The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in connection with Petitioner’s employment by Respondent on the basis of his national origin.
Findings Of Fact The evidence adduced at final hearing established the facts that follow. In May 1999, Winn-Dixie hired Torres to work as a bagger in one of its grocery stores. Until the event that precipitated his termination in July 2000, Torres’s job performance was generally satisfactory, although he was formally reprimanded at least once, in December 1999, for insubordination. Torres was at work bagging groceries on July 14, 2000. The store was crowded that day, and the lines were long at the cash registers. A customer checking out in one line asked Torres——who was stationed at another lane——to bag his groceries. Torres refused, and the man (according to Torres) called Torres an “asshole.” Torres retorted, “You’re the asshole.” (At hearing, Torres admitted using the epithet in front of “a whole line” of customers but explained——in effect——that, since his antagonist had used the word first, the man had it coming.) Having thus offended one another, the two men——Torres and the customer——engaged in a loud shouting match. The assistant store manager, who was in the parking lot outside when this verbal altercation began, was called inside to restore calm and order. Taking charge, he separated the disputants, apologized to the customer (who was a regular shopper at that store), and sent Torres home to cool off. When Torres reported for work the next day, he was fired. He complained, then as now, that Winn-Dixie’s decision was the result of his Puerto Rican origin. His supervisors, however, claimed——then as now——that the cause of Torres’s firing was his profanity-laced row with a customer, which had occurred in front of other customers. Ultimate Factual Determinations Winn-Dixie fired Torres, not because of his national origin, race, or ethnicity, but because Torres quarreled with a customer——angrily and loudly——before other customers. This is a legitimate reason for a grocery store to discharge a bagger. There is no credible, competent evidence that Winn- Dixie tolerated similar behavior in non-Hispanic (or non-Puerto Rican or non-minority) employees. The evidence does not support a finding that Winn-Dixie feigned disapproval of Torres’s dustup with a shopper as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Winn-Dixie did not discriminate unlawfully against Torres.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Torres’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Modesto A. Torres 25302 Southwest 127th Place Miami, Florida 33032 Maria H. Ruiz, Esquire 799 Brickell Plaza, Suite 900 Miami, Florida 33131 Denise Crawford Clerk of the Commission Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s (“Dillard’s”), discriminated against Petitioner based upon his national origin or disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).2/
Findings Of Fact Dillard’s is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Dillard’s is a department store chain. Petitioner, a Mexican male, was hired as a sales associate in the men’s department of Dillard’s store at Tallahassee’s Governor’s Square Mall on May 13, 2014. Petitioner’s job was to sell men’s fragrances directly to customers at the store. Allen Gustason was manager of the Dillard’s store at Governor’s Square Mall during the time Petitioner was employed there. Dee Thomas was the assistant store manager. Mark Kronenberger, who testified at the final hearing, was the men’s department sales manager and was Petitioner’s direct supervisor during the entire time that Petitioner worked at Dillard’s. Petitioner started at a salary of $12.00 per hour as a sales associate. His job performance and pay increases were assessed primarily on the basis of sales. On January 6, 2015, Petitioner received a raise to $12.60 per hour. On April 14, 2015, Petitioner was promoted to the position of fragrance specialist and received a raise to $14.50 per hour. Petitioner’s promotion did not change his basic duties, i.e., direct sales to customers. Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s ended on November 28, 2015. Dillard’s did not dispute Petitioner’s testimony that he was a good and effective salesperson. Petitioner developed a regular clientele of Spanish-speaking customers who liked his ability to communicate with them in their native language. At the time of his hiring, Petitioner received, read, and agreed to abide by Dillard’s Associate Work Rules and General Policies, which among other things forbade insubordination by sales associates. “Insubordination” was defined to include failure to follow lawful instructions from a supervisor and engaging in contemptuous or taunting conduct that undermines the authority of management. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Petitioner claims that he is a Mexican male with a disability. The claimed disability is the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Dillard’s did not dispute that Petitioner has HIV. Petitioner claims that he was harassed by fellow employees because of his Mexican national origin. Petitioner claims that he complained to his supervisors, Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Gustason, about the harassment. Petitioner claims that no effective action was taken to curb the harassment. Petitioner described a pervasive sense of discrimination at Dillard’s of which he became conscious only after about a year of working there. He testified that he is from California and had no real concept of being discriminated against because of his Mexican heritage. It took some time for him to realize and acknowledge to himself that it was happening. However, Petitioner was unable to describe many specific instances of discriminatory behavior by fellow employees. People were “mean,” or “picked on me,” or “didn’t like me,” but few of Petitioner’s complaints pointed toward racial discrimination as opposed to personal dislike. He complained that co-workers planned parties and get-togethers away from work but never asked him along, even for Mr. Kronenberger’s birthday party, but could only speculate as to the reason for his exclusion. Petitioner testified that he was an aggressive and successful salesperson. While its salespeople are assigned to specific departments, Dillard’s allows them to cross-sell in other departments. Several of the incidents described by Petitioner began when he took customers to other departments to sell them something. The undersigned infers that at least some of the bad feelings toward Petitioner were due to his perceived “poaching” of sales from other sections of the store. Petitioner testified that an employee named Carol would yell at him, apparently without provocation, so consistently that he went out of his way to avoid crossing her path. Petitioner stated that one day Carol screamed that he was good-for-nothing and was a “damn Mexican,” in front of customers and co-workers. Petitioner testified that he had no idea why she did this because he had done nothing to provoke her. He walked away, covering his ears from her abuse. Petitioner testified that he went upstairs and spoke to Mr. Gustason about the incident but that nothing was done. Petitioner stated that he returned to the sales floor. Other employees told him that Carol had worked for Dillard’s for many years and was a friend of Mr. Gustason and that he should not expect anything to be done about her behavior. Petitioner testified that an employee named Eric, who worked in the men’s department, made fun of his accent, particularly Petitioner’s difficulty in pronouncing “Saturday.” Petitioner testified that another fellow employee, a white woman named Amber who also worked in fragrance, was constantly rude and mean to him. In front of customers, Amber would say that she did not know why Petitioner was there, that he was only good for cleaning the counters. Petitioner repeatedly complained to Mr. Kronenberger about Amber. Mr. Kronenberger told him to continue doing a good job and not to focus on Amber. Petitioner stated that Mr. Kronenberger directed Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter, but she ignored the order and continued to harass him. Petitioner stated that matters came to a head when he was helping some female customers and went to Amber’s counter one day. He reached behind her to get the fragrance the customers wanted and Amber struck him with her elbow. The customers were aghast and complained to Dillard’s management despite Petitioner’s entreaties that they let the matter drop. Petitioner and Amber were called to the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Yami Yao, the manager of women’s cosmetics. Amber denied everything. The supervisors told Petitioner and Amber to get along. They told Amber to stay away from Petitioner’s counter. Petitioner testified that Amber ignored the instruction and continued to harass him. Petitioner testified that on another day he was approached by a customer who wanted to pay Petitioner for a pair of shoes. Petitioner testified that he asked Mr. Kronenberger about it, because he did not want to steal a sale or anger anyone. Mr. Kronenberger told him that he was there to sell and that cross-selling was fine. As Petitioner was completing the sale, an older white man working in the shoe department threw a shoe at Petitioner and said, “You damn Mexican, I’m going to raise hell against you.” Petitioner testified about an altercation with Risa Autrey, a fragrance model who worked in Dillard’s and who Petitioner stated was another longtime friend of Mr. Gustason. One day, Ms. Autrey approached Petitioner--again, with zero provocation, according to Petitioner--and began berating him, saying that she had no idea why Dillard’s kept Petitioner around. This occurred in front of co-workers and customers. The customers went upstairs and complained to Mr. Gustason, who followed up by admonishing Petitioner to stop telling people to complain to him because nothing was going to come of it. Petitioner testified that a day or so after the incident with Ms. Autrey, he met with Mr. Gustason and Mr. Thomas.4/ During the course of this meeting, Petitioner disclosed his HIV status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Gustason’s attitude towards him changed immediately, and that Mr. Gustason had him fired two weeks later on a pretextual charge of stealing and insubordination. Petitioner testified that he got sick a few days before Black Friday, which in 2015 was on November 27. When he returned to work on November 25, he attempted to give Mr. Gustason a doctor’s note that would have entitled Petitioner to paid leave, but Mr. Gustason would not talk to him. Petitioner worked a long shift on Black Friday. On Saturday, November 28, 2015, he was called to Mr. Thomas’s office about an altercation he had on November 25 with Ms. Yao, the woman’s cosmetics manager. Mr. Kronenberger was also in the office. Petitioner testified that Mr. Thomas accused him of stealing, as well as insubordination to Ms. Yao, and fired him. Two mall security officers, the Dillard’s security officer, and Mr. Kronenberger escorted Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner testified that he was given no paperwork to memorialize his firing or the reasons therefor. Mr. Kronenberger testified at the final hearing. He testified that Petitioner constantly complained about someone not liking him or picking on him. Petitioner never gave him specifics as to what happened. Mr. Kronenberger stated that Petitioner never complained about racial slurs or that any of his alleged mistreatment had a discriminatory element. It was always, “This person doesn’t like me.” Petitioner had issues with tardiness and absenteeism throughout his employment with Dillard’s. Mr. Kronenberger testified that there would be days when Petitioner simply would not show up for work, or would send a text message to Mr. Kronenberger saying that he had things to do or someone he had to meet. Employment records submitted by Dillard’s supported the contention that Petitioner was frequently late for, or absent from, work. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner was erratic in his communications. Petitioner would send a text message saying he could not come in. Then he would send a text telling Mr. Kronenberger how happy he was to have the job. Mr. Kronenberger recalled once receiving a text from Petitioner at midnight that read, “I know I’ve been bad.” In November 2015, Petitioner had six unexcused absences, including four consecutive days from November 21 through 24. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Petitioner finally admitted that he needed to cut his hours in order to qualify for some form of public assistance. Mr. Gustason told Petitioner that something could be worked out to cut his hours, but that just not showing up for work was unfair to Mr. Kronenberger and the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger testified that Dillard’s would normally terminate an employee with six unexcused absences in one month under the heading of job abandonment. He stated that Mr. Gustason bent over backward to work with Petitioner and keep him on the job. When Petitioner was absent, Mr. Gustason would leave messages for him, asking him to call and let him know what was going on. During the string of November absences, Mr. Kronenberger phoned Petitioner, who said that he was afraid to come into work for fear that Mr. Gustason would fire him. Mr. Kronenberger assured Petitioner that Mr. Gustason had no such intent, but that in any event no one would have to fire him because he had not been to work in a week. Petitioner was effectively “firing himself” by abandoning his position. Petitioner showed up for work on November 25, 2015, at 4:50 p.m. He had been scheduled to come in at 9:45 a.m. Mr. Kronenberger testified that he was not present for Petitioner’s altercation with Ms. Yao, but that Ms. Yao reported she had attempted to counsel Petitioner about gifts with purchases. The promotional gifts were to be given away only with the purchase of certain items, but Petitioner was apparently disregarding that restriction and giving the gifts with non-qualifying purchases. Ms. Yao told Mr. Kronenberger that Petitioner quickly escalated the counseling into a shouting match in front of customers and co-workers. He yelled, “You’re not going to talk to me that way.” Ms. Yao told Petitioner that she worked in another department and did not have to deal with his antics. She told him that she was going to report the matter to Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas.5/ Mr. Kronenberger testified that his conversation with Ms. Yao was brief because there was no need to give many particulars. He was used to getting reports of employee run-ins with Petitioner and did not need much explanation to get the gist of what had happened. Mr. Kronenberger decided not to raise the issue with Petitioner on Black Friday, the busiest day of the year at the store. On the next day, November 28, Petitioner was called into the office to meet with Mr. Kronenberger and Mr. Thomas. Mr. Kronenberger testified that this meeting was not just about the incident with Ms. Yao but also Petitioner’s absences. In Mr. Kronenberger’s words, “[I]t was to follow up with the incident with Yami, and it was to follow up with, ‘Hey, you’ve just missed a week, you’ve been back a day, and you’re having this blow-up with a manager on the floor.’ Like, ‘What’s going on?’” Mr. Kronenberger testified that neither he nor Mr. Thomas went into this meeting with any intention of terminating Petitioner’s employment. However, two minutes into the conversation, Petitioner was on his feet, pointing fingers, and shouting that he knew what they were trying to do and he was not going to let them do it. He was quitting. Petitioner walked out of the office. Mr. Thomas asked Mr. Kronenberger to walk Petitioner out of the store so that there would be no incidents on the floor with the other employees. Mr. Kronenberger accompanied Petitioner to the fragrance area, where Petitioner retrieved some personal items, then walked him to the door. They shook hands and Petitioner left the store. Mr. Kronenberger was firm in his testimony that no security personnel were involved in removing Petitioner from the store. Petitioner was not accused of stealing. His parting with Mr. Kronenberger was as cordial as it could have been under the circumstances.6/ After Petitioner left his office, Mr. Thomas prepared a “Separation Data Form” confirming Petitioner’s dismissal for “violation of company work rules.” The specific ground stated for Petitioner’s dismissal was violation of the Associate Work Rule forbidding insubordination. Mr. Kronenberger testified that in his mind the “insubordination” included not just the scene with Ms. Yao, but the explosion Petitioner had in the meeting with Mr. Thomas. At the time of Petitioner’s dismissal, Mr. Kronenberger was unaware of Petitioner’s HIV status. Mr. Kronenberger credibly testified that Petitioner’s HIV status had nothing to do with his dismissal from employment at Dillard’s. Mr. Gustason, who apparently was aware of Petitioner’s HIV status, was not at work on November 28, 2015, and was not involved in the events leading to Petitioner’s dismissal. Mr. Thomas, the assistant store manager, made the decision to treat Petitioner’s situation as a dismissal for cause.7/ Mr. Kronenberger’s testimony is credited regarding the circumstances of Petitioner’s dismissal and as to the general tenor of Petitioner’s employment at Dillard’s. Petitioner was constantly in the middle of conflicts, but never alleged until after his termination that these conflicts were due to his national origin or disability. Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was extremely emotional. He cried frequently and seemed baffled that Mr. Kronenberger was disputing his testimony. The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s version of events was genuine in the sense that it conveyed Petitioner’s subjective experience of his employment as he recollected it. However, the undersigned must also find that Petitioner’s subjective experience did not conform to objective reality. However, Petitioner internalized the experiences, it is not plausible that Dillard’s employees were yelling at Petitioner without provocation, hitting him, throwing shoes at him, and calling him a “damn Mexican” in front of customers. It is not plausible that Petitioner’s superiors would ignore such flagrant discriminatory behavior when it was brought to their attention. Petitioner’s feelings about the motives of his co-workers and superiors cannot substitute for tangible evidence of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner offered the testimony of two Dillard’s customers, neither of whom saw behavior from Petitioner’s co- workers that could be attributed to anything beyond personal dislike or sales poaching. Santiago Garcia testified that he noted other Dillard’s employees rolling their eyes at Petitioner, but he thought the reason might be that Petitioner talked too loud. Mr. Garcia also saw “bad looks” from other employees and believed that the atmosphere among Dillard’s employees was “tense,” but did not offer a reason for the tension. Claudia Pimentel testified, through a Spanish language interpreter, that she always went directly to Petitioner because she speaks only Spanish and Petitioner was able to help her. Ms. Pimentel noted that a female Dillard’s employee got mad at Petitioner because he sold Ms. Pimentel a cream from her counter. During the years 2015 and 2016, the Dillard’s store in Governor’s Square Mall terminated two other sales associates for insubordination. Neither of these sales associates was Mexican. One was a black female and the other was a black male. Neither of these sales associates had a known disability at the time of termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by Dillard’s for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s national origin or disability. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Dillard’s discriminated against him because of his national origin or his disability in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Higbee Company, d/b/a Dillard’s, did not commit any unlawful employment practices, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a restaurant, unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner, who is African-American, by refusing to serve her because of her race.
Findings Of Fact At approximately 2:25 p.m., on July 2, 2003, Petitioner, an African-American resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota, entered the premises of a Denny’s Restaurant located at 14697 Duval Road, Jacksonville, Florida, to eat a meal. Petitioner had spent the previous night in Gainesville, Florida, and had interviewed for a position with the City of Gainesville that morning before driving to Jacksonville to fly home to Minneapolis. Petitioner approached the wait stand and waited approximately three minutes to be seated. Petitioner noticed only five guests in the restaurant at the time she was seated, all of whom were Caucasian. Petitioner was seated close to a Caucasian family of four and a single Caucasian male seated at another table. Petitioner did not claim that she had been segregated in the restaurant, and admitted that she had been seated close to tables with customers of other races. Immediately after being seated, Petitioner asked the hostess for a cup of hot water with lemons, which was promptly delivered to her by the hostess. Petitioner was treated respectfully by the hostess. After the hostess left, Petitioner drank her beverage while she reviewed the menu and waited to be greeted by her server and to have her order taken. Although there appeared to be three servers in the restaurant at the time of Petitioner’s visit, only one appeared to be serving. The others appeared to be completing their “side work,” that is, restocking and end-of-shift cleaning duties. The only person actually serving customers during Petitioner’s visit was Rhonda Nicks, a Caucasian woman. The restaurant was short staffed during this period due to a shift change and another server’s failure to show for her shift. While she waited to be served, Petitioner observed that two Caucasian women entered the restaurant, were seated, and were promptly served by Ms. Nicks who appeared to be the only server in the restaurant. Petitioner next observed as a Caucasian man and woman entered the restaurant, were seated, then promptly had their drink and food orders taken and served by Ms. Nicks. After waiting 20-25 minutes, and not having her food order taken, or even being acknowledged by the server, Petitioner went to the cashier’s stand where she was met by Audrey Howard, an African-American employee of the restaurant, who asked Petitioner if she wanted to see a manager. Petitioner replied that she did want to see a manager, and one was summoned. After waiting a few minutes, Petitioner was greeted by a Caucasian manager who identified himself as Mike Kinnaman. After speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Kinnaman offered to immediately put in Petitioner’s food order, to even cook the meal himself, and to provide the meal at no charge. Petitioner refused Mr. Kinnaman’s offer, stating that she had to return her rental car at the airport, then catch a flight. Mr. Kinnaman then offered Petitioner a business card on which he wrote “1 free entrée, 1 free beverage, 1 free dessert . . . Unit #1789." Mr. Kinnaman told Petitioner that she could use the card for a free meal at another time. This offer was made based upon the manager’s belief that Petitioner did not have time to eat and needed to leave for the airport. After speaking with the manager, Petitioner left the restaurant at approximately 3:00 p.m. She drove the short distance to the airport, removed her luggage and belongings from the rental car, turned in the car, and received her receipt which showed that she had turned in the car at the airport Hertz location at 3:20 p.m. Although Petitioner told the Respondent’s manager that she had to leave to catch a flight, the evidence showed that Petitioner’s flight was not scheduled to leave for another four hours. Petitioner’s rental car receipt documented the fact that she had a two-day rental and could have kept the car for almost another full day. Petitioner was in no jeopardy of incurring additional rental car charges or of missing her flight when she hurried from the restaurant at 3:00 p.m. Although Petitioner observed only nine other customers in the restaurant while she waited to be served, Respondent’s records and the testimony of Audrey Howard, a former cook at Respondent’s restaurant, 24 customers were served in the restaurant between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. on the day of Petitioner’s visit. Although Petitioner testified that she was the only African-American customer in the restaurant, Ms. Howard recalled a table of two African-American patrons who were served during the time period when Petitioner was in the restaurant. She specifically recalled these patrons because the gentleman returned his omelet to the kitchen, asking for more cheese. During her time in the restaurant, Petitioner observed only five employees. Respondent’s records demonstrate that 14 hourly employees were in the restaurant between 2:25 and 3:00 p.m. From where she was seated in the restaurant, it is likely that Petitioner could not see every customer and employee in the restaurant. Petitioner never attempted to call a server over to her table, nor did she ask the hostess to either take her order or ask a server to provide her with service while she waited. Petitioner did not complain to the manager that she had been discriminated against. She complained that she had received poor service. Respondent requires training for all of its employees on diversity and discrimination issues before they are allowed to work for Respondent. Every server who testified at hearing had specifically undergone diversity and discrimination training. Although Respondent has a history of past discrimination against African-Americans as evidenced by a consent decree entered into by the company with the United States Justice Department, it has since received national awards and recognition for its strides in the areas of discrimination and diversity. Respondent takes claims of discrimination very seriously, and has a zero tolerance standard for acts of discrimination by its employees. Respondent’s managers are required to report all claims of racial discrimination to a 1-800 hotline. No call was made by the manager in this case because he did not believe that a claim of discrimination had been made by Petitioner when she claimed she had received poor service. Petitioner offered no evidence that she had suffered damages as a result of the poor service she received at the restaurant.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Ms. McAdory's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan S. Erdelyi, Esquire Marks Gray, P.A. Post Office Box 447 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Charlene McAdory 417 Oliver Avenue North Minneapolis, Minnesota 55405 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit any evidence to support findings of fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioner and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg Chapman 2727 Frontage Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Laura I. Korson, Esquire John Baird & Associates 360 Campus Lane, Suite 201 Fairfield, California 94533-1400 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes,1 by terminating Petitioner, Tina Garner (Petitioner), in retaliation for her reporting sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC, owns a number of businesses. Jeff Conway is Respondent’s managing member. Petitioner was hired by Respondent near the end of July 2018, to work as a bookkeeper doing payroll and accounts for Respondent’s real estate office known as Sunshine State Deals. In September 2018, Respondent opened a Smoothie King in the Spring Hill, Florida area. As the date for opening the Smoothie King grew closer, Petitioner took on more responsibilities and helped open and operate that store. Morgan Katocs was hired in September 2018 to work at the Smoothie King. Ms. Katocs was 17 years old at the time she was hired. Ms. Katocs brother, Hunter McGhee, was also hired to work at the Smoothie King. The Smoothie King store opened on September 18, 2018. Petitioner had no authority to hire employees for Respondent. Apparently, all hires to work at the Smoothie King were made by Brandon Berlinrut, who was a friend of Jeff Conway and recruiter for Respondent. While Petitioner had no hiring authority, during the time she worked at the Smoothie King, she supervised Ms. Katocs. As the Smoothie King was opening, there was work that needed to be completed. Respondent hired his friend, Constantine Tremoularis, as an independent contractor to install security cameras, work on the point of sale, and conduct various work at the location. Mr. Tremoularis was given access to areas at the Smoothie King store where only employees were permitted. While working at the Smoothie King, Ms. Katocs had physical limitations due to a back condition caused by a car accident. When Ms. Katocs requested assistance in lifting a mop bucket, Mr. Tremoularis responded, “I bet men like to say that they broke your back,” in a context inferring injury during sex. Ms. Katocs interpreted the comment as an unwelcome sexual comment and was offended and upset. Ms. Katocs reported the unwanted sexual comment to Ms. Garner within an hour after the comment was made. Later, while Petitioner was at Respondent’s real estate office, both Ms. Katocs and her mother called her on the telephone from the Smoothie King office and asked her to set up a meeting with Mr. Conway to discuss the unwanted sexual comment. They both expressed a desire for Petitioner to be present during the meeting. Ms. Garner told Mr. Conway of Ms. Katocs and her mother’s desire to have a meeting with him to discuss the unwanted sexual comment, and of their request that Petitioner be present at the meeting. Mr. Conway met with Ms. Katocs and Ms. Katocs’s mother on October 4, 2018, to discuss the incident. Mr. Conway did not invite Petitioner and Petitioner did not attend the meeting. Although he did not tell Ms. Katocs or her mother, the reason that Mr. Conway did not want Petitioner in the meeting is because he had already decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment for reasons unrelated to the reported unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. At the meeting, Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway discussed the unwanted sexual comment. During the meeting, Mr. Conway agreed to make changes and provide sexual harassment training for Respondent’s employees. On October 4, 2018, the day after the meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Mr. Tremoularis apologized to Ms. Katocs. Although he was allowed to stay at the Smoothie King location from several days to over a week to finish the job, Mr. Tremoularis made no further unwanted sexual comments to Ms. Katocs. On Saturday, October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway called Petitioner on the telephone and advised her that she was terminated. Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner because he perceived her as rude, argumentative, and combative. Mr. Conway also believed that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter, Tina Rowlands, to work at the Smoothie King store even though Petitioner knew that Mr. Conway did not approve of the hire. Mr. Conway’s perceptions of Petitioner’s aberrant behavior were consistent with those observations reported by Karen Stapleton in her testimony at the final hearing. Karen Stapleton, who worked with Mr. Conway’s companies as a consultant and in accounting, worked with and helped train Petitioner at Respondent’s real estate office in September 2018. Ms. Stapleton also observed Petitioner scream at an employee at Respondent’s Smoothie King store. When Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner, he also terminated Petitioner’s daughter, Ms. Rowlands, as well as Petitioner’s daughter’s boyfriend, Jake Fryar. Although Mr. Conway approved of Jake Fryar’s hire, he decided to terminate Mr. Fryar as well because of his association with Petitioner and Petitioner’s daughter. Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made because of Mr. Conway’s perceptions about Petitioner’s combative behavior and Mr. Conway’s belief that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter. Although in close proximity to the time of Petitioner’s termination on October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway had already decided to fire Petitioner prior to Petitioner’s report of the unwanted sexual comment made to Ms. Katocs and Mr. Conway’s meeting with Ms. Katocs and her mother to discuss the incident. As confirmed by the testimony of a locksmith, who was contacted on September 28, 2018, to change locks on Respondent’s offices and the Smoothie King store, Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made in late September 2018. Although the locks were not changed until October 6, 2018, the timing of the lock change request and Mr. Conway’s credible testimony confirm that the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was unrelated to her report of unwanted sexual comments. Following the October 4, 2018, meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Morgan Katocs continued her employment at the Smoothie King store until she voluntarily left at the end of December 2018. Ms. Katocs testified that she left Smoothie King because, in her view, nothing changed; she felt uncomfortable about remaining employed there, the promised sexual harassment training never occurred, and another employee was making inappropriate sexual remarks to other female employees. Ms. Katocs also did not like a manager that was hired after Petitioner was terminated, who, according to Ms. Katocs, was a bully and abusive. Ms. Katocs further testified that neither she, nor her brother, who was also employed at the Smoothie King, received negative repercussions from her report of the unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. Ms. Katocs’s brother remained employed at the Smoothie King until voluntarily leaving in April 2019.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jeff Conway JR Conway Enterprises, LLC Post Office Box 15389 Brooksville, Florida 34604 William Sheslow, Esquire Whittle & Melton, LLC 11020 Northcliffe Boulevard Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Erik DeL'Etoile, Esquire DeL'Etoile Law Firm P.A. 10150 Highland Manor Drive, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33610
The Issue The issue presented for determination is whether Respondent, Dillard’s, discriminated against Petitioner, Tanya Chun, based on her age, in violation of section 760.101, Florida Statutes (2012),1/ when it did not hire her for a sales associate position.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Chun was born April 4, 1957. Ms. Chun applied for a position as a sales associate at Dillard’s Department Store No. 209 in Lakeland, Florida, on June 7, 2012. At the time, she was 55 years old. Ms. Chun completed the employment application at a kiosk in the store linked to Dillard’s personnel system. Ms. Chun’s application disclosed only two periods of employment. The most recent was with Golf Plus, Inc., as a bookkeeper handling accounts receivable and accounts payable from January 1998 to May 2012. The other was employment at Macy’s in New York City from April 1993 to October 1994 in clothing sales and customer services as a retail sales associate. At the time, the Lakeland Dillard’s store had five openings--two in cosmetics, two in ladies’ shoes, and one in men’s shoes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Walter Soto was operation sales manager at the store with authority to hire people to fill the openings. Mr. Soto interviewed Ms. Chun and seven other applicants for the five positions. During the interview and hiring process, Mr. Soto relied upon the information the applicants provided in their applications and the interviews. Mr. Soto hired five of the applicants. He did not hire Ms. Chun. During Ms. Chun’s interview, Mr. Soto asked her a number of questions about Macy’s sales procedures and common sales procedures and practices. Ms. Chun was not familiar with common concepts, such as sales per hour and items per transaction. These are concepts with which someone with retail experience and knowledge should be familiar. The five people Mr. Soto hired are Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. All were younger than Ms. Chun, although Ms. Schoenmakers was only three years younger. The information available to Mr. Soto about Emil Pancorbo, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Pancorbo had recent retail experience at large retailers, JCPenney from October 2008 to April 2011, and Guitar Center from April 2011 to September 2011. Mr. Soto considered this experience in deciding to hire Mr. Pancorbo, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Angelique Schoenmakers, which he relied upon, indicated that she had recent retail experience as a counter manager for Elizabeth Arden and that she worked for Macy’s from October 2010 to April 2012. Ms. Schoenmakers was recruited to work for Dillard’s. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Schoenmakers’ employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Schoenmakers, instead of Ms. Chun. Ms. Schoenmakers was born January 15, 1960, making her only three years younger than Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Taylor Swallow, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience, working for Kohl’s from August 2011 to June 2012. Ms. Swallow also had cosmetic experience. She had applied makeup on clients. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Swallow’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Swallow, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about Ashley Thirion, which he relied upon, indicated she had recent retail experience working at a Clinique cosmetics counter at Macy’s from June 2011 to November 2011. Clinique is a cosmetics line that Dillard’s also carries. Mr. Soto considered Ms. Thirion’s employment history in deciding to hire Ms. Thirion, instead of Ms. Chun. The information available to Mr. Soto about David Tilton, which he relied upon, indicated that Mr. Tilton had recent retail experience at a large retailer, Bealls from May 2010 to May 2012. Mr. Tilton worked in the shoe department for Bealls. Mr. Soto considered Mr. Tilton’s employment history in deciding to hire Mr. Tilton, instead of Ms. Chun. Based on the information from the applications and interviews available to him, Mr. Soto made a fair and rational decision to hire applicants other than Ms. Chun. In particular, the fact that the retail experience of each of the applicants was more recent than that of Ms. Chun supports Mr. Soto’s decision. All of the applicants, except Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion, also had more retail experience than Ms. Chun. Ms. Swallow and Ms. Thirion both had cosmetics experience, and two of the positions that Mr. Soto was filling were for the cosmetics department. The Dillard’s employment procedure includes preparing an applicant summary for each individual interviewed. For the hiring cycle involved here, eight of the applicant summaries, including Ms. Chun’s, indicate the person was hired. In order for the Dillard’s system to permit obtaining a background check, Mr. Soto had to change an applicant’s status on the applicant summaries to “hired.” At the time, Mr. Soto was not following the Dillard’s procedure of only conducting a background check for an employee after the employee was hired. He did not think the procedure was fair to the applicants, who may be hired and then “un-hired” after the background check. Mr. Soto chose to conduct background checks before extending job offers. The status on Ms. Chun’s applicant summary states “hired.” But she was not hired, just as Ricky Davis and William Guadalupe, whose summaries state “hired,” were not hired. The status for all the applicants said “hired,” only because Mr. Soto changed the status in order to run a background check. If Dillard’s hires an employee, a Basic Employee Information sheet is prepared. There is no Basic Employee Sheet for Tanya Chun because she was not hired. There are Basic Employee Information sheets for Emil Pancorbo, Angelique Schoenmakers, Taylor Swallow, Ashley Thirion, and David Tilton. If an employee is hired, Mr. Soto conducts reference checks. He did not conduct a reference check for Ms. Chun because she was not hired. Ms. Chun maintains that Mr. Soto told her at the interview’s conclusion that she was hired and that they agreed to a start date and compensation of $10.00 per hour with full medical and dental insurance. She also maintains that Mr. Soto told her she would undergo a routine background check and requested that she sign a consent form and provide her identification card for the background check. Ms. Chun says that Mr. Soto stated that she did not “look that old” after he looked at her identification. She also claims he then said he had to talk to someone else and left the room for about five minutes. Mr. Soto denies Ms. Chun’s descriptions of the conversation. Ms. Chun, according to her own testimony, called for Mr. Soto a few times in the days following the interview to check on her employment status. She was correctly told that he had been transferred. On June 18, 2012, Ms. Chun sent a letter with the following text to Mr. Soto: I am writing to inquire the status of my employment application and I would like to receive your written response. Early last week, I applied for employment at Human Resources. The next day I was called in for an interview by you and when we met, before you offered a position you stated that I seemed to be a good candidate, and requested my identification and social security card, made photocopies, then stated that you will do a background check. As you reviewed my identification papers, your tenor changed and you stated that you will get back to me. I am writing to ask the status. I would like to request a copy of the documents I completed, as I do not have them for myself--both the application and the background disclosure form. And I would like to know why my identification with date of birth was requested before I was offered a position, and why my identification became the basis of your change of discussion. Thank you for your prompt attention. She did not receive a response. On February 28, 2013, Ms. Chun sent another letter, this one to the Dillard’s Human Resource Department. It states: I wrote the attached letter [June 18, 2012, letter] to your company more than six months ago, and I have received no response. My discussion with Walter at the interview, before being requested to provide my ID showing my age, was that I was going to be hired. Then, when my ID revealed my age I was told “we will get back to you” and I have requested an explanation and copies of the documents pertaining to my application, but you have totally disregarded my letter. I am writing to reiterate my request, and I request that you respond within five business days. Neither letter, both of which are specific and articulate, includes the claim Ms. Chun now makes that Mr. Soto said she did not “look that old” after seeing her identification. Dillard’s did not respond until March 11, 2013. A woman named “Arlie” called that day and told Ms. Chun it was Dillard’s policy to obtain identification and again advised that Mr. Soto had been transferred to another location. The weight of the credible, persuasive evidence does not establish Ms. Chun’s version of the events. The factors resulting in this determination include the fact that she testified that Mr. Soto told her she was hired and that they agreed upon a start date. Yet, she also testified that she called several times to check on the status of her application. Calling to check on the application’s status is inconsistent with having accepted a job and having agreed to a start date. If Ms. Chun had been offered and accepted a job, she would have reported for work, not called to check on the status of her application. In addition, Mr. Soto’s testimony about the process and the events is consistent with the documents for the applicants he interviewed. Finally, Ms. Chun did not make her very specific claim about what Mr. Soto said, “you don’t look that old,” in either of her letters or her initial Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Commission. From April to November of 2013, Mr. Soto hired at least ten individuals born in 1957, like Ms. Chun, or born earlier. This is persuasive evidence corroborating Mr. Soto’s testimony that he does not weigh an applicant’s age against the applicant when making his hiring decisions. Mr. Soto hired five applicants other than Ms. Chun because he found their qualifications superior for the open positions. Ms. Chun’s age was not a factor in Mr. Soto’s decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny Ms. Chun’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Conoco meets the statutory definition of an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Marlan D. Williams, who is black, is a member of a class protected by this statute. Petitioner began work at Conoco on January 4, 1990, as a sales associate and was discharged from his employment on May 27, 1992. When Mr. Williams was hired on January 4, 1990, he was required to sign a new employee agreement. Section 3 of that agreement explains to new employees the importance of good customer relations. After reading the employment contract, Mr. Williams signed the agreement. Mr. Williams testified that he understood the importance of good customer relations. Mr. Williams also testified that he understood that he could be terminated for multiple customer complaints and was aware of a white employee who had been terminated for customer complaints. Conoco's personnel policies and procedures regarding termination state in relevant part that, "involuntary terminations occur for a reason, such as when an employee's performance does not meet acceptable standards, if the employee violates Company policy, or when there is no work available for the individual." The details of Conoco's policy were left up to each sales district's manager. In this case, the district manager was Tammy Hunter. Her policy was that three complaints involving customers would result in termination. Ms. Hunter was not concerned with the truth behind these complaints, but only with the fact of multiple complaints. In the past, Conoco, through Ms. Hunter, has consistently applied its termination policy to employees receiving complaints involving customers in a nondiscriminatory manner. In fact, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the policy was not applied in a nondiscriminatory or had unintended discriminatory impact. 1/ Over the term of his employment Mr. Williams received at least three complaints. Two of the complaints were made by customers directly to Ms. Hunter. One complaint was reported by management to Ms. Hunter and involved a very heated and nasty argument between Mr. Williams and a manager trainee in front of customers. Numerous other incidences of nonspecific poor customer relations involving employees and poor attitude were noted by the store manager, Julia Meuse. Mr. Williams received informal verbal and written counseling regarding his poor behavior towards customers, from his store manager and two assistant store managers. Conoco accordingly discharged Mr. Williams for violation of the Company policy regarding acceptable performance standards in customer relations and customer complaints. The evidence did not demonstrate these reasons were pretextual. Petitioner failed to present any evidence that he was replaced by a person not from a protected class. Therefore Petitioner has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Finally, the decision to discharge Mr. Williams was made in good faith, for legitimate nondiscriminatory business reasons, and was based upon the objective application of Conoco's policies. Since Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons given by the Respondent for discharging him were a mere pretext to cover up discrimination on the basis of race, Petitioner has failed to establish he was discriminated against and therefore the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his race in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent, the University of Florida, discriminated against Petitioner, Tracey Krefting, previously known as Tracey Hardin, on the basis of a handicap as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Tracey Krefting, formerly known as Tracey Hardin, is a handicapped individual. She suffers from seizure disorder. Ms. Krefting graduated from the University of Florida in May of 1990. She received a bachelor of science degree with a major in advertising. Ms. Krefting had experience as an advertising sales representative prior to her employment by the Respondent. The Respondent, the University of Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "University"), is a State university located in Gainesville, Florida. Within the College of Journalism and Communications of the University is a radio station, WRUF. WRUF was an auxiliary operation of the University responsible for raising revenue to fund all of its expenses, including the salaries for its sales representatives. No state funding was received directly or indirectly from the University by WRUF. Ms. Krefting's Employment by the University. Ms. Krefting was employed by the University at WRUF on July 28, 1992. Ms. Krefting was employed as "OPS", other personnel services. Ms. Krefting was employed to act as one of six or seven sales representatives of WRUF. As of January 29, 1993, Robert Clark was the General Manager of WRUF. Mr. Clark was Ms. Krefting's supervisor from January 29, 1993 until her termination from employment. Sales Representative Qualifications. The essential function of sales representatives for WRUF was to sell radio time for advertising. This function was an essential function because the revenue necessary to operate WRUF was generated in this manner. Sales representatives were responsible for servicing existing clients and for finding new clients. An essential requirement of the sales representatives of WRUF, including Ms. Krefting, was the ability to travel to the businesses and offices of WRUF's advertising clients and prospective clients. Sales representatives were generally required to spend 80 percent of their working hours out of the office servicing clients and seeking new clients. Continuous contact and an ongoing relationship with clients was required. Contacts with clients were expected to be face to face and not just over the telephone. In addition to being required to make regular contacts with clients, sales representatives were also required to make themselves available to visit their clients with little notice. Obtaining new clients usually required more than one contact with a prospective client by a sales representative. The sales representative was required to sell himself or herself and the station and must gain the trust of the prospective client. Sales representatives were also responsible for performing public service work. This work entailed the providing of public service announcements. The public service work performed by sales representatives did not directly generate revenue for WRUF. Neither the application for employment completed by Ms. Krefting when she was initially employed at WRUF nor the University's OPS personnel requisition form authorizing her employment included any of the necessary skills or qualifications for the sales representative position she was hired to fill. Ms. Krefting was aware at the time she was hired, however, that she would be required to travel to her clients locations and to the locations of prospective clients. There are other means of transportation available which would have allowed Ms. Krefting to reach clients and prospective clients: vehicle driven by a hired driver, public transportation, taxi, and walking. The evidence failed to prove, however, that there were any reasonable means of transportation available to Ms. Krefting other than driving herself which would have allowed her to meet the requirements of a sales representative for WRUF. Ms. Krefting's Handicap. On April 18, 1993, Ms. Krefting fell while rollerskating. Ms. Krefting hit her head on the ground when she fell. On April 19, 1993, Ms. Krefting was admitted to the emergency room of the North Florida Regional Medical Center. The evidence failed to prove that the injury she suffered on April 18, 1993, caused Ms. Krefting to suffer any seizure. On May 6, 1993, Ms. Krefting suffered a seizure while leaving her home to go to work. Ms. Krefting was ultimately diagnosed as having "seizure disorder." At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Krefting suffered from a "handicap." Ms. Krefting's Inability to Drive. On or about May 18, 1993, Ms. Krefting provided a letter from George Feussner, M.D., dated May 18, 1993, to Mr. Clark. In the letter Dr. Feussner indicated that Ms. Krefting was able to return to work but that she could "not operate a motor vehicle " Although Dr. Feussner did not indicate how low Ms. Krefting would be unable to drive, Ms. Krefting informed Mr. Clark that Dr. Feussner had informed her that she would not be able to drive until she was seizure free for one year from the date of her last epileptic seizure, May 6, 1993. As a result of the restriction on Ms. Krefting's ability to drive and based upon Florida law, Rules 15A-5.003 and 15A-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, Ms. Krefting was unable to drive herself to see existing or prospective clients until at least May 6, 1994. Ms. Krefting discussed with Mr. Clark the possibility of hiring a "tenant" of hers to drive her around. Ms. Krefting did not identify the "tenant." Nor did Ms. Krefting inform Mr. Clark that she had completed making arrangements with anyone to drive her. Mr. Clark did not preclude Ms. Krefting from making arrangements to have someone provide transportation for her. Mr. Clark did tell Ms. Krefting that it would have to be determined what implications, if any, a driver would have on WRUF's workers compensation coverage. The resolution of this issue was to be delayed, however, until Ms. Krefting made concrete arrangements for a driver and discussed those arrangements with Mr. Clark. Ms. Krefting failed to finalize any arrangement for a driver. Had Ms. Krefting provided her own driver, at her own expense, Ms. Krefting may have been able to meet the requirement of her position that she be able to provide her own transportation. Ms. Krefting, however, did not take the necessary steps to hire a driver prior to her termination from employment. Ms. Krefting talked to her tenant, Kenneth Vest, about acting as her driver. Mr. Vest worked in the same building that Ms. Krefting did. Mr. Vest worked Sunday through Wednesday from 3:30 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. He was, therefore, generally available for part, but not all, of Ms. Krefting's working hours. Mr. Vest was generally willing to drive Ms. Krefting, if he were compensated. Ms. Krefting did not discuss with Mr. Vest the exact hours that he would be expected to drive her or her schedule. Nor did Ms. Krefting discuss compensation with Mr. Vest. Ms. Krefting failed to prove that Mr. Vest or any other individual was available at any time relevant to this proceeding, or at the final hearing, to provide transportation for her in a manner that would fulfill her responsibilities as a sales representative. Because of the restriction on Ms. Krefting's ability to drive and her failure to make alternative arrangements to have someone like Mr. Vest drive her, Ms. Krefting failed to prove that she met all the qualifications of her position with WRUF. Ms. Krefting did not meet all the qualifications of her position. But for her handicap, however, Ms. Krefting would have met all of the qualifications of a sales representative. The University's Decision to Terminate Ms. Krefting's Employment. On or about May 24, 1993, Mr. Clark informed Ms. Krefting that WRUF could not continue to employ her because of her inability to drive. Ms. Krefting suggested alternative means of meeting her responsibilities with Mr. Clark when she was informed that WRUF would not be able to continue her employment. Mr. Clark considered the suggestions, but did not accept any of them. On June 16, 1993 Mr. Clark agreed to extend Ms. Krefting's termination date to accommodate her efforts to find another postition within the University. Ms. Krefting was ultimately terminated from employment in early July of 1993. Ms. Krefting was terminated because she was prohibited from driving her vehicle and there was no other reasonable means of meeting her responsibilities to service clients and prospective clients. The University's Inability to Accommodate Ms. Krefting's Inability to Drive. During 1993, the financial condition of WRUF was precarious. WRUF was operating at a loss. Three employees had been terminated and a department had been eliminated. Another vacant position had not been filled. WRUF was forced to borrow funds from the University and a foundation account in order to continue operating. At all times relevant to this proceeding, WRUF was unable to create a newly funded position or to allow a sales representative to fail to generate reasonably expected revenues. Ms. Krefting suggested several possible alternatives to accommodate her inability to meet her requirement that she be able to drive. The suggestions were discussed with, and considered by, Mr. Clark. One suggestion Ms. Krefting made to Mr. Clark was to create a new position. The position would entail performing all of the public service work of the sales representatives. Mr. Clark rejected this proposal because it entailed the creation of a new position. The creation of a new position was not a reasonable accommodation. The creation of a new position, especially one that did not generate revenue, would have created a financial hardship on WRUF. The evidence also failed to prove that the public service work could be performed without the need for travel. A second suggestion Ms. Krefting made to Mr. Clark was to restructure her position so that she would be responsible for the preparing of proposals, filing, handling incoming sales calls and telemarketing. In effect, this suggestion also entailed the creation of a new position. This suggestion was rejected by Mr. Clark. Ms. Krefting's second suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation. It would have created an undue financial hardship on WRUF because there was not sufficient work to justify such a position. A third suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she be teamed with another sales representative who would do all the driving. Mr. Clark rejected this suggestion. Ms. Krefting's third suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation. Teaming two sales representatives would have reduced the effectiveness of two sales representatives who would be available to visit different clients and prospective clients at the same time if they were not teamed. This would have created an undue financial hardship on WRUF. A fourth suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she use public transportation and taxis. Mr. Clark rejected this suggestion. Although it is questionably whether Ms. Krefting's fourth suggestion constitutes an accommodation, to the extent that it does, it was not a reasonable accommodation. Public transportation does not provide the flexibility required of sales representatives because of the inadequacy of routes and schedules of available transportation. A fifth suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she provide her own driver. It is questionable whether the use of a driver, as suggested by Ms. Krefting, constitutes an accommodation. To the extent that Ms. Krefting was suggesting that WRUF provide her a driver, her suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation. If WRUF had been required to provide the driver, it would have caused an undue hardship on WRUF. Finally, Ms. Krefting suggested that a student intern from the University's College of Journalism be assigned to work with her and that the intern provide the driving required by her position. Mr. Clark rejected this suggestion. Ms. Krefting had discussed the idea of using an intern with Dr. Joseph Pisani, the Chair of the Advertising Department of the College of Journalism. Although Dr. Pisani was not opposed to the use of an intern-if the intern was properly used-he was opposed to the use of an intern primarily or exclusively as a driver. The suggestion that interns be used was not a reasonable accommodation. Student interns usually are only available to work as an intern for a maximum of 12 hours a week. Additionally, the 12 hours a week that an intern would be available depends upon their class schedule. Therefore, student interns would not be available for a sufficient period of time for Ms. Krefting to fulfill the responsibilities of her position. Although it is not impossible to find a student that would be willing to act as an intern full-time, the evidence failed to prove that it was likely that a student could be found that would be willing to take no classes for up a year or that it would be financially feasible for a student to do so. Mr. Clark did not actually attempt to implement any of Ms. Krefting's proposals. Mr. Clark also did not "consult with any experts" about the proposed accommodations. Mr. Clark's failure to attempt to implement any of the proposals or to consult with experts was not, however, necessary. The issue confronting Mr. Clark was not one involving a decision which required special knowledge or understanding of Ms. Krefting's handicap, or the needs of persons who suffer from seizure disorder. The only issue confronting Mr. Clark was how to accommodate the inability of a sales representative to transport herself to meet the needs of clients and prospective clients. Mr. Clark had all the necessary information to decide how to deal with this issue: Ms. Krefting, regardless of her condition or needs, was prohibited from driving an automobile for at least a year. Mr. Clark was fully aware of the impact of this restriction on WRUF and the resulting inability of a sales representative to carry out their responsibilities. The suggested accommodations made by Ms. Krefting also required no special knowledge or understanding. The suggestions only required an understanding of the needs of WRUF and what was expected of sales representatives. Ms. Krefting's Loss of Income. Subsequent to her termination by WRUF Ms. Krefting remained unemployed until February of 1994. After her termination by WRUF Ms. Krefting received unemployment benefits of approximately $3,500.00 Ms. Krefting earned $800.00 for part-time employment in March of 1994. Ms. Krefting was unable to work from April of 1994 until June of 1994. Ms. Krefting is currently employed. Ms. Krefting's Complaint. Ms. Krefting filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission on or about August 18, 1993 alleging that the University had discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap. On or about January 21, 1994, the Commission entered a Notice of Determination: No Cause, finding no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On or about February 17, 1994, Ms. Krefting filed a Petition for Relief contesting the Commission's determination. The Petition was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Conclusion. The evidence in this case failed to prove that the University terminated Ms. Krefting's employment because of her disability. Ms. Krefting was terminated by the University because she could not meet all of the requirements of her position. The evidence failed to prove that the University could reasonably accommodate Ms. Krefting's inability to drive without undue hardship to WRUF's activities. Ms. Krefting failed to prove that the University discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap.
