ten days to accommodate the request. Although the Association has established rules regarding the frequency and time of record inspections and copying, Mr. Nunez credibly testified that same were not enforced concerning Petitioner. It is undisputed that on at least one occasion, while Petitioner was present in the Association's office for the purpose of inspecting/reviewing Association documents, a conflict arose between Petitioner and Monica Zerante such that Ms. Zerante requested law enforcement assistance. In support of her contention that she was treated differently because of her race, Petitioner testified as follows: Okay. Mr. Nunez, while not on the Board, goes to the office and he gets a monthly statement of the Association operating budget on a monthly basis and he is entitled to that. I go and request the same thing and I'm told I have to pay for it. And if I object to paying for it, then the police is called. * * * Q. You have no evidence that Mr. Nunez, when he was off the Board, did not similarly have to pay for records, correct? A. I have seen with my eyes that he has not. Q. Well, you have no idea if he actually paid for those records separately, do you? A. I've never seen him pay for that. Inconsistently, Petitioner subsequently testified that, at times, like Mr. Nunez, she was also provided documents free of charge. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any document that the Association was required to maintain (and not prohibited from disclosure) was not, in fact, provided or made available for inspection. Respondents' witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had access to all available documents, and their testimony was buttressed by the record evidence. Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that Respondents' legal counsel, on multiple occasions, provided written responses to Petitioner's document requests.5/ Even if Petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to establish that she was denied access to the Association's records, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any such denial was due to any discriminatory animus on the basis of her race.6/ Access to Property Petitioner's Access The original Condominium Rules and Regulations provided that, "[a]utomobiles belonging to residents must at all times bear the identifying garage sticker provided by the Association." On July 27, 2011, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to all residents. The contents of the memorandum are as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT AS OF TODAY, YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES, WHILE COMING INTO THE BUILDING SO YOU CAN USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AND WHILE YOUR CAR IS PARKED IN YOUR ASSIGNED PARKING SPACE. ALSO, THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE CAR'S WINDSHIELD MUST DISPLAY THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL SHOWING THE SPACE NUMBER. IN CASE YOU DO NOT HAVE THE BARCODE LABEL OR THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL, PLEASE, STOP BY THE OFFICE IN ORDER TO GET THEM. IF YOU ALREADY HAVE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL DISPLAYED IN YOUR CAR, WE ASK YOU TO PLEASE REFRAIN FROM USING THE VISITOR'S GATE AND TO ALWAYS USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE. On that same date, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to the gate security personnel. Said memorandum set forth the same information as above, and further advised the gate personnel to advise residents without the requisite barcode and label to stop by the office to obtain the same. The memorandum further instructed the security personnel as follows: SHOULD THE RESIDENT WITH A CAR BARCODE LABEL ALREADY PLACED IN THE CAR STILL DECIDES [sic] TO USE THE VISITOR'S GATE, PLEASE TELL THEM THAT YOU WILL ONLY OPEN THAT TIME FOR THEM, THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY MUST USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AS YOU WILL NOT OPEN FOR THEM. SHOULD THEY HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE BARCODE LABEL, PLEASE TELL THEM TO STOP BY THE OFFICE. On September 8, 2011, the Board of Directors issued a memorandum to "Residents Using Visitor's Gate" entitled "FINAL NOTICE/RESIDENT BUILDING ACCESS." The memorandum advised the residents as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES. YOU MUST USE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL AND USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE WHEN ENTERING OUR BUILDING. SHOULD YOU CONTINUE USING THE VISITOR'S GATE, WHICH IS FOR VISITORS AND DELIVERIES ONLY, YOU WILL NOT BE ADMITTED. AS AN OWNER/RESIDENT YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER; HOWEVER, YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL NOT. IF YOU LEAVE YOUR AUTOMOBILE IN THE VISITOR'S ENTRANCE THE POLICE WILL BE NOTIFIED AND YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL BE TOWED. PLEASE, ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS. The Condominium maintained regular office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for residents to obtain the aforementioned barcode/label. On or about September 14, 2011, Petitioner attempted to enter the Condominium using the visitors' gate. Despite being advised of the barcode/label requirement and the admonition against using the visitors' gate, Petitioner had not acquired the barcode/label. After the security officer advised Petitioner that he was not permitted to open the visitors' gate for residents, Petitioner entered the security gate house and opened the gate herself. As a result of her actions, law enforcement was called to the scene, and ultimately Petitioner gained access to the Condominium. Subsequently, as a result of Petitioner's actions, she was advised via correspondence that her actions were improper.7/ After obtaining the requisite barcode/label, there is no evidence that Petitioner experienced any further inconvenience regarding the gate. The undersigned finds that Petitioner was not denied access to her property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner presented no evidence that any inconvenience regarding the gate was due to her race. Petitioner's Son Visitors of unit owners were required to pay $2.00 to park in the guest parking lot. Unit owners, like Petitioner, for the convenience of their guests, were permitted to pre-pay for a guest if the guest was anticipated to arrive that day. Carlos Devesa, a security guard at the front gate, testified that a special exception was made for Petitioner, wherein she was allowed to accept a deposit for her guests for a longer period of time. Petitioner testified that on one occasion, a security guard, who is not an employee of the Condominium or the Association, delivered a package to Petitioner's son at the front gate. Petitioner extrapolates that benefit into a denial of access to her property: Security was trying to be nice by greeting him off the property with a package that was left on the property for him. Q. Okay. What evidence do you have that was based on race? A. In the case of my son, again, he was denied access to come to the property. It wasn't because of parking, so maybe you should have been asking security what was his motivation. Q. I'm asking you because you made the allegation. A. Well, I believe that he met him out at the street because he wanted to interfere with his right to come on the property. The undersigned finds that Petitioner's son was not denied access to Petitioner's property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner failed to present any evidence that Petitioner's son's access to Petitioner's property was denied due to her or his race. Lien Between the twelfth and fifteenth day of each month, the Association runs a "delinquency report." If it is determined that a unit owner or resident is delinquent (in maintenance fees, assessments, etc.) an initial letter is issued reminding of the delinquency. If the delinquency is not then satisfied, a thirty (30) day certified letter is issued. Thereafter, if the delinquency is not cured, the Association ceases to be involved and refers the matter to the Association's legal counsel for further handling. It is undisputed that Petitioner became delinquent in maintenance fees. Following the above protocol, a lien was ultimately placed on Petitioner's unit. Thereafter, Petitioner satisfied the maintenance fees; however, she refused to pay the attorneys' fees associated with the legal process. Petitioner contends that she was treated differently in the lien process due to her race. In support of her position, Petitioner believes that Unit 2007 was not subject to the same protocol. The evidence establishes that Unit 2007 was delinquent for a longer period of time than Petitioner's unit prior to being sent to the Association's counsel. Unlike Petitioner's unit, however, Unit 2007 was placed in foreclosure, and was ultimately sold through a foreclosure sale. The undersigned finds that a lien was placed on Petitioner's unit. The undersigned finds that Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that the lien process was initiated due to her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact In January 2008, Petitioner filed a “Housing Discrimination Complaint” with FCHR and/or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race (black) and religion (Christian) in its servicing of her home mortgage loan. On or about March 27, 2008, a “Determination” was issued finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner. On April 18, 2008, FCHR sent a “Notice of Determination of No Cause” to Petitioner by certified mail No. 7007 1490 0002 5958 0931. Petitioner received the Notice on April 22, 2008, according to the certified mail receipt included in the case file. The Notice advised Petitioner that “FCHR has determined reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.” The Notice further advised Petitioner that she could request an administrative hearing, and clearly stated that any such request “must be filed with the FCHR within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice.” A “Petition for Relief, in blank” was sent to Petitioner along with the Notice. On May 23, 2008, FCHR received a completed “Petition for Relief” form from Petitioner. The form was signed by Petitioner and dated May 20, 2008. Petitioner stated in her response to the Order to Show Cause that she “never received any paperwork on the above case” and that “the only paperwork that [she] received was on or a about June 9, 2008.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act1 as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) on January 7, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Prior to its sale to Mr. Aizenstat, Mr. Maine owned the Building in which Petitioner leased an apartment. Mr. Maine decided to sell the Building, and he employed Respondent Alvarez and his company to represent him as his real estate broker. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondents were acting as agents on behalf of Mr. Maine. There were four apartments in the building, one of which was the apartment leased by Mr. Maine to Petitioner. Respondents notified all apartment owners of Mr. Maine’s plans to sell the building and secured permission from each tenant, including Petitioner, to show the tenant’s apartment to prospective purchasers.3 During the course of deciding whether to purchase the Building, Mr. Aizenstat arranged with Mr. Alvarez to view and photograph the interiors of the apartments. With Petitioner’s permission, Mr. Alvarez and Mr. Aizenstat entered Petitioner’s apartment on February 11, 2004, and took a number of photographs. Mr. Alvarez and Mr. Aizenstat also photographed the interiors of the other apartments in the Building as well as photographs of the exterior of the Building. The reason for taking each photograph was business-related. Petitioner is a white male and Mr. Alvarez is of Hispanic origin. Petitioner alleged that Mr. Alvarez called him a “gringo” when he was trying to get Petitioner to sign some documents pertaining to his tenancy in the Building.4 The confrontation at which Mr. Alvarez allegedly made the racial slur occurred the first part of March 2004. Mr. Alvarez denied using any racial slur directed towards Petitioner. The undersigned finds that denial to be credible. Mr. Aizenstat was present during the confrontation at which Mr. Alvarez allegedly made the racial slur. Mr. Aizenstat testified that Mr. Alvarez made no racial slur towards Petitioner. The undersigned finds Mr. Aizenstat’s testimony to be credible. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that such a slur was made. During that confrontation between Petitioner and Mr. Alveraz in early March 2004, Mr. Alvarez asked Petitioner to sign certain documents so that Mr. Maine would not have to institute eviction proceedings against him. That statement was not a threat and it was not made because of Petitioner’s race. As a consequence of the sale of the Building by Mr. Maine to Mr. Aizenstat, all tenants had to move out of the Building. At the time of the final hearing, the Building was vacant. Mr. Aizenstat testified that he planned to tear down the Building and build another structure on the property. There was no evidence that Respondents treated Petitioner any differently than any other tenant in the Building either before or after the sale of the Building to Mr. Aizenstat.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief that underpins this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by revoking an accommodation which allowed Petitioner to have a support dog in his condominium on the alleged ground that the support dog presents a health hazard for Petitioner’s neighboring condominium resident.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a resident owner of a condominium in Embassy House Condominiums (Embassy House). Embassy House is a covered, multifamily dwelling unit within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2). Petitioner’s condominium is a dwelling defined in Subsection 760.22(4). Respondent is the entity responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of the condominium association. Relevant rules and regulations prohibit residents from keeping dogs in their condominiums. Sometime after July 17, 2008, Respondent granted Petitioner’s written request to keep a support dog in his condominium as an accommodation based on Petitioner’s handicap. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner is a handicapped person within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(7). Petitioner’s handicap includes cancer and depression. After Respondent granted permission for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium, Petitioner purchased a small dog that weighs less than 15 pounds. Respondent now proposes to revoke permission for Petitioner to keep the support dog. The sole grounds for the proposed revocation is that the female resident of the condominium adjacent to Petitioner’s, identified in the record as Ms. Madeline O’Connell, allegedly is allergic to pet dander. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the support dog presents a health hazard to Ms. O’Connell. Neither Ms. O’Connell nor her physician, who is not identified in the record, testified. The admitted “sole basis” of Respondent’s position is a note from an unidentified, alleged physician that Respondent did not submit for admission into evidence. Respondent identified the note through the testimony of a lay witness, but never submitted the note for admission into evidence. The lay witness for Respondent identified the note as the note provided to him by Ms. O’Connell. The remainder of the testimony of the lay witness consists of statements by Ms. O’Connell to the lay witness concerning the alleged allergy of Ms. O’Connell. If the evidence were to show that Ms. O’Connell is allergic to pet dander, the support dog is a breed that does not have dander. The support dog is hypoallergenic. If the evidence were to show that the support dog were not hypoallergenic, adequate measures have been implemented to protect Ms. O’Connell from any threat to her health. The air conditioning vents that feed cool air from Petitioner’s condominium into the common lobby for the two condominium units have been sealed. The interior of the condominium units are cooled by separate air conditioning units. The trier of fact finds the paucity of testimony concerning the alleged health hazard to Ms. O’Connell to be less than credible and persuasive. Ms. O’Connell makes no effort to protect herself from exposure to the support dog. On at least three occasions, Ms. O’Connell voluntarily exposed herself to the support dog to make confrontational comments to Petitioner about the support dog.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order upholding the Petition for Relief and dismissing the proposed revocation of the accommodation for Petitioner to keep a support dog in his condominium. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009.
