Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as facts stipulated to by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Central Corporation, formerly known as TFC Teleservices Corporation, is a provider of alternative operator services (AOS). An AOS provider provides operator assisted long distance telecommunications services to various entities including hotels, motels, universities, hospitals and private pay telephone providers. This new AOS telecommunication industry emerged after 1984 when AT&T ceased paying commissions to hotels for toll-traffic from guests and when the Federal Communications Commission authorized privately-owned pay phones. There are currently nine AOS providers in Florida. Central is authorized by Certificate Number 1528, issued by the PSC on November 21, 1986, to operate as an interexchange carrier within the State of Florida. Central currently operates in Florida under an approved tariff on file with the PSC, which tariff became effective on September 15, 1987, and authorizes Central to charge certain amounts for its services. Prior to the challenged action, the PSC never placed any conditions upon Central's approved tariffed rates. Interexchange companies (IXCs) are companies which provide long distance telephone services. They are certificated by the PSC on a statewide basis and engage in competition with each other. Such competition, along with the PSC's fitness screening and approval of tariffed rates, is considered adequate to protect the public. Consequently, the PSC does not regulate the rates of IXCs, at least minor IXCs including AOS providers. The PSC does not set rate levels for minor IXCs and does not set an authorized rate of return on equity for minor IXCs. Indeed, in accordance with Section 364.337, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the PSC to exempt from the requirements of Chapter 364 a telephone company which is in competition with or duplicates the services of another telephone company, the PSC has placed AOS providers under the separate rules and regulations pertaining to IXCs, which are not rate base regulated. The PSC has never established for any minor IXC a rate base or an authorized or required rate of return. Local exchange telephone companies (LECs) serve a franchised monopoly area. The LEC agrees to provide service indiscriminately to the public without competition, and, in return, the PSC guarantees the LEC the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return designed to emulate what might be achieved in a competitive market. The PSC sets rate bases and rate levels for LECs, and authorizes the rate of return on equity. In other words, unlike IXCs, LECs are rate base regulated utilities. LECs and/or the PSC may initiate rate relief or rate decrease proceedings. Interim relief is often necessary and is authorized by statute and case law due to the regulatory lag time pending the conclusion of the proceedings. Such interim rate relief or interim rate decreases are done on an individual case-by-case basis and are based upon the financial condition of the particular LEC. The PSC has never provided interim rate relief or interim rate decreases on an industry-wide basis. It has set a "generic" rate cap, establishing a 25 cent local call rate for privately-owned pay phones, but that was done on a prospective basis. The PSC has never imposed an industry-wide rate cap, with a requirement to hold subject to refund monies in excess of that cap. At the request of PSC staff, the PSC opened, on December 18, 1987, Docket Number 871394-TP styled "In re: Review of Requirements Appropriate for Alternative Operator Services provided from Public Telephones." This was designated as a "generic" proceeding, and emanated from numerous complaints the PSC had received from end users (i.e., guests of hotels and motels, hospital patients and pay telephone users) who had been charged for alternative operator services. The nature of the complaints included end users being charged for AOS without being aware of using the service, lack of prior knowledge of the rates being charged, inability to use the services of their preferred IXC and inability to access the LEC operator. The most significant complaint, however, was the excessive rate being charged by some AOS providers. The evidence demonstrates that the intrastate long distance rates charged by Central are considerably higher than the rates charged by Southern Bell, an LEC. Central entered an appearance in Docket No. 871394-TP on December 30, 1987. At an Agenda Conference held on February 2, 1988, the PSC voted on various recommendations of its staff. As pertinent to this proceeding, the PSC voted to set an expedited hearing to be held as soon as practicable to determine whether AOS are in the public interest and various other issues concerning the provision of AOS. The PSC also voted to require all AOS providers to place all revenues subject to refund that are generated by charges in excess of the AT&T rate for a comparable call. This vote exceeded the staff's recommendation, which did not include a "hold subject to refund" requirement. At an Agenda Conference held on February 16, 1988, the PSC voted to reconsider the rate cap applicable to AOS providers and to hold the Order reflecting their February 2nd vote pending such reconsideration. At its Agenda Conference held on March 15, 1988, the PSC reconsidered and raised the rate cap amount from the AT&T rate for a comparable call to the LEC rate for a comparable call, thereby decreasing the amount of revenues that AOS providers must hold subject to refund. The action taken on March 15, 1988, was embodied in written Order No. 19095 issued on April 4, 1988. This Order is entitled "Order Setting for Hearing the Issue of Whether Alternative Operator Services are in the Public Interest and Placing Revenues Subject to Refund ..." The remainder of the title relates to "proposed agency action" concerning other requirements for AOS providers, which are not challenged in this proceeding. Order No. 19095 declares that paragraph 7, which requires AOS providers to hold subject to refund all charges collected in excess of the approved rate, is effective February 2, 1988. The Order further recites "We are cognizant of the serious impact this action may have on AOS providers and their customers. However, it is our view that we must take immediate and effective action to remedy the abusive situation we perceive exists at this time. It is in consideration of these conflicting concerns that we have chosen the least drastic action available. This action does not require AOS providers to immediately stop charging current rates. It does not suspend or revoke any certificates of public convenience and necessity. It does not levy any fines or penalties. It merely places revenues subject to refund to allow for the return of these monies if it is subsequently decided that they were generated from inappropriate charges." Although not embodied within the terms of Order No. 19095, the parties stipulated that the hearing to determine public interest is scheduled for August 9-12, 1988. Central requested the PSC to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to making the rate cap take effect, but this request was denied. The rate cap requirement and the disposition of the revenues held by AOS providers pursuant to Order No. 19095 are issues to be determined at the hearing to be held August 9- 12, 1988. The rate cap requirement set forth in Order No. 19095 applies to all AOS providers operating in Florida. Central's current tariff authorizes Central to charge more than the rate cap specified in Order No. 19095. Prior to Order No. 19095, there was no rate cap on AOS providers. Regardless of whether the PSC ultimately orders a refund, the "hold subject to refund" requirement which became effective on February 2, 1988, has immediate and significant adverse impacts upon Central. Central is a relatively new company and must use the revenue it generates on a daily basis. Prior to Order No. 19095, Central was able to rely on the unconditional use of revenues it receives under its approved Florida tariff. If Central continues to charge its current tariffed rates, it will have to set aside the difference between what it bills and the rate cap, place it in escrow and will not be able to utilize those funds. It is estimated that the revenues Central might have to refund if it continues to charge its current rates would between $1.2 and $1.7 million. Nonrecoverable commissions and the cost of a actually making the refund would increase the potential cost of the refund. If Central were to reduce its rates to the LEC rate, it would lose a substantial amount of revenue and does not know where it can make up that loss. Even if this option were chosen today, Central would still have to determine to whom it provided services since February 2, 1988, and what the potential refund would be. Additional staffing and/or computer equipment would be necessary to keep track of prior users and charges. A third option is for Central to withdraw from Florida intrastate operations pending the outcome and conclusions of the August PSC proceedings. Central operates in many states. While its Florida business makes up only 8 to 10 percent of its intrastate revenues, some 40 percent of Central's entire business originates at Florida properties. If Central were to cease paying commissions on intrastate revenues, its intrastate business originating from Florida would go to its competitors. While Central has made the decision not to do business in certain states due to those state's methods of rate regulation, such decisions were made on a prospective basis. Other immediate and adverse impacts upon Central include the administrative costs and burdens associated with separate bookkeeping for its Florida operations, as well as separate books within Florida to segregate the difference between the rate cap and its tariffed rates. Central has already experienced delays in loan financing. Lenders want to wait and see what the PSC does with AOS providers. The valuation of the company is affected due to money taken out of the revenue stream and placed in escrow. Central's financial statement must reflect the contingent liability of potential refunds and full disclosure must be made to the Federal Communication Commission.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was employed as building inspector of Suwannee County on or about November, 1974. and was terminated by action of Petitioner at a meeting on or about September 18, 1980. Respondent received a letter dated October 14, 1980 from Claude McDonald, Chairman, Suwannee County Board of County Commissioners, listing the following reasons for his termination: Gross neglect of duty. Absence without leave. Incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory services. Insubordination or serious breach of discipline. Habitual absences, tardiness or abuse of sick leave. Substantial violations of personnel regulations. Falsifying travel records. Fraudulent claims filed with the Board of County Commissioners `for reimbursement of travel expenses to job sites for inspections when, in fact, such inspections were not made, or in the alternative, making inspections which were not documented by signing building permits as required by established procedures. Respondent was the first building inspector for Suwannee County and established all of the procedures and forms used in the building department. He was bound by the personnel and fiscal regulations of Suwannee County, but was given a substantial degree of independence in setting up the building department, and thereafter in conducting the daily work of the department. In establishing and administering the department, Respondent consulted with other building inspectors and officials. In January, 1975 Respondent hired Connie Robinson as his secretary, and in February, 1979 he hired Pat Sura to be his assistant building inspector. Sura is now building inspector for Suwannee County. The evidence establishes that the regular business hours of the building department while Respondent was building inspector were from 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. This is consistent with the county's policy and with the practice of other county offices. Both Connie Robinson and Pat Sura, "employees" of the building department, testified that they worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Respondent would regularly arrive at the office at about 5:30 a.m., but he frequently conducted official county business both before arriving at the office and after leaving in the evening by visiting job sites. The building inspector is a "department head" as that term is defined in Part I, Suwannee County Personnel Regulations, and as such is exempt from a 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. work day and the 40 hours per week required by Part XIV, Section C, Suwannee County Personnel Regulations. Therefore, the evidence establishes that the "employees" of the building department maintained work hours consistent with applicable personnel rules at all times relevant herein, and also that Respondent's own work hours were not violative of applicable personnel rules. As a "department head", Respondent did not accrue compensatory time or earn over-time pay for hours worked beyond forty hours a week. Department heads were expected, when the need existed, to work more than forty hours a week. Respondent did earn vacation and sick leave. In order to use earned vacation or sick leave, Respondent was required to submit a request for leave as provided in Part XVI, Sections A4 and 55, Suwannee County Personnel Regulations. The evidence establishes that Respondent was absent from his office and did not perform official duties for the county on the following dates, although he was paid for work on these dates and did not submit a request to use either vacation or sick leave: February 5-12, 1980; June 3-13, 1980; September 15-16, 1980. This finding is based on the testimony of Connie Robinson and Pat Sura. Although Respondent called the office once during the February absence, notified the Board of County Commissioners in advance that he would be gone for two days during the June absence to attend an educational seminar in Orlando and also that he would need some additional time off due to his son's medical emergency, and had his wife call the office and leave a phone number where he could be reached during the September absence, Respondent never submitted a request for leave for any of this time. This failure followed a formal written warning concerning the use of leave issued by the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners to Respondent on December 6, 1979. Despite being absent from the office without claiming leave on the dates specified in finding of fact 7 above, Respondent submitted false reports to the county indicating that he had conducted inspections on June 6 and 9, 1980 when in fact he was in Orlando for his son's medical emergency and for an educational seminar. From February 24, 1979 to November 21, 1979, Respondent was in the process of building his house. He did not use a general contractor, but rather acted as an owner-builder. There is conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent was absent from his job without claiming leave during this time, and whether he spent time during his normal working hours working on his house, rather than as building inspector for Suwannee County. After considering all of the evidence, it is specifically found that Respondent did take unreported time off during his normal work day to either work on his house, receive materials on site, or check on contractors who were working on his house. The frequency of his visits with these contractors indicates that these were not normal inspections made during the course of his duties as building inspector. This finding is based upon the testimony of Connie Robinson, Pat Sura, Respondent himself, and also Buddy McCall, Anthony Donald Selph, Jan Touchton and James Benton who either worked on Respondent's house or delivered materials to the job site between 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. during this time, and who testified that Respondent was regularly present on the site between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. This finding is specifically made after considering the contrary testimony of Raymond Key, and Alfred Smith, and Respondent's denial that he took unreported leave to build, or worked on his home during his normal work hours. Although the exact number of unreported days off which Respondent took to work on his house in 1979 cannot be determined, there is competent substantial evidence based on the testimony of Connie Robinson and Pat Sura that Respondent took between 15 and 20 work days off between May and August, 1979 and did not report these absences. Respondent was paid his normal salary for these days by Petitioner. In May, 1980 Respondent was asked to submit a report to the Board of County Commissioners on the number of inspections he had personally made during the preceding twelve months, and thereafter to submit monthly inspection reports to the Board. This request was made on behalf of the Board by Jerry Scarborough, Clerk of the Court and Clerk to the Board. Claude McDonald, Chairman of the Board in 1950, testified that Commissioners had been receiving some complaints from the public that Respondent was frequently absent from his office, and that he was spending time at the real estate office of Robert Mahan where his wife worked. Robert Mahan confirmed that Respondent visited his wife during normal work hours quite often. Respondent reported to the Board of County Commissioners that he had made between 200 and 250 inspections during the preceding year while Pat Sura had made approximately 1200. He explained the difference was due to the fact that he had other duties, such as Public relations and administration, while Sura's sole job was to make inspections. However, subsequent to the request for regular reports which was made in May, 1980, the number of days per month when Respondent reported that he had conducted inspections increased substantially. Specifically, from January to April, 1980 he averaged inspections on 3 days per month while from May to August he averaged inspections on 11 days per month, according to his reports. From the evidence presented, it is found that Respondent did copy Pat Sura's inspection reports and submit them as his own regarding some of the inspections he reported after May, 1980. The exact number of falsified inspection reports cannot be determined, but it is clear that Respondent falsely reported an increased number of personal inspections in response to the request by the Board. From the evidence presented, it is also found that Respondent falsely claimed travel expense reimbursement for inspections which, in fact, he did not make on April 14 and 15, 1980 and September 2-4, 8, 9, 1980. The reimbursement received for travel associated with inspections during this time was less than $100, but it cannot be determined exactly how much of this claim was false. It is clear, however, from an independent audit conducted by Steven Collins, C.P.A., that the system for documenting travel expenses does not support a substantial number of the inspection trips claimed by Respondent on these vouchers. Respondent sought to explain the matters in findings of fact 12 and 13 by contending that on most of the inspections he made, he did not sign the building permit. However, he acknowledged that it was standard practice for the inspector to sign the permit when he made an inspection. Respondent indicated that his visits to a building site were not always formal inspections and that he might simply stop by to check up on a contractor or on the work of Pat Sura, or to make a public relations visit. Notwithstanding the possibility that some of his site visits and reported inspections may have, in fact, occurred as uncalled, surprise visits, a substantial number of these visits and inspections, as well as associated travel vouchers, were falsified by copying Pat Sura's inspection reports. On May 22, 1981, Lynn B. Martin, Appeals Referee, Unemployment Compensation Section, determined that Respondent was disqualified from receiving benefits for having been discharged for misconduct connected with his work. Respondent was not represented by counsel in that proceeding.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Edward P. Skiff has been the owner and operator of Petitioner Skiff's Workingman's Nursery. For 28 years the nursery was located on State Road 7 (US 441), one of the busiest traffic arteries in Broward County. In 1981, Respondent Department of Transportation first contacted Skiff to advise him that he would be required to relocate his business due to the construction of I-595, the Port Everglades Expressway. In 1985 Respondent purchased the property on which Skiff's Workingman's Nursery was located and ordered Skiff to vacate the property by January 1, 1986. Between 1981 and 1985 Skiff searched for a comparable piece of property on which to operate a retail nursery in Broward County. As requested by the Respondent, Skiff submitted to the Department a list of six properties he was considering, only 2 or 3 of which were platted. There is no indication that Department employees objected to any of sites under consideration. Skiff closed on his new site located on Hillsboro Boulevard in Broward County in 1985. At the time, that site was not yet platted, and Skiff was required by Broward County to plat the property. Prior to his purchase of the site, no mention was made of impact fees by the Department or anyone else. Skiff began processing his application for plat approval with Broward County. During the processing, he was advised that he would be required to pay impact fees to Broward County for the relocation site, a requirement that had been imposed by Broward County for any site within that county and not just for the relocation site selected by Skiff. The Department of Transportation knew at the time that impact fees had been imposed for any development in Broward County so that relocating businesses would be required to pay such fees. When Skiff was several months into the platting process with Broward County he was further advised that his relocation site had been annexed by the City of Coconut Creek, Broward County, Florida. Accordingly, Skiff became obligated to pay impact fees assessed by the City of Coconut Creek in addition to the impact fees assessed by Broward County. Skiff was required to pay to Broward County transportation impact fees as a condition precedent to recording the plat for Skiff's Workingman's Nursery. He was also required to pay to the City of Coconut Creek water, sewer, and street connection charges as a condition precedent to obtaining a building permit and a certificate of occupancy. Skiff paid to Broward County, in order to record his plat, impact fees in the amount of $32,887.00. Skiff also paid to the City of Coconut Creek water and wastewater impact fees in the amount of $4,499.20 and sewage and street connection charges in the amount of $24,634.00. None of the connection fees paid to the City of Coconut Creek involved bringing the utilities from the right-of-way to a building or improvement upon Skiff's property. The impact fees imposed by the City of Coconut Creek and by Broward County were necessary and reasonable. The fees were derived according to a specific formula which has a correlation to estimated usage, and they were not arbitrary numbers. Likewise, the mandatory sewage connection charges were both reasonable and necessary and involved the construction of a lift station required by the City of Coconut Creek. When Skiff submitted to Respondent his claim for reimbursement of the impact fees paid by him to Broward County and the City of Coconut Creek, Respondent preliminarily denied that claim reasoning that operating expenses of a business are not reimbursable under the Department's relocation assistance program. The Department never considered whether an impact fee is reimbursable as a license, permit, or certification required of a displaced person at the replacement location. The sole basis for the Department's denial was a memorandum written by an employee of the United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration in a different case which did not address the question of whether an impact fee qualifies as a reimbursable permit, license, or certification required by a governmental entity prior to the creation of a new business. At the time that Respondent denied Skiff's claim for reimbursement of impact fees, the district relocation administrator believed those fees to be reimbursable. However, the state relocation administrator who was new to her job, who could not define the term "operating expense of a business," who was unaware of the regulations qualifying permits and licenses and certifications as expenses eligible for reimbursement, and who did not consider whether the impact fees were eligible under those provisions, denied the claim. Her successor also believed the claim to be reimbursable. There are no definitional guidelines as to the terms "operating expense", "license, permit or certification", or any of the other terms relevant to these proceedings, contained in either the Code of Federal Regulations or in the Florida Department of Transportation guidelines. Accordingly, those terms must be given their common, everyday meaning. An impact fee is a developmental permit fee, i.e., a one-time fee mandated by a governmental entity which must be paid prior to that governmental entity's permitting development; it is a charge which allows a new or relocating business to start conducting business activities at a new location. An impact fee is therefore a start-up cost and not an operating expense since an operating expense is an ongoing cost of doing business for an existing business. The Department's decision-making personnel who testified in this proceeding all agree that the term "operating expense" assumes that a business is in operation. The Department has failed to consider whether impact fees are reimbursable under the proper criteria. In preparation for its move to the relocation site, Skiff's Workingman's Nursery paid professional consultant's fees (architectural and engineering) in the amount of $14,915.85 for site planning and site preparation planning for the a nursery. Skiff submitted his claim for reimbursement for design services to Respondent. Although the district relocation administrator believed those costs to be reimbursable under the specific provision allowing reimbursement for professional services related to the move of personal property, the claim was denied by the state relocation administrator who was new to her job and who stated that nurseries were excluded, without identifying where in the law such an exclusion was written. While the Department was considering Skiff's claims for reimbursement for impact fees and design services, it conducted its own survey of nurseries asking those nurseries for information pertaining to relocation of a nursery, asking specifically about eligible move costs and necessary land and soil preparations if a nursery had to be relocated to virgin land. Responses received by the Department indicated the importance of site location, plant layout, and soil considerations required by both the plants and customers of the nursery and the importance of paying impact fees. There is no evidence that the information the Department gleaned from its own survey was considered in determining whether the payment of impact fees by a nursery and whether the payment of professional design services by a nursery were reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by a displaced nursery required by the government to relocate to a new site. The Department took the position that although nurseries were an exclusion from the provision that businesses were entitled to be reimbursed for professional services attendant to relocation, an exception to the exclusion could be granted based upon appropriate documentation. It concluded, however, that Skiff's had not submitted the appropriate documentation. Yet it failed to advise Skiff as to what documentation would be appropriate and failed to request any additional documentation. After Skiff's plat was recorded, he filed an application with Broward County to modify that plat in order to provide access to the nursery from Hillsboro Boulevard, the main thoroughfare, rather than requiring customers to gain access to the nursery from the back of the nursery off a side street. Access from Hillsboro Boulevard was approved, and Skiff paid $7,500.00 to construct a traffic turn lane from Hillsboro Boulevard onto the nursery property. The first claim for reimbursement for that cost which would give Skiff's Workingman's Nursery access to a major thoroughfare comparable to the major thoroughfare from which it had been displaced by the Department was made during the course of the final hearing in this cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for water and wastewater impact fees imposed by the City of Coconut Creek in the amount of $4,499.20; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for transportation impact fees imposed by Broward County in the amount of $32,887.00; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for sewage and street connection charges imposed by the City of Coconut Creek in the amount of $24,634.00; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for professional consultant's fees for design services in the amount of $14,915.85; and Denying without prejudice Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for the cost of constructing a traffic turn lane in the amount of $7,500.00 which was not properly a part of this proceeding. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1652 The first unnumbered paragraph of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's second through sixth unnumbered paragraphs of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 have been rejected as not being supported in their entirety by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Philip Landsman, Esquire Emily Tracey, Esquire Broward Financial Centre 500 East Broward Boulevard Suite 1850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas H. Bateman III, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this order closing file is entitled to Judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950, and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1] HEREBY CERTIFY that this Order Closing File was filed in the official records of the Department of Management Services and copies were furnished to: Larry D. Scott, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950; Jane M. Letwin, Esquire, 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312, and Judge Stuart M. Lerner, Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060, this \ gs day of Qc , 2009. Debbie Shoup Clerk Department of Management Services (850) 487-1082 2 of 2 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ELLEN GLANZBERG, Petitioner, v. CASE NO. 09-2458 DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION Petitioner, ELLEN GLANZBERG, through undersigned Counsel, hereby files this Petitioner’s Notice of Withdrawal of her Petition without prejudice. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on JuLY 21%, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified in the attached service list via transmission of Notice of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF and via e-mail to Larry D. Scott, Esq., Asst. Gen’] Counsel, DMS, Division of Retirement, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, FL 32399- 0950. : By: s/Jane Letwin, Esq, FLA.BAR NO. 990329 Law Office of Jane M. Letwin Attorney for Plaintiffs 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale FL 33312 Tel: 954 297 4057; Fax: 954 301 8401 EXHIBIT Filed July 21, 2009 8:00 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. man SERVICE LIST Marylin Batista-McNamara, Esq. Office of the School Board Attorney 600 SE Third Avenue, 11" Floor Fort Lauderdale Fl 33301
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this order closing file is entitled to Judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950, and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IHEREBY CERTIFY that this Order Closing File was filed in the official records of the Department of Management Services and copies were furnished to: Larry D. Scott, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950; Jane M. Letwin, Esquire, 5426 SW 25% Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312, and Judge John G. Van Laningham, Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060, this | oH day of X gust , 2009. A Shoup Debbie Clerk Department of Management Services (850) 487-1082 2 of 2 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS BEVERLY HUTTON, Petitioner, Vv. CASE NO. 09-2466 DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION Petitioner, BEVERLY HUTTON, through undersigned Counsel, hereby files this Petitioner’s Notice of Withdrawal of her Petition without prejudice. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on JuLY 21*, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified in the attached service list via transmission of Notice of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF and via e-mail to Larry D. Scott, Esq., Asst. Gen’! Counsel, DMS, Division of Retirement, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, FL 32399- 0950. By: s/Jane Letwin, Esq, FLA.BAR NO. 990329 Law Office of Jane M. Letwin Attorney for Plaintiffs 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale FL 33312 Tel: 954 297 4057; Fax: 954 301 8401 EXHIBIT Filed July 21, 2009 8:00 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. : man SERVICE LIST Marylin Batista-McNamara, Esq. Office of the School Board Attorney 600 SE Third Avenue, 11" Floor Fort Lauderdale Fl 33301
