Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, HOWARD P. HAUSER, was eligible for licensure and licensed in this state by the Florida Department of Insurance as a Life and Health Insurance Agent; General Lines Insurance Agent - Property, Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Lines; and Legal Expense Insurance Agent. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was the registered agent and an officer or director of Hauser and Associates Insurance Agency, Incorporated of 7770 Davie Road Extension, Hollywood, Florida. Beginning on or about January 1, 1986, and continuing through August 31, 1987, Respondent represented to one of his clients that he had obtained insurance coverage for that client's three restaurants. This representation of coverage was false. Respondent received from the client insurance premium payments of $56,550.00, more or less, for the insurance of the client's three restaurants. These funds were obtained by Respondent under false pretenses. Respondent provided the mortgagee of one of the restaurants owned by his client with a document purporting to be a certificate of insurance on that restaurant from Scotsdale Insurance Company insuring the restaurant for the period December 11, 1985, to December 11, 1986. Respondent further provided the mortgagee with a declaration sheet stating that Protective Insurance Company would insure the restaurant from January 1, 1987, to January 1, 1990. Respondent falsified these declaration sheets. Respondent's client suffered no loss, other than the loss of his premium dollars, because of Respondent's misrepresentations as to coverage. Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft of the Second Degree, a second degree felony, based on the dealings with his client. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Grand Theft of the Second Degree. The Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for a period of three years and withheld adjudication of guilt. As a condition of the Order of Probation, the court required that Respondent make restitution to his client in the amount of $56,550.00 and further required that $15,000.00 be paid toward restitution on October 24, 1988, the date Respondent entered his plea of nolo contendere and the date the court entered the Order of Probation. Respondent made a restitution payment of $15,000.00 on October 24, 1988. Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner since April 1972. Although Petitioner has received other complaints about Respondent, no formal action has been previously taken against him. Respondent has been a good citizen, except for this misconduct, and a good family man. Respondent regrets his misconduct. Respondent timely requested a formal hearing after the Administrative Complaint was served upon him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order which revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance to Respondent, Howard Paul Hauser. DONE and ENTERED this 21st of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings addressed as follows: of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2. Addressed in paragraph 2. 3. Addressed in paragraph 6. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. 6. Addressed in paragraphs 3-4. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 6. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in part in paragraph 7. Rejected in part as being speculative. Rejected as being a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert G. Gough, Esquire, (at the hearing) and Charles Christopher Anderson, Esquire, (on the proposed recommended order) Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Gary D. Weiner, Esquire, Glendale Federal Building Suite 209 901 Southeast 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, William Robert Pearson, should be disciplined for alleged statutory and rule violations for his role in several insurance transactions.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed in Florida as a life including variable annuity agent (2-14), life including variable annuity and health agent (2-15), life agent (2-16), life and health agent (2-18), and health agent (2-40), regulated by the DFS's Division of Insurance Agent and Agency Services. He was so licensed at all times pertinent to this case. He was first licensed in 1988 and has been disciplined once, in September 2002, when he was given a Letter of Guidance for misrepresenting to a Pinellas Park resident that an annuity he sold her would generate interest in excess of 6.8 percent, when the guaranteed rate was three percent for the first year. During the transactions alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent also was registered with OFR's Division of Securities as a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) broker representative associated with Transamerica Financial Advisors, Inc. (Transamerica). On August 21, 2012, based on some of the same facts alleged in this case, OFR charged the Respondent with failing to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade because he: participated in the liquidation of variable and fixed annuities on behalf of several elderly customers referred by insurance agents not licensed as FINRA broker representatives; executed the liquidations recommended to the customers by insurance agent Richard Carter; failed to appropriately record the transactions on the books and records of Transamerica; failed to review the transactions, or have them reviewed by Transamerica, as to suitability; and provided Agent Carter with blank Transamerica letterhead to be used to facilitate the transactions. A Stipulation and Consent Agreement was entered on December 18, 2012, in which the Respondent admitted the OFR charges and agreed to never seek a license or registration as a dealer, investment advisor, or associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, chapter 517, Florida Statutes. A Final Order incorporating the settlement agreement was entered on January 11, 2013. (This Final Order is the basis for Count IX, which was added to the charges in this case, as well as for one of the Respondent's affirmative defenses.) Count I-–Geraldine Busing Geraldine Busing was born on December 1, 1930. She has a high school education. Her husband of 44 years died in 2001. When alive, he handled the family finances. Mrs. Busing's income is from a pension of $728 a month and social security payments of $1,090 a month. In addition, she had substantial investments in two Schwab accounts. During the market decline of 2007-2008, Mrs. Busing became dissatisfied with the performance of her Schwab accounts. An insurance agent named Richard Carter recommended that she invest in annuities, which would reduce her taxes. (In her deposition, testimony was elicited from Mrs. Busing that Agent Carter told her that the Respondent would do her taxes for free for the rest of her life. It is not likely that he made such a representation, and there is no evidence that the Respondent knew about such a representation.) Mrs. Busing followed Agent Carter's recommendation. Agent Carter did not have a FINRA license and approached the Respondent, who worked for Transamerica, to facilitate the liquidation of Mrs. Busing's Schwab accounts, so she could follow Agent Carter's recommendations. The Respondent agreed. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent provided blank Transamerica forms to Agent Carter and that Agent Carter "shuffled" the forms together with an EquiTrust Life Insurance Company (EquiTrust) annuity application and suitability forms and requested Mrs. Busing's signatures (although, it is alleged, one or more of the signatures on the Transamerica forms were not hers.) It is alleged that, unbeknownst to Mrs. Busing, Agent Carter gave the Respondent these forms, as well as a copy of her Schwab account statements, so he could liquidate her accounts, which totaled $627,000 at the time, "dump" the proceeds into a Transamerica account, and then "funnel" the liquidated assets into two EquiTrust annuities. It is alleged that Mrs. Busing became aware of these transactions in September 2010 after discussions with her accountant. Mrs. Busing testified that she has never met the Respondent and does not know him. She testified that she gave all of her Schwab account information to Agent Carter and did not expect him to share it with the Respondent. She testified that Agent Carter had her hurriedly sign a stack of papers without giving her a chance to review them. She said she was surprised when her stock broker, Barry Tallman, called to tell her that her Schwab accounts had been liquidated and used to open a Transamerica account. She denied ever receiving or signing the Schwab bank check dated July 7, 2010, used to open the Transamerica accounts; denied ever providing the Respondent and Transamerica with information for her customer account information (CAI) form used to open the Transamerica accounts; and denied that several of the Geraldine Busing signatures on the Transamerica documents used for the transactions were her signatures. She admitted to signing a Transamerica check dated August 13, 2010, which was used to purchase the EquiTrust policies. The Respondent testified that he telephoned Mrs. Busing at Agent Carter's request. He testified that she told him she wanted to implement Agent Carter's recommendation to liquidate the Schwab accounts and purchase annuities. He testified that he told her his services were not required because her current broker (Mr. Tallman) could handle it for her, unless she just wanted to avoid confronting her current broker. He said she wanted the Respondent to handle it, and he replied essentially that he would do whatever she and Agent Carter wanted him to do for her. The Respondent testified that he then mailed Mrs. Busing forms she had to fill out, sign, and return to him. He testified that he talked to her briefly by telephone about 15 to 20 times to answer questions she had about the forms. When she told him she received a Schwab check in the amount of about $150,000 and asked if she should mail it to him, he cautioned her that it would be better not to mail it and offered to drive to her house to get the check, which he did and returned immediately to Transamerica to open a Transamerica account with it. He testified that the Transamerica funds were used to purchase EquiTrust annuities at the direction of Agent Carter and Mrs. Busing. The evidence was not clear and convincing that Mrs. Busing's version of the facts is true and that the Respondent's version is untrue. To the contrary, Mrs. Busing's memory did not seem to be very good, and she seemed confused during her testimony. The evidence was not clear and convincing that the Respondent made any investment or insurance recommendations or misrepresentations to Mrs. Busing. The Petitioner's own witnesses (DFS and OFR investigators, Karen Ortega and Mercedes Bujans) testified that the Respondent never acted as Mrs. Busing's insurance agent. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Busing incurred tax and commission charges as a result of her Schwab account being liquidated, other than Transamerica's standard "ticket charge" for the transactions, which the Respondent admitted. There was no evidence that the Respondent received any remuneration on the EquiTrust annuity sales. Those commissions went to Agent Carter. The Petitioner contended in its proposed recommended order that the Respondent listed Mrs. Busing's annual income to be between $25,000 and $50,000, her investment objective as growth and income, and her investment time horizon as long-term. (Busing Deposition Exhibit 87). There was no testimony to put the exhibit in context or explain it. On its face, Busing deposition Exhibit 87 was a request from Transamerica to the client to confirm certain information. The form had the Respondent's name printed on it, but it was not signed by either the Respondent or Mrs. Busing, and the evidence did not prove who completed the form. (The CAI form contained similar information and had both their signatures.) The Petitioner contends that the information on the confirmation request was "absurd," because it listed Mrs. Busing's annual income as between $25,000 and $50,000, when her taxable income was $11,108 for 2009 and $8,251 for 2010. There was evidence that her total annual income was about $48,000 for 2007, $32,600 for 2008, $22,358 for 2009, and $19,001 for 2010, with the decline due to the decline in the stock market. The evidence was not clear and convincing that the income information on that form or the CAI form was absurd. The investment objective and investment time horizon on the forms were questionable, but the evidence was not clear and convincing that these were misrepresentations by the Respondent. The Transamerica account was a Pershing money market account used to facilitate the purchase of annuities. The evidence was that a separate suitability analysis would be required by the insurance company offering the annuity. The evidence was not clear that the information in the forms signed by the Respondent was used for the purchase of EquiTrust annuities on behalf of Mrs. Busing. Those purchases were recommended and executed by Agent Carter. The evidence was not clear and convincing that switching Mrs. Busing's investments from Schwab to EquiTrust annuities was not suitable for Mrs. Busing or in her best interest. No expert witness testified to that effect. Counts II through IV–-The Kesishes In 2010, William Kesish and his wife, Josefa, owned several annuities. Mr. Kesish had managed their business affairs before he developed Parkinson's disease and dementia in his old age. After that, Mrs. Kesish cared for him and took over the family's finances by default. Mr. Kesish died on November 26, 2010. Mrs. Kesish was born in Spain in 1937. English is her second language. In 2010, she had difficulty conversing and reading in English and was unable to write in English. After her husband became mentally disabled, she used their bank account to provide for their needs, but she had no investment acumen beyond knowing generally that it was better to make more money from their investments than to make less or to lose money. She was recovering from cancer treatment in 2010 and was physically frail. On May 25, 2010, Paula Rego, a professional guardian, met with an attorney who believed the Kesishes were being exploited and in need of a guardian. Ms. Rego reviewed documentation provided by the attorney and, in June 2010, agreed to Mrs. Kesish's voluntary request to become the guardian of the Kesishes' property. On July 8, 2010, Ms. Rego became aware of the Respondent's involvement in the Kesishes' financial business. She telephoned the Respondent to explain her guardianship role and faxed him on July 15, 2010, to direct him to cancel any investment transactions that were underway. The Petitioner presented the testimony of Ms. Rego to explain her review of the documentation she collected in her research to attempt to piece together the financial transactions involving the Kesishes. She also testified as to the surrender charges and, to some extent, the tax liabilities that resulted from them. She also related statements made by Mrs. Kesish to her and, to some extent, to the DFS and OFR investigators, Karen Ortega and Mercedes Bujans, who also related some of the statements Mrs. Kesish made to them. The Petitioner also introduced an affidavit prepared by Ms. Ortega and signed by Mrs. Kesish on March 31, 2011. All of Mrs. Kesish's statements were hearsay. The hearsay cannot itself support a finding of fact.3/ In general, the hearsay demonstrated that Mrs. Kesish did not have a clear recollection of her interactions with the Respondent at the time of her statements. Agent Carter introduced the Respondent to Mrs. Kesish in March 2010. The Petitioner alleged essentially that Agent Carter schemed and collaborated with the Respondent to exploit the Kesishes by tricking them into financial and insurance transactions that would not be in their best interest, but would generate commissions and fees for them. It was alleged that, as with Mrs. Busing, the Respondent's FINRA licensure was required to buy and sell securities in furtherance of the scheme. The Respondent testified that Agent Carter told him about his clients, the Kesishes, and that he went to meet Mrs. Kesish in person because he had difficulty communicating with her over the telephone due to her hard-to-understand Spanish accent and limited proficiency in spoken English. He testified that she told him she wanted to get out of the stock market and was unhappy with her current stockbroker, Doreen Scott. (That part of the Respondent's testimony was corroborated by Ms. Rego, who concurred that Mrs. Kesish did not like dealing with Ms. Scott because she talked down to her.) The Respondent testified that he went to Mrs. Kesish's house, asked if he could be of assistance to her, and discussed her financial situation with her. He testified that he then returned to his Transamerica office and mailed forms for her to fill out and sign.4/ Similar to his dealings with Mrs. Busing, the Respondent testified that he spoke to Mrs. Kesish several times by telephone to answer questions about the forms. It is reasonable to infer that the Respondent knew Agent Carter would be helping her. The Respondent testified that when the completed forms were returned to him by mail, he telephoned Mrs. Kesish to verify the information on the forms and, in some cases, get information that was omitted to add it to the forms. The Petitioner attempted to prove that the Respondent knew or should have known Mrs. Kesish was mentally disabled and incapable of voluntarily instructing the Respondent to effectuate financial transactions on her behalf. Mrs. Kesish lacked knowledge in investing and was susceptible to being misled and exploited, but it was not proven that Mrs. Kesish was mentally incapacitated or unable to consent to Agent Carter's recommendations or instruct the Respondent. Ms. Rego herself did not find it necessary to initiate involuntary proceedings to establish a plenary guardianship of Mrs. Kesish's person and property until October 2013. (Count II) One of the Kesishes' investments was a Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company (Genworth) variable annuity (G-58), which they bought on October 31, 2008, for $86,084.89. It was designed to begin paying monthly income on October 31, 2022. It provided a waiver of surrender charges if either Kesish was hospitalized, admitted to a nursing facility, or died. As of March 31, 2010, G-58 had a contract value of $102,954.90. Mrs. Kesish signed a form on letterhead of the Respondent and Transamerica that expressed her desire for the Respondent to be their insurance agent on G-58. On May 27, 2010, the Respondent used an automated account transfer (ACAT) to liquidate G-58 and transfer the funds to a Transamerica brokerage account he opened for the Kesishes on the same date. The Respondent did not independently determine whether the liquidation was suitable or in the Kesishes' best interest. He relied on Agent Carter to do this. The Respondent and the Kesishes signed the CAI form to open the brokerage account. The surrender of G-58 took effect on June 14, 2010. As a result of the liquidation, the Kesishes were assessed a surrender charge of $4,576.91 and federal tax was withheld, and the net proceeds from the liquidation were $90,314.19. On June 29, 2010, the funds in Mrs. Kesish's Transamerica account were added to an EquiTrust policy Agent Carter had sold her (E-92F). The Respondent testified that this was done at the direction of Agent Carter and Mrs. Kesish. The Respondent did not act as the Kesishes' EquiTrust agent and received no commissions. The Petitioner alleged and proposed a finding that the liquidation of G-58 allowed Agent Carter to represent to EquiTrust that the Kesishes had no other annuities and that the addition to E-92F was not replacing another annuity, which allowed Agent Carter to avoid having Genworth attempt to "conserve" G-58 (i.e., question the Kesishes as to whether they wanted to reverse the liquidation within the grace period for doing so). The evidence cited in support of the allegation and proposed finding is documentation of the initial purchase of E-92F in April 2010, not the addition in June 2010. There was no clear and convincing evidence that actions taken by the Respondent resulted in Agent Carter circumventing the replacement notice requirement, or that the Respondent should be held responsible for what Agent Carter did or did not do regarding the EquiTrust annuity. According to the Respondent, he made no investment recommendations to Mrs. Kesish, and all such recommendations were made by Agent Carter. He testified that he only took action in accordance with the wishes of Mrs. Kesish, who was being advised by Agent Carter. He denied that his purpose was to generate commissions or fees for himself or for Agent Carter, or to enable Agent Carter to conceal the replacement of the Genworth annuity. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's testimony was false. The Petitioner's proposed recommended order cites the testimony of Tarek Richey regarding his concerns about the Respondent's use of an ACAT to liquidate annuities, transfer of the proceeds to Pershing accounts at Transamerica, and use of those funds to purchase other annuities. Mr. Richey is a FINRA- licensed securities broker at Questar Capital Corporation, who employed and supervised the Respondent for about a month in early 2011, after he left Transamerica in December 2010. While supervising the Respondent, Mr. Richey was advised of OFR's investigation of the Respondent and reviewed the Respondent's documentation on the subject of OFR's investigation. One of Mr. Richey's concerns from his review of the Respondent's documentation was the use of ACAT, which would not guarantee that the client is aware of resulting surrender charges and tax consequences. He also was concerned that ACAT could have been used to bypass and avoid the use of forms required to analyze the suitability of annuities purchased for the Kesishes (and other clients). While he expressed these concerns, Mr. Richey had no personal knowledge and did not testify that the Kesishes (or the other clients) actually were unaware of surrender charges and tax consequences, or that liquidation was not suitable or in their best interest. Another of Mr. Richey's concerns was that the use of ACAT could result in the replacement of annuities without completing the required forms that would provide notice to the insurance company that its annuity was in the process of being replaced and give it an opportunity to conserve its annuity. Mr. Richey did not know that the use of ACAT actually resulted in the bypass of the replacement policy notice requirements for the Kesishes and other clients. He also did not testify that the Respondent should be held responsible for what Agent Carter did or did not do regarding replacement notices. Ms. Rego testified (based in part on discussions with a financial planner who did not testify) that she did not think the Genworth and EquiTrust transactions were not in the best interest of the Kesishes, mainly because of the Genworth surrender charge and tax consequences. There was no other expert testimony on the subject, and the evidence was not clear and convincing that those transactions were unsuitable or not in their best interest. (Count III) The Kesishes owned a Riversource Life Insurance Company (Riversource) annuity (R-30) that they bought on October 5, 2006. The contract had declining withdrawal charge rates that held at eight percent for the first four years. It had a death benefit rider. On March 23, 2010, a letter on the Respondent's Transamerica letterhead, written in English and signed by Mrs. Kesish, directed Riversource to list the Respondent as the Kesishes' financial advisor. On April 23, 2010, Mrs. Kesish signed a form directing Riversource to liquidate R-30. She also signed a form saying she knew there would be surrender charges. On April 26, 2010, Riversource sent the Kesishes a check for $26,430.07 (which was net after $2,454.30 in surrender charges). The testimony from Ms. Rego as to whether the liquidation of the Riversource annuity was contrary to the Kesishes' best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements, was similar to her testimony with respect to the Genworth liquidation. There was no other expert or other clear and convincing evidence. (Count IV) The Kesishes also had Great American Life Insurance Company (Great American) annuities in the amounts of approximately $560,854 (GA-25) and $28,785 (GA-00), which were purchased in January 2010. GA-25 was owned by the Kesishes' trust, with Mrs. Kesish as trustee; GA-00 was owned by Mr. Kesish. By June 4, 2010, they had contract values of $580,854.71 and $29,970.46, respectively. On June 18, 2010, Agent Carter took Mrs. Kesish to lunch. A letter dated June 18, 2010, signed by Mrs. Kesish for her and her husband, written in English on the Respondent's Transamerica letterhead, directed the transfer of GA-25 to a Transamerica Pershing account (TA-25). An ACAT form dated June 20, 2010, signed by Mrs. Kesish and the Respondent, directed the liquidation of Mr. Kesish's GA-00 and the transfer of the proceeds to the Kesishes' Transamerica Pershing account. This transaction took effect on July 7, 2010.5/ After becoming involved through Attorney Hook, Ms. Rego had numerous discussions with Mrs. Kesish and with Agent Carter regarding the Kesishes' investments. Agent Carter attempted to explain and justify his actions to Ms. Rego and blame other insurance agents who he claimed had essentially stolen his clients by tricking them into replacing Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America (Allianz) annuities sold to them by him with GA-25 and GA-00. Ms. Rego's research notes evidence her understanding that the Great American sales to the Kesishes were unsuitable. During Ms. Rego's discussions and research throughout June 2010, the Respondent's name did not come up, and Ms. Rego was unaware of the Respondent having anything to do with the Kesishes. When she learned about the Respondent's role on July 8, 2010, she attempted to contact him. On July 15, 2010, she faxed the Respondent to instruct him to stop acting on behalf of the Kesishes. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent did not follow Ms. Rego's instructions.6/ On July 17, 2010, Great American sent Mr. Kesish a conservation letter urging him not to surrender GA-00. Ms. Rego then contacted Great American and had the surrender of GA-25 and GA-00 stopped. Had the transactions not been stopped, the Kesishes $60,000 in surrender charges would have been imposed. There was no other expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of the Great American annuities was contrary to the Kesishes' best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Counts V through VI–-Edith Paz Edith Paz was born on January 20, 1926, and lives in Sun City Center. She has a high school diploma and held various jobs, from retailing to making plates in a dental office. Mrs. Paz married a GI returning from World War II. Her husband was successful in business before his retirement. Meanwhile, Mrs. Paz founded a successful real estate business and invested in the stock market. Mr. Paz died in 1999. In 2001, Mrs. Paz created a revocable trust with herself as trustee. When Mrs. Paz retired, she moved to Sun City Center. She did some investing, but was dissatisfied with her investments and her financial representative at the time. About that time, she met Glenn Cummings, an insurance agent who was a less experienced associate of Agent Carter and also not FINRA- licensed. After several conversations, Agent Cummings gained her trust and advised her to liquidate and consolidate her assets before deciding what other financial products to purchase. He referred her to the Respondent for that purpose. Agent Cummings and Mrs. Paz testified that he referred Mrs. Paz to the Respondent on the advice of Agent Carter to save "exit fees" on liquidating her investments. The evidence was not clear as to how the Respondent would be able to do this. The Respondent testified to his understanding that Mrs. Paz wanted to get out of the stock market and switch to more stable investments and that she had a bad relationship with her stockbroker. The Respondent's testimony is consistent with Mrs. Paz's actual losses in the stock market and her testimony that she listened to and followed the advice of Agent Cummings because she was dissatisfied with her prior financial advisor, a Mr. Shrago. Mrs. Paz testified that she spoke to the Respondent just once, briefly. That conflicts with the testimony of the Respondent and Agent Cummings. Their testimony was that there were several telephone conversations after the initial contact. They related that the Respondent mailed Mrs. Paz the forms that needed to be filled out, that Agent Cummings was with Mrs. Paz when she filled out the forms, and that both spoke to the Respondent several times during the process. According to Agent Cummings, this happened on July 29, 2010, when he visited Mrs. Paz to show her illustrations regarding the annuities he was recommending. While there, he helped her complete the forms the Respondent had sent to have her investments liquidated and consolidated into a Transamerica Pershing account. There also was conflict in the testimony as to whether anyone explained investment options and consequences to Mrs. Paz. She testified that no one gave her any explanation. Agent Cummings testified that he explained everything in detail to Mrs. Paz and that she also talked to the insurance agents who represented the companies whose annuities she would be surrendering. He testified that Mrs. Paz knew exactly what she was doing. The Respondent testified that he had no involvement in those explanations. He testified that he simply made sure he understood what Mrs. Paz wanted him to do for her. (Count V) In May 2007, Mrs. Paz purchased a Jackson National Life Insurance Company (Jackson National or JNL) annuity (JNL-42A) on the advice of Mr. Shrago. The initial premium was $100,000, and it was issued with a five-percent bonus. As of May 25, 2007, it had an account balance of $105,017.01 and was receiving an annual rate of return of 7.75 percent. On July 12, 2010, Mrs. Paz signed a letter directing Jackson National to make the Respondent, who held an appointment to represent Jackson National, her agent-of-record on JNL-42A. The change took effect on July 15, 2010. On July 29, 2010, Jackson National faxed the Respondent a statement of account for JNL-42A, listing the balance as $108,253.48 (which reflected a prior withdrawal of $2,500 by Mrs. Paz). The statement disclosed the surrender charges in effect. After her discussions with Agent Cummings, Mrs. Paz signed forms requesting that JNL-42A be liquidated and the proceeds rolled over into a Great American Life Insurance Company (Great American or GA) annuity (GA-61). The Respondent facilitated the rollover. As a result of the rollover, Mrs. Paz incurred surrender charges of $4,871.41 and a partial recapture of the initial bonus in the amount of $2,706.34, for a total loss of $7,577.75. The Petitioner alleged, and Mrs. Paz testified, that the Respondent never discussed with her that there would be surrender charges. The Respondent did not disagree, but explained that he understood Agent Cummings already had done so and that he just made sure he was following Mrs. Paz's wishes. Concurring, Agent Cummings testified that he did explain the surrender charges to Mrs. Paz. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's actions "insulated M[r]s. P[az] from comparative financial counseling by her then current Jackson National insurance agent Gary Mahan." This was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. To the contrary, there was evidence that it was Mrs. Paz's choice to change agents, that Mr. Mahan knew about the change, and that he had no objection to the Respondent taking over for him as agent of record on the policy. The Petitioner also alleged that the Respondent "provided [Agent Cummings] with the Transamerica brokerage application, transfer forms and letter of instructions to transfer JNL 42A" to the Respondent as account representative. It was not proven that these documents were not mailed to Mrs. Paz in accordance with the Respondent's testimony. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of Mrs. Paz's Jackson National annuity and purchase of a Great American annuity was contrary to her best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Mrs. Paz testified that Agent Cummings initially told her she would have to pay the Respondent $1,500 as a fee for his services with respect to JNL-42a and later told her the fee would be $2,600. Agent Cummings testified that the Respondent told her what his fee would be during the telephone conversation on July 29, 2010. Regardless who told Mrs. Paz what the Respondent's fee would be, or what she was told it would be, Mrs. Paz made out a $2,607.28 check to Agent Cummings' company, Big Financial, on July 29, 2010. On August 2, 2010, Big Financial gave the Respondent a check made out to the Respondent for $2,530, with the notation "Paz." (It is not clear from the evidence why the Big Financial check was made out for $2,530. When the DFS investigator questioned the discrepancy, Agent Cummings reimbursed Mrs. Paz $77.28.) The Respondent deposited the check the next day. The Allianz compliance guide prohibited agents from charging an additional fee for services that customarily are associated with insurance products. The Great American compliance guide prohibited fraudulent acts. By accepting the check from Big Financial, the Respondent received a fee from Mrs. Paz that was not authorized. (Count VI) Prior to meeting Agent Cummings or the Respondent, Mrs. Paz had investment accounts with Wedbush (WB-37) and Wells Fargo. There were two Wells Fargo accounts, an IRA (WF-15), and a trust account (WF-70). As of June 30, 2010, the Wedbush account (WB-37) had a balance of $349,438.11. The Wells Fargo IRA account (WF-15) had a net value of $51,737.11 prior to June 30, 2010. The Wells Fargo trust account (WF-70) had a balance of $332,798.76 prior to June 2010. The Respondent and Mrs. Paz communicated in the same manner they did for the Jackson National transaction. Mrs. Paz signed forms that enabled the Respondent to transfer the funds in the Wedbush and Wells Fargo accounts into two Transamerica brokerage accounts (TA-02) and (TA-86) using ACAT. Some of the forms referred to the Respondent as Mrs. Paz's "investment professional," but the sole purpose of the Respondent's involvement was to use Transamerica as a funnel to transfer funds from one investment to another. By August 11, 2010, the funds in the TA-02 account were used to purchase an Allianz annuity sold by Agent Cummings in the amount of $335,589.65. The funds in the TA-86 account were used to purchase a Great American annuity (GA-60) sold by Agent Cummings in the amount of $45,769.38. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of Mrs. Paz's Wedbush and Wells Fargo accounts and purchase of an Allianz annuity was contrary to her best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. Counts VII and VIII-–The Penwardens Wayne Penwarden was born on December 4, 1943. His wife, Sandra, was born on October 10, 1939. They inherited some money and decided to invest it. As of August 31, 2009, they had Morgan Stanley investment accounts that totaled close to half a million dollars. They also had an annuity with ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company (ING) purchased for $150,000 on April 24, 2008. Agent Carter became acquainted with the Penwardens and introduced them to the Respondent. The Amended Administrative Complaint alleged that the Respondent provided required forms to Agent Carter for him to get the Penwardens signatures and, then, used funds from their Transamerica accounts to fund the purchase of Allianz annuities, which was deceitful and against the wishes of the Penwardens. The Petitioner's proposed recommended order proposed no such findings, and there was no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent was guilty of those acts, that he said or did anything to deceive or mislead or withhold information from them, or took any action regarding them without their full knowledge and consent. (Count VII) On September 30, 2009, the Penwardens signed a change of agent request to make the Respondent their new ING insurance agent. They also signed CAI forms to open Transamerica brokerage accounts and transfer the funds from the Morgan Stanley investment accounts into them, using ACAT. The funds in the Transamerica accounts were then used to purchase Allianz's indexed annuities sold to the Penwardens by Agent Carter. On September 23 and October 16, 2009, the Penwardens purchased two Allianz MasterDex X annuities (MD-47) and (MD-24), respectively, with initial premium payments of $141,269.40 for MD-47 and $373,979.59, plus a premium bonus of $37,397.96, for MD-24. On June 17, 2010, acting on instructions from Agent Carter on behalf of the Penwardens, the Respondent liquidated the ING annuity. On June 30, 2010, the Penwardens added the $115,281.47 proceeds from the liquidation of the ING annuity to MD-47. The Petitioner proposed a finding that the surrender of the ING annuity cost $6,000 in surrender charges, which is true. The Petitioner omits from its proposed finding that the Penwardens received a premium bonus on the Allianz policy that more than offset the ING surrender charge. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the liquidation of the Penwardens' Morgan Stanley accounts and ING annuity and purchase of Allianz annuities was contrary to their best interests, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. (Count VIII) The Penwardens became dissatisfied with Agent Carter, and on November 9, 2010, signed a letter drafted by the Respondent on Transamerica letterhead to substitute him for Agent Carter as their sole financial advisor. On November 12, 2010, the Respondent was notified by Allianz that he would receive no commissions as servicing agent on policies sold to the Penwardens by another agent. On or about November 22, 2010, $37,408.54 was transferred from the Allianz MD-47 annuity into a new Nationwide Life and Annuity Insurance Company (Nationwide or NW) annuity (NW-08). The Respondent also effected a partial Internal Revenue Code, section 1035, exchange from the MD-47 annuity to a new annuity purchased from Nationwide (NW-09) for $23,746.19. On November 7, 2011, the Respondent faxed a request to transfer funds from the MD-24 annuity to fund a North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American or NA) annuity (NA-68). The Petitioner proposed a finding that the Respondent undertook these transactions on November 22, 2010, and on November 7, 2011, in order to benefit himself alone by generating commissions to replace the servicing agent commissions he was not getting on the Allianz policies. This was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. To the contrary, the Respondent explained that the transactions were done for the Penwardens' benefit after discussions regarding the benefits of diversifying out of the Allianz annuity into other annuities, which was accomplished cost-free. There was no clear and convincing evidence that these transactions were contrary to the Penwardens' best financial interest or that they were done solely to benefit the Respondent. There was no expert testimony or other clear and convincing evidence that the partial transfers from the Penwardens' Allianz annuities to other Nationwide and North American annuities were contrary to their best interest, unsuitable, or in violation of suitability form or replacement notice requirements. In early December 2011, Mr. Penwarden replaced the Respondent with another insurance agent. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent went to the Penwardens home to harangue them for two hours about their decision to switch agents. The only evidence on this allegation was the deposition testimony of Mr. Penwarden and the testimony of the Respondent. Mr. Penwarden's testimony as to what occurred was vague. The Respondent agreed that he was disappointed that the Penwardens were switching agents, but testified that he went to the home to retrieve the policies he sold to the Penwardens, which would have to be returned to the insurance companies to cancel at no cost during the "free-look" period. He testified that he waited for an hour or more while Mr. Penwarden tried to find the policies in his home. The evidence was not clear and convincing, and the Petitioner did not propose a finding as to this allegation. Count IX and Related Affirmative Defenses Count IX is based on the Final Order entered in OFR's securities case against the Respondent as an additional ground for discipline under section 626.621(13), Florida Statutes. The Respondent cites it in his affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel on Counts I through VIII. See Finding 2, supra. The Respondent also argues that the additional charge is barred by the ex post facto clause of the Florida constitution and due process clauses of the United States and Florida constitutions. As to the due process argument, the Respondent admitted the OFR Final Order in his answer to the original charges. He also had ample opportunity to demonstrate prejudice from the added charge, which he could not, and to present legal arguments, which he did. As to ex post facto, section 626.621(13) was added to the Florida Statutes, effective June 1, 2011. See Ch. 175, §§ 47 and 53, Laws of Fla. (2010). That was before the Respondent entered into the Stipulation and Consent Agreement that formed the basis for the OFR Final Order. Disciplinary guidelines for section 626.621(13) were added to the Florida Administrative Code on March 24, 2014. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69B-231.090(13). As to the collateral estoppel defense, the Respondent testified that he entered into the settlement with OFR because he was under heightened supervision by his employer due to securities violations, and he did not think any employer wanted to provide the required supervision (which he referred to as "baby-sitting.") The Respondent did not testify that he relied on the OFR Final Order to bar charges by DFS or that he believed the OFR Final Order would bar DFS charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Agent and Agency Services, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating section 626.611(7) and rule 69B-215.210 under Count V, and section 626.621(13) under Count IX, dismissing the other charges, and suspending the Respondent's insurance licenses for 12 months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged by the Department of Financial Services in the Administrative Complaint dated May 27, 2009, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services ("Petitioner" or "the Department") has regulatory responsibility for Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2009), the insurance licensing procedures law. Respondent, Eileen P. Suarez ("Respondent" or "Suarez"), is a licensed general lines agent transacting in property and casualty insurance, under license number E129078. She operated and was the agent in charge of the Suarez Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Agency"), in Hialeah, Florida. The Agency held a valid state license from 7/21/2006 to 7/27/2009. The Department filed a three-count Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that she violated various provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. COUNT I John Vila is the president of Vila Home Group, Inc., a trucking company that is in the business of hauling sand, soil, and gravel. In April 2005, he purchased a dump truck and, at the suggestion of the dealer, contacted Suarez for insurance. Suarez sold Vila two insurance policies, for the period April 29, 2005 to April 29, 2006, one with AequiCap Insurance Company ("AequiCap") and the other with the Underwriters at Lloyds, London ("Lloyds"). The AequiCap Policy was a commercial liability insurance policy. The Lloyds Policy was a commercial automobile physical damage insurance policy. In March 2006, Vila gave Suarez a check in the amount of $10,876.41, made payable to the Agency to renew the AequiCap and Lloyds policies, for the period April 29, 2006 to April 29, 2007. The AequiCap policy quote was approximately $5,350.00. The Lloyds policy quote was approximately $5,500.00. The check was deposited in the Agency's trust account, but the Lloyds policy was allowed to expire on April 29, 2006, and was not renewed until October 26, 2006, creating a six-month gap in commercial automobile physical damage insurance coverage for Vila. When it was renewed, the Lloyds Policy cost $5,712.03. Vila's AequiCap policy expired on April 29, 2006, and was not renewed because Suarez failed to pay MAI Risk Management, AequiCap's managing general agent. The funds were not returned to Vila. While the March 2006 quotes were pending, the registered driver of the truck, Andres Vila, was involved in an accident and was at fault for hitting a wire. Rather than risk an increase in the pending insurance quotes, Vila paid Bellsouth $2,390.36 in damages. COUNT II On or about October 26, 2006, Suarez provided Vila a Certificate of Liability showing that the truck was insured with AequiCap, under policy number TC012695, and with Lloyds, under policy number R641440/0251, for the period April 29, 2006 to April 29, 2007. Vila was not insured under AequiCap policy number TC012695 from April 29, 2006 to April 29, 2007. The Certificate of Liability was a false document that Suarez created on her computer, printed, and gave to Vila. COUNT III Shelly, Middlebrooks & O'Leary, Inc. ("Shelly Middlebrooks") is a licensed insurance agency, located in Jacksonville, that acts as a general agent for multiple insurance companies. Suarez collected insufficient funds to include the premiums that were intended to be forwarded to Shelley Middlebrooks for policies to insure the following trucking companies: All Nations Logistics, LLC (Policy Number 486865); Jose Veiga, d/b/a JJ Freightways (Policy Number 486885); Gary Castle/Diamond Mine (Policy Number 74APN338354); and Nics Oil, Inc. (Policy Number 74APN401617). For each of the four companies, she requested and received binders for insurance from Shelly Middlebrooks, followed by invoices for the premiums that were to have been paid within ten days of the date the invoices were received. In each instance, Suarez did not pay Shelly Middlebrooks, which cancelled the policies for non-payment of the premium. It also obtained a default judgment in the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida, that requires Suarez to pay it the outstanding balances due for the four policies and a $25 insufficient funds check fee, for a total of $8,335.60, which she has been unable to pay. Instead of paying for insurance, Suarez used most of the funds she collected to pay for various other corporate expenses for the same trucking companies, including state and federal government filings for intrastate or interstate travel that were prerequisites to their becoming insurable. Suarez expected to collect the additional funds needed for insurance later, but the clients, the owners of the trucking companies, did not pay her. Suarez admits that she failed her clients in 2006, after her father's death in February 2006. She realized the Vila errors and tried to correct them in October. The Agency is now closed. Suarez's husband has been unemployed for over a year, and their home is in foreclosure. She is receiving social security disability payments and has insufficient funds to file for bankruptcy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Financial Services: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 626.611(7), (8) and (10); Subsection 626.561(1); and Subsections 626.621(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 626.611(7) and (8); Subsection 626.621(6); and Subsection 626.9541 (1)(e)1., Florida Statutes, as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint; Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 626.611(7), (8) and (10); Subsection 626.561(1); and Subsections 626.621(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count III of the Amended Complaint; Revoking Respondent's licenses and appointments issued or granted under or pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code; Ordering Respondent to make restitution to John Vila in the amount of $5,164.38; and Ordering Respondent to make restitution to Shelly Middlebrooks & O'Leary in the amount of $8,335.60. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to be reimbursed for its attorney's fees incurred in the underlying proceeding.
Findings Of Fact On December 31, 1997, Respondent Department of Insurance issued its Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order, alleging that Petitioner And Justice for All, Inc., d/b/a Legal Club of America, was engaged in the legal expense insurance business without being properly licensed, and Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing regarding that Notice of Intent. That cause was thereafter transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 98-0442. Prior to the scheduled evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that there remained no genuine issues of material fact and that the controversy could be resolved based upon an agreed record, a joint pre-hearing stipulation, and proposed recommended orders. After the submission of those documents, a Recommended Order was entered on February 3, 2000, finding that Petitioner was not selling legal expense insurance and, therefore, was not subject to regulation by the Department. On May 2, 2000, the Department entered its Final Order modifying portions of the Recommended Order and finding that Petitioner was selling legal expense insurance and was subject to regulation by the Department. Petitioner appealed that Final Order. On September 26, 2001, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, filed its Opinion finding that the Department improperly rejected the holdings in the Recommended Order, reversing the Department's Final Order, and remanding the cause for entry of an order consistent with its Opinion. On January 11, 2002, the Department entered its Amended Final Order determining that Petitioner was not selling legal expense insurance and was not subject to regulation by the Department. On May 1, 2002, Petitioner filed its Motion for Attorney's Fees in this cause seeking an award for fees incurred in the underlying proceeding in the amount of $7,500, pursuant to Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. On May 14, 2002, the Department filed its Response to Motion for Attorney's Fees, alleging that the Department does not dispute the factual or legal basis for Petitioner's Motion and further alleging that the Department has no objection to the Motion being granted.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.003(1)(c) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Parties ATIF was established in 1948 by Florida lawyers in order to provide title insurance services to their clients. ATIF has over 6,000 member agents, all of whom are members of the Florida Bar issuing title insurance in private practice. ATIF issues policies exclusively through its member agents. Stewart Title is a title insurer operating in all 50 states. Stewart Title issues title insurance policies in Florida directly, through affiliated companies, and through independent agents. First American is a title insurer operating throughout the United States. It offers the JLP in states other than Florida, and sells the product directly, through independent agents, and through affiliated agents. As of 2007, approximately 27% of First American's business was written directly. The Financial Services Commission (the "Commission") serves as the agency head of OIR for purposes that include rulemaking. The Commission comprises the Governor, Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer, and Commissioner of Agriculture. § 20.121(3) and (3)(c), Fla. Stat. OIR is a structural unit of the Commission responsible for all activities concerning insurers and other risk bearing entities, including but not limited to licensing, rates and policy forms. The head of OIR is the Director, also known as the Commissioner of Insurance Regulation. § 20.121(3)(a)1, Fla. Stat. The JLP Title insurance is purchased to insure the purchaser (or his lender) against disputes regarding the ownership of a given piece of real property. Title insurance guarantees the transferability of the title to real property. The JLP is title insurance intended to cover "junior" mortgages, which include second mortgages and home equity loans. The JLP is intended to be less comprehensive and less expensive than a traditional owner's or lender's primary title insurance policy. The JLP ensures that the borrower is the last grantee of record for the property being used as collateral for the loan. It ensures that the tax payments are current, insures against any liens on the property, and ensures that the legal description on the policy is the same legal description found on the last deed of record.2 The JLP is not authorized for sale in the state of Florida because OIR has yet to approve a premium rate for this type of title insurance. As more fully explained below, ATIF and First American filed petitions in 2003 seeking OIR's approval of the forms and rates necessary for the issuance of the JLP, pursuant to Section 627.782, Florida Statutes. The Statute and Proposed Rule Title insurance contracts generally are governed by Chapter 627, Part XIII, Florida Statutes. Section 627.7711, Florida Statutes, provides the following definitions: As used in this part, the term: (1)(a) "Closing services" means services performed by a licensed title insurer, title insurance agent or agency, or attorney agent in the agent's or agency's capacity as such, including, but not limited to, preparing documents necessary to close the transaction, conducting the closing, or handling the disbursing of funds related to the closing in a real estate closing transaction in which a title insurance commitment or policy is to be issued. (b) "Primary title services" means determining insurability in accordance with sound underwriting practices based upon evaluation of a reasonable title search or a search of the records of a Uniform Commercial Code filing office and such other information as may be necessary, determination and clearance of underwriting objections and requirements to eliminate risk, preparation and issuance of a title insurance commitment setting forth the requirements to insure, and preparation and issuance of the policy. Such services do not include closing services or title searches, for which a separate charge or separate charges may be made. "Premium" means the charge, as specified by rule of the commission, that is made by a title insurer for a title insurance policy, including the charge for performance of primary title services by a title insurer or title insurance agent or agency, and incurring the risks incident to such policy, under the several classifications of title insurance contracts and forms, and upon which charge a premium tax is paid under s. 624.509. As used in this part or in any other law, with respect to title insurance, the word "premium" does not include a commission. "Title insurer" means any domestic company organized and authorized to do business under the provisions of chapter 624, for the purpose of issuing title insurance, or any insurer organized under the laws of another state, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country and holding a certificate of authority to transact business in this state, for the purpose of issuing title insurance. "Title search" means the compiling of title information from official or public records.[3] Section 627.782, Florida Statutes, titled "Adoption of Rates," provides as follows: Subject to the rating provisions of this code, the commission must adopt a rule specifying the premium to be charged in this state by title insurers for the respective types of title insurance contracts and, for policies issued through agents or agencies, the percentage of such premium required to be retained by the title insurer which shall not be less than 30 percent. However, in a transaction subject to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. ss. 2601 et seq., as amended, no portion of the premium attributable to providing a primary title service shall be paid to or retained by any person who does not actually perform or is not liable for the performance of such service. In adopting premium rates, the commission must give due consideration to the following: The title insurers' loss experience and prospective loss experience under closing protection letters and policy liabilities. A reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies, including contingent liability under s. 627.7865, sufficient to allow title insurers, agents, and agencies to earn a rate of return on their capital that will attract and retain adequate capital investment in the title insurance business and maintain an efficient title insurance delivery system. Past expenses and prospective expenses for administration and handling of risks. Liability for defalcation. Other relevant factors. Rates may be grouped by classification or schedule and may differ as to class of risk assumed. Rates may not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. The premium applies to each $100 of insurance issued to an insured. The premium rates apply throughout this state. The commission shall, in accordance with the standards provided in subsection (2), review the premium as needed, but not less frequently than once every 3 years, and shall, based upon the review required by this subsection, revise the premium if the results of the review so warrant. The commission may, by rule, require licensees under this part to annually submit statistical information, including loss and expense data, as the department determines to be necessary to analyze premium rates, retention rates, and the condition of the title insurance industry. Section 627.783, Florida Statutes, titled "Rate deviation," provides as follows: A title insurer may petition the office for an order authorizing a specific deviation from the adopted premium. The petition shall be in writing and sworn to and shall set forth allegations of fact upon which the petitioner will rely, including the petitioner's reasons for requesting the deviation. Any authorized title insurer, agent, or agency may join in the petition for like authority to deviate or may file a separate petition praying for like authority or opposing the deviation. The office shall rule on all such petitions simultaneously. If, in the judgment of the office, the requested deviation is not justified, the office may enter an order denying the petition. An order granting a petition constitutes an amendment to the adopted premium as to the petitioners named in the order, and is subject to s. 627.782. Section 627.7843, Florida Statutes, titled "Ownership and encumbrance reports," provides as follows: As used in this section, the term "ownership and encumbrance report" means a report that discloses certain defined documents imparting constructive notice and appearing in the official records relating to specified real property. An ownership and encumbrance report may not directly or indirectly set forth or imply any opinion, warranty, guarantee, insurance, or other similar assurance as to the status of title to real property. Any ownership and encumbrance report or similar report that is relied on or intended to be relied on by a consumer must be on forms approved by the office, and must provide for a maximum liability for incorrect information of not more than $1,000. On April 11, 2003, First American filed with OIR a petition for approval of title insurance policy forms, including schedules and endorsements thereto, previously approved by ALTA, for the issuance of the JLP in Florida, subject to a rate determination pursuant to Section 676.782, Florida Statutes. The petition asserted that First American had established historical data reflecting an "almost negligible default rate" for such policies, and that the growing market for "no-cost" or "low-cost" home equity loans and junior loans had led many institutional lenders to seek a product such as the JLP that could be provided quickly, accurately, and at a reasonable cost to the lender or borrower. First American did not suggest a specific premium rate for its proposed JLP.4 On or about April 14, 2003, ATIF filed with OIR a "petition for rulemaking setting title insurance rates." ATIF's petition sought approval of forms previously adopted by ALTA. Unlike the First American petition, the ATIF petition requested a specific premium rate, in the following terms: Based on the high-demand and low anticipated claims rates for this type of coverage, Petitioner estimates that a rate equal to 30% of the rate premiums presently promulgated for a mortgage title insurance policy pursuant to Rule 4-186.003, F.A.C.[5] with a minimum premium of $100.00 per policy, will provide a reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies, including contingent liability as provided in [Section 627.7865, Florida Statutes],[6] such as to allow a rate of return on capital that will attract and retain adequate capital investments in the title insurance business and maintain an efficient title insurance delivery system. In support of such rate, Petitioner would show as follows: The Petitioner's low prospective loss experience under the proposed policy. The Petitioner's low expenses and low prospective expenses for administration and handling of risks. The proposed premium will be $1.725 per $1,000 of coverage up to and including $100,000, and $1.50 per $1,000 of coverage in excess of $100,000, up to and including $250,000 of maximum coverage, with a minimum premium of $100.00. This proposed rate will not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, and will apply throughout the State of Florida. This proposed rate will be subject to the Respondent's review not less frequently than once every three (3) years, and may be revised based on such review. By letter dated June 13, 2003, OIR informed ATIF that it agreed the rulemaking process should be initiated in this matter, and that OIR would hold workshops to gather information as to the propriety of the rate suggested by ATIF. OIR's letter notified ATIF that OIR neither approved nor disapproved of the forms submitted by ATIF at that time, pending receipt of sufficient data at the workshops to permit OIR to make an informed decision. By letter dated June 23, 2003, ATIF's senior underwriting counsel, Ted Conner, informed OIR that ATIF did not dispute OIR's decision to initiate the rulemaking process and postpone approval of ATIF's forms. Following receipt of the First American and ATIF petitions and the decision to initiate the rulemaking process, OIR commissioned The David Cox Company to prepare an actuarial report (the "Cox Report") on the rates and forms for the proposed JLP. OIR general counsel Steven Parton recalled that Mr. Cox was hired to provide "an independent look" at the two proposed rates. Mr. Cox requested information from ATIF and First American. ATIF responded with detailed answers to Mr. Cox' questions as well as to follow-up questions from OIR concerning the scope of services required to make the determination of insurability under the JLP and the events that might trigger a claim under such a policy.7 The Cox Report, dated September 2003, and provided to OIR on November 24, 2003, made the following relevant recommendations: the ALTA Residential Limited Coverage Junior Loan Policy form, the Short Form Limited Coverage Junior Loan Policy and endorsements JR1 and JR2, all dated 10/19/96, should be adopted; eligibility for the JLP should be restricted to institutional lenders, to land having 1-4 residential units, and to loan amounts less than or equal to $250,000; and that the JLP premium should be no lower than $2.00 per $1,000 of liability and no higher than $2.60 per $1,000 of liability. The premium for a standard title insurance policy is $5.75 per thousand of liability. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69O-186.003(1)(a). Mr. Cox justified his premium recommendation in summary as follows: My recommended Junior Loan Policy risk rate of $2.00 to $2.60 is a 55% to 65% discount off of the owner's policy risk rate. The discount is based on judgment considering the relatively low level of expense and loss for the Junior Loan Policy, other Florida risk rate discounts and rates used in other states. The proposed rates should not result in inadequate compensation to insurers operating through independent agents. The Cox Report was conceptually based on a comparison of the JLP to a standard title insurance policy. Mr. Cox ultimately made an actuarial judgment as to the proper discount based on the reduced coverage, the fact that eligibility would be restricted to low cost, low risk title transactions, and the reduced expenses associated with the JLP. Mr. Cox concluded his report as follows: The Junior Loan Policy is a new product in Florida and out-of-state experience is incomplete and in some respects is not comparable. By necessity judgment must be used to set the Junior Loan Policy risk rate. This section will examine the consequences of setting an initial risk rate that is either too high or too low. The title insurance industry tends to view lenders as customers and not land owners [as customers]. This is because lenders are constant business associates while owners come and go. State and Federal laws prohibit rebating to lenders and other middlemen. Rebating drives up the cost of title insurance for the land owner. Rates for the junior loan policy that are set too low would act as a rebate to the lenders who pay the Junior Loan Policy premium directly. Furthermore, title insurers do not intend to track the expenses of the junior loan policy versus the owner's policy and any subsidy of the junior loan policy rates by the owner's policy rates will never be detected and corrected. Florida case law has upheld the rebating of commissions by title insurance agents (the agent's 70% share of the risk premium).[8] The rebating of related title services is not permitted under [Florida Administrative Code Rule 4-186.003(13)(a)][9] in that related title services cannot be provided below actual cost. Assuming there is competition in the junior loan title insurance segment, there would be little error in having a somewhat high risk rate because rebating commissions would adjust the risk rate downward.[10] This assumption does not, however, apply to policies written directly buy [sic] an insurer, in which case there is no commission to rebate. There are currently no insurers operating primarily on a direct basis in Florida . . . The primary consumer for the Junior Loan Policy is the lender. The second mortgage lender is concerned with low closing costs and usually pays the title insurance premium directly. Lenders have much more bargaining power than borrowers as regards title insurance premiums. Price competition for the Junior Loan Policy is expected to be strong and lenders should be able to obtain rebates on commissions and discounts on related title services. A critical part of title insurance risk rate is that part retained by insurers operating through independent agents. This segment's only source of revenue is the 30% retained risk rate. Agents, attorneys, insurers operating through owned agencies, insurers writing directly and insurers providing related title services can supplement their revenues with related title service fees, which are essentially unregulated. Two prominent Florida title insurers, United General Title Insurance Company and Alliance Title of America, Inc. rely predominantly on the insurer's portion of the risk premium. These companies could sustain a net operating loss on Junior Loan Policy business if the risk rate is set too low. There is a range of reasonable risk rates for the Junior Loan Policy. A rate set on the high end of this range would avoid hurting insurers operating through independent agents while not necessarily hurting others. Setting a flat risk rate rather than a series of risk rates that decrease with the amount of liability further provides support for insurers operating through independent agents. Subsequent to the issuance of the Cox Report, First American commissioned Milliman USA to prepare an actuarial report (the "Milliman Report") regarding rates and forms for the JLP. The Milliman Report, written by actuary Paul Struzzieri, was dated February 2004. The Milliman Report concurred with the Cox Report as to the ALTA forms that should be adopted, and that eligibility for the JLP should be restricted to land having 1-4 residential units. As to rates, the Milliman Report recommended that the JLP premium should be no lower than $0.86 per $1000 of liability, and no higher than $1.33 per $1000 of liability, and recommended a cap of $500,000 on the junior mortgage loan. In his report, Mr. Struzzieri took a different conceptual approach from that taken by Mr. Cox, who compared the JLP to a standard title insurance policy to arrive at a judgment of how much the standard policy's rate should be discounted to arrive at a fair JLP rate. Mr. Struzzieri believed that a more valid JLP rate could be derived from viewing the rates charged for JLPs in other states, and by comparison to the rates charged in Florida for the Ownership and Encumbrance ("O&E") reports described in Section 627.7843, Florida Statutes, which is set forth in full at Finding of Fact 9, supra. Mr. Struzzieri explained his proposed rates as follows: The rationale for my proposed rates is two- fold. The Junior Loan Policy has less risk than the Original Title Insurance Policy. The reduced risk comes from reduced levels of coverage and the elimination of defalcation claims. . . . Because there is less coverage, there is significantly less work involved in preparing and issuing a Junior Loan Policy. The following sections describe the support for the Junior Loan Policy losses (associated with reduced risk) and expenses (associated with reduced work load). I believe that these reduced amounts are reflective of the costs underlying a Junior Loan Policy by comparison to (a) rates for Junior Loan Policies in other states and rates for the Ownership and Encumbrance (O&E) report, to which the Junior Loan Policy coverage is most compatible. Reduced Risk As shown in the Cox report, losses are approximately 4% to 7% of the rate in Florida. . . . The current rate for an Original Title Insurance Policy (Owner or Lender) is $5.75 per $1,000 of liability. At a 5% loss ratio, losses would equal approximately $0.30 per $1,000 of liability. In First American's August 15, 2003, response to Cox's request for information regarding the Junior Loan Policy, a loss rate of $0.03 per $1,000 of liability is assumed. I believe that this is a reasonable estimate of the loss potential for the Junior Loan Policy, based on my attached analysis. . . .[11] This represents a 90% decrease in the losses underlying the Original Title Insurance Policy rates. The proposed Junior Loan Policy rates are 74% to 85% lower than the $5.75 rate, lower percentages than that indicated by the loss experience (i.e., 90%).[12] I believe that this comparison is illustrative of the magnitude of the reduced coverage and, therefore, the reduced effort and expense involved in issuing a Junior Loan Policy. Reduced Work In Florida, "primary title services" are included in the rate and are defined to include: determination of insurability in accordance with sound underwriting practices based upon evaluation of a reasonable search and examination of the title, determination and clearance of underwriting objections and requirements to eliminate risk, preparation and issuance of a title insurance commitment setting forth the requirements to insure, and preparation and issuance of the policy. The amount of work involved in issuing a Junior Loan Policy is greatly reduced because of the reduced coverage. In addition, the risk is reduced because of certain services that are generally performed by the lender. As an example of reduced work, a Junior Loan Policy insures against losses related to the borrower not being the same as the grantee in the last recorded deed. In order to determine insurability for a Junior Loan Policy, one must review the search to verify that the borrower is the grantee in the last deed of record. In addition, one must determine that the land described in the policy is the same as the land described in the deed to the borrower. To clear underwriting objections and eliminate risk, one must review the search results from the public records to verify that there are no liens against that borrower and that real estate taxes are current. As an example of reduced risk, I point out that the home equity lender generally performs the closing and disbursement functions. Therefore, most of the costs associated with these functions are borne by the lender and not the Junior Loan Policy issuer. Since neither the agent nor underwriter is involved in disbursing the funds, the defalcation element of the premium is eliminated. Mr. Struzzieri believed that the O&E report is the product most comparable to the JLP and therefore the one most likely to yield a reasonable rate: While the above discussion illustrates the minimal level of work involved in issuing a Junior Loan Policy, it is difficult to quantify the cost of this work because solid expense data is not available. Therefore, it is appropriate to compare the Junior Loan Policy to an O&E report. Essentially, the level of work involved in issuing a Junior Loan Policy is the same as the work performed for an O&E report. The majority of home equity loan transactions in Florida are currently closed using an O&E report. The cost of an O&E report to the lender is typically between $60 and $100 (this includes the cost of a search, which for the Junior Loan Policy would be an additional charge). Anecdotally, the O&E report is purported to be profitable to the companies in this business. For the $75,000 home equity loan used by Cox in the exhibits to his report, the premium for the Junior Loan Policy at the lower proposed rate ($0.86 per $1,000 of liability) would be $64.50[,] just above the low end of the range of O&E costs. Although the Junior Loan Policy provides broader coverage than the O&E report in Florida, the loss portion of the rate is small (estimated at $0.03 earlier in this report). Therefore, we conclude that my proposed rate (lower bound) of $0.86 is appropriate in Florida. The higher bound proposed rate ($1.33) would produce a premium of $99.75 in this example[,] equal to the high end of the range of O&E costs. As mentioned earlier, the cost associated with a search would be added onto the $99.75 premium. Therefore, I believe that any rate higher than $1.33 would be excessive. Unlike the Cox Report, the Milliman Report did not expressly consider the impact of an insurer's business model in the rate determination. Mr. Cox noted that setting a rate at the high end of his reasonable range "would avoid hurting insurers operating through independent agents while not necessarily hurting others." Mr. Struzzieri made no assessment of the impact his proposed rate would have on title insurers that operate through independent agents. This impact is of great concern to ATIF because it operates exclusively through independent agents, and because Subsection 627.782(1), Florida Statutes, permits the agent to retain as much as 70% of the premium. On April 30, 2004, OIR published proposed JLP rules establishing a JLP premium rate of $1.33 per $1000 of liability. Florida Administrative Weekly, vol. 30, no. 18, pp. 1788-1790. OIR general counsel Steven Parton testified that this rate was based on the Milliman Report and on "what we thought was an understanding among insurers that $1.33 per $1,000 would be acceptable to everybody. That turned out not to be true." Mr. Parton recalled that ATIF did not find the $1.33 rate acceptable.13 On September 10, 2004, OIR published a "Notice of Withdrawal" of those proposed rules. Florida Administrative Weekly, vol. 30, no. 37, p. 3784. In a letter to Ted Conner of ATIF dated August 17, 2004, OIR deputy director Lisa K. Miller explained OIR's decision to withdraw the proposed JLP rule as follows, in pertinent part: Thank you for working with the Office during the investigation of the proposed junior loan title product and the development of proposed rule drafts. At this time the Office has determined not to adopt the requested junior loan title product. Applicable statutory provisions do not specifically grant legislative authority for a rule adopting the JLP product, as required by FL Board of Medicine v. FL Academy of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc., 808 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Additionally, Section 627.784, Florida Statutes prohibits casualty title insurance such as the JLP product.[14] Adoption of this proposed rule would therefore be arbitrary, capricious, and not reasonably related to any statue that could possibly enable the Office to adopt the JLP through a rule, in contravention of Joseph v. Henderson, 834 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). . . . By Order dated May 20, 2005, OIR approved First American's use of the ALTA Residential Limited Coverage Junior Loan Policy form, with Florida modifications, and endorsement form JR1, both dated 10/19/96. On June 3, 2005, OIR published proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.003 with a proposed rate of $0.86 per $1000 of liability written. Florida Administrative Weekly, vol. 31, no. 22, pp. 2029-2030. This version of the proposed rule was held to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, but only on the procedural ground that OIR had published the rule without the approval of the Commission as the agency head. Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. and Florida Land Title Association, Inc. v. Financial Services Commission and Office of Insurance Regulation, Case No. 05-2630RP (DOAH May 17, 2006). OIR filed its notice of appeal of the summary final order in Case No. 05-2630RP to the First District Court of Appeal, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal on March 23, 2007. On June 12, 2007, the Commission approved for publication proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.003, again proposing a rate of $0.86 per $1,000 of liability written. The full text of the Proposed Rule is as follows: 69O-186.003 Title Insurance Rates. The following are risk rate premiums to be charged by title insurers in this state for the respective types of title insurance contracts. To compute any insurance premium on a fractional thousand of insurance (except as to minimum premiums), multiply such fractional thousand by the rate per thousand applicable, considering any fraction of $100.00 as a full $100.00. (1)(a) and (b) No change. For junior loan title insurance: The premium for junior loan title insurance shall be: $0.86 per $1,000.00 of liability written; The minimum premium shall be $50.00; The minimum insurer retention shall be 30%. This rate is approved for use with the following junior loan title insurance policy forms, copies of which are available on the Office's website www.floir.com: ALTA Residential Limited Coverage Junior Loan Policy (10/19/96)(with Florida Modifications) and ALTA Endorsement JR 1 (10/19/96); ALTA Short Form Residential Limited Coverage Junior Loan Policy (10/19/96)(with Florida Modifications), and ALTA Endorsement JR 1 (10/19/96); and Any substantially similar product that insures the same type risk. This rate does not include the $25.00 premium that shall be charged when issuing the optional ALTA Endorsement JR 2 (Revolving Credit/Variable Rate)(10/19/96) on a junior loan title insurance policy, as provided for in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.005(6)(c).[15] Eligibility for the junior loan policy shall be restricted to the following: The insured title is for land having 1-4 residential units; The junior loan must be a second or subsequent mortgage loan and must meet the definitional requirements of a "federally related mortgage loan", as defined in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. s. 2602, which is incorporated by reference and a copy is available from the Office; The junior mortgage loan amount is less than or equal to $500,000; No junior loan policy may be issued for an amount less than the full junior loan principal debt. (2) through (12) No change. On June 22, 2007, OIR published the notice of the Proposed Rule. As specific authority for the Proposed Rule, the notice cited Sections 624.308, 626.9611, 627.777, 627.782, and 627.793, Florida Statutes. The notice stated that the Proposed Rule would implement the following: Subsections 624.307(1), 626.9541(1)(h)3.a., Sections 627.777, 627.782, 627.783, 627.7831, 627.7841, 627.7845, and Subsection 697.04(1), Florida Statutes. OIR held a rule development workshop on July 24, 2007. On November 14, 2007, the Commission approved the Proposed Rule for final adoption. Petitioners' claim The Petition notes that Subsection 627.782(1), Florida Statutes, provides that at least 30% of the proposed JLP premium must be retained by the title insurer. ATIF asserts (without contradiction at the hearing) that the Legislature established this 30% minimum retention to ensure that market pressures, such as competition to attract and keep agents, do not lead title insurers to retain less premium than necessary to maintain their economic viability. Florida title insurers generally retain only the minimum 30% of the premium due to competition for agents. At the hearing, Petitioners presented a breakdown of the division of premium that would occur with the sale of a $100,000 policy if the JLP premium were set at $0.86 per $1,000. Out of a total premium of $86.00, the title insurer would receive $25.80. From this premium, the insurer must cover its expenses for issuing the JLP, generate a profit sufficient to attract and retain adequate capital investment, and set aside reserves to pay for claims. Petitioners noted that Subsection 625.111(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires title insurers to maintain a guaranty fund of $0.30 per $1,000 of net retained liability for policies written or title liability assumed in reinsurance. On a $100,000 policy, the title insurer would be required to place $30.00 into the guaranty fund. Petitioners also noted that Section 624.509, Florida Statutes, requires title insurers to pay a premium tax of 1.75% of their gross receipts on each policy. The insurer is liable for the tax on the full premium, even though the insurer actually retains only 30% of that amount. On a $100,000 policy with a premium of $86.00, the premium tax paid by the insurer would therefore be $1.51. Petitioners concluded that when the statutory liabilities ($30.00 guaranty fund and $1.51 premium tax) are deducted from the title insurer's 30% share of the $86.00 premium, the title insurer would actually lose $5.71 on a $100,000 policy. This deficit would have to be covered by funds from the insurer's general operating budget. Mr. Conner, now ATIF's vice president and associate general counsel, testified that the $5.71 per policy loss does not address other underwriting costs, such as policy processing, the cost of operating the claims department, the general overhead of running a large business, or the return on capital required under Subsection 627.782(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioners also offered evidence that the overall cost of performing the services associated with a JLP policy would greatly exceed the premium generated by the $0.86 per $1,000 rate. Mr. Conner spoke at the July 2007, workshop and tried to explain that the proposed JLP rate would not cover the expense of providing primary title services. OIR general counsel Steve Parton responded that OIR had no hard data on the cost of those functions and thus had no way of incorporating ATIF's concerns into the proposed rate. In an attempt to quantify the cost of providing primary title services for a JLP policy, Mr. Conner directed his central Florida branch staff to randomly16 select five residential properties on which a hypothetical second mortgage would be sought and to conduct a search and examination of title consistent with issuing a JLP. This analysis yielded the conclusion that primary title services, including labor costs, for a JLP policy cost a little over $100 per policy. If overhead is included, the total costs are approximately $150 per policy. Mr. Conner testified that the cost of performing these primary title services would be constant regardless of the size of the policy, and that they would have to be paid from the agent's maximum 70% share of the premium.17 On a $100,000 policy, the agent's share of the premium based on a rate of $0.86 per $1,000 would be $60.20. Mr. Conner further testified that a rate sufficient to cover the cost of the primary title services and provide a reasonable profit would be very close to the $2.00 to $2.60 range recommended by the Cox Report. Mr. Conner concluded that the agent's share would be "wholly inadequate" to compensate him for the work he must do. Mr. Conner testified that a number of ATIF's member agents represent lenders such as credit unions and community banks, and these agents will be issuing policies on second mortgages issued by those institutions. ATIF is concerned that the inadequate rate proposed by OIR could lead agents to issue the JLP without performing all the necessary title services, which would naturally increase ATIF's claims experience.18 Mr. Conner concluded that any title company offering the JLP at $0.86 per $1000 of liability, even by selling the product directly, would be offering it as a loss leader to obtain customers for other products. Petitioners contend that OIR's proposed adoption of the $0.86 per $1000 premium rate for the JLP fails to give "due consideration" to the specific ratemaking criteria set forth in Subsection 627.782(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioners contend that the proposed premium is plainly inadequate and insufficient for the JLP to exist as a self-sustaining product, and will thus require the title insurer to supplement issuance of the JLP with premium dollars collected on its other title insurance policies. Petitioners note that such a drain on premiums for these other policies was not contemplated when those policies' rates were adopted. Petitioners contend that the evidence establishes that OIR and the Commission have failed to consider the impact of the proposed premium rate on title insurance agents, including the adequacy of the rate in paying for the cost of primary title services connected with the JLP, and the agents' ability to earn a rate of return on their capital that will attract and retain adequate capital investment in the title insurance business and maintain an efficient title insurance delivery system, as required by Subsection 627.782(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Finally, Petitioners contend that the proposed JLP rule is vague and ambiguous because it provides that the JLP premium is approved for use with the named ALTA policies or with "[a]ny substantially similar product that insures the same type risk," but does not define the term "substantially similar product." OIR's response OIR's position is that it fulfilled its statutory ratemaking obligations under Subsection 627.082(2)(b), Florida Statutes, and made a rational decision to rely on the Milliman Report and the opinion of Mr. Struzzieri. Mr. Parton conceded the apparent anomaly of rejecting the OIR-commissioned, independent actuarial report of Mr. Cox in favor of a report commissioned by and based entirely on information provided to the actuary by a single company, First American. Mr. Parton also offered considered reasons for the agency's rejection of its own actuarial report. Mr. Parton testified that OIR had a number of concerns with the Cox Report. In the first place, Mr. Cox' fundamental premise regarding Florida law was inaccurate: OIR is not required to "create a rate that would fit everybody's business model." The rate promulgated by OIR need not be sufficient to guarantee profits to companies operating through agents. OIR believed that the Cox Report placed undue emphasis on setting a rate amenable to companies that worked only through agents and disregarded companies that perform direct sales even though the JLP, because it is a simple transaction, is tailored toward a direct business approach. Mr. Parton believed that Mr. Cox should have focused on a company such as First American, which was actually selling the JLP in other states and presumably could provide actual market data for use in recommending a rate. OIR also took issue with Mr. Cox' preference for setting the rate on the high side of the recommended range. The Cox Report noted that agents are free to rebate part of the rate to their customers. Relying on a rebate scheme to bring down rates hides the real cost of title insurance from both the consumer and regulator, and introduces unfair discrimination because not everyone will be able to take advantage of the rebate. OIR concluded that the existence of a rebate scheme constitutes an admission that the rate is excessive. OIR also suggested that ATIF's concern about not being able to cover expenses from the insurer's 30% share of premium could be solved by the insurer taking a greater share of the premium. OIR believed that the conceptual approach of the Milliman Report was more sound, because the agency was persuaded that the JLP bears much more resemblance to an O&E report than to a primary title insurance policy. Mr. Parton testified that during discussions with industry representatives, he had raised the question whether the JLP was really a title insurance product at all. Mr. Parton felt that the JLP was really "an [O&E] report that is trying to be dignified to the level of actually being an insurance policy, whereas an [O&E] report as it is set out in statute is not for the purposes of insurance and has a limit I believe of $1,000 for which you can make any claim against that report. Yet here we were with essentially a product that did nothing more than create an [O&E] report." OIR believed that the Milliman Report made more sense than the Cox Report because the former treated the product as OIR saw it: an O&E report with an insurance product attached. Mr. Parton pointed out that both reports relied on a great deal of actuarial judgment because the JLP is a new product to Florida. Mr. Cox arrived at his recommended rate by discounting a standard title insurance policy, whereas Mr. Struzzieri chose to rely on the costs and loss experience of a company that is actually writing this type of policy in other states. OIR concluded that the Milliman Report more consistently reflected the risk associated with the policy and the policy's intent to deal with simple transactions. Mr. Parton testified that OIR considered the statutory "reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies" ratemaking factor through its reliance on the Milliman Report's analysis of O&E reports. By assuming that the costs embedded in an O&E report are covered by the price First American charges for that product, and then assuming that the cost of producing a JLP would be similar to the costs of producing an O&E report, Mr. Struzzieri was able to arrive at the concluding assumption that $0.86 per $1,000 of coverage would provide a reasonable level of profit for the JLP. OIR accepted the Milliman Report's conclusions without further inquiry into the data upon which Mr. Stuzzieri relied. Mr. Parton testified that OIR did consider all the business models in the industry, but finally chose to go with the lowest rate proposed: [T]he OIR and the Governor and Cabinet in looking at the business models, [ATIF] is a strictly agent-driven entity; that is to say, all sales are through agents. First American as well as [Fidelity National Title Insurance Company], who also sells this product and is not contesting this rate, use a combination of sales through independent agents, affiliated agencies, which are owned, if you will, by the company in direct writing. [The JLP] is a product that frankly lends itself greatly to direct writing, particularly since what you're talking about is essentially simple transactions as opposed to major transfers of title of property. So at the end of the day, in looking at what is going on, we're looking at a company, actually two companies, who are actually selling this product nationwide, have a business model which allows them to write direct, which we believe and I think it's reported reduces costs, and a company who does it strictly through agents and who is not selling this product and has never sold this product . . . [OIR] and [the Commission] in our recommendation and explanation has [sic] come to the conclusion that we have an ability here to actually set a rate that significantly lowers cost in at least limited circumstances. We have a company who is actually engaged in the business of selling this, and we have a company who has proposed a rate and had said, "I can write this rate and make a profit at 86 cents." So ultimately the decision was to go with that particular matter. Thus, OIR's position on giving "due consideration" to the ratemaking factor of "reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies" found at Subsection 627.782(2)(b), Florida Statutes, as explicated by Mr. Parton, is that the statute allows OIR to set the rate at the lowest level at which any one company's actuary concludes it can make a profit.19 If the rate is set any higher, then the company that could have made a profit at the lower rate will be charging an excessive rate, to the detriment of policyholders. Mr. Parton testified that OIR was "not setting the rate for the industry as a whole. . . . I'm setting the rate we believe . . . meets all the requirements of the law, which may not be for the industry as a whole, but in fact can be adjusted if needed." OIR set great store in the fact that the $0.86 per $1,000 rate was proposed by "someone who actually engages in that business, who has engaged an actuary to take a look at the rate based upon the factors of the company who is actually doing it, and they use a direct business model." ATIF is not marketing this product anywhere in the country, and may never market it with its totally agent- generated business model. Mr. Parton stated that "due consideration was given by the fact that the insurers that are actually doing business in this matter have a business model which puts less emphasis on agent generated business and more on direct writing . . .". Mr. Parton noted that one factor leading to the adoption of the proposed rate was the availability of the "rate deviation" process set forth in Section 627.783, Florida Statutes. See Finding of Fact 8, supra, for the statute's text. Mr. Parton testified that Mr. Cox erred in not taking note of the rate deviation statute in his recommendation: ... Florida law allows any insurer to petition for deviation from a promulgated rate, and that's one of the things that, frankly, I believe Mr. Cox did not consider in setting this rate. If, in fact, the rates were set too low for [an] insurer operating through independent agents, and that insurer felt that it hurt him to be able to charge that, that insurer has the ability to petition for deviation and to have a rate set higher than that based upon what they have petitioned. . . . All they have to do is petition the Office pursuant to the statute, prepare whatever documentation under oath they feel supports what they need, and the Department [sic] will make a determination whether or not that justifies a higher rate.[20] * * * . . . It is not necessary for us to take into account the whole industry in adopting a rate when, in fact, the law particularly contemplates that that rate is not necessarily going to be the same for everybody and allows for companies who have a different business practice and different approach to present that to the Office for approval to charge a different rate. And if that's what [ATIF] wants to do, that's fine. So, it's difficult for me to understand how they're adversely impacted by that. Mr. Parton asserted that the rate deviation statute was especially significant to OIR's analysis because Chapter 99-286, sec. 13, Laws of Florida, changed the provision from an industry-wide deviation to one applying to a single applicant, meaning that for the first time the Legislature had authorized more than one rate for each type of title insurance.21 Mr. Parton testified that OIR considered the statutory "loss experience and prospective loss experience" ratemaking factor by holding a rate hearing to which the entire industry was invited, as well as by considering the Cox and Milliman Reports, both of which took loss experience into consideration. Mr. Parton testified that OIR's consideration of the statutory "past expenses and prospective expenses" ratemaking factor was essentially confined to its reliance on the Milliman Report's actuarial judgment in basing the potential costs expenses for the JLP on the costs and expenses associated with an O&E report. Mr. Parton testified that OIR's consideration of the statutory "defalcation" ratemaking factor consisted of adopting the Milliman Report's finding that there is virtually no danger of defalcation with the JLP product because the refinancing would almost always be handled by a bank, eliminating the danger of money passing through the hands of an agent. In summary, OIR's defense of proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-186.003(1)(c) is premised on its acceptance of the Milliman Report. This acceptance in turn reflects acceptance of the core concept of that report: that the JLP more resembles an O&E report than it does a traditional primary title mortgage policy. Expert testimony on the Milliman Report Dr. Nelson R. Lipshutz testified on behalf of Petitioners as an expert in the economics of the title insurance industry. Dr. Lipshutz has decades of experience in the design and implementation of title insurance statistical plans and ratemaking, including having designed ALTA's Uniform Financial Reporting Plan and Uniform Statistical Plan, which are used as the basis for title insurance regulation in roughly half of the United States. He collects data on behalf of rating bureaus in three states, has served as a consultant for several state departments of insurance (including Florida's) and is the author of a textbook, The Regulatory Economics of Title Insurance. Dr. Lipshutz was retained by ATIF to analyze the Milliman Report. At the hearing, Dr. Lipshutz explained that, unlike other lines of insurance, title insurance is not a loss reimbursement activity; rather, it is a loss prevention activity. Title insurance does not insure against some future contingency, but looks to the past to insure the state of title at a particular point in time. Relative to other lines of insurance, losses consume a small portion of the premium. With title insurance, more of the premium goes toward searching the title in a very complete way. Dr. Lipshutz stated that in most casualty lines, the amount of premiums going out in losses is between 60% and 110%, whereas the losses for title insurance are between 3% and 10%. Because such a small percentage of the title insurance premium goes to the underwriter, the losses are still significant, but loss prevention costs drive the rate for title insurance. In examining the Milliman Report, Dr. Lipshutz first critiqued Mr. Struzzieri's loss calculation, which was based on five years (1999 through 2003) of First American's experience writing JLPs. Mr. Struzzieri had data from First American as to its total liability written in each of those years, and the actual losses incurred on those policies up to June 2003. He also had national loss data averages developed by Milliman to predict the percentage of overall expected losses that were represented by those actual losses as of June 2003. These numbers allowed Mr. Struzzieri to calculate projected ultimate losses for each year, including a projected ultimate loss per $1,000 of liability. Mr. Struzzieri's ultimate projection was an expected loss of $0.03 per $1,000 of liability for the JLP. This projection included two years, 2001 and 2003, for which Mr. Struzzieri had no loss data and thus projected zero losses on over $6 million in liability written. At the outset, Dr. Lipshutz noted that title insurance has a long tail line, meaning that losses take a long time to come in. Unlike auto insurance, where the losses are fairly well known during the policy year, the tail on title insurance can go out for 20 years. The losses in title insurance must be projected and Mr. Struzzieri was conceptually correct in attempting a loss projection. Dr. Lipshutz faulted Mr. Struzzieri's projection for including the "highly unlikely" scenario of policy years with zero losses. Dr. Lipshutz also noted that the estimated losses for 1999, the earliest year in the report and therefore the year with the most fully developed losses, were $0.14 per $1,000, almost five times Mr. Struzzieri's overall projected loss for the JLP. Dr. Lipshutz was also critical of Mr. Struzzieri's use of national data because title insurance is "highly geographically idiosyncratic." Factors that can lead to losses in Florida, such as navigational servitudes, are insignificant in a state such as Arizona. Dr. Lipshutz found no discussion in the Milliman Report of the Florida market, as opposed to general comments on the title insurance industry. Dr. Lipshutz also noted that mortgage fraud is "endemic" in Florida. The state ranks first in the nation in mortgage fraud, with a rate twice the national average in 2006. Because a JLP is essentially insuring the identity of the property owner, fraud and identity theft in Florida should not be ignored in any loss calculation. Finally, Dr. Lipshutz faulted Mr. Struzzieri's loss calculation for failing to account for the cyclical nature of title insurance. When the real estate market is doing well, the losses on title insurance are low. When the market goes down, there are large spikes in the loss ratios. Dr. Lipshutz stated that the five years included in Mr. Struzzieri's analysis were some of the best years ever in the real estate industry. Using a mere five-year experience base will not lead to a good result unless the analysis accounts for the fact that the years under review are very strong for the market, and factors in the inevitable down cycles of the market. Dr. Lipshutz believed that Mr. Struzzieri's analysis gave insufficient consideration of what will happen in a downturn. Dr. Lipshutz next critiqued the Milliman Report's expense calculation or, rather, its lack of an expense calculation. After describing the "minimal level of work" involved in the issuance of a JLP, Mr. Struzzieri noted that it would be difficult to quantify the cost of the work because "solid expense data is not available." Therefore, Mr. Struzzieri looked to expense data for O&E reports as his point of comparison for deriving a JLP expense estimate. The problem with this approach, according to Dr. Lipshutz, was that Mr. Struzzieri also lacked "solid expense data" for O&E reports. Mr. Struzzieri's analysis is "extremely simple" and based on a series of assumptions that lack empirical support. First, Mr. Struzzieri assumes that "the level of work involved in issuing a Junior Loan Policy is the same as the work performed for an O&E report." Nothing in the Milliman Report attempts to quantify the expenses involved in issuing a JLP beyond the assertion that the work is the same as that involved in issuing an O&E report. Having made that assumption, Mr. Struzzieri then asserts that the cost of an O&E report to a lender is usually between $60 and $100. The Milliman Report provides no data to support that assertion. At the hearing, Mr. Struzzieri conceded that he had no supporting data for the $60 to $100 cost range and testified that an unnamed employee of First American gave him those numbers during a telephone conversation. Dr. Lipshutz testified that his own casual Google search of O&E prices in Florida turned up figures ranging from $125 to $250. While acknowledging that his search did not produce a scientific sample, Dr. Lipshutz rightly contended that it nonetheless called into question the validity of the upper end of Mr. Struzzieri's cost range. Finally, Mr. Struzzieri makes an assumption, based on anecdote, that O&R reports are profitable to the companies in that business. The Milliman Report does not include the anecdotes on which this assumption is based. Dr. Lipshutz thus described the Milliman Report's analysis as a conclusion reached at the end of a string of unsupported assumptions: if one assumes that the level of work for a JLP equals that for an O&E report, and assumes that the cost of an O&E report is between $60 and $100, and assumes that the companies make a profit by charging between $60 and $100, then one may assume that a JLP rate that provides the same revenue (calculated by Mr. Struzzieri to be between $0.86 and $1.33 per $1,000 on a $75,000 loan) would be profitable. Because the Milliman Report contained no data to allow one to test the reasonableness of its assumptions, Dr. Lipshutz concluded that the report's findings were unsupported and unreliable. Dr. Lipshutz disputed that a JLP is directly comparable to an O&E report, or at least the notion that such a comparison may be assumed without proof. He pointed out that an O&E differs from a JLP "even on the simplest financial terms." Because an O&E report is not an insurance product, no premium tax is charged on it. Dr. Lipshutz was not certain whether the issuer of an O&E report is required to maintain a guaranty fund, but noted that any such contribution would be negligible because the liability on an O&E report is limited to $1,000. The analysis discussed at Findings of Fact 35 and 36, supra, was performed at Dr. Lipshutz' request. As noted above, ATIF calculated that performing primary title services, including labor costs, for a JLP policy would cost slightly more than $100 per policy, and about $150 if overhead costs are included. ATIF performed the same calculation for an O&E report and found that the production cost would be just under $50 per policy, and just over $100 if overhead is included.22 Included in Dr. Lipshutz' written report were two charts produced by ATIF to support its calculation of the difference in cost between a JLP and an O&E report. The first chart showed the differences in coverage between the two products: Coverage JLP O&E Limit of liability $500,000 $1,000 Ad valorem taxes Yes No Gap coverage Yes No Encumbrances created by or liens against current owner Yes Yes Encumbrances created by or liens against prior owners Yes No Closing protection letter (CPL) coverage for failure of agent to follow lenders' closing instructions Available at no additional charge Not available CPL coverage for fraud or dishonesty of agent in handling lenders' funds or documents Available at no additional charge Not available Revolving credit/variable rate endorsement Available for $25 Not available Retain evidence of determination of insurability and premium charged for seven years Yes No The second chart showed the tasks required to produce a JLP and an O&E report:23 TASK JLP O&E Collect documents from recorder's office relevant to the property AFTER date of last deed or mortgage Yes Yes Collect documents from recorder's office relevant to the property BEFORE date of last deed or mortgage Yes No Check validity of documents Yes No Collect documents from courts for names in ownership AFTER date of last deed or mortgage Yes Yes Collect documents from courts for names in ownership BEFORE date of last deed or mortgage Yes No Check probate and foreclosure cases Yes No Check identity in case of common name Yes No Check for tax liens recorded AFTER date of last deed or mortgage Yes Yes Check for tax liens recorded BEFORE date of last deed or mortgage Yes No Check city and county tax offices for taxes owed Yes No Prepare O&E report No Yes Prepare commitment Yes No Downdate search before closing Yes No Review closing documents for compliance with conditions in commitment Yes No Review closing documents for compliance with lender's closing instructions Yes No Prepare policy Yes No Downdate search after recording and issue JR-1 and/or JR-2 endorsement Yes No From this data provided by ATIF, Dr. Lipshutz concluded that the extra work makes the cost of producing a JLP 85% higher than the cost of producing an O&E report, and corresponds to a rate of $2.52 per $1,000 of insured liability. Even accepting Mr. Struzzieri's range of reasonable rates ($0.86 to $1.33 per $1,000 of liability written), applying this 85% cost factor would change the range to $1.59 to $2.46 per $1,000 of liability. Dr. Lipshutz noted that this range overlaps significantly with the range of $2.00 to $2.60 per $1,000 recommended in the Cox Report. Dr. Lipshutz termed "specious" the statement in the Milliman Report that "[t]he proposed Junior Loan Policy rates are 74% to 85% lower than the $5.75 rate, lower percentages than that indicated by the loss experience (i.e., 90%)." Dr. Lipshutz stated that this statement would be reasonable in the context of auto insurance, where the primary concern is loss reimbursement: if the loss is 90% lower, then the rate should be 90% lower. However, in this case it is "downright silly" to tie rates to losses because loss prevention, not loss reimbursement, drives expenses in title insurance. As noted above, OIR contended that if an underwriter took a larger split of the premium from its agents, or wrote the policies directly, then the $0.86 per $1,000 rate for the JLP would be adequate. Dr. Lipshutz called this contention "violently incorrect." He stated that it is a "specious distinction" to say that a rate could be adequate for a direct writer but inadequate for an underwriter working through agents. Certain core title services must be performed, certain reserves must be set aside, and certain losses will have to be paid regardless of the premium split between the agent and underwriter. If the premium is not large enough to cover all of those costs, the rate will be inadequate regardless of the insurer's business model. As a secondary matter, Dr. Lipshutz noted that it is difficult for underwriters to dictate changes in the premium split to their agents. The market is competitive, and agents will walk away from an insurer that attempts to take more than the statutory 30% split of the premium. Many agents write for multiple insurers, and would likely direct most of their business toward those who were most generous in their premium splits. Dr. Lipshutz did not believe that changing the split is a practical way to solve the rate adequacy problem even from the underwriter's standpoint. Dr. Lipshutz was also critical of OIR's suggestion that dissatisfied insurers could avail themselves of the rate deviation statute, because it is difficult if not impossible to charge a significantly higher price than that charged by other participants in a competitive market. Dr. Lipshutz testified that rates are supposed to be based on industry averages, and thus disputed OIR's theory that a rate is "excessive" for any company that could offer the product for less than the promulgated rate. In a system of regulated competition as described by Dr. Lipshutz, it is a certainty that some companies are going to make more money than others at the promulgated rate. Those companies that cannot make a profit at the promulgated rate will drift out of that line of business. Those companies with high profits will invest more in their business, improving their technology and workflow. The profits and increased efficiency of these companies will appear in the industry data presented to the regulator, which will then fulfill its statutory mandate and lower the rate. However, if the initial rate is set so low that only one firm can sell the product at a profit, all of the other insurers are immediately knocked out of the market. Competition in the title insurance market is based on service as well as price, but the service element of competition would be wiped out by the low rate. Dr. Lipshutz was skeptical of the idea that a title insurer could offset an inadequate JLP premium with other charges because this product will be sold mostly to banks and other large institutional carriers, which have the leverage to resist paying extra charges above the statutory premium rate. Mr. Struzzieri testified at the hearing, after Dr. Lipshutz, to explain his methodology and defend the Milliman Report. He explained that he was contacted by First American to provide a rate analysis for filing with OIR. He reviewed the Cox Report and documents filed by First American in response to the report. Because there was no Florida experience on which to base his calculation, Mr. Struzzieri looked for other benchmarks and decided that the most relevant other experience would be JLP experience in other states. He examined the JLP loss experience of First American in other states and estimated an expected loss of $0.03 per $1,000 of liability written. This contrasted with an expected loss in the range of $0.20 to $0.30 per $1,000 on an original owner's or lender's policy. Mr. Struzzieri noted that, all things being equal, lower losses should result in a lower rate for the product. He agreed with Dr. Lipshutz that in title insurance, underwriting expenses are a more significant factor than expected losses in setting rates. Based on his understanding of the JLP product and what it covers, Mr. Struzzieri concluded that there is less work involved in the JLP than in a primary title policy and therefore less expense. Mr. Struzzieri's understanding was that the JLP "is intended for simple transactions such as, you know, a home equity loan, and that the lender on home equity loans is going to be performing the closing services as opposed to the title agent or the title company, the title insurers." This direct performance of closing services by the lender would eliminate the risk of defalcation by the title insurer or its agents, thus further driving down the cost of the JLP. Mr. Struzzieri stated that First American had no specific expense data for the JLP that would permit him to measure the work involved in producing a policy. Therefore, he needed to find other relevant data that would allow him to estimate the average cost of the work. Mr. Struzzieri's discussions with First American led him to study the O&E report, which seemed "parallel" to the JLP, such that the amount of work involved in the JLP could be assumed equivalent to the amount of work needed to produce an O&E report.24 Mr. Struzzieri decided to use O&E report costs as a proxy for the expense portion of the JLP product. First American told him that O&E report costs were between $60 and $100. Mr. Struzzieri conceded that he had no data to support those O&E costs, and did not doubt that Dr. Lipshutz found companies offering Florida O&E reports at prices well in excess of $100. Mr. Struzzieri also conceded that First American had initially convinced him of the comparability of the JLP and the O&E report by stating that the lender "probably will not close" if any adverse matters are uncovered during the limited search envisioned by the JLP. However, further discussions with First American had clarified that another option would be to exclude the adverse matters from coverage under the JLP and allow the lender to decide whether to close. Mr. Struzzieri pointed out that he checked his recommended rate range of $0.86 to $1.33 per $1,000 against the JLP rates charged by First American in other states. He believed that a comparison to other states' JLPs was more valid than a comparison to an original issue or owner's or lender's policy because of the greatly reduced scope, coverage, and the amount of work involved in a JLP. The data provided by First American showed rates that ranged widely, from $0.73 per $1,000 in California to $3.40 per $1,000 in New Mexico. Out of 29 states listed, only two had rates lower than $0.86 per $1,000. Seventeen of the 29 fell within a range of $1.33 to $2.33. Nonetheless, Mr. Struzzieri pronounced himself satisfied that his recommended range fit reasonably within the range of rates charged in other states. Mr. Struzzieri testified that he accepted Dr. Lipshutz' estimate of the risk of fraud and had no reason to doubt Dr. Lipshutz' data on the subject. However, Mr. Struzzieri did not believe that fraud had any bearing on his calculation of a $0.03 per $1,000 loss on the JLP because fraud losses are a small percentage of total title insurance losses. He acknowledged that there may be a small fraud component that his calculation missed by using national data rather than Florida data, given Florida's higher rate of fraud, but concluded that this component would be at most incremental. Mr. Struzzieri agreed that his data on the cost and profitability of an O&E report was anecdotal and unverified, but disagreed with Dr. Lipshutz' assertion that his anecdotal information about O&E profitability was the source of his conclusion that the JLP will be profitable at the recommended range of rates. Rather, said Mr. Struzzieri, the source of his assertion of profitability was the fact that First American is writing JLP policies in 29 other states, including California at $0.73 per $1,000, and appears to be making a profit on that business. He conceded, however, that this, too, was an assumption on his part. On cross-examination, Mr. Struzzieri was asked about a document he filed at OIR in response to a 2005 title insurance data call issued by OIR. In a letter dated November 17, 2005, Mr. Struzzieri wrote "to point out what I believe are several critical deficiencies in the 2005 title insurance data call." Mr. Struzzieri wrote that the deficiencies fell into two categories: missing information and insufficient data. As to the latter deficiency, Mr. Struzzieri wrote that OIR was not asking for enough information: It is my strong belief based on my many years of working with title insurance data that 5 policy years is insufficient to make rates. Reasons supporting this belief include: Long loss development "tail" -- Title insurance policies have no expiration date; claims continue to be reported far beyond 5 years after the policy effective date. . . . Not many losses reported in first 5 years -- Milliman analysis of title industry composite loss development triangles indicates that only a small percentage of total losses from policy years 2000 through 2004 are expected to have been reported as of December 31, 2004. For example, for policy year 2004, we would expect only 13% of "ultimate" losses to be reported by December 31, 2004. It is, therefore, my belief that policy years 2000 through 2004 are all too immature to be used in ratemaking without the benefit of additional policy years of data and will result in highly variable results. Title insurance cycle Milliman analysis of title insurance profitability indicates that title insurance is cyclical in nature. Specifically, profits vary with the real estate cycle; in particular, mortgage interest rates [sic]. For example, when interest rates are falling, title insurance revenue is higher and loss ratios are generally lower. Expenses are also higher; but not as high as revenue because certain expenses are relatively fixed. Therefore, profits are generally higher. When interest rates rise, revenues fall, expenses fall (but not as fast as revenue) and loss ratios increase. As a result, profits are lower. For this reason, I believe that any title insurance rate making exercise should use as many as 20 years of data (or at least 10 years). The number of years should correspond to a full real estate cycle. The 5 policy years included in the data call correspond to the lowest interest rates in the last 40 years. Therefore, the profits are likely much higher than an average year. When the real estate cycle turns (and there [are] indications that it soon may), the title industry may face losses. By using only the last 5 years, the OIR will be applying rates based off of the most profitable years and applying them to perhaps some very unprofitable years. However, if instead rates were based on 10, 15 or better yet 20 years of data, the OIR will have captured a complete cycle and will have made rates that are appropriate in the long run and, on average, for each individual year of the cycle. Mr. Struzzieri acknowledged his prior opinion that five years of data provides an insufficient basis for ratemaking, especially when those years were so recent that ultimate losses are uncertain. He further acknowledged that his own recommendation for a range of JLP rates was in part based on projected loss data from five years of recent First American policies. Mr. Struzzieri explained this apparent contradiction by noting that, as to primary title insurance, companies have sold the products in Florida for 50 to 60 years and typically report 20 years of data. As to the JLP, First American only had the five years of data used by Mr. Struzzieri. He agreed that more data would be better, but he used what was available. Summary Findings When it decided to commence rulemaking to set a premium rate for the JLP, OIR commissioned The David Cox Company to prepare an actuarial report on the rates and forms for the proposed JLP. The Cox Report recommended a rate ranging from $2.00 to $2.60 per $1,000 of liability, based on Mr. Cox' comparison of the JLP to a standard title insurance policy. Mr. Cox advocated setting the rate on the high end of the recommended range to avoid hurting insurers that operate through independent agents. OIR reviewed the Cox Report and found it flawed. OIR believed the Cox Report's recommended rate range was too high, because Mr. Cox overemphasized protecting companies that operate through agents, when the JLP appears more amenable to direct sales. OIR disapproved of Mr. Cox' rebate strategy for holding down rates, his assumption that the insurer is always bound to accept the 30% minimum premium split with its agents, and his failure to focus on actual market data generated by companies that are selling the JLP in other states. All of OIR's criticisms of the Cox Report's methodology and conclusions were reasonable concerns voiced by the regulatory entity charged with the responsibility to set a premium rate for the JLP. OIR had misgivings about whether the JLP qualified as an insurance product at all, and therefore found the Cox Report's conceptual strategy of "backing out" a JLP rate from the standard title insurance rate less than persuasive. The preponderance of the evidence at the hearing established that OIR's decision to reject the recommendations of the Cox Report was reasonable. OIR has freely conceded that the Proposed Rule is entirely dependent on the Milliman Report, with its recommended range of rates between $0.86 and $1.33 based on First American's experience in other states and the close comparison of the JLP to a non-insurance product, the O&E report. OIR's position, as elucidated by Mr. Parton, is that Section 627.782, Florida Statutes, allows OIR to base its ratemaking decision exclusively on an actuarial analysis conducted on behalf of one company, based on data derived exclusively from that company. OIR is under no obligation to set a rate for the industry as a whole, because any insurer that does not believe it can make a profit at the promulgated rate may petition for an upward deviation pursuant to Section 627.783, Florida Statutes. The rate should be set at the lowest level recommended by any single company's actuary, to ensure that no company can charge an excessive rate. ATIF demonstrated that it cannot profitably sell the JLP at the $0.86 rate set forth in the Proposed Rule. The insurer's 30% share of premium on a $100,000 policy ($25.80) is insufficient to cover its statutory liabilities ($30.00 to the guaranty fund and $1.51 premium tax), let alone its other underwriting costs. The insurer would be required to cover the losses with premiums from other policies.25 Mr. Parton pointed out that the insurer could solve this problem by forcing its agents to accept a 60-40 premium split. However, Dr. Lipshutz convincingly testified that such an imposition is not easily accomplished in a competitive market. Agents would either walk away or steer their less desirable risks toward that insurer. Further, ATIF showed that the cost of performing primary title services for a JLP policy would be a little more than $100, whereas the agent's 70% share of premium on a $100,000 JLP policy at the $0.86 rate would be only $60.20.26 Cutting the agent's share to 60% would merely shift more of the loss for a $100,000 policy onto the agent. However, because the agent's costs are fixed, his 70% share would more than cover expenses on a policy written for $167,000 or more. At a 60% share, the agent would not cover expenses on any policy worth less than $195,000. Mr. Conner of ATIF and Barry Scholnik of Stewart Title agreed that no company could issue the JLP for $0.86 per $1,000 and make a profit, and that a company selling the JLP at that rate would be offering it as a loss leader. OIR countered that ATIF is not marketing the JLP anywhere in the country, and may never do so. OIR asserted that it was entitled to rely on the fact that the $0.86 per $1,000 rate was proposed by a company that is actually selling the JLP throughout the country and has engaged an actuary to make a recommendation based on actual market data. First American maintains that it can generate a profit at the proposed rate through its direct business model. The Florida JLP purchaser should not be forced to pay higher rates in order to subsidize the less efficient "member agent" business model of ATIF. Petitioners' expert, Dr. Lipshutz, discussed at length his dispute with Mr. Struzzieri's loss projection of $0.03 per $1,000 of liability for the JLP. Dr. Lipshutz made valid points regarding the long tail line and cyclical nature of title insurance versus the very recent five years' data employed by Mr. Struzzieri, which included the unlikely projection of two years with zero losses. Mr. Struzzieri conceded that his loss data from First American was not optimal. However, both experts agreed that loss experience is not the driving force in setting title insurance rates. Additionally, Mr. Struzzieri's point that defalcation losses will be virtually nonexistent with the JLP was not effectively countered by Dr. Lipshutz. Even conceding the validity of Dr. Lipshutz' critique, Mr. Struzzieri persuasively argued that any upward projection of the loss projection would have an insignificant effect on the recommended range of rates. The experts and industry witnesses agreed that expenses are the main driver of title insurance rates. Dr. Lipshutz disputed that Mr. Struzzieri performed an expense calculation at all, and certainly questioned every expense assumption upon which Mr. Struzzieri ultimately based his rate recommendation. Mr. Struzzieri first assumed that expense data for O&E reports would provide a reliable basis for a JLP expense estimate. He was forced to use this assumption because First American could provide him with no specific expense data for the JLP, a fact that undercut the rationale for OIR's reliance on the Milliman Report as based on real industry data from a company actually selling the JLP. In fact, Mr. Struzzieri used First American's JLP price data from other states only after the fact as a tool to check the reasonableness of his rate recommendation. The evidence is not entirely clear whether Mr. Struzzieri independently reached the conclusion that the two products are equivalent, or whether this assumption was provided by First American. The Milliman Report does not explain the basis for its assumed equivalence of the O&E report and the JLP beyond a simple assertion that the "level of work . . . is the same" for the two products. At the hearing, Mr. Struzzieri merely stated that he found parallels between the O&E report and the JLP that allowed him to assume their equivalence. Mr. Conner of ATIF testified that the tasks necessary to issue a JLP are "not even close" to those employed to produce an O&E report. In support of this position, Petitioners offered a detailed, step-by-step review of the JLP process versus the process involved in producing an O&E report. This review led Dr. Lipshutz to conclude that the cost of producing a JLP would be 85% higher than the cost of producing an O&E report. Dr. Lipshutz' analysis on this point was credible, the more so because OIR offered no serious criticism of or alternative to Petitioners' evidence regarding the extensive differences between the production process for the two products. The preponderance of the evidence produced at the hearing established that the Milliman Report's assumption of equivalence between the JLP and an O&E report was simply wrong. Even if it were granted that the cost of an O&E report is comparable to that of a JLP, Mr. Struzzieri's assertion that the cost of an O&E report to a lender is usually between $60 and $100 was unsupported. At the hearing, Mr. Struzzieri conceded that he had no supporting data for the assertion and was unable to name the First American employee who gave him those numbers. Dr. Lipshutz' sworn testimony that he found O&E price quotes in Florida ranging from $125 to $250 was admittedly anecdotal but even so was at least as credible as Mr. Struzzieri's undocumented hearsay cost data from an unnamed source. The preponderance of the evidence produced at the hearing established that the Milliman Report's statement of the cost of a typical O&E report was an assumption lacking empirical support. The unsupported assumptions regarding the comparability of the JLP to the O&E report and regarding the cost of an O&E report render the Milliman Report's rate recommendation a speculative exercise, not the basis for an industry-wide JLP rate. Mr. Parton testified that Mr. Struzzieri employed a great deal of actuarial judgment in making his recommendation because the JLP is a new product to Florida, and that OIR was entitled to rely on that actuarial judgment. However, Mr. Struzzieri himself qualified his report with the following: In performing this analysis we have relied on data and other information provided to us by First American Title Insurance Company. We have not audited, verified, or reviewed this data and other information for reasonableness and consistency. Such a review is beyond the scope of our assignment. If the underlying data or information is inaccurate or incomplete, the results of our analysis may likewise be inaccurate or incomplete. (Emphasis added) Petitioners did not question Mr. Struzzieri's actuarial judgment. They questioned the underlying data provided by First American to Mr. Struzzieri, and showed that data to be unsupported in the case of the JLP/O&E comparison, and unverifiable in the case of the O&E costs. Mr. Struzzieri's qualifying statement acknowledges that his conclusions are only as good as their underlying information. OIR may have been entitled to rely on the Milliman Report at the time the Proposed Rule was published, before the agency was aware of the report's flaws. However, this rule challenge hearing is a de novo proceeding, not a review of OIR's past actions. At the hearing, Petitioners established that the Milliman Report was based on faulty assumptions and inadequate data. OIR failed to respond adequately to the objections raised by Petitioners. OIR simply reiterated its position that it had the discretion to rely on Mr. Struzzieri's actuarial analysis, without really answering Petitioners' evidence that the assumptions undergirding the analysis were unsubstantiated. OIR essentially adopted the Milliman Report as its own. Mr. Parton testified that as to each of the "due consideration" ratemaking factors listed in Subsection 627.782(2), Florida Statutes, OIR derived its conclusions largely from the Milliman Report. Whatever the merits of OIR's legal reasoning regarding its statutory ratemaking responsibilities, OIR's reliance on the Milliman Report to meet those responsibilities was misplaced. OIR's only response to Petitioners' sustained attack on Mr. Struzzieri's assumptions was to reiterate its reliance on the Milliman Report. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Proposed Rule was based on unsupported data and was, therefore, arbitrary.
Findings Of Fact On December 31, 1997, the Department of Insurance issued a Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order against Petitioner, alleging that Petitioner is engaged in the legal expense insurance business in the State of Florida without being licensed. The Department alleges that Petitioner is in violation of several statutory provisions requiring licensure. Petitioner timely requested an evidentiary proceeding regarding the allegations contained within that Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order. Jurisdiction over the matter was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 28, 1998, to conduct the evidentiary proceeding. The matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 98-0442. By Notice of Hearing entered February 17, 1998, that cause was scheduled for final hearing on June 15 and 16, 1998, and the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. By agreement of the parties that cause was re-scheduled several times and then was placed in abeyance. On February 24, 1999, Petitioner filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings its Petition for Administrative Determination of Invalidity of Existing Rule and Unpromulgated Rule. That Petition was assigned DOAH Case No. 99-0771RX, was consolidated with DOAH Case No. 98-0442, and is the subject of this Final Order. The Petition asserts the invalidity of the Department's Rule 4-201.003, Florida Administrative Code, and the invalidity of an alleged unpromulgated rule consisting of a statement by the Department that the amount of the membership fee Petitioner charges its members will determine whether Petitioner is a legal expense insurance corporation subject to regulation under Chapter 642, Florida Statutes. The existing Rule and the alleged unpromulgated rule are the subject of the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order and the Department's Cross Motion for Summary Final Order. Petitioner alleges that Rule 4-201.003, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because (a) it enlarges, modifies, and contravenes specific provisions of the statute it purports to implement; (b) the Department exceeded its rulemaking authority; and (c) the Department materially failed to follow the requirements set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, by failing to repeal a rule for which there was no legislative rulemaking authority. Petitioner argues that the Department's alleged unpromulgated rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because (a) the statement is an unpromulgated rule; (b) the statement enlarges, modifies, and contravenes specific provisions of the statute it purports to implement; and (c) the statement is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for the Department's decisions, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency. The Department's Cross Motion for Summary Final Order alleges that Petitioner lacks standing to assert its challenges, that the challenge to the existing Rule is moot, and that the alleged unpromulgated rule does not exist. Rule 4-201.003, Florida Administrative Code, relates to exemptions from the statutory definition of "legal expense insurance." The Department's Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order does not allege that Petitioner has violated that Rule and does not even cite to that Rule as a basis for the Department's action against Petitioner. Since Petitioner is not charged with violating that Rule, Petitioner cannot show that it is substantially affected by the Rule. Further, the Department has now commenced the repeal of that Rule and has filed in this cause an affidavit from the Department's Bureau Chief of Specialty Insurers that Rule 4-201.003, Florida Administrative Code, has not been and will not be used against Petitioner in DOAH Case No. 98-0442 or in any other enforcement proceeding. As to the alleged unpromulgated rule, the record in this cause reveals that the Department in both correspondence and conversations with Petitioner raised a concern about the amount of Petitioner's membership fees in re-considering whether Petitioner is a lawyer referral service or a legal expense insurer. However, Petitioner does not allege that the amount of the membership fee has been considered as to any entity other than Petitioner. Conversely, the Department has filed affidavits from the Bureau Chief of Specialty Insurers and from the employee charged with handling licensure of legal expense insurers on a day-to-day basis that they have never heard of a Department policy in which the price of a legal service plan determines whether that plan is legal expense insurance. Those affidavits further state that no such policy has been applied by the Department and that the first time the Department heard of such a policy is when Petitioner asserted that such a policy existed. Accordingly, since it has not been shown that such a policy exists, it cannot be shown that the alleged policy constitutes an unpromulgated rule.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Department's audit assessment against Petitioner for additional insurance premium tax for the tax years 1989 and 1990 is proper.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the Final Hearing, the parties agreed to numerous facts and entered into a Joint Prehearing Statement. The Hearing Officer entitles the Findings of Fact section of the Recommended Order "Agreed Facts"; however, instead of reciting the actual stipulation facts submitted by the parties, the Hearing Officer paraphrases and adds facts that were not agreed to by the parties. The "Agreed Facts" section should only recite the facts that were actually agreed to by the parties. Accordingly, the Department substitutes the Joint Prehearing Statement for the Hearing Officer's "Agreed Facts" numbers 1 through 6 as follows: Central Dade is, and at all material times was, a Medical Malpractice Self Insurance Fund as defined in Sec. 627.357, Fla. Stat. Central Dade is a trust, not a corporation. It has been in existence and operation since 1979. Its sole purpose is to provide medical malpractice insurance for its members, i.e., approximately 100 doctors in Dade County. Central Dade has no capital and is not operated for profit. It does not and cannot, absent permission from the Department of Insurance, legally pay dividends to its members; rather it is required by law to hold one hundred percent of its premium and investment income to fund medical malpractice claims and pay its operating expenses (including taxes). Central Dade's members are individually liable or assessable for any shortfall in its trust funds. Central Dade has standing to challenge Fla. Admin. Code Rule 12B- 8.001(5) because it is substantially affected by the Rule. The Department, as an agency within the Executive Branch of the government of the State of Florida, is authorized by Chapters 213 and 624, Fla. Stat., to conduct audits and make assessments of tax pursuant to Chapter 624, Fla. Stat., (Insurance Premium Tax). The Department conducted an audit of Central Dade for the audit period of 12/31/89 through 12/31/90 for Insurance Premium Tax. After the conclusion of the audit and after administrative protest of the proposed assessment by Central Dade, an assessment was issued on July 20, 1994. The assessment became a Final Assessment on July 20, 1994. Central Dade was assessed $8,996.31 tax; $899.63 penalty; and $2,346.58 interest through March 10, 1993. Central Dade paid the entire assessment and is seeking a refund of the payment through this action. Central Dade timely filed a Petition seeking to have the tax assessment declared invalid. Additionally, Central Dade filed a Petition pursuant to Sec. 120.56, Fla. Stat. challenging Fla. Admin. Code Rule 12B-8.001(5) as invalid. Upon Motion by the Parties, the cases were consolidated for Final Hearing. Medical Malpractice Self-insurance Funds became subject to the Insurance Premium Tax beginning July 1, 1989. Ch. 88-206, ss. 6, Laws of Fla. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 12B-8.001(5) became effective March 25, 1990. The parties agree the Rule was correctly promulgated and the Petitioner is only challenging the applicability of the Rule to Petitioner and the substance of the Rule. The dispute between the parties concerns whether Petitioner is entitled to the credits contained in Sec. 624.509.(4), Fla. Stat. The parties additionally stipulated to the following: If the Department prevails in this action, the Petitioner will not be entitled to any refund for the tax years 1989 and 1990. [Joint Exhibit Two] Any overpayment made by the Petitioner will be applied to subsequent tax years. 1/ If the Petitioner prevails in this action, it will be entitled to a refund of $23,774.76 for the tax years 1989 and 1990. [Joint Exhibit Two] The Department rejects the Hearing Officer's "Agreed Fact" number 7 because it is a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. The Department rejects the Hearing Officer's "Agreed Fact" number 8 as irrelevant to this proceeding. The Department makes the following additional findings of fact based on competent and substantial testimony and evidence presented at the Final Hearing: A premium tax on "medical malpractice self-insurance [funds]" was first imposed in 1989. Effective July 1, 1989, Chapter 88-206, ss. 6, Laws of Fla., amended Sec. 627.357, Fla. Stat. to provide: 627.357 Medical malpractice self-insurance -- (9) Premiums, contributions, and assessments received by a fund are subject to s. 624.509 (1), (2), and (3), except that the tax rate shall be 1.6 percent of the gross amount of such premiums, contributions and assessments. E.S. The premium tax imposed on medical malpractice self-insurers was, pursuant to the above-quoted statute, 1.6 percent of the gross amount of the premiums, contributions and assessments. A premium tax on "dental service plan corporations" self-insurance funds was first imposed in 1989. Effective July 1, 1989, Chapter 88-206, ss. 6, Laws of Fla., amended Sec. 627.357, Fla. Stat. to provide: 637.406 Tax on premiums, contributions, and assessments. Premiums, contributions, and assessments received by a dental service plan corporation are subject to the tax imposed by s. 624.509. The premium tax imposed on dental service plan corporations in 1988 was 2 percent of the gross amount of the premiums, contributions, and assessments pursuant to Sec. 624.509(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). The Legislature in the same Bill that added the amendments to Sec. 627.357 Fla. Stat., which subjected medical malpractice self-insurers to subsections (1), (2) and (3) 2/ of Sec. 624.509, Fla. Stat., 3/ and made dental service plan self-insurers subject to "s. 624.509" in its entirety also made multiple employer welfare arrangements, 4/ Commercial self-insurance funds, 5/ professional liability self-insurance, 6/ and group self-insurer funds subject to subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Sec. 624.509, Fla. Stat.; but made other insurers, such as the continuing care contracts, 7/ subject to Sec. 624.509, Fla. Stat., in its entirety. Further, all those entities which the Legislature specifically made subject to noncredit paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 624.509, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988) were given a lower 1.6 percent tax rate by the Legislature. In contrast, those entities made subject to Sec. 624.509, Fla. Stat., in its entirety, such as the dental service plan self-insurers, without a listing of the specific paragraphs, and which are clearly entitled to the credits therein, were made subject to the higher 2 percent tax rate provided in Sec. 624.509(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). 18. Sec. 624.509(1), (2), (3), (4), and (9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988), states in pertinent part: 624.509 Premium tax; rate and computation. In addition to the license taxes provided for in this chapter, each insurer shall also annually, and on or before March 1 in each year, except as to wet marine and transportation insurance taxed under s. 624.510, pay to the Department of Revenue a tax on insurance premiums, risk premiums for title insurance, or assessments, including membership fees and policy fees and gross deposits received from subscribers to reciprocal or interinsurance agreements, and on annuity premiums or considerations, received during the preceding calendar year, the amounts thereof to be determined as set forth in this section, to wit: An amount equal to 2 percent of the gross amount of such receipts on account of life and health insurance policies covering persons resident in this state and on account of all other types of policies and contracts (except annuity policies or contracts taxable under paragraph (b)) covering property, subjects, or risks located, resident, or to be performed in this state, omitting premiums on reinsurance accepted, and less return premiums or assessments, but without deductions: For reinsurance ceded to other insurers; For moneys paid upon surrender of policies or certificates for cash surrender value; For discounts or refunds for direct or prompt payment of premiums or assessments; and On account of dividends of any nature or amount paid and credited or allowed to holders of insurance policies; certificates; or surety, indemnity, reciprocal, or interinsurance contracts or agreements; and An amount equal to 1 percent of the gross receipts on annuity policies or contracts paid by holders thereof in this state. Payment by the insurer of the license taxes and premium receipts taxes provided for in this part of this chapter is a condition precedent to doing business within this state. Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the distribution of the premium tax and any penalties or interest collected thereunder shall be made to the General Revenue Fund in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Revenue and approved by the Administration Commission. The intangible tax imposed under chapter 199, the income tax imposed under chapter 220, and the emergency excise tax imposed under chapter 221 which are paid by any insurer shall be credited against, and to the extent thereof shall discharge, the liability for tax imposed by this section for the annual period in which such tax payments are made. As to any insurer issuing policies insuring against loss or damage from the risks of fire, tornado, and certain casualty lines, the tax imposed by this section, as intended and contemplated by this subsection, shall be construed to mean the net amount of such tax remaining after there has been credited thereon such gross premium receipts tax as may be payable by such insurer in pursuance of the imposition of such tax by any incorporated cities or towns in the state for firemen's relief and pension funds and policemen's retirement funds maintained in such cities or towns, as provided in and by relevant provisions of the Florida Statutes. For purposes of this subsection, payments of estimated income tax under chapter 220 and of estimated emergency excise tax under chapter 221 shall be deemed paid either at the time the insurer actually files its annual returns under chapter 220 or at the time such returns are required to be filed, whichever first occurs, and not at such earlier time as such payments of estimated tax are actually made. (9) As used in this section "insurer" includes any entity subject to the tax imposed by this section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the Department's assessment issued July 20, 1994, was improper and finding Petitioner entitled to a refund in the amount of $23,774.76. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5 and 7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 6, and 8 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, and 9-11 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 5 and 12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 6-10, 13, and 15-19 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 2 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 14, 20, and 21 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 11 and 22 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis H. Sitterson, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, et al. Museum Tower 150 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Lisa M. Raleigh, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 627.832(1)(i) and 627.848, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Alliant Premium Finance Corporation, is a Florida licensed premium finance company domiciled in Florida. Alliant has been licensed to sell premium finance agreements to the general public in Florida since December 16, 1993. William J. Villari has been the president of Alliant since its licensure. In 1995, Petitioner, Department of Insurance, performed a routine regulatory examination of Alliant. During the examination, 15 Alliant files, which had refunds due to insureds within 30 days, were reviewed. Out of the 15 files, 12 were late, ranging from 87 to 329 days late. The Department sent Alliant the Department's 1995 Report of Examination, which gave notice to Alliant that between December 16, 1993, and June 30, 1995, Alliant had violated the insurance code by failing to make refunds within 30 days. Mr. Villari advised the Department by letter dated December 18, 1995, that he was taking steps to ensure that in the future refunds would be made on a timely basis. No disciplinary action was taken by the Department as a result of the 1995 examination. During January 1998, the Department performed another routine regulatory examination of Alliant. The findings of the examination are contained in the Report of Examination for the period from July 1, 1995, to September 30, 1997. As was noted in the report, 11 Alliant accounts were reviewed which had refunds due to insureds within 30 days, and 8 of the 11 accounts were refunded late. The lateness ranged from 5 to 67 days. The report was mailed to Alliant on February 17, 1998. The 1998 examination also revealed that between July 1, 1995, and September 30, 1997, Alliant had failed to maintain certificates of mailing showing that notices of intent to cancel insurance contracts were mailed to insureds ten days before cancellation. The evidence did not show that Alliant had failed to mail the cancellation notices, only that Alliant had failed to maintain certificates showing that the notices had been mailed. Respondent does not dispute that Alliant was late in making refunds as noted in the 1998 Examination Report or that Alliant did not maintain certificates of mailing for the cancellation notices. Alliant disagrees with the penalty proposed by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered, finding that Alliant Premium Finance Corporation violated Sections 627.832(1)(i) and 627.848(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of $2,500 for the violation of Subsection 627.832(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and $250 for the violation of Section 627.848(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher R. Hunt, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 William J. Villari, President Alliant Premium Finance Corporation 303 Gardenia Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
