The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner Maia Fisher (Petitioner) on the basis of her gender and retaliated against Petitioner because of her pregnancy in violation of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is a female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in gender discrimination and retaliation after Petitioner disclosed her pregnancy. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a printing business. Respondent is a corporation wholly-owned by Mr. John Disbrow and Ms. Angela Disbrow. Mr. and Ms. Disbrow are the principal operators and decision-makers. Respondent was Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was an employee during the relevant period. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent sometime in March 2008. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on July 28, 2008. Petitioner discovered in June 2008 that she was pregnant. Petitioner informed Mr. and Ms. Disbrow. Mr. Disbrow instructed Mr. Alfred Buranda to terminate Petitioner’s employment sometime in July 2008. Mr. Buranda was the head of human resources for Respondent at that time, but has since moved on to other employment. Mr. Buranda refused to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Mr. Buranda conducted a teleconference with Petitioner in his office on July 28, 2009. Mr. Buranda telephoned Mr. and Ms. Disbrow on his office speaker phone with Petitioner present in his office. Mr. and Ms. Disbrow explained to Petitioner by speaker phone that the pregnancy was the reason for the termination of employment. Respondent owes Petitioner unpaid compensation in the total amount of $2,820.00. Respondent owes Petitioner back wages for unpaid overtime equal to $720.00. Respondent owes Petitioner unpaid commissions equal to $2,100.00. Back wages in the amount of $720.00 is the product of multiplying an hourly overtime rate of $12.00 by the total of uncompensated overtime equal to 60 hours. Unpaid commissions of $2,100.00 are composed of two parts. Petitioner made five sales under $500.00 for which Respondent owes a commission of $100.00 for each sale and a total of $500.00 for all five sales. Petitioner made eight sales over $500.00 for which Respondent owes a commission of $200.00 for each sale and a total of $1,600.00 for all eight sales. Petitioner has been living in a shelter for battered women. Contact and service on Petitioner has been problematic. The Board may require an investigator or other means to provide Petitioner with actual notice of the final order in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is guilty of discrimination and retaliation on the basis of gender in violation of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37 and require Respondent and its principals to pay Petitioner $2,820.00 in unpaid compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Maia Fischer 2302 48th Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34207 Camille Blake, EEO Manager Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1101 John Disbrow ADCO Printing 8412 Sabal Industrial Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33619
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the $124.00 penalty assessed against Respondent by the Department of Transportation is legally and mathematically correct.
Findings Of Fact The maximum legal weight allowed for vehicles traveling on a Florida state highway is 80,000 pounds. On November 18, 1991, a commercial motor vehicle owned and operated by Respondent was driving on State Road 15, also known as U.S. Highway 1, in Nassau County, Florida. At that time and place, DOT Weight Inspector R. S. Young weighed Respondent's vehicle on the pit scale at the Hilliard Weigh Station at approximately 23:32 (11:32 PM), using a "split weigh" method because the vehicle exceeded the 56 feet which the DOT scale would accommodate. Inspector Young filled out the Load Report indicating three separate axle weights of the vehicle with a total weight of 82,480 pounds, which exceeded the maximum weight restriction by 2,480 pounds. The fine imposed was $124.00, calculated at five cents per pound by which the scale weight of the vehicle exceeded the maximum weight of 80,000. Respondent paid the fine. The scale at the Hilliard Weigh Station which was used by Inspector Young on November 18, 1991 had been inspected and certified pursuant to statute by the Florida Department of Agriculture on July 24, 1991, four months before the weighing of Respondent's vehicle. On March 4, 1992, approximately five months after Respondent's vehicle was weighed, the Hilliard Weigh Station scale was again inspected and certified by the Florida Department of Agriculture. Neither time was there a discrepancy in true weight which would have materially affected the weighing of Respondent's truck on November 18, 1991. Affording Respondent's position every benefit of the doubt, it is possible, but not proven, that the Hilliard Weigh Station scale could have weighed 80 pounds heavier than the truck's true weight on November 18, 1991. Respondent contended that he had "split weighed" his loaded vehicle earlier on November 18, 1991 on a commercial Howe scale and that the Howe scale weight was accurate in showing his vehicle weighed under the 80,000 pound statutory limit, as opposed to the weight at the Hilliard Weigh Station later the same day, which weight showed the loaded vehicle weighed over the 80,000 pound statutory limit. All witnesses are agreed that if done correctly, a "split weigh" is reasonably accurate for multiple tandem, multiple axle vehicles longer than 51 feet, and it is unrefuted that many of these types of weigh-ins are done regularly at the Hilliard Weigh Station and throughout the industry. The method is specifically permitted for use by law enforcement, in this instance, by DOT. However, the expert testimony of Mr. Robert Garris, Supervisor of Weights and Measures for the State of Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is accepted that "split weighs" on a Howe scale are "assuredly inaccurate" because such scales are not manufactured to be used with "split weighs" and that, although DOT is authorized, for law enforcement purposes, to do "split weighs", DOT's scales also are not necessarily any more accurate for use with the "split weigh" method than the Howe commerical scale. Therefore, it is found that if it could be shown by competent evidence that the Howe scale "split weigh" and the Hilliard scale "split weigh" were each done correctly and showed different weights, one weight being "over" and one weight being "under" the statutory limit, DOT could not prevail herein by a preponderance of the evidence. Respondent presented a weight ticket purportedly showing that this loaded vehicle had a gross weight of 76,600 pounds on the Howe scale at 14:29 (2:29 PM) on November 18, 1991, also achieved by a "split weigh" method. Although self-serving, Respondent's direct testimony to this effect is unrefuted, as is his direct testimony that when he weighed his loaded truck on the Howe scale, the Howe scale bore a current Florida Department of Agriculture certification seal. However, the four weights printed automatically onto the Howe scale weight ticket do not add up to the pencilled "76,600" handwritten thereon. Upon Respondent's direct testimony and supporting exhibits, it was also shown that a commercial Certified Automated Truck Scale (CAT Scale) had recorded the gross weight of Respondent's front two axles as only 19,280 pounds on October 9, 1991. The CAT scale, which renders a "full platform" gross weight, provides a more accurate gross weight than the "split weigh" method, but this weigh-in occurred approximately a month before the weighing of Respondent's truck at the Hilliard Weigh Scale on November 18, 1991 and accounted for only two axles and no load. Respondent contended that if one added together the weight of his load as stated by the shipper on his November 18 bill of lading, the manufacturer's weight of 9500 pounds as stamped on the side of the trailer, a weight he personally estimated for nylon ropes to secure the load, possible fuel intake, and the CAT weight of his vehicle's front two axles, Respondent's vehicle weight on November 18 would still have been under 80,000 pounds when it reached the Hilliard scale, and Respondent would not have been subject to an overweight assessment and fine. However, this scenario is speculative. It is speculative because of insufficient predicate for the accuracy of some of the figures named, due to the failure of the numbers on the Howe scale ticket to add up as specified by Respondent, and due to the margin for error when only two axles were weighed a month earlier on the CAT scale.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order ratifying the assessment and penalty of $124.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17 day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-1872 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59 (2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) Petitioner's PFOF: 1-6, 8 (There is no "6", but the unnumbered paragraph between "5" and "7" is treated as "6") Accepted. 7 Accepted in part and rejected in part because of Respondent's direct testimony which established certain facts found. Respondent's PFOF 1, 13 Accepted that some of this is what the shipper told Respondent and placed on the bill of lading, but it remains hearsay and unpersuasive on the dispositive issue of true weight in light of other exhibits and testimony. Accepted except where contrary to the probative evidence and rejected as unproven and also rejected where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Specifically, the numbers show a print out of 4 axles, not 3, or four printed items for gross, tare and net pounds. It is not clear which. Also, the total of the four figures are in excess of legal weight limits. See Exhibit R-1. Rejected as not of record and rejected as legal or persuasive argument as opposed to a proposed finding of fact; rejected as not dispositive and as not persuasive. The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as mere legal or persuasive argument. 5-6, 8-10 Accepted except where unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 7,14 Rejected because much of this is not of record. Otherwise it is unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 20-21, 23 Accepted, except that Mr. Garris did not testify that the Howe scale was certified or accurate. This was Respondent's testimony. 11-12 Rejected as stated because not supported by the record as a whole. Covered accurately in the RO. 15-18 These calculations are rejected as speculative and not supported by any weight ticket. Legal and persuasive arguments are also rejected as not factual proposals. 19 Accepted, but unnecessary, subordinate and cumulative. 22, 24 Rejected as legal and persuasive argument only, not factual proposals. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn S. Holifield Chief, Administrative Law Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mrs. Thomas Bachota 201 North Shaffer Street Milford, Indiana 46542 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, General Consel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Martin Marietta Corporation is a multi-state, multi- national defense contractor. Respondent functions as one of its primary divisions/operations in Orlando, Florida. The Petitioner, Frank Maggio was born on April 3, 1914. Petitioner was employed by Respondent on June 16, 1981 in the position of Quality Control Fabrication Inspector A (Fate A Inspector) at Respondent's Orlando facility. Respondent's primary role within the overall corporate operation is the production of highly sophisticated, high-tech missile systems. The development and production of these weapons is maintained under tight security due to the involvement of the national defense effort. Because of Respondent's participation in military and defense programs, the manufacturing process is constantly reviewed and critically inspected by governmental agencies. The Respondent utilizes "state-of-the-art" machines and equipment on its advanced, technical and highly complex defense projects. Petitioner's responsibilities as a Fab A Inspector included checking the first piece of hardware off of the machines, qualifying the tape that runs the machine with his stamp and checking the dimensions of the first layout. This procedure is referred to as a set-up and, once "bought off" "accepted) by the "A" inspector, it establishes the critical reference point or benchmark for the sophisticated, state-of- the-art-manufacturing processes of the Respondent. Respondent's operations involve the manufacture or production of weaponry or weapons systems that require tolerances The Petitioner was given a warning that another similar incident might result in further disciplinary action, up to and including discharge and specifications which are not found or even known in consumer oriented production plants. Certain pieces of equipment used will drill and measure within one one-thousandth of an inch (1/1,000"). The integrity of the highly integrated and closely coordinated production procedures depends upon the correct initial setting, which "commits" the production process. If the initial setting is off or in error, nonconforming parts or items will be manufactured. If the nonconforming parts cannot be reworked or brought into tolerances, they are regarded as scrap and represent a loss to the company. The Petitioner functioned as the only Fab A Inspector on the second shift with very little, if any, supervision. "B" and "C" Inspectors were present, but not performing in a capacity that could provide a backup for Petitioner. In February, 1983, Petitioner functioned under the direct supervision of Charles Holley, Chief Quality Inspector. Although both men worked on the second shift, Petitioner performed as a Fab A inspector and was responsible for making the initial, critical decisions on "set-up" tapes for the second shift production operations. On April 5, 1983, while on his second shift assignment, Petitioner "bought off" on a first piece inspection in order to qualify a newly released tape. On April 7, 1983, the first shift rejected a piece on that particular tape because the dimensions were out of tolerance. Subsequently, after a second inspection of the piece by the senior tool inspector, it was determined that the part was non-conforming and out of tolerance. This error lead to the production of approximately 180 pieces of "scrap" and a loss of about $100,000. As a result of this incident, Mr. Holley, Petitioner's superior, completed a Significant Incident Report (S.I.R.) dated April 18, 1983, which was placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Pursuant to routine procedure, Petitioner was counseled about the S.I.R. and given an opportunity to respond. The Petitioner was given a warning that another similar incident might result in furhter disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. Following the April, 1983 incident, Mr. Holley felt that Petitioner's work performance began to decline. Mr. Holley was dissatisfied because Petitioner often used scales for measurements at times when Mr. Holley believed that calipers should have been used. In addition, Petitioner used his lunch break to take naps, and several times he was late returning to work. Sometime in late September or early October, the Petitioner approved a piece of hardware similar to that involved in the April, 1983 incident and it too was rejected for being out of tolerance. Following this incident, Mr. Holley once again went to the Personnel and Industrial Relations Department (S.I.R.) attempting to have another S.I.R. placed in Petitioner's file. However, the management in P.I.R. did not allow the report to be placed in Petitioner's file. Subsequently, Petitioner was not reprimanded or otherwise disciplined and no official record was kept of this incident. During February, 1984, a "set-up" error by Petitioner on a secret laser tracking missile project know as "Hell-Fire" caused unusable parts to be manufactured and a financial loss to Respondent. Prior to submitting an S.I.R., Mr. Holley met with management in the Personnel and Industrial Relations Department to discuss the Petitioner's situation. It was at this time that Mr. Thomas Mallis, supervisor of employee relations, seized upon the idea of Petitioner's upcoming 70th birthday on April 3, 1984 as a way in which to be rid of Petitioner. Mr. Mallis reasoned that rather than attempting to terminate Petitioner for cause, Petitioner's 70th birthday would provide a point where Petitioner could be "gracefully retired" under Martin Marietta Corporation's corporate retirement policy. Martin Marietta Corporation has a nationwide corporate retirement which requires retirement at age 70. Generally, the company does not enforce this requirement at facilities which are located in states where such a policy violates age discrimination laws. Likewise, Respondent does not generally enforce the corporate wide retirement policy at its Orlando facility because it is subject to Florida state law concerning age discrimination. As of April 4, 1984, Respondent employed approximately 11,000 employees. Approximately 5,017 of those employees were 40 years of age and a small number were over 70. Although the company's age 70 retirement policy is not generally enforced at Respondent's Orlando facility, the retirement plans provided by the company and the benefits package negotiated by the union with the company for retirement pay focus on age 70 as the point at which retirement benefits mature or "top out." After age 70, no further benefits accrue under the retirement plan. Thus, as a matter of established practice and/or expectation on the part of the employees, virtually all workers have retired or plan to retire on or before their 70th birthday. Therefore, Mr. Mallis believed that having respondent "retire" at age 70 would be an easy non-confrontational way to terminate Petitioner's employment. As a member of the United Aerospace Workers local bargaining unit, Petitioner would have had the right to object and file a grievance concerning any proposed termination for cause by Respondent. By "retiring" Petitioner under the corporate policy, Mr. Mallis believed that a "bitter challenge" under the union's often cumbersome grievance/arbitration procedures could be short-circuited. Under the Respondent's progressive discipline system, generally employees are given 3 to 5 S.I.R.'s or written warnings before any stronger action is taken. At the time of his involuntary retirement by Respondent on April 4, 1984, the Petitioner was not vested under the company's retirement program and was not entitled to any benefits thereunder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes and awarding the Petitioner attorney's fees. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be reinstated to his former position. The Respondent may seek to institute proceedings within 30 days from the date of the final order to terminate Petitioner for cause based on his work performance up to April 4, 1984. If the respondent is barred from attempting to terminate Petitioner for cause based on those past incidents for whatever reason, if Respondent chooses not to institute termination proceedings, or if the Respondent successfully defends any termination proceedings, then the Petitioner shall be entitled to back pay for the statutory maximum of two years. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Egan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas C. Garwood, Jr., Esquire 57 West Pine Street, Suite 202 Orlando, Florida 32801 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner (None submitted) Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 3. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 14 and 16. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 5, and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7,/ Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 10 and 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as unnecessary and subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 13, 14, 16, and 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and/or subordinate. In particular, the finding that the "Petitioner under normal circumstances, should have been discharged for his pattern of poor performance and the associated financial impact upon the company" is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as argumentative and/or subordinate. ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Respondent, Palmetto Pine Country Club, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act of 1977. Petitioner, Fletcher Shelton, was employed for approximately 11 years by Respondent as a lawn caretaker and tractor driver on the Club's golf course. On November 27, 1983, Petitioner was terminated from his position. The Petitioner's actual firing was handled by a foreman who approached him early in the week and told him that Friday would be his last day. When Petitioner asked the foreman why he was being terminated, the foreman replied: "you're too old." The Petitioner was born on September 22, 1912, and was 71 years old at the time of his termination. There was no evidence presented suggesting that Petitioner was unable to physically perform the requirements of his position, or that Respondent was in any way dissatisfied with Petitioner's performance. In November of 1983, the board of directors of the Palmetto Pine Country Club adopted the following resolution, which is set forth below in its entirety: RESOLUTION ADOPTING MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE After discussion and upon motion duly made, seconded, and unanimously carried, it was RESOLVED as follows: That the mandatory retirement age for employees of this Corporation is age seventy (70). Every employee of this Corporation, upon reaching his or her 70th birthday, shall be retired from employment by this Corporation, effective first pay period following 70th birthday. This Resolution shall be effective November 27, 1983. Employees of this Corporation who have attained the age of 70 or older shall be given a one-time retirement benefit equivalent to 90 days wages. All employees of this Corporation shall be furnished with a written statement of the mandatory retirement age established by this Resolution. The Corporate Secretary shall certify the statement as being a true and correct copy of the Resolution. I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the Resolution. FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: //signed// Glenn W. Taylor, Secretary The resolution was adopted by the Board following a discussion which included the question of insurance coverage. The workmen's compensation insurance carrier "expressed concerns" about accident prevention, particularly with employees who were "getting along in age." A Representative from the insurance company suggested that the Respondent consider a mandatory retirement system. However, there was no evidence that the carrier threatened to withdraw coverage or raise premiums if the suggestion was not followed. The Petitioner was paid $3,505.50 in retirement and severance pay. At the time of Petitioner's involuntary retirement, he was earning approximately $1,414.50 per month. The Petitioner suffered lost wages and earnings of approximately $21,217.50 up to the time of the final hearing. The Petitioner earned approximately $3,240 at other employment between the time of his involuntary retirement and the final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the Respondent, Palmetto Pine Country Club, Inc., is guilty of a violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes; directing that Respondent cease its involuntary retirement system; and, further awarding the Petitioner lost wages in the amount of $14,272. RECOMMENDED and ORDERED this 17th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this l7th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Fletcher Shelton 2955 Dunbar Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Karl L. Johnson, Esquire P. O. Drawer 2199 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2199 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 7 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has worked as a furniture finisher and repairman for over 30 years. He was hired by Respondent on October 10, 1986. At that time, he worked at Respondent's store located on U.S. Route 441 in the Orlando area. Respondent is a furniture retailer. Although Respondent does not manufacture furniture, at least in the Orlando area, Respondent employs persons to perform various work on furniture, such as to repair damage in shipment or delivery. From 1986 through the end of 1987, Petitioner was the only finisher employed by Respondent and the only person qualified to perform major repairs. During this time, Petitioner performed a variety of services, including finishing, repair, upholstery, set up, and service calls. In December, 1987, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent's Landstreet facility. In general, Respondent was experiencing increasing retail sales at this time. To meet the needs associated with increased sales activity, Respondent added another warehouse employee to perform touch- up work and new equipment, such as a spray booth, to assist finishing and repair work. As Respondent's business increased, the demands on Petitioner also increased. Petitioner possesses substantial skills with respect to furniture finishing. However, Petitioner takes considerable time to perform his work. While retail activity had remained modest, Respondent tolerated Petitioner's slow pace. But as sales increased, Respondent pressured Petitioner to increase the pace of his work. On August 16, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a performance and potential summary in connection with a periodic performance review. The summary states that Petitioner's performance rating is below average. The summary identifies Petitioner's major weakness as "complain[ing] about everything and everybody." The summary notes Petitioner's slow pace, poor work habits, refusal to use new finishing aids, and refusal to give up his "old ways." The summary also states that his results were generally reasonable, but his overall results "leave something to be desired." On December 8, 1988, a supervisor gave Petitioner a disciplinary action form. The form states that, in the four months since the August 8 performance summary, Petitioner has shown no significant improvement. The form concludes that, "If there is no improvement there will be no more chances." Petitioner refused to sign the December 8 disciplinary action form. Petitioner became angry at the meeting at which the form was produced. Respondent fired Petitioner on December 28, 1988. Petitioner is a black person. However, he presented no evidence that his race was a factor in the termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald M. McElrath, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Herbert Dawkins 7055 Hennepin Blvd. Orlando, FL 32818 Jerry Lind, Operations Manager Rhodes, Inc. 901 Landstreet Rd. Orlando, FL 32821
The Issue Whether or not Respondent Alachua County has committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner due to her "handicap" of obesity.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a 43 year old white female, five feet-three inches tall, and weighing 265-270 pounds on the date of formal hearing. At all times material, she has weighed in excess of 200 pounds, the weight at which she was initially employed by Alachua County in January, 1980. Petitioner considers herself "obese". At the onset of her employment with Alachua County Department of Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Petitioner performed as a standby driver. She previously had been certified as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) by the State of Florida in 1978 and as a paramedic in October, 1979, but she did not begin to function as a paramedic for Respondent County for a period of time after her initial employment. Petitioner's employment application made no claim of "handicap" by obesity or otherwise. Petitioner passed a medical examination most recently in 1988. See, infra. The physical examination did not indicate Petitioner's weight impaired her functioning successfully as a paramedic. Petitioner has had a weight problem all of her adult life. Although Petitioner testified that the only times she has had marked weight loss success has been under medical supervision accompanied by the administration of pharmaceuticals, either orally or by injection, there is no expert medical evidence to establish whether her obesity is endogeneous (metabolic) or exogeneous (caused by overeating). There is no competent evidence upon which to find Petitioner's obesity is physiological in origin or that it is permanent. There is competent evidence that Petitioner's obesity was a source of concern to fellow employees and to certain of her supervisors for some period of time even before 1987. In 1987, the County did not fund a weight reduction program suggested by EMS Director Cunningham and agreed upon between Cunningham and Petitioner. There is, however, nothing to show that the County was obligated to fund such a program. Under the threat of job loss, Petitioner agreed to be physically evaluated as to her ability to perform her job, and she was given a special physical evaluation and job evaluation even though she was not on either a probationary or conditional status. She passed each of these. In early July, 1987, Petitioner was required to undertake a special agility test even though Alachua County had never required any other permanently employed EMT or paramedic to take such a test. The test involved simulated emergency job responses and was very physically demanding. Petitioner passed it. Despite the grueling hours of being a paramedic, Petitioner was also able to hold outside part- time employment. Nonetheless, some supervisors and co-employees continued to perceive Petitioner's obesity as a job impediment even though she had demonstrated that it was not. After satisfying the physical agility test, Petitioner was taken from a less strenuous zone and reassigned to one of the busiest zones in Alachua County and the only remaining zone that still required two man stretcher lifting. There is no direct evidence that the County could not assign paramedics to its various zones at will. There is no competent evidence to show Petitioner's weight problem has significantly impaired her normal functioning so as to render the resulting condition "handicapping" within the meaning of Chapter 760 F.S. Two instances formed the basis of Petitioner's termination. Petitioner offered plausible explanations for her performance in each incident, but upon the more credible evidence of Dr. Orban, it is found that approximately March 29, 1988, Petitioner responded to a motor vehicle accident and delayed immediate transport of an injured person to the hospital which was less than two minutes away by ambulance in favor of continuing attempts to start intravenous (IV) intubation and use of a mass (blood pressure stabilizing) suit, which would be treatment more suitable for a long transport. Also, upon the eye witness testimony of EMS District Chief Karen Newman,, who is also a paramedic, it is found that on April 17, 1988, Petitioner responded to a gunshot wound call and was unable with two attempts to start an IV or its catheter into the victim. Although Petitioner had started the victim on oxygen, she had failed to bandage his abdominal wound which clearly evidenced blood. This situation delayed arrival of the victim at the hospital. Ms. Newman completed the IV intubation quickly, herself, en route to the hospital with Petitioner's help. Dr. Orban and Chief Newman respectively testified that these situations which they observed were below the paramedic standards of care. As initially reported, the March incident had not been dealt with as a disciplinary matter and during the month between incidents, the Petitioner was not disciplined. Petitioner was suspended after the April incident. Dr. David Orban is employed by Shands Teaching Hospital at the University of Florida and functions as the Medical Director of Alachua County EMS, pursuant to contract. Dr. Orban testified that in May, 1988, after reviewing written reports and orally consulting supervisors and fellow-employees on Petitioner's conduct, he had concluded that Petitioner was not performing within the standards of care of a paramedic and removed her right to practice medical care under his license. In reaching his conclusion, it is clear that Dr. Orban also relied in large part on far more detailed hearsay characterizations given the foregoing and other incidents by other County employees, some of whom may have perceived Petitioner's weight as being a problem when it was not, but the doctor's relying on such hearsay statements at that time was not a divergence from the County's or the doctor's standard supervisory procedure, and Dr. Orban also at that time had formed his own opinion of Petitioner's competency based upon the single occasion of personal observation in March. Ms. Newman had never previously worked with Petitioner, and therefore her absence of any opportunity for prejudice supports her credibility as to the observed details of the April incident. Petitioner's weight was not a factor in Dr. Orban's personal observations or those of Ms. Newman. Dr. Orban advised Respondent of his decision by a letter dated May 16, 1988. Although no action has to date been taken by the State against Petitioner's licenses, she cannot practice except in conjunction with the supervision of a licensed physician. Since Dr. Orban would no longer accept the oversight responsibility of the Petitioner, Petitioner could no longer operate in the Alachua County EMS. Following the termination of Petitioner's right to function under Dr. Orban's license, Alachua County terminated her employment as a paramedic. At some point, the County offered her secretarial employment which Petitioner rejected due to lower salary and confined, sedentary working conditions. The subject of Petitioner's weight did not become a part of the proceedings that led to Petitioner's termination by the County. No other permanently employed EMT or paramedic received termination as a result of single instances of similar competency incidents. In similar situations, other employees variously were suspended, or required to return to driver status, or were required to take further courses or training, or they were issued written reprimands only. Except for the foregoing 1988 incidents, Petitioner has consistently had better than average job evaluations. Her evaluations were as follows: 1/16/81 - Good (26 on 40 point scale) 3/28/81 - Very Good (2.73 on 4.0 scale) 5/23/81 - Good (2.46 on 4.0 scale) 2/10/82 - Very Good (2.73 on 4.0 scale) 8/11/81 - Very Good (2.93 on 4.0 scale) 1/26/83 - Very Good (3.06 on 4.0 scale) 7/26/82 - Very Good (3.40 on 4.0 scale) 2/01/84 - Very Good (3.2 on 4.0 scale) 7/01/85 - Very Good (3.33 on 4.0 scale) 8/03/84 - Very Good (3.13 on 4.0 scale) 7/25/83 - Very Good (3.0 on 4.0 scale) 3/12/85 - Very Good (3.0 on 4.0 scale) 7/20/86 - Very Good (3.33 on 4.0 scale) 2/28/87 - Good (2.6 on 4.0 scale) 6/28/87 - Very Good (3.0 on 4.0 scale) The Petitioner has had no prior substantial disciplinary history and has never previously been suspended from her job nor has she ever been held back from any merit raises. However, upon the testimony of Kevin Rolfe, it is found that Petitioner's ability with regard to institution of intravenous tubes (IVs) was of concern to at least one superior in 1985.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the petition herein. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-1548 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 22, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 46, 52, 63, 70 and 71 are accepted. 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 27, 28, 31, 35-36, 40, 42, 44, 47, 50, 55, 59-62, 65-69, 72-73 are subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found. Sentence 1 of PFOF 6 is accepted; the remainder is subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found. 23 is incompetent and immaterial 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, and 49, are rejected as out of context or mere recitation of unreconciled exhibits and/or testimony. Most is also uncorroborated hearsay upon which no finding of fact can be made. Otherwise rejected as not in accord with the record as a whole and/or not credible or not competent. 34, 43, 45, 53, 56-58 are accepted in part; the remainder is subordinate. 8, 21, 41, 48, 50, 51, 54, 64 to the extent not accepted are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible, competent evidence as a whole or not necessary to resolve the dispositive issues of this case. Accepted that this is Petitioner's perception of events. Respondent's PFOF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 are accepted. 8, 10, and 20 is subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found. 12 is rejected because as stated is misleading and not entirely supported by the record. See the facts as found. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 628 Alachua, Florida 32615 Thomas A. Bustin County Attorney Post Office Drawer CC Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner McGowan was dismissed from his position as State Trooper by Respondent by letter dated 31 January 1978 (Composite Exhibit 1) which recites that the action in dismissing Petitioner is based upon Petitioner's violation of General Order No. 43 2.1C, Insubordination, third offense, and Rule 22A- 7.10(7)(a) Florida Administrative Code. McGowan was advised of his right to file a grievance pursuant to the agreement between Florida and the PBA or appeal the dismissal to the Career Service System. McGowan opted for the former and during the course of that hearing raised the issue before the Arbitrator that G.O.'s 40 and 43 were rules and invalid because not promulgated as required by Chapter 120 Florida Statutes. Respondent contested the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to resolve this question, the parties stipulated that this issue be submitted to DOAH for determination, and the Petition here involved was filed. G.O. 40 relates to physical fitness of members of the Florida Highway Patrol and, after pointing out that weight control is an important part of physical fitness, provides in pertinent part: Members shall maintain control of their weight in relation to their height, age, and body build. There are several charts and tables available indicating the ideal or desirable weight based on the above factors. The maximum allowable weight by height for all ages and body builds for the members of the Florida Highway Patrol shall be those used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See G.O. 41, Appendix A. Exception to the maximum limits may be made for members who have a large amount of muscle weight (without excessive fat) and a physician certifies that the individual is not overweight due to excess fat. Failure to comply with the maximum weight limits will result in a low rating for personal appearance on the employee evaluation form and disciplinary action may be taken for violation of this regulation, as provided in G.O. 43. G.O. 43 contains guidelines for establishing standards of disciplinary actions and for appeals to the Career Service Commission. Guidelines for disciplinary actions are contained in Section 2.1 of G.O. 43 which provides in pertinent part: C. Guidelines: The following guidelines are established to insure that all supervisors are being reasonably consistent in taking disciplinary actions against employees involved in similar situations. These guidelines may be expanded or modified from time to time to meet changing conditions and to make their use more effective. They shall be followed generally; however, it is realized that some of the offenses and deficiencies will be more frequent in some cases, and the supervisor may take or recommend another course of action. In no case will these guidelines be binding on the Department as the disciplinary action it shall take. G.O. 43 goes on to provide in the recommended table of Disciplinary Actions following the above quoted provision that for the third offense of insubordination the offender may be dismissed. By letter dated August 10, 1976 (Composite Exhibit 1) Petitioner was advised by Respondent that he was 60 pounds overweight, that his doctor had stated Petitioner's back problem is greatly aggravated and brought about by the overweight problem, and he was directed to make a concerted effort to reduce weight. By letter dated April 7, 1977 (Composite Exhibit 1), Petitioner was suspended from duty for 8 hours without pay for insubordination based upon failure to lose weight as directed in the August 10 letter. By letter dated September 28, 1977 (Composite Exhibit 1) Petitioner was suspended from duty for 16 hours without pay for insubordination for not conforming to weight regulations. By letter dated January 31, 1977 (Composite Exhibit 1) Petitioner was dismissed for the third offense of Insubordination for not conforming to weight regulations. On one or more occasions petitioner was granted sick leave by reason of back problems associated with being overweight.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was wrongly terminated from employment by Respondent, and, if so, whether monetary damages are warranted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Henry Woodie, is a 66-year-old African- American man. He has a bachelor's degree in math and education, a bachelor's degree in accounting, and a master's degree in business administration. Petitioner first became employed by Respondent in August 2004, as a DCC at Ranier House, a group home owned and operated by Respondent, Independent Group Home Living (IGHL). In February 2007, Petitioner was promoted to the position of overnight (or nighttime) ARM for Ranier House. This promotion occurred after Petitioner filed a lawsuit against Respondent for discrimination. A fellow employee (Sarah McElvain, a white female) had been promoted to ARM for Ranier House some months earlier. Petitioner felt slighted because he had not been granted an interview, although he had more formal education than McElvain. However, McElvain had considerably more experience in the healthcare industry than Petitioner at that time. Nonetheless, Respondent created a position for Petitioner equal in status to the position McElvain obtained. In February 2007, Petitioner was made the overnight ARM; he and McElvain were then co-managers of the Ranier House as McElvain took the day shift. Neither had supervisory status over the other. Each was responsible for assisting developmentally- disabled adults at Ranier House by providing hands-on assistance with daily living activities. Petitioner worked from approximately midnight until 8:00 a.m. as the nighttime ARM. McElvain's hours were generally 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. The two managers' paths did not cross very frequently, although McElvain would come in early on many occasions to have her morning coffee and chat with the DCC workers. She may or may not have contact with Petitioner during those visits. In mid-July 2007, Petitioner noticed that there was a shortage of available food products at Ranier House. Inasmuch as Petitioner was responsible for preparing bag lunches for the customers (residents of the house), he purchased some lunch meats and other products from his personal account on July 30, 2007, at 2:39 p.m., i.e., outside his normal work hours. It was understood that any such purchases would be reimbursed. Petitioner contends the food shortage existed because McElvain was overspending the funds budgeted for food, thus resulting in shortages. However, McElvain made food purchases using a WalMart debit card provided by Respondent. The card was replenished with funds each month by Respondent's corporate offices in New York. If the card was not timely replenished, McElvain could not make food purchases. This is the more reasonable and likely explanation of why shortages sometimes occurred. Any time a food shortage occurred, one of the ARMs could make a purchase with their own money (if they were able) and then obtain reimbursement from the corporate office. At 10:41 p.m. on July 30, 2007, some nine hours after Petitioner had made a food purchase using his own money, McElvain made a very large purchase ($711.11) of food and other items using the corporate WalMart card. McElvain was also shopping outside her normal work hours. McElvain brought the groceries to Ranier House at around 11:30 p.m., i.e., just prior to Petitioner coming on duty for his regular night shift. McElvain and DCC LaShonda Hemley sorted the purchase by item type. They then distributed the items to the rooms or areas where those items would ultimately be put away for storage. For example, cleaning products were left near the storage closet; food was left near the refrigerator or pantry; household goods were left in the kitchen, etc. After the food items had been distributed, McElvain saw Petitioner in passing and told him the goods needed to be put away. She then left the Ranier House. Petitioner does not specifically remember being told to put away the groceries. He does remember being told that the groceries were being distributed around the house so they could be put away, but assumed that someone else would do that job.2 McElvain and Hemley did not put the groceries away because of several stated reasons: McElvain had been working and going to classes all day and she was tired; the night shift was coming on duty and would be paid to put the groceries away, whereas McElvain and Hemley would have to be paid overtime to do that job; and McElvain made a presumption that Petitioner would follow through on her statement that "the food needs to be put away." Neither Petitioner, nor his DCC staff put away the food and supplies. As a result, dangerous chemicals were left sitting in the hallway all night long. Perishable foods were left in the garage (right next to the refrigerator) all night long and spoiled. Petitioner did not put away the food because of two stated reasons: Usually the person who buys the groceries puts them away; further, he had previously suffered a stroke and did not feel fully recovered. As for his medical condition, his physician had released Petitioner to work as of July 9, 2007 (several weeks prior to the incident in question), but Petitioner did not personally believe he was fully able to perform his duties. He did not make a request to his employer for a lighter work load or relief from his duties, however. Further, the final hearing was the first time Petitioner raised his health concerns as a reason why he did not put the groceries away. That testimony is not credible and flies in the face of the fact that Petitioner said he put away the groceries that he had purchased. Petitioner does not remember McElvain asking or telling him to put away the groceries. He says he would have, had he been asked. This statement is not credible since the groceries were in full view throughout Petitioner's shift, but he did not put them away. At some point during the night of July 30 or 31, 2007, Petitioner opened some of the bags containing perishable foods and used some of them to make sandwiches for the customers. He did not put the opened packages or any of the other bags of groceries into the refrigerator at that time. Petitioner does not accurately remember, but believes the lunch meats he used may have come from food he had bought (and put away) earlier in the day. Besides the perishable foods, there were also some bleach and cleaning supplies left unattended. These items were placed on the floor in a hallway immediately adjacent to a locked storage closet where they are to be stored. The closet was locked and the keys were located in the office at Ranier House. Petitioner maintained at final hearing that he did not see the items even though they were right next to customer rooms (which are supposed to be checked every 15 minutes throughout the night). It is hard to reconcile Petitioner's statement with the pictures of the bleach introduced into evidence at final hearing. The location of the bleach is patently obvious to even the most casual observer. Further, a letter written by Petitioner to an unknown recipient clearly states, "When I came to work at Mid-night [sic], I noticed about 50 bags of groceries spread out on the floors of different rooms." This letter, which Petitioner admits writing, contradicts his contention that he did not see the goods. One of the concerns about the bleach was that one customer was prone to getting up at night and finding something to drink. He would apparently drink anything, including bleach. Knowing that, it is unconscionable that Petitioner would allow the bleach to sit in close proximity to the customer bedrooms over an entire eight-hour shift. On July 31, 2007, McElvain came to work around 8:30 a.m. When she passed Petitioner on her way in, he said something akin to "I'm out of here" and left. McElvain then spotted the spoiled food and other items which had not been put away. She became extremely angry about that negligence. McElvain sorted through the food products and identified $167.27 worth of groceries that were no longer edible. She took pictures of the bags of groceries that were placed in different areas around the house. Then she called her supervisor, Joyce Herman, to lodge a complaint. McElvain told Herman that she (McElvain) had instructed Petitioner to put away the food items or, at least, had told Petitioner that the items needed to be put away. Herman contacted Petitioner at his home, inquiring as to why he had not put the groceries away. He said that he had not been told to do so. Herman says that the job descriptions for ARMs would suggest that someone needed to put the groceries away; if one ARM didn't, the other should. She places the primary blame in this case on Petitioner because the groceries were left out for his entire shift. Herman instructed Petitioner not to contact McElvain, but he did so anyway. Petitioner left a message on McElvain's home phone and then one on her cell phone. The messages were not preserved and could not be played at final hearing. However, a transcript of the home phone message, which both parties indicated was an accurate reflection of what was said, reads as follows: "Yes, Sarah, this is [Petitioner]. I was wondering why you told Joyce [Herman] that lie that you told me to put the groceries away and I didn't. Number one, you don't tell me what to do and number two, you could have put the groceries away yourself. Give me a call." McElvain says part of the message was stated in a "nasty tone," but Petitioner disagrees. McElvain contacted Herman and forwarded Petitioner's voicemail message so Herman could listen to it. Both McElvain and Herman describe the tone in Petitioner's voice as angry and confrontational. The voicemail was alternatively described by Respondent as "threatening," "confrontational" or "upsetting." Petitioner admits that he was angry when he made the call and might not have made the call had he not been angry. Petitioner and McElvain did not appear to have had a smooth or cordial working relationship, although they were peers. Upon hearing the voicemail and considering the facts as to what had occurred, Herman and her subordinate, Doris Diaz, made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The basis of the termination was violation of the IGHL Code of Conduct, specifically the following language: "[D]ecisions on disciplinary action to be taken will be up to and including discharge. The following are examples of unacceptable behavior. . . . Confrontation with customers or co-workers." Petitioner acknowledged receipt and understanding of the Code of Conduct. Petitioner requested of Respondent a letter setting out the reason for his discharge. He was told that IGHL policy did not allow for a written statement; however, a letter was thereafter sent to him stating the basis for Respondent's action. The letter is unequivocal that the employer's reliance on confrontation with a co-worker was the basis for terminating Petitioner's employment. Petitioner presented no competent substantial evidence to support his claim of race, gender, or age discrimination as the basis for his termination from employment. Petitioner was promoted from DCC worker to nighttime ARM by IGHL. His promotion included a substantial salary increase, but not much change in his duties or responsibilities. He was, by his own admission, probably overpaid for the job he was performing. He claims that his termination from employment was for the purpose of eliminating this particular position. There is no evidence to support that contention.3 Petitioner claims retaliation may have occurred because of the fact that he pointed out McElvain's failure to stay within her prescribed food budget. There is no evidence that McElvain strayed from her budget. Rather, the evidence shows a failure on the part of IGHL's corporate offices to stay current when replenishing the WalMart card used for making purchases. The 90-day evaluation for Petitioner after his promotion to ARM is acceptable, but is considerably less laudatory in nature than McElvain's evaluation. It is clear Petitioner did have some minor issues relating to other employees, but that is often the case when someone is promoted from within an organization. If Petitioner is claiming retaliation based on his previous claim of discrimination against his employer, that claim is not supported by the evidence. As a matter of fact, Petitioner was promoted, not fired, as a result of the prior claim he filed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding Respondent not guilty of an unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's age or perceived disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a 51-year-old white male who had cancer in one kidney at the time of an alleged unlawful employment practice. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent is a construction company engaged in the business of building bridges and other highway structures in Florida. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's age or perceived disability. Respondent employed Petitioner as a crane operator on February 22, 2008, at a pay rate of $18.00 per hour. Petitioner listed his residence as Naples, Florida. Petitioner was unaware that he had any disability and did not disclose any disability at the time of his initial employment. Petitioner solicited employment from Respondent and was not recruited by Respondent. Petitioner relocated from Wyoming to Florida to be with his family. Respondent assigned Petitioner to a construction job that was under the supervision of Mr. Scot Savage, the job superintendent. Mr. Brandon Leware was also a superintendent on the same job. Mr. William (Bill) Whitfield was the job foreman and Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Sometime in October 2008, medical tests revealed that cancer may be present in one of Petitioner's kidneys. The treating physician referred Petitioner to a specialist, David Wilkinson, M.D., sometime in October 2008. Medical personnel verbally confirmed the diagnosis of cancer to Petitioner by telephone on October 30, 2008. On the same day, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from his employment during a verbal dispute with his supervisors. Petitioner did not disclose his medical condition until after he voluntarily resigned from his employment. The verbal dispute involved Petitioner and several of his supervisors. On October 30, 2008, Mr. Whitfield, the foreman, assigned work to several employees, including Petitioner. Mr. Whitfield proceeded to complete some paperwork and, when he returned to the job site, discovered the work assigned to Petitioner had not been performed. When confronted by Mr. Whitfield, Petitioner refused to carry out Mr. Whitfield’s directions. Mr. Whitfield requested the assistance of Mr Savage. Mr. Savage directed Petitioner to return to work or quit. Petitioner quit and walked off the job. As Petitioner was walking off the job, Petitioner turned around and stated that he had cancer. Petitioner then left the job site. Petitioner's statement that he had cancer was the first disclosure by Petitioner and first notice to Respondent that Petitioner had cancer. The medical condition did not prevent Petitioner from performing a major life activity. Respondent did not perceive Petitioner to be impaired before Petitioner voluntarily ended his employment. None of the employees of Respondent who testified at the hearing regarded Petitioner as impaired or handicapped or disabled or knew that Petitioner had cancer prior to Petitioner's statement following his abandonment of his job on October 30, 2008.2 Within a week after Petitioner voluntarily left his position, Petitioner returned, approached Vice-President Mr. Scott Leware, and asked for his job back. Mr. Leware advised him that he would not get his job back. At the time, Mr. Leware was unaware that Petitioner had cancer. Mr. Leware was the ultimate decision-maker, and Mr. Leware was unaware that Petitioner had cancer when Mr. Leware made that decision approximately a week after Petitioner voluntarily left his employment. The terms of employment did not entitle Petitioner to a per diem payment while employed with Respondent. Petitioner's residence in Naples was within 75 miles of the job site where Petitioner worked. Respondent did pay for the hotel room that Petitioner used at the Spinnaker Inn while on the job, but not other per diem expenses, including meals. The cost of the hotel ranged between $50 and $60 a night. Mr. Brandon Leware followed Petitioner to a gas station and paid for gasoline for Petitioner’s vehicle. Mr. Leware and Petitioner then went to the Spinnaker Inn where Petitioner resided in a room paid for by Respondent. Mr. Leware advised the manager of the Spinnaker Inn that Respondent would pay for Petitioner’s lodging for that night, but not after that night. The rate of compensation that Respondent paid Petitioner was within the normal range of compensation paid to crane operators employed by Respondent. Crane operator compensation ranges from $16.00 to $20.00 an hour. Respondent paid Petitioner $18.00 an hour. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent ever offered to pay Petitioner $22.00 an hour. The allegation of age discrimination is not a disputed issue of fact. Petitioner admitted during his testimony that he never thought Respondent discriminated against him due to his age. Respondent employed another crane operator with cancer at the same time that Respondent employed Petitioner. The other crane operator is identified in record as Mr. Roddy Rowlett. Mr. Rowlett’s date of birth was October 14, 1949. Mr. Rowlett notified Respondent that he had cancer, and Respondent did not terminate the employment of Mr. Rowlett. Mr. Rowlett continued to work as a crane operator until a few weeks before his death. A preponderance of evidence does not show that age, cancer, or perceived impairment were factors in how Respondent treated Petitioner during his employment with Respondent. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent hired anyone to replace Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR"), and if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a hospital located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a registered dietician in the Nutrition Services Department from February 1991 until her termination on October 24, 2011. Petitioner was 50 years old when she was hired by Respondent. In January 1999, Mindy McClure (age 61 as of the date of the hearing) was hired by Respondent as the assistant director of Nutritional Services. From January 1999 until October 24, 2011, Ms. McClure supervised Petitioner. As a registered dietician, Petitioner's job duties required her to: (1) evaluate and assess hospital patients' nutritional needs; (2) formulate nutrition care plans according to nutritional assessments and standards of care; (3) assess the effects of nutrition intervention; (4) educate and counsel patients requiring nutrition intervention; (5) evaluate services and care provided to identify opportunities for improvement; and (6) communicate pertinent information to appropriate individuals. Petitioner's job performance was satisfactory during much of her employment with Respondent. However, in early 2011, Petitioner's job performance significantly deteriorated. Each patient's nutritional assessment is communicated to Respondent's health care team, which includes other dieticians, via the patient's chart. Providing complete and accurate information in a patient's chart and following a doctor's order is critical to the duties of a dietician and to formulating a proper nutritional care plan for the patient. On June 30, 2011, Petitioner received a Notice of Disciplinary Action in the form of an oral warning for failing to meet her job standards. This warning was given to Petitioner because she failed to provide complete information in a patient chart, and she failed to order any recommended tube feedings pursuant to a doctor's order. Petitioner was directed to complete assessments and make recommendations according to established protocols and procedures so that any dietician can easily discern a patient's needs. Petitioner was also warned that failure to do so will result in continued disciplinary action. On July 17, 2011, Petitioner received her annual performance evaluation. She received an overall rating of "Partially Meets Standards." Accordingly, Petitioner was placed on a three-month work improvement plan from July 25, 2011, to October 24, 2011. The improvement plan required Petitioner to improve her: (1) organizational skills; (2) timeliness when starting her shift; (3) promptness in clocking in and out of her shift; (4) tracking and communication with patients and patient information; and (5) computer skills. Petitioner was also required to keep a notebook where she maintained patient information. Petitioner and Ms. McClure met on a weekly or bi- weekly basis to monitor Petitioner's progress and ensure she was documenting patient information correctly. On August 2, 2011, Petitioner received a written warning because she lost patient information, specifically a tube feeding card and calorie count sheet. On August 24, 2011, Petitioner received a final written warning because she failed to monitor her e-mail messages and had continued inaccuracies in her patient charting. Because Petitioner's job performance did not significantly improve after she was given the work improvement plan, her employment with Respondent was terminated on October 24, 2011. Ms. McClure made the decision to terminate Petitioner. Dawn Outcalt, Respondent's executive director of Nutritional Services, and Rachel Thompson, Respondent's associate relations coordinator, also participated in the decision. Respondent has policies and procedures in place regarding complaints of discrimination. At no time prior to her termination did Petitioner complain to Respondent that she was discriminated against because of her age. Following Petitioner's termination, Respondent did not replace Petitioner.1/ The parties stipulated that: "Petitioner is not presently capable of recalling the events surrounding her termination from employment with Respondent nor providing testimony in this proceeding." The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Petitioner was terminated for legitimate, non- discriminatory reasons having nothing to do with her age. Petitioner's charge of age discrimination is based on speculation and conjecture, and Petitioner failed to prove that she was terminated because of her age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2015.
